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DESIGN OF INDIAN
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER
REACTOR COMPONENTS
H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit
68.1 INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Power Program in India at present is based mainly
on a series of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs).
Starting from Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, comprising of two
units of 200 MWe Canadian-designed PHWRs in 1973, the pro-
gram has come a long way with 15 PHWR units (which includes
two units of 540 MWe PHWRs) in operation and 3 units under
construction. Narora Atomic Power Station commissioned in
1991 marked major indigenization and standardization of PHWR
designs. The current design plans include 700 MWe capacity
units. The choice of PHWRs in the current stage of India’s
nuclear power program is based on long-term objectives to be
achieved in the available uranium resources and industrial infra-
structure. These reactors use natural uranium as fuel and heavy
water as moderator and coolant. The nuclear power stations in
India are generally planned as twin-unit modules, sharing com-
mon facilities such as service building, control building, turbine
building, spent fuel storage bay, and so on.
The Indian PHWR design has evolved through a series of
improvements over the years in progressive projects. Such
improvements have been driven by, among others, evolution in
technology, feedback from experience in India and abroad,
including lessons learnt from incidents and their precursors,
evolving regulatory requirements, and cost considerations.
Valuable experience gained in design, manufacture, construction,
operation, maintenance, and safety regulation has enabled contin-
ual evolution, improvement, and refinement in the PHWR concept
in a progressive manner.
In Indian PHWRs, the design, fabrication, testing, and inspec-
tion of all mechanical components basically follow the require-
ments of appropriate sections of the ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code (ASME B&PV Code).
Other international codes used are (1) Canadian Code CAN/
CSA N285.4-05 and IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 for ISI and
(2) French Code RCC-G for containment design. This chapter
first provides a general overview of the Indian PHWR design and
its evolution. The design approach, material selection, and fabri-
cation practices are described for major components such as
calandria, headers, steam generators, and piping. Details are
CHAPTER
68
provided of the development and the use of leak-before-break
(LBB) criterion to eliminate the need for installation of pipe
whip restraints. Results of experiments conducted to determine
load-carrying capacity of cracked pipes and the results of fatigue
crack growth rate tests in support of LBB criteria are discussed.
As a further example of the research and development work con-
ducted in India related to nuclear power plant applications, the
development of a modified B2 stress index (used in NB-3600-
type stress analyses) for pipe elbows and curved pipes and quan-
tification of additional safety factors to account cyclic tearing in
LBB assessment are discussed.
68.2 INDIAN PHWR
68.2.1 Introduction to Indian PHWR [1]
The first PHWRs at Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2
and Madras Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 were of Canadian
design (based on Douglas Point). When design work for the third
PHWR station, Narora Atomic Power Station #1 and 2, was taken
up in the early 1970s, major modifications were incorporated with
the objectives of upgrading the designs in line with the interna-
tionally evolving safety standards and to cater to the seismic load-
ing. Narora Atomic Power Station design was the first opportunity
to apply India’s operating experience with PHWRs, including
aspects such as ease of maintenance, in-service inspection (ISI)
requirements, improved constructability, increased availability,
and standardization of the unit. In Narora Atomic Power Station,
some of the new designs were incorporated with the objective to
serve as stepping stones for the design of subsequent larger 540
MWe PHWR.
Some of the significant design improvements made in Narora
Atomic Power Station included adoption of an integral calandria
(reactor vessel) and end shields assembly, two independent fast
acting reactor shutdown systems, a high-pressure Emergency
Core Cooling System, and a double containment with suppres-
sion pool.
Subsequent to Narora Atomic Power Station, Kakrapar Atomic
Power Station #1 and 2, Kaiga Atomic Power Station #1 and 2,
and Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #3 and 4 saw further
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2 • Chapter 68

TABLE 68.1 DESIGN FEATURES: IPHWR – 220 MWe [1]

Design data
A. General
(i) Rated output thermal 756 MWt
(ii) Rated output electrical 220 MWe
(iii) Fuel Natural UO2
(iv) Moderator and reflector Heavy water
(v) Coolant Heavy water
(vi) Type Horizontal pressure tube
B. Reactor
(i) Calandria shell Horizontal stepped cylinder
welded to extensions of end
shield
(ii) Calandria shell material SS-304L
1. Calandria shell 11. Main shell assembly
(iii) End shields Cylindrical box-type
2. Overpressure relief device(OPRD) 12. Tube sheet F/M side
structure integral with 3. Shutdown system #1 13. Tube sheet cal. side
calandria shell 4. Shut down system #1 14. Lattice tube
(iv) End shield material SS-304L 5. Moderator inlet 15. End-shield support plate
(v) Calandria tubes 6. Moderator outlet 16. End shield cooling inlet pipes
7. Vent pipe 17. End fitting assembly
(a) Quantity 306 8. Coolant channel assembly 18. Feeder pipes
(b) Material Zircaloy-2 9. End shield 19. Outer shell
(vi) Coolant tubes 10. End shield support structure 20. Support lug
assembly
(a) Quantity 306
(b) Material Zirconium–2.5% niobium FIG. 68.1 INTEGRAL ASSEMBLY OF CALANDRIA AND END
alloy SHIELD (CUT-AWAY VIEW OF REACTOR) [1]
C. Steam generators
(i) No. of steam generators 4
(ii) Type Vertical U-tube with The calandria is housed in a steel-lined vault filled with light
integral steam drum water that serves as shielding as well as provides cooling to the
(mushroom-shaped) calandria.
(iii) Material Incoloy-800 The Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system uses heavy water
(iv) Steam pressure 3.923 MPa under forced circulation in a figure-of-eight loop. Figures 68.2
(v) No. of tubes per SG 1834 and 68.3 show the schematic of the system.
(vi) Total steam flow 370 kg/s The main circuit of 220 MWe units has four branches on
to turbine each side.
For the latest 220 MWe units, PHT system is valveless.
(vii) Steam temperature 25 ⬚C Elimination of these valves along with general reduction in the
(viii) Maximum moisture 0.25% number of components has helped to decongest the layout in the
content pump room, facilitating better maintenance approachability, less
maintenance, and lesser manrem.
The primary heat transport system pressure control in 220
MWe units is based on the “feed and bleed” concept. During nor-
mal operation, the average pressure of both outlet headers is con-
improvements leading to standardizations in design and layout for trolled at a set pressure of 8.53 MPa to keep the system “solid,”
220 MWe PHWRs. Table 68.1 lists the design features of Indian that is, no bulk boiling is permitted. Operational transients such
standard 220 MWe PHWR. as turbine trip, load rejection, boiler feed pump trip, reactor
power setback, and so on cause “swell” or “shrinkage.” The feed
68.2.2 Description IPHWR or bleed control valves actuate to counter these swells/shrink-
The reactor consists of a low-pressure horizontal reactor vessel ages. Though the system is ‘solid’ there is some finite compress-
(calandria) containing heavy water moderator at near ambient ibility of the system, which keeps the pressure changes within a
pressure and temperature. The calandria (Fig. 68.1) is pierced by fairly narrow band. The feed is provided by two feed control
a large number (306 in 220 MWe and 392 in 540 MWe PHWR) of valves located on the discharge side of primary pressurizing
coolant tubes, which contain the fuel bundles, and through which pumps, which take suction from storage tank. Two bleed control
pressurized heavy water coolant circulates. The calandria houses valves are connected to reactor inlet header. The hot bleed is
all reactivity and reactor shutoff devices in the low-pressure, low- depressurized, cooled and returned back to storage tank via
temperature environment. purification system.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 3
FIG. 68.2 PHWR SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM [1]
In 540 MWe PHWR, a pressurizer has been introduced for pri-
mary heat transport system pressure control, while feed and bleed
is retained for inventory control.
Current Indian PHWRs use a double containment principle. The
annular space between the primary and secondary containment
envelopes is provided with a purging arrangement to maintain a
negative pressure in the space. This arrangement significantly
reduces the ground-level releases to the environment during acci-
dents involving radioactivity release into the primary containment.
Figure 68.4 shows the schematic of containment.
The containment structures are made of concrete. The primary
containment is a prestressed concrete structure, consisting of a
perimeter wall topped by a prestressed concrete dome. The outer
or secondary containment is a reinforced concrete cylindrical wall
topped by a reinforced concrete dome. The primary containment
uses epoxy coating as liner on the inner surface for enhanced
leak-tightness and ease while decontamination. Because of the
use of double containment, incorporation of a steel liner is not
considered necessary.
68.2.3 Design Codes
The design, fabrication, testing and inspection of all mechanical
components are as per the appropriate sections of ASME ASME
B&PV Code [2, 3].
The design philosophy of the containment structure is based
on limit state concept where the response of the structure under
FIG. 68.3 PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF STEAM GENERATOR
AND PHT SYSTEM [1]
load combinations pertaining to both limit state of serviceability
and limit state of strength is checked. The various limit states
specified in the French Code RCC-G [4] along with the support-
ing documents BPEL [5] and BAEL [6] are adopted for design-
ing the structural elements of the inner and outer containment
structures.
68.2.4 Regulatory Structure [7]
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the national author-
ity to ensure safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). AERB fulfills
its mission by stipulating and enforcing rules and regulations
concerned with nuclear and radiological safety. AERB has devel-
oped safety documents that lay down requirements for meeting
safety criteria for activities related to nuclear energy and provide
guidance on methods for fulfilling the requirements.
Safety documents published by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulatory bodies of other countries
are appropriately used as reference material for the purpose.
Safety Codes establish objectives and set minimum require-
ments that have to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for
safety in nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety Guides provide
guidelines and indicate methods for implementing specific
requirements as prescribed in the codes.
As on date, AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety
Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other safety
support documents. Several other documents are under various
stages of preparation. All these safety documents are being exten-
sively utilized in developing designs, operating procedures and in
regulation activities including safety reviews by AERB. A short
list of documents related to NPPs is given in Table 68.2.
For design of mechanical components such as vessels, pumps,
and piping, use of appropriate ASME Codes is permitted.
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4 • Chapter 68
FIG. 68.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING [1]
68.3 DESIGN OF INDIAN PRESSURIZED
HEAVY WATER REACTOR
COMPONENTS
68.3.1 Calandria End Shield Assembly
The calandria end shield assembly consists of calandria vessel
with main shell and small shell connected by an annular plate.
The vessel houses 306 coolant tubes, reactivity mechanisms, and
shutdown assemblies. At the two ends, the calandria vessel is con-
nected with end shields. The end shields limit the radiation dose
in the fuelling machine vaults adjoining the calandria vault. They
also support and locate the calandria tubes and primary coolant
channel assemblies in which the fuel resides. In the original
design of end shield (Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2
and Madras Atomic Power Station #1), the end-shield material of
construction was 3.5% Ni-steel. However, it was found that nil
ductility transition temperature (NDTT) crossed the operating
temperature within a short period of operation. While the stability
of the end shields in this condition is assessed in detail; from the
second unit of Madras Atomic Power Station onward, the end-
shield material has been changed to SS-304L, which is resistant to
radiation embrittlement due to fast neutrons.
In the current design (Narora Atomic Power Station onward)
(Fig. 68.1), the calandria and two end shields constitute an integral
assembly, supported from the reactor vault walls, unlike earlier
designs wherein the calandria and end shields were separately sus-
pended by support rods. This design allows common tube sheet
between calandria and end shield. It also simplifies alignment
requirement between calandria tubes and end-shield lattice tubes,
and is more suited to conditions at seismic site.
68.3.2 Main PHT System Components
The main PHT system consists of steam generators, primary
circulating pumps, pressurizer (for 540 MWe PHWR), headers,
feeders, and interconnecting piping.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 5
TABLE 68.2 PARTIAL LIST OF REGULATORY DOCU-
MENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS [7]
S. No. Title of Safety Document
1. Code of practice on quality assurance for safety in
nuclear power plants
2. Code of practice on design for safety in pressurized
heavy water reactor-based nuclear power plants
3. Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation
4. Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant siting
5. Code of regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities
6. Safety classification and seismic categorization of
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)
7. Design basis events for pressurized heavy water reactors
8. Primary heat transport system
9. Loss of coolant accident analysis for pressurized
heavy water reactors
10. Safety guide for quality assurance in the design of
nuclear power plants
11. Safety guide for seismic studies and design basis
ground motion for nuclear power plant sites
12. Civil engineering structures important to safety of
nuclear facilities
13. Design of concrete structures important to safety of
nuclear facilities
14. Design, fabrication, and erection of steel structures
important to safety of nuclear facilities
15. Design, fabrication, and erection of embedded parts and
penetrations important to safety of nuclear facilities
68.3.2.1 Steam Generator The steam generator (SG) design is
of mushroom type. This design has the advantage of a single inte-
gral unit with provisions of manholes on primary head to enable
in-service inspection of the tubes. Four identical steam generators
transfer heat from the heavy water reactor coolant on the primary
side to the ordinary feedwater on the secondary side. The steam
generators consist of an integral inverted vertical U-tube bundle in
shell. Moisture separators and driers are housed in the upper end
of the shell.
The primary side of the steam generator consists of primary
head, the primary side of the tube sheet and the primary side of
the tube bundle. A partition plate separates the inlet half of the
primary head from the outlet half. The U-tubes are welded to the
primary side of the cladded carbon steel tube sheet and rolled into
the tube sheet. The steam generator primary shell and head are
made of low alloy steel.
The secondary side of the steam generators consists of the
shell, moisture separators and driers, the tube bundle shroud, the
secondary side of the tube sheet, the secondary side of the tube
bundle, and tube support egg-crate grids. Low alloy carbon steel
is the principal material of construction.
The SG tubes are of 19-mm outer diameter (OD) and incoloy-
800 material. The 19-mm tubes, when compared to 16-mm tubes
of 220 MWe PHWR SG, offer advantages in ease of fabrication,
reduction in manufacturing time and lower D2O side pressure
drop. The shell of SG is provided with a manway. Secondary side
of the tube sheet is provided with suitable holes to blow off and
remove concentration of impurity in the secondary side water.
Both primary and secondary sides of the steam generators are
designed and manufactured to the requirements of the ASME
B&PV
Code Section III, Subsection NB, Class-1 components.
68.3.2.2 Primary Coolant Pumps The primary coolant pumps
(PCP) are vertical, single stage, single suction, double discharge,
centrifugal pumps. Each pump is driven by a vertically, totally
enclosed, air and water cooled, squirrel cage induction motor.
A spacer type rigid coupling connects the pump shaft to the
motor shaft. Each motor is supplied with a single piece flywheel
so that the total rotational energy of pump motor unit prolongs the
operation of the pump after loss of motor power and the rate of
flow approximately matches the power run down following a
reactor trip.
The pump has capability to operate without external injection
(gland coolant external injection) but with process water available
from high pressure cooler. During hot standby condition when the
pumps are unavailable, high pressure coolers which are located at
an elevation higher than the seal location provide necessary ther-
mosyphon flow to ensure that temperature in seal areas do not
increase.
The pump casing design is in accordance with the requirements
for class-1 components of ASME B&PV Code Section III.
Primary circulating pump motor unit is a vertical assembly, with
dead weight being supported at two locations; 80% on two spring
hangers located on boiler room floor and 20% on pump room
floor through straight pipe piece attached to suction elbow. To
reduce stresses in heavy water pipes under operating conditions,
sliding support has been provided at the bottom of pump suction
elbow. To mitigate large displacements of pump motor unit under
earthquake, two horizontal snubbers each of 100 Te safe shut-
down earthquake (SSE) rating have been provided at pump motor
C.G. location in two mutually perpendicular directions. The pump
bottom support is designed to resist vertical loads during the
earthquake.
68.3.2.3 Pressurizer In 500 MWe PHWRs pressurizer is incor-
porated into the PHT main circuit to reduce onerous demand on feed
and bleed system to control inventory and pressure of the system. In
these reactors, feed and bleed system mainly acts as inventory con-
trol system and backup for pressure control when pressurizer is not
available. Pressurizer is connected to Reactor Outlet Header (ROH)
of each loop through one common isolation valve and two isolating
valves, one for each loop. The flow path is from ROH to steam gen-
erator to Primary Circulating Pump and then to Reactor Inlet Header
(RIH). Pressurizer is located in the pump room.
The heat transport medium is kept in a pressurized liquid state
by a pressurizer (surge tank) backed up by control valves, which
feed or bleed heavy water from the system including pressurizer.
Pressurizers are fabricated and machined from carbon steel
forgings with nonintegral nozzles for piping connections. The
forgings of the vessel conform to SA 508 Cl.3 and in-house speci-
fication, and are made from vacuum degassed, Electro Slag
Remelted (ESR), killed fine grained steel. The forgings are deliv-
ered in normalized heat-treated and fully machined condition. The
in-house specification imposes special requirements on chemical
composition and notch toughness for these forgings. Pressurizer is
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6 • Chapter 68
in accordance with the requirements for Class-1 components of
ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NB.
68.3.2.4 Headers In 540-MWe reactor there are four outlet
headers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit. Each outlet header
receives flow from 98 outlet feeders and directs the flow to the
steam generator via two inlet pipes. There are also four inlet head-
ers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit. Each inlet header
receives flow from the primary coolant pump and distributes the
flow to 98 inlet feeders.
Headers in 540-MWe PHWR are machined from single-piece
carbon steel forgings with integral nozzles for feeders and other
piping connections, and the ends are closed by ellipsoidal caps.
The single-piece forgings are made from the material conforming
to SA 350 LF2 and in house specification. Also, these are made
from vacuum degassed, Bohler Electro Slag hot topping process
(BEST) killed fine grained steel forgings and are delivered in nor-
malized heat-treated and fully machined condition. The in-house
specification imposes special requirements on chemical composi-
tion and notch toughness for these forgings. Reactor headers are
designed to meet the requirements for Class-1 components of
ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NB.
In principle the reactor outlet headers are floating assemblies
and govern the design/behavior of the rest of the circuit. Each out-
let header is mainly suspended through two steam generator inlet
(SGI) lines connected to SG’s inlet nozzle and resting on sliding
guide supports. Each of the reactor inlet headers is suspended
through two pump discharge lines (PDL) connected to discharge
nozzles of main circulating pump.
To reduce large displacement due to inertial loading under
earthquake, two snubbers each of 200 KN capacities have been
provided at each outlet header.
68.3.3 Feeders
There are 784 feeders in all, 392 at each end of the reactor, in
540-MWe PHWR. The 392 feeders at each end of the reactor run
from the fuel channels vertically up the face of the reactor and
thereafter horizontally across and above the fuelling machine area
to the reactor headers.
In order to achieve uniform outlet temperature, the feeders
range in four sizes, namely, 80-mm Nominal Bore (NB), 65- mm
NB, 50-mm NB, and 40-mm NB. These are inside diameter (ID)-
controlled pipes.
The feeders are of seamless carbon steel pipes conforming to
SA 333 Gr.6 material and in accordance with the requirements for
Class-1 components of the ASME B&PV Code Section III,
Subsection NB.
The feeder pipes are arranged in banks, with a maximum of 10
feeders in a bank. The feeders are connected to end fittings by
high-pressure pipe couplings at lower end and are welded to
header stubs at upper end. On the basis of analytical studies car-
ried out on feeders, it is observed that maximum stress occurs, in
general, either at elbow after the coupling or at the pipe bend
location near header end. Thus, to take care of higher seismic
load, the elbows at these ends have been strengthened by increas-
ing the wall thickness.
68.3.4 Piping
All of the piping in the main primary heat transport system is
of seamless carbon steel, ASME SA 333 Gr. 6, and designed and
fabricated in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III,
Subsection NB requirements. SA 333 Gr.6 seamless carbon
steel pipes are intended even for the low-temperature application
and have been preferred over SA 106 Gr. B piping used in
NAPP and earlier reactors because of inherent fracture tough-
ness property.
In all standardized 220-MWe and 540-MWe PHWRs, the three
important segments of PHT piping are running from ROH to SG
inlet nozzle; SG outlet nozzle to suction nozzle of PCP, and from
discharge nozzle of PCP to RIH. The dead weight of outlet head-
er, feeders, and heavy water SG inlet pipes would cause undue
large moments on SG inlet nozzle because of offset between SG
and outlet header along N-S axis. To reduce these moments,
sliding guide supports resisting vertical loads have been incorpo-
rated in heavy water pipes connecting outlet header to SG inlet
nozzles.
68.3.4.1 Design Philosophy All the components of main PHT
system are categorized as Class I components and hence have been
designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Division I NB.
Detailed design by analysis approach has been adopted for all
Class I components. All the components have been designed for
six sets of conditions. These six service levels and the loads con-
sidered for each of them are summarized below:
Design Conditions Internal pressure ⫹ Dead weight (cold
flooded)
Level ‘A’ Service Loadings (Normal Operation) Internal
pressure ⫹ Thermal loads ⫹ Operating cycles.
Level ‘B’ Service Loadings (Up-set Condition) Internal pres-
sure ⫹ Thermal loads ⫹ operation basis earthquake (OBE)
(inertial) ⫹ OBE (Seismic anchor movement) loads ⫹ oper-
ating cycles. Operation basis earthquake inertial and OBE
seismic anchor movement loads have been combined on
absolute sum basis.
Level ‘C’ Service Loadings (Emergency Condition) Internal
pressure ⫹ Dead weight
Level ‘D’ Service Loadings (Faulted Condition) Internal
pressure ⫹ Dead weight ⫹ SSE Inertial load.
Test Conditions Test pressure ⫹ Dead weight
68.3.5 Coolant Channel Assembly
Coolant channel assemblies house the fuel bundles and contain
the hot pressurized heavy water coolant flowing through them.
Each coolant channel assembly consists of a Zr-2.5% Nb coolant
tube, two martensitic stainless steel end fittings–one each at either
end, and associated hardware. The coolant tube is rolled to end
fittings at both ends. Each coolant tube is thermally isolated from
cold heavy water present in the calandria vessel by a seamless- or-
seam-welded concentric Zircaloy-4 calandria tube, which is rolled
into the tube sheet of the end shield assembly at both ends.
Calandria tube envelops coolant tube forming an annulus space
between the two tubes. Calandria tubes are manufactured out of
Zircaloy-4 material either by seamless route involving hot extru-
sion and cold pilgering or by seam welding cylindrically formed
tubes from strips. Both types of tubes would meet the specified
longitudinal and transverse mechanical properties such as ulti-
mate tensile strength (UTS), yield strength (YS), and elongation
percentage. Calandria tubes are vacuum annealed to minimize
residual stresses.
Coolant tubes that are the most important structural components
in the reactor core are manufactured from Zr-2.5% Nb alloy.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 7
Coolant tube is attached at either end to a stainless steel (type AISI-
403 modified) end fitting by a roll-expanded joint. These joints are
of zero-clearance type and this feature helps in controlling the
residual stresses in the joint region to a low level, providing neces-
sary safeguard from delayed hydride cracking of coolant tube.
Coolant tubes are seamless tubes produced by hot extrusion
and cold pilgering followed by stress relieving (autoclaving) in a
steam atmosphere. The ends of the coolant tubes require special
finishing operations to obtain stringent dimensional control neces-
sary for zero-clearance rolled joints. The inlet and outlet end of
coolant tube is roll expanded to end fittings made of martensitic
stainless steel (type 403 modified) solid forgings. End fitting is an
open-ended tubular body of approximately 164 mm outside diam-
eter and 2516 mm length. It has an integral side opening (feeder
hub) to which the feeder pipe is attached.
Although zirconium alloys are not ASME Code approved mate-
rials, attempts have been made to follow all the requirements of
the ASME Code for each component. Rolled joints are also not
covered by ASME Code. However, detailed development work
and evaluation have been carried out to qualify these joints for
reactor application and to establish that these joints satisfy all
design requirements.
68.3.5.1 Calandria Tube The ends of calandria tubes are joined
with calandria side tube sheet of end shield assembly by means of
a special type of rolled joint called sandwich rolled joint. This joint
is developed for a thin tube and low-pressure conditions. If the
calandria tube is directly rolled into a plain or grooved tube sheet,
the joint would not develop the required seating pressure and hence
the required leak tightness. Due to this limitation, a sandwich type
of joint is adopted where calandria tube is squeezed (sandwiched)
between an inner-landed sleeve insert of stainless steel Type 410 in
a full annealed condition and the outer stainless steel tube sheet.
The ends of the calandria tubes are flared to a larger diameter to
accommodate the landed sleeve insert and to provide design clear-
ances between the coolant and calandria tubes anywhere along
the channel axis. Joint configuration with PIWR (percentage insert
wall reduction) of 6.5 – 7.5 is selected after development work.
Calandria tube rolled joints have a minimum pullout load of
31 metric tons and a leak tightness of 3 ⫻ 10⫺6 cm3/s.
During normal operation, calandria tubes are subjected to a
temperature of 75 oC and maximum external pressure of 1.45
Kg/cm2, corresponding to the lowermost row of calandria tubes in
the calandria vessel (hydrostatic head of 0.85 Kg/cm2 ⫹ modera-
tor helium cover gas pressure of 0.6 Kg/cm2) . In addition, calan-
dria tube is subjected to (i) garter spring loads, (ii) Buoyancy
force, (iii) direct pressure load on the tube sheets causing a tensile
loading on all tubes, and iv) stresses due to differential thermal
expansion of calandria tubes and calandria shell.
Calandria Tube Collapse Pressure. The calandria tubes are
designed on the basis of neutron economy and collapse due to
external pressure. The wall thickness is set at a minimum value,
satisfying the requirement of stability against collapse pressure.
The design also caters for postulated accident conditions where
overpressure of the calandria vessel is assumed. Calandria tube
collapse pressure works out to be 2.85 Kg/cm2.
68.3.5.2 Coolant Tube The temperatures and pressures at the
inlet and the outlet considered in design are as follows:
Coolant tube inlet pressure 124.18 Kg/cm2
Coolant tube inlet temperature 260 ⬚C
Coolant tube outlet pressure 115.82 Kg/cm2
Coolant tube outlet temperature 304 ⬚C
Since the pressure and temperature vary along the length of the
coolant tube, the design condition is established by evaluating
stresses at several locations along the length to determine which
location requires the largest wall thickness. Minimum required
coolant tube wall thickness calculated on this basis works out to
4.3 mm, inclusive of corrosion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm,
with critical section of the tube being the inlet end.
Coolant tubes are designed in accordance with the intent of
ASME Section III, Subsection NB requirements. As per ASME
Code, design stress intensity for coolant tubes should be the
lowest of
(a) 1/3 of the specified minimum UTS at room temperature,
(b) 1/3 of UTS at temperature,
(c) 2/3 of the specified minimum YS at room temperature, and
(d) 2/3 of YS at temperature.
Of the above criteria, the governing quantity deciding coolant
tube design stress is the 1/3 UTS at operating temperature.
Neutron-irradiation-enhanced creep deformation is one of the
important factors deciding the life of coolant tube in PHWRs.
Based on the present level of understanding, the coolant tube
is estimated to undergo a diametric creep strain of the order
of 3% and an axial elongation of 2.5% during the life of the
reactor. The potential life limiting concerns due to creep are as
follows:
(a) Diametral expansion causing bypass of coolant flow around
the fuel bundles, and
(b) Relative sag between coolant tube and calandria tube caus-
ing possible contact.
Corrosion and Hydriding. Zr-2.5% Nb alloy has good corro-
sion resistance in high temperature water as long as oxygen con-
tent is held extremely low. The predicted corrosion rate is expected
to be about 0.1 mm over the operating life of the reactor. A corro-
sion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm is provided on the coolant
tube. Moreover, finished tubes are autoclaved in steam atmosphere
at 400 ⬚C for 24 h to form a protective layer on the tube surface.
The presence of 1% oxygen in the circulating annulus gas moni-
toring system helps in maintaining a constant oxide layer thickness
at the tube OD.
The more complex part of the corrosion reaction is the absorp-
tion of hydrogen evolved in the oxidation reaction of heavy water
with zirconium. Hydrogen is evolved in this reaction and a portion
of this hydrogen is absorbed by the zirconium alloy; this phenome-
non is termed “hydrogen pickup” by the alloy. If the hydrogen
concentration in the tube exceeds the solubility limit, then it pre-
cipitates as zirconium hydrides.
The solid solubility of hydrogen in zirconium alloys is very low
– below 150 ⬚C. Hence, more zirconium hydrides will be present
at lower temperatures. Hydrogen when in solid solution in zirco-
nium alloys can be driven in directions of thermal stress and con-
centration gradients. Hydrogen in excess of solubility limits pre-
cipitates as zirconium hydrides. As zirconium hydrides are brittle,
this can lead to failure of coolant tube by initiation and propaga-
tion of a crack in the radial axial plane due to phenomenon of
delayed hydride cracking. Delayed hydride cracking is the
process of formation of hydrides and their cracking aided by the
presence of tensile hoop stress (including residual stress) and
defects in the tube.
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8 • Chapter 68

