Republic of the Philippines

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

11th Judicial Region
Branch 1
CITY OF DAVAO

ECOLAND PROPERTIES CIVIL CASE NO.M-DVO-18-03778-CV

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Plaintiff,
FOR: Recovery of Possession,
NILO EMBORGO & any other persons Damages and Atty’s Fees
acting for and in his behalf
Defendants.
x-------------------------------------x

ANSWER
WITH SPECIFIC DENIAL,
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND
COUNTERCLAIM

Comes now, Defendants assisted by counsel, unto this Honorable

Court, respectfully avers:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

The court's primary duty is to render or dispense

justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."
"Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts."

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to

prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and
to compel the party out of possession to respect and
resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the
authorities can speedily settle actions to recover
possession because of the overriding need to quell
social disturbances.

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 AVERMENTS
A. COMPLAINT

1. The Plaintiff alleged that it is a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines but failed to attached its
Certificate of Registration from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the status thereof.

2. The plaintiff claimed as registered owner of the property as

evidence by a Torrens Title issued in 1979 but the technical
description of the property declares that the parcel of land is
situated in the BARRIO OF MATINA which is far beyond from
Ecoland.

3. The plaintiff alleged illegal occupation of the defendants

therefore this is a clear case of forcible entry and not unlawful
detainer.

4. The Plaintiff failed to state the date of the alleged intrusion of

the defendants on the subject property and failed to allege PRIOR
PHYSICAL POSSESSION of the said property.

5. The Plaintiff failed to comply the condition precedent which is

the referral of the case with the Barangay before resort to judicial
process.

B. ANSWER

6. The defendants have been in adverse, exclusive, open and

notorious possession of the property and their predecessors in
interest since 1950.

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7. The subject property which is allegedly owned by the Plaintiff is
the subject of Proclamation No. 20 issued by President Ramon
Magsaysay. Hereto attached and marked as Annex “1”.

8. The Real Party in interest is the City Government of Davao having

legal ownership of the said land, and not the Plaintiff;

9. The Plaintiff has no legal personality to sue as it is not the real

party in interest.

10. The Plaintiff alleged that the occupancy of the defendants were
illegal from the very beginning but did not allege the number of
years of its dispossession. Worst, it failed to allege PRIOR PHYSICAL
POSSESSION.

ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS

10. Paragraphs 2 of the complaint is admitted with the qualification

that the defendant is not illegally occupying and residing the
property subject of this complaint.

11. Paragraphs 1, 4 to 10, 11, 12,14,15,16 to 19 of the Complaint

are denied for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the veracity or falsity thereof, the allegations therein
being matters known only to, and are within the control only, of the
plaintiff

12. Paragraph 13 is admitted but with a qualification that the

defendant has NO knowledge about the Sketch map prepared by the
geodetic engineer for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the veracity or falsity thereof, the allegations

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therein being matters known only to, and are within the control
only, of the plaintiff;

13. Paragraph 18-19 of the Complaint is denied for lack of

knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
veracity or falsity of the alleged amounts of attorney’s fees agreed
upon between the plaintiff and her lawyer. The said paragraph is
likewise denied insofar as it alleges that the defendant has no basis
or justification to occupy the subject property, the truth being
those alleged in the special and affirmative defenses part herein
below.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

A. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION

THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT THE REAL

PARTY IN INTEREST AS THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS COVERED BY
PROCLAMATION NO. 20 ISSUED BY
FORMER PRESIDENT RAMON
MAGSAYSAY

It is evident that plaintiff is not the real party in interest because

said property claimed by the plaintiff is covered under Proclamation
No. 20. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act
categorically declares that only the government may institute an
action to recover ownership of a public land.

Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. It
further defines a real party in interest as one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. The interest of the

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party must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must

be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas v. Durian, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the
patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently,
prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a
certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to
bring the action was the government, to which the property would
revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure
to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of
Alivio noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead
applicant, was not the real party in interest to institute an action
for reconveyance.

B. THE CLAIM STATES NO CAUSE OF

ACTION OR PREMATURITY

NO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE

PARTIES BEFORE THE LUPON
TAGAPAMAYAPA

No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter

within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly
in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless
there has been confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the Lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the Lupon or pangkat chairman or unless
the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

The Supreme Court also said in Pang-et vs. Manacnes (G.R. No.
167261, March 2, 2007), that:

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 “What is compulsory under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation
between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached, as
attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before
a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be
instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication. In other words, the only necessary pre-
condition before any case falling within the authority
of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a
court is that there has been personal confrontation
between the parties but despite earnest efforts to
conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the
dispute. Xxx xxx “.

Moreover, Circular No. 14093 issued on July 15, 1993 requires all
lower courts to comply the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
It provides:

“ xxxx III. All complaints and/or informations filed or

raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if
there has been compliance with prior Barangay
conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, as a pre-condition to judicial action,
particularly whether the certification to file action
attached to the records of the case comply with the
requirements herein above enumerated in par. II;

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior

Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for
formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon
motion of defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of
the court but for failure to state a cause of action or
prematurity (Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales
vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court may suspend
proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1,
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court; and refer the case motu
proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority,
applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law which reads as
follows:

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling

within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are
filed may at any time before trial, motu proprio refer
case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

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 Strict observance of these guidelines is enjoined. This
Administrative Circular shall be effective
immediately.xxx”

B. LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUBJECT MATTER

THE ACTION IS ONE FOR FORCIBLE

ENTRY AND NOT FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well

as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint. Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. On its
face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to
assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of

the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the
complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not
controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves
are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.

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A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress
of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise
necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with. Correspondingly, facts alleged in the
complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon
him. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader.

In this case, Plaintiff judicially admitted that respondents took control

and possession of subject property without their consent and authority
and that respondent’s use of the land was without any contractual or
legal basis.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, differentiated the distinct

causes of action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct

causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for
in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the
termination of the defendant's right to continue in
possession.

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall

include every situation or condition under which one person can
wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had
prior possession, therefrom. The foundation of the action is really the

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forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right.

The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property,
and this is all that is necessary. The employment of force, in this case,
can be deduced from Plaintiff allegation that defendant’s occupation
was illegal from the very beginning.

TAKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE

ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY, AND NOT FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or

building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Where the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the
summary action for forcible entry is the remedy to recover possession.

In their Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s occupation of

the subject property is illegal from the very beginning. Assuming that
this allegation is true, hence it follows that defendants forcibly excluded
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. Thus,
there can be no tolerance as plaintiff alleged that defendant’s
possession was illegal at the inception.

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

the complaint was illegal from the very inception of occupation, the
plaintiff must have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the
instant suit for unlawful detainer. Hence, the Plaintiff must have filed
the complaint within the reglementary period of one year from the time
of dispossession. As evidenced by its land title issued in 1979, thirty nine

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(39) long years had elapsed before the plaintiff enforced its right. Be it
noted that upon the issuance of its title (if it were true), the defendants
and their predecessors in interest have been occupying in the area in
open, continuous, adverse possession.

AS THIS IS THE CASE FOR FORCIBLE

ENTRY, PRIOR PHYSICAL
POSSESSION MUST BE ALLEGED BY
THE PLAINTIFF

In the present case, the Complaint failed to allege prior physical

possession.

The title to the property of plaintiff and Tax Declaration proved

possession de jure, but not their actual possession of the property
prior to defendant’s entry.

The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession carries

with it the concomitant burden of establishing one’s case by a
preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so, plaintiff herein
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the
weakness of that of defendant. It is not enough that the allegations
of a complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff
must prove prior physical possession. It is the basis of the security
accorded by law to a prior occupant of a property until a person
with a better right acquires possession thereof.

Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the

possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in
issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit
refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not one flowing out of ownership. These are different legal
concepts under which the law provides different remedies for
recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who

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can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against
the owner. Whatever may be the character of the possession, the
present occupant of the property has the security to remain on that
property if the occupant has the advantage of precedence in time
and until a person with a better right lawfully causes eviction.

Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not

conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that
no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in one’s actual or constructive possession.

There is forcible entry, when one is deprived of physical possession

of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning
and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession
of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution
thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the
physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who
can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs
merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.

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Therefore, since plaintiff failed to discharge their burden of proving
the element of prior physical possession. Hence, the complaint must
be DISMISSED.

C. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO AVER

FACTS CONSTITUTIVE OF FORCIBLE
ENTRY OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
THE REMEDY SHOULD BE ACCION
PUBLICIANA OR ACCION
REINVIDICATORIA

ASSUMING IT IS NOT FOR FORCIBLE

ENTRY BUT THE DISPOSSESSION
LASTED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR,
THE ACTION IS ONE FOR ACCION
PUBLICIANA WHICH MUST BE
BROUGHT BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT

Indubitably, from the time of issuance of the title in 1979 up to the

present, more than thirty (30) years had elapsed. This is based on
the assumption that the title attached has the same description of
the property subject of this case. The length of time that the
petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it
one for accion publiciana.

In Cruz v. Torres, this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an

action to recover possession or accion publiciana, thus:

x x x This is an action for recovery of the right to

possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the

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 better right of possession of realty independently of
the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is
also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession
of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. x x x

In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of

possession of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding

which may be either that for forcible
entry (detentacion) or unlawful
detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for
recovery of physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court;

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the

recovery of the real right of possession, which should
be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and

3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de

reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of
ownership which must be brought in the proper
Regional Trial Court.

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that

determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the
possession of the property in this case is the length of time of
dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, it affords the person
deprived of the possession to file at any time within one year after
such withholding of possession and filed it before the proper
Municipal Trial Court.

Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an
ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more
than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion

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publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial
Court.

Based on the allegations of the complaint and of the evidence

attached, it is one for forcible entry of which should be filed within
one year from knowledge of dispossession. However, it is clear that
the knowledge of dispossession is more than one year, therefore the
proper case is one for accion publiciana which shall be brought
before the Regional Trial Court.

As explained by the Court:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners

are indeed the owners of the subject lot and were
unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they
should present their claim before the regional trial
court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial
court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer
or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the
property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in physical or material
possession of the same for more than one year by
resorting to a summary action for ejectment.

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of
dispossession of lands. Thus, whenever the owner is dispossessed by
any other means than those mentioned he may maintain his action
in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait
until the expiration of twelve months before commencing an action
to be repossessed or declared to be owner of the land. Courts of
First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of
real property illegally detained, together with rents due and
damages, even though one (1) year has not expired from the
beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of
ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the
party illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal
dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property, he

14
may commence such action in the Court of First Instance
immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he
decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the
action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or
withholding of possession, then the Court of First Instance will have
original jurisdiction over the case. The former is an accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well as
possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

D. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS
BARRED BY LACHES

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It
should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere
lapse of time.

As in the Gamponia case, the four elements of laches are present in

the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. In
the case at bar, the plaintiff acquired the land in 1979 evidences by
a Torrens Title but the subject property is owned by the City

15
Government of Davao City by virtue of proclamation No. 20 issued
by the then President Ramon Magsaysay. The defendant was made
to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filed against
him by such passivity and also because he found it to be owned by
the LGU-Davao City. Hence, the defendant will be plainly
prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be barred.

As a general rule, an action to recover registered land covered by

the Torrens System may not be barred by laches. Neither can laches
be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right. In exceptional cases, however, the Court allowed laches as a
bar to recover a titled property. Thus, in Romero v. Natividad, the
Court ruled that laches will bar recovery of the property even if the
mode of transfer was invalid.

Likewise, in Vda. de Cabrera v. CA,23 the Court ruled:

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a

registered owner of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property
Registration Decree), no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The
same is not true with regard to laches. x x x.

More particularly, laches will bar recovery of a property, even if the

mode of transfer used by an alleged member of a cultural minority
lacks executive approval. Thus, in Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño, it
provides:
“ xxxthe Court upheld the Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land executed by
Ting-el Dicman in favor of Sioco Cariño despite lack of
executive approval. The Court stated that “despite the
judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property
by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack
of approval of competent authorities, the right to
recover possession has nonetheless been barred
through the operation of the equitable doctrine of
laches.”

