Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Highway
Highway
College of Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
Highway Engineering
Submitted by:
Arizapa, Kevin Ezsykiel
Casalan, Jev Rose
Ramirez, Ma. Janella
Malacaste, Joy Camille
Oplado, Rica Joy
Bruno, Christopher Carlo
Pareja, Jhozel
Submitted to:
Engr. Porfirio Entice
Date submitted:
March 3, 2018
Chapter One:
Introduction:
It was 2013 when the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
started The government’s P560-million flood interceptor project in Blumentritt,
Manila, designed to direct floodwaters from the northern part of Metro Manila to the
Tondo area and then out to Manila Bay, is already 70.66 percent complete. The five-
phase project, which started in July last year has been delayed by right-of-way
issues, changes in the design due to the presence of underground facilities
belonging to utility firms like Maynilad Water Services and inclement weather
conditions, among others. The DPWH’s water catchment facility is 3.3 kilometers
long, 6 meters wide and 3 meters deep. DPWH said that this project will be finished
in the first quarter of 2015 but this deadline has not met. The said project is then
expected to be finished by the end of June 2016 but as of now, there are no reports
regarding this project is being released. We decided to do a research for this study
for the reason that the manila flood interceptor project affects the convenience,
traffic and also it affects the health and business of individual residing near the
project. We intend to analyze and solve the problems it may cause due to its
incomplete phase.
This study is only limited to the factors that causes the delays of the Manila
flood interceptor project including its status and effects to the people.
Chapter Two:
In the centre of Cape Town, overlooking the busiest intersection in the central
City, en route to the major Waterfront tourist attraction, and snugly to one side of
the International Convention Centre is a freeway, suspended and incomplete.
Follow the arc which this road describes and you will see, at the opposite side of
the intersection another stub of freeway, also suspended, also incomplete.
Elsewhere, more hidden from public scrutiny are four more suspended, incomplete
pieces of two lane freeway. These pieces of road form part of the so-called
Foreshore Freeway of Cape Town. They are the focus of ridicule, the location for
advertising creativity, the source of urban mythology and iconic Cape Town
structures. They are also an anachronism of the transport planning process - a
process which tends to finish what it starts. How did Cape Town come to have
freeway stubs suspended above its centre? What can this “artefact” tell us about
road engineering of that time? And what does it mean for us – engineers, planners,
South Africans - today?
The story which emerges from these questions is rich and complex, and deeply
rooted in Cape Town’s contemporary history. This Foreshore Freeway story
touches east into District 6 and north to Government Avenue. It also connects
across to the US and to the birth of transport planning in the 1950s, and with the
associated development of traffic survey techniques, computers and modelling.
The story was influenced by tensions between levels of government, between
modes of transport and across professional boundaries and, inevitably, by the
South African politics of race. Locating and forming the Foreshore Freeway was,
in sum, a complex, protracted set of compromises between multiple actors with
many agendas, and is the focus of a piece of research work in progress. This brief
paper focuses on one part of that story, on some of the debates which ran from
the 1940s to the early 1960s. The focus is particularly on the Eastern Boulevard,
the road which runs into central Cape Town from the southern suburbs, and which
cuts through the Woodstock/District 6 area.
The genesis of the Foreshore Freeway scheme can be placed as early as the
Paris spring of 1940, when Monsieur Beaudouin (Chief Architect to the
Government of France and “first placed town planner in the Grand Prix de Rome”),
received a cable from WS Lunn (City Engineer, Cape Town) and JC Collings
(Town Planning Branch in City Engineers Dept) requesting his planning advice for
how best to use the land being created from the dredging for a new Cape Town
harbor (Beaudouin, 1940). Expected to cover 480 acres and situated at the
shoreline of Table Bay, between the existing city and the sea, Cape Town’s
Council had long recognized the untapped potential of the land but were now in
need of some strong planning advice. The Railway Administration, who were
cobeneficiaries of the Foreshore land, were unhappy with Council’s plan for the
area and had appointed Professor LW Thornton White (“former scholar of the
British School in Rome”) and Longstreth Thompson (“town planning consultant of
London”) to help them to develop an alternative. The cable to Beaudouin,
requesting his input, was the Council’s response to the Railway Administration’s
appointment of experts (Cape Town Foreshore Joint Technical Committee
(CFJTC) 1948).
As war rumbled in Europe, Beaudouin started his three month sojourn in Cape
Town. According to him, there was an easing of tensions between the Cape Town
parties as they worked on their separate reports but with “a considerable degree
of cross-reference and collaboration”. The resulting plans had a similar approach
and “the same essential elements”, which were a largely at-grade Parisian inspired
scheme with straight, wide Boulevards stretching to the East and West and a newly
developed civic centre. The plan for a Monumental Approach from the harbor and
vistas stretching in all directions, ensured that approach to Cape Town by sea (the
focus, as this was in a time before commercial aviation) would be most impressive
(CFJTC, 1948).
A year later, in March 1941, the City Engineer presented three alternative
schemes to Council: the Council’s scheme by Beaudouin of Paris; the Longstreth-
Thompson’s scheme produced for the Railway Administration and the original Joint
Town planning Scheme created before the various expert advisors joined the
process. The tensions were many, but focused on the location of the railway station
and the civic centre site. A Committee was set up to broker a compromise plan,
but these negotiations broke down, with the City believing that no satisfactory
solution could be found while the position of the Railway Administration on the
siting of the railway station remained as it was. The Foreshore plan was
deadlocked (CFJTC, 1948).
Two and a half years later, in October 1944, local parties lobbied national
government to intervene in the stand-off and a Committee was appointed under
the chair of MajorGeneral Szlumper. The Foreshore Investigation Committee
(Szlumper Committee) sat in February of the following year with the plans
developed so far and the Committee made recommendations, mainly relating to
the siting of the new railway terminal and following this the Minister of Transport
approached the City Council with a suggestion for a new Foreshore Joint Technical
Committee (JTC), which was formed and subsequently sat 34 times (CFJTC,
1948).
In June 1946, six and a half years after that first cable to Monsieur Beaudouin,
and many versions of the plan later, a report, plan, and photos of a model of the
proposed Foreshore Scheme were submitted to the Minister of Transport1. It
1 Report published by Government printer as UG 48, of 1946 and tabled 12 February 1947.
seemed that the scheme would now finally be built. But it was not to be so
straightforward.
Reference:
By 2009, most of the eastern half of the system (consisting of the Romeo and
Macomb arm) had been completed. At that time, some remedial repairs had been
performed in the western half of the system (designated as the Oakland and Avon
Arms), although there were significant repairs yet to be made when it was
transferred to the newly formed “Oakland Macomb Interceptor Drain Drainage
District” (OMIDDD) in fall 2009.
The OMIDDD is currently in the process of making these major repairs. The repairs
to this are being conducted to minimize risk of future collapses and prepare the
interceptor for many more years of service to the community. Flow control structure
construction is nearly finished and the first of several sewer repair contracts were
bid in July 2011. Total repair costs were estimated to be in the range of $160 million
and will require approximately five years to complete.
System history
The interceptor ranges in depth from approximately 30 feet to over 100 feet
and is constructed through various soil conditions including clay, silt and sand. The
northern portion of the alignment is within a nature area which is difficult to access
due to flooding, wetlands and areas of environmental concerns. The middle portion
of the sewer is within road rights-of-way, and the southern portion is within the
International Transmission Company (ITC) high voltage electrical corridor and
series of private easements.
Flow control
Due to high flows in the interceptor, an extensive flow control plan was
developed to allow entry to the sewer to conduct the repairs. The developed flow
control program involves installation of four new flow control gates and a new
dewatering pump station, as well as utilization of three existing gates and an
existing pumping station. The flow control plan was designed to accomplish in-
system storage of flow to allow access of all of the deteriorated sections of the
sewer, for repair periods ranging from six to 15 hours. Depending on the area of
the sewer to be accessed and the repair period, the system will store up to about
45 million gallons which will be released between subsequent storage/repair
periods.
To solve the difficulty of operating and monitoring gates located miles apart,
the owner and design team have designed an innovative system of remotely
operated sluice gates that can be monitored and controlled through a SCADA
system. Design for installation of the flow control gates was complicated by a
number of factors, including limited right-of-way for some of the structures, poor
soil conditions, high groundwater and the fact that three of the structures were to
be installed directly below high-voltage power lines supplying most of the
population in the area and to the north. In addition, live-tapping and fluming of the
existing flow during the shaft installation was a major challenge. These flow control
structures were constructed under Segment 1 of the OMID reconstruction.
Segment 2
Once the Segment 1 flow control was completed and tested, work was
started on the design to prepare the Edison Corridor Interceptor (ECI) and a portion
of the Oakland Arm Interceptor (0AI) for future repairs. Based on the Segment 1
hydraulic testing and additional modeling, the need to modify the pump station at
the downstream end of the ECI was identified. The existing pumps at the pump
station were not suitable to fully dewater the lower portion of the ECI. Accordingly,
part of the Segment 2 work included the installation of an additional large pump
capable of dewatering the downstream portion of the ECI and upgrading a small
pump to maintain the lowered sewage level within the pump station wet well.
There have been three major collapses on the former Oakland Macomb
Interceptor System, two on the Romeo Arm Interceptor, now part of the Macomb
Interceptor System and one at the upper end of the ECI. These failures all resulted
from soil fines being washed into the interceptor through cracks as small as 0.01
inch. The purpose of Segment 2 of the restoration program is to seal running and
gushing leaks and tostabilize loose soils adjacent to the interceptor that were
identified through the use of surface geophysical testing and confirmed by a
geotechnical investigation.
REFERENCE:
3. Causes of Floods
Floods are caused by many factors (or a combination of any of these): heavy
rainfall, highly accelerated snowmelt, severe winds over water, unusual high
tides, tsunamis, or failure of dams, levees, retention ponds, or other structures that
During times of rain, some of the water is retained in ponds or soil, some is
absorbed by grass and vegetation, some evaporates, and the rest travels over the
land as surface runoff. Floods occur when ponds, lakes, riverbeds, soil, and
vegetation cannot absorb all the water. Water then runs off the land in quantities
that cannot be carried within stream channels or retained in natural ponds, lakes,
and man-made reservoirs. About 30 percent of all precipitation becomes
runoff and that amount might be increased by water from melting snow. River
flooding is often caused by heavy rain, sometimes increased by melting snow. A
flood that rises rapidly, with little or no warning, is called a flash flood. Flash
floods usually result from intense rainfall over a relatively small area, or if the area
was already saturated from previous precipitation.
Flooding occurs when a river's discharge exceeds the capacity of its channel
to carry that discharge. The river overflows its banks. Flooding may be caused by
a number of natural causes or physical factors: Excessive levels of precipitation
occurring over a prolonged period of time. This eventually leads to saturation of
the soil. When the water table reaches the ground surface, there is increased
overland flow or runoff Intensive precipitation over a short period of time
particularly when the ground surface is baked hard after a long period without
rainfall. In such circumstances the infiltration capacity is such that the ground
cannot soak up the rainfall quickly enough, so more water reaches the river than
would normally be the case The melting of snow particularly when the subsoil is
It’s raining season once again and we face the yearly problem of flooding in
Metro Manila. I keep getting calls from broadcast media asking for interviews about
the problem, its historical origins and urban redevelopment solutions. Giving these
interviews I feel like a broken record enumerating the reasons for floods in the
metropolis, so I figure it would be good just to list them once and for all.
This list may not contain all the reasons but these, in my opinion, are the major
ones:
It floods because it rains; the rains and the typhoons that bring them
have increased in magnitude. Yes, it’s climate change. To deny this is futile. It’s
here now and it makes all historical flood levels, well, history. The paths of
typhoons have also become unpredictable (not that we have enough weather men
to predict them — many of our good ones have left for better-paying jobs
overseas). Typhoons now cross parts of the archipelago that did not use to have
them regularly and so people are caught unprepared. Despite these changes in
patterns, Metro Manila still gets dumped with rain, especially since its total area,
and population in this area, is equivalent to or larger than most provinces and many
regions in the country.
It floods because the rain comes down from denuded uplands. Metro
Manila floods come from elevated surrounding regions, all the way up to the Sierra
Madres. There, we have lost almost all of our original forest cover from illegal
logging. All this forest cover lost makes millions of hectares of upland a bald
watershed that flows freely into the metropolis. This situation is repeated around
almost all major urban areas in the country. The source is upstream and this is
where solutions should start, although it is among the longest-term solutions. We
need to recover our forest cover to reduce the amount of rain that floods our low-
level metropolis.
Metro Manila is not only low but it is sinking. Ground water extraction
due to deep wells is causing major areas of the metropolis to sink. The north
section of CAMANAVA and the southern cities from Pasay onwards have sunk
from a foot to over a meter and this has made those areas more vulnerable to
floods and storm surges. Scientists have pointed to the fact that this flattening has
increased the reach of storm surges from the seaside to as much as 20 kilometers
inland. So we get it from both ends in a perfect storm — from the mountains and
from the sea. The ground is also sinking due to the weight of all that concrete,
buildings and infrastructure mentioned in reason no. 2 above.
It floods because we have less drainage than before. Reports have it that
we have lost almost half of our metropolitan esteros and canals. We used to have
over 40 kilometers of them and now we only have about 20. Many have been lost
to development, disappearing without a trace (now it regularly floods where they
used to be of course).
It floods because the main flood control system started in the ’70s was
never completed. The Manggahan floodway was only one half of the picture. It
was meant to channel floodwater into Laguna Bay. The lake was meant only as a
holding area and the excess water was to have been flushed from there to Manila
Bay via the Parañaque spillway. That spillway was never built. To build it now
would cause trillions and urban sprawl has seen its path covered with more millions
of people and thousands of structures.
It floods because what little left of our drains and flood control
infrastructure is ill-maintained.Reaching many of them is a problem because of
informal settlements. Overlapping jurisdictions of local and national agencies
conspire to dissipate responsibility and funding for this vital task of ensuring our
drains are unclogged and free. It’s just like homeowners not cleaning their gutters
of debris before a rainy season. When the typhoons come, the gutters overflow.
The final reason it floods in this short list (and there are many other
reasons) is politics. Metro Manila is made up of 16 cities and one town (Pateros).
Floods do not respect political boundaries and will flow from one city to the next
yet we continue to address flooding (as well as all other urban problems) within the
confines of individual LGUs. It does not make sense. Politics also conspires to
keep informal settlers where they are because they represent votes.
Reference:
4. Effects of Floods
Flooding has many impacts. It damages property and endangers the lives of
humans and other species. Rapid water runoff causes soil erosion and
concomitant sediment deposition elsewhere (such as further downstream or down
a coast). The spawning grounds for fish and other wildlife habitats can become
polluted or completely destroyed. Some prolonged high floods can delay traffic in
areas which lack elevated roadways. Floods can interfere with drainage and
economical use of lands, such as interfering with farming. Structural damage can
occur in bridge abutments, bank lines, sewer lines, and other structures within
floodways. Waterway navigation and hydroelectric power are often impaired.
Financial losses due to floods are typically millions of dollars each year, with the
worst floods in recent U.S. history having cost billions of dollars.
As most people are well aware, the immediate impacts of flooding include
loss of human life, damage to property, destruction of crops, loss of livestock, and
deterioration of health conditions owing to waterborne diseases. As
communication links and infrastructure such as power plants, roads and bridges
are damaged and disrupted, some economic activities may come to a standstill,
people are forced to leave their homes and normal life is disrupted.
Floods can also traumatize victims and their families for long periods of time.
The loss of loved ones has deep impacts, especially on children. Displacement
from one's home, loss of property and disruption to business and social affairs can
cause continuing stress. For some people the psychological impacts can be long
lasting.
In Australia, floods are the most expensive type of natural disaster with direct
costs estimated over the period 1967-2005 averaging at $377 million per year
(calculated in 2008 Australian dollars).
Until recently, the most costly year for floods in Australia was 1974, when
floods affecting New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland resulted in a total cost
of $2.9 billion. The Queensland Government estimates costs for the 2011 floods
will exceed this figure for Queensland alone; with the damage to local government
infrastructure estimated at $2 billion, and the total damage to public infrastructure
across the state at between $5 and $6 billion.
The environmental benefits of flooding can also help the economy through
things such as increased fish production, recharge of groundwater resources, and
maintenance of recreational environments.
Areas that have been highly modified by human activity tend to suffer more
deleterious effects from flooding. Floods tend to further degrade already degraded
systems. Removal of vegetation in and around rivers, increased channel size,
dams, levee bank and catchment clearing all work to degrade the hill-slopes, rivers
and floodplains, and increase the erosion and transfer of both sediment and
nutrients.
Many of our coastal resources, including fish and other forms of marine
production, are dependent on the nutrients supplied from the land during floods.
The negative effects of floodwaters on coastal marine environments are mainly
due to the introduction of excess sediment and nutrients, and pollutants such as
chemicals, heavy metals and debris. These can degrade aquatic habitats, lower
water quality, reduce coastal production, and contaminate coastal food resources.
Reference:
Chapter Three:
Methodology
Source of Data:
Data progress report serves as the primary data of the study. The
mentioned data were gathered from the site through an ocular observation.
Research Instrument:
Observation. The researchers went to the location of the project and conducted
actual observation of the site and the contractors working.
Chapter Four:
Result:
Progress
Phase 1 100 %
Phase 2 84.25 %
Phase 3 55.85 %
Phase 4 72 %
Phase 5 79 %
From the DPWH-NCR report disclosed that only Phase 1 of the project—
which covers the construction of a 440-m box culvert from Laong Laan Street to the
area between Dapitan and Piy Margal Streets—is 100 percent complete. On the
other hand, Phase 2, which has a total length of 560 m traversing the Manila North
This table, represent the completion rate of the project from phase 1 up to phase
5.
Chapter Five:
Recommendation:
Conclusion:
Based on the results and findings of the study, careless planning leads the
project to delayed due to lack of the coordination needed between the contractors,
government and agencies managing the existing underground utilities. Also, the
study that they conducted is insufficient and the construction engineering principle
was not properly executed. We concluded that coordination and intensive planning
of a big project is really and an important thing to consider, good communication
for both parties-the local government and implementing agency, so that there will
be no problems to encounter while doing the construction. In this case study, We
did site visit and asked some concerned professionals from the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to give us some supporting details that
caused the whole project to be delayed. The Bureau of Construction Engr. Francis
Fontilar gave us a copy of report in which a particular structure affect rthe
Blumentritt Interceptor. With that, We concluded that a little miscommunication can
cause a big problem.
Documentation: