CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES

This chapter discusses the related literature and studies conducted in the
Philippines and in foreign countries. It confined itself to the topics and studies that have
bearing to the present study.

Foreign
There is no conventional definition of corruption, mainly because of significant cultural
differentiation. For instance, something that is called a bribe in one society, in other one
may be allowed and expected. Corruption means actions that lead to infringement of
rights and freedoms equity. Experts from the Europe Council have created a general
definition of corruption: graft, bribery, and any other kind of behavior of a person, endowed
responsibilities in public or private sector, who infringes his duties as a public person,
employee, independent agent or other same status, aimed at obtaining incompetent
advantages of any kind for themselves of another person” (Some Aspects, 2000).

Local literature:
Even if only half of the allegations against her turn out to be true, Janet Lim-Napoles, the
supposed brain behind the mind-boggling pork barrel scam that is the subject of ongoing
Inquirer reports, would easily qualify as the country’s foremost expert on corruption. The
elaborate scheme attributed to her presumes an intimate grasp of the workings of the
political system that no Filipino scholar has ever fully documented. Napoles appears to
have explored the weakest links of government and seen the vulnerabilities of officials at
various levels. But, instead of writing a doctoral thesis or book on the topic, she has used
this knowledge to build a lucrative business. (Randy David, 2013).

Foreign literature:
Existence of public property presupposes that some people will realize their own interests
from participation in a state organization by trying to maximize their use of opportunities.
In modern research, this kind of behavior is connected with opportunism and examined
as a form of corruption. This phenomenon is common for states and has been known for
some time. Public property in the form of state property sometimes is not used in the
interests of society but in the interest of private persons. A contradiction between public
and private interests is not decided in society’s favor. Hence it is impossible to attain the
full potential realization of state property as a basis for the realization of public interests.
Russia traditionally has a strong state institution. State power, which dominates social
life, is connected with a complex of historical, geopolitical, economical, national, and
social factors (Ryazanov, 1998).
Local literature:
Enotes May 2016. In May 2016, the Philippine people elected a radically more
authoritarian president, Rodrigo Duterte, than in the recent such elections. After decades
of democracy, and it is important to note that Duterte came to power democratically, the
Philippines are today governed by a president with very little regard for human rights and
for the rule of law. President Duterte's anti-drug campaign has been analogous to the
anti-communist wars of Central America during the 1980s. Police and death squads
operate with impunity in carrying out Duterte's order to stem the nation's drug problem by
killing all those associated with the trade in illegal narcotics. What does President
Duterte's lethal campaign against drug traffickers and users mean for the issue of political
corruption? The Philippine president's success in carrying out such a campaign with little
or no regard for the rule of law could also bode ill for those accustomed to acting corruptly
in both the government and civilian realms. Duterte has already taken a harsh stance on
the issue of government corruption, removing public officials from office and going so far
as to threaten the lives of those deemed corrupt (Enotes, 2016).

Foreign literature:
The literature describes several types of corruption, including local, business, and
supreme (Yani et. al., 2002). Local corruption is triggered by interaction of common
citizens and officials on duty. This type of corruption includes gifts and services for the
officials and/or their families and is often associated with nepotism. Business corruption
arises during interaction between state powers and business society. Supreme corruption
relates to higher political officials in democratic systems. It supposes dishonest behavior
of politicians who are not in favor with the electorate. Supreme corruption is a type of
behavior strategy used by powerful social groups and directed at economic seizure of
state and power for further establishment of shadow control under markets and finance.
People who make such seizures are usually called oligarchic.

Several types of corruption can be defined according to the chosen criterion, for instance,
bureaucratic and political; forced and consensual; centralized and decentralized
(Ozhiganov, 1999), criminal and mainly of economic character (Katayev & Serdyuk,
1995). Executive power is usually corrupted more than others because it conducts
operative management of economic resources (Chetvericov, 2008). To sum up,
corruption appears in multiple forms and involves either obtaining or giving up some
advantages.

Theories of corruption broadly fall under two categories: demand theories and supply
theories. In general, demand theory models of corruption include two approaches:
resource-allocation models, which assess the consequences of the allocation of
resources to bribe-seeking activities, and principal-agent relationship models (Jain,
1998). Resource-allocation models are based on the premise that bribe-seeking is one
aspect of any economic activity and thus part of a firm’s resources are devoted to this
pursuit (Krueger, 1974). In a competitive world, bribe-seeking opportunities are created
either by agents through Bribes are shared between agents and firms.
Principal-agent models of corruption concern the misuse of power by a ruling government,
which is motivated either by the desire to be re-elected or by self-interest. Economic
policies motivated by self- interest lead to the misallocation of resources to the highest
bribe-yielding projects (Jain, 1998). The second aspect of this model explains that
bureaucratic corruption arises from an agent’s incentive to disregard a principal’s interest
because of information asymmetry and the principal’s inability to monitor the agent’s
behavior. Demand models clearly indicate that agent behavior is the central determinant
of corruption and thus demand-model theorists have argued that anticorruption efforts
should be aimed at controlling agent behavior.

Supply theorists put the onus of the fight against corruption on the supplier side. People
pay bribes by their own volition and primarily for three reasons: to counterbalance poor
quality or high pricing, to create a market for redundant goods, or to stay in competition
(Stuart, 1997). On the basis of an empirical examination of the 19 largest exporting
countries during 1992-1995, Lambsdorff (1998) observed that highly corrupted exporting
countries attract a larger market share in corrupt importing countries. He concluded that
the inclination to offer bribes therefore emerges as the sovereign choice of exporters.

More recent theories support a middle-of-the-road approach and have observed that
corrupt behavior is characterized by the decision calculus of both the payee and the payer
based on value maximization. Also, an experimental game has been developed to
analyze corrupt behavior at the micro level (Abbinik et al., 2002). According to these
researchers, the essential characteristics of corruption are reciprocity relations, as no
corrupt contract can be legally enforceable, negative welfare effects, and sanctions when
corrupt practices are discovered. Based on the authors’ experiments using game theory,
they conclude that reciprocity alone establishes stable relations between the payee and
the payer and negative externalities such as welfare effects have no impact on the level
of cooperation. Additionally, the threat of drastic penalties significantly reduces the level
of reciprocal cooperation. However, the payer-payee pair has a tendency to
underestimate the overall probability of sanctions, which diminishes the deterrence to
some extent.

The main reasons for the existence of corruption are low incomes of the majority;
opportunism of officials on duty; weakness of civil society and democratic tradition; and
illiteracy of the majority. Social and economics situations are influenced greatly by
corruption. First, an illegal economy grows and leads to decreases in tax inflows. Social
guarantees become difficult obtain. Second, market mechanisms are broken, which
decreases economic efficiency and discredits the market system at large. Third, public
budget resources are used sometimes in the interests of small, powerful groups. Fourth,
prices increase because of additional costs of corruption. As a result, consumers suffer.
Fifth, property inequality and poverty are maintained. More, corruption whips up injustice
and unjust redistribution of facilities in favor of oligarchic groups. Sixth, rights as the main
instruments of civil regulation are discredited. Consequently, the public consciousness
forms impressions about the defenselessness of households and entrepreneurs before
harassment of bureaucracy. Seventh, police corruption stimulates development of
organized crime, which merges with bureaucracy.

