UH R3

1NC
 NC – Hobbes
The meta-ethic is motivational internalism
Prefer:
•
Constitutivism – an agent’s ability to interpret the world requires that
they construct definitions and interpretations of the world. Thus, the
political order was created for the constitutive purpose of defining
meaning
Koch ‘4
Koch, Andrew M. "Dionysian Politics: The Anarchistic Implications of Friedrich Nietzsche's Critique of Western Epistemology." Book Chapter, I Am Not a Man, I Am Dynamite!:
Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchistic Tradition. Moore, John and Spencer Sunshine, ed. 2004. https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Koch_Andrew_Dionysian_2004.pdf. [Professor
of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University. Ph.D. and M.A. from UC Santa Barbara.]

“The character of the nation-state, and the validity of its foundations, represent another matter. If the nation-state arose out of
conditions that are historical and dependent upon the material conditions of life then, obviously, there can be no link between the
exercise of power and any transcendental notion of collective essence, human or social teleologies, or moral foundations. There is
still a question, however, regarding the ‘will to structure’ as part of the ‘will to power.’ What is the origin of the process that initiates
the construction of a political structure? The will to any structure is, for Nietzsche, Apollonian will. Nietzsche’s position is that the
relationship between human beings and the world of nature was essentially an aesthetic relationship. The world is justified only as
an aesthetic phenomenon.9 This claim has several facets. Theworld requires interpretation. Human beings do not
engage in uncovering any hidden transcendental truths. Science does not uncover truth, but is only a form of
interpretation that takes place within a strict syntactical structure. The ‘objectivity’ it seeks to bring to
interpretation produces an outcome of a lower order than the artistic.10 Science’s real character is actually the suspension of ‘will’ in
its interpretation.11 The condition of artistic creation is the highest condition for the human being. The Apollonian and Dionysian are
the two forces whose tension produces art. Nietzsche uses the metaphors of ‘dream’ and ‘intoxication’ to indicate what he means by
these two concepts.12 The Apollonian is an aesthetic will to construct an illusion, a fantasy, that brings beauty and order.
Through the construction of an image we interpret our place and activities in relation to
the world. ‘If we could imagine an incarnation of dissonance—and what is man if not that?—that dissonance, in order to endure
life, would need a marvelous illusion to cover it with a veil of beauty. This is the proper artistic intention of Apollo...’13 We are
redeemed through these illusions.14 The illusions give us identity, purpose, and connection. Nietzsche argues
that this fantasy has its origins in necessity.15 Necessity initiates the construction of the illusion, but that alone is insufficient to
validate the tentative and contingent outcome as corresponding to the ‘true.’ This is important because it
establishes the foundationless character of all political structure. If the origin of structure is aesthetic rather than
‘essential’ or even ‘scientific,’ then the tentative and contingent nature of any structure is more apparent. As Nietzsche puts it, art is
not an imitation of nature but its metaphysical supplement, raised up beside nature to overcome it.16 The construction of
a political order is precisely the type of product that Nietzsche describes as the outcome of Apollonian will. A
political structure is the residue of the ‘will to power’ as it seeks to bring order to the world by constructing
an image of its structure. This drive gives rise to the formation of an illusion. The origin of the ‘political’ is the need to
create order and structure, to raise human beings out of the dissonance of nature. In political terms, the will to
construction, driven by necessity, has generated the representation of ‘human nature’ as a
fixed reference point for a deductive process of political application. Once a definition of the human character can be asserted, a
political structure emerges as a logical outcome. This is the case regardless of the content of that representation. Nietzsche’s
rejection of the Western philosophic tradition would, therefore, also constitute a rejection of the Western political traditions. From the
perspective of genealogy, the characterizations of human nature that have served as the foundation for political prescriptions from
Plato to Hobbes, Locke, Kropotkin, and Marx17 have their origins in specific historical and contextual necessities. Human nature
was represented in order to provide a basis for an Apollonian construction, the need to bring order and structure. The practice of
politics is the application of that illusion.”
 • Regression – all frameworks collapse to mine because even if the
central state sovereign is removed, each person becomes their own
sovereign entity
• Any ethical standard must take into account that people make
decisions based on internal justification. That explains action and
how intent links to reason.

The standard is preventing the state of nature The standard is means-

based and requires giving legitimate and ultimate moral power to the
sovereign.
Without a sovereign state that unifies moral meaning, individuals would fall
into a lawless and violent state of nature where individuals would force
meaning upon one another.
Parrish 1 – bracketed for clarity
Parrish, R. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event, vol. 7 no. 4, 2005. Project MUSE, <muse.jhu.edu/article/244119>. [Assistant Professor
of Political Science at West Texas A&M University. Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2004.]

“All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign's first and most fundamental job is
to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon
the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace ‘is
possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting [is]
eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign.’57 Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes'
mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that ‘one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary
unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives.’58 ‘The whole raison d'être of
sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defus[es]ing of interpretive clashes,’59 without which
humans would ‘fly off in all directions’60 and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.”

The state of nature is the worst impact and outweighs—

• Morality – individuals are free to impose their own moral vision on one
another which destroys any possibility of productive ethics and
precedes any other framework.
• Violence – individuals must act in the nature of self-preservation.
Without a sovereign state to provide protection, each person acts
violently to defend themselves, resulting in infinite uncontrolled
violence. Lastly. the affirmative must concede the neg framework prefer
– A. Reciprocity – aff already gets to choose the advocacy for the round
so I should choose the framework, this equalizes which offense links
where B. Aff is at an advantage in the framework debate – they have the
1AC and 1AR to establish offense, while I only have the NC creating a 11
to 7 skew. Conceding the framework minimizes the abuse.
Offense
States need military aid in order to motivate compliance, protect the
security of the sovereign, and defend against attacks.
Sullivan 11, Patricia L., et al. “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation.” Foreign
Policy Analysis, vol. 7, no. 3, 2011, pp. 275–294. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/24909798.
The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to
The American government expresses a wide variety of
foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009).
goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US
administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of
compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to
augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US
objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act: Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national
Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important
security interests worldwide....
strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S.
interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1). Importantly, the policies that guide the provision of US
military aid have changed significantly in recent years. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration sent Congress an antiterrorism bill that would have lifted all restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to foreign
governments in cases where such assistance could "help fight terrorism"
 DA – Proliferation
Huge wins against prolif now, but future is fraught – US action and military
aid is a deciding factor
Stratfor 4/29 Stratfor is an American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded
in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon
was appointed as president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer.,
"The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at 50," Stratfor, 4-29-2018,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50th-anniversary-united-
states-russia-china, ghsBZ
Highlights The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been remarkably successful in severely limiting the
emergence of new nuclear weapons states. The United States has been the key player in these successes. Looking
ahead, however, growing great power competition, increased degrees of freedom among regional powers, and more ubiquitous knowledge of nuclear
technologies and delivery systems are all acting to weaken the treaty. Vulnerabilities for proliferation are greatest in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific
regions. Given the power shifts in these critical geographies, the United States will increasingly be at loggerheads with Russia and China when it
comes to ensuring nonproliferation compliance among regional actors. Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman caused a media stir
in March when he warned that Saudi Arabia will develop a nuclear weapon if Iran does, raising the
troubling possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb," the crown prince told the
CBS news program 60 Minutes, "but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible." Salman's
remarks came as President Donald Trump considers whether to withdraw the United States from the
Iran nuclear deal and amid tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapons testing. Nuclear proliferation has reentered the heart of the global
security discourse. A Remarkable Success The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which opened for signing 50 years ago on July 1, 1968,
governs the pursuit of nuclear weapons and associated technologies. The treaty effectively bars any state outside the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) from possessing nuclear weapons. Such a possession or
pursuit is known as nuclear proliferation. Practically all countries — India, Pakistan and Israel being the main exceptions — have signed the treaty;
North Korea withdrew in 2003. In the early years after its invention, the atomic bomb was seen by top U.S. politicians and military leaders as a weapon
like any other, albeit a much more destructive one. Over time, a campaign for nuclear disarmament emerged globally, championed by post-colonial
countries such as Ireland and India. It took a decade or more for a compromise to emerge between the idealism of a nuclear-free world and the
dangers of ready battlefield use by anybody and everybody. The NPT was the embodiment of this compromise. The NPT lays out four core principles
of the global nuclear order. The first legitimizes the five permanent Security Council members as nuclear weapons states and shuts the legal door on
any new entrants to the nuclear club. The second forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons and technologies from the five founding nuclear weapon
states to any other state. The third (Article IV) enshrines the "inalienable right" of all signatories "to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes." And the fourth (Article VI) requires the permanent five to undertake "good faith" negotiations leading to universal
nuclear disarmament. Nonproliferation has expanded over time from a single treaty to a full-blown regime of agreements, clubs, Security Council
resolutions and domestic policies involving export controls, penalties and occasionally military action. More subtly than its raft of associated
arrangements, the legal aspects of the treated also created an international norm against nuclear weapons use that Brown University scholar Nina
Tannenwald famously called "the nuclear taboo." States that have nuclear weapons risk enormous opprobrium if they actually use them. This is not to
say that the use of nuclear weapons is forbidden. But the norm has had the effect of inducing extreme caution among the states that possess nuclear
weapons. The nonproliferation treaty's remarkable success can also be measured by the fact that since its inauguration five decades ago, only three
additional countries have acknowledged embracing nuclear weapons. A fourth, South Africa, developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but
subsequently gave them up, as did three new post-Soviet states that had inherited Russian nuclear weapons. Overall, about 20 countries that pursued
nuclear weapons have stopped their efforts. Thus, 50 years after the NPT was first signed, we are left with a small set of only eight nuclear weapons
states. (A ninth, Israel, is believed to have developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s but declines to confirm that it possesses them.) Considering the
large number of countries facing acute security threats, including from nuclear powers, that single-digit number counts as remarkable success.
Technology and Motivation Fundamentally, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a supply-demand problem. On the supply side, it is about the availability
of technologies, material and know-how for making nuclear weapons, but it is also about systems for their delivery — such as missiles, submarines and
nuclear-capable aircraft. With the passage of time, the technology needed to make nuclear weapons (particularly the capacity for uranium enrichment)
has become widely known and within the reach of almost all medium-size countries. The demand side evokes the core motivations of states to pursue
latency (that is, the capability to build nuclear weapons but not possess them) or possession. Extended deterrence — the commitment by a (usually)
great power to use its own nuclear weapons to defend an ally threatened by another nuclear weapons state — is a key inhibitor of demand. NATO
embodies the strongest and clearest such extended deterrence; other key examples include U.S. treaties with Japan, South Korea and Australia.
States have pursued the nuclear option mostly when they have perceived an acute security threat. Two examples are the Soviet program to counter
the U.S. bomb, and China's to counter both the Soviet and American arsenals. Achieving global status has also been a prime motivator in a few cases
— for example, France's nuclear weaponization in the 1950s under a NATO nuclear umbrella. Domestic interest groups sometimes have contributed to
the nuclear drive in order to expand their turf, an example being India's civilian nuclear research community. This data visualization by Isao Hashimoto
shows every nuclear detonation that occurred between 1945 and 1998 (HASHIMOTO, ISAO, 2003). The United States got serious about enforcing
nonproliferation with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. While the Arms Export Control Act barred
assistance to any state that imported or exported enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the nonproliferation act requires full-scope International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and barred enrichment and reprocessing using any U.S.-supplied nuclear materials. Other major powers have had
a more complicated relationship with nonproliferation. China is believed to have aided Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s. The Soviet Union
generally cooperated strongly with the United States, but more recently Russia has been sanctioned by Washington for allegedly providing modest aid
to the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs. And Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network is known to have sold enrichment technologies to Iran, Libya and North
Korea. Pressure, Persuasion and Partnerships In the case of adversaries such as North Korea, Iraq or Iran, the United States has taken a proactive
stance, known as counter-proliferation, using mostly coercive tools such as sanctions, interdiction on the high seas or military intervention. The
situation has been more challenging when an ally or non-adversary has pursued nuclear weapons. Here, the United States has used a combination of
The strongest inducement the United States has been able to
nonmilitary coercive tools and inducements.
provide to an ally is that of a nuclear umbrella, also known as extended deterrence. This has been granted to all NATO states as
well as Japan and South Korea. However, a formal commitment still leaves uncertainties in the minds of some allies, particularly those outside NATO,
as to whether the United States will truly step in and risk its own security when the nuclear chips are down. In other words, would Washington risk San
 South Korea and Taiwan's push toward mastering nuclear
Francisco to save Seoul? This fear was one factor behind
technologies in the 1970s. The United States had to threaten sanctions — including a cutoff in military aid and
the withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella in the case of South Korea — and offer sweeteners for the two countries to eventually back off. Japan also has
pushed but succeeded in getting the United States to enable it to enrich nuclear fuel and reprocess waste as part of a more relaxed nuclear deal with
Washington. A small set of countries have opposed the nonproliferation regime from the beginning. For example, India long resisted signing the NPT
on largely moral grounds. But facing perceived threats from China and Pakistan, New Delhi embarked on a tortuous nuclear journey marked by
vigorous contestations among domestic constituencies, and eventually developed nuclear weapons in the late 1980s. Pakistan, seeing India as a
threat, simultaneously developed nuclear weapons. The United States was aware of Pakistani proliferation but decided to prioritize its alliance with
Islamabad during the Soviet war with Afghanistan. Having failed to change Indian behavior through economic sanctions, and faced with a need to
balance China in Asia, the United States decided to enter into a strategic partnership with India through the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2005. India is
now effectively a legitimate nuclear power, though outside the NPT and lacking full treaty rights of the NPT's five nuclear weapons states. Pakistan
remains in limbo, not subject to meaningful pressure on its nuclear weapons, but by no means legitimized under the nonproliferation regime. Greater
Possibilities for Proliferation Three big drivers, however, are putting enhanced pressure on the nonproliferation treaty as it currently stands. First, a
great power competition is emerging involving the United States, China and Russia, with Moscow and Beijing acting in close concert on many matters.
This competition is marked by more global institutional deadlock than at any period during the Cold War, and by the fraying of certain U.S. alliances.
Second, and related to this competition, is the increased autonomy among a number of regional and middle powers. The third driver is ever-greater
access to technologies relevant to nuclear proliferation. This has been in play for the past two or three decades, but is getting even easier going
forward. For example, gas centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment can be mastered by many candidate countries and is hard to detect.
Technologies for missiles, particularly of the shorter-range variety, are also more widely available than before. The Middle East and Asia-Pacific are
regions most vulnerable to nuclear proliferation. The end result is an enhanced sense of insecurity among those outside, or in some cases inside, a
formal nuclear umbrella. In terms of over-the-horizon proliferation threats, the Middle East and East Asia are regions most vulnerable, any prospects of
a North Korean disarmament notwithstanding. And among the new nuclear powers, India and Pakistan are already locked in a nuclear arms race that
shows no signs of easing. Iran's dangerous nuclear drive is well-documented. But
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey also
present nuclear possibilities. The first two are not covered by a formal U.S. nuclear umbrella. Israel's alleged nuclear arsenal could
also become a greater issue going forward as Iran enhances its role in the region. In Asia, China's meteoric rise implies that Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and perhaps even Vietnam have reasons for entering the nuclear candidates' club in the long run. Regional power assertion takes the form of
striking nuclear energy deals with multiple countries, and opening up the old debate about Article IV of the NPT: Does the "inalienable right" to pursue
peaceful uses of nuclear technology include a right to enrich and reprocess? This has been Iran's position, and it was India's before that. The five
permanent Security Council members, however, do not hold a consistent position on this issue, differentiating how states are treated. For example, the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with India and Japan have formalized this "right" for these
states. Other states are increasingly making a moral argument, citing Article VI of the NPT, which enshrines a "good faith" effort for disarmament by the
treaty's five nuclear weapons states. Though this article was not an ironclad commitment, it has given an opening to those who claim to resist a
permanent division of the world between the nuclear haves and the have-nots. Thus, looking ahead, the overall prospects for nonproliferation are
rather fraught. While the United States has been primarily responsible for ensuring the nonproliferation successes of the past 50 years, the dynamic of
great power competition implies that Washington will increasingly come up against Moscow and Beijing on questions of nonproliferation, particularly in
the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. And regional actors will get bolder in doing what they think they need to do to enhance their security, even as a
small but vocal disarmament movement continues to thrive in the shadows.

