1AC – CCA GY

1ac – 1
 advantage 1 – tech leadership
Advantage one is technological leadership –

US tech innovation is faltering – Chinese competition will upend US superiority absent

the plan
Bey 18 – Matthew Bey, energy and technology analyst for Stratfor, an American geopolitical
intelligence, holds a bachelor’s degree from Texas Lutheran University and a master’s degree in
mathematics from the University of Texas., The Coming Tech War With China, 2/7/18,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2018/02/07/the-coming-tech-war-with-china/#5a4def731cd4,
msm

The United States is already in the middle of its next great war -- even if it's only just starting to realize it. In the latest National Security Strategy,
the White House highlighted China's growing technological prowess as a threat to U.S. economic and
military might. The Asian powerhouse has taken on a leading role in several critical emerging technologies. Five years ago, by contrast, it was widely perceived as an imitator in
technology, not an innovator. As hard as it may be for Washington to admit, China is catching up in the tech race. The question now is

whether tech firms in the United States, a country that embraces private enterprise and a free economy, will be able to keep up with
their Chinese counterparts' breakthroughs. The Disruptive Power of Dual-Use Technology Chinese President Xi Jinping has made developing his country's
technological capabilities a key priority, not only to wean China from its dependence on foreign technology but also to turn it into a leader in innovation. And sure enough, China is gaining
ground on its rivals in the tech realm. The country has chalked up an array of impressive achievements over the past few years, including its developments in hypersonic missiles, human gene
editing trials and quantum satellites. Of the many emerging technologies China is helping to advance, though, artificial intelligence is perhaps the most significant -- for Beijing as well as its
adversaries. Google CEO Sundar Pichai recently posited that the advent of AI was "more profound than ... (that of) electricity or fire." If he oversold the development, he did so only slightly. AI
may well be the most important technological advancement of our lifetime. What makes it so critical is that, much like aerospace technology or the internet before it, AI will have applications

In the civilian world alone, AI has practically unlimited uses. The technology
in military as well as civilian life -- and will likely revolutionize both.

AI
already helps power smartphone applications such as visual and audio recognition software and digital personal assistants. As global data collection rates continue to grow exponentially,

algorithms will inevitably have to take over processing and managing the glut of information. AI will also transform
the medical industry, diagnosing and treating various illnesses -- to say nothing of the other white-collar jobs the technology will eventually complement or supersede. The military

applications, meanwhile, will be no less impressive. In 2016 an algorithm running on a Raspberry Pi -- a $35 computer that fits in the palm of your
hand -- beat a retired U.S. Air Force colonel every time in a series of simulated dogfights. The computer, moreover, showed no sign of fatigue over time, unlike its human competitor. As AI

The technology's potential for rapid

continues to evolve, it will doubtless work its way onto the battlefield, driving tanks, ships and perhaps even robotic soldiers.

data processing and analysis could give troops on the front lines a more complete picture than ever
before of their enemy's position and activities. AI will probably find more applications in asymmetric warfare, too. Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria
have used drones to deliver explosives to their targets, while Houthi rebels in Yemen have deployed unmanned vessels to carry waterborne improvised explosive devices. For now, these

The possibilities of AI aren't lost on the

vehicles are operated by remote control, but in time, they could give way to autonomous technology. An Eye on AI

Chinese president. In a feat of meticulous blocking, two influential books on the subject stood on the bookshelf behind Xi during his annual televised New Year's Eve address.
Weeks earlier, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a three-year development plan for AI, part of a larger initiative launched in July 2017 that includes specific
goals for such technologies as artificial neural network processing chips, intelligent robots, automated vehicles, intelligent medical diagnosis, intelligent drones and machine translation.

China's Ministry of Science and Technology announced in November 2017 that it had formed a sort of
dream team made up of the biggest Chinese tech firms -- Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent -- to lead the
country's AI development alongside voice recognition software developer iFlytek. Each of these
companies is hard at work cultivating the learning algorithms and hardware, and gathering the data,
necessary to build a wide range of functional AI platforms. Baidu, for instance, has started developing open-source programs, such as the
autonomous driving platform Apollo, to collect as much data as possible. Nor is the importance of AI lost on the U.S. Department of

Defense. Like his predecessor, Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense James Mattis supports the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), despite calls from Republican
lawmakers to roll the project into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DIUx, headquartered in Silicon Valley, aims to ensure that the military can quickly adapt and integrate
innovations that come out of California's tech hub. To that end, it awarded tech firm C3 IoT a contract late last year to develop an AI platform for the Air Force to predict when aircraft and
equipment need maintenance. In the quest to hone its AI capabilities, the Defense Department hasn't lost sight of China's own progress with the technology. The country's sheer size sets it
apart from other tech innovators such as South Korea or Japan; China could scale up its rapidly increasing tech abilities and use them against the United States in a way that not even Russia

Mattis made China's rise in tech a centerpiece of his National Defense Strategy,
has managed. With that in mind,

highlighting the U.S. government's need to strengthen ties with emerging tech companies, including AI
startups. A Space Race for the 21st Century Today's mad dash for AI isn't the first technology race the United States has run. During the Cold War, the country vied against the Soviet
Union to develop a variety of aerospace, nuclear and computing innovations. Washington emerged victorious from that contest; though the Soviet Union focused

its efforts almost exclusively on military applications, it lacked the research and development capacity of
the United States. The size of its critical industries enabled the United States to outstrip the Soviet Union in military technology while still diverting some of its attention and
resources to consumer products. Like the Soviet Union, China is interested more in national security and defense than it

is in the commercial sector. The difference lies in China's size and in its economy. The country's immensity could make it a more
even match for the United States in terms of developing and adopting emerging technologies. Given that the
country's population exceeds 1.3 billion people -- and that data privacy is a low priority for Beijing -- China offers its AI companies a big leg-up over their U.S. competitors by giving them access
to a huge pool of data. Furthermore, unlike the tightly controlled Soviet economy that hindered innovation, China's hybrid economy offers individuals and companies incentive to push the
boundaries in tech development. The country's model of capitalism isn't one of control, though Western media often portray Chinese tech firms as dependent on Beijing to subsidize and direct
their activities. Instead, the central government outlines areas in which it would like companies to operate and provides incentives to encourage competition. AI is one of those areas, and
China's tech giants are eager to outpace one another in the field. Aware that it missed the boat with smartphone technology, Baidu, for instance, has set its sights on AI as its opportunity to

For now, China lags behind the United States in the tech race, especially in
get an advantage over Tencent, Alibaba and Huawei.

semiconductor development. As the gap between them narrows, however, the United States will be forced to respond. The challenge for
Washington will be that, unlike earlier dual-use technologies, AI applications will immediately have profound implications for the consumer electronics market. And because the Chinese and
U.S. economies are highly integrated with each other, China's achievements even in the commercial sector pose a serious threat to the United States. The question for the United States isn't so

China is large enough that its

much whether China can surpass it in the race to harness emerging technologies; it's how close the Asian country will come to doing so.

tech sector could give Silicon Valley a run for its money in terms of market share if it even comes close to producing the same technologies. For
that reason, many U.S. tech firms are trying to withhold some of their advancements from defense applications in hopes of maintaining a competitive edge in the commercial sphere. Building
a Strategy Once upon a time the United States could rest easy in the knowledge that no other country could match its combination of physical size and technological ability. Now China can. As
a result, the current U.S. administration is working to develop a more robust response to the United States' budding rival. The White House's investigations into China's intellectual property
policies, calls for greater scrutiny of its foreign investment activities and even proposals to nationalize the fifth generation wireless protocol, or 5G, network are all initial attempts to counter

Forging a comprehensive strategy

the country's rise in technology. So far, though, these initiatives have only provoked backlash in the United States.

against China will become all the more important for Washington as time goes by. The dizzying pace
and unpredictable trajectory of innovation compels tech companies to constantly broaden their
horizons or else jeopardize their competitiveness. But as the same firms expand their services into more and more industries, they risk running afoul
of U.S. antitrust laws. The more companies such as Google, Amazon and Apple Inc. grow, the bigger the targets on their backs become. Antitrust investigations and busts in the United States,
in turn, could give Chinese companies a prime opportunity to catch up to their competition.