Following remedial measures have been implemented in the 68.4 DEVIATIONS FROM ASME CODE
design of a coolant tube against embrittlement effects and hydriding:
All the Indian PHWR components are, in general, designed, fab-
(1) Zero-clearance rolled joints, which will significantly ricated, commissioned, and tested as per the ASME Code require-
reduce the tensile residual stresses in the neighborhood of ments. However, there are some areas in PHWRs where deviation
rolled joint region. from the ASME Code requirements is unavoidable due to the basic
(2) Stringent Inspection and quality control, consisting of both, design of the reactor. Still, in such areas, the basic intent of the
angle beam and normal beam ultrasonic examinations as ASME Code is maintained. The following are such areas:
well as a supplementary eddy current examination.
(3) Control of impurities, such as hydrogen, chlorine, phos-
phorous, and carbon.
68.4.1 Calandria
(4) Autoclaving of coolant tube that produces hard adherent
68.4.1.1 Material of Calandria Tubes Material of calandria
oxide layer of about 1 ␮m thick on the tubes, which acts as
tubes is Zircaloy-2/ Zircaloy-4. This material has not been
a barrier for hydrogen ingress from annulus gas side.
approved by ASME Code Section III as Class I material. Since the
(5) Addition of oxygen in the annulus gas to avoid deteriora-
calandria tubes are present in reactor core, due to neutron econo-
tion of the oxide film.
my, choice of material for calandria tubes is restricted to
(6) Avoidance of cold pressurization to improve the flaw toler-
Zirconium alloys. ASME B&PVCode Section III has been devel-
ance at low system temperatures.
oped for PWRs and boiling water reactors (BWRs) designed and
Leak-Before-Break Methodology. Achieving leak before built in the United States. These reactors do not have calandria
break depends on the difference between the time available to tubes. For heavy water reactors, calandria tubes are inherently pre-
detect a leaking crack and time required to detect a leaking crack. sent, and thus this violation of code is unavoidable. However, the
The time available to detect a leak is estimated from design, manufacturing, and inspection follow Section III, Class I
philosophy.
Time available Ta (in hours) is given by
(C ⫺ 7W ) 68.4.1.2 Rolled Joints Between Calandria Tubes and
Ta ⫽ Calandria Side Tube Sheets This type of joint is not approved by
2V
ASME Code Section III for Class I components. The reason for
using this type of joint is that Zircaloy-2 cannot be easily welded
where C is the critical crack length (CCL), 7 W is the leakage size
to stainless steel. This violation of code also takes place due to
crack and V is the delayed hydrogen cracking velocity in the axial
presence of calandria tubes and thus is unavoidable. However, this
direction.
joint has been so developed that its pullout strength is at least equal
During service, CCL reduces and the DHC velocity increases
to tensile strength of calandria tube. Moreover, this joint is so
and the time available to detect a leaking crack decreases. If
designed that it is not falling on boundary of heavy water–light
hydrides are present and a defect does initiate DHC, then the time
water. Moreover, this joint has been experimentally proven satis-
available to detect the leak would be in the range of 11 – 12 h.
factory for strength and leak-tightness requirements.
Thus, a sensitive leak detection system called annulus gas moni-
toring system is implemented in the design that enables leak
68.4.1.3 Use of Rupture Disc for Overpressure Relief
detection and safe shutdown in less than 5 h.
Overpressure in calandria develops when rupture of a coolant
channel occurs in calandria vessel. During this condition, prima-
68.3.5.3 End Fittings End fittings are manufactured out of
ry coolant that operates at high temperature and high pressure
AISI-403 (modified) stainless steel. coolant tube and end fittings
gets liberated in moderator that operates at low temperature and
are connected by means of a rolled joint. To have a leak tight rolled
pressure. This results in pressurization of calandria vessel. Four
joint at all temperatures, end fittings need to have coefficient of
relief pipes having diameter of 500 mm are provided on calandria
thermal expansion as close as possible to that of the coolant tube.
vessel for relieving the pressure. The ends of these pipes are
End fittings also require comparable values of mechanical proper-
closed by rupture disc assemblies. In case of a coolant channel
ties such as hardness with respect to coolant tube and liner tube for
rupture in calandria, these rupture discs break open and over-
rolled joint integrity. AISI-403 (modified) material can be heat
pressures in calandria are restricted.The use of rupture discs as
treated to attain the required mechanical properties.
the primary pressure relief device is not allowed by ASME
Results of fast neutron irradiation damage on AISI 403 materi-
B&PVCode Section III, Subsection NB. As per this subsection,
al at 304 ⬚C show that there is a change of NDTT from 40 ⬚C to
the rupture disc may be used in conjunction with safety valves.
about 100 ⬚C during the life of the reactor. The presence of trace
However, for the accident condition described above, the flow
elements such as copper, vanadium, antimony, aluminium, and
rate required for the pressure relief is so large that use of safety
arsenic can increase the shift in NDTT. Hence, these trace ele-
valves is not adequate.
ments are controlled to the extent possible in the end-fitting
It may be mentioned here that the reactors that are mainly
material. Presence of trace elements such as copper, vanadium,
addressed by ASME Code are light water reactors (LWRs). In
antimony, aluminium, and arsenic are controlled to a maximum
these reactors, the functions of moderator and coolant are per-
of 1450 ppm out of which copper alone is controlled to a maxi-
formed by the same fluid. There are no coolant channels in these
mum of 600 ppm.
reactors, so that the type of accident that is being considered for
End-fitting material is specified with the following impact
PHWR calandria is not relevant for these reactors. Overpressures
properties:
in the reactor vessels of these reactors occur mainly due to system
Longitudinal: 2.8 Kg/min at 20 ⬚C transients, and these can be relieved using safety valves and thus
Transverse: 2.1 Kg/min at 66 ⬚C the use of rupture disc is not necessary in these reactors.
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 9
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 9
Normal operating pressure of the helium cover gas that is at the
top of the calandria is low, that is, 0.3 kg/cm2(g). There is a relief
valve in the system, which opens when the system pressure rises
above 0.5 kg/cm2(g). This relief valve has a capacity of 2348 stan-
dard lpm, which is sufficient to take care of changes in volume of
moderator due to swelling or other minor causes. The rupture disc
set pressure is 1.4 kg/cm2(g), which is not close to the relief valve
setting.
So, the OPRDs come into action only when there is an accident
involving coolant tube rupture. The size of opening is such that
one OPRD is sufficient to relieve the pressure in calandria in case
of coolant tube rupture accident. For redundancy, four identical
rupture discs have been provided for each calandria.
The sample rupture disks are tested in shop for burst pressure
and cycle testing. The accepted range of burst pressure is 1.26–1.40
kg/cm2(g).
68.4.2 End Shields
68.4.2.1 Tri-Junction Welds The design of end shield meets all
requirements of ASME Code Section III, Class 2 in all respects
except for inspection of joint among lattice tubes, baffle plates, and
calandria side tube sheet. However, ultrasonic technique has been
developed for this purpose. In addition to ultrasonic examination,
dye penetrant (DP) examinations are carried out after each weld-
ing pass. Mock-up weld passes are carried out everyday before
start of welding to ensure good quality. These mock-ups are sec-
tioned and inspected if found necessary.
68.4.2.2 Monitoring of Intermetallic Joint (Diaphragm
Plates) Diaphragm plates are provided in the calandria side tube
sheet and the fuelling machine tube sheet. The diaphragm plates
have lower thickness compared to the tube sheets to provide the
flexibility required to allow thermal expansion of the calandria
tubes. There are weld joints between the diaphragm plates and the
tube sheets. Total thermal neutron flux at this joint is 1.08 E11
n/cm2/s. This is not expected to cause embrittlement of the material
over a period of 30 FPY. Stress analysis shows that stress level in
this zone is very low. Quality control procedure assures no defect in
this joint (100% radiography in addition to root pass DP). Thus, no
failure is expected during service. The water level in expansion tank
and makeup rate are monitored continuously.
68.4.3 Coolant Channel Components
Material of Coolant Tubes. Zirconium–Niobium alloy has not
been used as a material for the pressure-retaining components in
LWRs. Here also, the intent of ASME Code is followed in the
design, manufacture, inspection, and testing of the tubes.
Rolled Joint Between Coolant Tubes and End Fittings. The
reasons for using rolled joint here are same as those for the joint
between calandria tube and the calandria tube sheet.
Material of End Fitting. Material of end fittings is marten-
sitic stainless steel AISI 403 (modified), hardened and tempered.
The essential elements of modification are (i) controlled range of
C and Cr to achieve consistent mechanical properties with same
heat treatment parameters and (ii) low level of residuals to
reduce the shift in ductile to brittle transition temperature due to
irradiation.
This material has been approved by ASME, vide Code Case
No. N-4-11 (approval date 13.7.81), as a pipe material, where the
toughness requirement as per NB-2332 applies. Accordingly, this
material is required to exhibit a lateral expansion (LE) of 25 mils
(0.65 mm) minimum in a Cv test conducted at lowest service tem-
perature (LST).
A series of tests were conducted jointly by Nuclear Power
Corporation (NPC) and Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research (IGCAR) to obtain data on this aspect of unirradiated
end fitting material. From the results, it is clear that this material
is capable of meeting this code requirement at temperatures above
60 ⬚C. Nil ductility transition temperature of this material in unir-
radiated condition corresponding to 15 ft. lb. absorbed energy in
Cv test is 40 ⬚C. The shift in NDTT due to irradiation effect gets
saturated at a fluence of about 6.5E19 n/cm2. The maximum shift
is about 55 ⬚C. Further, a test was conducted at low temperature
to simulate radiation damage, in which an artificially produced
[electrical discharge machining (EDM)] notch defect in the high-
ly stressed rolled joint area was extended by fatigue and the end
fitting was tested up to burst. The end fitting could withstand
nearly three times the design pressure.
Therefore, end-fitting material is safe for all conditions of reac-
tor operations, as it always operates at 265 ⬚C. However, as a pre-
caution, hydro-test during manufacture and at precommissioning
stage is conducted at a minimum temperature of 65 ⬚C and also
cold pressurization is prohibited in the reactor, where during start-
up, pressurization starts at a temperature of 130 ⬚C.
Inspection of End Fittings. There are some areas of end fitting
(at the top of the nozzle and some portion of side) that are not
covered by bidirectional ultrasonic examination during manufac-
ture. At these places only straight beam technique is used.
68.4.4 Inaccessibility for In-Service Inspection
The reactor components such as end shields and calandria are
not accessible to periodic ISI. However, during design and fabri-
cation stage, all precautions are taken to see that no regular ISI is
needed for this component. Stress analysis for all the components
has been done as required by the code.
68.5 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION,
LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK, ISI,
CONTAINMENT DESIGN
68.5.1 Seismic Qualification
The various structures, systems, and components in NPP are
classified into three categories [8]. Category I systems are those
whose failure could lead to release of activity into containment or
in the environment (e.g., reactor containment structure, PHT sys-
tem and so on) and are designed for S1 (equivalent to OBE)- and
S2 (equivalent to SSE)-level earthquakes [9]. Category II struc-
tures (e.g., waste management building) are designed for S2-level
earthquake and Category III structures (e.g., turbine building,
turbo-generator and so on) are designed for earthquake resistance
as per national practice [10].
Due to the numerical difficulties associated with use of
plate/shell elements for complex geometries, the present practice
is to carry out separate analysis for the entire reactor building
using 3D stick model, in which the inner containment (IC) is
modeled using a separate 3D stick connected to the reactor build-
ing raft. In this method, the structure is modeled using 3D beam
properties based on strain energy equivalence between 3D finite
element model and 3D beam model. Lateral torsional coupling
and the effect of flexibility of floors, offset, and partial support of
walls are accounted for. In this method, the beams are located at
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10 • Chapter 68