A wide range of negative economic consequences follow corruption. Corruption in public

sector leads to decisions that may not meet public interests and therefore reduces
efficiency in society. Corruption may also increase transaction costs for individuals and
firms in their interactions with public sector bureaucracy. This may result in higher public
spending and changes to the structure of that spending (e.g., in favoring public investment
or procurement). Corruption in public procurement also may increase prices (i.e.,
taxpayers receive less for their money). This type of corruption also increases investment
risk in the country, as it raises question about the rule of law. In a corrupt environment,
people lose trust in public institutions. Corruption can create a perverse incentive
structure that provides incorrect signals with asymmetric information. Corruption
introduces inequality among individuals, favors those who are able to bribe; redistributes
resources to those who have decision-making power over valued resources and are
willing to use it in somebody’s favor. Corruption distorts the role of the government in the
area of contract enforcement and protection of property rights. Corruption may reduce the
trust of citizens in democracy and market economy (Tanzi, 1999).

The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) studies (Gupta et. al., 1998) of cross-country
regressions showed considerable impact of corruption. A worsening of the corruption
perception index (CPI) by 2.5 points (on a scale of 1 to 10) is associated with an increase
in inequality equivalent to the reduction of education at the secondary level by three years,
which is indeed a large effect. A 1% increase in the rate of corruption reduces the income
growth of the poorest (bottom 20%) by almost 8% per annum.

The corruption level of a country in general is a reliable indicator of the quality of its
institutions. Recent research work aimed at pointing out priority fields in combating
corruption have emphasized the need to control the transparency of rules and regulations
about public decisions so as to limit the discretionary power and domain of civil servants.
These studies also have discussed the role of incentives such as higher salaries and
penalties for corruption in lowering such types of behavior (Tanzi, 1998).

Local literature:
Philippine National Police (PNP) Corruption
Cops are among the most noticeable of public servants, and daily exposure to corrupt,
inefficient, or badly managed police officials is a cancer upon the body politic. Failure to
pursue reforms such a course will further enfeeble the PNP, hamper the improvement of
rule of law, lead to greater crime and corruption, lessen the peace and order needed for
faster economic growth, and undermine public safety and internal security in the face of
existing terrorist activities and insurgencies.
In the absence of systemic PNP reform, popular impatience for better police performance
and management -- exacerbated by the belief that nearly everyone in the PNP is corrupt
-- encouraged more public support for elected officials, such as the mayors of Davao and
Cebu, who openly supported the use of extra-judicial killings, coordinated in concert with
local police forces under their control, as a means of controlling crime. Such an outcome
has been disastrous to the human rights climate in this democracy.
Corruption in the Philippine National Police (PNP) and related agencies stems primarily
from the unholy trinity of gambling, drugs, and prostitution that beset law enforcement
organizations worldwide. However, PNP corruption is exacerbated by Philippine law,
which gives local officials control over the appointment and dismissal of local PNP
commanders, encouraging corrupt city mayors to make common cause with dishonest
police commanders. Observers compare the PNP to police forces in Al Capone,s Chicago
or 1940,s "L.A. Confidential" Los Angeles. According to Transparency International's
"2004 Global Corruption Barometer," the PNP was the most corrupt national institution in
the Philippines. But in 2006 it acknowledged that the PNP had taken "positive steps" to
rectify the situation such as recruiting civilian officials and implementing sanctions such
as dismissal and imprisonment for corrupt officers.
Apart from corruption, many cops undertake investigative short cuts that often employ
physical abuse, the planting of evidence, and sometimes -- allegedly under guidance from
local elected officials -- the extra-judicial killing of criminal suspects. The PNP suffers from
a potent combination of malfeasance (misconduct or wrongdoing) and misfeasance
(improper and unlawful execution of an act that in itself is lawful and proper) within an
institutional culture of poor management. The results permit not only corruption but also
a level of incompetence that is often indistinguishable from corruption. Individual PNP
members are courageous, but -- especially at junior levels -- tempted by the opportunities
(and, given the poverty-level wages, the virtual necessity) to "learn how to earn" from
corrupt officers in the field.
The PNP leadership has admitted the PNP has a problem with endemic corruption, and
has publicly expressed a willingness to improve the PNP as an institution. After his
appointment as PNP Chief in September 2004, then-Director General Edgar Aglipay
made several moves to counter growing criticism of PNP incompetence under the tenure
of Hermogenes Ebdane (formerly National Security Adviser and now Secretary of Public
Works and Highways). Aglipay used his six-month term in office to acknowledge publicly
the PNP, culture of misfeasance, incompetence, and corruption, and to create
disciplinary barracks at the former U.S. Naval base at Subic Bay and in Camp Molintas
in Benguet province. Since October 2004, 198 police officials identified by their
commanders as lazy, undisciplined, and abusive had to undergo one of five re-training
courses or a "Values and Leadership Enhancement Course."
In addition, Aglipay inaugurated campaigns against the solicitation of petty bribes for
minor traffic offenses, and succeeded in getting officers back in proper uniform, properly
groomed, and visible on their beats. Even the appearance of PNP headquarters at Camp
Crame noticeably improved, with interior courtyards cleared of refuse, drained of still
water, and landscaped. Under "Project Item," the PNP optimized deployment of personnel
to perform the three basic police functions of patrolling, traffic management, and
investigation. National Capitol Region command staff again prowled the streets at night,
conducting snap inspections of police posts and checkpoints. There was an increasingly
visible police presence on many major thoroughfares during rush hour and at night, an
important component of the "broken windows" school of community policing.
In a PNP Anti-Corruption Plan submitted by outgoing chief Director General Aglipay to
President Arroyo, the PNP made public what had been common knowledge for years --
bribery of police trainers and extortion of recruits are common practices. As one Internal
Affairs Service Police Superintendent (Colonel equivalent) at a PNP training institution
quipped, "when you start with garbage, you get garbage." The Filipino press reported
complaints of extortion of recruits in the Visayas and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) by officials of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the
official body charged with supervision and recruitment of police officers. Police trainees
and local government officials complained that NAPOLCOM officials also sometimes
receive amounts ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 pesos ($900-$1,800) for swearing in
police recruits who fail the entrance tests but are willing to pay bribes.
Under Philippine law, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) controls
the institutions -- the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) and the Philippine National
Police Academy (PNPA) -- that provide entry-level and senior-executive training for the
PNP. Both civilians and PNP instructors staff the institutions. Officially, the PPSC provides
equipment and training allowances to its students, with the GRP budgeting 1,370 pesos
(approximately $25) per student per day for a 90-day training course for enlisted police
recruits. However, according to Embassy contacts, students only spend 60 of those 90
days in training, with a third of the training days at the discretion of the local training
centers, providing an excellent opportunity for skimming. While the PNPA in principle
provides equipment and uniforms to officer recruits, much of the equipment needed for
training is reportedly either non-existent or of poor quality (handguns in particular).
Recruits from both institutions often must take out loans or buy what they need on
installment plans from individuals and businesses connected to PPSC or PNPA staff.
Many newly minted officers graduate from the PPSC and PNPA heavily in debt and
unprepared to face the dangers of their new assignments. PNPA cadets are also
sometimes expected to perform personal errands for their instructors during class time in
exchange for passing grades (Canindo, 2017).

Foreign literature:
Intervention of the state in the economy has three main roles: (1) the allocation of funds
consists of corrections to the weaknesses of the market, such as imperfect information
and competition or limited rationality that leads to wrong allocation of the resources and
are obstacles to development; (2) the state has to act on the stabilization of economic
activity and the redistribution of wealth, and (3) the state makes a certain amount of goods
and public services available for everyone. However, the different forms of corruption in
civil service prevent the state from fulfilling wholly its roles insofar as they give way to
distortions in public decision-making (Delavallade, 2006).

To be more precise, corruption may occur in civil service in the form of bribes offered to
a public official as reward for a favor shown toward a private actor. This is an obstacle to
competition as it reduces the cost of economic activity for the active corruptor or creates
for new opportunities. Corruption can also take the form of bribes to a public official for a
service that would normally be provided by the administration without any additional tax.
This can incite the civil servant to invent rules that make it legal to ask for a commission.
In both cases, the rules of public decision-making are biased (Delavallade, 2006).

Varoudakis’ (1996) typology, as well as Tanzi’s and Davoodi’s (1997) empirical research
and that of Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) have shown that the total
amount of social spending is increased by bribes when public-decision makers are
corrupt, especially under the influence of a bureaucratic system. When corruption exists,
by diverting public funds, the state budget includes not only effective social expenditures,
but also the diverted amounts. Corruption probably also reduces the amount of effective
government expenditure.

The impact of corruption on the allocation of government spending can use various
channels. First, as for bribe demand (i.e., collection), government authorities find
themselves in a monopsony position, with little competition because of their small number
compared to great demand. They decide the allocation of expenditures and contracts,
which increases their negotiating power and develops bribe-seeking behaviors.
Moreover, corrupt agents are incited to favor some spending items for which they know
or expect that decisions are made in relative secret (e.g. defense, public order). Second,
as for bribe supply (i.e., attribution), firms may be incited—namely by noncommittal laws
or even tax codes that allow bribes to obtain contracts abroad—to bribe foreign civil
servants to exporting arms, military equipment, oil, gas, or gold. Moreover, the effects of
the competition level between sellers on the bribe offer is uncertain;
heavy competition between sellers could prompt them to pay commissions to compensate
for these civil servants’ weak negotiating power and get market shares (Gupta, de Mello,
& Sharan, 2000). On the other hand, low competition induces anticipation of significant
bribes to obtain these markets (Mauro, 1998).

To sum up, consequences of corruption cost much more than the cost of bribes paid to
officials. Corruption is not only a crime but also a symptom of systemic economic crisis.
The most important condition needed to eradicate corruption is efficient social policy
directed at increasing life quality and wealth. Moreover, real losses from corruption
significantly exceed those calculated on the basis of few revealed corruption crimes and
accomplished investigations. It is particularly interesting to note that the sum total of
allocated public spending correlates significantly with corruption: the higher the level of
corruption, the weaker the portion of allocated spending. Analysis of the correlation table
suggest that corruption practices reduce not only the global part of the budget allocated
to different budgetary items but also the relative part allocated to social sectors.

There is now a fairly extensive body of literature on the history and nature of police
corruption as well as an expanding body of literature on efforts to tackle corruption and to
protect and/or stimulate integrity. As mentioned earlier, there is now a growing body of
work looking at aspects of police conduct in the UK, the bulk of it by investigative
journalists and former police officers, much of which is uncovering – or at least making
public – details about some of the more significant problems alleged to have affected, or
be affecting British policing. Both domestically and internationally, and very
understandably, much of the extant literature on corruption emanates from jurisdictions
that have (a) considerable experience of police corruption, and (b) have initiated major
inquiries and reform programs in response to such experiences.

The main reports from the major commissions are generally of great value in that, despite
the fact that the majority are rather dated, they offer significant insight into the problem of
corruption, the difficulties of uncovering corrupt conduct, the strategies most commonly
adopted in response to the identified problems, and the often short-term impact of any
changes that are instituted. The main reports worthy of significant scrutiny are those from:
Knapp Commission (New York City) (Knapp, 1972); Mollen Commission (New York City)
(Mollen, 1994); Fitzgerald Commission (Queensland) (Fitzgerald, 1989); Wood
Commission (New South Wales) (Wood, JRT, 1997a and b).

The last decade or so has seen an increasing number of studies, though they are still
small in number, which attempt to measure the extent and nature of police corruption.
The best known, and most rigorous, are those undertaken by the late Carl Klockars and
colleagues (Klockars et al, 2000; Klockars et al, 2005; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003). Such work
is, by its very nature, subject to some very considerable limitations, not least because of
the ‘invisibility’ of much of the conduct itself, and the well-documented unwillingness of
officers to reveal information about such conduct (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005).

The bulk of the literature, about police corruption specifically, or corrupt activity more
generally, has increasingly sought to identify ‘indicators’ of corruption (see, in particular,
Transparency International, 2012; 2013). Finally, there is now a substantial and
impressive body of work on trust and confidence in policing (see, in particular, Hough et
al, 2010; Jackson et al, 2012a; Jackson et al, 2012b) which, in particular, takes Tom
Tyler’s research on ‘procedural justice’ and applies it to policing. Such work, reflecting
elements of Tyler’s earlier studies (e.g., Tyler, 2006), strongly suggests that the greater
the extent to which citizens feel their interactions with police officers are characterized by
procedural fairness, the greater the likelihood they are both to 16 want to, and actually
will, comply. The implications in the field on corruption and misconduct are potentially
profound. Most obviously, such work underlines the potentially hugely deleterious
consequences of police actions that are perceived to be illegitimate or unfair and
reinforces, were it necessary, one of the key reasons why corrupt conduct is such an
important matter. In addition, however, it also points to the fact that police departments
seeking to deal with corruption, and to enhance integrity, also need to be seen to operate
fairly and legitimately with members of those organizations.

Efforts to curb police corruption have occurred in many countries around the world, some
more successful than others. The following section examines a number of case studies
where reform efforts have been identified as successful, at least in part, in curbing police-
related corruption.
In Russia, The World Bank has estimated that annual worldwide bribery is close to $1
trillion. Fifteen percent of enterprises give bribes in Western Europe and North America,
30% in Asia, and around 60% in Eastern Europe and Middle Asia (Petrova, 2007). The
corruption system in Russia involves more than 2.5 million people, and the society pays
them approximately $40-45 million per annum. In 2006, there were approximately 6
thousand bribe-taking crimes, 4 thousand bribe-giving crimes in the public sphere and
about 2 thousand commercial grafts were registered. Thus, corruption income reached
7% of an average company’s annual sales. According to the most optimistic estimates,
total annual losses caused by corruption exceed $30 million or around 1% of GNP in
buying goods and services for public needs. As a result, market efficiency declines,
democratic institution fail, and economic and political inequity increase. Obviously,
corruption has become a national threat (Kupreschenko, 2008).

Direct and indirect economic losses caused by corruption can be distinguished. Direct
losses are calculated as public budget income shortages. For instance, the Russian
Federal Tax Department increased its own efficiency and increased its income by $500
million. Indirect losses are much more difficult to estimate, though approximate
calculations can be made by using international comparisons. These calculations are
based on regression models in which corruption level, on the one hand, and general
economic efficiency indicators, on the other hand, are correlated. One recent example is
the research, which showed that scales of corruption in Russia, cause additional
expenses for investors equal to an additional 43% taxation (ibid.).

According to the Freelance Bureau (2005), an approximate estimate of losses from top-
level corruption can be made on the basis of well-known examples for which losses have
been calculated. This process showed that a decrease corruption levels from Mexico to
Singapore has the same effect as a 20% increase in taxes. Losses from corruption are
caused by nonmarket pricing, which leads to 5-15% consumer goods price increases.
Corruption causes additional costs equal to 15% greater taxation or 10% employment
decline. Good examples of corruption in top executive power all over the world are found
in contracts for public needs. Not surprisingly, losses from this kind of corruption exceed
30% of such public expenditures (ibid.).

A slight increase has occurred in frequency of bribery from 38.72 to 39.30%. Some data
have been based on impersonal interviews: 21% give bribes to tax inspectors, 16.2% to
policemen and judges, 13.9 to fire inspectors, 13.4% to public officials who sign contracts
for public needs, 12.5% to customs officers, and 4.1% to public officials of legislative
power (ibid.).

Russian experts have distinguished the corruption potential of Russian regions. In these
experts’ opinions, the most corrupted territories are big cities, transport nodes, ports, and
transit zones. Interestingly, no zones are completely free of corruption. The least
corrupted are spheres in which advantages are difficult to estimate, for instance, private
health services and innovative business.

The most corrupted spheres are political power, police, communal services, tax, customs
services, public health, and education. The most common corruption transactions are:
overestimation of costs, especially in state entrepreneurship; kickbacks from public and
private partnership; bribery in the business sphere aimed at obtaining/granting
competitive advantages; bribery in business sphere aimed at licensing and accreditation;
bribery among politicians for granting certain advantages to business; bribery in schools
aimed at obtaining/granting false certificates; and bribery in hospitals aimed at
obtaining/granting better services.
Executive power is the most corrupted in Russia. State officials are always engaged in
property redistribution using ordered bankruptcies, unfriendly mergers and absorptions,
business captures, lately including widespread corporate raider seizures of property. Not
surprisingly, this business is very profitable and can be compared with the drug trade.
Estimated profitability of corporate raider seizures reaches 500% (Kupreschenko, 2008)

Local literature:
Lessons from the Philippines: Marcos era
A stereotypical account of corruption in the Philippines may be used to clarify and extend
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993, hereafter referred to as S-V) theory of corruption. In the
Marcos regime, corruption was highly centralized. Imported goods, for example, were
routinely seized and bribes paid to expedite their timely release and facilitate lower duties.
Such operations had the tacit approval of higher authorities who were repaid with both
bribe shares and political support. Not only did the centralization of corruption permit both
higher bribe collection and lower excess burden (S-V, 1993), it permitted greater grand
corruption as well. According to President Aquino’s Commission on Good Government,
Transparency International, and the U.N. Commission on Drugs and Crime, the Marcoses
and their cronies were able to accumulate $10-15 billions in assets from various
operations. But the styles of grand corruption were quite different even within the Marcos
regime. Imelda Marcos allegedly extorted hefty percentages from many government
contracts under her authority as Governor of Metro Manila and Minister of Human
Settlements and expected wealthy business owners to contribute generously to her
various public works projects. President Marcos, in contrast, devised numerous schemes
to extract wealth under the guise of legitimacy (James Roumasset, 2008).

Foreign literature:
The growth of corruption in Russia occurs mainly in the form of kickbacks for obtaining
large-scale contracts. The share of kickbacks in the cost of these contracts recently
increased from 1.51 to 1.99%, and the share of other types of bribes in the total turnover
of all Russian companies fell from 1.43 to 1.07% (ibid.). In 2005, the annual volume of
bribes distributed by Russian businessmen was in $316 million; the average Russian
company pays $135,800 per annum (ibid.).
It is also important to pay attention to low-level corruption. Small and medium enterprises
in Russia spend a minimum of $500 million per month on official bribes (around $6 million
per annum). The preliminary analysis showed that 10% of gross income is spent on bribes
(ibid.).
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the main reason for corruption is poverty and
low quality of life. This is persuasively confirmed by international research. The level of
corruption is identified by CPI, which is annually determined and published by
Transparency International (TI, 2010). This index seems to be objective, as it reflects
estimates of corruption levels among businessmen and analysts in miscellaneous
countries. The absence of corruption corresponds to 10; growth of corruption drops the
index to 0. Russia stands in 146th place among the 180 least corrupted countries in 2010;
the CPI calculated on the basis of eight surveys by TI is 2.2. In comparison, the index
exceeds 9.0 in good practice economies such as Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The least developed countries of the world shoulder a double burden: poverty and
corruption. TI therefore recommends that states with low incomes oppose corruption and
provide greater access to information about budget expenses. A sign of national
corruption is unprecedented development of low-level corruption, which is founded on the
historically based principle of management in the Russian state, that is, the institution of
so-called feeding. As a result, the majority of the population ethically accepts corruption
as a form of problem-solving. More, 54% of Russians are tolerant of bribes to executives,
27% acknowledged that they sometimes give bribes to official public executives.
Interestingly, young people showed more tolerant attitude toward bribery than the elderly.
Illegal interaction between public officials, police, and criminals are widespread in modern
Russia, especially in big cities. Corruption phenomena have also spread in the judicial
system. Judges often solve deals in favors of wealthier complainants. Recent sociological
surveys show that only 14% of respondents have answered that the present court is
objective; more than 21% suppose that it is not objective, and
Experts have noted that the Russian electoral process is highly corrupt. Corruption occurs
in illegal financing of electoral campaigns and mass media, grafting of persons called to
provide openness and publicity for the electoral process (the watchers, members of the
electoral commissions with consultative privileges). Last year, large criminal groups
actively introduced their representatives in the legislative and executive branches of all
levels to pursue the lobbying interests of the former. These lobbyists actively master the
electoral system and direct significant material and financial facilities in electoral funds to
their own representatives.
Education also is corrupt at all stages, even in primary education. Bribery often occurs at
entrance and intermediate qualification exams. More, a shadow market has emerged and
affects term papers, diplomas, and theses. As a result, general efficiency of education
decreases. The medical services market remains nominally free of charge; however, it
appears that many free services provided to the population by medical organizations are
limited and differentiated on quality. As a consequence, many types of officially free
services are performed in the shadow economy. Interestingly, high price often does not
mean high quality of medical services.
The redistribution of property by a new class of top public officials and businessmen, a
strong desire to occupy the high position in society not as a result of professional skills
but on account of wealth, reassessment and the fall of certain valuables in society,
weakness of local authorities, and staff leapfrogging have become reasons for the rapid
development of corruption in modern Russia.
Georgia is an often-cited example of successful reform to tackle police corruption.
According to the US Department of State, low level corruption is almost completely
eradicated in Georgia due to dramatic police and institutional reforms (US Department of
State 2017), and overt bribery and extortion have virtually disappeared in Georgia (Light
2014).
Before the Rose Revolution of 2003, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs was a
militarized Soviet style structure whose mission was to defend government authority. It
had close connections with organized crime, and the drug trade in particular. Police
officers extorted bribes from drivers daily, passing a portion of their gains to their
superiors. Corruption within the police and other state organs in Georgia was so deeply
institutionalized that an official position had to be purchased, and taking bribes was seen
as a necessity to repay this initial investment (Di Puppo 2010).

With the election of Mikheil Saakashvili as president in 2004, the new government
immediately targeted the corrupt police service. The reforms saw mass dismissals of
police and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials, allowing for increased salaries (Di Puppo
2010; DCAF 2012). There was also institutional restructuring and service provision –
eliminating several agencies and shifting mandates – whereby changes in jurisdiction
removed the military from policing and limited police to law enforcement. Salary, training
and personnel policy for the police were also significantly overhauled and revamped
(Light 2014). The reform included education for police officers to train them to enhance
professionalism, awareness and adherence to human rights and the rule of law (DCAF
2012).

Di Puppo concluded that targeting highly visible areas of corruption can quickly
enhance public trust in state institutions and the reform of the traffic police had an
immediate positive effect on the lives of ordinary Georgians (Di Puppo 2010).

However, despite its successes, there is evidence that high-level misconduct persists in
the Georgian police force (Kupatadze 2012; Light 2014), and weak accountability of police
structures remains a significant problem (Di Puppo 2010). Further, there is a mixed record
on the human rights protections afforded by the police (Di Puppo 2010; Kupatadze 2012;
Light 2014). The Ministry of Interior remains a powerful, centralised and hierarchical state
organ and lacks transparency, accountability and external oversight (Kupatadze 2012).
Without adequate checks and balances, the result may be a police force still perceived
not as protectors of the citizens but rather of executive interests (Di Puppo 2010).

Local literature:
Corruption in the government is a real issue that the Philippines is experiencing today.
Both the local and national governments are plague with cases of graft and corruption. It
is no surprise to hear news reports of plundering of funds, the most famous case being
the misuse of the Priority Development Assistant Funds or more known as the “pork
barrel” scam. The Filipino masses have a right to feel distrust towards the government. It
is crucial to understand the root cause of corruption in the Philippine government. The
article is very informative as it provides a historical background as to how dishonesty in
the government came to rise. I appreciate that the commentary was honest and direct,
not sugar-coating the real state of our government. It said that “The Republic of the
Philippines is a weak postcolonial state.” I proceeded to reflect upon these words and I
could say that this is true. The Philippines is a third-world country and the corruption in
the government does not help alleviate matters. What we need is true change right now.
We must know where the problem lies and take steps toward solving it.
If there is anything I’ve learned from reading the article, it is that the nature of our colonial
and post-colonial history contributed towards sustaining corruption. Caciques, the term
for the powerful elitist clans, has its beginnings in the Spanish colonial era. These
continue to persist even up to today and throughout history. During the American
occupation, politics has been mingling with oligarchy. Candidates for government
positions depend on their connections; the more connections and support you have from
powerful elitist clans, the bigger your chances are for winning (Alfredo Alvarez, 2016).

Foreign literature:
Police corruption was rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period (Quah
2014). Analyses of police corruption in colonial Singapore indicate that it was the result
of at a series of factors including: low salaries; poor working conditions; a high degree of
formalism in the police force; poor recruitment and selection procedures; a lack of training
programs; and ample opportunities for corruption due to inadequate controls (Quah
2001). Measures to tackle corruption in the police force were introduced in 1952 with the
establishment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Since then, a myriad
of reforms has reduced corruption within the Singaporean Police Force. Corruption
among the police in Singapore is now very low, and Singapore is placed equal sixth in
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International
2017c).

The reasons for Singapore’s success is considered to be fourfold: i) political will and the
commitment of the government; ii) salaries and working conditions; iii) recruitment and
selection procedures and iv) training and socialization (DCAF 2012).

It is important to note, however, the social, political and economic context in which these
reforms took place. Singapore is neither a developing nor a post conflict country, and it
has enjoyed decades of political stability and benefited from a considerable head start in
the development of an independent anti-corruption body. Further, its small size means it
must contend with few of the problems encountered by geographically sparse countries
(Transparency International 2012). This does nothing to detract from Singapore’s
success, but suggests that countries requiring police reform might need a considerable
period of time before truly positive results can be expected (Transparency International
2012).

Local literature:
MANILA - The police force is widely regarded as one of the Philippines' most corrupt
institutions, a reputation reinforced by accusations three officers were involved in
abducting and killing a South Korean businessman. "Extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances" by police and military forces were the Philippines' most significant
human rights issue, the US State Department said in its annual human rights report in
2015.Since then, police have reported killing 2,250 drug suspects, and another 3,710
people killed in unexplained circumstances as part of President Rodrigo Duterte's
controversial drug war. Three policemen abducted the South Korean businessman last
year when they went to his house on the pretext of a raid on illegal drugs, then killed him
the same day but claimed he was still alive to extort money from his wife, authorities said.
Here are some of other notorious cases of recent years: 'Drug generals'
In July last year,
newly elected President Duterte accused five police generals -- two retired and three in
active service -- of being part of the country's illegal drugs trade. All five denied
involvement, but the three active-duty officers were removed from key posts, though none
of them has been charged in court. Nine senior Philippine police officials, including the
comptroller in charge of the force's budget at the time, were briefly held at a Moscow
airport in 2008 for carrying 105,000 euros (about $112,000) while on their way to an
Interpol conference in another Russian city. The Ombudsman, the government's special
anti-graft prosecutor, filed graft charges against the officials in 2013 for the alleged misuse
of police intelligence funds for their travel expenses. The case is ongoing. (Cecil Morella
and Agence France-Presse, 2017).

Foreign literature:
Hong Kong is often provided as an example of a state that has been particularly
successful in reducing corruption, including police corruption. Mass demonstrations in
1966 and 1973 saw the Hong Kong public demand that the authorities control corruption,
especially in the police service. In response, the Hong Kong authorities established the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, one of the most highly
regarded anti-corruption bodies in the world.

From an institutional perspective, the establishment of ICAC was essential for holding the
police accountable but also for enhancing institutional capacity in maintaining political
order. The high degree of institutional continuity and integrity is one of the hallmarks of
the Hong Kong ICAC (Hope 2015). Simultaneously, organizational reforms to the Hong
Kong Police Force occurred with legal and regulatory instruments developed to ensure
the proper ethical discharge of police duties which impose disciplinary measures on
officers guilty of offences contained in the regulation.

Other preventive measures were also put in place, including transparent recruitment
procedures and robust selection procedures. Integrity management has also been
incorporated into the organizational structure of the Hong Kong Police Force through
education and culture building, governance and control, enforcement and deterrence,
rehabilitation and support (Hope 2015).

There are several factors that could account for the low level of police corruption in Hong
Kong. First is the institutional integrity of the internal and external control mechanisms.
The multi-pronged approach toward police anti-corruption in Hong Kong has created an
institutional structure that discourages rent-seeking behaviour by the police. Second, the
development of a values-based framework within the police force has facilitated the
creation of a corruption-free organizational setup. In particular, the emphasis placed on
professionalism, integrity and honesty is considered important in establishing a service-
oriented police culture (Wong 2012). Third, the high degree of fairness and predictability
in determining the pay and benefits of police force personnel is considered to be a factor
discouraging police corruption (Hope 2015).

In one study in South Africa, a reduction of bribery in the South African Police Service
(SAPS) prompted research into the possible causes of such a reduction. Data showed
that perceptions of corruption in the police had fallen in the Limpopo province between
2011 and 2015, suggesting that a wider shift had taken place in police-community
relationships in the province. In 2011, according to Afro barometer, more than half of
those surveyed in Limpopo said that “most or all police are corrupt”; in 2015 that figure
had nearly halved (28 per cent). The study found that police-related bribery reduction in
Limpopo occurred at the same time that the national government led an unprecedented
high-level anti-corruption intervention in several provinces (Peiffer et al. 2018).

The research suggests the police in Limpopo may have been especially reluctant to
engage in bribery during this time because of an uncertainty as to whether they were also
under investigation for corruption and because of the heightened anticorruption action
that took place. The drivers of bribery reduction in this case were likely indirect and
unanticipated, a “benign side effect” of a separate anti-corruption intervention. The
intervention in Limpopo was not targeted at local police, yet police likely feared they were
under greater scrutiny as part of the perceived efficient degree of “command and control”
national-level agents were exerting. The sustainability of the intervention’s impact on
bribery reduction in Limpopo is therefore questionable (Peiffer et al. 2018).

This case demonstrates that certain types of disruption may work to reduce bribery
patterns, but only in a relatively short timeframe. For longer impact, disruption strategies
likely need to be continuously inventive and re-inventive, and driven by strong leadership
(Peiffer et al. 2018).

Local literature:
Studies on Corruption Much has been written on the subject of corruption, on its meaning,
the negative impacts on the political and economic development of states, and the causes
for its persistence. This is especially so after the international recognition conferred upon
it by the passing of international conventions such IJAPS, Vol. 13, No. 2, 93–113, 2017
Hannah Frances C. Bodegon et al. 97 as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, in 1997 (Rushton 2011) and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption in 2003 (United Nations Convention Against Corruption
2004). In effect, the passing of such conventions put corruption as an agenda to be
resolved at the level of the state and through cooperative pursuits among the states,
international institutions, and the civil society. A review of the extant literature shows that
many of the studies explore the relationship between institutions and corruption and
culture and corruption. We first examine institutions and then proceed to culture.
Institutions are defined in the traditional sense as "the formal rules and organisations"
(Lowndes 2010: 60). The focus then is on the arrangement of the institutions and the
formal rules and regulations that bound the organisation and the people in it. Later on,
the definition of institutions under new institutionalism had come to include conventions
and norms constructed by the members, which regulate their interaction with each other.
However, a survey of the literature shows that studies on corruption and institutions view
institutions in the more traditional sense. Specifically, these studies inquire as to which
types, and permutations of institutions, do low levels of corruption persists; unitary vs.
federal form of government; parliamentary vs. presidential form of government (Gerring
and Thacker 2004); an open and transparent democratic form of government (Alt and
Lassen 2003); the extent of freedom of press (Lederman, Loayza and Soares 2005;
Treisman 2007); electoral rules and constitutional structures (Kunicova and Ackerman
2005); strong rule of law and established politicallegal structures (Zhan 2012); and the
design and structure of government institutions and political processes (Shleifer and
Vishny 1993). A few of the literature also examine how institutions can contribute to the
pervasiveness of corruption. For instance, Yadav (2012) argues that legislative
institutions, its rules and regulations can contribute to corruption. Ionescu (2011) for his
part explores how the federal form of government contributes to the persistence of
corruption in Mexico. To some extent, also explored in the literature is the link between
culture and corruption. Culture is defined as the "values and attitudes that guide a
population" (Landes 2000: 2). In a compendium, Harrison and Huntington (2000)
emphasise the import of culture in the course of human progress as for them, values
matter! Indeed values matter as several authors have examined the relationship between
the value of collectivity and corruption (Husted 1999; Soleim and Bontis 2009). The
relationship between political culture and corruption is mostly examined in Asian states
(Chang and Chu2006). This appears to be especially true in the Philippines. For example,
Co (2005) and Jimenez (2010) aver that corruption is sustained by the culture of gift-
giving, reciprocity and clientelism. Gift giving is related to the value of kindness, reciprocity
meanwhile is related to the value of hiya (shame) or utang-na-loob (debt of gratitude).
Clientelism refers to an asymmetrical relationship between two individuals where one acts
as a patron and one acts as a client. In a similar discussion of elements in the Philippines
that underlie Filipino values, Varela (2003) asserts that there are elements: personalism,
familism, and particularism or popularism. Personalism is explained as the extent of
importance Filipinos face on interpersonal relations. Familism meanwhile is related to the
high value placed by Filipinos on the welfare of their own families in relation to the welfare
of the community. Particularism or popularism pertains to the importance placed by
Filipinos on being held in a high esteem by the members of the community. These three
elements underlie the transactions of Filipinos with each other. Adding to the values
already enumerated by Co (2005), Varela (2003) adds that Filipinos also hold the values
of amor propio (honour), delicadeza (propriety), and pakikisama (getting along). These
elements plus the values undergird the daily interaction of Filipinos. Quah (2010) agrees
with Co (2005) and Varela (2003) and cites the same values as one of the culprits behind
the persistence of corruption in the Philippines. Evidently, much of the literature have
focused on the macro level, focusing on the relationship between corruption and
institutions, and corruption and the larger culture, whether as solution or contributing
factor. However, a noteworthy investigation would also be at the level of the individual
and the interaction between individuals and how it contributes to the persistence of
corruption. This is where the present study comes in. In exploring the frame alignments
on corruption between the local state authorities and public utility drivers, the spotlight is
shifted to the individual's agency in the prevalence and persistence of corruption. (Hannah
Frances C. Bodegon, 2017)

Local literature:
MANILA, Philippines - The Philippine National Police (PNP) is the most corrupt institution
in the country, according to the latest Global Corruption Barometer of the anti-corruption
watchdog Transparency International. The survey showed that 69 percent of surveyed
Filipinos believed police personnel were corrupt, 64 percent believed public officials and
civil servants were affected by corruption, while 58 percent had the same view on political
parties. The media and religious institutions were perceived to be the least affected by
corruption with 14 percent and 15 percent, respectively. At least 56 percent of the
respondents thought the judiciary was corrupt, four percentage points higher than the 52
percent who have the same opinion on the legislature. The military was deemed corrupt
by 43 percent of the respondents. The survey also showed that 32 percent viewed the
educational system as affected by corruption while 31 percent had the same opinion on
the medical and health services. About 30 percent of the respondents thought corruption
was affecting businesses, while 25 percent had the same perception on non-government
organizations. The Global Corruption Barometer has been gathering the corruption views
and experiences of people around the world since 2003. This year’s survey covered more
than 114,000 respondents in 107 countries.