Robust empirics prove withdrawing US military aid increases prolif –

induces policy changes and signals geo-strategic interests
Cho 16, Wondeuk Wondeuk Cho currently works at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and
National Security of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy. Wondeuk does research in
International Relations, International Security and Arms Control and Political Economy. Their
current project is 'Chinese Sanctions Against US Allies., "Revisiting US Economic Statecraft:
Three Essays on Nuclear Reversal, Anti-American Political Violence, and Social Policies in
Target States" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1127, ghsBZ
2.3.3 The Effects of U.S. Positive Inducements on Nuclear Reversal Reward dimension of coercive diplomacy refers to a strategy that “can use positive
induce- ments and assurances” to influence an adversary. According to George (1991), “the magnitude and significance of the carrot can range from a
seemingly concessions that bring about a settlement of the crisis through a genuine, balanced quid pro quo” (10). Positive inducements may have an
As foreign rewards or assistance increase, a sanctioned
influence on the policy change of a target state in two regards.
state becomes more accountable to the sender country than to its domestic constituencies. So, when a target state is
more dependent upon foreign positive inducements, it is likely to make a policy
concession to the sanctioning state in exchange for material benefits. Like negative sanctions, on the other hand, positive
inducements also have a costly signaling effect. In contrast to negative sanctions, foreign positive rewards may signal to the target the sender’s
U.S. positive inducements may lead to the target state’s policy
positive attitude toward the target state. Fist,
change through ‘aid-for- policy’ deal. Target leaders tend to be accountable to the aid provider (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2009b). Based on this logic, a target nation may reverse the nuclear development programs 17As Jentleson and Whytock (2005, 82) explain the three
phases of the US-led sanctions against Libya: (1) phase 1: the“very limited United States-European cooperation”; (2) phase 2: “the UN Security
Council gave its normative legitimacy and economic weights to the sanctions”; and (3) phase 3: “the United States and Britain worked closely together
were key factors in the variation in coercive diplomacy success.” 26 responding to the aid donor’s nonproliferation request. A target state’s leaders
benefit their ruling supporters using foreign aid in exchange for withdrawing the existing nuclear development. If target leaders believe that the policy
concession does not result in regime change or breakdown, positive inducements may strengthen the power of the moderates within the incumbent
govern- ment. Positive sanctions have distributional consequences in the target state in the sense that they may improve and/or strengthen the target
government’s political legitimacy through the distribu- tion of economic benefits from them. On the other hand, when
the aid-recipient
country does not make a concession, it is likely to become a sanction-target and lose economic benefits
that it has been receiving. In this case, the target nation should be loss-averse. For example, South Korea, at one point
attempted to build nuclear weapons for security purposes but then made a decision to withdrew its nuclear weapons
 because of the U.S. pressure, i.e., the threat of cutting its assistance and security guarantees (Hersman and Peters 2006).
program
Indeed, South
Korea was a major recipient of U.S. economic and military aid in the post-KoreanWar period.18
Egypt also initiated a nuclear program in the 1960s but gave it up in the 1970s because Anwar Sadat, a successor of Gamal Abdel Nasser,
sought to avoid giving much power to the existing ruling elites but pre- ferred market-oriented reforms (Nincic 2011). At the same time, Egyptian
government needed to withdraw its nuclear exploration in order not to lose economic aid from the US. Second, U.S.
positive inducements retain a significant effect on a target country and third-party countries as well. Positive rewards such as foreign aid are a positive
signal to a recipient country itself and other countries because a sender spends a considerable amount of its resources in the aid allocation. For
instance, Garriga and Phillips (2014) argued that U.S. aid allocation is prone 18South Korea has received from the US aid of a “total of $11 billion by
1973” and “$3.5 billion during the period between 1954 and 1970” which was “ equivalent to nearly 5 of South Korea’s total gross national product for
the same period. American economic and military aid combined account for nearly 10 of South Korea’s GNP
in that period”(Han 1980, 1076). 27 to follow geo-strategic concerns. Especially during the Cold War, U.S. foreign assistance to a recipient country
played a role in signaling that it was strategically important to the U.S. or at least the U.S. may not implement hostile policies. Hypothesis 2.3 Nuclear
aspiring states receiving U.S. positive inducements have a higher likeli- hood of reversing their nuclear pursuit. 2.4 Research Design This study
evaluates the testable hypotheses of a theory of U.S. economic statecraft and nuclear reversal, using a time-series cross-sectional dataset that include
18 countries and the time period lasting from 1970 through 2004. The test period is primarily based on a theoretical reason. Since the birth of nuclear
age, the first nuclear club-i.e., the US, USSR/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China-has attempted to deter nuclear proliferation. In particular,
the U.S. government has adopted a nonproliferation policy since the establishment of the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Dunn 2006). Thus,
the first club nations are excluded from this dataset. Also ex- cluded are countries such as Japan and Sweden that withdrew their nuclear weapons
programs before 1970. This doesn’t necessarily cause a sampling problem because the U.S. nuclear nonpro- liferation activity does not apply to them
as targets. This dataset is well documented by previous studies (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007). It does, however, need to be modified for
test- ing the hypotheses of the nuclear reversal based on updated information (Levite 2002; Cirincione and Rajkumar 2005). 28 2.4.1 Dependent
Variables The outcome variable of interest is whether a nuclear-proliferating state that has explored and/or pursued nuclear weapons programs
reverses or keeps pursuing, in a given year, its nu- clear weapons development. To be included in the dataset, the country must have at least begun
an initial exploration and/or pursuit of nuclear weapons, or engaged in nuclear weapons activity. Existing quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation
tend to place the variable of nuclear la- tent capabilities on the side of the independent variables. In reality, many nuclear proliferating countries have
retained nuclear latent capacity in the process of nuclear pursuit. Some countries removed the entire infrastructure and technology with latent capacity
after renouncing nuclear weapons programs. Some countries have maintained nuclear latent capabilities even though they have suspended existing
nuclear weapons development. The measurement of nuclear reversal conceptually relies on Lodgaard’s discussion on nuclear rollback. According to
Lodgaard (2010, 115), nuclear reversal “is a process in the opposite di- rection (of nuclear proliferation), reversing intentions and/or capabilities to
acquire nuclear arms. Some states have rolled back to a stable non-nuclear status. Others have kept a certain prepared- ness for going nuclear if
changing circumstances so suggest. Yet others have rolled back and forth between different degrees of interest in the nuclear option and different
degrees of material pre- paredness to exercise it.” Thus, I regard a state in stable non-nuclear status when it discarded both the intention and capability
to construct nuclear bombs. I also consider a state in nuclear latency status when it still maintains some degrees of nuclear latent capacity to build
nuclear weapons within some time period if it wants to do while it removes the willingness to make nuclear bombs. To code dates of nuclear reversal
paths for each state, I discuss coding rules from four different 29 dataset: Bleek and Lorber (2014), Kroenig (2016), Levite (2002), and Way and Weeks
(2014). Based on the conceptualization of the paths of nuclear weapons development, I use the depen- dent variable, which consists of two measures.
The first dependent variable is a binary measure- ment. A dichotomous outcome variable, Nuclear reversal, is coded 1 if a nuclear proliferating state
makes a decision to reverse its nuclear weapons development in a given year and 0 if not. The second dependent variable has value 0 for all country
years for no nuclear pursuit (Non- nuclear status), value 1 for Nuclear pursuit, and value 2 for Nuclear latency. Data for the depen- dent variable are
collected by Way and Weeks (2014) for nuclear paths with nuclear latency from Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015). A state having an ENR plant in operation
is considered a state with nuclear latency capacity (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015). But, nuclear latency status as a category of nuclear reversal outcomes
is coded if the state ever acquires and possesses nuclear latent capability in spite of its renouncing nuclear weapons development. I code a state as in
a non-nuclear status if a state not only has no intention to pursue its nuclear weapons development but also lacks nuclear latent capacity to quickly
restart nuclear weapons programs when circumstances suggest. The data are a recent updated version, which includes cases ignored by past
studies.19 2.4.2 Independent Variables The data on independent variables primarily depend on the HSEO dataset (Hufbauer et al. 2007). To estimate
the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted state’s nuclear reversal, U.S. nega- tive sanctions are measured in a dichotomous way in terms that they
are coded 1 for each year that 19A recent review of nuclear proliferation research criticizes existing studies for not accounting for new cases
(Montgomery and Sagan. 2009; Sagan 2011). Way and Weeks (2014) claimed that their data updated Singh and Way’s (2004) proliferation data in the
sense that they either added or revised the cases of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. 30 the HSEO dataset records all sanctions imposed by
the United States, and 0 otherwise. Another sanction variable is U.S. economic sanctions through international organizations. The US multilat- eral IO
sanctions is coded as 1 for each year that the United States has imposed negative sanctions through international organizations. I also analyze the
effect of U.S. sanctions on a variation in nuclear reversal behaviors using US sanction duration and US nuclear sanctions. Including U.S. sanction
duration in the equation reflects a possibility that sanctions are more likely to have the cu- mulative effect over time rather than the immediate effects.
The variable of U.S. nuclear sanctions is also measured in a dichotomous way. The aim of U.S. nuclear sanction is specifically to prevent nuclear
proliferation. The US aid ( GDP) variable as a proxy for U.S. positive inducements is a country’s is a country’s annual inflows of U.S. total aid as a
percentage of domestic product (GDP). It appropri- ately captures a country’s aid-dependence on the U.S., which indicates that the country has more
incentives to give policy concession to the U.S. in exchange for U.S. aid allocation. Alternatively, the US aid variable includes U.S. economic aid and
military aid flowing into targeted countries. It is measured as the natural logarithm of U.S. total aid in a given year (the result is reported in the section of
Appendix.). It is argued that the the increase in superpower aid (e.g., U.S. aid) by the aid-recipient country is regarded as the actual increase of the
superpower’s support to the recipient country no matter how big the recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014). 2.4.3 Control Variables For
controlling for other factors to a proliferating state’s affect nuclear reversal behaviors, the study includes several relevant variables including Sensitive
nuclear assistance, Civil nuclear co- 31 operation, NPT ratification, US security alliance, Trade openness, GDP per capita (log), Polity score, Disputes,
and Rivalry. First, then, in line with the recent studies on the supply-side of nuclear proliferation, I include both foreign sensitive nuclear assistance
(Kroenig 2009)20 and civil nuclear cooperation (Fuhrmann 2009). Sensitive nuclear assistance is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a nuclear
proliferating state obtained sensitive nuclear materials or technologies from abroad, and 0 otherwise. Sensitive nuclear transfers enable nuclear
aspiring states to overcome technical obstacles in pursuing nu- clear weapons development. At the same time, purchasing foreign sensitive nuclear
technology is said to be less expensive than the indigenous nuclear weapons development in part because of nu- clear suppliers’ strategic interest in
helping nuclear aspirants to obtain sensitive nuclear technology (Kroenig 2009). However, it still should not be always less expensive to obtain foreign
sensitive nuclear assistance given that international community works hard to take measures to deter the spread of nuclear weapons technology. In
that situation, nuclear aspiring states need to pay both political and economic costs as it becomes more difficult for them to obtain the access to
sensitive nuclear technology from abroad. For example, according to a news report, North Korean govern- ment “bribed top military officials” in
Pakistan “to obtain access to sensitive nuclear technology in the later 1990s” through the secretive deal with transferring more than $3 million in
payments (Smith 2011). Thus, it is expected that Sensitive nuclear assistance is negatively associated with a state’s nuclear reversal (Bleek and
Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2009; Reiter 2014). Civil nuclear cooperation is a variable, which counts the aggregated number of bilateral civil- 20“Sensitive
nuclear assistance takes three forms. States receive sensitive assistance when they receive assistance in the design and construction of nuclear
weapons, receive significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material, or receive assistance in the construction of uranium-enrichment or plutonium-
reprocessing facilities that could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material” (Kroenig 2009, 168) 32 ian nuclear agreements that a proliferating
state has signed in a given year (Fuhrmann 2009). Civil nuclear cooperation is said a key determinant of nuclear proliferation because a such
cooperation enables a state to obtain the capacity to pursue nuclear weapons programs. The probability of nuclear proliferation is said to be increased
by the number of civil nuclear agreement (Fuhrmann 2009). Some scholars, however, argued that civil nuclear agreements often used by the interna-
tional community may play a role in dissuading nuclear aspiring states from obtaining access to sensitive nuclear technology (Bluth et al. 2010, 190).
Thus, the number of civil nuclear agreements may also decrease a proliferating state’s incentive to pursue nuclear weapons development. Second, a
state’s nuclear behaviors tend to be affected by domestic variables. Previous re- search has found that political factors have no significant impact on
nuclear proliferation (Jo and Gartzke 2007). However, some recent studies has founded that domestic political variables have a significant influence on
a state’s nuclear development commitments (Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009). For instance, Way and Weeks (2014) found that “personalistic”
dictatorships are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons than are other political regimes. It is expected that more democratized countries are more
likely to reverse nuclear weapons development than less democratized countries (Polity score). Polity score reflects a proliferating state’s regime type
based on the 21-point scale (Marshall and Gurr 2011). This variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values representing greater levels of
democracy and with lower values indicating greater levels of autocracy. The Nonproliferation Treaty membership (NPT ratification) is a dichotomous
variable mea- sured 1 if a proliferating state has ratified the NPT in a given year and 0 if not. A state’s ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
tends to signal its willingness to conform to international rules/norms over the nonproliferation commitments. It is expected that a state’s NPT
ratification is more likely to increase the probability of its nuclear rollback commitments (Bleek and Lorber 33 2014; Fuhrmann 2009). Third, several
international factors may influence a state’s nuclear reversal behaviors. Security guarantees through defense pacts are likely to reduce a state’s
motivation to go nuclear. It is expected then that security alliance with the U.S. (US security alliance) is more likely to increase the probability that a
proliferating state withdraws its nuclear weapons development in accordance with the existing findings (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Gerzhoy 2015; Kroenig
2009; Reiter 2014). A state’s involvement in international disputes (Disputes), however, may decrease its incentive to withdraw the ongoing nuclear
development (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Reiter 2014). In a similar vein, having an enduring rivalry (Rivalry) may decrease a state’s
intention to reverse its ongoing nuclear pursuit due to security concerns. The next international factor is a state’s openness to trade (Trade openness).
When a state is more open to the international economy and economically more interdependent, it is more likely to stop nuclear development and