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Similarly in this case, while the respondent may not be considered
as having acquired ownership by virtue of its long and continued
possession, nevertheless, the petitioner’s right to recover has been
converted into a stale demand due to the respondent’s long period
of possession and by the petitioner’s own inaction and neglect.

The plaintiff could have sought judicial relief, or at the very least
made his demands to the respondent, as early as 1979, after the
registration of the title to the register of deeds. The defendant and
his predecessor in interest has been in possession of the property as
early as 1960s. Consequently, the petitioner’s lengthy inaction
sufficiently warrants the conclusion that he acquiesced or
conformed to the occupancy of the defendants.

In Munoz vs. Court of Appeals, it enunciated:

“For even if he is the owner, possession of the

property cannot be wrested from another who had
been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12)
years through a summary action for ejectment.
Although admittedly, petitioner may validly claim
ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsibly address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible
entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by
a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him
to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected
by a person having a better right by accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.”

Thus, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an

occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to

17
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as
these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM

1. By reason of the abuse of right committed by the plaintiff and by

reason of the instant precipitate and unfounded suit, the defendant
was constrained to hire the services of a lawyer to defend his rights
and interests for a professional fee of P20,000.00 plus P3,000.00 per
court appearance;

2. Similarly, the plaintiff’s unfounded suit has caused the defendant

mental anguish and suffering and public humiliation and
embarrassment, for which the defendant claims moral damages of
P100, 000.00.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that

after due notice and hearing, an order be issued DISMISSING the
instant case for lack of cause of action of lack of jurisdiction.
Without prejudice to whatever ruling of the Honorable Court of

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Defendant’s Affirmative defense, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court to order the CONDUCT OF RELOCATION SURVEY
of the subject property to be spearheaded by the Bureau of Lands
and Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Furthermore, that an order be issued directing that Plaintiff pays to
the Defendant the following, to wit:

1. moral damages of P100,000.00;

2. exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00
3. Acceptance fee of Php 50,000.00, attorney’s fees of P20,
000.00 and cost of suit.

The defendant respectfully prays for such and other reliefs as may
be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

Davao City, JUNE 21, 2019

NILO EMBORGO
Defendant

Assisted by:

ATTY. GILDA S. MAHINAY

Counsel for the Defendant
187 Dominica St. Solariega, Puan, Talomo,Davao City
PTR No. 2470304/January 8, 2019
IBP No. 068212/ January 10, 2019
Roll No. 70474
MCLE EXEMPTED

VERIFICATION AND ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING CERTIFICATION

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I, NILO EMBORGO, both of legal age, married, and with postal
address: c/o MAHINAY LAW OFFICE, Block 11, Lot 20, Phase 2, 187
Dominica St. Solariega Plantacion, Talomo,Davao City, under oath, depose:

I am the defendant in the foregoing case; that I caused the

preparation of the foregoing Answer; that I have read its contents;
and that the same are true and correct of our own direct, personal
knowledge.

Further, pursuant to Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and

existing Supreme Court circulars, we hereby certify that we have
not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; that to the best of our knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; and that if we
should hereafter learn that other similar or related actions or
proceedings has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, we undertake
to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this court.

NILO EMBORGO
Defendant

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me in Davao City on June 21, 2019,

the affiant showing their government issued ID as stated above as
competent proof of their identity.

ATTY. GILDA S. MAHINAY

Counsel for the Defendants
187 Dominica St. Solariega, Puan, Talomo,Davao City
PTR No. 2470304/January 8, 2019
IBP No. 068212/ January 10, 2019
Roll No. 70474

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 MCLE EXEMPTED

Doc No. ______;

Page No.______;
Book No. _____;
Series of 2019

COPY FURNISHED:

ATTY. SANTOS E. TORRENA, JR.

Counsel for the Plaintiff
NB Mercado Bldg., Mac Arthur Highway corner Sandawa
Matina, Davao City

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