OCW
ICW 10
1 9
1 4
2 24 8

Damping Ratio
6 VT
3 8 EW 7
5 6
10
7 5
12 NS 4
9 14 3
11 19 2
13 24 IS
1
18 28 17 0
LINK 44700 16 45
23 35 20 0 10 20 30 40
15 21 25 Frequency in Hz
27 40 26 29
11 34
34 30 CV FIG. 68.6 FREQUENCY DEPENDENT DAMPING VALUES
46 36 49
37 41 33 (ASME CODE CASE N 411-1)
39 71
56 50
42 48 38
45 30000
47 50 44
62 51
55 52 51 57 54
58
The floor-mounted equipment and piping are analyzed using
72 52 64 24000 60
61
67 66 63 74 floor response spectra. For this purpose, time history of the floor
59 70
71 78 58 81 82 motion is generated by performing a time history analysis of the
73
69 65
75 80
19000 76 RCB. The resulting spectra are broadened ⬰15% for use in equip-
77 58 83 86
88 79 57 ment design.
84 89 92
87 59 14250 For active equipment, such as electrical relays, switches, con-
94 85 60 95 101 tacts, shut-off rod drives and others, whose functioning solely
93 90 96
91 99 63 104 107 depends on the actuation of some parts within them, it is neces-
103 97
98 7500 81
102 100 64 105 110 sary to demonstrate their operability during an earthquake event
116
109 106 112 FLEXURAL CENTRE by testing on shake table. In addition, the equipment must with-
108 111 113
114 119 stand the effects of a number of OBEs prior to the SSE. The pro-
117 118 115 120 AREA CENTRE
cedures given in IEEE-344, 1987 for the assessment of integrity
23 44 121 69 126 000
122 NODES and operability are adopted for testing. For heavy equipment such
123 124 82
130
70
127 129 as primary heat transport pumps, it is acceptable to qualify by
RAFT 83 128 xxx ELEM detailed finite element analysis wherein the bearing stiffness, gap
131
between the casing and the impeller, and so on, must be consid-
FIG. 68.5 BEAM MODEL OF PHWR BUILDING ered in a mathematical model.

68.5.2 In-Service Inspection Philosophy

shear centers [11, 12] and the masses ate located at mass centers
with a rigid link joining the two (Fig. 68.5). Beam models are
used for obtaining the global seismic responses.
These are finally applied on the 3D finite element model for
evaluating the design stresses. The seismic analysis model was
supplemented by an axisymmetric model to evaluate the stresses
at the shell/dome interface. In the current design being carried out
for 700 MWe project, the seismic forces on the containment struc-
ture will be computed from a detailed 3D FE model developed
using beam/shell/solid elements.
For aspects such as soil–structure interaction, decoupling crite-
ria, and damping in concrete structures, guidelines of ASCE are
followed. The application of the decoupling criteria has resulted
in a model of the reactor containment building, which includes
beam elements representing calandria vault, calandria, and the
end shields.
The application of the decoupling criterion to the complex
structure such as containment structure is not straightforward.
Modifications have been suggested [13] that make the criteria applic-
able to the complex structure such as reactor containment structure.
This criterion is also not applicable for multiconnected equipment.
A new criterion [14, 15] was developed that can be used for checking
the decoupling requirement of multiconnected equipment.
For damping in piping, higher values such as the PVRC damp-
ing [16], as shown in Fig. 68.6, are also used.
As an integral part of quality assurance during operation, a
periodic program of in-service inspection has been instituted to
cover all critical items important to safety [17]. This program has
been formulated on the basis of guidelines given in IAEA Safety
Guide 50-SG-02 entitled “In-service Inspection for Nuclear
Power Plants” [18] and the Canadian Code CAN/CSA N285.4-05
and 8-05 [19, 20].
In formulating this program, the following special characteris-
tics of PHWRs have been taken into consideration:
• Use of a large number of coolant channel assemblies (306 for
235 MWe unit and 392 for 500 MWe unit) in place of a reac-
tor pressure vessel and leading to a multicomponent primary
cooling system.
• Use of a variety of material requiring different kinds of exam-
ination techniques.
• Strict requirements in limiting leakage of primary coolant
from the point of view of safety and economy.
• On-power refueling, which reduces the frequency of outages.
Examples of the components and methods of examination nor-
mally considered for the ISI program are listed in Table 68.3.
The inspection areas and degree of inspection required for each
system or component are determined by the inspection category,
which in turn is based on two factors: stress intensity (SI) ratio
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 11

TABLE 68.3 COMPONENTS AND METHODS

Low Medium High
OF EXAMINATION [17]
Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue
Factor Factor Factor
Items to be Examined Methods

Stress Intensity Ratio, RS

High
Vessel and piping Visual, volumetric, and integrative
C1 B A Stress
Pump and valve. Intensity
– weld Visual, volumetric, and integrative Medium
– interior surface Visual and surface (if material is sub- C1 B B Stress
jected to stress corrosion or erosion) Intensity
Support Low
– weld Visual, surface, and volumetric C2 C1 C1 Stress
– others Visual Intensity