Skilled labor shortages are the reason – robust immigration is necessary to adequately
staff technological sectors
HRT 17 - HRTechnologist, 8/10/17 Impact of US Restrictions on Immigration,
https://www.hrtechnologist.com/news/recruitment-onboarding/impact-of-us-restrictions-on-
immigration/, msm

The report finds that while these orders create more jobs for the Americans, they also limit access to technical talent, especially
STEM talent, from other nations. But, with 40% of the Fortune 500 companies being founded by immigrants or their descendants, there are many who are not
supporting these new policies that restrict immigration. As per a recent American Action Forum (AAF) report, if such immigration policies
are in force, there will be a shortage of 1.1 million Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math ( STEM) workers in the US by 2024. The

Hired research found a 60% decrease in the interest expressed by US-based companies in hiring foreign
tech workers between the second and fourth quarter of 2016, due to the new immigration policies proposed during the US elections. But,
post elections, though the interest was down, it was down only 37% YOY. Similarly, though there was a 4% decrease of interest in engaging with US companies
between the third and fourth quarter of 2016, by the end of Q2 2017, it rose by 10%. According to the respondents, 81%
agreed that immigration
was useful for the US economy as it enhanced innovation in the technology industry. About 77% agreed that
immigration brought diversity to the workforce, which is much needed in the technology industry. But 55% said that the US did not have enough tech talent to meet
the demands in the region. Additionally, the Trump administration has also
announced that it plans to terminate a federal rule
which allows foreign entrepreneurs to come to the US for starting new companies. All this will have a
negative impact on the ability of the country in retaining talent and fostering innovation. About 60% of the
respondents are sure that these policies will have a negative impact on the tech industry, with 25% even saying that they may not create a new company in the US.
"Over the long term, these issues could very well have a negative impact on the US’ ability to stay competitive in
the global tech economy," says Lindsey Scott, director, Communications at Hired and the author of the report.
"This is especially true given efforts by countries like France and Canada to lure tech talent and

companies to their soil through more relaxed immigration policies, special visas for entrepreneurs and
tech talent, and tax incentives for businesses."

Only the plan solves – existing H-1B visa limits are counterproductive and outdated
Anderson 4-2-18
Stuart, Forbes Contributor, Better Immigration Policies Would Help U.S. Tech
Companies, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/04/02/better-
immigration-policies-would-help-u-s-tech-companies/#63d0b49b151d, msm
For a U.S. technology company – and, really, almost any company today – the most important input is human capital. When
companies make decisions on where to invest resources, the ability to hire a sufficient number of
qualified workers in that location is paramount. Restrictive immigration policies encourage U.S.
companies to place more resources – and people – in foreign countries. Moreover, many U.S. companies contract out information
technology and other services to focus on their core line of business. Burdensome policies, such as the Trump administration’s new third-party placement requirements, encourage more of

those services to be delivered from outside the United States. “Today, 81 percent of the full-time graduate students at U.S. universities
in electrical engineering and 79 percent in computer science are international students,” according to a
National Foundation for American Policy analysis. In other words, when U.S. companies recruit on college
campuses they hire U.S. students, of course, but also find the vast majority of the graduate students in many key technical
fields are foreign nationals who cannot work in America unless U.S. immigration rules are reasonable. H-
1B status is typically the only way a high-skilled foreign national or international student graduating from a U.S. university can work long-term in the United States. The wait for

employment-based green cards often stretches to years, making them impractical to use for hiring most
people. That means despite its limitations, H-1B visas are the key way U.S. companies employ high-skilled
foreigners. Companies can transfer certain employees to the U.S. but they must have worked abroad for at least a year and gaining approvals even for those types of visas has become
more difficult. The first week of April is when employers file for H-1Bs – even though the start date for the professionals will not be until October, the beginning of the next fiscal year. This

will be the 16th consecutive year the supply of H-1Bs runs out, both the 65,000-annual limit and the
additional 20,000 reserved for international students from U.S. graduate schools. The reason H-1B visas run out each year is
simple: The small annual limit of 65,000 (for an economy with over 160 million workers) was set back in 1990. Since then the

World Wide Web, social media, smartphones, 3-D printing, and advances in biotech and other fields
have fueled the demand for high-skilled technical labor. Most H-1B visa holders have earned a master’s
degree or higher. Trump administration officials have said America should shift to a “merit-based” immigration system but that is code for eliminating most family-sponsored
immigration categories and reducing legal immigration, not admitting more high-skilled foreign nationals. In fact, since many family-sponsored individuals possess high levels of education,
preventing them from immigrating to the United States would result in the admission of fewer highly educated immigrants. When asked, immigration attorneys cannot name any policies the
Trump administration has established or proposed to make it easier for high-skilled foreign nationals to work in or immigrate to the United States – and can talk for hours about all the new
measures that have made life more difficult for immigrants and employers. If the Trump administration wanted to make U.S. high tech companies more competitive in global markets, then

the administration should support H.R. 392, which

here are the immigration policies it should enact: First, on the legislative front,

eliminates the per-country limit that contributes to high-skilled immigrants from India waiting
potentially decades to receive permanent residence. Congress should also raise the annual limit on
employment-based green cards and add exemptions for individual with degrees in science, technology,
engineering and math (STEM) and the dependents of employer-sponsored immigrants. The annual limit on
H-1B visas should be raised substantially to reflect the demand for high-skilled labor in today’s
modern economy.
Innovation is key to maintaining defense leadership – the plan solves
Ansley 4-6-17
Rachel Ansley is an editorial assistant at the Atlantic Council. Innovation Key to Maintaining
US Defense Leadership, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/innovation-
key-to-maintaining-us-defense-leadership, msm
The United States’ role as a global leader in defense is not “automatic,” it must be maintained and
improved by building bridges between the technology and security sectors to encourage innovation in military operations, former US Defense Secretary Ash
Carter said at the Atlantic Council on April 4. While the US military “is the finest fighting force the world has ever known,” Carter said, “that excellence is not a birthright; it’s not automatic.” He

we need to ensure that our innovative

called for the federal government to invest in innovation technology to meet an uncertain future. “I believe that

engine works… to bring innovation and public purpose together,” he said. Carter delivered the keynote address at the launch of an
Atlantic Council report, Keeping America’s Innovative Edge, authored by Peter Engelke, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, and Robert
A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center and its Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative. The report is the culmination of a year-long effort, as part of a two-year partnership with

Qualcomm. “ Efforts to widen the opportunities of technological change… [are] critical for America’s future,”
according to Carter who will begin his new role as director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Belfer professor of technology and global affairs in
July 2017. “Military services have begun to exploit the benefits of building bridges [between the Pentagon and US tech companies]… using technology to improve their own systems and
processes,” he said, emphasizing the connection between innovation and public service. He added: “That spirit is there among our innovators, but the bridge connecting them to contribute is
not.” Carter described how recruiting innovators from the technology community to work with the military on the development of innovative operational plans was one of his priorities during
his tenure as secretary of defense in the Obama administration. While Carter sought to foster such connections throughout his time in office, “these bridges don’t maintain themselves,” he
said, insisting they must be restored. “Seizing these opportunities is essential to our success as a nation and civilization in the twenty-first century,” he added. Through the dovetailing of
technology and defense throughout his time in office, he “ensured that [the Department of Defense] was a place where thinking boldly and innovatively was fostered.” Carter claimed such
thinking will be crucial for his successor, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, not only in order to meet the security challenges of today—terrorism, Russian aggression, instability in the Asia-
Pacific, Iranian belligerence in the Middle East, and North Korea’s nuclear threat—“but also to meet the unforeseen challenges and opportunities that an unpredictable future might hold.”
While Carter was confident that “we will maintain our competitive edge… with unrivalled strength,” Fred Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, said that in

