ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.

Facts:A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed against Roos (for brevity) before the NLRC. Jose
Martillos (Martillos, for brevity) alledged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic in 1988 but was not made to
sign any employmen contract by Roos. Roos contended that Martillos had been hired on several occasions as a
project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects.

The Labor artiber ruled in favor of Martillos finding that he had acquired the status of a regular employee as he was
hired as a driver with little interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of
his employer. The Labor Arbiter ordered Roos to pay Martillos the aggregate sum of P224,647.17 representing
backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th monh pay.

Roos filed an appeal however instead of posting the required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period,
Roos filed a motion for extension of time to submit/post surety bond.

The 2nd Division of the NLRC dismissed Roos’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction stating that the bond is an indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary perion and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Roos elevated the dismissal to the CA but the resolution of the NLRC was affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with the NLRC rules.

RULING:

NO. The NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to
perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last day thereof.

The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from
the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision. The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional.
Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Indeed, non-compliance with such legal
requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there
is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond.”The overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond
requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer. The intention
of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is
underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The
word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the
employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be considered completed. The law however
does not require its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually
paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such
bond. The overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond
requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer (Borja Estate v
Balad, G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005).

The judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into
effect. It is well to recall too our pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et al. that the judicial interpretation
of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine
does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing
one, as is the situation in this case.