Rotating machinery Visual, surface, and volumetric 0 0.01 0.1 1.0

Mechanical couplings Fatigue Usage Factor

– bolt Visual, surface, volumetric, and
integrative FIG. 68.7 DETERMINATION OF INSPECTION CATEGORY [17]
– stud
– nut
All components procedures adopted are generally in conformance with ASME
– corrosion UT Thickness gauging Section V and XI Codes.
– erosion The results of the preservice inspection (PSI) of the compo-
nents prior to the start of operation of the plant establish the base
Heat exchangers/steam line data required for comparison during subsequent ISI. This
generator examination is carried out using the same methods and techniques
– shell Visual, surface, and volumetric and types of inspection instruments as those, which are planned to
– tube Volumetric be used for in-service inspection. In the case of many components
and systems, the inspection data collected during manufacture
Coolant tube PT–CT Gap, Garter spring location,
serve as baseline data. PSI is performed either
volumetric, dimensional, and
hydrogen pickup (a) after the hydrostatic pressure test but before start up of the
reactor; or
Feeder pipe Visual, feeder gap, volumetric, and
(b) before the hydrostatic pressure test provided that a confir-
thickness
matory examination is performed after the component
hydrostatic pressure test and the results indicate no signifi-
cant change.
In order to minimize the radiation exposure of inspection per-
(Rs) and fatigue usage factor. There are three levels of stress
sonnel and keeping in view the fact that a large number of compo-
intensity, namely, high (ⱖ2/3), medium, and low (ⱕ1/3).
nents used are identical, a sampling approach has been taken for
working out the inspection program. For identical welds of identi-
Calculated SI
cal components, the number of welds to be inspected may be
reduced to FA. The value FA is taken from Fig. 68.8.
SI Ratio (Rs) ⫽
The in-service inspection intervals are chosen such that any dete-
Allowable SI rioration occurring in systems and components is detected well
before any failure takes place. The first inspection is carried out
Similarly, there are three levels of fatigue usage factor, namely, commencing from the end of the first year to the end of the fifth year
low (ⱕ0.01), medium, and high (ⱖ0.1). Based on different after going into commercial operation with the examinations spread
combinations of stress intensity ratio and fatigue usage factor, as evenly as practicable over the period. The subsequent in-service
four levels of inspection categories A, B, C1, and C2 in the inspections are scheduled at intervals of 10 years (Table 68.4).
decreasing degree of examination requirements have been arrived Acceptance Standards for Visual, Surface, and Volumetric
at (Fig. 68.7). Examinations are Same as Those in ASME Code Section XI.
Inspection category A requires examination of all welded While the components of primary heat transport system do
points and adjacent base metal. Category B requires examination receive the inspection commensurate with their importance, the
of at least one-third of the inspection areas. For Category C1, no major challenges faced by the Indian PHWRs are (i) Life man-
examination is required if the metal is ductile and creep resistant agement of coolant channels, and (ii) thinning of feeders and sec-
and the effects of neutron irradiation are not significant. For cate- ondary side piping due to flow accelerated corrosion (FAC).
gory C2, no examination is required. The inspection methods are These challenges have been successfully met through ISI and
of non-destructive type such as visual, dye penetrant, ultrasonic, maintenance/replacement strategies. The coolant channels suffer
radiography, acoustic emission, and hydro and leak testing. The from degradation due to irradiation creep resulting in increase in
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12 • Chapter 68

As far as replacement is concerned, India has successfully

100 completed en masse coolant channel replacement in four reactors
where Zircaloy-2 pressure tubes were used. Also, feeder replace-
Number of Identical
Components/Welds

ment has been successfully completed in three reactors.

10 68.5.3 Leak-Before-Break
Leak-before-break approach has been applied to primary heat
transport system piping of 500-MWe Indian PHWR as per
NUREG-CR-1061, Vol.3 [21], and IAEA TECDOC-710 [22].
Parallel to these analyses, a comprehensive Component Integrity
1 Test Program has been initiated to address some of the issues in
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the fatigue and fracture analyses. These issues include the trans-
Number of Components to be inspected
ferability of the specimen fracture parameters to the component
level, the effect of cyclic/ dynamic load (that may occur during an
FIG. 68.8 INSPECTION SAMPLE FOR IDENTICAL COMPO- earthquake) on fracture properties, the effect of system compli-
NENTS/WELDS [17] ance on the load-bearing capacity of piping components and so
on. For in-depth understanding of these issues, 70 fatigue/fracture
tests have been conducted so far on full-scale piping components.
TABLE 68.4 INSPECTION SCHEDULE FOR PRESSURIZED
Apart from these, probabilistic methodology has also been used to
HEAVY WATER REACTOR
address the uncertainty associated with the input parameters used
in the LBB analysis. The present paper discusses the LBB qualifi-
Inspection period cation of PHT system piping of 500 MWe Indian PHWR and
indicated as Minimum addresses some of the issues not considered in LBB concepts by
calendar year of percentage of Maximum above standards.
plant service from examinations percentage of The LBB concept is basically demonstrated through fracture
Inspection commencement of required to be examinations mechanics analysis that there is negligible chance of catastrophic
Interval operation completed credited break of PHT pipes without giving prior indication of leakage. This
1st 0–2 16 34 involves detailed fracture mechanics studies of different piping
(5 years) 2–5 100 100 components such as straight pipe, elbow and branch tee. Leak-
before-break is ensured by demonstrating three levels of safety
2nd 5–8 16 34
assessment against sudden double-ended guillotine break (DEGB).
(10 years) 8–12 50 67
Level 1 is inherent in the design philosophy of ASME Code Section
12–15 100 100
III [2], which is normally followed in piping design. Ductile and
3rd 15–18 16 34 tough materials are widely used in nuclear power plant piping due
(10 years) 18–22 50 67 to their high resistance against nonductile rupture. The design is
22–25 100 100 done with a well-defined factor of safety of code- specified 95%
4th 25–28 16 34 exceedance probability on strength. It does not permit the presence
(10 years) 28–32 50 100 of any defect larger in size than allowed in ASME Code Section III
32–35 100 100 for girth welds. The demonstration of Level 2 safety consists of
postulating a surface crack mostly in the weld, which may go unde-
Note Plant life is assumed to be 40 years. tected during the nondestructive examination. It is then shown that
there is insignificant crack growth of this surface crack during the
entire life period of the reactor. In this crack growth study, one
should consider all the possible crack growth mechanisms such as
diameter and sag; deuterium pickup resulting from corrosion corrosion, erosion, fatigue, creep, flow-induced vibration, and so
reaction lead to loss of fracture toughness. The ISI program for on, whichever may be operative for the particular piping system.
coolant channels consists of the following: From the operating experience of various PHWRs, it has been
observed that under the controlled environment of PHT piping sys-
(a) Nondestructive examination for flaws including flaws in
tem, fatigue is the only crack growth mechanism which cannot be
the rolled joint region.
totally ruled out. Hence, one should perform the fatigue crack
(b) Channel CT–PT gap, wall thickness, axial elongation,
growth study of the postulated surface flaw in the PHT pipes. In the
channel sag, and so on.
Level 3 safety assessment, a through-wall crack is postulated at the
(c) Eddy-current detection for location of garter springs.
maximum stress location with the worst material properties. The
(d) Measurement of gap between coolant tube and calandria
size of the crack is chosen so as to ensure the predicted leakage is
tube.
detected by the leak monitoring devices. Finally, it is shown that
(e) Sliver sampling for measurement of hydrogen content.
this crack will withstand the maximum credible load that may act
BARC In-service inspection System (BARCIS) and sliver sam- during a safe shutdown earthquake.
pling scraping tools are some of the important tools developed for
ISI of coolant channels. 68.5.3.1 Fatigue Crack Growth Tests Fatigue crack growth
Flow accelerated corrosion has become another focused area tests [23] have been conducted on pipes till the crack depth has
following some recent incidents. Thickness measurement is regu- reached through-wall. During the tests, crack depth and number of
larly carried out at a large number of locations. cycles have been recorded. Maximum crack depth and number of
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 13
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 13
FIG. 68.9 MAXIMUM CRACK DEPTH VERSUS NUMBER
OF CYCLES FOR DIFFERENT INITIAL CRACK DEPTH AND
R ⴝ 0.5 [23]
406MM OD Pipe and pipe weld
20 PBSC16-1
PBSC16-2
PBSC16-3
14 PBSC16-4
PBSC16-5
PBSC16-6
2C/a
12
8 68.5.3.3 Compliance Effect on Load Carrying Capacity of
4
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
a/t
FIG. 68.10 VARIATION IN ASPECT RATIO WITH CRACK-
GROWTH FOR 324-MM OUTER DIAMETER PIPE [23]
cycles for given stress ratio (R) and initial crack depth in pipes
have been shown in Fig. 68.9. Maximum crack depth and number
of cycles calculated analytically have also been shown in Fig. 68.9
and shows a good comparison. Figure 68.10 shows that crack
growth in depth direction is more rapid compared with circumfer-
ential direction and the limiting value of the aspect ratio is between
2.5and 5. This is essential for verification of Level 2 LBB.
68.5.3.2 The Cyclic Loading Effect on Load-Carrying
Capacity of Piping Components Leak-before-break assessment
is based primarily on the monotonic fracture tearing instability.
The effect of cyclic loading has generally not been considered in
the fracture assessment of nuclear power plant piping. The pipe
fracture analysis used in present LBB considers the seismic load-
ing as a one-time applied load of magnitude equal to peak load at
the postulated flaw location during the earthquake event. The
assessment of pipe with flaw (or crack) is based on the monotonic
tearing instability or Net Section Collapse (NSC). There is no
explicit consideration of the cyclic damage or the number of
applied load cycles during earthquake event.
An experimental and analytical investigation [24] was carried
out by conducting tests on full-scale circumferential through- wall
cracked pipe under reversible cyclic loading conditions. The
experiments covers a wide range of pipe sizes (NPS: 6⬙, 8⬙, 12⬙,
16⬙), crack sizes (2␪: 60⬚, 90⬚, 120⬚), material (low carbon man-
ganese steel, stainless steel), crack location (base, weld), loading
mode (load controlled, displacement controlled), and loading para-
meters (load ratio, load amplitude, displacement increment etc.).
The cyclic test results have been compared with the corresponding
monotonic pipe fracture test results to quantify the damage (loss in
load-carrying capacity) due to cyclic loading as a function of num-
ber of load cycles, and a simplified master curve has been generat-
ed to include the cyclic tearing damage in LBB assessment. The
master curve is a plot of the cyclic load amplitude (given as per-
cent of maximum load recorded in corresponding monotonic frac-
ture test) versus number of load cycles to failure (Nf) as shown in
Fig. 68.11. Few available results on similar tests (on 4⬙-pipe,
STS410 Japanese carbon steel) from literature of Central Research
Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan [25] have also
been plotted in the master curve and are in good agreement with
the results of the present tests series. The curve is independent of
crack sizes as well as pipe sizes since all experiment data lie with-
in a narrow scatter band.
This curve gives the load reduction factor as a function of num-
ber of load cycles and is applied on the monotonic critical load.
The curve suggests an additional safety factor “␤c” of 4/3 for SSE
loading and 3/2 for OBE loading over the monotonic critical load
for LLB assessment. For an OBE, the factor is relatively higher in
view of its higher frequency of occurrence than a SSE.
Piping Components A phenomenon mitigating the effect
described in the preceding section is the role of system compliance.
It means the stiffening effect of the connected piping on the cracked
section is negligible. Moreover, in these analyses the LBB assess-
ment is based on the maximum load, irrespective of the location at
which they are acting. However, in the real situation, the local com-
pliance of the cracked section and the global residual compliance of
the piping system may have significant effect on the load-carrying
capacity of the cracked pipe. These compliance effects must be
included while evaluating the safety margins. This is due to the fact
that the load acting on the cracked section changes, during crack
growth, because of indeterminacy of the piping system. Thus, a
purely load-controlled condition, representing the case of a piping
system with infinite compliance, changes into a mixed mode, that
is, partly load-controlled and partly displacement-controlled. As a
result the crack section sheds some of the load during the crack
growth, and this load is picked up by the connecting piping system.
The load redistribution may increase safety margin. For simplified
fracture mechanics calculation, an analytical expression is pro-
posed [26, 27] to evaluate actual moment at the cracked section in
a 3D piping system equation:
冤
Mu 1␴
Lc
Leff冥
Mc ⫽
冤1␴ LL I 冥
c I
eff eff
Here Mu is the uncracked moment and Mc is the actual moment at
the cracked section. Lc and Ieff are the length and effective
moment of inertia of the equivalent piping element used to simu-
late crack. The Leff is the equivalent length of the pipe modeled
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 14

14 • Chapter 68

Basis of βc factor in Proposed LBB Design Criteria

95
QCSP-8-60-L3-CSB Load Controlled Cyclic Tearing Tests
QCSP-6-60-L2-SSB

C-4 (2θ=60) 90

Cyclic Tearing : Load Amplitude (Given as %

SA333 Gr.6 Carbon Steel

of Monotonic Experimental Fracture Load)

QCSP-8-60-L2-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSW Base Metal
QCSP-16-120-L1-CSB
C-1 (2θ=30°) SA333 Gr.6 Carbon Steel 85
Weld Metal
QCSP-8-60-L2-CSW QCSP-12-90-L6-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L1-SSB STS410 Japanese Carbon
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSW C-6 (2θ=60°)
Steel Base Metal 80
QCSP-8-60-L4-CSW QCSP-6-60-L4-SSB
QCSP-8-90-L6-CSB SS 304 L Stainless Steel
QCSP-8-60-L1-CSW C-2 (2θ=30°) Steel
βc = 0.75 QCSP-8-60-L5-CSB
75
C-6 (2θ=30°)

QCSB-8-60-L4-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSB
70
Safe LBB
Design 67
25 Tests were conducted on Straight
65
Pipes: 6 ″, 8 ″, 12 ″, & 16 ″ NB Pipes of
Carbon and Stainless Steel Material
60
0 20 50 80 100 120 140 160 180

FIG. 68.11 MASTER CURVE FOR CYCLIC TEARING ASSESSMENT [24]

with fixed-end conditions, which simulates piping system com- Load-Displacement Plot
pliance at the crack element. The I is moment of inertia of the 1
pipe. Crack initiation load
Actual tests were performed on reactor grade pipes to validate 0.8
theoretical studies regarding the effects of system compliance on System Test
fracture integrity. Seven fracture tests have been conducted in 0.6
P/Po

which system compliance was simulated by fixed ends and it was
varied in terms of L/R parameters. The main conclusions of this
experimental study can be summarized as follows:
• Fracture load of a piping system having even very large
crack size is very near the collapse load of an uncracked pip-
ing system (as shown in Fig. 68.12), thereby proving that
large plastic straining occur at uncracked ends before the
system collapse.
• A large margin was observed between crack initiation load
and the maximum load that the piping system has sustained.
It is worth noting that in conventional fracture tests (infinite
compliance), crack initiation load is usually very near to the
maximum collapse load.
68.5.3.4 LBB ASSESSMENT of 500 MWe PHWR PIPING
Fatigue Crack Growth Analysis of 500 MWe TAPP 3&4
PHT Piping (Level 2). A part-through semi-elliptical circumfer-
ential flaw at the inside surface of pipe is postulated. The depth
of flaw is conservatively assumed to be 25% of wall thickness of
pipe based on ASME Code Section III, Appendix G recommen-
dation. The flaw aspect ratio is assumed to be six, which is repre-
sentative of typical flaw found in service. Cyclic loading due to
normal operating condition (Service Levels A and B) is consid-
ered to calculate the fatigue crack growth. Paris power law as
Component Test
0.4
0.2
Crack initiation load
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Actuator Disp. (mm)
FIG. 68.12 COMPARISON OF COMPONENT AND SYSTEM
LOAD DISPLACEMENT BEHAVIOUR (PO REFERS TO LIMIT
LOAD OF UNCRACKED COMPONENT/SYSTEM)
given in ASME Section XI [3] is used. Table 68.5 shows the vari-
ous transient events and the number of excursions of each event
postulated for the entire design life period of the reactor. It was
seen that the fatigue crack growth is very small (original crack
depth of 25% increased to 27%) over the entire design life period
of the reactor.
Fracture Assessment (Level 3). The fracture assessment of
PHT system pipes, with postulated through-wall circumferen-
tial and axial flaws, was carried out using the concept of a
two-criteria failure assessment diagram (FAD) [28], which
describes the interaction between fracture and collapse and is
documented as the R-6 procedure. The results obtained have
been used to qualify leak-before-break criteria of PHT pipes.
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 15
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 15
TABLE 68.5 VARIOUS TRANSIENT EVENTS POSTULATED
FOR ENTIRE DESIGN LIFE OF 500 MWe TAPP 3&4
Sl. No. Event No. of cycles
1 Operation basis 50 (5 events, each
earthquake causing 10 cycles)
2 Heat-up from cold 1000
shutdown to hot standby
3 Start-up from hot 3500
standby to full power
4 Power maneuvering 15,000
at full power
The R-6 method was also used to perform sensitivity analysis
for reserve margins with respect to different input parameters
such as material properties, material test temperature, initial
crack length and so on.
The margins (FL ⫽ critical load/applied load) obtained for the
different piping segments using R-6 method and accounting for
the cyclic loading effect, range from 1.7 to 3.4 against a minimum
required value of √2.
68.5.3.5 General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation
for Pipe Bends under In-Plane Bending The limit load assess-
ment is essential to prevent the pipe or pipe bends to fail by
excessive deformation or collapse. Currently available limit load
equations have a limited range of applicability and do not cover
the wide range of bend geometries that are used in power plant
piping. Ideally, the elbow limit load equation should approach
straight pipe limit load with increasing pipe bend radius. Keeping
this fact in mind, finite element analyses of around 65 elbows
having different geometric parameters were performed. The
parameters considered were elbow bend radius (rb) to mean
radius (R) ratio (2, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 18) and pipe radius (R) to
thickness (t) ratio (5, 7.5, 10, 15, 20, and 30).
One quarter of elbow was modeled using three-dimensional 20
nodded brick elements and elastic perfectly and a plastic analysis
was performed, which included the geometric nonlinearity. The
analyses have been carried out for both in-plane closing and open-
ing bending, and limit load for each case was determined using
the twice elastic slope method. A relational study was performed
to understand the dependence of limit load on the R /t, rb /R and
elbow characteristic h. The study addressed the weakening factor
(Wf ), that is, the normalized limit loads (ratio of limit load of
elbow to limit load of corresponding pipe). A simple expression
for weakening factor (or limit load) is proposed [29] for “closing
bending,” which covers the entire domain of the parameters and
provides a good prediction of limit load for nonstandard elbows.
A margin consistent definition [30] for B2 index defines it as the
ratio of the pipe collapse load to the collapse load of correspond-
ing elbow.
MLElbow ⫽ Wf MPipe
L ⫽ Wf (4R2 ␴o)
Limit moment of an equivalent pipe 1
B2 ⫽ ⫽ mation. In order to obtain the stresses in the discontinuity areas
Limit moment of the elbow Wf
0.2
⫽ 1⫹ (68.1)
h1.028⫹0.95rb /R
The Section III of ASME B&PV Code allows for design by sim-
plified analysis (NB-3600) using stress indices. The B2 index is used
for calculating the primary stress intensity due to bending load.
Using margin consistent definition, the ASME Code expression
⫺2
for B2 can easily deduced as 1.3␭ /3 from the lower bound in-
plane limit moment expression for the elbow as 0.8␭0.6MLPipe given
by Spence and Findlay [31]. However, The ASME Code has typi-
cally defined B2 as two-third of C2 index. Thus, the stress index
value of 1.3 for B2 in the ASME Code is equal to 2/3 of 1.95. The
ASME Code C2 index is based on Dodge and Moore [32] investi-
gations on the stress intensities in curved pipe under combinations
of in-plane, out-of-plane, and torsional moments. He found that a
C2 index of 1.95/(h2/3) would conservatively predict the maximum
stress intensity for any resultant moment.
ASME B2 index is found to be in good agreement for extra
large bend-radius elbows. However it is very conservative for
standard elbows (rb /R ⫽ 2 and 3). Based on these investigations,
a new B2 index (Eq. 68.1) is proposed, which eliminates undesir-
able conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it
can be used for elbows of any bend radius. Figure 68.13 shows
the conservatism of present B2 index equation as well as com-
pares the limit load equation with other literature equations as
Caladine [33], Touboul [34], Chattopadhyay [35], and Kim [36].
Similar equations are also proposed for opening bending, clos-
ing, and opening bending for elbow with circumferential through-
wall crack.
68.5.4 Containment Design
The containment design has evolved from single containment
in Rajasthan Atomic Power Station to full double containment in
all the current designs with the provision of openings in the dome
of reactor building for erection of steam generator. The design
follows the guidelines of French Design Code RCC-G [4].
68.5.4.1 Design Against Membrane Stresses The major loads
considered for the design of containment structure are dead load,
prestress loads with appropriate losses, internal pressure on account-
postulated design basis accident scenario, temperature loads under
test, normal operating and design basis accident conditions, envi-
ronmental loads, namely, seismic (both operating basis earthquake
and safe shutdown earthquake) and wind loads. Appropriate live
loads under normal operating condition as well as during construc-
tion process are also considered while carrying out the design of
containment structure.
The prestress loads that are imparted on the structure to counter
the tensile stresses generated during design basis accident condi-
tion vary both spatially as well as in time domain on account of
short-term and long-term losses. The short-term losses are due to
friction and wobble effect, anchorage draw-in, and elastic short-
ening of concrete structure due to stagewise stressing of cables
during the process of prestressing. Shrinkage and creep of con-
crete and relaxation (creep) of prestressing steel contribute toward
the long-term losses of prestress loads.
Finite element analysis is carried out in order to evaluate the
membrane forces due to various types of loads for the inner con-
tainment structure. Normally, the IC structure can be modeled
using thick shell elements, which can take care of the shear defor-
more accurately due to irregular geometry and also discrete
anchorage forces because of prestress cable, the IC ring beam is
modeled using 8-noded 3D solid brick elements. The effect of the
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16 • Chapter 68

1.9

1.7 rb/R = 6
rb/R = 3 rb/R = 18
R/t = 5 R/t = 10 rb/R = 12
R/t = 20 R/t = 30
l = 0.6 l = 0.6
l = 0.6 l = 0.6
Collapse Load of Eqv. Pipe
Collapse Load of Elbow
1.5
rb/R = 9
R/t = 15
l = 0.6
1.3

1.1 Elastic Perfectly Plastic FEM Solution

Propsed Equation

0.9
Iso 'λ' Lines ASME B2-Index [1]
forλ = 0.6
Calladine [2]
Touble [3]
0.7
Chattopadhaya [4]
Y. J. Kim [5]
0.5
0 5 10 15 20
Elbow Bend Radius / Mean radius (rb/R )

