CASES OF JUSTICE PERLAS-

BERNABE
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES
 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES

I. LEGAL ETHICS
A. Practice of Law
1. Concept
2. Qualifications for admission to the Bar (Bar Matter No. 1153)
3. Continuing requirements for membership in the bar

JILDO A. GUBATON, complainant, vs. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR, respondent. A.C.
No. 8962, SECOND DIVISION, July 9, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. It was
emphasized that to satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay
evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay.

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that respondent had illicit affairs
with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality. Substantial evidence, which
only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise," exist to prove Jildo’s accusation of gross immorality against Atty. Amador. This is
because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement
to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. First, Jildo’s own
account that he actually saw Atty. Amador and Bernadette together on various intimate occasions is
credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse Atty. Amador of such a serious charge - much
more a personal scandal involving his own wife - unless the same were indeed true. Second,
corroborative statements in an affidavit executed by Navarez, who works in BIR, Malaybalay City as a
messenger and, goes around the city in relation to his work, deserve ample consideration, considering
that he is a neutral and disinterested witness. Third, description by Jildo’s sister, Nila, about how Atty.
Amador would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their residence, while she was still living
with Bernadette and their children thereat. Nila likewise recounted that whenever the two of them
arrived home in one vehicle, they would kiss each other before alighting therefrom. Fourth, love
letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette to Atty. Amador to prove the existence of their illicit
relationship were not refuted.

FACTS:

Jildo Gubaton alleged that Atty. Augustus Amador (Atty. Amador), a former Assistant Prosecutor at
the City Prosecutor's Office in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic relationship
with his wife, Ma. Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette).

He averred that he discovered the illicit relationship while working in the USA. Jildo and Bernadette's
house helper informed him through a phone call that a man whom she knows to be "Fiscal Amador"
often visits Bernadette. The house helper also told him that Atty. Amador spends nights at their house
and stays with Bernadette in their bedroom. When Jildo called Bernadette's dental clinic to verify the
information, it was the secretary who took his call. Upon inquiry, the latter confirmed that Atty.

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Amador and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair. He also alleged that Bernadette wrote
love letters/notes to respondent, as in fact, one of these letters had the word "fiscal" on it.

Jildo alleged that he personally saw Atty. Amador and Bernadette together in various places in
Malaybalay City. At one instance, he saw them kissing while inside a vehicle; when he approached to
confront them, Atty. Amador ran away. The illicit affair of Atty. Amador and Bernadette was known
to other people as well. Jildo’s sister, Nila Canoy, told him about it during phone calls while he was
still in the USA. Likewise, Carlos Delgado (Delgado), Chief of Barangay Public Safety Office in
Poblacion, Malaybalay City, and one Edgar Navarez (Navarez), an employee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and a resident of Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the affair and executed their
respective affidavits relative thereto.

In defense, Atty. Amador denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that he was merely
acquainted with Bernadette and they would only see each other on various occasions and social
gatherings. He also denied the incident where complainant allegedly saw him and Bernadette kissing
inside a vehicle.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the affidavit-complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating that that the information supplied by Jildo and Bernandette's house
helper, Bernadette's clinic secretary, and Jildo’s sister, Nila, about the alleged illicit affair were purely
hearsay. Likewise, the supposed love letters/notes offered in evidence did not prove that the same
were written by Bernadette to Atty. Amador. Similarly, the affidavit executed by Delgado did not
positively refer to Atty. Amador, while that of Navarez contained general statements of an affair
between Atty. Amador and Bernadette. As for the affidavit executed by Nila, the same is clearly biased
in view of the latter's relationship with Jildo. Finally, the incident where Jildo allegedly saw Atty.
Amador and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle and attempted to confront them was found to be
contrary to human experience, reasoning that an offended husband would be expected to do more
than just confront them under the circumstances. In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
reversed and suspended Atty. Amador from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Atty.
Amador moved for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Amador is guilty of gross immorality.
(YES)

RULING:

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise. It was emphasized that to satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative
cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence
that are not hearsay.

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that respondent had illicit affairs
with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality. Substantial evidence,
which only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise," exist to prove Jildo’s accusation of gross immorality against Atty.
Amador. This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a

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continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. First, Jildo’s own account that he actually saw Atty. Amador and Bernadette together on
various intimate occasions is credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse Atty. Amador
of such a serious charge - much more a personal scandal involving his own wife - unless the same
were indeed true. Second, corroborative statements in an affidavit executed by Navarez, who works
in BIR, Malaybalay City as a messenger and, goes around the city in relation to his work, deserve
ample consideration, considering that he is a neutral and disinterested witness. Third, description by
Jildo’s sister, Nila, about how Atty. Amador would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their
residence, while she was still living with Bernadette and their children thereat. Nila likewise
recounted that whenever the two of them arrived home in one vehicle, they would kiss each other
before alighting therefrom. Fourth, love letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette to Atty.
Amador to prove the existence of their illicit relationship were not refuted.

For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. Suffice it to say that "denial
is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and
self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters." In any event, the Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent"
encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too many for comfort and coincidence. Such
encounters actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit affair.

Extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the sanctity of marriage, the family, and
the community. When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and
morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not
disbarment. This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

4. Appearance of Non-Lawyers
a. Law student practice rule (Rule 138-A)
b. Non-lawyers in courts and/or administrative tribunals
c. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing as
counsels
5. Prohibited practice of non-lawyers and appearance without authority
6. Public officials and the practice of law; prohibitions and disqualifications
7. The Lawyer’s Oath
GERONIMO J. JIMENO, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FLORDELIZA M. JIMENO, respondent. A.C. No.
12012, SECOND DIVISION, July 2, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct

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himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well
as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law, as
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct.

In line with the letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession, the courts,
the society, and his clients.

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement that
respondent's acts in relation to the subject SPA and the subject deed constitute blatant transgressions
of her duties as a lawyer, as ordained by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which engraves an overriding
prohibition against any form of misconduct. Additionally, the Court finds that respondent fell short of
her duty to impress upon her client compliance with the pertinent laws in relation to the subject
transaction. In this case, while seemingly aware of the demise of Perla that rendered the Malindang
property a co-owned property of Geronimo Sr. and the Jimeno children, instead of advising the latter to
settle the estate of Perla to enable the proper registration of the property in their names preliminary to
the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily signed the subject deed, as attorney-in-fact of Geronimo Sr., despite
the patent irregularities in its execution. These irregularities are: (a) the fact that it bore the signature
of Perla, who was already deceased; (b) the erroneous description of Geronimo Sr. as married to Perla
despite the latter's demise and as being the absolute owner in fee simple of the Malindang property
which is a co-owned property; and (c) the erroneous statement of Geronimo Sr.'s residence and postal
address.

FACTS:

Geromino Jimeno, Jr. (Geromino) claimed to have discovered that Atty. Flordeliza Jimeno (Atty.
Flordeliza), who is his cousin, sold the Malindang property owned by his parents, Spouses Geronimo
Sr. and Perla Jimeno, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 8, 2005 (subject deed)
executed by Atty. Flordeliza as attorney-in-fact of Geronimo Sr.. He claimed that the subject deed was
falsified considering that: (a) the same bore the signature of Perla who had already passed away on
May 19, 2004, or more than a year prior to the execution thereof; (b) Geronimo Sr. was erroneously
described as married to Perla, when he was already a widower at the time; (c) Geronimo Sr. was
made to appear as the absolute and registered owner in fee simple of the property when the same is
co-owned by him and his ten (10) children (Jimeno children); and (d) Geronimo Sr.'s residence and
postal address was stated as "421 (formerly 137) Mayon Street, Quezon City," when the same should
have been "10451 Bridgeport Road, Richmond, British Columbia" as indicated in the Special Power
of Attorney dated July 9, 2004 (subject SPA) he executed, authorizing respondent to administer and
sell his real properties in the Philippines. Complainant likewise alleged that Atty. Flordeliza
mentioned "so many unnecessary and un-called for matters like [his] father having allegedly (sic)
illegitimate children" when his lawyer requested for copies of the titles and other documents
respecting the properties covered by the SPA, in violation of her duty to keep in confidence whatever
informations were revealed to her by the late Geronimo Sr. in the course of their professional
relationship (lawyer-client privilege).

In her defense, Atty. Flordeliza claimed that: (a) she was not the one who prepared or caused the
preparation of the subject deed and that all the necessary documents for the sale of the Malindang
property, including the subject SPA and the Deed of Waiver of Rights and Interests executed by the
Jimeno children in their parents' favor, were merely transmitted by her cousin and respondent's

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sister, Lourdes Jimeno-Yaptinchay (Lourdes), from Canada; (b) the sale of the Malindang property
was with the consent of all the Jimeno children, including Geronimo; and (c) she merely signed the
subject deed in good faith before endorsing the same to the buyer, Melencio G. Aquino, Jr. (Aquino),
for disposition. Atty. Flordeliza further claimed that the contents of her email to Geronimo’s lawyer
are "privileged communication" which are relevant to the subject of inquiry, and they did not arise
from the confidences and secrets of the late Geronimo Sr. She challenged Geronimo’s invocation of
Canon 21, contending that the matter is personal to a client, and is intransmissible in character.

The IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed that while the sale of the Malindang property
appeared to be a unanimous decision of the Jimeno children, and the documents of sale which were
all prepared in Canada were merely sent to respondent in the Philippines, she allowed herself to
become a party to a document which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies in violation of her
duties as a lawyer, namely: (a) to refrain from doing or consenting to any falsehood; (b) to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client; and (c) to refrain from allowing
his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. Accordingly, he recommended that Atty.
Flordeliza be reprimanded for her acts, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors (Board) in Resolution. Geronimo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by
the Board in a resolution increasing the imposed penalty to suspension from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Flordeliza should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
(YES)

RULING:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule
of law, as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct.

In line with the letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession, the
courts, the society, and his clients.

Pertinent to this case are Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19,
which provide:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

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 xxx xxx xxx

Rule 15.07 — A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 19 — A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 — A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client x x x.

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement that
respondent's acts in relation to the subject SPA and the subject deed constitute blatant transgressions
of her duties as a lawyer, as ordained by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct. Additionally, the Court finds that respondent
fell short of her duty to impress upon her client compliance with the pertinent laws in relation to the
subject transaction. In this case, while seemingly aware of the demise of Perla that rendered the
Malindang property a co-owned property of Geronimo Sr. and the Jimeno children, instead of
advising the latter to settle the estate of Perla to enable the proper registration of the property in
their names preliminary to the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily signed the subject deed, as attorney-
in-fact of Geronimo Sr., despite the patent irregularities in its execution. These irregularities are: (a)
the fact that it bore the signature of Perla, who was already deceased; (b) the erroneous description
of Geronimo Sr. as married to Perla despite the latter's demise and as being the absolute owner in fee
simple of the Malindang property which is a co-owned property; and (c) the erroneous statement of
Geronimo Sr.'s residence and postal address.

That respondent had no hand in the preparation of the documents of sale is of no moment because
as a lawyer, she is expected to respect and abide by the laws and the legal processes. To say that
lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can
never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly
bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law.
As a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of a voluntary conveyance of
property, particularly, the scope of the rights, interests, and participation of the parties/signatories
to the deed of sale, and the consequent transfer of title to the properties involved, yet, she chose to
disregard the patent irregularities in the subject deed and voluntarily affixed her signature thereon.
Notably, respondent did not specifically admit nor deny knowledge of the demise of Perla, but her
claim of such strong ties to complainant's family bolsters knowledge thereof. However, despite being
aware that something was amiss with the documents of sale, respondent allowed herself to become
a party to the subject deed which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies in violation of her duties
as a lawyer.

Respondent's claims that she acted in good faith, and that she relied on the assurance of full
responsibility from the ten (10) Jimeno children cannot relieve her of administrative liability. As a
lawyer, she cannot invoke good faith and good intentions as justifications to excuse her from
discharging her obligation to be truthful and honest in her professional actions since her duty and
responsibility in that regard are clear and unambiguous.

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Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to
the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. It is worthy to emphasize that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and
common sense. Respondent's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of her client does
not warrant a course of action not in accordance with the pertinent laws and legal processes.

All told, respondent is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07
of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR by allowing herself to become a party to the
subject deed which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Flordeliza M. Jimeno (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice
of law, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more
severely.

B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer under the Code of Professional

Responsibility
FELIPE C. DAGALA, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY. AMADO T.
ADQUILEN, Respondents.
A.C. No. 5044, SECOND DIVISION, December 2, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that complainant's corresponding failure to appear during
the mandatory conference hearings was upon his counsel’s advice. Under the premises, it is therefore
reasonable to conclude that Atty. Quesada had indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the
prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code.
He violated Canon 17. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his
part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free.
A lawyer is expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. Atty. Quesada’s
failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper
justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause in
violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code.
FACTS:
On November 8, 1994, Felipe Dagala was assisted by Atty. Quesada in filing a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol). However, the said case was dismissed
for failure of the complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory

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conference hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, Dagala engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a
former Labor Arbiter (LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case. Similarly, the case was
dismissed due to the parties' failure to submit their respective position papers. Complainant and Atty.
Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time. During its pendency, the representative of Capitol offered
the amount of ₱74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the
latter’s position paper. Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of interest and failure to prosecute. On July 11, 1997, complainant – this time
assisted by Atty. Imelda L. Picar – filed a motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal
and transmitted to the NLRC-National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR). However, the NLRC-NCR
dismissed the same for having been filed out of time. Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate
letters to respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative
cases against them before the Court. Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of
settlement, respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picar’s office. Only Atty. Quesada
responded to the said letter and subsequently, through a Memorandum of Agreement, undertook to
compensate the damages sustained by complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an
administrative complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus
prompting complainant to proceed with the complaint.
The Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. The Investigating IBP Commissioner found the respondents
guilty of violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
that each of them be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, Atty.
Quesada was directed to comply with his undertaking under the MoA to pay the amount of
₱68,000.00; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay the amount of ₱6,000.00, representing the
difference between the ₱74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and the above-stated settlement
amount. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the afore-stated report and
recommendation. Consequently, it directed respondents to pay complainant the total amount of
₱74,000.00. However, prior to the promulgation of the Decision, Atty. Adquilen passed away due to
cardiac arrhythmia. Hence, the case against him was dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Quesada violated Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR. (YES)
2. Whether or not Quesada violated Canon 17 of the CPR. (YES)
3. Whether or not Quesada violated Canon 18 of the CPR. (YES)
4. Whether or not Quesada should pay the complainant the amount of ₱74,000.00. (NO)
RULING:
1. Quesada violated Canons 1 and 10. Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that
complainant's corresponding failure to appear during the mandatory conference hearings was
upon his counsel’s advice. Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty.
Quesada had indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code.

2. He violated Canon 17. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with
utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-

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 mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their
affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

3. He violated Canon 18. A lawyer is expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with
the courts. Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due
notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence
in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code.

4. He should not pay the amount of ₱74,000.00. The return of the said amount partakes the nature
of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary
proceeding such as this case. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court illumined that disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-
lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his
administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional
engagement, such as the liabilities of the parties which are purely civil in nature, should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrative-disciplinary
proceedings, as in this case.

1. To society (Canons 1 to 6)
CHAMELYN AGOT, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. LUIS RIVERA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8000, EN BANC, August 5, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, as provided for under Rule 1.01, Canon 1. In the
instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to
complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount
of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no
specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US
consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him.
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent in order to secure her US Visa. As part of their
agreement, complainant was to deliver a downpayment in the amount of Php 350,000 and pay the
same amount for the balance after she acquires her visa. However, respondent failed to perform his
undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview. As
the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint
for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
Respondent claims that his failure to comply was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda
with whom he’s had previous transactions regarding the application and issuance of US Visa.

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Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but,
nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable for engaging in
deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the
services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of
₱350,000.00. IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR. (YES)
RULING:
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, as provided for under Rule 1.01, Canon 1.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to
complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount
of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no
specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US
consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract,
which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a
flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18. Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer
a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this
case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics.

REBECCA MARIE YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. ROBERTO UY,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 9115, FIRST DIVISION, September 17, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
The Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted,
mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. He should not
have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which
would endanger the Bar's reputation.