The latest survey also showed that 35 percent of Filipinos thought corruption in the
country had gone down a little in the past two years, while 31 percent believed it had
stayed the same. Nineteen percent of surveyed Filipinos said corruption had increased a
lot, while 12 percent said it had increased a little. Only two percent thought corruption in
the country had decreased a lot. Some respondents also admitted to paying bribes in the
last 12 months. Nineteen percent admitted to bribing the police while 14 percent did the
same for registry and permit services. Eleven percent of the respondents said they paid
bribes to land services, while 10 percent bribed members of the judiciary. Seven percent
and six percent of the respondents bribed tax authorities and education officials,
respectively. Six percent of the respondents said they paid bribes to personnel involved
in education services, while four percent did the same to those in medical services. Five
percent admitted to bribing those in the utilities sector, while four percent did the same to
those in medical services. Almost half or 45 percent of respondents agreed that ordinary
people could make a difference in the fight against corruption (Alexis Romero, 2013).

Local literature:
“I think that corruption is the heart of the problem,” writes a reader in reaction to last
week’s column piece — regarding five cases of ordinary citizens arrested in joint AFP-
PNP operations, using court warrants issued in the names of alleged CPP-NPA leaders
with millions of pesos offered as bounties for their capture/arrest.

In two instances, the courts ruled (on habeas corpus petitions) that the arrests were cases
of mistaken identity. However, in one of these resolved cases the AFP chief reportedly
awarded to an “informant” the P5.6-million bounty. Who collected that money?

Most likely to be similarly found mistaken is the recent arrest, in Mexico, Pampanga, of
two elderly residents: Lourdes Quioc, a village midwife, and Reynaldo Ingal, a retired
driver. Their relatives have filed a petition for habeas corpus against the PNP-Central
Luzon director and other police officers involved in the arrest.

Another reader, Carmelito Tatlonghari, writing in behalf of fellow workers at the Bataan
Nuclear Power Plant, attests that Ingal is a “law-abiding citizen who worked with us at the
BNPP for so many years.” They are appealing for his immediate release.

The blogger “Pulis Na Pogi” for his part requests that I read his posts about corruption in
the Philippine National Police and asks for my comments. I did. He seems to be a
knowledgeable PNP insider, probably a ranking police officer. He writes:

“The most approximate reason of corruption right now in the PNP is the entrenched
culture of ‘keeping up with the Joneses.’ This PNP culture is but a microcosm of the whole
state of government in general and a reflection of the Filipino people at large…”

“This culture permeates the organization from top to bottom, thus corruption happens as
is, where is,” he adds quoting a general who said, “I did not invent corruption, I walked
into it.” “(It) existed and flourished because of the monolithic leadership that suppressed
potential whistle blowers and pressured many others to ‘go with the flow’.”

Like the Mafia, Pulis Na Pogi explains, the PNP leadership is “almost monolithic, with the
top 100 positions all occupied by PMAyers [graduates of the Philippine Military Academy]
except for a few deputy positions numbering to no less than 10 occupied by officers from
other sources of commission.”

But he didn’t blame the PMAyers solely for the corruption. At all levels where PMAyers
and PNPAyers [graduates of the Philippine National Police Academy] are assigned, both
are to blame.

“In the Finance and Comptrollership, arguably the most corrupt unit of the PNP where the
amount of funds stolen would make the pork barrel scam of Napoles look like loose
change, there are as many equally corrupt PNPAyers as there are PMAyers,” he points
out.

Here’s how he depicts the various levels of corruption in the PNP:

• Since the PMAyers are on top, the top-level corruption is committed by them.

• Since there are no more PMAyers lower than Superintendents (Class ‘92, the youngest
PMAyers, will be promoted to Senior Superintendents this year), the corruption at the
lower levels are masterminded by PNPAyers.

• Top-level corruption would be in the form of wholesale “clearing” of MOOEs

[miscellaneous operating and other expenses] and special releases of the Department of
Budget and Management, mostly from the pork barrel of politicians.

• At the middle level (Regional Directors – PMAyers; Provincial Directors – mix of

PMAyers and PNPAyers) would be the organized rackets, most especially illegal
gambling.

• At the bottom, where most of the junior PNPAyers are, that would be street-level
corruption such as hulidap, small-time protection rackets, and recycling of illegal drugs.

“Unfortunately for the PNPAyers,” he laments, “the street-level corruption is (what) Juan
dela Cruz feels very strongly about because it is where the shenanigans directly affect
him.”

Pulis Na Pogi segues with a blog focused on PNP Director-General Alan Purisima’s
controversial resthouse in Nueva Ecija and other assets. He posts three photographs of
the house from three angles, and contrasts them with three photographs of the PNP-AFP
housing project in Bulacan.

Two photos show President Aquino inspecting a housing unit, one from the outside and
the other, inside — showing a narrow room with bare galvanized-ironsheet roofing.

Purisima, says the blogger, in insisting that his is just an ordinary house, is “a sad
reflection of his Boss P-Noy in terms of mindset. This is [being] very insensitive to
policemen, especially the beneficiaries of PNP housing programs whose units have floor
areas of less than 30 square meters and bunched in cramped locations.”

For further contrast, he posts color slides from an official PNP presentation in 2009 culled
from a United Nations Development Program study. The slides show the following:

“Police stations are squatters”: 80% are built of inferior materials, vulnerable to forces of
nature… more than 75,000 (63%) of PNP personnel need decent shelters…60% of
personnel live below the poverty line…83.4% of policemen resort to salary loans…50%
of pensioners don’t receive regular budget allocations…only 7% of personnel with
dependents receive educational assistance.

Assuming that Gen. Purisima’s wealth all came from legal sources, Pulis Na Pogi
concludes:
“Something is very, very wrong with the system because the lifestyle gap between him
and his subordinates is not proportionate to the salary gap between them.” (Satur C.
Ocampo, 2018)

Synthesis of the Related Literature and Studies

Corruption has a great impact in our community it involves in several forms and
consists of a wide array of illicit behaviors such as extortion, bribery, fraud, nepotism,
embezzlement, graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, kickbacks, etc. It starts within the
organization that affects their performance in serving the community.

Our gathered foreign and local literature and related studies about our topic shows the
history of all corruption activities within the country and even in the different part of the
globe. It shows how the corruption evolve in a period of time and who are those people
most likely commits this kind of activities.

In the study of Some Aspects (2000), it states that there is no conventional definition of
corruption, mainly because of cultural differentiation.

The literature describes several types of corruption, including local, business, and
supreme (Yani et. al., 2002). Local corruption is triggered by interaction of common
citizens and officials on duty. This type of corruption includes gifts and services for the
officials and/or their families and is often associated with nepotism. Business corruption
arises during interaction between state powers and business society. Supreme corruption
relates to higher political officials in democratic systems. It supposes dishonest behavior
of politicians who are not in favor with the electorate. Supreme corruption is a type of
behavior strategy used by powerful social groups and directed at economic seizure of
state and power for further establishment of shadow control under markets and finance.
People who make such seizures are usually called oligarchic.

The main reasons for the existence of corruption are low incomes of the majority;
opportunism of officials on duty; weakness of civil society and democratic tradition; and
illiteracy of the majority. Social and economics situations are influenced greatly by
corruption. First, an illegal economy grows and leads to decreases in tax inflows. Social
guarantees become difficult obtain. Second, market mechanisms are broken, which
decreases economic efficiency and discredits the market system at large. Third, public
budget resources are used sometimes in the interests of small, powerful groups. Fourth,
prices increase because of additional costs of corruption. As a result, consumers suffer.
Fifth, property inequality and poverty are maintained. More, corruption whips up injustice
and unjust redistribution of facilities in favor of oligarchic groups. Sixth, rights as the main
instruments of civil regulation are discredited. Consequently, the public consciousness
forms impressions about the defenselessness of households and entrepreneurs before
harassment of bureaucracy. Seventh, police corruption stimulates development of
organized crime, which merges with bureaucracy.

However, the different forms of corruption in civil service prevent the state from fulfilling
wholly its roles insofar as they give way to distortions in public decision-making
(Delavallade, 2006).

To be more precise, corruption may occur in civil service in the form of bribes offered to
a public official as reward for a favor shown toward a private actor. This is an obstacle to
competition as it reduces the cost of economic activity for the active corruptor or creates
for new opportunities. Corruption can also take the form of bribes to a public official for a
service that would normally be provided by the administration without any additional tax.
This can incite the civil servant to invent rules that make it legal to ask for a commission.
In both cases, the rules of public decision-making are biased (Delavallade, 2006).

Alfredo Alvarez, (2016) Corruption in the government is a real issue that the Philippines
is experiencing today. Both the local and national governments are plague with cases of
graft and corruption. It is no surprise to hear news reports of plundering of funds, the most
famous case being the misuse of the Priority Development Assistant Funds or more
known as the “pork barrel” scam.

In addition of that Randy David, (2013) Janet Lim-Napoles appears to have explored the
weakest links of the government and seen the vulnerabilities of officials at various levels.

Police corruption was rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period (Quah
2014). Analyses of police corruption in colonial Singapore indicate that it was the result
of at a series of factors including: low salaries; poor working conditions; a high degree of
formalism in the police force; poor recruitment and selection procedures; a lack of training
programs; and ample opportunities for corruption due to inadequate controls (Quah
2001).

There is now a fairly extensive body of literature on the history and nature of police
corruption as well as an expanding body of literature on efforts to tackle corruption and to
protect and/or stimulate integrity.

Furthermore, Hong Kong is often provided as an example of a state that has been
particularly successful in reducing corruption, including police corruption. Mass
demonstrations in 1966 and 1973 saw the Hong Kong public demand that the authorities
control corruption, especially in the police service. In response, the Hong Kong authorities
established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, one of the
most highly regarded anti-corruption bodies in the world.

From an institutional perspective, the establishment of ICAC was essential for holding the
police accountable but also for enhancing institutional capacity in maintaining political
order. The high degree of institutional continuity and integrity is one of the hallmarks of
the Hong Kong ICAC (Hope 2015). Simultaneously, organizational reforms to the Hong
Kong Police Force occurred with legal and regulatory instruments developed to ensure
the proper ethical discharge of police duties which impose disciplinary measures on
officers guilty of offences contained in the regulation.

In one study in South Africa, a reduction of bribery in the South African Police Service
(SAPS) prompted research into the possible causes of such a reduction. Data showed
that perceptions of corruption in the police had fallen in the Limpopo province between
2011 and 2015, suggesting that a wider shift had taken place in police-community
relationships in the province. In 2011, according to Afro barometer, more than half of
those surveyed in Limpopo said that “most or all police are corrupt”; in 2015 that figure
had nearly halved (28 per cent). The study found that police-related bribery reduction in
Limpopo occurred at the same time that the national government led an unprecedented
high-level anti-corruption intervention in several provinces (Peiffer et al. 2018).

According to Alexis Romero, (2013) the Philippine National Police (PNP) is the most
corrupt institution in the country, according to the latest Global Corruption Barometer of
the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International.

Also, Cecil Morella and Agence France-Presse, (2017) found out that the police force is
widely regarded as one of the Philippines' most corrupt institutions, a reputation reinforced
by accusations three officers were involved in abducting and killing a South Korean
businessman. (Cecil Morella and Agence France-Presse, 2017).

Furthermore, Canindo, (2017) stated that cops are among the most noticeable of public
servants, and daily exposure to corrupt, inefficient, or badly managed police officials is a
cancer upon the body politic. Failure to pursue reforms such a course will further enfeeble
the PNP, hamper the improvement of rule of law, lead to greater crime and corruption,
lessen the peace and order needed for faster economic growth, and undermine public
safety and internal security in the face of existing terrorist activities and insurgencies.
While the PNPA in principle provides equipment and uniforms to officer recruits, much of
the equipment needed for training is reportedly either non-existent or of poor quality
(handguns in particular). Recruits from both institutions often must take out loans or buy
what they need on installment plans from individuals and businesses connected to PPSC
or PNPA staff. Many newly minted officers graduate from the PPSC and PNPA heavily in
debt and unprepared to face the dangers of their new assignments. PNPA cadets are
also sometimes expected to perform personal errands for their instructors during class
time in exchange for passing grades.
Finally, according to Satur C. Ocampo, (2018) “The most approximate reason of
corruption right now in the PNP is the entrenched culture of ‘keeping up with the Joneses.’
This PNP culture is but a microcosm of the whole state of government in general and a
reflection of the Filipino people at large…”
“This culture permeates the organization from top to bottom, thus corruption happens as
is, where is,” he adds quoting a general who said, “I did not invent corruption, I walked
into it.” “(It) existed and flourished because of the monolithic leadership that suppressed
potential whistle blowers and pressured many others to ‘go with the flow’.”
These previous studies we had gathered will help us in pursuing our study to find out the
causes and effects of police graft and corruption in Bacolod City and how can we
contribute in looking for solutions and recommendations for the specific problem.