FIG. 68.13 COMPARISON OF FEM AND PROPOSED EQUATION WITH THE

LITERATURE EQUATIONS [29]

duct openings and the reinforcing/prestressing steel is accounted
for appropriately at the design stage.
The design of the prestressed concrete inner containment struc-
ture is checked both under limit state of serviceability as well as
under limit state of strength (also called as ultimate limit state) as
per the provisions of RCC-G. It is ensured that a membrane com-
pressive stress of at least 1 MPa is available under accident condi-
tion. Presence of voids in the concrete section due to cable duct
openings led to development of special computer programs for
carrying out the design check under limit state of serviceability
and limit state of strength.
The entire inner containment is checked against the require-
ment of limit state of strength. In general, the load factor for the
permanent loads is 1.35 and that for the variable loads 1.5.
68.5.4.2 Design Against Radial Stress in IC Dome The nor-
mal stress in the thickness direction, also called as radial stress, is
generated in the inner containment structure due to (i) Curvature
effect, in which the curved prestressed cables embedded inside the
concrete exert pressure toward the center of curvature at the bot-
tom of the cable sheath leading to development of radial stress, (ii)
Transition effect, arising at locations where the shell thickness
changes rapidly within a short distance, and (iii) Stress concentra-
tion effect, in which the in-plane membrane compressive stresses
in the IC dome also generate radial tensile stress around the cable
duct openings.
Normally, the radial stresses in the prestressed concrete inner
containment structure are maximum during the construction period
since the prestress forces are maximum. With time, long-term
losses take place and thus, the residual prestress is reduced. In
view of this, the design against radial stress is carried out for the
loads under construction stage. Working stress method of design
is adopted for this.
In order to control cracking of concrete, the radial stresses are
limited to 0.67 times the tensile strength of concrete. The allowable
radial tensile stress is further reduced in order to take into account
the effect of membrane compressive stress field. The radial tensile
stress generated due to all the phenomena are considered for lim-
iting the concrete tensile stress except that due to the effect of
stress concentration, since the radial stress generated due to this
phenomenon is secondary in nature and is balanced by the adja-
cent compressive stress field.
The radial reinforcements in the IC dome are designed to carry
the radial tensile force resulting from the curvature effect and
transition effect where the cable spacing is sufficiently large.
However, where the cable spacing is close, reinforcements are
provided to take care of the local tensile force due to stress con-
centration effect also.
A reduced value of permissible stress is considered while
designing the reinforcements to limit cracking in the concrete.
The deflection and strains at certain locations in the IC are
recorded during proof testing mainly to compare the deflection as
well as strains obtained from analytical study. The strain mea-
surements are also necessary to monitor the development of stress-
es in the IC structure at different stages of prestressing during
construction.
The strains are measured using vibrating wire strain gauges
(VWSG) connected to automatic data-logger at locations covering
the entire IC in order to capture both membrane as well as radial
stresses. Based on the recorded data the stresses developed in the
IC are compared with the specified allowable stress limits of the
design code RCC-G.
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 17
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 17
68.5.4.3 Equivalence Study with Respect to ASME Code
Section III, Division 2 As discussed in the preceding sections,
the design of containment structures of Indian PHWRs has been
based on the methodology evolved considering the Indian con-
struction practices. The design methodology is mainly based on
the principles of the French Code RCC-G as the containment
system adopted for the Indian PHWRs is a double containment
without metallic liner, similar to the one adopted in the French
containments of PWRs. However, an attempt has been made to
study the equivalence of the various provisions of design of pri-
mary (inner) containment structure being followed in India with
respect to those adopted in various international standards in
order to assess the level of its safety under design basis accident
scenario. The study has been carried out to establish the equiva-
lent partial safety factor for accident pressure (Pa) in factored
load combination under limit state of strength. For this purpose,
a detailed design check has been carried out for some typical ele-
ments located in different regions of inner containment structure,
such as (i) IC dome thickened area near SG opening, (ii) IC dome
general area, (iii) IC wall raft junction, (iv) IC wall general area,
and (v) IC dome springing area under accidental load combina-
tion as per the provisions of various international standards,
namely, Canadian Standard,ASME Section III, Division 2 and
RCC-G.
Based on the equivalence study, the following conclusions are
drawn:
(i) Though the design philosophy and partial safety factors for
material and loads, prestress loss computation, and others
are different in various international standards (such as
Canadian, ASME and RCC-G), the design provisions and
the associated design parameters suggested by various
international codes pertaining to design of containment
structure are laid down in such a balanced way that the
final design lies in the same range.
(ii) In general, it is noticed that the load combination involving
accident pressure along with the design philosophy sug-
gested in RCC-G is equivalent to the design provisions
adopted in the Canadian standard as well as the ASME
Code.
68.6 ORGANIZATION OF DESIGN,
FABRICATION, CONSTRUCTION,
OPERATION, AND ISI OF NPPS
IN INDIA
68.6.1 Design
India started its nuclear power program with two BWRs, which
were constructed on turnkey basis by General Electric, USA
in 1969. Later on, India had collaboration with Canada for two
220 MWe PHWRs. First PHWR was designed and constructed by
Canadians. However, during the construction of second reactor,
the collaboration ended and India took over the remaining con-
struction work. Subsequent to the end of collaboration with
Canada, India has built 11 ⫻ 220 MWe PHWRs and 2 ⫻ 540
MWe PHWRs. Three more 220 MWe PHWRs are in the final
stages of completion. Design, construction and operation of
all these reactors are totally done in India. All the PHWRs
are being designed, constructed, and operated by Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), a Government of
India Enterprise, under the Department of Atomic Energy. Civil
structures design is by consultants such as M/s. STUP, Develop-
ment Consultants Private Limited, Tata Consulting Engineers, and
others and quality assessment is done by NPCIL.
NPCIL has developed a very high expertise in design of small-
and medium- sized PHWRs. It has its own R&D facilities where
new and innovative designs are developed and tested. Besides this,
NPCIL gets support from its sister concerns such as Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research (IGCAR), and Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced
Technology (RRCAT) in the field of research and development. It
has a strong team of design engineers who look after all the design
aspects starting from conceptual design to detailed structural design
and analysis, process design, and electrical, civil, and instrumenta-
tion design of NPPs. International codes such as ASME, IEEE,
RCC, and others are followed for design of nuclear power plants.
Further, safety codes and guides issued by IAEA, USNRC, and
AERB are also followed.
Design of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) is done by IGCAR.
They have all the facilities for design, analysis and R&D of FBRs.
FBRs are totally looked after by IGCAR with the help of other
sister organizations such as BARC, NPCIL, RRCAT and others.
One fast breeder test reactor is under operation. One Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor of 500 MWe capacity is under construction
by Bhartiya Vidyut Nigam (BHAVINI).
Design and development of thorium-based reactors, including
all the engineering, analysis, and related R&D activities, is done
by BARC. A 300-MWe Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR)
is being designed by BARC.
68.6.2 Fabrication
India is one of the few countries in the world that has acquired
expertise in the entire range of nuclear fuel cycle activities. As
these activities are of special nature and did not form a part of
the general industrial domain of the country, Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) established facilities for carrying them out
in a proper phased manner. Over the years, significant efforts
were put by DAE/NPCIL to develop indigenous manufacturing
capability to fabricate various equipment/components conform-
ing to stringent quality standard of nuclear power plants.
Indigenous industrial infrastructure for nuclear power plants is
well developed. Indian industry has gained valuable experience
and reached a stage of maturity in manufacturing components for
these reactors. Indian industries are fully capable of manufactur-
ing all the components, including large-size components such as
calandria, end shields, steam generators, turbine, condenser, and
others. These Indian industries have developed capabilities to
manufacture all the nuclear as well as secondary side compo-
nents. All the Class I, II, and III nuclear components are fabricat-
ed, inspected, and tested as per applicable ASME Codes. Raw
materials are procured to meet the ASME specifications.
Inspection is done by the Quality Assurance Group of these
industries. NPCIL has its own QA group, which does the surveil-
lance job at the shops of manufacturers. Expertise for carrying
out all the nondestructive examinations has been developed by
NPCIL as well as the manufacturers.
68.6.3 Construction
Over the years, India has developed expertise in the construc-
tion of nuclear power plants. At present India is constructing
nuclear power plants in less than five years. Advanced project
management techniques are being followed to cut down the
gestation period. Further, the following improvements have been
ASME_Ch68_p001-021.qxd 7/28/08 4:33 PM Page 18
18 • Chapter 68
made in the construction methodology to cut down the gestation
period.
• Concept of mega packages has been introduced
• Vendor’s participation in analysis and decision making has
been increased.
• Integrated action plans are evolved to resolve issues related to
design, material, and construction activities.
• Targets and expectations are fully defined.
• Open top construction, increased mechanization, and parallel
civil and mechanical erection are implemented.
• Round the clock construction work is practiced.
• Use of project management tools, increased use of informa-
tion technology for prompt decision making and timely mid-
course corrections and revision of construction sequence have
been successfully implemented.
There are a large number of civil construction companies in
India, which take care of full construction of civil structures.
Prominent among them are M/s. Engineering Construction and
Contracts (ECC), M/s. Gammon India Ltd., M/s Hindustan
Construction Co., and others. In the early reactors, mechanical
erection was done by NPCIL. But now there are many companies
that undertake engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC)
contracts. Now, the construction of NPPs is being carried out
through mega packages. On the secondary side, mostly, there are
EPC packages. On the nuclear side, there are PC packages. This
has reduced the construction time drastically.
68.6.4 Operation
At present India has 2 ⫻ 200 MWe BWRs, 13 ⫻ 220 MWe
PHWRs, and 2 ⫻ 540 PHWR NPPs in operation. All operations
are done indigenously by NPCIL. Each twin station unit has
around 600 operating manpower, including Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) personnel. At each station, there are four
operating crews, one for each operating shift and one extra crew
for exigencies. All the engineers are trained and licensed and their
licenses are periodically updated. All the reactors are operated as
per their operating technical specifications, which cover all the
operating limits as per IAEA safety standards. The technical spec-
ifications are duly reviewed and approved by Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board.
NPCIL is a member of World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO), CANDU Owners Group (COG), and International
Atomic Energy Agency. The peer reviews by expert teams of
WANO has been recognized internationally as major tool for
sharing the best practices in operation and performance improve-
ment. Such reviews have been completed for all the reactors.
These reviews indicate that the condition and performance of sta-
tions matched with those at the world level. WANO members reg-
ularly visit our plants and review the operation and safety aspects.
In the recent reactors, even preoperation reviews have been car-
ried out by WANO before the criticality of newly constructed
reactors. Regular seminars/meetings are held among members of
COG, during which the challenges faced in various PHWRs are
shared and discussed. This helps in upgrading the safety standards
further.
India has experience of 265 reactor operating years. Till now
there has not been any significant event wherein radioactivity is
released to the public domain and no nuclear accident, as defined
by International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of IAEA, has
occurred.
Indian PHWRs have very high availability factor over the entire
lifetime. This is made possible by strict scheduled outage for main-
tenance and in-service inspections. Biennial shutdown is taken only
for 18– 20 days. All the in-service inspections, containment testing,
and so on are done within this time. Unscheduled outages have
totally reduced and downtime is very much controlled. On redun-
dant systems, preventive maintenance is performed on power.
Radiological protection is enhanced by choosing cobalt-free materi-
als, providing adequate shielding thickness, and by optimized
design and layout of components and systems.
A comprehensive radiological surveillance program around
each NPP is pursued by well-equipped environmental survey lab-
oratories (ESLs). The basic objective of these laboratories is to
assess the radiation doses to the public due to operation of NPPs
and to demonstrate the compliance with the applicable regulatory
limits set by national and international authorities.
The environmental survey laboratories at site periodically col-
lect and analyze various environmental matrices, including
dietary items such as water, cereals, pulses, meat, fish, milk, eggs
and others for their radioactivity contents. Environmental sam-
ples are collected on regular basis from various locations sur-
rounding the nuclear facility up to a distance of 30 km. The sam-
pling locations are selected on the basis of wind pattern,
utilization of environment, and population clusters around the
facility. The type of samples are selected on the basis of potential
pathways to man. Annually about 2500 environmental samples
are being collected and analyzed by ESL at each nuclear site.
The samples are analyzed for various biologically important
radionuclides. The data thus obtained are processed statistically
and used to evaluate the dose annually to the members of public
residing around NPPs.
The well-defined and executed environmental radiological sur-
veillance program around each nuclear power plant shows that
radioactive contamination is insignificant. It also demonstrates
that the NPP releases are well within the prescribed regulatory
limits. It is observed that the annual radiation doses at the site
boundary of the respective nuclear power plant are less than 7%
of the annual regulatory limit of 1000 µSv during the period of
operations. On comparing with the naturally occurring back-
ground radiation of 2400 µSv/yr, it is almost negligible.
The release of radioactivity to environment from the nuclear
power stations is in very small quantities and in any case well
within the limits stipulated by AERB. For monitoring the compli-
ance to the prescribed regulatory requirements, environmental
survey and meteorological laboratories are set up at each plant
site. These laboratories analyze samples of food, air, water,and so
on up to an area of 30-km radius from the plant to assure environ-
mental security.
68.6.5 In-Service Inspection
In-service Inspection at all the operating plants is carried out peri-
odically as per station ISI program. Based on ISI documents, ISI
program is finalized, which meet the intent of ASME Section XI.
India has developed all the special tools required for ISI of coolant
channels and steam generators. BARCIS and Sliver sampling scrap-
ing tools are some of the important tools developed for ISI for pres-
sure tubes. Life management of coolant channels, flow accelerated
corrosion mainly on secondary side, and feeder thinning are the
major challenges faced by the Indian PHWRs. These challenges
have been successfully met through ISI and maintenance.
India has successfully completed en masse coolant channel
replacement in four reactors where Zircaloy-2 pressure tubes
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 19
were used. All the tools and techniques were developed indige-
nously. Also, feeder replacement has been successfully completed
in three reactors.
During the evolution of main circuit design, effort has been
made at minimizing the weld joints and in turn the in-service
requirement of such joints. This has been achieved by adopting
integral forging for the headers with pullout nozzles, main circuit
piping with hockey stick combination for large pipe spools. The
steam generator shells have also been specified as ring forging to
eliminate longitudinal joints.
68.6.6 Development of Codes, Guides, and
Standards
In order to fulfill its mission of stipulating and enforcing rules
and regulations concerned with nuclear and radiological safety,
AERB is in the process of developing codes and guides for vari-
ous aspects of nuclear reactor design. These guides will borrow
appropriate elements from ASME, ASCE, ACI, Canadian and
French Codes and incorporate India’s experience in their usage,
Indian materials, and construction practices. One such effort aims
at developing a safety standard for “Design of Nuclear Power
Plant Containment Structures” and is currently in draft stage [37].
This is based on ASME Code Section III, Division 2 [38], ACI
349 [39], RCC-G [4], CSA-N287.3 [40], and the Indian Code IS
456 [41]. Another guide in draft stage is the one for “Seismic
Qualification of Structures, Systems and Components of
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors” [42]. This guide builds on the
Indian experience gained during seismic design of reactor struc-
tures and is based on ASCE [43], IEEE [44] JAEG 4601 [45],
IAEA NS-G-1.6 [46], and IS 1893 [10].
68.7 CONCLUSIONS
1. Design of Indian PHWRs is based on ASME B&PV Code
Section III.
2. In those cases where the code rules could not be met in let-
ter, they have been met in spirit by carrying out the required
material characterization and component qualification tests.
3. Indian PHWR program depends on leak-before-break crite-
rion for eliminating pipe whip restraints. Leak-before-
break has been demonstrated by carrying out extensive tests
on specimens, pipes, and elbows.
4. The tests have demonstrated adequate margins with respect
to failure by fracture even when leakage size crack is present.
5. The R&D program has explored effects of cyclic loading
and presence of connected piping on fracture behavior of
piping.
6. A new B2 index is proposed which eliminates undesirable
conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it
can be used for elbows of any bend radius.
7. In-service program follows a combined philosophy of ASME
Code Section XI and the Canadian Code CSA/ N281.5-05.
8. Design of concrete containment is based on French Code
RCC-G.
9. In order to avoid a mixture of codes, a need has been felt to
write our own codes and a beginning has been made in this
respect. AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety
Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other
safety support documents. A few others are in various stages
of preparation.
68.8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Vivek
Bhasin, Rohit Rastogi, P.K. Singh, Suneel K. Gupta, and Imran
Ali Khan of Reactor Safety Division of BARC, and K.P. Dwivedi,
A.G. Chhatre, Raghupati Roy, and Santosh Kumar of Nuclear
Power Corporation (NPC).
68.9 REFERENCES
1. Bajaj, S.S. and Gore, A.R., The Indian PHWR, Nuclear Engineering
and Design, Vol. 236, Nos 7–8, pp. 701–722, April 2006.
2. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III; also, Appendix G,
1995.
3. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, 1995.
4. RCC-G (English Translation), Vols I & II, Design and Construction
Rules for Civil Works of PWR Nuclear Islands, Drawn-up by
Electricite De France (EDF), July 1988.
5. BPEL-83 (English Translation by AFNOR, Association Francaise de
Normalisation), Technical Rules for the Design of Prestressed
Concrete Structure Using the Limit State Method. 1983.
6. BAEL-83 (English Translation by AFNOR, Association Francaise de
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Reinforced Concrete Structures and Buildings Using Limit State
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7. Koley, J., Harikumar, S., Ashraf, S.A.H., Chande, S.K., and Sharma,
S.K., Regulatory Practices for Nuclear Power Plants in India, Nuclear
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8. AERB/SG/D-1, Safety Classification and Seismic Categorization for
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9. AERB/SG/S-11, Seismic Studies and Design Basis Ground Motion
for Nuclear Power Plants Sites, Atomic Regulatory Board, Mumbai,
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10. IS: 1893, Criteria for Earthquake Resistance Design of Structures,
BIS, New Delhi, 1984.
11. Reddy, G.R., Kushwaha, H.S., and Kakodkar, A., Seismic Analysis of
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12. Reddy, G.R., Kushwaha, H.S., Mahajan, S.C., Kelkar, S.P., and
Karandikar; G.V., Development of 3-D Beam Model for Seismic
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13. Reddy, G.R., Vaze, K.K., Kushwaha, H.S., Tandale, J.V.,
Subramanian, K.V., and Kelkar, S.P., Procedure of Applying
Decoupling Criteria for a Complex Primary and Secondary System,
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272, No.1, pp.129–139, 1994.
14. Neelwarne, A., Kushwaha, H.S, and Kakodkar, A., Seismic
Qualification of Nuclear Equipment under Multiple Support
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15. Reddy, G.R., Kohei, S., Kushwaha, H.S., and Mahajan, S.C.,
Decoupling Criteria for Multi-Connected Equipment, Journal of
Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol.120:, pp. 93–98, 1999.
16. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case N-411-1,
Alternative Damping Values for Response Spectra Analysis of Class
1, 2 and 3 Piping, Section III, Division 1, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, February 20, 1986.
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20 • Chapter 68

17. AERB Safety Guide AERB/SG/O-2, In-Service Inspection of Nuclear
Power Plants.
18. IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 entitled In-Service Inspection for
Nuclear Power Plants.
19. CAN/CSA N285.4-05, Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear
Power Plant Components, Canadian Standard Association, 2005.
20. CAN/CSA N285.8-05, Technical Requirements for In-Service
Evaluation of Zirconium Alloy Pressure Tubes in CANDU Reactors,
Canadian Standard Association, 2005.
21. Report of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping
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NUREG/CR-1061, Vol.3, 1984.
22. International Atomic Energy Agency, Applicability of Leak-Before-
Break Concept, Report of the IAEA Extra Budgetary Programme
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TECDOC-710, 1993.
23. Singh, P.K., Vaze, K.K., Bhasin, V., Kushwaha, H.S., Gandhi, P., and
Murthy, D.S.R., Crack Initiation and Growth Behaviour of
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24. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., Ghosh, A.K., and Kushwaha,
H.S., Experimental Investigations on Effects of Simulated Seismic
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25. Miura, N., Fujioka, T., Kashima, K., Kanno, S., Hayashi, M.,
Ishiwata, M., and Gotohm, N., Low Cycle Fatigue and Ductile
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26. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., and Kushwaha, H.S., Ductile
Fracture Assessment of Piping Systems Including the Compliance
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27. Khan, I.A., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., Ghosh, and A.K., Kushwaha, H.S.,
Significance of Finite Compliance of a Connected Piping System on
Fracture Integrity Assessment, American Society of Engineering
Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference (ASME-PVP-2005),
Colorado, USA, July 2005.
28. Rastogi, R., Bhasin, V., and Kushwaha H.S., Qualification of PHT Piping
of Indian 500MW PHWR for LBB, Using R-6 method, Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, External Report, BARC/1997/E/026, India, 1997.
29. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V.,. Vaze, K.K, Ghosh, A.K., and Kushwaha,
H.S., General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation for Pipe
Bends under In-Plane Bending, Paper # B04/5, SMiRT-19, Toronto,
Canada, August 12–17, 2007.
30. Tan, Y., Experimental and Nonlinear FEA Investigation of Elbow
Leading to a new definition of the B2 Stress Index, [PhD Thesis, with
Vernon C. Matzen], Civil Engineering Department, North Carolina
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31. Spence, J. and Findley, G.E., Limit Load for Pipe Bends under In-
Plane Bending Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on
Pressure Vessel Technology, San Antonio, Texas, pp. 393–399,1976.
32. Dodge, W.G. and Moore, S.E., Stress Indices and Flexibility Factors
for Moment Loadings on Elbows and Curved Pipes, Welding
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33. Caladine, C.R., Limit Analysis of Curved Tubes, Journal of
Mechanical Engineering Science, Vol. 16, pp. 85–87,1974.
34. Touboul, F., Ben Djedidia, M., and Acker, D., Design Criteria for
Piping Component Against Plastic Collapse: Application to Pipe Bend
Experiments, Proceedings of 6th International Conference on
Pressure Vessel Technology, Beijing, China, pp.73–84,1989.
35. Chattopadhyay, J., Tomar, A.K.S., Dutta, B.K., and Kushwaha, H.S.,
Closed Form Collapse Moment Equation of Through Wall
Circumferentially Cracked Elbows Subjected to In-Plane Bending
Moment, ASME Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol.126, pp.
307–317,2004.
36. Kim, Y.J. and Chang, S.O., Closed Form Plastic Collapse Loads of
Pipe Bends under Combined Pressure and In-Plane Bending, Journal
of Engineering Fracture Mechanics. Vol. 73, Issue 11, pp. 1437–1454,
July 2006.
37. AERB/SS/CSE-3, Design of Nuclear Power Plant Containment
Structures (draft).
38. ASME Code Section III, Division 2.
39. ACI 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete
Structures.
40. CSA-N287.3-1983, Design Requirements for Concrete Containment
Structures for CANDU Nuclear Power Plant, Canadian Standard
Association.
41. IS 456-2000, Plain and Reinforced Concrete – Code of Practice.
42. AERB Safety Guide No. AERB/SG/D-23, Seismic Qualification of
Structures, Systems and Components of Pressurised Heavy Water
Reactors (draft).
43. American Society of Civil Engineers, Seismic Analysis of Safety-
Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, ASCE 4-98, Virginia,
USA, 2000.
44. IEEE Standard 344-1987, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic
Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Generating
Stations,1987.
45. Japan Electric Association, Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design
of Nuclear Power Plants, JEAG-4601, 1987.
46. International Atomic Energy Agency, Seismic Design and Component
Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6,
Vienna, Austria, 2003.
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