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FACTS:
Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate half-
cousin, continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her
as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the
aforementioned corporations. She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial property in favor
of Philippine Savings Bank despite an existing Trust Agreement wherein respondent, in his capacity
as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds
therefrom, but to no avail.
Respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and
prescription
Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention, praying that the
investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the
legal profession.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was observed that respondent lacked
the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with
the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and
deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. Investigating
Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did not serve as a bar for the further
consideration and investigation of the administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and
recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Uy violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1. (YES)
RULING:
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct.
The SC observed that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. The propriety of said
courses of action eludes the Court’s determination, for that matter had never been resolved on its
merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that
the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct
by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the
same. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property
violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any

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act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, -versus – EXEC. JUDGE OWEN AMOR,
RTC DAET, CAMARINES NORTE, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, EN BANC, October 7, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s
confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and
will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability,
and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the
Court is guilty of the same. In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded several
opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of time to comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but
he has failed and continuously refused to heed the same.
FACTS:
Judge Contreras alleged the following acts of respondent: First, respondent impounded a tricycle, but
the records bore a wrong date. Judge Contreras brought the matter to SG Morico, who conferred it
with respondent. Thereafter, the latter berated all the security guards in the hall of justice. Second
was when respondent accused Judge Lalwani of being lazy and abusive of other judges when she
sought reconsideration of her detail. Respondent also ordered Judge Lalwani, who was handling a
case of the former’s friend, to slow down. Third, was when respondent intervened in one of the cases
handled by Judge Contreras and calling the latter an abusive judge in open court. Fourth, lawyers,
prosecutors and litigants often complain on respondent habitual absences. Last was when
respondent caused the delay in all petitioner for extra-judicial foreclosure and requiring the Clerk of
Court to ask grease money from the newspaper publisher under the pain of being blacklisted.
The OCA found that respondent’s failure to comment on the administrative complaint despite being
given an opportunity to do so is tantamount to an admission of the truth of the allegations against
him. Thus, the OCA found respondent to have gravely abused his authority, committed grave
misconduct, and performed acts inimical to judicial service. It also found respondent guilty of gross
misconduct and insubordination for unduly refusing to obey the Court’s repeated orders for him to
file his comment on the instant administrative case against him. Further, respondent’s filing of a COC
for the 2002 Barangay Elections that resulted in his automatic resignation was considered "as a mere
convenient ploy for a ‘graceful exit’ from the judiciary and to evade liability on his part. However, it
did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction to pronounce whether or not respondent was guilty or
innocent of the charges against him
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service. (YES)
RULING:

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The acts being charged are inimical to judicial service, and thus, constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service as they violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to
diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
Further, the OCA properly found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for
refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the administrative
complaint against him. Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply
with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent
was afforded several opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of time to comply with the
Court’s lawful orders, but he has failed and continuously refused to heed the same.
Finally, the OCA correctly noted that respondent’s automatic resignation due to his filing of a COC for
the 2002 Barangay Elections did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining his
administrative liability. It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or
an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction.
It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it
had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.

PAULINO LIM, complainant, vs. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, respondent. A.C. No. 12156,
SECOND DIVISION, June 20, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a post-dated
check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated demands.
It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in
a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility." Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless
check was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

FACTS:

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Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring about the status of
a case. The two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation with each other. The following
month, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00, which the former needed
immediately. Complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his
favor BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a
guarantee check to ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently, respondent made several other loans
for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been taken by
respondent's sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive as
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases. However, when complainant deposited guarantee check, it was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or return
complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's text messages. He completely avoided complainant.
Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a demand letter for the payment of respondent's
indebtedness in the aggregate amount of P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was
constrained to file an administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a worthless
check in violation of the CPR. (YES)

RULING:

Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross
misconduct that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private
capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of
law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the
profession justifies disciplinary action, as in this case.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a post-
dated check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated
demands. It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence
in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They
must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility." Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that
respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which
explicitly states:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

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In Enriquez v. De Vera, the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct penalized by
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no conviction of the criminal charge
is even necessary. Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was "designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit,
because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated." 25 Being
a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly violated the law and thereby "exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order."

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
Rule 138, Rules of Court. Respondent should stand foremost in complying with the directives of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal
orders of duly constituted authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the
case involved the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of
concern or interest in the status or outcome of his administrative case would show how much less he
would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of
the legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision,
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty

2. To the legal profession

a. Canons 7 to 9
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant -versus- ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6116, THIRD DIVISION, August 1, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined
for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private
capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution letter was belied by
admission to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the
responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which

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prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, of the attorney's fees the
latter would receive in representing Spouses Yap, whom he referred, in an action for partition of the
estate of the late Benjamin Yap. Their agreement evidenced by a letter. However, respondent failed
to pay him the agreed commission. He then demanded the payment of his commission which
respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required
of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two
children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four children. He also accused
respondent of engaging in money-lending business.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis,
and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap
assumed to pay complainant's commission.
Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from
the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7
and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Atty. Pefianco violated the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)
RULING:
Atty. Pefianco is guilty of such violation. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is
wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution letter was belied
by admission to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the
responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit
with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well
as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, We find no reason to disturb

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the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10628, FIRST DIVISION, July 1, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As members of the bar, lawyers should be more circumspect in their words, especially when being fully
aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed.

FACTS:
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against
his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando’s
IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not
2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case
for grave threats and estafa against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint,
he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo
from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged
exorbitant fees, saying, among others: “x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will
impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records,
never appeared even once, that’s why you lost in the pretrial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your]
lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong
polpol. Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the
complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino “x x x has never done anything to protect the
interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law
practitioner and aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable
expenses, said counsel’s contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for
motions to dismiss x x x” as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for
his signature
Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 1922,
and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages. IBP Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE
compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required
information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to
warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando. the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando. (YES)

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RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as
well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.
With regard to Orlando’s alleged violation of BM No. 1922, his failure to disclose the required
information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother
Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of
the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. ROBERTO “ARGEE” C.

GUEVARRA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 11394, FIRST DIVISION, December 1, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Respondent’s inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining
the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter
violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility. By posting the subject
remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a
lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful,
firm, and decent

FACTS:

Respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina “Josie” Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases
against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005,
purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009. In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts
on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing
complainant. His posts included remarks about the complainant’s alleged quack doctoring and
bribery allegedly to pin him down. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on
his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI’s medical personnel, as well as
the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause. Complainant
likewise averred that some of respondent’s Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of
women. Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort
money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his
Facebook post.
In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-
guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on
his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which
complainant was not a part.

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The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the
practice of law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03, Rule 8.01, and Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the
verified complaint. (YES)

RULING:

The defense of the respondent is untenable. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her online social networking activity – in this case, Facebook – it is first necessary that said user
manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook
posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view.
However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of
Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well
as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent’s statement
is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly
insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are,
therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times,
be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of
an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive
way by hurling insults and maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto “Argee” C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03,
8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZAL P. BALBIN, respondent.
A.C. No. 7088, SECOND DIVISION, December 4, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. To this end, Canon 8 commands: A

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lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy,
dignity[,] and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon
their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must
treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence
counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action."

In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of the
CPR. As aptly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to contest
the ruling adverse to his client, respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing litigant's
counsel, herein complainant. Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating,
harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal cases and
prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client.
His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client, especially
considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not
to harass them. More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable
behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member
thereof.

FACTS:

Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr. (Roque) alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a civil case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Shortly after securing a favorable judgment for his client,
Atty. Rizal Balbin (Atty. Balbin)—as counsel for the defendant, and on appeal—started intimidating,
harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by
his client. According to Roque, Atty. Balbin would make various telephone calls and send text
messages and e-mails not just to him, but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file
disbarment and/or criminal suits against him. Further, and in view of Roque’s "high profile" stature,
Atty. Balbin also threatened to publicize such suits in order to besmirch and/or destroy Roque’s name
and reputation.

Initially, Atty. Balbin moved for an extension of time to file his comment, which was granted by the
Court. However, Atty. Balbin failed to file his comment despite multiple notices, prompting the Court
to repeatedly fine him and even order his arrest. To date, the orders for Atty. Balbin’s arrest remain
unserved and are still standing. Eventually, the Court dispensed with Atty. Balbin’s comment and
forwarded the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Balbin administratively liable and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. In a Resolution, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Balbin should be administratively liable. (YES)

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RULING:

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. To this end, Canon 8 of the
CPR commands, to wit:

CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity[,] and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar,
depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each
other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients
should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering,
unjustified recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity
of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action."

In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of
the CPR. As aptly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to
contest the ruling adverse to his client, respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing
litigant's counsel, herein complainant. Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly
intimidating, harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal
cases and prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered
by his client. His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client,
especially considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them. More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of
respect and despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct
unbecoming of a member thereof.

Furthermore, respondent's aforesaid acts of threatening complainant with the filing of baseless
administrative and criminal complaints in an effort to strong-arm the latter and his client into
submission not only contravened the Lawyer's Oath, which exhorts that a lawyer shall "not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same," but also violated Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

To aggravate further respondent's administrative liability, the Court notes that respondent initially
moved for an extension of time to file comment but did not file the same, prompting the Court to
repeatedly fine him and order his arrest. Such audacity on the part of respondent — which caused
undue delay in the resolution of this administrative case — is a violation of Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule
12.03, and Rule 12.04 of the CPR, which respectively read:

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx xxx xxx

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 CANON 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.

Verily, respondent's acts of seeking for extension of time to file a comment, and thereafter, failing to
file the same and ignoring the numerous directives not only indicated a high degree of
irresponsibility, but also constituted utter disrespect to the judicial institution. The orders of the
Court are not to be construed as a mere request, nor should they be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively; and the obstinate refusal or failure to comply therewith not only betrays
a recalcitrant flaw in the lawyer's character, but also underscores his disrespect to the lawful orders
of the Court which is only too deserving of reproof. Undoubtedly, the Court's patience has been tested
to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyer's impudence and disrespectful bent. At the
minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy, and such other
becoming conduct essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial, and speedy justice. What
respondent has done was the exact opposite; hence, he must be disciplined accordingly.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8, Canon 11, Canon
12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this · Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Further, he is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to
determine when his suspension from the practice of law shall take effect.

b. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A)

i. Membership and dues
3. To the courts (Canons 10 to 13)
MELANIO S. SALITA, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8101, FIRST DIVISION, February 4, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the
Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the
Law Profession.
Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s affidavit, before the court
in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing.
FACTS:

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Complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera and were asked by
the latter to pay his acceptance fee plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses.
A year later, when the deadline was looming, Atty. De Vera rushed the preparation of the necessary
documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits
of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was
personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be
signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera
allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for
the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. Later,
however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. siding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits
filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence,
and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera. The IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely
with respect to the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted
to comment on. The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP
Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2)-month
suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera. On reconsideration, however, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December
14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. In his dealings with his
client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and
trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical
burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the
Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of
the Law Profession. Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election
protest of Umaguing.

4. To the clients
a. Canons 14 to 22

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6903, THIRD DIVISION, April 16, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Atty. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Capistrano committed acts in
violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. He himself admitted liability for his failure to act

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on Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded
for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his
first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s livelihood.
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer
must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.
FACTS:
Suzette and her friend Tuparan engaged the services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial
declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the
same date, a Special Retainer Agreement was entered into by and between Suzette and Atty.
Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per
hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave
Atty. Capistrano the total amount of PhP 78,500.00
He made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the RTC of Malabon City and
awaiting notice of hearing. However, she discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed
but no petition has yet been filed for her.
She demanded the refund of the total amount of PhP 78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered
to return the amount of PhP63,000.00 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the
filing of Tuparan’s case, to which she agreed.
However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the only PhP5,000.00 and thereafter, refused to
communicate with her, prompting the institution of this administrative complaint.
In his Comment/Answer, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt of the amount of PhP78,500.00 from
Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum of PhP63,000.00. He also admitted
responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as justification his heavy workload and
busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of available funds to immediately refund
the money received.
The IBP-CBD found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform
Suzette of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It also concluded that his inability to refund the amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)
RULING:
Atty. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Capistrano committed acts in
violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. He himself admitted liability for his failure to act
on Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only

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pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that
this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s livelihood.
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of
a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client
and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer
must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his
possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if
not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession.
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing
an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the
surrounding facts.

EMILIA O. DHALIWAL, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING, Respondent.

A.C. No. 9390, THIRD DIVISION, August 1, 2012, Perlas-Barnabe, J.

Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as payment for the balance of the purchase
price of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned." A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment."
Since respondent withdrew the consignation of the BPI manager’s checks in the total amount of ₱
311,891.94 from the HLURB and the same was not used to settle the balance of the purchase price of the
parcel of land purchased by complainant from Fil-Estate, then reimbursement with legal interest was
properly ordered by the IBP. Respondent's proffered excuse of having to await the HLURB action on his
alleged motion-- the filing of which he miserably failed to prove-- as a condition to the return of the
sum of ₱ 311,891.94 to complainant compounds his liability and even bolstered his attitude to use
dishonest means if only to evade his obligation. It underlines his failure to meet the high moral
standards required of members of the legal profession.

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FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in connection with the purchase of
a parcel of land from Fil-Estate. Upon the instruction of respondent, complainant's daughter and son-
in-law withdrew ₱ 342,000.00 from the PNB and handed the cash over to respondent. They then
proceeded to BPI Family Bank where respondent purchased two manager's checks both payable to
the order of Fil-Estate Inc.
These manager's checks were subsequently consigned with the HLRUB. Respondent, on behalf of
complainant, filed with the HLURB a complaint for delivery of title and damages against Fil-Estate.
He then withdrew the two manager's checks that were previously consigned.
Complainant then informed the HLURB that respondent was no longer representing her. The HLURB
promulgated its Decision, adverse to complainant, finding the case for delivery of title and damages
premature as there was no evidence of full payment of the purchase price. Thereafter, complainant
made demands upon respondent to return and account to her the amounts previously consigned with
the HLURB. Respondent did not comply. Thus, complainant prays that respondent be disbarred.
In his answer, respondent admitted all of the allegations in the complaint. In defense, he claims that
the amount of P311,819.94 was consigned to the HLURB to cover the full payment of the balance of
the purchase price of the lot with Fil-Estate. Fil-Estate, however, did not accept the same as it wanted
complainant to also pay interests and surcharges totaling more than ₱ 800,000.00. Because the
amount was formally consigned with the HLURB, he allegedly filed a motion to verify if the judgment
in the case was already satisfied. He claimed that his motion has not yet been acted upon; hence, he
did not deem it proper as yet to return the consigned amount.
The IBP-CBD, submitted its Report finding that respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It also found respondent to have submitted a false and fabricated piece
of documentary evidence, as the Motion attached to his answer as did not bear any proof of service
upon the opposing party and proof of filing with the HLURB. The Commission recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)
RULING:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.

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Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as payment for the balance of the purchase
price of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned." A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."
Since respondent withdrew the consignation of the BPI manager’s checks in the total amount of ₱
311,891.94 from the HLURB and the same was not used to settle the balance of the purchase price of
the parcel of land purchased by complainant from Fil-Estate, then reimbursement with legal
interest was properly ordered by the IBP. Respondent's proffered excuse of having to await the
HLURB action on his alleged motion-- the filing of which he miserably failed to prove-- as a
condition to the return of the sum of ₱ 311,891.94 to complainant compounds his liability and even
bolstered his attitude to use dishonest means if only to evade his obligation. It underlines his
failure to meet the high moral standards required of members of the legal profession.

GLORIA P. JINON, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 9615, EN BANC, March 5, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Rule 16.03, Canon 16 was violated when he failed to return, despite due demand, the funds
allocated for the transfer of the title that he received from her. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 was also violated. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that
he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession,
the court and society.
FACTS:
After the death of her brother Charlie in July 2001, Gloria entrusted two land titles covering
properties owned by their deceased parents to her sister-in-law, Viola Jinon (Viola): one is the Sta.
Barbara Property and the other is the Leganes Property. Eventually, Gloria sold the Sta. Barbara
Property, which resulted in disagreements between her and Viola regarding their respective shares
in the proceeds. Consequently, Viola refused to return to Gloria the Transfer Certificate of Title of the
Leganes Property, prompting Gloria to engage the services of Atty. Jiz to recover the said title, for
which she immediately paid an acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00. In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz
assured the transfer of the title in Gloria's name. Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions, remitted the
amount of ₱45,000.00 to answer for the expenses of the transfer. However, when she later inquired
about the status of her case, she was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was

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handling the same. Moreover, when she visited the Leganes Property, which has been leased out to
one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been collecting the rentals for the period
June 2003 up to October 2004, which amounted to ₱12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals,
Atty. Jiz gave her only ₱7,000.00, explaining that the balance of ₱5,000.00 would be added to the
expenses needed for the transfer of the title of the Leganes Property to her name. The foregoing
incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of the
amounts of ₱45,000.00 and ₱5,000.00 which has remained unheeded.
Gloria filed an administrative complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating of Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional (CPR) and recommended that he be reprimanded, with a
stern warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same
acts. The IBP Board of Governors adopted his findings but modified the recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jiz violated Canon 16 of the CPR. (YES)
2. Whether or not Jiz violated Canon 18 of the CPR. (YES)
RULING:
1. Aside from the demand letter which he sent to Viola, he failed to perform any other positive act in
order to recover the Transfer Certificate of Title. Moreover, Rule 16.03, Canon 16 was violated when
he failed to return, despite due demand, the funds allocated for the transfer of the title that he
received from her. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
2. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 was also violated. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants
that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree
of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal
profession, the court and society.