there is a real risk that the United States could lose this edge.” Kempe cited China as
today’s technological environment, “

a lead contender poised to unseat the United States from its traditional role. Kempe, who delivered the opening
remarks at the report launch, pointed out the significant geopolitical implications of effective innovation and

technological preeminence: “Imagine if the United States had not been first to the atomic bomb.” Keeping America’s Innovative Edge was part of an effort “aimed at
gaining an understanding of how the United States fits into the rapidly evolving global knowledge economy” and lays forth a roadmap for Washington to regain the country’s strategic edge,
said Kempe. Melinda Epler, founder and chief executive officer of Change Catalyst; Donna Harris, cofounder and strategic adviser at 1776; Philip Jordan, executive director of the Economic
Advancement Research Institute; and Aaron Olver, managing director of University Research Park at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, later participated in a panel discussion to examine
the report’s findings and application. Michaela Ross, a reporter with Bloomberg BNA, moderated the discussion. The report found, and the panelists agreed, that the United States is doing
well, but needs to do more in order to maintain its technological lead on the world stage. According to Jordan, who also serves as the vice president of BW Research Partnership, while there is
a positive moment in the innovation ecosystem “perhaps this had bred some complacency.” “It’s terrific that we’re doing so well,” he said, “but the report calls out correctly that we can’t sit
and expect all good things to come to us, it takes constant work.” Where Carter emphasized building bridges between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon, Olver emphasized the importance of
federal programs supporting both university and private sector research, also highlighted in the report. “We’ve slipped now to twelfth in federally sponsored research, which is affecting

we run the risk of losing out on the

universities across the country,” he said, adding “we lose innovators” because of this. Without ample funding, Olver claimed, “

talent race.” Harris called for the federal government to create a climate of funding for and investment in innovation so that the United States “can be the place where the problems
get solved.” The alternative, she said, is to cede technological preeminence to other countries. Harris described how both China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pose serious threats to the
United States’ position at the top of the innovation food chain. “Take a trip to China and see how much government money is fueled into research centers,” without constraint, she said.
Though Harris said there are not as many dollars invested in innovation in China, “there’s a focus to it, and a race to it.” Additionally, the UAE “has set an objective to be the smart cities capital
of the world and drive innovation across the Middle East,” according to Harris. She said, “they’re framing their economy around it and throwing some serious dollars behind it.” “This truly is a
competitive race,” said Harris. She described how many nations prioritize entrepreneurship and innovation. “We have the lead; we need to keep the lead,” she added. While the panelists
agreed that increased investment in education is essential to maintain US leadership in technological innovation, “we also need to recognize that the process of innovating is how we change
the culture,” said Harris. An intentional focus on risk-taking and entrepreneurial ventures at all levels of education and business could help facilitate innovation, she said. The panelists agreed
that technology companies and government investments must focus on fostering innovation among new demographics. Currently, said Olver, “innovators like to cluster together, and you see

this at every level of scale.” Siloed communities of technological innovation, such as Silicon Valley, are the result. While “ innovation breeds innovative culture,”
said Jordan, it then becomes difficult for innovation hubs to look outside of the small pool from which they typically source talent. This leads to a stark economic divide. Consequently, Epler
called for a “democratization of innovation,” which could consist of government funding of lower-class education in the tech sector. “We need to ensure that everyone benefits from this

The United States needs more innovators to maintain its edge, yet
innovation economy, and lots of people are left out,” she said.

currently struggles with a shortage of talent, said Jordan. “If we’re going to get serious about talent shortages… maybe there’s a source of talent that we
could start looking at,” in underrepresented neighborhoods, he said.

That solves Chinese aggression – US military leadership is uniquely suited to defuse

tensions
Jennings 1-3-16
Nathan Jennings is an U.S. Army Major attending the Command and General Staff
Officer’s School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is an Armor officer who served combat
tours in Baghdad and Kirkuk, Iraq, taught history at the United States Military Academy
at West Point, and holds a MA in American History from the University of Texas at
Austin. Deterring Chinese Aggression, msm
Tensions between China and nations across the South China Sea have simmered for the past decade as
competing states contest territorial waters and economic exclusion zones. As the leading power in the Asia-Pacific region
since World War II, the United States, and its peerless military in particular, should begin deploying diverse and scalable elements of

national power to promote coalitions to deter Chinese aggression. This would fulfil the 2015 National Security Strategy’s
imperative to, “manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms.”[1] While objectives

should both limit and accommodate Chinese ambitions, the judicious application of diplomatic, military, economic, and informational
capabilities in the South China Sea and across the Pacific basin—in concert with empowering coalitions—offers the best hope for achieving
a peaceful balance of power. Any effort to form coalitions to deter Chinese belligerence begins with

American diplomatic leadership. As the traditional guarantor of international freedom of navigation and commerce
in the region, the United States is uniquely positioned to sponsor and guide any emerging multinational

partnerships. It alone possesses the national power and influence and lead combinations of
conciliatory and provocative diplomacy. This would include both bi-lateral and multi-lateral economic arrangements and
broader military coalitions with long-standing allies like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Australia, and newer partnerships with modernizing powers like India, Vietnam, and Burma. The reemergence
of a 21st century version of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe—would be offer a possible
diplomatic objective. While the President and State Department officials would lead these efforts, senior
military leaders would play a
pivotal role in securing agreements by adding martial credibility. The commander of U.S. Pacific Command, in particular, would
emerge as an important figure in any security cooperatives and provide multinational and joint leadership as the lead flag officer. As a final and important task,
American diplomats and senior officers could mediate disputes over coveted islands, both natural and
artificial, to prevent hostilities between China, South Korea, and Japan. The U.S. military itself, as a second and
decisive element of national power, would provide the foundation of any multi-national security agreement. As recently

argued by the commander of U.S. Pacific Command before the U.S. Senate, American strategy in the region must include “the

forward presence of military forces to engage allies and partners and deter aggression.”[2] With the ongoing
build-up of the Chinese armed forces, the formation of a robust and vigorous military coalition would be necessary to

provide credibility to diplomatic initiatives. Though American naval and aerial forces would remain central
to any attempts to project national power, the U.S. Army, as the premier landpower institution in the Free World, would also
remain crucial to multi-national efforts with increased rotational presence by combined arms forces
across islands and the main-land continent. This military coalition, perhaps arriving as a reimagined SEATO, would
include multiple lines of effort to create multiple and simultaneous dilemmas to confound Chinese
responses. Beginning with large-scale, multinational exercises, American joint forces could lead numerous small-scale naval,
land, and air training events that could culminate in an annual coalition-wide exercise designed to
demonstrate ability to conduct major campaigns. Similar to REFORGER exercises by NATO in Europe in decades past, this kind of
cooperation would solidify the alliance and communicate resolve. In addition to multi-lateral engagements, the U.S.
military could provide assistance and training to partnered navies, armies, and air forces. With the assurance of
American presence and technical expertise, the armed forces of nations like Japan and South Korea would continue to

benefit from long-standing partnerships while others like India, Australia, and Vietnam would gain
confidence against Chinese intimidation.
Goes nuclear – signals of US weakness embolden China – makes escalation likely
Ayson 14
(Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, “Escalation in North Asia: A
Strategic Challenge for Australia,”
http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)

knowing the
China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But

resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly
against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was

unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the
context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least
some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7

Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of
an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to
face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first
targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has
available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves,

become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR
systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and
damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early

resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile
capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is
it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in

nuclear escalation
the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that

is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may
resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great
equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to

retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks
separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese)
conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to
retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a
last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based
nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation.

Hegemony is sustainable in the long-term and prevents great power war – specifically,
a litany of hotspots go nuclear – decline causes transition wars and regional bloc
formations that increase instability globally – no fill-in
Kagan – PhD – 16
Robert, Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings
Institution, Why America Must Lead, Winter 2016,
http://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/leadership/why-america-must-lead.html, msm
The liberal world order that was created in the aftermath of the Second World War is today being challenged by a variety of forces
— by powerful authoritarian governments and anti-liberal fundamentalist movements, as well as by long-term shifts in the

global economy. Great power competition has returned. In Europe, Russia has launched the first cross-border

invasion of a neighboring country since World War II. In East Asia, China is expanding its reach as a military
power, seeking both economic and strategic hegemony at the risk of destabilizing that critical region. In the Middle
East, Iran is expanding its influence and Islamic jihadists have gained control of more territory. In the face
of this turmoil, many Americans have come to doubt whether there is anything the United States can do or should do in response. Many assume either that it
doesn’t matter very much what happens beyond America’s shores or that the United States no longer has the wisdom or capacity to shape events and prevent
others from doing what they please. Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining
United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.” These days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at
best premature. Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.”
These days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at best premature. America has substantially recovered from the Great

Recession, while the once-heralded “rise of the rest” has stalled. Many around the world who once
decried American overseas involvement as “hegemonic” now seek greater American engagement in
international affairs. Widespread Support for US Actions Against ISIS Pew Research Center: Support for U.S. Actions against ISIS Among the
American public, too, there are signs of greater receptivity to a more active American global role. What is missing
for most Americans, however, is a sense of strategy and purpose in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, fear of the Soviet Union and international
communism did not always produce agreement on policy but did provide an answer, for most, as to why the United States needed to play an international role and
what that role should be. Today, our political leaders need to remind Americans that our fundamental interests are
still best served by upholding the world order — economic, political, and strategic — that was established at the end
of the Second World War and that was further strengthened and entrenched by the revolutions of 1989. Americans need to recognize their

nation’s central role in maintaining the present international order and muster the will to use their still
formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers. Supporting Democracy is a
Matter of National Security What will this require? Above all, it means working to shore up all three pillars – politics, economics, security —

of what has made the American-led world order so remarkable. There is a tendency to separate politics, economics, and security —
“ideals” from “interests,” support for democracy from defense of security — but in the present world order they have all been related. Start with the reality that a
world order that supports freedom will only be supported by free nations. Supporting
democracy is not just a matter of keeping faith with our own
values. It is a matter of national security. Americans and other free peoples who benefit from and support the present world order therefore have
an interest in supporting democracy where it exists and in pressing for greater democratic reforms in the world’s authoritarian nations, including the two great
power autocracies. Supporting democracy is not just a matter of keeping faith with our own values. It is a matter of national security. In their economic policies,
Americans need to continue promoting and strengthening the international free trade and free market
regime. This, of course, means setting their own economy back on a course of sustainable growth. It means doing a better job of educating and training
Americans to compete with others in an increasingly competitive international economy. It means providing a healthy environment for technological innovation.
But it also meansresisting protectionist temptations and using American influence, along with other free-trading
nations, to push back against some of the tendencies of state capitalism in China and elsewhere . Gaining
congressional approval of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, and then moving to agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe,
are critical, and not only for their economic benefits. They also are a critical step in knitting the democratic world more closely together. But it also means resisting
protectionist temptations and using American influence, along with other free-trading nations, to push back against some of the tendencies of state capitalism in
China and elsewhere. In Asia, especially, this is more much than a trade issue. Although the United States stands to benefit from the agreement, it is, above all, a
strategic issue. The
United States and China are locked in a competition across the spectrum of power and
influence. Militarily, the Chinese seek to deny American access to the region and hope thereby to divide
the United States from its allies. Economically, China would like to turn Asia into a region of Chinese hegemony, where every key trade
relationship is with Beijing. In such a world, the United States is a net loser — providing costly security to allies but not much else, while China reaps the economic
rewards and grabs the hearts and minds, and pocketbooks, of regional players. Finally,
there is the matter of American hard power.
What has been true since the time of Rome remains true today: there
can be no world order without power to preserve it, to
shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace.
Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems that it cannot
answer or that have no answer. But it is also essential. No nation or group of nations that renounced power could expect to

maintain any kind of world order. If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the
present order, that order will begin to unravel. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United
States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There can
be no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft
power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military
power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest.
Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to

the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to play the role of providing balance in far-flung regions
of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.
Without a U.S. willingness to play the role of providing balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition
of regional powers. Today, as a result of the Budget Control Act and a general unwillingness to spend adequately on defense, America’s ability to play this vital role
is coming increasingly under question. Current defense spending has created a readiness crisis within the armed forces. Only a handful of Army brigades are
available for use in a crisis. The army is about to be forced to cut 40,000 soldiers from its active force. There are too few ships to provide a U.S. presence in the
multiple hotspots that have sprouted up around the world. As the bipartisan, congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel has argued, the U.S.
military must be able to deter or stop aggression in multiple theaters, not just one, even when engaged in a large-scale war.
It needs to be able to fight ISIS and deter Iran in the Middle East, deter Russia in Europe and Syria, and
in Asia deter North Korea and maintain stability in the face of a rising China. Consider the threat now
posed by Iran. Whatever one thinks about the recently-concluded nuclear deal, any serious strategy aimed at resisting Iranian
domination also requires confronting Iran on the several fronts of the Middle East battlefield. In Syria, it
requires a determined policy to remove Iran’s close ally, Basher al-Assad, using U.S. air power to provide cover
for civilians and creating a safe zone for Syrians willing to fight. In Iraq, it requires using American forces
to push back and destroy the forces of the Islamic State so that we do not have to rely, de facto, on Iranian
power to do the job. Overall, it requires a greater U.S. military commitment to the region, a reversal of both the perceived and the
real withdrawal of American power. And therefore it requires a reversal of the downward trend in U.S. defense spending, which has made it harder for the military
even to think about addressing these challenges, should it be called upon to do so. The challenge we face today is to decide whether this liberal world order is worth
defending and whether the United States is still willing to play the role of its principal champion. The answer to both questions ought to be “yes,” but it
will
require a renewal of American leadership in the international system, economically, politically, and
strategically. It will also require a renewed understanding of how important and unique the present
liberal world order is, both for Americans and for peoples all across the globe. The simple fact is that for all the
difficulties and suffering of the past 70 years, the period since the end of World War II has been unique in the history of the human race. The period since the end of
World War II has been unique in the history of the human race. Democratic government, once rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every
continent, for peoples of all races and religions. There has been an unprecedented growth in prosperity. Billions have
been lifted out of poverty. Democratic government, once rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for peoples of all
races and religions. Although the period has been marked by war, peace among the great powers has been preserved. There has been no recurrence of the two
devastating world wars of the first half of the 20th century. This world order has been a boon for billions around the world, but it has also served American
interests. Any
other world order, one in which the United States had to cede power and influence to China
and Russia, or what is more likely, a descent into disorder, is unlikely to serve Americans’ interests as well.

Deterrence theory is empirically, statistically, and cognitively verified

Moore 04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, &
Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the
Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 27-31.

there is strong evidence that deterrence the effect of external factors on the decision to go
As so broadly conceived, , that is,

to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation I have undertaken to examine . In my War/Peace Seminar, the level of deterrence before

principal wars of the twentieth century.

the in every case the potential aggressor made a 10 This examination has led me to believe that

rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the

Hitler believed that Britain and France could not

German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. in his attack on Poland take the
occasion to go to war with him . And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure

Calculations in
to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace.

the North Korean attack and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be
on South Korea

completed in a matter of days. virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at Indeed, least those involving conventional

were preceded by
invasion, double deterrence absence , the aggressor believed that they had
what I refer to as a " ." That is potential

the military force to prevail promptly in place and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have

about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the

Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this
historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence . Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in

Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and

1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book heconducts a detailed examination of the

World War II, each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence
among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that

each occurred in the absence of such deterrence. Game theory seems to offer yet further support
and that for the
proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit

17Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through
for tat strategy.

incentives the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining

. Similarly, much of relation to war and the (and danger of asymmetric information) in

democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives .18 The well-known
correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not
the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation
between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or
asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade
relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk
of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade.
Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates
expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade a nd war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly
affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts det errence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the
heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their
freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors
affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in
1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of
"globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first
and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 ind exes. I am unaware of any comparable index
with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a
war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large
variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the
chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and context ual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a
weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall d eterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in
settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to
invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy
NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at
scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw
Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vi etnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North
Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia
and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless,

exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent
both

future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that

developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other
side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the

The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there
1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83.

was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial
disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32 Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also

newer studies of human behavior from cognitive

assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is,

psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level
of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning

deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing
potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process
generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that
deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had
moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Sad dam Hussein from his 1990
attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may
have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have
required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level
of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had
no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO
bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as
earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in
fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Sad dam
Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates,
there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we
tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in
its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of
democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose.
In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely
believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of
his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists
and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on
the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk
of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major
interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external

deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the

deterrence become crucial.

totality of external factors, that is, , that
Hegemony creates peace by preventing both great power and regional conflicts –
checks rogue actors
Kyl and Lieberman 2015 (Jon and Joseph, Former US Senators, working in conjunction with a litany of qualified senior fellows
and researchers like Elliott Abrams, a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at CFR and David Adesnik, Policy Director at the Foreign Policy
Initiative, “Why American Leadership Still Matters”, American Enterprise Institute, December 2015, https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Why-American-Leadership-Still-Matters_online.pdf

American leadership is critical to the security, stability, and prosperity of both the world and the
American homeland. In recent years, however, US international leadership has increasingly been challenged in both spheres. Abroad, the international
order is under attack from multiple sources: from nonstate actors such as al Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, and
others, to regional rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, a nationalist Russia challenging the
sovereignty of neighboring states, and an increasingly ambitious China. Whether the aims of these countries or nonstate actors are
hegemonic, terroristic, or just opportunistic, only vigorous international leadership from the United States and its allies will

adequately address the challenges to the international order that each presents. No other country
would, or could, fill America’s shoes as the underwriter of international security should the US choose
to step back. Yet here at home, a growing number of Americans question whether the costs of US international
leadership are worth the benefits. Some have lost confidence in the effectiveness of US national security policies as they have witnessed the efforts of America’s political leaders yield
questionable results. For others, the Great Recession shook their economic confidence and meant America needed to focus on nation building at home, and this continued economic insecurity

In both the economic and security realms, though, history shows that America
has led to a reluctance to engage abroad.

and the world are more prosperous and secure when the US exercises leadership. At the end of World
War II, the United States supported the creation of a new global political, military, and economic order.
America played a central role in founding the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). In the years

that followed,Washington concluded a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
designed to reassure allies and deter potential aggressors. In the decades that followed, the United States played an essential role in nurturing
and sustaining the international order that it helped build. That order has helped keep us safe and has allowed us to prosper. At this crucial juncture, America

faces a choice: continue to lead and work with its allies to preserve current international institutions and
change them to meet the new threats and challenges of our time or risk the security and economic
strength that has resulted from decades of US international leadership. Over the course of many discussions, we have
concluded that international leadership aligns with America’s enduring interests and objectives and that
the long-term risks of an inward-looking America overwhelm the short-term benefits. Enduring US Interests and
Objectives For the better part of a century, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has fostered

security and stability at home and abroad through the pursuit of a relatively consistent set of policy aims. First and
foremost, the United States has acted through the use of highly capable armed forces to protect the American people and to
defend the country. The need to “provide for the common defense” was set out in the preamble to the Constitution as one of the central responsibilities of the federal government. Since
World War II, the United States has responded to threats as far from America’s shores as possible through highly capable armed forces and through diplomatic initiatives geared toward

Early, active involvement has been essential to preventing crises from becoming
reducing, managing and countering threats.

conflicts and for dealing with threats before they grow and spread. Moreover, the unquestioned strength of
America’s military capabilities—and the demonstrated will to use them—have provided deterrence to aggression from
potential adversaries. Second, to promote shared interests and shared values, as well as to protect its allies, the United States has
developed a network of treaties and alliances with likeminded countries. In addition to America’s own
efforts, its allies have multiplied its strength and have helped maintain global and regional security.
Australia, for example, has recently played a major role in promoting security in Southwest Asia, including peacekeeping operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. France launched
military operations against al Qaeda in Mali, and Japan has been an important and growing source of development and security assistance in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

Third, the United States has promoted and protected global public structures that have become as crucial to
America’s national security and prosperity as they are to nations across the globe. These include open markets and free trade,

international standards for the environment and human humyn rights, and many of the structures that underlie cyber and
information technologies. Participation in international organizations not only provides America with the opportunity to shape and
influence the evolution of international standards, but it also facilitates trade and reduces the likelihood that misunderstandings
between great powers will lead to military conflict. Fourth, the United States has acted over decades to ensure
access to the global commons—that is, the sea lanes through which trade flows—in peacetime and protect them in wartime. Defending freedom
of navigation on the high seas has benefited not only the United States but also nations the world over. The free flow of goods, services, and information resulting

from the broad acceptance of these norms has facilitated global economic development, opened up markets to US
goods and services, and ensured that US traders and businesses can compete on a level playing field. A fifth objective is less frequently
discussed but nonetheless represents an enduring American aim: for the past century, the United States has sought to preserve an equitable balance of interests across Eurasia.

Ensuring a stable security environment across the Eurasian land mass not only has economic benefits for the United States, but it
also helps prevent the outbreak of conflicts that, because of its alliance obligations, could draw the United States into

great-power wars. Finally, the United States has acted for the common good by providing humynitarian assistance and disaster relief. Indeed, the United States has historically
led many international relief efforts through its own resources and expertise both civilian (for example, the Agency for International Development) and military (the US Navy, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard), through the United Nations and other multilateral entities, and through civil society nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the charitable generosity of the American

people. Humynitarian assistance and economic development are not only morally right things to provide and encourage, but they also create a world that is more stable and secure .
Those who call for the United States to retreat from its traditional international role explicitly or
implicitly assume that the United States should trim the goals that it seeks to achieve. They argue that if the United
States pulls back from leadership, it will entangle itself less in the world’s problems. The historical case for this line of argument is flimsy—often,

the United States has been pulled into foreign conflicts specifically because it tried to disengage, not
because it engaged too much. (The Korean War and World War II are just two examples.) But if the benefits to the
security of the both the homeland and the international order of American leadership are clear, why do so many question the value of engagement? Why US International Engagement Is Being
Questioned Although the case for US international leadership, and the principles behind it, is strong, critics who argue that the costs of international involvement outweigh the benefits, both
at home and abroad, are reacting primarily to two recent developments in American history. First, more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan eroded the willingness of some
Americans to support future major military operations. Some doubted the wisdom of the war in Iraq, while others questioned the effectiveness of US national security institutions in waging
the wars once they had been launched. For some, the seeming inability of the United States to formulate and implement an effective strategy has raised larger questions about the efficacy of
US military intervention in general. Second, the Great Recession and the unequal distribution of the gains from the subsequent recovery have produced a mixture of anxiety and pessimism
about America’s role in the world. A growing number of Americans question why the United States is expending limited resources when many continue to struggle at home. Others see the
North American energy boom as an opportunity for the United States to disengage from its overseas commitments, particularly in the Middle East.9 The public still supports American
international engagement when they see a worthy cause. A poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2014, as the reach of ISIS expanded and other powers, such as Russia and
China, became increasingly assertive along their peripheries, showed that 6 in 10 Americans supported an “active” role for the US in international affairs.10 These findings were a marked
contrast to public attitudes from 2013, when the Pew Research Center found that “growing numbers of Americans believe that US global power and prestige are in decline” and that “support
for US global engagement, already near a historic low, had fallen further.”11 That poll also found that members of the “millennial” generation (ages 18–29) were slightly more hesitant than
older generations about US international leadership. Public attitudes are often cyclical. So has America’s level of engagement and restraint in the international arena, but this should not be the

case. As the principal guarantor of international security, America creates space for new challenges to
emerge and for old adversaries to grow stronger when it does not act. Time and again after major
conflicts, Americans have questioned whether it makes sense to continue their leadership role, and time
and again, events eventually remind Americans what the world would be like without their participation.
The fact of the matter is that the consequences of American withdrawal would be long lasting and would affect both

the international arena and the homeland. Regardless of the changing nature of public attitudes, this fact remains as true today as it ever was. Why US
International Engagement Still Matters The world of today is far different than the world of 1945 or even that of 1995. The interconnected nature of global

commerce and communications and the speed with which military power can be exerted, means that,
unlike in the past, the United States could not disengage from the international community even if it so desired.
The global integration and reach of communications and financial tools has created economic opportunities and empowered local populations in a manner never before seen. But it has also
created opportunities for terrorist organizations and state actors alike to organize, support, and perpetrate attacks across international borders in new and rapid ways. Are America’s enduring
objectives still relevant today? The first and foremost enduring objective of the United States, as with any nation, is to provide for the common defense of its own people.

Maintaining credibility with allies, acting from a position of influence in international organizations , and
providing aid to those who suffer around the world cannot be done if our national defense and capabilities are not strong. This is
as true today as it ever was, but the budgetary cuts our military currently faces undermine this central objective. The first imperative of a new administration thus must be to work with
Congress to reverse the effect of the Budget Control Act on defense spending. Though this was not its intention, the act has pushed the Pentagon into budgetary disarray and weakened the

Despite the
American military’s capacity to defend America’s core interests. What of the second objective—the establishment and maintenance of useful alliances and partnerships?

perception among some that the United States has a tendency to act unilaterally, the manner by which
America has historically exercised its leadership tells a different story. Since World War I, the United States has
consistently engaged, organized, and deployed with allies and coalition partners and produced decisive
results. Many of these countries would not have—and in some cases, simply could not have— acted without the support of the United States. America’s allies share many of America’s
security concerns. But doubt in the ability or willingness of America to lead leaves our allies looking for other

partners and security arrangements, ones that may not benefit America. Cooperating with allies also protects our security at home.
Since September 11, 2001, for example, such cooperation has played a role in preventing no fewer than 11 of 60 planned terrorist attacks against the homeland.12 The third and fourth
objectives—promoting liberal economic values and maintaining access to the global commons—are arguably more important to the United States now than at any other point in history. Many
 command
saw the fall of the Soviet Union as proof of the superiority of the capitalist and liberal economic order long championed by the United States. In recent years, however,

economies that mix elements of communism and capitalism, such as China’s economic system, have gained appeal in the
developing world. Meanwhile, the world’s shipping routes have increasingly come under threat by modern pirates and by manipulations of international legal regimes that grant countries

exclusive rights to waters near their shores. Both of these developments threaten the vitality of international trade, which accounts for the
equivalent of $10,000 of each American household’s income.13 Some may view the importance of the fifth objective, maintaining a favorable balance of power across Eurasia, as outdated.

In the absence of clear leadership from the United States, Russia’s

Recent events, however, have proven this objective’s renewed importance.

hostilities toward its western neighbors have reached their highest levels since the Cold War; in addition to
unilateral actions in the East and South China Seas, China has expanded its economic influence in Southeast Asia, Central Asia,

and Africa; and Iran has continued to fund terrorist groups that threaten the stability of the Middle East. As
ambitious nations become more powerful, it is in America’s interest to ensure that their rise is
peaceful. Otherwise America may find itself in a historically familiar situation in which it is called on by its
allies to contribute to a conflict that could have been prevented through deterrence, strategy, diplomacy, and presence. When
people across the globe need help, they turn not to China, nor to Russia, but to America. This is particularly true in times of humanitarian need. Helping others is the right thing to do, but the
last of the enduring objectives, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, remains important to all Americans for more than just moral reasons. For very little money, foreign assistance
creates goodwill toward the United States and eases the accomplishment of other economic and national security objectives. That goodwill translates into increased opportunities for
American businesses, ease of travel for its citizens, and better diplomatic relations that can then be leveraged in times of difficulty. America’s power bestows upon its citizens many benefits.
With those benefits come a responsibility to help those in need—but doing so helps Americans too. For all of the introspection by Americans about their role in the world and the media
coverage of those from around the world who criticize the United States, the world’s population, in fact, would rather have America at the wheel than anyone else. In its inaugural poll of
international opinion about major world powers, Gallup found that an average of slightly more than 43 percent of respondents between 2007 and 2014 approved of America’s leadership role
in international affairs—higher than for any other country.14 People across the world understand that America leads on the global stage to protect not only its own interests but also the
prosperity, security, and dignity of all. With increased calls for a retracted stance in international affairs, now is the time for Americans to remember this as well. Conclusion In sum,

American leadership has helped ensure stability and security throughout the globe and has bestowed immeasurable
benefits on the American people. The fact that the era of American leadership has corresponded with the decline of

great-power war is not a coincidence. Moving forward, US engagement and leadership will remain as
crucial to security, stability, and prosperity today as in past decades. The arguments advanced by
those advocating a retreat from America’s traditional international role do not stand up under
scrutiny. Still, these arguments need to be addressed. To be sustainable, US international engagement needs to be realistic and results oriented. There is plenty of room to debate how
best the US could play a 21st-century leadership role. But the key word here is how, not whether, it should play such a role. The

choice before the United States is whether it will help shape the world or allow others to fill the
vacuum created by its absence. The foundation for American leadership—and the prosperity and security that derive from it—
lies in the insurmountable power of its military. Speaking to the British House of Commons in 1982, Ronald Reagan stated, “Our military
strength is a prerequisite to peace.”15 The US military is the best trained, best equipped, and most
capable in the world, and to maintain the peace, the United States must ensure that this continues to be the case. Military strength is an essential
element of national strength, but it is not the only tool in America’s tool kit. To finish Reagan’s thought, “We maintain this [military] strength in the hope it will never be used.” The United
States should thus rely on diplomatic and economic levers as tools of first resort in its interactions with other countries. It should meet its obligations to its allies and expect its allies to meet
their obligations to the United States. International engagement and leadership are often equated with military intervention, but engagement across other fronts will often preclude the need

The security, diplomatic effectiveness, and economic vitality of the American people are
to resort to violence.

inextricably intertwined, and the absence of security imperils the other two. President John F. Kennedy understood this truism
when he stated in 1961, “Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another.”16 Today, the links between diplomacy and defense are still frequently lost in public conversations about
the importance of maintaining a ready and capable force; too often, providing for the common defense is construed as an end unto itself rather than as a means to protect the interests of all

maintaining our military power, and the ability to project it, may be more important in
Americans. In fact,

today’s interconnected world than at any time in our history.

 plan
Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should remove the annual limit
on governmentally-awarded H-1B visas.
 advantage 2 – epidemics

Advantage two is epidemics –

New diseases are coming – they cause extinction – increased research is key
Lee 3-10-18

Bruce, Associate Professor of International Health at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Disease X Is What May Become The Biggest Infectious Threat To Our World,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2018/03/10/disease-x-is-what-may-become-the-biggest-
infectious-threat-to-our-world/#2f682f7f2cd7, msm

The World Health Organization (WHO) has now added Disease X to its Blueprint list of priority diseases. What? WHO? What the heck is
Disease X? No, this is not Wolverine getting a bad hangnail, Mystique getting jaundiced, or some other X-Men problem. Nor is it caused by Generation X, the
generation supposedly "steeped in irony, detachment, and a sense of dread." And, no it isn't a bad bottle of Dos Equis XX. After the second annual review of the
Bluprint list occurred February 6-7, 2018, Disease
X appeared at the end of the following list of diseases for which the WHO
determined accelerated research and development is urgently needed: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) Ebola
virus disease and Marburg virus disease Lassa fever Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Nipah and henipaviral diseases Rift Valley fever (RVF) Zika Disease X If this list were the answer in a Jeopardy contest, the question would be: what would you not
want to get? Or what do you not want to invite to a dinner party? Or what could cause a public health emergency? And what diseases don't have adequate drugs
and/or vaccines to prevent and treat them? You've probably heard of Ebola, Zika, MERS, and SARS. Lassa Fever is spread by rat pee and poop and can cause you to
bleed in lots of places and kill you. CCHF is spread by ticks and can cause you to bleed in lots of places and kill you. Marburg Virus is spread person-to-person
through body fluids and can cause you to bleed in lots of places and kill you. (Are you detecting a trend here?) You can catch the Nipah virus from infected bats,
pigs, or people (depending on whom you tend to hang out with) and then subsequently develop inflammation of the brain that can lead to neurological problems,
convulsions, personality changes, and death. Livestock can transmit the RVF virus to you. While you may have only mild symptoms like fever and some liver
abnormalities, in some cases, you can develop eye problems (including going blind), suffer inflammation of the brain, and, yes, bleed in lots of places. What

can happen with Disease X? Who knows? (Not who as in WHO but who as in no one really knows.) That's the point. There is a
high probability that the next big epidemic will come from a completely unexpected source, a
pathogen that has not yet revealed itself. And as they say, the most dangerous enemy is the one that you don't know. It's not as if most
people were expecting the Zika epidemic to occur in 2015 to 2016. Before 2015, very few people in the world paid attention to the Zika virus. A dangerous virus or
some other pathogen won't call or Tweet everyone and say, "yeah, I'm getting antsy. Watching Real Housewives of Beverly Hills isn't really doing it for me. Here's a
heads up that I will probably start causing trouble in about a year. Cheers." Thus,
Disease X represents "the knowledge that a
serious international epidemic could be caused by a pathogen currently unknown to cause human
disease." As philosopher and former puncher of faces Mike Tyson once said, "everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face." When is the last time
that you completely anticipated the biggest challenges, the biggest threats in your life?

Diseases cause extinction

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York University, Leo and Julia
Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein
College of Medicine, former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, “The future of biological
warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584–587, September 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential
threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war
followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change
making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For
the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential
threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens
to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been
associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was
responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006).
Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the
notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was
naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from
the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of
host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without
harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of
existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity
than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if
some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

Subsumes their defense

Carey 6-9-16

Rear Admiral James J. Carey, U.S. Navy [Ret.], is National Chairman of THE FLAG &
GENERAL OFFICERS' NETWORK and Former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Maritime
Commission. We are Losing the Fight Against Superbugs,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/we-are-losing-the-fight-against-superbugs-
16530?page=2, msm
CDC) announced an alarming development in the battle between humans
Last week, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (

and dangerous bacteria: Researchers at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center confirmed that a forty-nine-year-old woman in Pennsylvania
was infected with a superbug resistant to colistin, an antibiotic of last resort, generally given to patients when
everything else has failed. Public health officials have been tracking this new kind of colistin resistance since it first emerged in China last year. Quickly thereafter, it
was also discovered on multiple continents, in countries around the world. It was only a matter of time until it was discovered the United States. And now we know it is here. What is most

form of resistance is highly transferable. It can

concerning about this particular superbug—a strain of E. coli—is the kind of antibiotic resistance it has. This

spread more easily than other superbugs giving it the potential to easily combine with other types of
drug resistance and create a whole new category of superbugs that are immune to every antibiotic we
have. This is a dangerous turning point, particularly as doctors have been turning to colistin more and
more in recent years to treat increasingly drug-resistant infections. According to, a 2012 study showed colistin use is on
the rise in Veterans Affairs hospitals as patients—in this case America’s military veterans—run out of options to treat their infections. The
CDC announcement follows on the heels of a report commissioned by the U.K. government’s warning of the cost of not taking action
against the growing threat of superbugs. According to that report, by 2050 we could be looking at 10 million lives lost each year—that’s one death every three seconds—due to
antimicrobial resistance, and a cumulative cost of $100 trillion to the global economy. Our own CDC conservatively estimates that already each year at least two million Americans are infected

statistics paint a grim picture of what could be to come: the dawn of a

with these resistant superbugs, 23,000 of them fatally. These

postantibiotic era in which the modern medicine we take for granted today is no longer safe because
we will not be able to control infection—from childbirth and surgery to dialysis and chemotherapy. Even simple cuts and wounds could
have an increased risk of turning septic and fatal without effective antibiotic treatments. Indeed, many of our soldiers have already seen a preview of what this
post-antibiotic world will look like, as more than a third of returning Iraq and Afghanistan veterans are affected by resistant bacteria.

H-1B visas are key to sustaining biotech and pharma

Lee 16 - Bruce Y. Lee, an Associate Professor of International Health at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health and Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School. Previous
positions include serving as Senior Manager at Quintiles Transnational and Associate Professor of
Medicine and Biomedical Informatics at the University of Pittsburgh, 5/1/16, “Trump's And Sanders'
Immigration Plans Would Shake The Biomedical World”,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2016/05/01/trumps-and-sanders-immigration-plans-would-
shake-the-biomedical-world/#586247a14fc5
First the big news. Presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders actually agree. On what could they possibly agree? Both are are
opposed to the current H-1B visa program and would like to see the minimum wage of the visa raised. Both have highlighted the impact of the
current visa program on jobs for Americans. Much of the presidential
debate over the H-1B visa has focused on how
the visa affects the computer and information technology world. Part of the reason has been that Trump has criticized
Facebook Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Mark Zuckerberg for wanting to increase the number of H-1B Visas. Computer tech executives have
been vocal about H-1B Visas and immigration reform. For example, along with Reid Hoffman, chairman of LinkedIn, John Doerr, general partner
of Kleiner Perkins, and Joe Green, cofounder of NationBuilder, Zuckerberg formed FWD.us (pronounced as Forward U.S.), an organization that
has lobbied for measures to increase legal immigration and facilitate those from other countries to work in the U.S.. The group has some other
high-profile backers, including Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google, Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo, Reed Hastings, founder and CEO of
Netflix, Mark Pincus, founder and CEO of Zynga, and Elon Musk, CEO of both Space X and Tesla Motors. Yes, U.S. computer and information
tech organizations depend heavily on people from other countries, especially those from Asia. But now the important news that hasn't been
discussed nearly as much...the same is true for medical, biotechnology and pharmaceutical organizations in the
U.S. Go to any large biomedical laboratory in the U.S., whether in an academic, government or industry
setting, and there's a high likelihood that you'll find many people who recently came from other
countries, such as China, Taiwan and India. For instance, according to a Scientific American article,
"Scientific and Engineering Indicators 2008," published by the National Science Board, the total number
of postdocs in U.S. labs may be as high as 90,000, and at least half of these post-docs are non-citizens.
And post-docs are not the only positions in U.S. labs. An academic, government or industry lab typically will have a
variety of positions ranging from technician to research associate to scientist positions that are occupied
by non-U.S. citizens. In fact, in a number of major laboratories, citizens of other countries far outnumber
U.S. citizens. And they are not performing "menial" labor. Instead, many are conducting highly skilled
and intellectual scientific work. Foreign nationals are behind many of the discoveries and products
coming out of U.S.-based laboratories, healthcare facilities and companies. In fact, if visa policies were
to become so strict that foreigners would have to immediately leave the country tomorrow, many
laboratories could collapse. Some critics have claimed that the H-1B visa program facilitates
outsourcing, which in turn displaces opportunities for U.S. citizens. The H-1B visa is a temporary U.S. specialty-
occupation visa that allows a person to work for three years in the U.S., with the option of extending the
duration to six years. After six years, if the H-1B holder wants to remain in the U.S., he or she[they] must
either obtain permanent residency status or leave the U.S. for a year and then reapply for another H-1B
visa. A U.S. employer must submit an application for the visa on behalf of the potential employee to the United States Department of Labor.
There are other criticisms of the H-1B program. Ron Hira, an Economic Policy Institute research associate, associate professor of public policy at
Howard University and author of Outsourcing America, has argued that the visa program is in essence indentured servitude. The employer
controls the visa and therefore the employee's ability to stay in the U.S. Many H-1B holders are from economically disadvantaged situations or
see the H-1B visa as the only pathway to permanent residency status. Therefore, they may be willing to work longer hours and make efforts
that U.S. citizens would not. Hira also argues that by providing a low-cost alternative for employers the program drives down wages for
Americans. Another criticism is that the visa programs help employers use "temporary" employees to fill positions rather than create positions
that are progressions along a career path. In other words, why not hire a technician or research associate whom you do not have to mentor or
provide subsequent career opportunities? Limiting such career paths contributes to a leadership void in the biomedical world. Relevant
experience plays a vital role in leadership, especially in the biomedical world where even understanding the key problems and questions takes
much time and practice. Martin Skreli has shown how lack of experience actually conducting biomedical research and development can lead to
leadership missteps. Proponents of the program claim that the
H-1B program brings foreign talent to the U.S. and
enhances the competitiveness of U.S. organizations, which would otherwise struggle to find the talent to
get things done. As a result, there has been debate among the presidential candidates over whether and how to reform the H-1B
program. Suggestions range from raising the minimum wage limits to decreasing or increasing the requirements to obtain a visa. ZDNet
summarizes the stances of the different presidential candidates here. However, the debate has largely been around the social media and
computer technology worlds and much less so around the biomedical world. If the gates were narrowed for foreign scientists,
could the U.S. biomedical world fill the void? Not immediately. And maybe not for a while, if ever,
unless the current situation changes. The pipeline of U.S. citizen biomedical talent has been long
eroding. Other countries such as those in Asia are not simply the source of cheap labor. In many cases, they are the source of highly skilled,
talented and motivated people. Many biomedical graduate programs are also now filled by citizens of other countries. Therefore, changes
in immigration policy could expose what has been a growing deterioration in the U.S. biomedical talent
base.

Plan’s key to solve

Brody 5-28-17

Harrison Brody is a PhD student in neuroscience at Yale University and a member of Yale Science
Diplomats. CUTTING H-1B VISAS ENDANGERS SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS FOR EVERYONE,
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/cutting-h-1b-visas-endangers-scientific-progress-everyone/, msm

Academic institutions have long relied on an international network from which to source the most
successful and talented scientists. This global supply of talent, unrestricted by national boundaries, is critical to the
ability of US institutions to compete on a global scale, and this fact is reflected in current policy. While the government
caps the number of new H-1B visas awarded to the private sector at 85,000 visas annually, the number of H-1Bs granted to academic and non-
profit research institutions is currently unrestricted, demonstrating just how important an unlimited source of international talent is for scientific discovery and
innovation. It's unclear if the Trump administration's H-1B visa reform will alter or eliminate this protection for research institutions. If the administration does
ultimately recommend imposing tighter restrictions on the H-1B visa program, any changes that restrict how colleges and universities recruit
scientists would have devastating repercussions. The contribution of highly skilled foreign talent to US

innovation and economic growth is well-established, and much of this growth is closely tied to academic
research. Patents can be a useful proxy for measuring innovation, and in 2015, approximately 22 percent of utility patents filed by US organizations in the
category of pharmaceutical drugs and 24 percent of utility patents filed by US organizations in the category of molecular biology and microbiology were awarded to
US colleges and universities by the US Patent and Trademark Office. These patents were in no small part due to the work of foreign-born academic researchers; a
report from the Partnership for a New American Economy, a bipartisan research organization, found that 76 percent of patents awarded to the top 10 patent-
producing US universities listed at least one foreign-born inventor. The report also found that 99 percent of these patents were in STEM-related fields. More than
half of all basic scientific research conducted in the US, the kind of research that paves the way for advances in medicine and technology, was conducted at US
colleges or universities, the report found. The scientific and economic gains produced by foreign-born innovators are in no way limited to the ivory tower.
Researchers at the University of California, Davis and Colgate University found that an increase in the number of H-1B visa holders working in STEM-related fields
can at least partially account for an increase in wage growth of native-born STEM workers in the same metropolitan area. Research conducted by the Migration
Policy Institute suggests that a major factor in maintaining the United States’ edge in scientific innovation is a
critical mass of talented and educated professionals. A pool of talent, coupled with capital, professional networks, and momentum,
renews itself by attracting more and more skilled labor. But this cycle is by no means guaranteed indefinitely . Without an

uninterrupted stream of global talent to draw from, the United States could quickly lose its edge to
nations that gladly welcome high-skilled innovators and scientists. While members of Congress debate greater restrictions to the H-1B visa program, other rapidly
advancing countries are poised to take advantage of any barriers that prevent highly skilled scientists from entering the US. Once lost, re-establishing a critical mass
of talent and regaining US dominance in STEM-related fields may be impossible.

Eliminating the cap is key

Cromwell 09 Courtney L. Cromwell, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market: Why Congress Should
Raise or Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap, 3 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. (2009). Available at:
http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol3/iss2/6

VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE H-1B CATEGORY Any
reforms implemented by Congress to the
H-1B category should focus on meeting the goals of the statute, i.e. bringing the best and brightest
minds to the United States, preventing displacement of U.S. workers, providing U.S. employers with
adequately trained employees, and protecting H-1B workers from labor abuses. Possible reforms to the
H-1B category include eliminating the cap entirely and, instead, setting up a sliding scale limiting the number of H-1B
workers a company may hire based on the percentage of employees at the company; continuing to offer the option of
permanent residency to H-1B workers, making LCA applications readily available to the public; and imposing stricter penalties for
labor or fraud violations. These proposed reforms are discussed more fully below. A. ELIMINATE THE CAP ENTIRELY Since the H-
1B program was designed to allow the United States to remain at the forefront of the global economy,
“the program ought to maximize its potential economic benefits by increasing its efficiency and
flexibility, the ability to easily adapt to the fast changing global economy.”211 Arbitrary caps do not
promote efficiency and flexibility, but rather hinder American companies in the “unpredictable, fast-
paced, and fiercely competitive global high-tech labor markets of the twenty-first century.”212 The
amount of H-1B visas issued each year should either be controlled by the labor market213 or by
percentage limits, rather than strict numerical caps. Regarding the labor market as the determining factor for H1Bs,
proponents note that in 2002 and 2003 the labor market controlled the demand for H-1B visas.214 In both of those
years, the H-1B cap was set at 195,000;215 however, fewer than 80,000 visas were issued in either of those years,
leaving 230,000 H-1B visas unused.216 Thus, employers “did not hire more H-1Bs just because the cap was
higher.”217 Instead, employers requested H-1B employees according to their need. A sliding scale percentage
may work equally as well. For example, Congress should limit H-1Bs for small companies (10−25 employees) to 30% of their employees; for
medium employers (25−200 employees) to 15%; and for large employers (201−1000+ employees) to 5%. This
will effectively
eliminate body shopping and the inflexible deadline of April 1 for H-1B applications. It will also protect
U.S. workers from displacement. Both the labor market determinate and the sliding scale will also allow
the United States to retain valuable intellectual capital by allowing foreign students to remain in the
United States after graduation and by allowing U.S. companies facing a labor shortage to recruit foreign
employees. Either method will also appease companies’ hiring needs, preventing many U.S. companies
from moving offshore.