rollback its nuclear programs because it does not want such risky behaviors to hurt its economy and ruling elites (Solingen 1994, 2012). It is expected
that the more open a state’s economy is, the higher the probability that it reverses its nuclear weapons development (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Kroenig
2009). Lastly, I takes into account, using a method suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010), the temporal dependence in the data. The study
includes a variable that counts the number of years that pass with a nuclear pursuit or non-nuclear-pursuit (Years) with its square (Years2) and its cube
(Years3). All independent and control variables are measured as the lagged one due to possible lag-effect of sanctions on nuclear behaviors. 34 2.5
Methods and Results To test this paper’s arguments, the study estimates a series of binary logit and multinomial logit model (MNLM).21 However, the
analysis produced the warning message of “... observation com- pletely determined. Standard errors questionable,” when running a standard logit
regression. This results from problems of complete- or quasi-separation in the small-sample data. Some studies suggest that researchers should
implement penalized likelihood logistic regression to cope with the problems of separation and finite sample biases (Allison 2004; Brown and Kaplow
2014; Firth 1993; Zorn 2005). In this case, one or more of my independent variable are excellent predictors of nuclear reversal (Brown and Kaplow
2014; Zorn 2005). To run a penalized likelihood logistic model, I use the command “firthlogit” in Stata. It begins with the binary dependent variable-
nuclear pursuit vs. nuclear reversal. Table 2.1 shows the results of five logistic regressions that test whether U.S. economic statecraft is associ- ated
with a change in the likelihood of a nuclear aspirant’s reversing a nuclear weapons devel- opment. Regarding the effects of U.S. economic statecraft on
nuclear reversal, Models 1 and 2 include U.S. negative sanctions, U.S. sanction duration, and U.S. aid ( GDP) plus control vari- ables while Models 3
and 4 include U.S. multilateral IO sanctions and U.S. non-IO sanctions plus control variables. First, the coefficient for U.S. negative sanctions is
statistically insignificant and negative, which is, however, in the expected direction. The coefficient for U.S. sanction duration is also insignificant but
positive. The result in Model 3, on the other hand, shows that the
variable of U.S. non-IO sanctions decreases the
probability that a nuclear-aspiring state reverses its nuclear pursuit. For instance, the logit coefficient on
U.S. non-IO sanctions is -1.990 and its odd ratio is 21Quantitative literature on nuclear proliferation conducts multinomial logit and event history or
hazard model to deal with multi-outcome dependent variable (Singh and Way 2004; Bleek and Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2016). 35 0.137. This means that,
other things being equal, the odds of a nuclear proliferating state reversing its nuclear pursuit are almost 0.14 times as likely when under U.S. non-IO
sanctions than when under no such sanctions. In fact, becoming a target of U.S. non-IO sanctions decreases
the odds of
reversing nuclear pursuit by over 86 percent. However, U.S. sanctions with IO involvement have a positive sign
(direction toward nuclear reversal) but are not statistically significant in affecting a state’s nuclear reversal behavior. The coefficient for U.S. multilateral
IO sanctions is, for instance, 2.141 in Model 4. The odds ratio for the variable is 8.5. This means that, other things being equal, the odds of reversing
nuclear weapons development increase by over 750 percent. Regarding the impacts of U.S. positive inducements, U.S. aid ( GDP) has a insignificant
but positive effect on nuclear reversal in all five models (Models 1-5). Overall, these findings show that, in a binary choice setting (nuclear reversal vs.
pursuit), neither U.S. negative sanctions nor U.S. nuclear sanc- tions are not influential factors in extracting policy concessions of nuclear
nonproliferation from a target state. But, U.S. multilateral IO sanctions are effective in inducing a state’s reversal behavior. Let us now turn to the
determinants of each of a trichotomous nuclear behavior, using a multi- nomial logit model (MNLM) to examine the likelihood that a specific outcome is
determined in nuclear development paths. In the multinomial logit models, the study estimates the effects of U.S. economic statecraft for stable non-
nuclear status (outcome 0), nuclear pursuit/acquisition (outcome 1), and nuclear latency status (outcome 2). The reference category of the dependent
variable is non-nuclear status. Model 6 in Table 2.2 shows the effects of U.S. negative sanctions on each outcome of a state’s nuclear proliferation
commitments. U.S. negative sanction imposi- tion lead to a positive effect on nuclear pursuit. However, they are not statistically significant in pursuit
and latency outcomes. U.S. sanction duration in Model 7 is also insignificant in affecting both nuclear pursuit and latency outcomes. Model 8 shows
that, when the U.S. imposes economic 36 Table 2.1: Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal, 1970-2004 Model 1 -0.593 (0.646) Model 2 0.0142 (0.0360)
Model 3 Model4 Model 5 0.0262 (0.0327) US negative sanctions US sanction duration US multilateral IO sanctions US non-IO sanctions US nuclear
sanctions US aid ( GDP) Polity score Trade openness (log) Sensitive nuclear assistance Civil nuclear cooperation GDP per capita (log) NPT ratification
US security alliance Disputes Rivalry Proliferation years Non-proliferation years Constant Observations 1.724 2.141+ 0.138 (0.127) 0.128∗ 0.121
(0.121) 0.134∗ -1.439 (0.909) 0.0608 (0.161) 0.128∗ (1.174) -1.990∗ (0.947) (1.245) -1.803+ (0.992) -1.057 (0.997) 0.111 (0.134) 0.152∗ 0.164 (0.120)
0.163∗∗ (0.0559) (0.0555) (0.0627) (0.0623) (0.0566) 1.312+ 1.211+ 1.784∗ (0.779) (0.706) (0.727) -0.117 -0.183 0.0934 (0.730) (0.687) (0.623)
0.0733∗ 0.0665+ 0.128∗ (0.0362) (0.0349) (0.0500) (0.0501) (0.0334) AIC BIC Log likelihood Note: Penalized likelihood coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses. All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1. -0.716 (0.459) 3.048∗∗ (1.051) 0.556 (0.627) -0.102 (0.360) -0.430
(0.365) 0.396 (0.313) 6.885∗∗ (2.163) -4.809 (4.188) 528 49.84 126.7 -6.918 -0.650 -1.244∗ (0.453) (0.621) 2.812∗∗ 4.159∗∗ (0.978) (1.266) 0.663
0.565 (0.618) (0.674) -0.152 0.124 (0.282) (0.128) -1.231+ (0.630) 4.160∗∗ (1.267) 0.643 (0.668) 0.164 (0.117) -0.630 (0.470) 2.973∗∗ (1.009) 0.800
(0.643) 0.0754 (0.190) -0.557 (0.374) 0.444 (0.320) 7.450∗∗∗ (2.075) -6.323 (4.477) 528 43.23 124.3 -2.615 -0.460 -0.612+ -0.589+ (0.341) 0.430
(0.329) 7.367∗∗ (2.405) -5.071 (4.045) 528 44.78 121.6 -4.391 (0.331) 0.376 (0.332) 6.382∗∗ (2.282) -3.217 (4.226) 528 44.62 125.7 -3.310 (0.333)
0.391 (0.314) 6.465∗∗ (2.081) -3.764 (4.297) 528 44.89 130.3 -2.444 1.867∗ 1.373+ (0.727) (0.701) 0.247 0.134 (0.635) (0.678) 0.125∗ 0.0709∗ 37
Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported. + p0.10,∗ p0.05,∗∗ p.01,∗∗∗ p.001 sanctions against a nuclear aspirant through
international organizations, it can extract suboptimal and/or partial compliance i.e., a nuclear latency outcome. This result indicates that when it comes
to America’s higher goals (a target state’s complete and/or optimal concessions of nuclear nonpro- liferation), U.S. economic sanctions are generally
ineffective. However, with lower or sub-optimal goals (nuclear power with nuclear disarmament; (Miller and Sagan 2009), U.S. economic statecraft is
moderately successful and effective in nonproliferation outcomes. In regard to the substantive interpretation of the results (Table 2.2), this study
interprets the results using the relative risk ratios (rrr), similar to odd ratios in the logistic estimation. In Model 8, for example, for the category of nuclear
latency, the rrr value for the U.S. IO sanctions is 37.6. This means that the relative risk of choosing nuclear latency over non-nuclear status is
approximately 38 times for a state targeted by U.S. sanctions involving international organizations relative to a state under no such sanctions. The rrr
value for the U.S. multilateral IO sanctions is 64 in Model 9. U.S. aid ( GDP) is, in Models 8 and 9, both positively and significantly associated with
nuclear latency outcome, relative to non-nuclear status. For instance, the rrr value for U.S. aid ( GDP) is 1.35 for the category of nuclear latency in
Model 8. This represents the effect of a change of one percent of U.S. aid/GDP in changing the odds of selecting either nuclear latency or non-nuclear
status. The odds of 1.35 means that for every percent of U.S. aid/GDP, the odds of a state adopting nuclear latency over non-nuclear status increase
by almost 1.5 times. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the predicted probabilities of key independent variables (i.e., U.S. mul- tilateral IO sanctions and U.S. aid (
GDP) for each category of nuclear development outcomes. In Figure 2.1, plots the predicted probability for U.S. IO sanctions based on Model 9. The