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, Complainant -versus- ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES,

JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7749, SECOND DIVISION, July 08, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing
which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. The relationship between an attorney
and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs.

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A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
FACTS:
Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, wherein she was
represented by respondent. Cabanes failed to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to attend the
preliminary conference. The opposing counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision which
motion was granted. MTC issued a Decision against complainant, ordering her to vacate and turn-
over the possession of the property. RTC reversed the MTC Decision but the CA reinstated the MTC
Decision. Cabanes received a copy of the CA’s ruling yet, he failed to inform complainant about it. As
such, complainant decided to engage the services of another counsel. Respondent failed to turn-over
in time the documents of the case, thus, other remedies were barred.
Josefina filed an administrative complaint, alleging that Atty. Cabanes’ acts amounted to gross
negligence which resulted in her loss. IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabanes failed
to exercise ordinary diligence in handling his client's cause, and therefore recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved her recommendation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cabanes violated Canon 17 of the CPR. (YES)
2. Whether or not Cabanes violated Canon 18 of the CPR. (YES)
RULING:
1. Cabanes, Jr. violated Canon 17. The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant’s cause. Records show that he failed to justify his absence
during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing which led the same to be immediately
submitted for decision. The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with
utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-
mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
2. Cabanes violated Canon 18. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to
prod him or her to do so. Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is
per se a violation.

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 MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. RUSTICO B.
GAGATE, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9532, EN BANC, October 8, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Gagate violated Canon 17. The respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling
complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and
proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s
cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending. He remained unmindful of his client’s
trust in him – in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal
advice in pursuing her interests.
Garate violated Canon 18. Considering respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his
client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Rule 18.03
of Canon 18 of the Code.
Garate violated Canon 19. A person cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the
merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in
order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the
same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing,
respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice, in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code.
He should return the ₱150,000.00 he received from Pitcher as acceptance fee since the same is
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature.
FACTS:
Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher claimed to be the legal wife of the late David B. Pitcher who
owned 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased
husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent. Complainant and respondent met with
Katherine Bantegui, a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, to discuss the settlement of David’s
interest in the company. Prior to another scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by
respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the premises. Bantegui expressed disappointment over
these actions then asked them to leave and refused to give them a duplicate key. Respondent, without
the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, which
prevented the employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This
prompted Bantegui to file a complaint for grave coercion. In turn, respondent advised complainant
that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal
records/business interests in Consulting Edge. Thus, the two entered in Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid
the amount of ₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent. Respondent advised complainant to
go into hiding until he had filed the motions in court. However, respondent abandoned the grave
coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant.

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Failing to reach Atty. Gagate, Pitcher filed an administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Gagate guilty of violating Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the imposition of six (6) months suspension
from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved his recommendation.
However, the Office of the Bar Confidant modified the recommended penalty to three (3) years.
Likewise, it ordered respondent to return the ₱150,000.00 he received from the complainant as
acceptance fee.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Gagate violated Canon 17 of the CPR. (YES)
2. Whether or not Gagate violated Canon 18 of the CPR. (YES)
3. Whether or not Gagate violated Canon 19 of the CPR. (YES)
4. Whether or not Gagate should return the ₱150,000.00 he received from the complainant as
acceptance fee. (YES)
RULING:
1. Gagate violated Canon 17. The respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently
by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, second,
abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending. He
remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him – in particular, her trust that respondent would
only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests.

2. He violated Canon 18. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but
also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the
client or the court. Hence, considering respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by
leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he
violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code.

3. He violated Canon 19. It bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her
deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action
taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latter’s interest in
Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free
ingress and egress of the employees of the said company – was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same
light, respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the
criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes
transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly
violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, in
violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code.

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4. He should return the ₱150,000.00 he received from Pitcher as acceptance fee since the same is
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the
acceptance fee in this case).

AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 7965, SECOND DIVISION, November 13, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant to cover
for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his client’s act of
confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. With the fact of receipt being
established, it was then respondent’s obligation to return the money entrusted to him by
complainant. Except only for the retaining lien exception under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code,
the lawyer should not withhold the property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the applicability
of such exception or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed to perform his
duties under Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his
administrative liability.
Atty. Lawsin did not only fail to accomplish his undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to
give an adequate explanation for such non-performance despite the protracted length of time given for
him to do so. As such, these omissions equally showcase respondent’s non-compliance with the
standard of proficiency required of a lawyer as embodied in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
FACTS:
Azucena Segovia-Ribaya and Atty. Bartolome Lawsin entered into a retainership agreement for the
processing of registration and delivery, within a period of six (6) months, of the certificate of title
over a certain parcel of land in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the
late Isabel Segovia. In connection therewith, respondent received from complainant the amounts of
₱15,000.00 for the litigation and ₱39,000.00 for land registration expenses. After the lapse of more
than three (3) years, complainant alleged that respondent, without proper explanation, failed to fulfill
his undertaking to register the subject land and deliver to complainant the certificate of title over the
same. As complainant was tired of respondent’s excuses, she finally decided to just withdraw the
subject amount from respondent. She confronted the latter at his office and also subsequently sent
him two (2) demand letters, but all to no avail. Hence, complainant was prompted to file the instant
administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent admitted that he indeed received the subject amount from complainant
but averred that after receiving the same, the latter’s brother, Erlindo, asked to be reimbursed the
amount of ₱7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land surveyor. Respondent likewise
alleged that he later found out that he could not perform his undertaking under the retainer because

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the ownership of the subject land was still under litigation. Finally, respondent stated that he wanted
to return the balance of the subject amount to complainant after deducting what Erlindo took from
him, but was only prevented to do so because he was maligned by complainant when she went to his
office and there, shouted and called him names in the presence of his staff.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Lawsin guilty of violating Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to properly
account for the money entrusted to him without any adequate explanation why he could not return
the same and recommended the imposition of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted his findings but modified the recommended penalty. He ordered
the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00, with legal interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice, to complainant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lawsin violated Canon 16 of the CPR. (YES)
2. Whether or not Lawsin violated Canon 18 of the CPR. (YES)
3. Whether or not Lawsin should return the the amount of ₱31,500.00 to the complainant. (NO)
RULING:
1. Lawsin violated Canon 16. Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject
amount from complainant to cover for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to
return the same due to his client’s act of confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and
called him names. With the fact of receipt being established, it was then respondent’s obligation
to return the money entrusted to him by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that
complainant’s purported act of "maligning" respondent does not justify the latter’s failure to
properly account for and return his client’s money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer’s duty to
his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to
exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. In this case, despite that singular
encounter, respondent had thereafter all the opportunity to return the subject amount but still
failed to do so. Besides, the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the
temperament or occasional frustrations of the lawyer’s client, especially so when the latter
remains unsatisfied by the lawyer’s work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal with his client with
professional maturity and commit himself towards the objective fulfillment of his
responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the correct course of action is for the lawyer to
properly account for his affairs as well as to ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another
lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien exception under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code,
the lawyer should not withhold the property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the
applicability of such exception or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still
failed to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which
perforce warrants his administrative liability.

2. He violated Canon 18. Atty. Lawsin did not only fail to accomplish his undertaking under the
retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate explanation for such non-performance despite
the protracted length of time given for him to do so. As such, these omissions equally showcase

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 respondent’s non-compliance with the standard of proficiency required of a lawyer as
embodied in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

3. The foregoing resolution should not include a directive for the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00
as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. The same amount was given by complainant to
respondent to cover for registration expenses; hence, its return partakes the nature of a
purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary
proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias, the Court held that its "findings during administrative-
disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are
purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's
professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such
nature." This pronouncement of the Court applies to this case and thus, renders a disposition
solely on respondent’s administrative liability.

FELIPE LAYOS, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

A.C. No. 8085, FIRST DIVISION, December 1, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble,
respondent no longer kept track of complainant's criminal case and merely assumed that the same was
already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew that the case was
still on-going, he attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the RTC's issuance of the June
26, 2003 Order which is prejudicial to complainant's cause. Despite such alarming developments,
respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the interests of his client.
FACTS:
Records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble, respondent no longer
kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that the same was already amicably
settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew that the case was still ongoing, he
attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the RTC’s issuance of the June 26, 2003
Order, waiving the defense’s right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite such alarming
developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the interests of his client.
Instead, he relied on the representations of the court employees that they would send him a copy of
the aforesaid Order. When he finally secured a copy on April 4, 2006, it still took him over a year, or
until April 21, 2007, just to move the RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order. The RTC and the CA
denied the motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the detriment of
complainant.
On November 26, 2008, Felipe Layos charged respondent Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for neglecting the interests of his
client. The IBP Commissioner found that respondent failed in his duty as counsel to serve
complainant’s interests with competence and diligence by neglecting the latter’s criminal case which

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was pending before the RTC. The IBP Board unanimously adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, and hence, upheld respondent’s recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for negligence in the
performance of his legal duty to complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. (YES)
RULING:
Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to serve his
client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the
developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client
informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the client's interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his
actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected
to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-
hearted fealty to the client's cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble,
respondent no longer kept track of complainant's criminal case and merely assumed that the same
was already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew that the case
was still on-going, he attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the RTC's issuance of
the June 26, 2003 Order which is prejudicial to complainant's cause. Despite such alarming
developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to further the interests of his client.
Instead, he passively relied on the representations of the court employees that they would send him
a copy of the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he finally secured a copy on April 4, 2006, it still took him
over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to move the RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order.
Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period,
to the detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.

WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. JOSE MA. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J.
CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY-VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY.
CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA, and ATTY.
WILFRED RAMON M. PEÑALOSA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10567, FIRST DIVISION, February 25, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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A lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.
As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a
corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the
conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the
balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence.
FACTS:
Respondents’ law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted
against him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client,
FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client,
and his wife.
In their defense, respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association is
not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain “arrangements. According to them, each
lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses
for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each
lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively. As
such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and associates, unless they
agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the
law firm since its inception. They averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively
handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the
qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñ alosa, a new associate who had no
knowledge of complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof. Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor cases but averred that
it was terminated on June 13, 2008.
The IBP Commissioner found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a
conflict of interest in this case. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent
provisions of the CPR. (YES)
RULING:
All respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. A lawyer is prohibited from representing new
clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.
As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a
corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the

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conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the
balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence. Had
such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary
of the above mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent
engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm,
ought to be administratively sanctioned.

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 10681, EN BANC, February 3, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes
that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.
Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating Rule 16.04 and Canon 7 of the CPR. Respondent borrowed money
from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan,
were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely
on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However,
respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround.
Furthermore, in unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the
same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
FACTS:
Atty. Dela Rosa served as the retained lawyer and counsel of the complainants. In this capacity,
respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others,
the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed
to materialize. Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business
venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which
he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who,
believing that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to
respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks in respondent’s name. Atty. Dela
Rosa failed to pay complainants and did not heed their demand letter.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered
to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report but reduced the penalty against the
respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of the
P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.
ISSUE:

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Whether Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client's interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into
his possession.
Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.
Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating Rule 16.04 and Canon 7 of the CPR. Respondent borrowed
money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on
the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants
relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five (5) days.
However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the
runaround. Furthermore, in unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients,
and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., Respondent.

A.C. No. 10681, FIRST DIVISION, March 18, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently,
if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client.

FACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of Atty. Agacoili for the purpose of filing a case in order to
determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of their Samahan. In connection
therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees
for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment executed by respondent
himself. Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When confronted,
respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in
court. Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have spent
the same and even demanded more money.

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The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the
penalty of Censure, with a warning that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty;
and (b) directed to account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification
increasing the recommended penalty from Censure to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. (YES)
RULING:
A lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. In the
instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to answer for the
filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the
flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing
fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands. Verily, when
a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently,
if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, Complainant, – versus – ATTY.

EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8371, FIRST DIVISION, June 28, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He
should have been more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious
consequence of failure to attend the scheduled preliminary conference.

FACTS:

Spouses Montecillo engaged the legal services of Atty. Gatchalian for an ejectment case in which they
were the defendants. After filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from
the court setting the preliminary conference. When complainants went to respondent's office to
confer with him about it, the latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that he could not
attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict in his schedule. He allegedly advised them not to
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attend anymore as he would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available.
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore.
Thereafter, they found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary
conference, but also failed to take any steps to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also
learned that, contrary to respondent's representation, he did receive the notice setting the date of
the preliminary conference. Subsequently, complainant received an order that the ejectment case
submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear during the preliminary conference.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty. Gatchalian from the
practice of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case for resolution and the eventual adverse
decision against complainants were attributable to respondent's negligence. The IBP Board of
Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Gatchalian should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR (YES)
RULING:
The Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling
complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the
hearing due to a conflict in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to
present their evidence in the ejectment case. As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case,
respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been more circumspect in
preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the
scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff
to a judgment, as what happened in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.

A.C. No. 11669, FIRST DIVISION, July 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly,
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.

FACTS:

Joy T. Samonte alleged that she received summons from the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case filed by four
(4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation. Consequently, complainant

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engaged the services of respondent Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the
submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was
held liable to the workers in the total amount of P633,143.68. When complainant confronted
respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm
workers. She filed the instant complaint.
The IBP-CBD found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD found
respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be administratively held liable (YES)

RULING:
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and
accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers
are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full
attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they
accept them for a fee or for free.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLTY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon
10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if
still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

NANETTE B. SISON, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 11663, FIRST DIVISION, July 31, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand. His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has appropriated it
for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross violation of his
professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.

FACTS:

Sometime in September 2012, complainant, an OFW in Australia, engaged respondent's legal services
to file an action against Engr. Eddie S. Pua of B.S. Pua Construction and Engr. Dario Antonio for failing
to construct complainant's house in Laguna in due time. Although no written agreement was

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executed between the parties specifying the scope of legal services, respondent received the total
amount of P215,000.00 from complainant.
Subsequently, complainant terminated respondent's legal services with a demand to return the
amount given, which was not heeded notwithstanding several demands. Hence, complainant,
through Sarabia, filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), alleging that despite receipt of her payments: (a)
respondent failed to render his legal services and update her regarding the status of the case; (b)
commingled her money with that of respondent's wife; (c) misappropriated her money by failing to
issue a receipt for the last installment of the payment received; and (d) fabricated documents to
justify retention of her money.
In the Report and Recommendation dated June 7, 2014, the IBP CBD Investigating Commissioner (IC)
recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating his obligations under the CPR with a
stem warning never to commit the same mistakes again.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated rules 16.01 and 16.03 , canon 16 of the CPR (YES)
RULING:
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. In this
relation, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all
other relevant information.
The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand. His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has appropriated
it for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross violation of his
professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04, Canon
18, as well as Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from the finality
of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
LOLITA R. MARTIN, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. JESUS M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9832, SECOND DIVISION, September 4, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

A lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve his client once the former takes up the latter's
cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him. Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable
negligence for which he must be administratively liable.

FACTS:

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Lolita R. Martin engaged the legal services of Atty. Dela Cruz. During the pendency of that case,
complainant repeatedly went to respondent's office to inquire on the status of the same, but
respondent was not there. Thus, complainant wrote several letters to him requesting the return of
the money she paid as acceptance fee due to respondent's failure to take any action on her cases. He
even failed to appear in the hearing for preliminary investigation before the OCP-QC on January 16,
2013. Respondent also refused to answer any of her calls.
After several months, respondent finally contacted complainant, and told her not to worry as he
would still handle the other cases, particularly the Estafa case pending before the OCP-QC. However,
respondent still failed to attend the scheduled preliminary investigation. Complainant reiterated her
demand for the return of the acceptance fee, but the latter refused.
The Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to comment on the letter-complaint, but he failed
to comply. The Court then dispensed with respondent's comment and, instead, referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP
conducted a mandatory conference, but only complainant appeared. On even date, it issued an Order
directing the parties to file their position papers within ten (10) days, to which only complainant
complied.
The Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year and ordered to return to complainant the amount of P60,000.00
he received as acceptance fee with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR (YES)
RULING:
Respondent violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR. Under these provisions, a lawyer
is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve his client once the former takes up the latter's
cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him. Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable
negligence for which he must be administratively liable, as in this case. The Court finds no credence
to respondent's defense that he prepared pleadings for complainant given that he failed to provide
any proof to substantiate his claim.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Rules
18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the finality of
this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, Complainant, – versus – ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, Respondent.
A.C. No. 11822, SECOND DIVISION, November 22, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who possess and continue
to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must

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perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code.

FACTS:

Vicka Marie Isalos alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings, Management &
Consultancy, Inc. (C Five), Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel
who handled its incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Sometime in July 2011, when C Five was exploring investment options, respondent recommended
the purchase of a resort in Laguna, with the assurances that the title covering the property was
"clean" and the taxes were fully paid. Relying on respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to
acquire the property and completed the payment of the purchase price.
Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of
the property in C Five's name. More than a year thereafter, however, no title was transferred in C
Five's name. It was then discovered that the title covering the property is a Free Patent issued on
August 13, 2009, rendering any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof within a period of five (5) years
from issuance of the title null and void. Thus, formal demand was made upon respondent to return
the P1,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which remained unheeded, prompting C Five to
file a criminal complaint for Estafa before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP issued a Report and Recommendation dated June 29,
2015, finding respondent administratively liable and thereby, recommending her suspension from
the legal profession for a period of three (3) years. In a Resolution dated June 30, 2015, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the CBD-IBP's Report and
Recommendation dated June 29, 2015, meting upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year and directing the return of the amount of P1,200,000.00 to
complainant. In a Resolution dated January 26, 2017, the IBP denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:

Whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Cristal administratively liable (YES)
RULING:
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurred with the findings and conclusions of
the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable in this case.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing,
and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code: “Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for
any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private
capacity."
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal is found guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the

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practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
BUENAVISTA PROPERTIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA, respondent. A.C.
No. 12160, SECOND DIVISION, August 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Atty. Deloria violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 when he represented Menguito, the President of
LSDC, in a criminal case for estafa filed by Spouses Flores, while he filed a complaint for delivery of title
against BPI on behalf of Corazon before the HLURB. As such, Atty. Deloria simultaneously represented
Menguito and Corazon despite their conflicting interests, considering that Corazon's estafa case against
Menguito was premised on the latter's and LSDC's alleged misrepresentation of ownership over the lots
sold and LSDC's eventual failure to deliver the title. Thus, Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of
Menguito and Corazon sans their written consent after a full disclosure of the facts violated the rules on
conflict of interest.

Atty. Deloria violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the CPR on forum shopping when he lodged a complaint
before the HLURB praying for BPI to execute deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles over the
subdivided lots, which was the same subject matter in the preliminary mandatory injunction earlier
denied by the RTC while the main civil case was still pending.

Atty, Deloria violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, since he failed to
communicate with and inform his client about her complaint against BPI before the HLURB and also
failed to file the required position paper and draft decision before the HLURB. As such, he neglected the
legal matters entrusted to him and failed to serve his client with competence and diligence, for which he
must be clearly held administratively liable.

FACTS:

Buenavista Properties, Inc. (BPI) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with La Savoie
Development Corporation (LSDC), represented by Atty. Deloria, for the development of a parcel of
land into a mixed-use commercial and residential subdivision and for the sale of the subdivided lots.
LSDC misrepresented itself as the owner of the lots, prompting BPI to demand that LSDC refrain from
further selling them. However, LSDC disregarded BPI's demands; hence, the latter filed a complaint
against the former for termination of contract, recovery of property and damages, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (civil case)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). With Atty. Deloria as counsel, LSDC filed an answer with
counterclaim and a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct
BPI to execute the deeds of absolute sale and release the corresponding titles to the lot buyers.
However, LSDC's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was denied. Thereafter,
the lot buyers demanded LSDC to release the titles covering the subdivided lots; in tum, LSDC
demanded the same from BPI. However, BPI refused, contending that it was not a party to the
transactions between LSDC and the lot buyers, and that LSDC sold the lots despite its objections.
Eventually, the RTC also denied LSDC's prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction.

Subsequently, LSDC, through Atty. Deloria, filed a complaint against BPI before the BLURB to compel
the latter to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles of the subdivided lots, the same
reliefs prayed for in LSDC's answer with counterclaim in the civil case. Meanwhile, BPI further alleged
that in order to shield LSDC from liability, Atty. Deloria convinced the lot buyers that the former was
responsible for the non-delivery of their titles. Thus, several lot buyers appointed him as counsel to
file cases on their behalf against BPI before the HLURB. Lot buyers Spouses Corazon and Roberto

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Flores (Spouses Flores), through their attorney-in-fact Mariano L. Celis, filed a criminal case for estafa
against LSDC President Jeanne G. Menguito (Menguito), premised on the latter's misrepresentation
that she was the owner of the lot that Corazon purchased. Thereafter, Atty. Deloria filed several
complaints for delivery of title against BPI before the HLURB on behalf of the lot buyers.

In view of the foregoing, BPI prayed for the suspension or disbarment of Atty. Deloria for committing
multiple violations of the CPR, to wit: (a) Rule 1.03, for encouraging the lot buyers to file cases against
BPI in order to deflect the charges that the lot buyers have against LSDC; ( b) Rules 2.03 and 8.02 for
convincing the Spouses Flores to withdraw the estafa case against Menguito and to appoint him as
lawyer to file a case against BPI instead; (c) Rules 1.01 and 10.02 when he resorted to lies with
respect to the employment of Hesola and for misquoting the JVA in his pleadings; (d) Rule 1.01 for
inducing the lot buyers to file cases against BPI; (e) Rules 15.01 and 15.03 for acting as counsel for
LSDC and the lot buyers at the same time; (f) Rule 12.02 for having filed two (2) cases involving the
same parties, issues, facts, and reliefs; (g) Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18, for failing
to file the necessary pleadings on behalf of Corazon in the HLURB case; and (h) Rule 6.03 for acting
as counsel for LSDC after leaving the government service as HLURB Commissioner.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found Atty. Deloria administratively liable and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
However, the IBP-IC found that Atty. Deloria did not violate Rules 1.01, 1.02, 1.03, 2.03, and 8.02 of
the CPR on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. There was also no violation of Rule 6.03 of the
CPR as Atty. Deloria was engaged as LSDC's counsel thirteen (13) years after his retirement from
HLURB. The proscription under Section 7 (b) of RA 6713 prohibiting a former public officer from
engaging in certain transactions applies only for a period of one (1) year after his/her resignation,
retirement, or separation from office. Moreover, BPI failed to prove that Atty. Deloria intervened in
any of the transactions where LSDC was involved during his stint as HLURB Commissioner. A
corporate entity, like BPI, may institute disbarment proceedings as in this case. In a Resolution, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Deloria administratively liable for any violations of the
CPR. (YES)

RULING:

Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR state:

CANON 15 — x x x
Rule 15.01 — A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"The rule against conflict of interest also 'prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases,' since the representation of opposing clients, even in unrelated
cases, 'is tantamount to representing conflicting interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of

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double-dealing which the Court cannot allow.'" Moreover, the requirement under Rule 15.03 is quite
clear. A lawyer must secure the written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the
facts; failure to do so would subject him to disciplinary action as he would be found guilty of
representing conflicting interests.

In this case, Atty. Deloria represented Menguito, the President of LSDC, in the criminal case for estafa
that the Spouses Flores filed against her. Subsequently, however, Atty. Deloria filed a complaint for
delivery of title against BPI on behalf of Corazon before the HLURB. As such, Atty. Deloria
simultaneously represented Menguito and Corazon despite their conflicting interests, considering
that Corazon's estafa case against Menguito was premised on the latter's and LSDC's alleged
misrepresentation of ownership over the lots sold and LSDC's eventual failure to deliver the title. It
must be stressed that it was LSDC that obligated itself to ensure the transfer of the ownership of the
purchased lot to Corazon, a lot buyer, pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed between them. Thus,
Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of Menguito and Corazon sans their written consent after
a full disclosure of the facts violated the rules on conflict of interest.

Moreover, he represented several lot buyers as complainants in HLURB Case No. REM-C-03-8-1171
against BPI while also representing LSDC as third-party respondent therein. In fact, he even filed a
Position Paper on behalf of both the complainants therein and LSDC. Such dual representation
without the written consent of the parties again constitutes a violation of Rules 15.01 and 15.03,
Canon 15 of the CPR, warranting disciplinary action therefor.

Likewise, Atty. Deloria violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the CPR on forum shopping, which states:

CANON 12 — x x x
Rule 12.02 — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
or causes of action; and (c) identity of relief sought.

In the civil case before the RTC, Atty. Deloria, on behalf of LSDC, filed an answer with counterclaim
and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to direct BPI to execute
the deeds of absolute sale and release the titles covering the purchased subdivided lots.
Notwithstanding the RTC's denial of LSDC's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in an Order dated August 11, 1998, as well as the pendency of the main case therein, Atty.
Deloria nonetheless lodged a complaint before the HLURB praying for the same relief as that pleaded
for in its answer with counterclaim — to compel BPI to execute deeds of absolute sale and deliver
the titles over the subdivided lots. Clearly, the elements of litis pendentia are present, considering:
(a) the identity of parties, i.e., BPI and LSDC; (b) identity of rights or causes of action, i.e., BPI and
LSDC being parties to the JVA, from which sprang their respective rights and obligations; and (c)
identity of reliefs sought, i.e., to compel BPI to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles
of the purchased lots. In fact, the HLURB in its Decision dated September 27, 2000 dismissed LSDC's
complaint based on the same ground.

Finally, Atty. Deloria violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, which state:

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 CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

In this case, Corazon attested to the fact that Atty. Deloria failed to communicate with and inform her,
as his client, about her complaint against BPI before the HLURB. Likewise, Atty. Deloria failed to file
the required position paper and draft decision before the HLURB. As such, he neglected the legal
matters entrusted to him and failed to serve his client with competence and diligence, for which he
must be clearly held administratively liable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria is found GUILTY of violating Rules 15.01 and 15.03
of Canon 15, Rule 12.02 of Canon 12, Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

PIA MARIE B. GO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI, respondent.

A.C. No. 12296, SECOND DIVISION, December 4, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Neglect of a legal matter entrusted to respondent constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the CPR.

Case law exhorts that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as
respondent in this case.

Moreover, records further show that respondent misrepresented to complainant that she filed the first
petition for annulment in early 2013, withdrew the same after complainant told her to do so, and filed
the second petition in 2015. However, no such case was filed. This act is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Canon 15 of the CPR.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Clearly, respondent fell short of such standard when
she committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant.
Respondent's acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they
also reveal basic moral flaws that make her unfit to practice law.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed
to return to complainant the total amount of P188,000.00 representing her legal fees despite numerous
demands from the latter.

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In sum, respondent's acts of neglecting her client's affairs, failing to return the latter's money and/or
property despite demand, and at the same time, committing acts of misrepresentation against her client,
constitute professional misconduct for which she must be held administratively liable. In this regard,
jurisprudence provides that in instances where the lawyer commits similar acts against their respective
clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years.

FACTS:

Pia Marie Go (Go) alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Grace Buri (Atty. Buri) to handle the
annulment of her marriage with her husband. In connection therewith, she paid the amount of
P150,000.00 representing the latter's "package engagement fee" and professional services. Shortly
thereafter, Go was informed that a petition for annulment was already filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa (RTC), albeit no copy of the petition was furnished to her despite her request.
However, Go asked Atty. Buri to "hold" her case as she had to deal with various personal problems,
to which the latter responded by "withdrawing" the petition supposedly filed before the RTC. When
Go decided to push through with the annulment, she tried contacting Atty. Buri, but to no avail. When
she was able to contact her, Atty. Buri asked Go for another P38,000.00 purportedly for the re-filing
of the case, which Go reluctantly remitted to her. Later on, Go repeatedly demanded Atty. Buri to
furnish her copies of the original and the re-filed petition for annulment and to issue receipts for the
money she remitted, but Atty. Buri failed or refused to do so. Go went to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC and discovered that there was no petition for annulment filed by Atty. Buri on her
behalf. This prompted Go to confront Atty. Buri, to which the latter responded by promising to file
the petition. However, Atty. Buri continuously failed to file the same, resulting in Go losing trust in
her and subsequently demanding that she return her money. Atty. Buri promised to return only half
of the money, which she still failed to do despite Go’s repeated demands. Hence, Go was constrained
to file the instant complaint.

Eventually, the IBP-CBD required the parties to attend the Mandatory Conference and submit their
respective mandatory conference briefs, to which only Go complied. In view of the foregoing, the IBP-
CBD deemed Atty. Buri’s continued failure to appear before it and comply with its directives to be a
waiver on her part to participate in the proceedings.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Buri administratively liable and recommended that
she be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that Go should claim and
collect the amount she remitted to Atty. Buri through an independent action, civil or criminal, as the
case may be. The totality of Atty. Buri’s acts - namely, failing to file the contracted petition for
annulment of marriage and tore-file the same after collecting money for the supposed re-filing fee,
receiving the full payment of her professional fees for legal services not rendered, and committing a
series of lies and misrepresentations in the handling of complainant's case - is anathema to Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), for which she must be administratively sanctioned.
There were efforts made by the IBP-CBD in furnishing Atty. Buri copies of orders and notices via
registered mail to her office and both her Metro Manila and provincial addresses, but that Atty. Buri
simply chose to ignore the same, as a ploy and scheme to evade sanctions in the future by invoking
lack of notice and due process.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation,
with the following modifications: (a) increasing the recommended period of suspension to two (2)
years; (b) ordering the return of the amount of P188,000.00 to Go; and (c) imposing on Atty. Buri a
fine of P5,000.00 for refusing to comply with the IBP-CBD's order to file an answer despite due notice.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Buri should be administratively liable. (YES)

RULING:

Neglect of a legal matter entrusted to respondent constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the CPR, which reads:

CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Case law exhorts that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable, as respondent in this case.

Moreover, records further show that respondent misrepresented to complainant that she filed the
first petition for annulment in early 2013, withdrew the same after complainant told her to do so,
and filed the second petition in 2015. However, no such case was filed. This act is a violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Canon 15 of the CPR, which read:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Clearly, respondent fell short of such
standard when she committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against
complainant. Respondent's acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws that make her unfit to practice law.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she
failed to return to complainant the total amount of P188,000.00 representing her legal fees despite
numerous demands from the latter, viz.:

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand x x x.

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It bears stressing that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. This act is a gross violation of general morality,
as well as of professional ethics.

In sum, respondent's acts of neglecting her client's affairs, failing to return the latter's money and/or
property despite demand, and at the same time, committing acts of misrepresentation against her
client, constitute professional misconduct for which she must be held administratively liable. In this
regard, jurisprudence provides that in instances where the lawyer commits similar acts against their
respective clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon
15, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, effective immediately upon her receipt of this Decision. She is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. She is likewise ORDERED to
pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 for failure to comply with the directives of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.

Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Pia Marie B. Go the legal fees she received
from the latter in the aggregate amount of P188,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality ·of
this Decision. Failure to comply with this directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Finally, she is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of her receipt of this Decision to enable it to
determine when her suspension from the practice of law shall take effect.

b. Attorney’s fees
i. Acceptance fees
ii. Contingency fee arrangements
iii. Attorney’s liens
iv. Fees and controversies with clients
v. Quantum meruit
C. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers
1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers

RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon
Involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City
A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, EN BANC, June 6, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the
allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the
facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or
defense.

FACTS:

Adante filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a letter, alleging that it was
“intimated to her” that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only once, was in cahoots with Justice Lantion
in engaging in the shameful business of “selling” decisions involving cases from the CA-CDO to the
highest bidder. Subsequently, Ofendoreyes filed before the same agency a letter, requesting the latter
to investigate and stop the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion from the
business of selling decisions in exchange for money. Both letter-complaints were respectively
referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on November 22, 2016 and November 23, 2016, which
were, consequently, docketed as IPI No. 17-248-CA-J and A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA. In a Resolution dated
January 10, 2017, the Court referred the administrative matters to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to study the possible consolidation of the same.
The OCA recommended that the matters be consolidated, considering that both letter-complaints
involve the same respondents, i.e., Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion, and issue, i.e., the sale of
favorable decisions involving cases in the CA-CDO to the highest bidder. The OCA, however, observed
that the letter-complaints were insufficient in form and substance in that they: (1) were not verified;
and (2) lacked affidavits of persons who may have personal knowledge of the facts to prove or
substantiate the letter-complaints' allegations against respondents, as well as supporting documents.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion should be held administratively liable. (NO)
RULING:
Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving
the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their
exception or defense. The same goes with administrative cases disciplining for grave offense court
employees or magistrates. The evidence against the respondent should be competent and should be
derived from direct knowledge. WHEREFORE, the complaints are DISMISSED.

2. Grounds
3. Proceedings (Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, as amended)
ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, – versus – JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5333, FIRST DIVISION, March 13, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as
well as legal principles, practice or procedure, and calls for legal knowledge, training, and
experience." During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from
practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon

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the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an
order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.

FACTS:

In a Decision dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended Justo Paras (respondent) from the
practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other
related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with
the penalties to be served simultaneously. March 2, 2001, Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) filed a
Motion to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty.
Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading
prepared by respondent and that respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on February
21, 2001, in violation of the suspension order. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started
accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension.
On June 22, 2004, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Court issue an order
declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted.
In a Resolution dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
recommendation. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline’s Board of Governors passed a
Resolution affirming respondent's suspension from the practice of law. Thereafter, in a letter dated
September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he
was suspended (YES)
2. Whether or not the Court should lift his suspension (NO)

RULING:

1. The "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
as well as legal principles, practice or procedure, and calls for legal knowledge, training, and
experience." During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist
from practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically
lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and
wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.
2. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting
the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case - are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six

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(6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this
penalty can no longer be imposed.

4. Recoverable amounts; intrinsically linked to professional engagement

D. Readmission to the Bar
1. Lawyers who have been suspended
2. Lawyers who have been disbarred

RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF JUDGE IRMA ZITA V. MASAMAYOR

A.M No. 12-2-6-SC, EN BANC, March 12, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

The Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
"1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency."
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's request.
A review of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which
occurred more than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for
additional time to resolve the aforecited cases, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same within
the extended period sought. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the
performance of her duties and has not committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of
the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of
pending cases was acknowledged and she was even commended for her good performance in the
effective management of her court and in the handling of court records.
FACTS:

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Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor is the Executive and Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, Talibon,
Bohol. She filed this petition in connection with her application for lateral transfer to the RTCs of
Tagbilaran City.
Petitioner received a letter from the JBC informing her that she was not included in the list of
nominees for RTC, Tagbilaran City. She attributes her disqualification to her previous administrative
record of gross inefficiency for belatedly filing her motions for extension of time to resolve the cases
in 1990 and 2000 which were then pending before her sala. She was ordered to pay a fines and was
held in violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Considering petitioner's previous record, she is indeed disqualified from being further nominated for
appointment to any judicial post, unless she be accorded judicial clemency. Notwithstanding,
however, she was previously nominated by the JBC for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City
in 2005.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Judge Masamayor is entitled to Judicial Clemency. (YES)

RULING:
Petitioner is entitled to Judicial Clemency. The Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, thus:
"1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members
of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency."
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's request.
A review of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which
occurred more than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for
additional time to resolve the aforecited cases, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same
within the extended period sought. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the
performance of her duties and has not committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum
of the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements

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of pending cases was acknowledged and she was even commended for her good performance in the
effective management of her court and in the handling of court records.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard for
petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number of its members addressed to the IBP dated
October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11,
Series of 200912 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City.
Petitioner's dedicated service of 23 years to the judiciary, having been first appointed as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge in 1989, merits compassion from the Court. It bears to note that petitioner
does not seek for promotion to a higher position but only a lateral transfer to a place of work near
her residence.

JOCELYN C. TALENS-DABON, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, Respondent.
RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF THEN JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, EN BANC, November 20, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Judge Arceo is entitled to Judicial Clemency. Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
reformation after his dismissal from the service meriting the Courts liberality. While it may be conceded
that respondent at 71 years old had already reached retirement age and can no longer be eligible for
regular employment in the public service, yet, considering his achievements and mental aptitude, it
cannot be doubted that he could still be of service to the government in some other capacity.
True, respondent was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law
and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Records, however, reveal that he was granted
probation and finally discharged after having complied with all the conditions thereof.
Concomitantly, all his civil rights which he had lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to be
employed in the public service, were restored.
FACTS:
In 1996, respondent was dismissed from service for committing lewd and lustful acts against
complainant Talens-Dabon which constituted gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the
best interest of service.
On October 1, 2012, sixteen (16) years after his dismissal, respondent filed the instant petition
alleging that he had immensely suffered from and endured the stigma caused by his dismissal from
the service. He also claimed to have been humbled by his experience and has become remorseful of
his previous acts causing him to reform his ways and treat each person with dignity and respect. He
has devoted the past sixteen (16) years to "mending his ways and proving to himself and to the
community that he can be a better man. He now asks for Judicial Clemency seeking to lift the ban on
his employment in any branch of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Arceo is entitled to Judicial Clemency. (YES)
RULING:

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Judge Arceo is entitled to Judicial Clemency. Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
reformation after his dismissal from the service meriting the Courts liberality. While it may be
conceded that respondent at 71 years old had already reached retirement age and can no longer be
eligible for regular employment in the public service, yet, considering his achievements and mental
aptitude, it cannot be doubted that he could still be of service to the government in some other
capacity.
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., the Court lifted the penalty of disqualification imposed against the
respondent judge found guilty of immorality after he showed sincere repentance and taking into
account his contributions during his tenure in the judiciary.
In Re: Conviction of Imelda B. Fortus, Clerk III, RTC, Br. 40, Calapan City for the Crime of Violation of B.P.
22, the Court dismissed the errant probationer-employee on the ground that the crime she committed
involved moral turpitude but at the same time decreed that "she may be allowed to re-enter the
government service if she can prove that she is fit to serve again."
True, respondent was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Law and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Records, however, reveal that he was
granted probation and finally discharged after having complied with all the conditions
thereof. Concomitantly, all his civil rights which he had lost as a result of his conviction, including
the right to be employed in the public service, were restored.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO,

Respondent.; RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
A.C. No. 6148, EN BANC, January 22, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent
has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office while the Office of the Human Resource
Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case. He is not known to be
involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011. Furthermore, respondent’s plea for
reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by
his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he
is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
FACTS:
This is a petition for extraordinary mercy filled by respondent Atty. Macarubbo. In 2004 Respondent
was disbarred from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant
Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen
Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Eight years after such disbarrment or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For
Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court
initially treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for

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lack of merit. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of
the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Macarubbo’s prayer for clemency should be granted. (YES)
RULING:
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records
also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and
devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008.

The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification
from the Municipal Local Government Office; (5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; (6) Certification from the Election
Officer of Enrile, Cagayan; (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao; (8) Certifications
from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor;
(10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative; and (11)
Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter. The Office of the
Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary accountabilities in relation
to his office while the Office of the Human Resource Management Officer attested that he has
no pending administrative case. He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or
accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record
on file as of May 31, 2011.
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev.
Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines
of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant
suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with
the Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.

E. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (Bar Matter No. 850, as amended)

1. Requirements
2. Compliance
3. Exemptions
4. Sanctions
F. Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

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 EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE
BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D. SIOTING,
Complainant, -versus – ATTY. PHILIP Z.A. NAZARENO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6677, EN BANC, June 10, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the
time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and
that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the
foregoing rule.
The Court finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned
only one document number to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six complaints
for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate
notarial act.
FACTS:
In 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Imus,
Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp. In view of several inadequacies and
construction defects in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the
rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they had paid. The first batch of rescission
cases were filed by Sioting, Crisostomo, and Marquizo, while the second batch of rescission cases
were filed by complainants Balatucan, Solis, Ederlinda M. Villanueva (represented by Minerales), and
Batang. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by herein respondent Atty.
Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases.
Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions for review assailing the
judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the
certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting
which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004,
Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps.
Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May
24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment
complaint also against Sps. Sioting. The same certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno. Finally,
on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the
other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the
existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Complainants jointly filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno,
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission
and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations
therein.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Nazareno is guilty of malpractice as a notary public. (YES)

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RULING:
The Court finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering that he assigned
only one document number to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six
complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated
as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in
the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of
the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e.,
that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions
or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. In this case, respondent’s conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.

1. Qualifications of a notary public

2. Term of office of a notary public
3. Powers and limitations
MELANIO S. SALITA, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8101, FIRST DIVISION, February 4, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth
of what are stated therein.
Considering the circumstances, it is simply unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have
the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental to his own interests. His act of certifying under
oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons
executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
FACTS:
Rodriguez used, among others, the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Atty. Salve to file an ejectment
complaint against Salita. However, Salita was merely made to sign such document as collateral for
his loan and that he had already fully paid the same, as evidenced by the notarized Release of Real
Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez herself. In his defense, Atty. Salve narrated that both Salita
and Rodriguez went to him and brought the PN and other loan documents executed by Salita himself.
Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against Rodriguez and Atty.
Salve. Salita likewise filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Salve. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner found that Salita was not able to obtain the required quantum of proof to hold Atty.

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Salve administratively liable, especially considering that Salita’s criminal complaint was dismissed
for lack of probable cause. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation dismissing the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Salve should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the
truth of what are stated therein. Considering the circumstances, it is simply unfathomable for Salita
to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental to his own
interests. Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the preformed Deed of Absolute Sale
without Salita’s presence before him.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale,
from a private document into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from the records
of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally
appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same persons
who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely
executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to
discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Having failed in this regard, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an
irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing
the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.

4. Notarial Register
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization

FELIPE ALMAZAN, Complainant, -versus – ATTY. MARCELO SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.

A.C. No. 7184, FIRST DIVISION, September 17, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it.
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual.
Respondent himself admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and
the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, thus could
not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is
beyond the jurisdiction.
FACTS:

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Complainant alleged that respondent, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the
City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document. To prove his claim, complainant
attached a Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Marikina City, certifying
that respondent is not a commissioned notary public for the City of Marikina. Respondent, on the
other hand, admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the subject document but
denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. To prove his defense, he
attached a Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City certifying
the fact of his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities of Taguig,
Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the
lawyer’s oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject document in
Marikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. In the acknowledgment of the
subject document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public for and in the City of
Marikina, Province of Rizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the Notarial Law. Moreover,
respondent likewise violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws
and do no falsehood. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
Respondent himself admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and
the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, thus could
not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is
beyond the jurisdiction. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Said principle is equally echoed in the
Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of
Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further
committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said
transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from
it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission
as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual.

6. Competent evidence of identity

ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, Complainant, – versus –
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10783, FIRST DIVISION, January 13, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves
to be part of illegal transactions. In line with this mandate, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.

FACTS:

In the complaint, Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City, notarized a document
entitled "Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate Landholdings" (Joint Affidavit) purportedly
subscribed and sworn to before him by Loreto M. Tañedo (Tanedo) and Ramon T. Lim on January 15,
2006, and supposedly recorded as Doc. No. 375, Page No. 75, Book No. X, Series of 2007 in his notarial
register, despite the fact that Tañedo had already passed away as early as December 1, 2003.
In his Answer/Comment dated June 24, 2009, Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint Affidavit
but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified the identities of the persons who appeared
before him through their respective Social Security System (SSS) identification cards and driver's
licenses. He further denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him misrepresented
himself as Tañedo and that the latter was already dead.
In a Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 2010 submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner
Randall C. Tabayoyong (Investigating Commissioner), Basilio was found to have manifested gross
negligence and a complete disregard of the Notarial Rules.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable for violation of the Notarial Rules. (YES)
RULING:
A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions. In line with this mandate, a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. By
failing in this regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the
Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Verily, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; and it is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that
a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

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 HERNANIE P. DANDOY, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROLAND G. EDAYAN, Respondent. A.C. No.
12084, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the signatory to the document is in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization, and
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. Section 12, Rule II of the same rules defines "competent evidence of identity" as follows:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.- The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers
to the identification of an individual based on:
(a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or
(b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP, was remiss in the faithful observance of his duties as
a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming to be Jacinto through the
competent evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial Rules. Jurisprudence provides that a
community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity
not only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules; but
moreso, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the persons appearing before them, which the
Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which notaries public can ascertain the
person's identity. Records show that Jacinto passed away on July 13, 1999, and therefore, clearly could
not have appeared before respondent to sign and execute the two (2) documents. Had respondent been
more circumspect in performing his duties as notary public and asked for the photograph-
and-signature-bearing identification document required by the 2004 Notarial Rules, he would have
immediately discovered that the person before him was not the person whom he purports to be. All told,
by accepting the residence certificates presented by the person who claimed to be Jacinto as evidence of
identity, respondent made it appear that Jacinto personally appeared before him and subscribed the
SPA and the Deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules and to the detriment of Dandoy and his siblings.

FACTS:

Hernanie P. Dandoy alleged that respondent notarized: (a) a Special Power of Attorney executed by
his father, Jacinto S. Dandoy, in favor of a certain Antoine Cyrus C. Garzo (Garzo) granting the latter
authority to offer as collateral two (2) parcels of land located in San Juan, Siquijor; and (b) a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Real Estate of Dandoy's late grandmother, Eutiquia Sumagang, wherein
his father was also one of the parties. According to Dandoy, Jacinto could not have been present
before respondent because he already passed away. He added that, through the SPA and the Deed,
Garzo was able to mortgage the two (2) parcels of land as security for a P400,000.00 loan. The
mortgage was, however, foreclosed and the mortgaged properties were not redeemed to the great
prejudice of Dandoy and his siblings. In his Sworn Statement respondent admitted to having
notarized the two documents, but claimed that he verified the identities of the signatories thereto

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through their residence certificates. He narrated that on the said date, two (2) persons came to his
office claiming to be Jacinto and Felipe and asked him to draft and notarize the SPA and the Deed.

Dandoy filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines an action against respondent Atty. Roland
G. Edayan for violation of Canons 1, 3, and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In its Report
and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable
for failure to comply with the 2004 Notarial Rules, and accordingly, recommended that respondent's
notarial commission, if existing, be revoked and that he be disqualified from being commissioned as
a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is liable for violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules. (YES)

RULING:

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed with public
interest. Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith
and credence. As such, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
notarial system. In this light, the Court has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the facts
they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the signatory to the document is in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent
evidence of identity. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Section 12, Rule II of the same rules defines
"competent evidence of identity" as follows:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.- The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or
(b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
public documentary identification.

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP, was remiss in the faithful observance of his duties
as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming to be Jacinto through
the competent evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial Rules. Jurisprudence provides that
a community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of

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identity not only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the
Rules; but moreso, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the persons appearing before
them, which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which notaries public
can ascertain the person's identity. Records show that Jacinto passed away on July 13, 1999, and
therefore, clearly could not have appeared before respondent to sign and execute the two (2)
documents. Had respondent been more circumspect in performing his duties as notary public and
asked for the photograph-and-signature-bearing identification document required by the 2004
Notarial Rules, he would have immediately discovered that the person before him was not the person
whom he purports to be. All told, by accepting the residence certificates presented by the person who
claimed to be Jacinto as evidence of identity, respondent made it appear that Jacinto personally
appeared before him and subscribed the SPA and the Deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules
and to the detriment of Dandoy and his siblings.

Moreover, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By notarizing the subject documents, he
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for
violation of the Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

As herein discussed, respondent's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public resulted not
only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining the
integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should thus
be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence, he should be meted out with the modified penalty of immediate revocation
of his notarial commission, if any, disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years, and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Roland G. Edayan (respondent) GUILTY of
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court resolves to: SUSPEND him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKE his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and, PROHIBIT him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same
offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

NICANOR D. TRIOL, complainant, vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., respondent. A.C. No.
12011, SECOND DIVISION, June 26, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In this light, Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Notarial Rules requires a duly-commissioned notary public
to perform a notarial act only if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
is: (a) in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (b) personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules. In other words, a notary public is not allowed to notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.

In this case, records show that respondent indeed violated the 2004 Notarial Rules when he notarized
the subject deed without complainant and Grace personally appearing before him, much more without

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the requisite notarial commission in 2011. Significantly, it was established that both complainant and
Grace could not have personally appeared before respondent, since Grace was already residing at the
U.S. at the time of the supposed notarization. Furthermore, complainant presented a Certification dated
April 7, 2015 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC showing that respondent was also not a
commissioned notary public for and within Quezon City in 2012. On the other hand, respondent, apart
from his bare denials and unsubstantiated defense of forgery, failed to rebut complainant's allegations
and evidence. While respondent provided his specimen signature in his Answer to support his defense of
forgery, the same nonetheless remained insufficient. As aptly observed by CIBD Dir. Esguerra,
respondent did not even submit a copy of his signature appearing in the records of the Office of the Clerk
of Court or any other official document containing the same specimen signature to prove its genuineness
and authenticity. Case law states that where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to
submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is
sustained. Hence, no reasonable conclusion can be had other than the fact that respondent notarized
the subject deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules.

FACTS:

Nicanor Triol (Nicabor) alleged that he and his sister, Grace D. Triol (Grace), are co-owners of a parcel
of land in Quezon City. In January 2011, Nicanor decided to sell the subject land to a Leonardo P.
Caparas (Caparas) but was unable to do so, as he could not obtain the signature of Grace who was
already residing in the United States at that time. Subsequently, Nicanor discovered that a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 11, 2011 (subject deed) was executed and notarized by Atty. Delfin
Agcaoili supposedly conveying the subject land to Leonardo without the authority of Nicanor and
Grace; neither did they give their consent to the same, as they allegedly did not personally appear
before Atty. Agcaoili when the subject deed was notarized. Moreover, Nicanor found out that their
purported community tax certificates stated in the subject deed were fake. Accordingly, he filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Agcaoili.

In his defense, Atty. Agcaoili disavowed knowledge of the execution and notarization of the subject
deed, claiming that he did not know Nicanor, Grace, and Caparas. He maintained that his signature
on the subject deed was forged, since he would never notarize an instrument without the signatory
parties personally appearing before him. He likewise asserted that he could not have notarized it, as
he was not a commissioned notary public in Quezon City in 2011.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint, there being no
substantial evidence to show that Atty. Agcaoili is guilty of violating Section 1 (b) (7), Rule XI of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (2004 Notarial Rules). In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, as well as disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for the same period. It was observed that while Atty. Agcaoili
provided his specimen signature in his Answer, he failed to substantiate its genuineness and
authenticity, given that he did not submit a copy of his signature appearing in the records of the Office
of the Clerk of Court or any other official document containing the same specimen signature. Atty.
Agcaoili filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Agcaoili violated the 2004 Notarial Rules. (YES)

RULING:

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It is settled that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial
duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined."
In this light, Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Notarial Rules requires a duly-commissioned notary
public to perform a notarial act only if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document is: (a) in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and (b) personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. In other words, a notary public is not
allowed to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.
Parenthetically, in the realm of legal ethics, a breach of the aforesaid provision of the 2004 Notarial
Rules would also constitute a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), considering
that an erring lawyer who is found to be remiss in his functions as a notary public is considered to
have violated his oath as a lawyer as well. He does not only fail to fulfill his solemn oath of upholding
and obeying the law and its legal processes, but he also commits an act of falsehood and engages in
an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. Thus, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR categorically state:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, records show that respondent indeed violated the 2004 Notarial Rules when he
notarized the subject deed without complainant and Grace personally appearing before him, much
more without the requisite notarial commission in 2011. Significantly, it was established that both
complainant and Grace could not have personally appeared before respondent, since Grace was
already residing at the U.S. at the time of the supposed notarization. Furthermore, complainant
presented a Certification dated April 7, 2015 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC showing that
respondent was also not a commissioned notary public for and within Quezon City in 2012. On the
other hand, respondent, apart from his bare denials and unsubstantiated defense of forgery, failed to
rebut complainant's allegations and evidence. While respondent provided his specimen signature in

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his Answer to support his defense of forgery, the same nonetheless remained insufficient. As aptly
observed by CIBD Dir. Esguerra, respondent did not even submit a copy of his signature appearing in
the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court or any other official document containing the same
specimen signature to prove its genuineness and authenticity. Case law states that where a party
resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained. Hence, no reasonable conclusion can be
had other than the fact that respondent notarized the subject deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial
Rules.
In the same breath, respondent also violated the provisions of the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 thereof. By misrepresenting himself as a commissioned notary public at
the time of the alleged notarization, he did not only cause damage to those directly affected by it, but
he likewise undermined the integrity of the office of a notary public and degraded the function of
notarization. In so doing, his conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers, and it is only but proper that he be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent) GUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years;
PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years; and
REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO/HERMENEGILDO A. UNITE, represented by his sole heir,

FLORENTINO S. UNITE, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAYMUND P. GUZMAN, respondent. A.C. No.
12062, SECOND DIVISION, July 2, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Under Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is "in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization," and is "personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity."

In this case, Atty. Guzman failed to faithfully observe his duties as a notary public when he failed to
confirm the identity of Torrices through the competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial
Rules. The Deed itself shows that Torrices presented only his CTC when he appeared before respondent.
A community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of
identity not only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules;
more importantly, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the person appearing before
notaries public which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which they can
ascertain the person's identity.

FACTS:

Florentino Unite (Florentino) alleged that on December 19, 2012, Atty. Raymund Guzman (Atty.
Guzman) notarized a Deed of Self Adjudication with Sale and/with Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed)
executed by Jose Unite Torrices (Torrices), claiming to be the sole heir of Herminigildo, in favor of
one Francisco U. Tamayo (Tamayo), covering a parcel of land under Herminigildo's name. According

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to Florentino Unite, the Deed was executed with only Torrices's community tax certificate (CTC) as
evidence of identity. Florentino asserted that he is the only surviving heir of his father, Herminigildo,
as Torrices is his cousin. The Deed was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, which caused the
cancellation of his father's title and the issuance of a new one in the name of Tamayo. Complainant
added he filed a complaint for the annulment of the Deed and Tamayo's title, with
liquidation/accounting and damages before the Regional Trial Court.

In his Answer, Atty. Guzman claimed that he complied with the requirements of the Notarial Rules.
Particularly, he verified the identity of the parties to the Deed from their current government
identification documents with pictures and CTCs. He further inquired from the parties, especially
from Torrices, their capacity to execute the Deed.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found Atty. Guzman administratively liable for
violation of the Notarial Rules, for failure to confirm the identity of the parties to the Deed through
the presentation of competent evidence of identity as required by the Notarial Rules, pointing out, in
this regard, that a CTC is not one of the enumerated evidence of identity under the Rules. Accordingly,
the IBP-IC recommended that Atty. Guzman be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1)
year. In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the recommended penalty imposed on
Atty. Guzman to reprimand, considering that Atty. Guzman personally knows the affiant and the CTC
then will suffice." Dissatisfied, Florentino moved for reconsideration, which the IBP Board of
Governors denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Guzman violated the 2004 Notarial Rules. (YES)

RULING:

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed with public
interest. Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith
and credence. As such, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
notarial system. In this light, the Court has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the facts
they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.

Under Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is "in the notary's presence personally at the time of
the notarization," and is "personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity."

Section 12, Rule II of the same rules, as amended by the February 19, 2008 En Banc Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, defines "competent evidence of identity" thus:
Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; such as but not limited to, passport, driver's
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance,

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 police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior
citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book,
alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID,
certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.

In this case, Atty. Guzman failed to faithfully observe his duties as a notary public when he failed to
confirm the identity of Torrices through the competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial
Rules. The Deed itself shows that Torrices presented only his CTC when he appeared before
respondent. A community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent
evidence of identity not only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity
under the Rules; more importantly, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the person
appearing before notaries public which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent
means by which they can ascertain the person's identity.

Also, the phrase "personally known" contemplates the notary public's personal knowledge of the
signatory's personal circumstances independent and irrespective of any representations made by the
signatory immediately before and/or during the time of the notarization. It entails awareness,
understanding, or knowledge of the signatory's identity and circumstances gained through firsthand
observation or experience which therefore serve as guarantee of the signatory's identity and thus
eliminate the need for the verification process of documentary identification. Here, the
acknowledgment portion of the Deed does not state that Torrices is personally known to Atty.
Guzman, as the Rules require; rather, it simply states that “Torrices is known to me.”

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman GUILTY of violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court hereby: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as
a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

7. Sanctions
8. Relation to Code of Professional Responsibility
PABLITO L. MIRANDA, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ, SR., respondent. A.C. No.
12196, SECOND DIVISION, September 3, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The basic requirements a notary public must observe in the performance of his duties are presently laid
down in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The failure to observe the requirements and/or comply
with the duties prescribed therein shall constitute grounds for the revocation of the notarial commission
of, as well as the imposition of the appropriate administrative sanction/s against, the erring notary
public.

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Atty. Alvarez committed the following violations of the Notarial Rules: First, he performed notarial acts
without the proper notarial commission therefor. In this case, it was established that respondent
notarized a Joint Affidavit in 1993 and an Application for Business Permit, as well as the SPA of Amante,
in 2010, all in San Pedro, Laguna. However, as per the October 5, 2011 Certification issued by COC Beran-
Baraoidan of the RTC-San Pedro, respondent was commissioned as a notary public for and within San
Pedro, Laguna only from 1998 to 2005, and that the said commission has not been renewed in 2010 and
therefore, already expired.

Second, he notarized a document that is bereft of any details regarding the identity of the signatory. The
jurat of the 2010 Application for Business Permit which respondent notarized did not bear the details
of the competent evidence of identity of its principal-signatory. While this application appears to be a
ready-made form issued by the Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, this fact alone cannot justify
respondent's non-compliance with his duties under the Notarial Rules.

Third, he failed to forward to the COC of the commissioning court a certified copy of each month's entries
and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before him. Under the Notarial Rules, a
notary public must forward to the Clerk of Court, within the first ten (10) days of the month following,
a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged
before the notary public. According to case law, failure to comply with this requirement is "[a] ground
for revocation of a notary public's commission.” As per the September 21, 2011 Certification issued by
COC Beran-Baraoidan, a copy of the SPA executed by Amante was not submitted before the Office of the
COC of the RTC-San Pedro.

Accordingly, in view of respondent's numerous violations of the Notarial Rules, the Court upholds the
IBP's recommendation to revoke his incumbent notarial commission, if any, as well as to perpetually
disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.

FACTS:

Pablito L. Miranda, Jr. (Miranda) filed a Complaint-Affidavit, averring that Atty. Jose Alvarez, Sr. (Atty.
Alvarez) notarized certain documents during the year 2010 notwithstanding that his notarial
commission for and within the jurisdiction of San Pedro, Laguna had already expired way back in
December 31, 2005 and has yet to be renewed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro,
Laguna (RTC-San Pedro) where he resides and conducts his notarial businesses. Miranda alleged that
Atty. Alvarez maintained three (3) notarial offices. He also presented pictures of Atty. Alavrez’s
offices in San Pedro, Laguna, and documents to prove that Atty. Alvarez notarized. Likewise, Miranda
submitted a copy of: (1) Certification issued by Catherin B. Beran-Baraoidan, Clerk of Court VI (COC
Beran-Baraoidan) of the RTC-San Pedro, stating that Atty. Alvarez was commissioned as a notary
public for San Pedro, Laguna from 1998 to 2005; and (2) Certification issued by COC Beran-
Baraoidan, stating that "no document entitled SPA executed by Amante notarized by Atty. Alvarez for
the year 2010, is submitted before this Office." Miranda submitted his Position Paper, additionally
pointing out that in 1993, Atty. Alvarez notarized a Joint Affidavit despite the absence of a notarial
commission therefor, as well as an Affidavit for Death Benefit Claim in April 10, 2012 after his notarial
commission for and within Biñan, Laguna had already expired.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found Atty. Alvarez administratively liable for violating
the Notarial Rules, the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Lawyer's Oath, and
recommended that his notarial commission, if existing, be revoked, that he be barred perpetually as
a notary public, and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from
notice. In particular, the IBP-IC found that: (a) Atty. Alvarez’s three (3) notarial offices, including his

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residence, are all within the jurisdiction of San Pedro, Laguna, whereas his notarial commission
existing in 2010 was not issued by the RTC-San Pedro but by the RTC-Biñan; (b) Atty. Alvarez
notarized an Affidavit of Death Benefit Claim and Amante's Application for Business Permit in his
notarial offices in San Pedro, Laguna which is outside his notarial jurisdiction; and (c) Atty. Alvarez
notarized the Application for Business Permit even though it bore a fictitious address and lacked
details regarding the signatory's competent evidence of identity, thus causing it to appear that
persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) reduced the recommended penalty of suspension to one (1)
year. Atty. Alvarez filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that he maintains only one (1) notarial
office which is located in Biñan, Laguna, where he, together with one Atty. Edgardo Salandanan (Atty.
Salandanan) as Senior Partner, has been holding office and conducting all his notarial works for
several years. He added that the office in San Pedro, Laguna is managed and owned by his son, Atty.
Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. The IBP-BOG partially granted Atty. Alvarez’s motion by deleting the penalty of
suspension considering that his violation relates to the Notarial Law.

Miranda moved for reconsideration, revealing that Atty. Alvarez was practicing law while the order
of suspension previously imposed has not yet been lifted by the Court. The IBP-BOG denied Miranda’s
motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alvarez violated the 2004 Notarial Rules. (YES)

RULING:

Time and again, the Court has held "[t]hat notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies[,]
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."

The basic requirements a notary public must observe in the performance of his duties are presently
laid down in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The failure to observe the requirements and/or
comply with the duties prescribed therein shall constitute grounds for the revocation of the notarial
commission of, as well as the imposition of the appropriate administrative sanction/s against, the
erring notary public.

Atty. Alvarez committed the following violations of the Notarial Rules: First, he performed notarial
acts without the proper notarial commission therefor. In this case, it was established that respondent
notarized a Joint Affidavit in 1993 and an Application for Business Permit, as well as the SPA of
Amante, in 2010, all in San Pedro, Laguna. However, as per the October 5, 2011 Certification issued
by COC Beran-Baraoidan of the RTC-San Pedro, respondent was commissioned as a notary public for
and within San Pedro, Laguna only from 1998 to 2005, and that the said commission has not been
renewed in 2010 and therefore, already expired.

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Second, he notarized a document that is bereft of any details regarding the identity of the signatory.
The jurat of the 2010 Application for Business Permit which respondent notarized did not bear the
details of the competent evidence of identity of its principal-signatory. While this application appears
to be a ready-made form issued by the Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, this fact alone cannot justify
respondent's non-compliance with his duties under the Notarial Rules.

Third, he failed to forward to the COC of the commissioning court a certified copy of each month's
entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before him. Under the Notarial
Rules, a notary public must forward to the Clerk of Court, within the first ten (10) days of the month
following, a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary public. According to case law, failure to comply with this
requirement is "[a] ground for revocation of a notary public's commission.” As per the September 21,
2011 Certification issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan, a copy of the SPA executed by Amante was not
submitted before the Office of the COC of the RTC-San Pedro.

Accordingly, in view of respondent's numerous violations of the Notarial Rules, the Court upholds
the IBP's recommendation to revoke his incumbent notarial commission, if any, as well as to
perpetually disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.

However, the Court cannot affirm the IBP's deletion of the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law, which penalty was originally recommended by the IBP-IC. It should be emphasized that
respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a bearing on his standing as a lawyer. As
a member of the Bar, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By flouting the Notarial Rules on
numerous occasions, respondent engaged in unlawful conduct which renders him liable for violation
of the following provisions of the CPR:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Thus, aside from the above-stated penalties, the Court further suspends respondent from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on the subject matter.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. (respondent) GUILTY of
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, effective immediately, the Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2)
years; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and, perpetually
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when his
suspension from the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and his
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect.

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Further, respondent is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be held in contempt of court and/or further disciplined for allegedly practicing law despite the
suspension therefor as discussed in this Decision.

NORBERTO S. COLLANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO B. MABUTI, respondent. A.C. No.
9917, SECOND DIVISION, January 14, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
no authorization or commission to do so, an act which the Court has characterized as reprehensible,
constituting as it does, not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. Jurisprudence provides that without a commission, a
lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. A lawyer who performs a notarial act
without such commission violates the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Rules.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document, "Memorandum of
Agreement," without being commissioned as a notary public at the time of notarization. This fact has
been duly certified to by none other than the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thus, by knowingly performing notarial acts at the
time when he was not authorized to do so, respondent clearly violated the Notarial Rules and in
consequence, should be held administratively liable.

It should be emphasized that respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a bearing on
his standing as a lawyer. In Virtusio v. Virtusio, the Court observed that "[a] lawyer who notarizes a
document without a proper commission violates his lawyer's oath to obey the law. He makes it appear
that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer's oath
forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Canon 7 as well."

FACTS:

Norberto Collantes (Collantes) alleged that Atty. Anselmo Mabuti (Atty. Mabuti) notarized a
document entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" dated October 10, 2009 in the City of Manila. Upon
verification, however, he discovered that Atty. Mabuti was not commissioned as a notary public in
the City of Manila for the years 2008 and 2009. In support thereof, Collantes attached a Certification
issued by the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila attesting to the same.

In his Comment, Atty. Mabuti prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of double
jeopardy, pointing out that the present case is based on the same cause of action subject of an earlier
complaint, filed by a certain Mina S. Bertillo before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
which he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. In support
thereof, he attached a copy of the Commissioner's Report and the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution
of CBD Case No. 11-3036. The complaint was thereafter referred to the IBP for investigation, report,
and recommendation.

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The IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found Atty. Mabuti administratively liable for failure to
comply with the Notarial Rules and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years. Atty. Mabuti was indeed not commissioned as a notary public at the time
the subject "Memorandum of Agreement" was notarized. The IBP-IC brushed aside Atty. Mabuti’s
claim of double jeopardy, pointing out that the present administrative action concerns an act that is
entirely different from the act for which he was found guilty of violation of the Notarial Rules in CBD
Case No. 11-3036. The IBP Board of Governors increased the recommended penalty to: (a) perpetual
disqualification from being commissioned as a Notary Public since this is Atty. Mabuti’s second
offense; ( b) revocation of his notarial commission, if subsisting; and ( c) suspension for two (2) years
from the practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Mabuti violated the 2004 Notarial Rules. (YES)

RULING:

The Court has emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit, and as such, notaries public are obligated to observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

For these reasons, notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. As a corollary to the protection of that interest,
those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. The requirements for the issuance of a commission as a
notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. Where the notarization of a document
is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, an act which the Court has characterized as reprehensible, constituting as it does, not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. Jurisprudence provides that without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to
perform any of the notarial acts. A lawyer who performs a notarial act without such commission
violates the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Rules.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document, "Memorandum of
Agreement," without being commissioned as a notary public at the time of notarization. This fact has
been duly certified to by none other than the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thus, by knowingly performing notarial acts
at the time when he was not authorized to do so, respondent clearly violated the Notarial Rules and
in consequence, should be held administratively liable.

It should be emphasized that respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a bearing
on his standing as a lawyer. In Virtusio v. Virtusio, the Court observed that "[a] lawyer who notarizes
a document without a proper commission violates his lawyer's oath to obey the law. He makes it
appear that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the
lawyer's oath forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well," to wit:

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 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti

(respondent) GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, effective
immediately, the Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES
his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for one (1) year. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

II. JUDICIAL ETHICS

A. Sources
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore Draft)

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCHES 72 AND 22, NARVACAN, ILOCOS SUR
A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, THIRD DIVISION, June 13, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline
for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters,
he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on
the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay,
the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time
to decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having
therefore failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable under
the circumstances.

FACTS:

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The judicial audit team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) revealed that Branch 72, the
regular court of Judge Buenavista, had a caseload of 333 cases while Branch 22, where he acted as
pairing judge, had 302 cases
Judge Buenavista had several cases submitted for decision beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
While he was able to dispose many of the cases submitted for decision in both branches, and even
decided six (6) cases after the conduct of the judicial audit, most of them were resolved beyond the
reglementary period. There were cases where no action had been taken since their filing, and others
did not progress for unreasonable periods of time.
In connection with these findings, Judge Buenavista explained that the death of his wife a year prior
to the audit and his slowly failing eyesight, compounded by his designation as pairing judge of Branch
22, contributed to the dismal state of his case docket.
The OCA recommended that Judge Buenavista be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for failing to
decide twelve (12) cases and resolve the incidents in seven (7) cases within the reglementary period,
and for his failure to effectively manage the court dockets in RTC Branches 72 and 22.
In arriving at its recommendation, the OCA took into account the demise of Judge Buenavista’s wife
the year preceding the audit; his failing eyesight; the fact that he presided over two (2) RTC branches
for almost four (4) years; his diligence in disposing twenty-five (25) cases before he retired; and the
information that the periods of delay in deciding cases were minimal, save for a few cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Buenavista should be fined 10,000 for failing to decide cases and failing to
manage the RTC. (YES)
RULING:
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice
denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition
of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judicial system.
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days
from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline
for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to
decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters,
he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from
office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending
chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as

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the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a
result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time
to decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having
therefore failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable
under the circumstances.

RE: COMPLAINT OF LEONARDO A. VELASCO AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICES FRANCISCO H.

VILLARUZ, JR., ALEX L. QUIROZ, AND SAMUEL R. MARTIRES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J, EN BANC, January 15, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a standard of

behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment
against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various
petitions filed by the former, who apparently exhausted what he perceived were valid available remedies
under the law. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold them administratively liable for
grave misconduct.
FACTS:
Leonardo A. Velasco filed an administrative complaint against the respondents, Honorable Associate
Justice Villaruz, Jr., Justice Quiroz, and Justice Martires of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan for
grave misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
On December 10, 2008, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, then composed of respondents
rendered a Decision convicting accused Pacifico C. Velasco for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019. In the hearing for the execution of accused Velasco’s sentence, his counsel
manifested that he was confined and was due for surgery. The hearing was reset to June 9, 2010 upon
agreement of the parties. Nonetheless, a warrant of arrest was issued, but as agreed by the parties,
accused Velasco shall remain in the hospital until further order by the Sandiganbayan.
Velasco filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest, invoking humanitarian consideration.
However, the Sandiganbayan Justices, instead issued an Order of Arrest which they recalled
conditioned on the posting of a bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00. The Sandiganbayan Justices
then set aside their earlier order recalling the warrant of arrest and issued anew an Order of
Arrest for failure of accused Velasco to attend the hearing. Meanwhile, in another hearing before the
Sandiganbayan Justices on January 18, 2012, accused Velasco was directed to post a new cash bail
bond in the amount of P70,000.00 on the verbal motion of his counsel, and the hearing was reset once
more to March 19, 2012.

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Hence, the instant administrative complaint for grave misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct filed by Leonardo A. Velasco (complainant Velasco) against the Sandiganbayan Justices. In
his verified complaint, complainant Velasco asserts that, the conviction of accused Velasco having
attained finality on September 25, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Justices should have merely performed
the ministerial duty of executing his final sentence of conviction and not entertained his motions or
pleadings that forestalled its execution. In doing so, they have shown evident partiality, bias and
impropriety in favor of accused Velasco.
In their Comment, the Sandiganbayan Justices claimed that the repeated resetting of the hearings for
the execution of judgment against accused Velasco was mainly due to medical reasons and the
pendency of incidents before the Court. Vehemently denying that their questioned orders were
issued to unduly favor accused Velasco, they insisted that these were prompted by circumstances
which were not at their instance and that the instant complaint consists of unfounded allegations and
suspicions of partiality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan Justices may be held administratively liable for their
actions which unduly delayed the execution of the final sentence of conviction of accused Velasco.
(NO)
RULING:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment
against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various
petitions filed by the former, who apparently exhausted what he perceived were valid available
remedies under the law. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold them administratively
liable for grave misconduct.
However, the becoming modesty that the Sandiganbayan Justices have exhibited in this case cannot
detract from the fact that the judgment of conviction of accused Velasco should have been
immediately executed, absent any restraining order from the Court, in violation of the Court's
directive in A.M. Circular No. 07-7-12-SC, adopting amendments to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. HON. OSCAR P. NOEL, JR.,

Executive Judge/Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of General, Santos City, Branch
35, respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525, SECOND DIVISION, June 25, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The Court agrees that respondent extended the TRO beyond the period allowed by Section 5, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court, considering that at the time he issued the order extending the TRO on July 14, 2015,
the original 72-hour TRO issued on July 10, 2015 had already expired at 8:01 a.m. of July 13, 2015. Thus,
in conducting the summary hearing and issuing the July 14, 2015 Order, respondent in effect revived

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what would have already been an expired 72-hour TRO and extended the same to a full twenty (20) -
day period beyond the Rules' contemplation. The Rules' requirements are very clear, basic, and leave no
room for interpretation. Clearly, therefore, respondent erred in failing to comply with these elementary
provisions.

The observance of the law, which respondent judge ought to know, is required of every judge. When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; x xx failure to consider a basic and
elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. Canon 1 (Rule 1.01) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Canon 3 states that "A judge should perform his official duties honestly and with
impartiality and diligence." By his actuations, respondent judge has shown his lack of integrity and
diligence, thereby blemishing the image of the judiciary.

FACTS:

Rodriguez took over the operations of Golden Dragon International Terminals, Inc. at MAKAR Wharf,
General Santos City, after the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was issued in relation to Civil
Case No. 10433 was implemented. GDITI is in the business of receiving and disposing the liquid and
solid wastes generated by docking vessels. The previous management, headed by a certain Cirilo
Basalo was supposed to cease from handling the operations of GDITI, but when the latter defied the
injunctive writ, Rodriguez filed a motion for its re-implementation, which was granted. Consequently,
Rodriguez and the court sheriff went to the port to inspect the operations and saw a truck reportedly
owned by Basalo transporting solid wastes from the docking vessel. While he was taking pictures of
the truck, another vehicle driven by Basalo suddenly came from behind with the intent to sideswipe
him. He initially dodged the vehicle but was nonetheless hit when he tried to chase it. While he was
on the ground, another vehicle stopped in front of him and a number of armed men stepped out and
pointed their guns at him. Fortunately, he was able to run away and hide.

As a result of the incident, Rodriguez filed a complaint for Frustrated Murder against Basalo and his
companions. However, on a Sunday, respondent issued a Temporary Release Order in favor of Basalo
and one of his companions, Arjay J. Balansag. Rodriguez argued that while executive judges can act
on petitions for bail on Sundays and holidays, a petition for bail must be filed before the court can act
on it; here, it was only the following Monday, that Basalo and his companions actually filed the
Petition.

Another, Rodriguez claimed that in Civil Case No. 8588, respondent issued, on July 10, 2015, a 72-
hour temporary restraining order enjoining him from causing any act that might cause violence and
to maintain the status quo in GDITI. A Notice of special raffle was also issued by respondent and was
received by Rodriguez's aunt on the same date. To his surprise, however, on July 14, 2015, the 72-
hour TRO was extended for another twenty (20) days, or way beyond the 72-hour period. Rodriguez
claimed that he was also not furnished a copy of the notice of hearing relative to the extension of the
TRO.

The OCA recommended that respondent be reprimanded for gross ignorance of the law or procedure
and be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Judge Noel should be held administratively liable for violation of the Rules of Court
and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Bias and
Partiality. (YES)

RULING:

The Court agrees that respondent extended the TRO beyond the period allowed by Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, considering that at the time he issued the order extending the TRO on July 14,
2015, the original 72-hour TRO issued on July 10, 2015 had already expired at 8:01 a.m. of July 13,
2015. Thus, in conducting the summary hearing and issuing the July 14, 2015 Order, respondent in
effect revived what would have already been an expired 72-hour TRO and extended the same to a full
twenty (20) - day period beyond the Rules' contemplation. The Rules' requirements are very clear,
basic, and leave no room for interpretation. Clearly, therefore, respondent erred in failing to comply
with these elementary provisions.

The observance of the law, which respondent judge ought to know, is required of every judge. When
the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; x xx failure to consider a
basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight
or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. Canon 1 (Rule
1.01) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Canon 3 states that "A judge should perform his official duties honestly
and with impartiality and diligence." By his actuations, respondent judge has shown his lack of
integrity and diligence, thereby blemishing the image of the judiciary.

As noted, respondent had been remiss in the issuance of the July 14, 2015 Order extending the TRO
and the scrupulous observance of the requisites therefor.

WHEREFORE, Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 35 is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall definitely be dealt with more severely by this Court. He is further reminded to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties.

BOSTON FINANCE and INVESTMENT CORPORATION, complainant, vs. CANDELARIO V.

GONZALEZ, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, SECOND DIVISION, October 9, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In this case, respondent's "cease and desist" Order issued on November 19, 2010 was, as the OCA had
correctly pointed out, in the nature of a TRO. However, the aforesaid order failed to justify the necessity
for its issuance, as it merely issued the directive to the Clerk of Court, acting as Ex-Officio Sheriff, and
the Deputy Sheriff without stating the reasons therefor. Likewise, it did not specify any period for its
effectivity, in essence making the same indefinite. These omissions on respondent's part are contrary to
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the rules and
restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of procedure, and hence, renders
him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Case law states that "when a law or a rule is
basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law." It is of no moment that he was motivated by

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good faith or acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the
discharge of his official functions. According to jurisprudence, gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.

Similarly, the Court finds respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering an order for his failure to
expeditiously resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY despite complainant's repeated
motions for early resolution. In fact, it was only when the case was transferred to another judge that it
was finally acted upon. Likewise, his explanation for archiving the case on the ground that the parties
were in the process of entering into an amicable settlement does not justify the prolonged inaction
thereon, in light of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 or the "Guidelines in the
Archiving of Cases," which provides that a case may be archived only for a period not exceeding ninety
(90) days, after which, it shall be immediately included in the trial calendar after the lapse thereof.
Respondent's failure to perform his judicial duty with reasonable promptness in this respect clearly
contravenes the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

FACTS:

Boston Finance and Investment Corporation (Boston Finance) alleged the the Estate of Danilo Y. Uy
and Thelma D. Uy, et al. (plaintiffs), filed a Petition with Application for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/TRO to enjoin the sale at public auction of the properties
that served as collateral for the loans they obtained from Boston Finance. Judge Candelario Gonzalez
(Judge Gonzales) issued an Order directing Boston Finance to show cause why an injunctive writ
should not be issued. In the same order, however, Judge Gonzales also directed the Clerk of Court, as
Ex-Officio Sheriff, and her Deputy Sheriff to cease and desist from conducting the scheduled public
auction pending the resolution of the instant petition without, however, specifying the duration of its
effectivity.

Boston Finance filed its Compliance, maintaining that no injunctive writ should issue in favor of the
plaintiffs, and that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. Unfortunately, Judge Gonzales failed to resolve all pending incidents in connection with
the case for a relatively long time. The scheduled hearings were also postponed several times for
various reasons, one of which was the information given to the court by plaintiffs' counsel that the
parties were in the process of negotiations for a final settlement. However, no compromise
agreement was reached for failure of the plaintiffs to cooperate with Boston Finance. Finally, in an
Order dated July 24, 2013, Judge Gonzales suspended the proceedings in and archived the civil case
pending resolution of the other related case in Bacolod City. Boston Finance maintained that Judge
Gonzales’s failure to promptly resolve all pending incidents in the case, i.e., the motion to lift the cease
and desist order and the motion to dismiss the civil case, despite repeated pleas for their immediate
resolution, constituted gross dereliction of duty and violation of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0. Likewise,
Boston Finance pointed out that its several manifestations and motions praying for the early
resolution of the pending incidents should have been sufficient to apprise respondent that it was no
longer willing to enter into a compromise agreement with plaintiffs. As such, respondent had no basis
to assume that the parties were close to having an amicable settlement.

In a Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Gonzales
be found guilty of: (a) gross ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of P30,000.00; and (b)
undue delay in resolving pending incidents in the civil case and violation of Sections 3 and 5, Canon

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6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and additionally be fined in the
amount of P11,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Gonzales is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue delay in rendering
an order. (YES)

RULING:

"To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges
should be embodiments of competence, integrity[,] and independence. Judges are also expected to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them
properly in all good faith. Judges are likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of
law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith.”

In this case, respondent's "cease and desist" Order issued on November 19, 2010 was, as the OCA had
correctly pointed out, in the nature of a TRO. However, the aforesaid order failed to justify the
necessity for its issuance, as it merely issued the directive to the Clerk of Court, acting as Ex-Officio
Sheriff, and the Deputy Sheriff without stating the reasons therefor. Likewise, it did not specify any
period for its effectivity, in essence making the same indefinite. These omissions on respondent's part
are contrary to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary

injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to
be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte
a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he
shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within
the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically vacated. The
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial

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 declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on
the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining
order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be
effective until further orders.

In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the rules and
restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of procedure, and hence, renders
him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Case law states that "when a law or a rule
is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law." It is of no moment that he was motivated
by good faith or acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the
discharge of his official functions. According to jurisprudence, gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.

Similarly, the Court finds respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering an order for his failure to
expeditiously resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY despite complainant's
repeated motions for early resolution. In fact, it was only when the case was transferred to another
judge that it was finally acted upon. Likewise, his explanation for archiving the case on the ground
that the parties were in the process of entering into an amicable settlement does not justify the
prolonged inaction thereon, in light of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 or the
"Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases," which provides that a case may be archived only for a period
not exceeding ninety (90) days, after which, it shall be immediately included in the trial calendar after
the lapse thereof. Respondent's failure to perform his judicial duty with reasonable promptness in
this respect clearly contravenes the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:

Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills
and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking
advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available,
under judicial control, to judges.

Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

WHEREFORE, respondent Candelario V. Gonzalez, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bais
City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of P30,000.00. Likewise, he is found GUILTY
of Undue Delay in Rendering an Order and accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of
P11,000.00. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt
with more severely.

Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the aforestated guidelines shall be observed. These
guidelines shall APPLY to all pending and future administrative cases involving court employees,
subject to revision by the Court through the pertinent issuance therefor.

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 2. Code of Judicial Conduct
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF AMA LAND, INC. AGAINST HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON and HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS
A.M. OCA IPI NO. 12-202-CA-J, EN BANC, January 15, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the questioned order
of the respondent CA Justices, which is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a decision
on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this
administrative proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof
turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of
the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by
fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as
well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein,
bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party.
FACTS:
AMALI commenced the construction of a 37-floor commercial/residential building located at EDSA
corner Fordham Street. After securing the required licenses and permits, AMALI notified WWRAI, the
owner of Fordham Street, of its intention to use the said street as an access road and staging area of
the project. However, WWRAI fenced off the said street which prompted AMALI to file before the
RTC-Pasig a petition to enforce an easement of right of way.
The RTC-Pasig granted AMALI's prayer. In 1998, however, AMALI suffered financial setbacks, forcing
the suspension of its project construction. In 2002, it filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a petition
for corporate rehabilitation, which was later approved. Among the recommendations contained in
the approved rehabilitation plan was the conversion of the use of the 37-floor
commercial/residential tower (AMA Tower) to a 34-floor residential condominium
Meanwhile, WWRAI assailed the Orders of the RTC-Pasig denying its application for injunction
through a petition for certiorari before the CA. The case was raffled to the Special Former Tenth
Division composed of the respondent CA Justices.
The CA rendered a Decision granting WWRAI's petition and directing the RTC-Pasig to issue the
injunctive writ in favor of WWRAI pending determination of the petition for the declaration of
permanent easement of right of way filed by AMALI.
AMALI questions, among others, the jurisdiction of the respondent CA Justices to act on WWRAI's
petition assailing the denial of its application for injunctive relief to stop AMALI from proceeding with
its project construction, claiming this issue as irrelevant to the principal action to enforce an
easement of right of way pending before the RTC Pasig. It also raises the non-payment by WWRAI of
the docket fees on its counterclaim and the forum shopping the latter committed in filing various
suits before different fora on the same issue involving the legality of the project. In any event, AMALI
asserts that the respondent CA Justices acted in bad faith and knowingly rendered an unjust judgment
in granting WWRAI's petition, which effectively declared the project construction illegal and granted
the latter's counterclaim before the RTC-Pasig could have finally disposed of the case.

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AMALI questions, among others, the jurisdiction of the respondent CA Justices to act on WWRAI's
petition assailing the denial of its application for injunctive relief to stop AMALI from proceeding with
its project construction, claiming this issue as irrelevant to the principal action to enforce an
easement of right of way pending before the RTC Pasig. It also raises the non-payment by WWRAI of
the docket fees on its counterclaim and the forum shopping the latter committed in filing various
suits before different fora on the same issue involving the legality of the project. In any event, AMALI
asserts that the respondent CA Justices acted in bad faith and knowingly rendered an unjust judgment
in granting WWRAI's petition, which effectively declared the project construction illegal and granted
the latter's counterclaim before the RTC-Pasig could have finally disposed of the case.
AMALI filed an administrative complaint before the OCA charging the CA Justices with the following
violations: (a) Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, specifically for dishonesty and violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019), gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order; and
(b) pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics, for issuing the
Decision enjoining AMALI from continuing with its project construction pending the determination
of its petition for declaration of right of way against WWRAI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of AMALI are meritorious. (NO)
RULING:
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the questioned
order of the respondent CA Justices, which is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a
decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices
in this administrative proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or
portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof
that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or
hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this
case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party.
Here, other than AMALI's bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAI's counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing
other misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law artd jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are
best addressed to the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of AMALI's petition for review on
certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts' dockets. Those who seek relief from the
courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse court processes in their efforts to
vindicate their rights.

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ANGELITO R. MARQUEZ, EDUARDO R. MARQUEZ, CRISTINA M. OCAMPO, CARMEN MARQUEZ-
ROSAS, HEIRS OF ERNESTO MARQUEZ, RENATO R. MARQUEZ, ALFREDO R. MARQUEZ, FRED
EVANGELISTA, JOSE MACALINO, SANTIAGO MARQUEZ, SPOUSES FREDDIE AND JOCELYN
FACUNLA, SPOUSES RODRIGO AND VIRGINIA MAZON, SPOUSES ALFONSO AND LEONILA
CASCO, SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND PRISCILLA BUENAVIDES, EDUARDO FACUNLA, AND ALICIA
A. VILLANUEVA, Complainants, -versus- JUDGE VENANCIO M. OVEJERA in his capacity as
presiding judge of Municipal Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, AND SHERIFF IV LOURDES E.
COLLADO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, Respondents.
A.M. No. P-11-2903, SECOND DIVISION, February 5, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Collado should be held administratively liable for violating the pertinent provisions on SALN submission.
Section 8 of RA 6713 states that, "all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks,
bonds, and the like", should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN. In this case, however, it
was established, through Collado’s admission, that she only declared the original amount of her
time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests which
had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly, Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated
under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be held administratively liable for said infraction.
FACTS:
Complainants Angelito R. Marquez, Eduardo R. Marquez, Cristina M. Ocampo, Carmen Marquez-
Rosas, Heirs of Ernesto Marquez, Renato R. Marquez, Alfredo R. Marquez, Fred Evangelista, Jose
Macalino, and Santiago Marquez were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1330 involving a suit for
unlawful detainer and damages, while complainants Spouses Freddie and Jocelyn Facunla, Sps.
Rodrigo and Virginia Mazon, Sps. Alfonso and Leonila Casco, Sps. Benjamin and Priscilla Buenavides,
Eduardo Facunla, and Alicia A. Villanueva were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1416 involving a suit
for recovery of possession and damages. Both cases were filed before the Municipal Trial Court of
Paniqui, Tarlac, and raffled to the sala of Judge Ovejera. Eventually, the aforementioned cases were
decided against complainants. The complainants involved in Civil Case No. 1330 appealed the MTC
decision to the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui Tarlac. However, the appeal was dismissed, leading to
the issuance of a writ of execution. Due to said complainants ‟failure to vacate the premises, a writ of
demolition was issued. Maintaining that there was a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
latter moved for the stoppage of the implementation of the writ of demolition, but the same was
denied by Judge Ovejera. Similarly, a writ of execution was issued in Civil Case No. 1416, followed by
a writ of demolition, due to the failure of the complainants to remove the improvements involved
therein. Collado, in her capacity as sheriff, was tasked to implement the writs of demolition issued in
both cases.
Complainants filed a complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), imputing abuse
of authority, disregard of due process, misuse and fabrication of judicial orders, arrogance and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court against Ovejera and Collado in relation to the issuance
and implementation of the afore-stated writs of demolition. In addition, Collado was charged for
failure to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits with the Moncada
Women’s Credit Corporation (MWCC) for a total amount of ₱3,700,800,000. The OCA found no factual
and legal bases to support the complaint against Judge Ovejera and Collado for violations of their
administrative and judicial functions. Nonetheless, finding that Collado did not indicate in her SALN
for the years 2004 and 2005 the amounts indicated in the subject time deposits, the OCA
recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case for possible violations

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of the pertinent provisions on SALN submission, and that the same be referred to the Executive Judge
of the RTC for further investigation. The OCA’s recommendations were adopted by the Court.
Consequently, The RTC Executive Judge recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Collado,
finding that while the imputed amounts on the subject time deposits were not specifically stated in
her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 as Collado herself admitted, she nonetheless declared the
initial capital thereof as an asset therein. The matter was then referred to the OCA for evaluation,
however, the OCA found that Collado failed to submit her SALN for the years 2000 and 2001.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Collado be fined in an amount equivalent to her salary for
six (6) months.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Collado should be held administratively liable for violating the pertinent
provisions on SALN submission. (YES)
2. Whether or not Collado could be held administratively liable for her purported failure to
submit her SALN for the years 2000 and 2001. (NO)
RULING:
1. Collado should be held administratively liable for violating the pertinent provisions on SALN
submission. Section 8 of RA 6713 states that, "all other assets such as investments, cash on hand
or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like", should be declared by the public official in his or her
SALN. In this case, however, it was established, through Collado’s admission, that she only
declared the original amount of her time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005,
and did not disclose the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly,
Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be
held administratively liable for said infraction. Furthermore, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00 is amply
justified considering that Collado’s misstep in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 appears to
be her first offense, adding too that same does not appear to have been attended by any bad faith
or fraudulent intent.

2. Collado cannot be held administratively liable for her purported failure to submit her SALN for
the years 2000 and 2001 as she was not given an opportunity to be heard on this matter
considering that said infraction was not included in the original charge.

SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO
G. PICHAY, Respondent.
A.C. No. MTJ-13-1838, SECOND DIVISION, March 12, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that Judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with
reasonable promptness. Noncompliance with the periods prescribed constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge. While trial court
judges are often burdened with heavy case loads, they are given the option to, for good reasons, ask for
an extension of the period within which to resolve a particular case or any pending incident therein.

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In the case at bar, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions within the 3-month period
prescribed therefor. The matter had already been submitted for Resolution but Judge Pichay continued
with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably delaying the
execution of the subject decision.

FACTS:
An unlawful detainer case filed by Spouses Marcelo against Spouses Magopoy was pending before
Judge Pichay of MeTC, Parañaque City. A Joint Decision was rendered by Judge Pichay ordering
Spouses Magopoy to vacate and surrender the possession of the property to Spouses Marcelo. A writ
of execution was issued and later implemented by Sheriff Espres, thus, Spouses Marcelo obtained the
possession of the property. However, at around 6 o’clock in the evening of the same day, Spouses
Magopoy re-entered the property and regained its possession. As such, Spouses Marcelo moved to
cite Spouses Magopoy in contempt for disobedience to lawful court processes. However, the
defendants were not cited in contempt but, instead, were ordered to surrender the property to
Spouses Marcelo within 10 days. Spouses Marcelo filed an Ex Parte Constancia because of the
continued refusal of defendants to surrender the property, which prompted Judge Pichay to issue an
Order directing the Sheriff to execute the eviction within 3 days. Consequently, a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by defendants, which was opposed by complainants. During the hearing,
Spouses Magopoy were directed to file their Reply with Supplemental Motion to which they
complied. The following day, Spouses Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents for resolution.
However, instead of resolving the case, Judge Pichay directed Spouses Marcelo to file their comment
regarding Spouses Magopoy’s supplemental motion within 5 days and after which the court will
resolve the pending incidents. Spouses Marcelo failed to file their comment, nonetheless, Judge
Pichay set Spouses Magopoy’s previous motion for reconsideration as well as their supplemental
motion for hearing.
Spouses Marcelo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), charging Judge Pichay and Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending
incidents in relation to the implementation of the writ of execution of the subject decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the
pending case. (YES)
RULING:
Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the case.
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires the courts to conscientiously observe the time
periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower
courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. In
consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides that Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with reasonable promptness. Noncompliance with the
periods prescribed constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against the defaulting judge. While trial court judges are often burdened with heavy case
loads, they are given the option to, for good reasons, ask for an extension of the period within which
to resolve a particular case or any pending incident therein.

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In the case at bar, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions within the 3-month period
prescribed therefor. The matter had already been submitted for Resolution but Judge Pichay
continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably
delaying the execution of the subject decision. Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons
as to why he failed to resolve the matter on time, as well as to why he still had to set the same for
hearing and repeatedly grant postponements despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings
and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution.

GERSHON N. DULANG, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN G. REGENCIA,

Respondent.
A.C. No. MTJ-14-1841, SECOND DIVISION, June 2, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation
to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which states that "A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods" and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which provides that "Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness."
Here, it is undisputed that the case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite
this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only on February 18, 2011.

FACTS:
On February 2, 2000, Gershon Dulang filed an ejectment complaint before the MCTC presided by
Judge Mary Jocylen Regencia. On May 4, 2009, complainant moved for the resolution of the ejectment
case given that the same had been filed as early as year 2000 and had already been submitted for
resolution. However, notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment proceedings, respondent
judge rendered a judgment dismissing the ejectment case only on February 18, 2011 or more than
11 years after its filing.
Dulang filed a complaint before the OCA, accusing Judge Regencia of gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty. The administrative case was
referred to the Executive Judge of the Toledo City RTC for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Consequently, the Executive Judge found Judge Regencia administratively liable for gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious
dereliction of duty in handling the ejectment case, and thereby recommended that she be dismissed
from service. Judge Montero opined that Judge Regencia failed to observe the Rules on Summary
Procedure as she did not resolve said case with dispatch. The OCA recommended that Judge Regencia
be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in the
amount of 20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. However, the OCA no longer determined Judge Regencia’s administrative
liability with respect to the charges of gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty, in due deference to her right to
be afforded due process.

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ISSUE:
Whether Judge Regencia should be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision. (YES)
RULING:
Judge Regencia should be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "A judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and echoed in Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that "Judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and
with reasonable promptness."
Here, it is undisputed that the case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it
is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from
the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.
Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only on February 18, 2011. While rules prescribing
the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the
orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has
nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that
may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions
of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in
delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision.
In imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside from her
aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively liable for gross
inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover, her length of service of more than
17 years should be taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she should
have already known that the case, being an ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought
to be expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of ₱40,000.00, instead of suspension, should be the
appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia' s misconduct.

GERSHON DULANG, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE MARY JOCELYN REGENCIA, MCTC,

ASTURIAS-BALAMBAN, CEBU, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, SECOND DIVISION, June 2, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges.
If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the
litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

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Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for resolution on October 17,
2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a
period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a
decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2)
years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011.
FACTS:
Complainant Dulang had an ejectment case before the respondent judge which had been pending
since 2000. Sometime in 2009, complainant moved for the resolution of his case. However,
respondent judge dismissed the ejectment case only in 2011 or two years thereafter. The whole case
was pending for more than 11 years since it was filed.
Complainant filed a Complaint as well as a Verified Supplemental Complaint against respondent
judge alleging that the latter ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and
serious dereliction of duty for the undue delay of the ejectment case. The case was referred to the
Executive Judge of RTC Toledo City, which recommended the dismissal of the judge.
The OCA recommended that the judge be administratively liable. She was fined in the amount of Php
20,000 and was given a stern warning.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge was liable for the undue delay in rendering a decision in a Summary
Proceeding. (YES)
RULING:
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for resolution on October 17,
2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets
a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a
decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2)
years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011.
Further, as adverted to earlier, Judge Regencia tried to justify the delay in resolving Civil Case No.
212-B by claiming, inter alia, that there exists a prejudicial question brought about by the existence
of a pending case in the Toledo RTC and that the parties agreed on the suspension of the proceedings.
However, Judge Montero found that there was neither a prejudicial question nor an agreement
between the litigants that would warrant substantial delays in the proceedings – a finding which is
subscribed to by the OCA. Verily, Judge Regencia’s clear and blatant attempt to mislead the Court is
deplorable and should never be countenanced.

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 RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE CORAZON D. SOLUREN, PRESIDING
JUDGE, AND RABINDRANATH A. TUZON, LEGAL RESEARCHER II, BOTH OF BRANCH 91,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BALER, AURORA, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-14-3217, FIRST DIVISION, October 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. In order to differentiate Grave Misconduct from Simple Misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established
rule, must be manifest in the former.
In the instant case, Tuzon readily acknowledged that he accepted various amounts of settlement money
from party-litigants and kept them in his custody without authority to do so and without issuing any
official receipts therefor. In doing so, he clearly went beyond his duties as a Legal Researcher of the RTC.
FACTS:
An anonymous letter was sent to the OCA alleging that respondent judge had been requiring
settlement money from party-litigants. They were not given any official receipts, but merely
handwritten one prepared by Tuzon. When they request the return of the money, Tuzon would fail
to timely comply.
The OCA referred the matter to the Executive Judge of the concerned RTC, which found no
irregularities or unauthorized collections. Tuzon, on the other hand, admitted receipt, but raised that
he only accepted it as per the orders of the respondent judge. As regards the release of the money, he
said that most of them are release, while some will be used to cover for the civil liabilities in criminal
cases, the others are yet to be released following certain procedural measures.
OCA recommended that the complaint against Judge Soluren be considered closed and terminated on
the ground that her compulsory retirement on January 29, 2012 had divested it of jurisdiction.
Moreover, it found no substantial proof to hold her liable for the administrative charges against
respondent. On the other hand, it found Tuzon guilty of Grave Misconduct. It held that by receiving
money from the party-litigants under the guise of safekeeping the same, Tuzon had overstepped his
bounds as Legal Researcher. In this relation, the OCA opined that accepting fiduciary money for the
court’s safekeeping is not within the scope of Tuzon’s duties. Thus, in doing so, he disregarded the
rules of procedure and the law, especially considering that he kept the money in his possession for a
long period of time and did not issue official receipts therefor.
ISSUE:
Whether Tuzon should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. In order to
differentiate Grave Misconduct from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In the instant case, Tuzon readily acknowledged that he accepted various amounts of settlement
money from party-litigants and kept them in his custody without authority to do so and without

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issuing any official receipts therefor. In doing so, he clearly went beyond his duties as a Legal
Researcher of the RTC. The Court, however, disagreed with the OCA’s appreciation of the
misconduct’s gravity. Considering the absence of any proof that Tuzon’s actions were tainted with
corruption, or with a clear intent to violate the law, or would constitute a flagrant disregard of an
established rule.
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360, FIRST DIVISION, November 19, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community,
and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with his
mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent
paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by
bringing her to fiestas and other public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a
result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their morally
depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against respondent judge accusing the latter of improper use of his sala, using
the court process server as his driver, delegating his work to the legal researcher because he could
no longer perform his duties due to his vices, committed gross ignorance of law, asked for monetary
benefits from the government, and failure to timely decide a case. In his comment, respondent judge
denied the allegations mentioned in the complaint.
The OCA referred the matter to the CA for investigation, report, and recommendation. The
Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, improper use of his sala as his residence in violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92
and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
Similar to the Investigating Justice, the OCA found respondent to have violated Administrative
Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC when he used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his
residence. The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of Immorality for bringing his mistress to his
chambers and using the same as their "love nest."
ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and violation of SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. (YES)
RULING:
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for
functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3,

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Part I of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of
Justice.
In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers
in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the
Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the
possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be
renting one place while actually and physically residing in another.
Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality.
Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant,
or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with
his mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how
respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general
public by bringing her to fiestas and other public places, without any regard to consequences that
may arise as a result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven
for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. There is no doubt
that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the
members and employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage which the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.
B. Disqualifications of judicial officers (Rule 137)
1. Compulsory
2. Voluntary
C. Administrative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over Judges and Justices (all
levels)
III. PRACTICAL EXERCISES
A. Demand and authorization letters
B. Simple contracts: lease and sale
C. Special power of attorney
D. Verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
E. Notice of hearing and explanation in motions
F. Judicial Affidavits
G. Notarial certificates: jurat and acknowledgement
H. Motions for extension of time, to dismiss, and to declare in default

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