pre- dicted probability of continuing nuclear pursuit is around 0.9 and is highest (near 1) but drops to near 0.5 when the U.S. imposes sanctions
through an international organization. However, it is 38 Table 2.2: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal, 1970-2004 Base outcome (Non-
nuclear) Nuclear pursuit US negative sanctions US sanction duration US multilateral IO sanctions US non-IO sanctions US nuclear sanctions US aid
(GDP) Sensitive nuclear assistance Polity Trade openness (log) Civil nuclear cooperation GDP per capita (log) NPT ratification US security alliance
Disputes Rivalry Proliferation years Constant -0.338 (1.062) 3.039 (2.157) Model 6 1.123 (1.167) Model 7 0.00528 (0.0528) -0.0771 (0.126) 0.454
(1.078) -0.120∗ (0.0584) -3.372∗∗ (1.254) -0.130∗∗ Model 8 -0.0919 (0.142) 0.602 (1.187) -0.128∗ (0.0620) -3.551∗∗ (1.126) -0.139∗∗∗ (0.0403) 0.473
(0.608) -2.146 (1.499) -0.155 (0.685) 0.0466 (0.177) 0.817∗ (0.417) 0.769∗∗ (0.252) 11.38+ (6.889) -0.113 (0.207) 0.460 (1.244) -0.135∗ 0.0503
(0.881) -0.0964 (0.128) 0.329 (0.973) -0.119∗ 0.300 (0.560) -1.737 (1.341) -0.476 (0.557) 0.0837 (0.156) 0.782+ (0.408) 0.887∗∗∗ (0.200) 12.00+
(7.090) 39 0.894 (0.774) -2.983 (1.950) -0.0261 (0.729) -0.0325 (0.139) 0.913∗ (0.438) 0.624∗ (0.301) 10.67 (6.915) 0.897 (0.815) -3.028 (2.110) -
0.0126 (0.707) -0.0110 (0.132) 0.917∗ (0.438) 0.640∗ Model 9 0.00470 (1.032) 3.086 (2.174) -0.641 (0.922) -0.138 (0.251) 0.479 (1.177) -0.136∗
(0.0596) (0.0602) (0.0598) -4.017∗∗∗ (1.141) -0.192∗∗ -3.928∗∗∗ (1.051) -0.191∗∗ -3.286∗∗ (1.226) -0.124∗∗∗ (0.0406) (0.0587) (0.0594) (0.0371) 0.342
(0.605) -1.876 (1.410) -0.493 (0.494) 0.0532 (0.135) 0.782+ (0.411) 0.880∗∗∗ (0.305) (0.194) 10.27 11.45 (7.118) (7.193) Model 10 Model 6 US
negative sanctions US sanction duration US multilateral IO sanctions US non-IO sanctions US nuclear sanctions US aid (GDP) Sensitive nuclear
assistance Polity Trade openness (log) Civil nuclear cooperation GDP per capita (log) NPT ratification US security alliance Disputes -0.0464 (0.170)
Rivalry 0.0547 (0.326) Proliferation years Constant Observations Model 7 0.0188 (0.0380) 0.298∗∗ (0.0923) 1.045 (1.138) 0.0526 (0.0618) -3.137∗
(1.498) -0.0541 (0.0429) -0.596 (0.516) 2.095 (1.822) 1.292 (0.892) -0.0668 (0.174) 0.0709 (0.324) -0.780 (0.504) 15.62+ (8.211) 528 402.3 474.8 -
184.1 Model 8 3.628∗ (1.598) -0.831 (1.133) 0.302∗∗∗ (0.0661) 1.317 (1.166) 0.0806 (0.0754) -2.999∗ (1.500) -0.0566 (0.0484) -0.984 (0.789) 2.267
(1.907) 1.759∗ (0.796) -0.0416 (0.164) 0.0263 (0.325) -0.865 (0.686) 18.04 (11.03) 528 374.4 447.0 -170.2 Model 9 4.159∗ (1.797) -0.782 (1.233) -
1.539 (2.919) 0.279∗∗∗ (0.0840) 1.342 (1.153) 0.0769 (0.0742) -2.895+ (1.501) -0.0552 (0.0478) -1.055 (0.778) 2.319 (1.883) 1.818∗ (0.807) 0.0161
(0.137) -0.0336 (0.373) -0.845 (0.686) 18.17+ (10.82) 528 373.1 445.7 -169.6 Model 10 Base outcome (Non-nuclear) Nuclear Latency 0.0610 (0.637)
0.307∗∗∗ (0.0907) 1.090 (1.191) 0.0637 (0.0631) -3.123∗ (1.469) -0.0567 (0.0440) -0.726 (0.505) 2.139 (1.850) 1.383 (0.904) -2.196 (2.471) 0.273∗∗
(0.104) 1.132 (1.189) 0.0641 (0.0668) -3.085∗ (1.492) -0.0568 (0.0434) -0.888 (0.555) 2.274 (1.815) 1.443+ (0.844) 0.0287 (0.138) -0.0393 (0.351) -
0.775 (0.521) 17.81∗ (8.410) 528 398.7 471.3 -182.4 -0.783 (0.543) 16.65∗ (8.135) 528 399.0 471.6 -182.5 AIC BIC Log likelihood Note: Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1. Squared and cubed
terms for temporal dependence are not reported. + p0.10,∗ p0.05,∗∗ p.01,∗∗∗ p.00140 Figure 2.1: U.S. IO sanctions and Predicted Probabilities of
Nuclear Reversal Outcomes not statistically significant. The probability of adopting nuclear latency status climbs slightly to near 0.5 from near zero
when a state becomes a target of U.S. multilateral IO sanctions. In Figure 2.2, the predicted probability of continuing pursuit is highest (almost 1.0) at
the lowest US aid ( GDP) and drops to a low level (near 0) at the highest level of US aid ( GDP) in a target state. The probability of opting for nuclear
latency is the lowest (almost 0) at the lowest level of US aid ( GDP), and climb to near 1, at the highest level of US aid ( GDP). Models 11-15 in Table
2.3 investigates whether U.S. IO sanctions and U.S. aid ( GDP) lead to 41 Figure 2.2: U.S. aid ( GDP) and Predicted Probabilities of Nuclear Reversal
Outcomes the transition from nuclear pursuit to nuclear latency status. The coefficients for U.S. multilateral IO sanctions have a statistically significant
and positive effect on a state’s nuclear latency behavior in Models 13 and 14. U.S. aid ( GDP) has a significant impact in all models (Models 11-15). In
contrast, Models 16-19 investigate the onset of nuclear reversal outcomes (i.e., from nuclear pursuit to nuclear latency or to non-nuclear) only,
excluding decisions to continue nuclear reversal. In the model of the transition from pursuit to latency (Models 16 and 17), the presence of U.S. IO
sanctions has a positive and significant effect on the probability of transition in nuclear latency 42 status. U.S. aid ( GDP) has , on the other hand, an
insignificant impact in Models 16 and 19 (i.e., nuclear latency and non-nuclear status). The remaining section of the results deals, based on the existing
findings, with the influence of control variables in explaining nuclear reversal outcomes. First, a state’s NPT ratification has a consistent and positive
relationship with its commitment to nuclear reversal in almost all models in logit analysis of nuclear reversal (Models 1-5 in Table 2.1). This finding
confirms the evidence gathered from existing studies (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Fuhrmann 2009). But, the variable has no significant effect on nuclear
latency and nuclear pursuit in all models in multinomial logit regression in Table 2.2 in spite of its expected direction. Second, the previous research
emphasizes the deterrent effect of U.S. security alliances in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The result of analysis offers up mixed findings
with inconsistent significance-in Models 8-10, US security alliance has a significant and positive effect on nuclear latency outcome. U.S. security
alliance also has a positive and significant effect on the transition from nuclear pursuit to latency (Models 11-15 in Table 2.3) or to latency onset
(Models 15 and 17 in Table 2.4). Third, some scholars have focused on the role of a state’s openness to the world on nuclear proliferation (Solingen
1994, 2009). The findings in the logit regression are consistent with the results of the existing quantitative studies in that an increase in trade openness
opens up more incentives for a state to reverse its nuclear weapons development (Models 1-5). Trade openness variable also yields similar findings in
the multinomial logistic models. Rivalry variable is nega- tively associated with a proliferating state’s nuclear reversal in logit analysis (Models 3-4)
while it has a positive impact only on nuclear pursuit status in multinomial logit analysis (Models 6-10). The results confirm previous findings (Brown
and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015). 43 Disputes variable has, however, no significant relationship with nuclear reversal in spite of the
expected direction. Finally, according to the existing literature (e.g., Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009), the supply- side determinants to nuclear
proliferation are expected to influence nuclear reversal outcome(s). On one hand, sensitive nuclear assistance is anticipated to encourage a state to
develop its nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2009). It has no significant influence on a proliferating state’s nuclear policy change in logit and multinomial logit
models in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Such a finding does not confirm the previous findings (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2009; Reiter 2014). However, the
variable is statistically and positively significant in logit analysis-transition from pursuit to latency in Models 11-15. In contrast, civil nuclear cooperation
have a significant relationship with nuclear reversal in both logit and multinomial logit regression. These findings contradict previous findings in that the
international community may use civil nuclear agreements to dissuade a state from obtaining access nuclear weapons technology (Bluth et al. 2010,
190). 2.5.1 Robustness Analysis Overall, the findings in the previous section are consistent with this study’s hypotheses. To avoid the spuriousness of
statistical results, a few robustness checks were conducted on the empir- ical analysis to show the validity of the inference from the data. The detailed
results can be found in Appendix 1. First, one of the most problematic issues in nuclear proliferation literature, how- ever, is the measurement of
nuclear behavior because nuclear programs are usually implemented in secrecy (Montgomery and Sagan. 2009; Sagan 2010). Recent quantitative
works on nuclear prolif- eration have constructed several new datasets with nuclear proliferation dates by updating and/or 44 Table 2.3: Logit Analysis
of U.S. Economic Statecraft and Nuclear Reversal: from pursuit to latency Model 11 Model 12 0.000713 (0.0244) 0.332* (0.0878) 1.022* (0.437)
0.0946 (0.0334) -1.893* (0.484) -0.0350* (0.0158) -0.763* (0.383) 1.895 (0.717) 1.440 (0.497) -0.399+ (0.205) -0.0701 (0.312) -0.942 (0.341) 0.704*
(0.351) 10.44 (3.625) 528 143.8 220.7 -53.92 45 Model 13 2.655* (1.058) -3.435 (1.251) 0.338* (0.0942) 1.252 (0.444) 0.100 (0.0373) -1.945* (0.520) -
0.0376* (0.0168) -1.080* (0.420) 2.073 (0.693) 1.819 (0.555) -0.350+ (0.205) -0.103 (0.317) -0.836 (0.323) 0.795* (0.372) 12.74* (3.720) 528 137.0
218.1 -49.51 Model 14 2.646* (1.040) -3.419 (1.208) 0.266 (0.941) 0.339* (0.0955) 1.250 (0.444) 0.100 (0.0374) -1.948* (0.527) -0.0377* (0.0169) -
1.077 (0.416) 2.067 (0.690) 1.818 (0.553) -0.354+ (0.206) -0.101 (0.316) -0.831 (0.322) 0.799* (0.372) 12.73* (3.685) 528 138.8 224.1 -49.38 Model
15 0.00753 (0.0246) -1.456 (1.059) 0.315* (0.0898) 1.123* (0.436) 0.104 (0.0355) -1.729* (0.496) -0.0355* (0.0159) -0.966* (0.418) 1.896 (0.735)
1.637 (0.525) -0.349+ (0.210) -0.150 (0.322) -0.920 (0.342) 0.712* (0.352) 11.46 (3.750) 528 143.0 224.2 -52.52 US negative sanctions US sanction
duration US multilateral IO sanctions US non-IO sanctions US nuclear sanctions US aid ( GDP) Sensitive nuclear assistance Polity Trade openness
(log) Civil nuclear cooperation GDP per capita (log) NPT ratification US security alliance Disputes -0.386+ (0.207) Rivalry -0.0786 (0.312) Proliferation
years Non-proliferation years Constant Observations -0.282 (0.590) 0.337* (0.0879) 1.019* (0.435) 0.0975 (0.0343) -1.892* (0.471) -0.0350* (0.0157) -
0.802* (0.391) 1.982 (0.707) 1.428 (0.496) -0.931 (0.343) 0.699* (0.353) 10.77 (3.635) 528 149.9 226.8 -56.96 AIC BIC Log likelihood Note: Penalized
likelihood coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1. Squared and cubed terms for
temporal dependence are not reported. + p 0.10, * p 0.05, p .01, * p .001 Table 2.4: Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal Onset NPT ratification US
security alliance Disputes -0.0684 Rivalry Proliferation years Constant Observations (0.329) -0.290 (0.486) 0.143 (0.611) -3.916 (9.500) 399 95.41
159.2 -31.70 pursuit-to-latency pursuit-to-non nuclear US multilateral IO sanctions US non-IO sanctions US nuclear sanctions US aid ( GDP) Sensitive
nuclear assistance Polity Trade openness (log) Civil nuclear cooperation GDP per capita (log) Model 16 2.582∗ (1.172) -2.010 (2.082) 0.165 (0.472)
0.250 (1.226) 0.0827 (0.111) 0.312 (1.011) 0.0463 (0.0693) -0.768 (0.845) 3.680 (2.521) 3.385∗∗ (1.183) Model 17 2.589∗ (1.245) -1.892 (2.060) -
0.500 (1.138) 0.132 (0.548) 0.349 (1.181) 0.0790 (0.115) 0.418 (1.104) 0.0455 (0.0705) -0.741 (0.841) 3.618 (2.598) 3.368∗∗ (1.198) -0.0483 (0.344) -
0.317 (0.510) 0.149 (0.604) -4.452 (9.338) 399 97.29 165.1 -31.64 Model 18 -0.0364 (0.957) -2.508∗ (1.220) -5.471 (5.361) -1.533 (1.414) -0.155+
(0.0855) 2.234∗ (1.059) 0.127∗∗ (0.0458) -0.937 (0.659) 1.982∗ (0.818) 0.768 (1.053) 0.174 (0.170) -0.998 (0.859) 0.484 (0.407) -6.665 (7.118) 448
120.8 186.5 -44.39 Model 19 0.128 (1.242) -2.491+ (1.294) -0.312 (1.564) -5.450 (5.213) -1.492 (1.541) -0.159+ (0.0835) 2.266∗ (1.105) 0.128∗∗
(0.0446) -0.909 (0.734) 1.991∗ (0.825) 0.770 (1.077) 0.189 (0.133) -0.994 (0.864) 0.488 (0.420) -7.097 (8.249) 448 120.7 186.4 -44.37 AIC BIC Log
likelihood Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at
t-1. Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported. + p0.10,∗ p0.05,∗∗ p.01,∗∗∗ p.001 46 revising the existing periods of nuclear
proliferation-the updated datasets of Jo and Gartzke (2007) and Kroenig (2016). Second, the empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of
U.S. pos- itive inducements-US aid (log). It is argued that the the increase in superpower aid (e.g., U.S. aid) by the aid-recipient country is regarded as
the actual increase of the superpower’s support to the recipient country no matter how big the recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014). The
substantive results are unchanged. Third, as another robustness check, the study also subset the data by excluding non-NPT nuclear weapons states
that possessed nuclear weapons-India, Israel, and Pakistan. The substantive results are still robust. Fourth, the Cold War and the Post-Cold War were
separatged because for many countries in the world the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a decrease in the efficacy of possession nuclear
weapons (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014; Sagan 1996). Despite adding the Cold war variable, the results still support the main hypotheses. Lastly, I add
the variable of Liberalization for a state’s openness with the international economy, in addition to trade openness (Solingen 2009). The finding remains
unaltered. All these findings of robustness tests are reported in the appendix. 2.6 Conclusion This paper tests whether U.S. economic statecraft
influences nuclear reversal. The empirical evidence suggests that U.S. negative sanctions have a detrimental effect on counterproliferation in both the
logistic and multinomial logistic estimations. In other words, when states that have initiated or pursued nuclear development come under U.S. sanction
imposition, they are less likely to reverse their nuclear pursuit. The findings indicate that with regard to nonproliferation U.S. sanctions result in
counterproductive outcomes. U.S. sanctions produce negative political and 47 economic externalities, as sanctioned states may anticipate the U.S.
using of military force against them (Lektzian and Souva 2007). In contrast, when nuclear reversal outcomes are disaggregated into non-nuclear
status, nuclear latency, and nuclear latency, U.S. positive inducements including US aid ( GDP) have a posi- tive impact on a proliferating state’s
decision to maintain nuclear latent capacity in exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons development. These findings suggest that U.S. aid allocation
pro- vides a costly signal to recipient countries; they are sufficiently important geo-strategically that their political survival will not be hurt and that they
are not potential targets for U.S. military at- tack (Garriga and Phillips 2014). U.S. sanctions through international institutions leads to a state’s decision
to choose nuclear latency over nuclear pursuit. These findings offer several important contributions to the current literature on nuclear (non-
)proliferation. They confirm the detrimental effects of U.S. negative sanctions on unintended prod- ucts such as a state’s continuing to pursue nuclear
weapons development due to potential imminent threats from the U.S. and its coalition countries However, the results indicate that if the U.S. were to
adopt a lower standard of success in its economic statecraft (e.g., U.S. sanctions through in- ternational institutions, U.S. positive inducements), it
could extract from a proliferating state a sub-optimal policy concession like “nuclear latency status” or “nuclear power without nuclear proliferation.” At
the same time, when the U.S. induces more international cooperation using its negative sanctions, it may lead to a partial nonproliferation outcome.
The 1994 Agreed Frame- work between the U.S. and DPRK illustrates, despite its later breakdown, the effectiveness of positive inducement in
nonproliferation and/or nuclear reversal. The recent negotiation and the conditional agreement over nuclear withdrawal between the West (in particular
the U.S.) and Iran imply that U.S. sanctions through international institutions and U.S. positive inducements (e.g., 48 lifting existing sanctions) can be
effective enough to extract a nuclear-aspiring state’s compliance with nonproliferation. 49 2.7 Appendix I 2.7.1 Robustness Analysis • Alternative
nuclear datasets (Models A1-A2). As I discussed in the paper, it is sometimes difficult to identify whether states are pursuing the bomb in light of the
secrecy that often shrouds nuclear weapons programs. To address this issue, I recode the dependent variable using two alternative nuclear behavior
datasets coded or produced by (Jo and Gartzke 2007) and (Kroenig 2016). The results show that U.S. IO sanctions remains closely associated with a
state’s nuclear latency behavior when I use the Jo and Gartzke (2007) and Kroenig (2016) dataset to construct my dependent variable. • Alternative
measure of U.S. positive inducements (Models A3-A4). Alternatively, the US aid variable includes U.S. economic aid and military aid flowing into
targeted countries. It is measured as the natural logarithm of U.S. total aid in a given year. It is argued that the the increase in superpower aid (e.g.,
U.S. aid) by the aid-recipient country is regarded as the actual increase of the superpower’s support to the recipient country no matter how big the
recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014). The results show that U.S. aid (log) is positively associated with the category of nuclear latency
status indicating that a state receiving the higher level of U.S. total aid, regardless of its economic size, adopts nuclear latency status.

Prolif snowballs – acquiring nuclear weapons causes other countries to

react similarly
Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, 2015
(Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
"The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_
Does_It_Have_a_Future, Accessed 6/28/16, JL @ RKS)
Nuclear proliferation poses an additional threat to international peace and security because it causes further
proliferation. As former Secretary of State George Schultz once said, ‘proliferation begets proliferation’ 65 When one
country acquires nuclear weapons, its regional adversaries, feeling threatened by its neighbor’s new nuclear
capabilities, are more likely to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response. Indeed, the history of
nuclear proliferation can be read as one long chain reaction of proliferation. Of course, reactive proliferation does not always occur.
In the early 1960s, for example, US officials worried that a nuclear-armed China would cause Taiwan,
Japan, India, Pakistan, and other states to acquire nuclear weapons.66 In hindsight, we now know
that they were correct in some cases, but wrong in others. Using statistical analysis, Philipp Bleek has shown that reactive
proliferation is not automatic, but that rather, states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are
met (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries, (2) the potential proliferant state does not have a security
guarantee from a nuclear-armed patron (3) and the potential proliferant state has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an
indigenous nuclear program.67 In other words, reactive proliferation is real, but conditional. To be sure, as Barry
Posen has argued, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all have primitive nuclear infrastructures and it would be difficult for any of them
to build nuclear weapons overnight.68 In addition, Turkey is a member of NATO and Saudi Arabia enjoys a close security
partnership with the United States and these states might prefer to lounge in the shade of America’s nuclear umbrella rather than
build independent arsenals. On the other hand, one or more of these states, much like the United Kingdom and France in the early
days of the Cold War, might decide that America’s nuclear protection is insufficient. With a decade’s worth of dedicated nuclear
development, any of these states could conceivably become nuclear powers. Just because reactive proliferation takes time, does
not mean that it is not a problem. If Iran enters the nuclear club, therefore, it is likely that some, but not all, of the countries that we
currently worry about will eventually become nuclear powers. We should worry about the spread of nuclear weapons in every case,
therefore, because the problem will likely extend beyond that specific case. As Wohlstetter cautioned decades ago, proliferation is
an N+1 problem.69 In sum, nuclear proliferation gives us many reasons to fear the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states.
While it is important not to exaggerate the above threats, it would be an even greater sin to underestimate them and, as a result, not
take the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.

Outweighs – multiple nuclear war scenarios

Kroenig, 16—Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security at the Atlantic Council (Matthew, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s
Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58, June 2016,
dml)
The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be
used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be
catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse,
could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes
how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be
magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with
a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar
nuclear order.14 First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises
may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a
state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it
believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state
B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the
war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely
that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in
U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute. In
addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the
interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that
one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third
nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena
the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to
Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China. There is also the issue
of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase
the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on
one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and
thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the
third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario
never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major
powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically
developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between
their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within
alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this
was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of
multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger,
the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical
precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies,
Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The
United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several
crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of
the nuclear era.
 Disclosure
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open
source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after
debating.
Violation – you don’t
1. Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s
good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as
novices in under-privileged programs.
Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High
School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8;
http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //]
a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's
better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument
communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most
destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based
answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of
enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and
personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for
better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce
entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could
plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the
option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence
economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less
bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

2. Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that
cards aren’t miscut – full text doesn’t solve since you could have
highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is
key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t
cheat
Vote aff to set a norm – if you lose you’ll open source from now on
No RVIs: 1. Chilling effect- abusive debaters will get really good at the rvi
debate and bait theory meaning we can never check back abuse. 2. Illogical
you shouldn’t win for not being abusive
Competing Interps – 1. Reasonability collapses since you justify brightline
with offense and defense 2. Reasonability leads to a race to the bottom
where debaters are incentivized to be as abusive as possible

Drop the debater to 1] prevent future abuse 2] to solve back for the time
spent on theory
 Case
Military aid empirically leads to increased regime democracy and transition
to democratic ideals
Axelrod 11, [Matthew Craig Axelrod The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania] April
2011 “Aid as Leverage? Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship”
https://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Axelrod.pdf SLHS-RR
The U.S.
In the end, it was not foreign leverage that brought about political reform in Egypt, but domestic political action.
Government’s belief that the Egyptian army could arbitrate a critical rupture in Egyptian politics
proved correct in February 2011, when in response to weeks of popular demonstrations and regime intransigence, Field
Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi ushered President Mubarak from power. Tantawi now serves as
the head of the The Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Egypt’s current ruling body. A policy of continued
U.S. military assistance to Egypt seems to have been validated, as the U.S. maintained a strong
partner for several decades, and at ―the moment of truth‖ the Egyptian military stepped in on
the side of the people rather than on the side of a repressive regime. But the picture is not entirely clear.
On the one hand the new military leadership has stated that it will honor its political commitments
abroad, meaning its durable peace with Israel.39 Indeed, Israeli leaders have even expressed satisfaction in
upgraded border security measures.40 More importantly, the military has also stated its intentions to
preside over a democratic transition.41 But on the other hand there have been disturbing allegations that the Egyptian
military has adopted some of the repressive practices of the deposed regime, including detentions and torture.42 The only
thing that is clear is that the Egyptian military is no longer dissociated from politics. As the
transition period continues to progress, the U.S.-Egypt military and strategic relationship will
enter a new phase. Understanding its benefits, and its limitations, will aid in restructuring and
balancing the relationship.

Aid doesn’t force countries to bend to America’s rule – countries are more
likely to ignore US interests when they’re given military assistance.
Sullivan ’12 Sullivan, Patricia (Associate Professor of Public Policy, Curriculum
in Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina). “Is Military Aid an
Effective Tool for U.S. Foreign Policy?” Scholars Strategy Network. 1 May 2012.
https://scholars.org/brief/military-aid-effective-tool-us-foreign-policy. SLHS-CG

The Reverse Leverage model suggests that, paradoxically, a powerful nation can become dependent on
countries it aids. In this way of thinking, the amount of military aid granted to a foreign government
reflects the extent to which the U.S. is reliant on that nation – for things like oil exports, intelligence,
bases for troops, and military cooperation. In this perspective, it could be easier for a nation receiving
assistance to obtain military aid elsewhere than for a superpower like the United States to find an
equally valuable strategic partner. Rather than inducing compliance, generous U.S. military funding runs
the risk of creating strong clients who are able to ignore U.S. interests and play us off against other
powers. What the Evidence Shows The world is much more complicated than any one model can
capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that
changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid
and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between
1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. In general, U.S.
military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In
fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United
States than governments given no military aid. Some countries that received U.S. military aid became
more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from
formal U.S. allies. In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it
reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because
higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in
subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid.