[88] INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL v.
DE VERA AND ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 205703 | March 07, 2016 | Mendoza, J.
SUMMARY: Respondent was hired by petitioner as a Safety Officer in its project site in
Madagascar for a 19-month period. Three months in, he was dismissed due to diminishing
workload of his area of expertise and unavailability of alternative assignments. The Court ruled
he was invalidly dismissed. Canadian law cannot be applied in the employment contract as an
exception. There was also no valid cause for dismissal proven.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment
contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State
shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas.
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract,
provided:
● That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific
foreign law shall govern;
● That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the
Philippine rules on evidence;
● That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines;
and
● That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.
FACTS:
● SNC-Lavalin offered Arriola the position of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site
in Madagascar with a rate of CA$32.00 per hour for 40 hours a week with overtime pay
in excess of 40 hours, for a period of 19 months from June 9, 2008 to December 31,
2009.
● Arriola was hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, and his
overseas employment contract was processed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). In a letter of understanding, SNC-Lavalin confirmed
Arriola's assignment in the project.
○ Arriola says he signed the contract of employment in the Philippines. On
June 9, 2008, Arriola started working in Madagascar.
● After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment from
SNC-Lavalin, due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the
unavailability of alternative assignments. On September 15, 2009, Arriola was
repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to
CA$2,636.80.
● Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the LA.
○ SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month
unexpired portion of his contract (P1,062,936.00).
○ SNC-Lavalin never offered any valid reason for his early termination and he
was not given sufficient notice regarding the same.
○ The petitioners must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same
could be applied to his employment contract.
Employer's Position
○ The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them.
○ SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the global financial crises. The
economy of Madagascar also slowed down.
■ SNC-Lavalin presented a copy of a news item in the Financial
Post, dated March 5, 2009, showing the decline of the value of its
stocks. It had no choice but to minimize its expenditures and
operational expenses and re-organized its Health and Safety
Department at the Ambatovy Project site and Arriola was one of
those affected.
○ The petitioners invoked EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. NLRC:
particular labor laws of a foreign country incorporated in a contract freely
entered into between an OFW and a foreign employer through the latter's
agent was valid. As all of Arriola's employment documents were processed
in Canada, and SNC-Lavalin's office was in Ontario, the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was applicable. Thus, Canadian laws governed the contract.
○ The pre-termination of Arriola's contract was valid for being consistent with
the provisions of both the Expatriate Policy and laws of Canada. The law did
not require any ground for early termination of employment, but only the
written notice of termination. Even assuming that PH laws should apply,
Arriola would still be validly dismissed because domestic law recognized
retrenchment and redundancy as legal grounds for termination.
○ The petitioners presented a copy of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) of
Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and
certified by the Philippine Embassy.
● LA dismissed Arriola's complaint for lack of merit. The rights and obligations among
and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal
were governed by the employment contract pursuant to the EDI-Staffbuilders case.
Given that SNC-Lavalin was able to produce the duly authenticated ESA, the LA opined
that there was no other conclusion but to uphold the validity of Arriola's dismissal based
on Canadian law.
● NLRC: reversed the LA decision; Arriola was illegally dismissed by the petitioners.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoyed the protective mantle
of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. Thus, the Labor Code of the Philippines and RA 8042, or the Migrant
Workers Act, as amended, should be applied. Moreover, the overseas employment
contract was processed in the POEA.
○ There was no substantial evidence presented by the petitioners to show any
just or authorized cause to terminate Arriola. The ground of financial losses
by SNC-Lavalin was not supported by sufficient and credible evidence.
● CA: affirmed that Arriola was illegally dismissed. Even though an authenticated copy of
the ESA was submitted, it did not mean that the said foreign law automatically applied
in this case. Although parties were free to establish stipulations in their contracts, the
same must remain consistent with law, morals, good custom, public order or public
policy.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
W/N respondent arriola was validly dismissed pursuant to the employment contract. — NO.
● R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was enacted to institute the policies on
overseas employment and to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion
of the welfare of migrant workers. Although it acknowledged claims arising out of law
or contract involving Filipino workers, it does not categorically provide that foreign laws
are absolutely and automatically applicable in overseas employment contracts.
● In Pakistan International: “A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected,
as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party
autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306,
of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they
may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy."
○ Thus, counterbalancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is
the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially
provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed
written into the contract. Parties may not contract away applicable
provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and
employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate
themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other.
● The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts.
This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State
shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas.
○ As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the
employment contract. Requisites:
■ That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment
contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;
■ That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts
pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence;
■ That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment
contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
■ That the overseas employment contract must be processed
through the POEA.
○ If the first requisite is absent, then the domestic labor laws shall apply in
accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus.
○ If the second requisite is lacking, “the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours.”
○ If the third requisite is not met, then Philippine laws govern. This finds legal
bases in the Civil Code, specifically: (1) Article 17, which provides that laws
which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws of a foreign country; and (2) Article
1306, which states that the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions in a
contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
○ If the fourth requisite is missing, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is
violated. Article 18 provides that no employer may hire a Filipino worker for
overseas employment except through the boards and entities authorized by
the Secretary of Labor. In relation thereto, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as
amended, declares that the State shall only allow the deployment of overseas
Filipino workers in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are
protected.
○ Lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the application of the
foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment
contract.
● Petitioners were able to observe the second requisite, or that the foreign law must be
proven before the court by presenting the ESA, duly authenticated by the Canadian
authorities and certified by the Philippine Embassy, before the LA. The fourth requisite
was also followed because Arriola's employment contract was processed through the
POEA. HOWEVER, those were the only requisites that they complied with. Even though
an authenticated copy of the ESA was submitted, it did not mean that said foreign law
could be automatically.
● The foreign law was not expressly specified in the employment contract
○ In its pleadings, the petitioners did not directly cite any specific provision or
stipulation in the said labor contract which indicated the applicability of the
Canadian labor laws or the ESA.
○ They failed to show on the face of the contract that a foreign law was agreed
upon by the parties. Rather, they simply asserted that the terms and
conditions of Arriola's employment were embodied in the Expatriate Policy,
Ambatovy Project - Site, Long Term. Then, they emphasized provision 8.20
therein, regarding interpretation of the contract, which provides that said
policy would be governed and construed with the laws of the country where
the applicable SNC-Lavalin, Inc. office was located.
○ The overseas labor contract was executed by Arriola at his residence in
Batangas and it was processed at the POEA. Since no foreign law was
specified in the contract and the same was executed in the Philippines, the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern.
● The foreign law invoked is contrary to the Constitution and the Labor Code
○ Granting arguendo that the labor contract expressly stipulated the
applicability of Canadian law, still, Arriola's employment cannot be governed
by such foreign law because the third requisite is not satisfied. Some of the
ESA provisions are contrary to the Constitution and the labor laws of the
Philippines.
■ ESA does not require any ground for the early termination of
employment. Article 54 thereof only provides that no employer
should terminate the employment of an employee unless a written
notice had been given in advance.
■ The ESA allows the employer to dispense with the prior notice of
termination to an employee. Article 65(4) indicated that the
employer could terminate the employment without notice by
simply paying the employee a severance pay.
○ The provisions of the ESA are patently inconsistent with the right to security
of tenure. They also deprive the employee of his constitutional right to due
process by denying him of any notice of termination and the opportunity to
be heard.
● No authorized cause for dismissal was proven
 ○ Article 279 of our Labor Code has construed security of tenure to mean that
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by law.
○ Some of the authorized causes to terminate employment would be
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses and the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking. Petitioners assert that the economy of Madagascar weakened
due to the global financial crisis. Consequently, SNC-Lavalin's business also
slowed down. To prove its sagging financial standing, SNC-Lavalin presented
a copy of a news item in the Financial Post, dated March 5, 2009. They insist
that SNC-Lavalin had no choice but to minimize its expenditures and
operational expenses. The government of Madagascar prioritized the
employment of its citizens, and not foreigners. Thus, Arriola was terminated
because there was no more job available for him.
● The Court finds that Arriola was not validly dismissed. The petitioners simply argued
that they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be dismissed. It was
not even clear what specific authorized cause, whether retrenchment or redundancy,
was used to justify Arriola's dismissal. Petitioners did not even present a single credible
evidence to support their claim of financial loss. They simply offered an unreliable news
article.

1. Granting that there was illegal dismissal in the case at bar, w/n the six-week
on, two-week off schedule should be used in the computation of any
monetary award. YES.
2. Granting that there was illegal dismissal, w/n the amount being claimed by
respondents had already been satisfied, or at the very least, whether or not
the amount of ca$2,636.80 should be deducted from the monetary award.
● As to the amount of backpay awarded, the Court finds that the computation of the CA
was valid and proper. The issue of whether the petitioners had made partial payments
on the backpay is a matter best addressed during the execution process.

RULING: The petition is DENIED. The January 24, 2013 Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in toto.
[89] HON. STO. TOMAS v. SALAC
GR NO. 152642; GR NO. 152710; GR NO 167590; GR NOS 182978-79;
GR NOS 184298-99 | November 13, 2012 | Abad, J.
PROVISIONS:
● XXX, Art. XXX. kdjhskfhlk
SUMMARY: Consolidated cases on constitutionality of provisions of RA 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), enacted on June 7, 1995.
1) G.R. 152642, 152710: SC DISMISSES petitions for having become moot and
academic; 2) G.R. 167590: SC SETS ASIDE Decision of RTC Manila (Dec 8, 2004)
and DECLARES RA 8042’s Sections 6, 7, and 9 valid and constitutional; 3) G.R.
182978-79, G.R. 184298-99, G.R. 167590: SC HOLDS last sentence of Section
10(2) of RA 8042 valid and constitutional → but SC RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE
the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held
intervenors Gumabay, Taguiam, Bonifacio, and De Guzman jointly and solidarily
liable with respondent Becmen to spouses Cuaresma for lack of finding in those
cases that they had part in act/omission imputed to their corporation.
DOCTRINE: On April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo signed into law RA 9422
which expressly repealed Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 8042 and adopted the policy of close government
regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs.
FACTS:
G.R. 152642, G.R. 152710 (Constitutionality of Sections 29, 30)
● Sections 29 and 30 commanded DOLE to begin deregulating within 1yr of its passage
the business of handling recruitment and migration of OFWs and phase out within 5yrs
the regulatory functions of POEA.
● Jan 8, 2002: respondents Salac, Espiritu, Montenegro, Belonio, Salinel, and Bonnevie
(Salac, et al.) filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
TRO and preliminary injunction against petitioners, DOLE Sec, POEA Administrator, and
TESDA Secretary-General before the QC RTC, Branch 96.
● Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE DO 10 and POEA MC 15; 2) prohibit DOLE, POEA,
and TESDA from implementing same and from further issuing rules and regulations that
would regulate recruitment and placement of OFWs; and 3) enjoin them to comply with
policy of deregulation under RA 8042’s Sections 29 and 30
● March 20, 2002: QC RTC GRANTED THE PETITION: 1) ordered government agencies
mentioned to deregulate recruitment and placement of OFWs; 2) annulled DOLE DO 10,
POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars and issuances inconsistent with
deregulation under R.A. 8042.
● Government officials concerned filed present petition in G.R. 152642, seeking to annul
RTC’s decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition.
● April 17, 2002: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
intervened in case before SC, claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002
Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed deployment abroad
of OFWs and performing artists. → Confederated Association of Licensed
Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for same
purpose.
● May 23, 2002: SC issued TRO, enjoining QC RTC Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
● Parallel case, Feb 12, 2002: respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter,
Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for TRO and preliminary injunction against DOLE Secretary, POEA
Administrator, and TESDA Director-General, before QC RTC Branch 220, to enjoin
● latter from implementing 2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist from issuing other orders,
● circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs in
violation of deregulation in RA 8042’s Sections 29 and 30.
● March 12, 2002: QC RTC GRANTED THE PETITION, enjoining government
agencies involved from exercising regulatory functions over
recruitment and placement of OFWs → DOLE Secretary, POEA
Administrator, and TESDA Director-General filed present action in
G.R. 152710 → SC issued (May 23, 2002) TRO enjoining QC RTC Branch
220 from enforcing decision.
G.R. 167590 (Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, 9 of R.A. 8042)
● Aug 21, 1995: respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI) filed petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
before Manila RTC → to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for
being unconstitutional.
● Sec 6: defines “illegal recruitment”, enumerates acts constituting it.
● Sec 7: provides penalties for prohibited acts.
● Sec 9: allowed filing of criminal actions arising from “illegal recruitment” before RTC of
province or city where the offense was committed or where offended party actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
● Manila RTC: SEC 6 UNCONSTITUTIONAL → its definition of “illegal
recruitment” is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters and for that reason gives undue advantage to
the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal
protection of those that operate with government licenses or
authorities.
● Manila RTC: SEC 7 UNCONSTITUTIONAL → its sweeping application of the
penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the
act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such
violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere failure to
render a report under Section 6(h) or obstructing inspection by Labor
Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for 6yrs,
1 day and minimum fine of P200K but which could unreasonably go even
as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least 3 persons.
 ● Manila RTC: SEC 9 UNCONSTITUTIONAL → allowing offended parties to
file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the
general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the
crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said
the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of
criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended parties
violates their right to due process.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79, G.R. 184298-99 (Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of
2nd paragraph)
● Respondent spouses Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed claim for death and insurance
benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen and White Falcon for the death of
their daughter Jasmin while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
● LA: DISMISSED CLAIM → 1) Cuaresmas had already received insurance
benefits arising from their daughter’s death from OWWA; 2) credence
to findings of Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed
suicide.
● NLRC: FOUND BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR
JASMIN’S DEATH → ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas US$113,000.00
(actual damages) → NLRC relied on Cabanatuan City Health Office’s
autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.
● CA: BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THEIR
SAUDI ARABIAN EMPLOYER for actual damages → Becmen having a right of
reimbursement from White Falcon
● SC: Jasmin’s death not work-related or work-connected since her rape
and death did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing
acts incidental to her employment. → 1) deleted award of actual
damages; 2) Becmen’s corporate directors and officers are solidarily
liable with their company for its failure to investigate true nature
of her death; 3) Becmen and White Falcon abandoned their legal, moral,
and social duty to assist Cuaresmas in obtaining justice for their
daughter; 4) held
● foreign employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and latter’s corporate
directors and officers jointly and severally liable to Cuaresmas for: a) P2.5M (moral
damages); b) P2.5M (exemplary damages); c) attorney’s fees of 10% of total monetary
award; and d) cost of suit.
● Corporate directors and officers of Becmen → Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira
Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) →
filed motion for leave to Intervene → questioned constitutionality of
last sentence of 2nd paragraph of Sec 10, R.A. 8042 which holds
corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily
liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against their
employers and the recruitment firms → Court allowed intervention,
admitted Gumabay, et al.’s motion for reconsideration
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] WON Sections 29, 30 of RA 8042 are constitutional -- G.R. 152642, G.R. 152710:
Petition dismissed → moot, academic
● Dec 4, 2008: on April 10, 2007 former Pres Arroyo signed R.A. 9422 →
expressly repealed RA 8042’s Sections 29 and 30, adopted policy of
close government regulation of recruitment and deployment of OFWs.
● Aug 20, 2009: respondents Salac, et al. told SC in G.R. 152642 that they agree with
Republic’s view that repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders issues they
raised by their action moot and academic
[2] WON Sections 6, 7, 9 of R.A. 8042 are constitutional -- G.R. 167590: SECS 6, 7, 9 valid and
constitutional
● ON SEC 6: “illegal recruitment” is clear and unambiguous → actually
distinguishes between licensed and nonlicensed recruiters → persons
who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” w/o appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment w/n they commit
wrongful acts enumerated in that section → recruiters who engage in
the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment
only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Sec 6.
● ON SE 7: in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts
under Sec 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what
individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State
policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the
same penalties → not within SC’s power to question wisdom of this
kind of choice → legislative policy has been further stressed with
enactment of R.A. 10022 → increased even more duration of penalties
of imprisonment and amounts of fine for commission of acts listed
under Sec 7 → law considered that OFWs must work outside the country’s
borders and beyond its immediate protection → law must make effort to
protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction
who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear
assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs
fairly and humanely.
o People v. Ventura: State under its police power “may prescribe
such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure the general welfare of the people, to protect
them against the consequence of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.” → Police power
 is State’s inherent and plenary power; enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.”
● ON SEC 9: nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue
for violations of Sec 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from venue established by Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
○ Section 15(a), Rule 110 allows exceptions provided by laws.
○ Sec 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is
consistent with that law’s declared policy of providing a criminal justice
system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal
recruitment.

[3] WON the last sentence of Section 10(2) is constitutional -- G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79, G.R.
184298-99: last sentence of Sec 10(2), RA 8042 is valid and constitutional
● But SC RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79
and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Gumabay Taguiam, Bonifacio, and De Guzman
jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen to spouses Cuaresma for lack of
finding in those cases that they had part in act/omission imputed to their corporation.
● 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 holds corporate directors, officers, and partners
of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims
and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
● G.R. 167590 (PASEI case), QC RTC held as unconstitutional last sentence of 2nd
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042.
o Absent sufficient proof that corporate officers and directors of erring
company had knowledge of and allowed illegal recruitment, making them
automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.
● But SC has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that liability of corporate
directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with
their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of
that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
● Becmen and White Falcon: while there is evidence that these companies were at fault
in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no mention of any evidence
in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers
and directors, were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or
omissions in Jasmin’s cas

RULING:
1. G.R. 152642, 152710: SC DISMISSES petitions for having become moot and academic;
2. G.R. 167590: SC SETS ASIDE Decision of RTC Manila (Dec 8, 2004) and DECLARES RA
8042’s Sections 6, 7, and 9 valid and constitutional;
3. G.R. 182978-79, G.R. 184298-99, G.R. 167590: SC HOLDS last sentence
of Section 10(2) of RA 8042 valid and constitutional → but SC
RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-
79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Gumabay, Taguiam,
Bonifacio, and De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent
Becmen to spouses Cuaresma for lack of finding in those cases that
they had part in act/omission imputed to their corporation.
[90] HORNALES v. NLRC
G.R. No. 118943 | September 10, 2001 | J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
PROVISIONS:
● POEA Rules and Regulations, Rule II, Book II. Section 1 - Requirements for Issuance of
License. Every applicant for license to operate a private employment agency or manning
agency shall submit a written application together with the following requirements:
f) a verified undertaking stating that the applicant:
3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract,
including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability
compensation and repatriation
SUMMARY: Hornales worked as a fisherman aboard a vessel owned by Taiwanese company Min
Fee Fishery Co. Ltd from Oct. 1991-Jul. 1992. He escaped from the vessel due to abusive working
conditions. He received no pay. Upon return to the Philippines, Hornales filed a case with POEA to
recover the unpaid salaries from private respondents Cayanan and JEAC who he alleged were
responsible for his recruitment and placement. This was denied entirely by them. POEA ruled in
favor of Hornales, but the NLRC would overturn this decision due to there being no employer-
employee relationship. The Supreme Court found the NLRC to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion and reinstated the POEA decision finding that the findings of POEA in favor of Hornales
were more convincing and supported by substantial evidence. Cayanan and JEAC were made to
pay the unpaid salaries of USD16,466.66 less P16,000 worth of obligations owed by Hornales to
Cayanan. Held solidarily liable was Travelers' Insurance Corp., JEAC's surety.
DOCTRINE: One could not use his/her non-compliance to the requirements set by POEA as a
defense. The Court said that in another proceeding that may be a ground for a suspension or
cancellation of their license.
Solidary liability of the surety was maintained from the POEA ruling. Cash and surety
bonds are required by POEA from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means
of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants
or workers claims.
FACTS:
● Hornales travelled to Singapore along with other Filipinos, having been sent by Cayanan
and JEAC. They were met by one Victor Lim, owner of Step-Up Employment Agency.
From there, they would join the crew of Ruey Horn #3 – a vessel owned by Min Fee
Fishery – and work as fishermen with a supposed wage of USD200 per month.
● However, inhumane work conditions met them including inadequate supply of food and
water, maltreatment by the ship captain, lack of medical attendance, and twenty-two
hour work days with no pay. Due to this, Hornales and other Filipino workers left the
vessel while it was docked in the Mauritius Islands on July 15, 1992.
● Once he had returned home Hornales demanded payment of his salaries from private
respondents. They did not pay him his unpaid wages. Instead they took his passport
and promised another job. They would pay him 500 pesos.
● Hornales filed a complaint with POEA to recover his unpaid salaries.
● Claims and evidence presented: 1) Cayanan and JEAC would claim that Hornales, Victor
Lim, and Min Fee Fishery were total strangers to them. The evidence they presented
was a joint affidavit from 2 of Hornales' coworkers which stated that they had heard
from Hornales that he had come to Singapore as a tourist and acquired work upon his
arrival. Also presented was a Certification of the affidavit from Step-Up Agency. 2) The
evidence presented by Hornales to prove his story were photocopies of PNB checks
issued by Cayanan to his and co-workers' relatives as well as agreements he and co-
workers entered into that authorized deductions from their salaries that were made in
order to pay loans to Cayanan.
● POEA ruled in favor of Hornales. NLRC overturned the ruling saying that there was no
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents. They also
concluded that JEAC obtained for Hornales a tourist passport and plane ticket in a fly
now pay later arrangement only as a travel agency. They said Hornales' evidence was
hearsay as his name did not appear in the employment agreements and checks
presented.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
Whether or not the private respondents are responsible for petitioner’s recruitment and
deployment to Singapore -- YES, Cayanan and JEAC are responsible.
● The evidence presented by Hornales debunked the total strangers theory advanced by
Cayanan and JEAC. It is clear due to the agreements made that there was some prior
arrangement between Victor Lim and JEAC/Cayanan. Besides which the checks presented
were drawn from a joint account of a Lim Chang Khoo and/or Jose Cayanan. o NLRC ruling
that JEAC was a travel agency is not supported even by private respondents' claims, as they
are a licensed recruitment agency and service contractor. (Though not authorized to deploy
fishermen, hence why Hornales was made to travel as a tourist.)
• The contention that the documentary evidence were mere photocopies and thus not the best
evidence was set aside by the Court saying there are exceptions to the best evidence rule.
Namely, when the original has been lost or destroyed, it cannot be produced in court without
bad faith on the part of the offeror or when the original is in the custody or under the control
of the party against whom the evidence is offered and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. The original checks had to be in the possession of the bank in order to be
encashed and the originals of the agreements were likely with Cayanan, in whose favor they
were executed. The PNC checks were not disowned by Cayanan nor did he deny the
existence of the agreements.
• For respondents' evidence: the joint affidavit was not given probative weight due to the
affiants not being available for cross-examination by the petitioner, making their statements
hearsay. They also only attested to what was said by petitioner, but not to the truth of his
statements. The certification from Step-Up Agency was likewise disregarded due to Victor
Lim not being available for cross-examination and because said certification was not verified
or made under oath.
• Another defense raised by JEAC was that there was no employment contract between
Hornales and Step-Up Agency had been approved by POEA. Further, JEAC had no Special
Power of Attorney nor Affidavit of Responsibility – both requirements for agency deploying
overseas Filipino worker. The Court found that they could not use their non-compliance to
these requirements as a defense and said that in another proceeding that may be a ground
for a suspension or cancellation of their license.
• Solidary liability of the surety was maintained from the POEA ruling. Cash and surety bonds
are required by POEA from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of
ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for
applicants or workers claims.
RULING: The petition is hereby GRANTED and the respondent NLRCs a) Decision dated uly 28,
1994, and b) Resolution dated October 6, 1994 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of POEA
Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson in POEA Case No. L 9207939 is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that the sum of P16,000.00 be deducted from the total amount to be awarded to
petitioner.
[91] AVELINA F. SAGUN v.. SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
G. R. No. 179242 | February 23, 2011 | Nachura, J.
PROVISIONS:
● LABOR CODE, Art. 32. Fees to be Paid by Workers. — Any person applying with a private
fee charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any
fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the appropriate receipt clearly
showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees.
● LABOR CODE, Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. — It shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor; or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received
by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment.
SUMMARY: Sagun filed a complaint for violation of Arts. 32 & 34(a)(b), LC before the POEA
against Sunace, alleging that she applied for the position of caretaker in Taiwan but she instead
worked as a domestic helper and in a poultry farm. Respondent denied this and said that it did not
furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or
employment as it was duly received, passed upon, and approved by the POEA. The POEA
Administrator dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Sec. partially granted the
motion. The OP affirmed the order but the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The SC affirmed
the decision and held that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the
respondent is liable for collection of excess placement fees.
DOCTRINE: Mere general allegations of payment of excessive placement fees cannot be given
merit as the charge of illegal exaction is considered a grave offense which could cause the
suspension or cancellation of the agency's license. They should be proven and substantiated by
clear, credible, and competent evidence.
FACTS:
● Complaint for violation of Art. 32 & Art. 34(a)(b), LC filed by Sagun against Sunace
International Management Services, Inc. and the latter's surety, Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation, before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
● Petitioner claimed that in Aug. 1998, she applied with respondent for the position of
caretaker in Taiwan.
○ In consideration of her placement and employment, petitioner allegedly paid
P30K cash, P10K in the form of a promissory note, and NT$60K through
salary deduction, in violation of the prohibition on excessive placement fees
○ Respondent promised to employ her as caretaker but, at the job site, she
worked as a domestic helper and in a poultry farm.
● Respondent denied:
o Only collected P20,840.00, the amount authorized by the POEA and for which
the corresponding official receipt was issued
o It did not furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in
relation to recruitment or employment as it was duly received, passed upon,
and approved by the POEA
● Dec. 27, 2001: POEA Administrator Dimapilis-Baldoz dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit
o Petitioner failed to establish facts showing a violation of Art. 32, since it was
proven that the amount received by respondent as placement fee was
covered by an
official receipt
o Or Art. 34(a) as it was not shown that respondent charged excessive fees;
o Or Art.34(b) because respondent processed petitioner's papers as caretaker,
the position she applied and was hired for
● Petitioner filed a MR with the Office of the Labor Sec. The motion was treated as a
Petition for Review which was partially granted the motion.
● The Office of the President (OP) affirmed the order, and emphasized the State's policy
on the full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized
o That it is impossible for respondent to have extended a loan to petitioner
since it was not in the business of lending money
o That it is immaterial that no evidence was presented to show the
overcharging since the issuance of a receipt could not be expected
● CA ruled in favor of respondent because their conclusions were based not on evidence
but on speculation, conjecture, possibilities, and probabilities
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] Whether the CA erred in granting the respondent's petition for review reversing the decision
and order [of the] OP – NO
● Respondent was originally charged with violation of Article 32 and Article 34(a) (b) of
the Labor Code, as amended
● The POEA, Labor Sec., the OP, and the CA already absolved respondent of liability under
Arts. 32 and 34 (b). As no appeal was interposed by petitioner when the Secretary of
Labor freed respondent of said liabilities
[2] Whether respondent is liable for collection of excess placement fee defined in Art. 34(a), LC –
NO
● The SC looked into the records of the case and weigh anew the evidence presented by
the parties because of the conflicting decisions of the lower courts.
● In proceedings before admin. and quasi-judicial agencies, the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, or that level of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
● The pieces of evidence the petitioner presented was not substantial to show that
respondent collected from her more than the allowable placement fee.
● To show the amount it collected as placement fee from petitioner, respondent presented
an acknowledgment receipt showing that petitioner paid and respondent received
P20,840.00. This notwithstanding, petitioner claimed that she paid more than this
amount
o presented a photocopy of a promissory note she executed, and testified on the
purported deductions made by her foreign employer.
o In the promissory note, petitioner promised to pay respondent the amount of
P10K that she borrowed for only two weeks.
 o Petitioner also explained that her foreign employer deducted from her salary a
total amount of NT$60K.
o She claimed that the P10K covered by the promissory note was never obtained
as a loan but as part of the placement fee collected by respondent.
o She alleged that the salary deductions made by her foreign employer still
formed part of the placement fee collected by respondent
● The SC gave more credence to respondent's evidence, that is, the acknowledgment
receipt showing the amount paid by petitioner and received by respondent
● A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been
delivered. Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, an exhaustive review of the
records of this case fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough
to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in respondent's receipt as to the amount it
actually received from petitioner
● Having failed to adduce sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the contents
of the receipt issued by respondent
o subject receipt remains as the primary or best evidence
● The promissory note presented by petitioner cannot be considered as adequate
evidence
o A promissory note is a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal
commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by
the borrower and the lender.
o A person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate
obligation duly assumed by him through the signature he axes thereto as a
token of his good faith.
● The fact that respondent is not a lending company does not preclude it from extending
a loan to petitioner for her personal use.
● As for the deductions purportedly made by petitioner's foreign employer, the SC
reiterated the CA’s findings that "there is no single piece of document or receipt
showing that deductions have in fact been made, nor is there any proof that these
deductions from the salary formed part of the subject placement fee
● The factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the POEA, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is conned to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
● While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and to the protection
of the working class, it should not be presumed that every dispute will automatically be
decided in favor of labor
● Mere general allegations of payment of excessive placement fees cannot be given merit
as the charge of illegal exaction is considered a grave offense which could cause the
suspension or cancellation of the agency's license. They should be proven and
substantiated by clear, credible, and competent evidence

RULING: PETITION DENIED

[92] PEOPLE v.. TABERNA
GR 239140 | March 6, 2019 | Resolution by 2nd Division of SC
PROVISIONS:
● LABOR CODE, Art. 13. Definitions – “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged.
● LABOR CODE, Art. 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:
a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received
by him as a loan or advance;
b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment;
c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any
act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority
under this Code.
d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his
employment in order to offer him to another unless the transfer is designed
to liberate the worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
e) To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any
worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to
public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by
his duly authorized representatives;
h) To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures
and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of
Labor.
i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of
the Secretary of Labor;
j) To become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in
travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a
travel agency; and
k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before
departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those
authorized under this Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
● LABOR CODE, Art. 39. Illegal recruitment.
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39
of this Code. The Department of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
c) Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
d) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Secretary
shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment
activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so.
SUMMARY: Without a license from POEA, TABERNA promised to 4 complainants a job in the US
after a payment of placement fee. He reneged on the promise and failed to deploy the
complainants despite the payments. When asked for a refund by the complainants, Taberna
refused to refund placement fees. From the foregoing facts, in this resolution, the Court affirmed
the decisions of the RTC and CA finding Dennis Taberna guilty of illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale.
DOCTRINE: Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is committed by a person who:
(a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code;
(b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers;
(c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
FACTS:
● This is a resolution that the Court - Second Division issued after a careful review of the
records of the case of People v. Dennis Taberna.
● Taberna promised to 4 complainants jobs abroad, particularly in the United States.
● He impressed upon them that upon payment of the placement fee, they would be
deployed for work overseas; but reneged on his promise and failed to deploy private
complainants for work overseas despite payment of the fees.
○ Worse, accused-appellant also failed to refund their monies despite
promising to return them
● RTC and CA: prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
○ It is undisputed that accused-appellant does not have the license or authority
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit
 and deploy workers abroad; and despite not having any authority from POEA,
he committed acts of recruitment against at least three (3) persons.
● Taberna appealed the CA decision. Hence, this resolution by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE w/ HOLDING & RATIO:

W/N Taberna is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale - YES
● The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that the facts sufficiently support the conclusion
that accused-appellant is indeed guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale.
● Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is committed by a person who:
○ Undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor
Code;
○ Does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers;
○ Commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
● In People v. Bayker, the Court has ruled that "[e]ven the mere employee of a company
or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment could be held liable, along with the
employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had actively
and consciously participated in illegal recruitment x x x because recruitment and
placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."
● IN THE CASE AT BAR: Accused-appellant's insistence that he had very limited
participation in the recruitment of complainants and did not benefit from the fees paid
by them is belied by the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses (No. 2 in the Facts of this digest).
○ As regards the penalty, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 in accordance with Section 7 (b)
7 in relation to Section 6 (m) 8 of Republic Act No. 8042.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of facts of the trial court is affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The appeal is DISMISSED.
[93] PEOPLE v. AMIGO AND CAYABYAB ○ In Heirs of Spouses Liwagon and Dumalagan v. Heirs of Spouses Liwagon and
G.R. No. 227357 | February 7, 2018 | Third Division Liwagon, this Court emphasized that: The Court defers and accords finality to
the factual findings of trial courts especially when such findings are
PROVISIONS: undisturbed by the appellate court, as in the case at bar.
● XXX, Art. XXX. kdjhskfhlk ○ This factual determination deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed
on appeal, save for the most compelling reasons, such as when that
SUMMARY: Petitioner was found guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment by the TC and affirmed determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse of
by the CA and the SC. discretion has been committed.
● It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for illegal
DOCTRINE: It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of
recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised the Revised Penal Code.
Penal Code. ○ RA 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas employment Act of 1995," established a higher standard of protection and promotion of
and increased the penalties, especially for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal the welfare of the migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in
Recruitment committed by a Syndicate, which are considered offenses involving economic distress.
sabotage. ○ RA 8042 also broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas
employment and increased the penalties, especially for Illegal Recruitment in
FACTS: Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment committed by a Syndicate, which are
● (There are actually no facts besides the ruling of the RTC and CA) considered offenses involving economic sabotage.
● February 12, 2013: RTC rendered a Decision binding Cayabyab guilty beyond ● Section 6 of RA 8042 provides for the definition of Illegal Recruitment, thus:
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment large scale and simple illegal SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
recruitment. (His co-accused Amigo remains at-large.) canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
○ He was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of Php 100,000 includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
(for Criminal Case No. 222-07); to suffer the contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, to pay a fine of Php 100,000 without known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs (for holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad for two or
Criminal Case No. 262-08). more
○ RTC also found Cayabyab guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of persons shall be deemed so engaged.
estafa on five counts and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 xxx xxx xxx
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
maximum, to indemnify complaining witness Gabriel Cabesas in the amount (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
of Php 20,000, and to pay the costs (for Criminal Case No. 289-07); and to committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to more persons individually or as a group.
20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify complaining ● Section 7 of the same law provides that those who shall be found guilty of illegal
witness Luzviminda Cabesas in the amount of Php 15,000, and to pay costs recruitment shall be meted the following penalties, to wit:
(for Criminal Case No. 291-07). SEC. 7. Penalties. — (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
○ Charges against Cayabyab in Criminal Case Nos. 290-07, 381-08, and 395- penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than
08 are dismissed for lack of interest to prosecution. twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
● CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, with modifications as to the nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
penalties imposed. (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
○ For illegal recruitment large scale: from Php 100,000 to Php 500,000 pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed
○ For simple illegal recruitment: from Php 100,000 to Php 500,000 if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
● SC agrees with the RTC and the CA that in this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO: that appellant was, indeed, engaged in large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal Case
W/N petitioner is guilty of illegal recruitment. — YES No. 222-07.
● SC: We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the CA on appellant's guilt, as well as the ○ As for Criminal Case No. 262-08, CA correctly modified the RTC's ruling,
penalty meted upon him for the illegal recruitment case. However, it is necessary to finding that Cayabyab only committed simple illegal recruitment since what
modify the penalties imposed in his conviction for Estafa.
 was proved during trial was its commission against two (2) complainants
only.
○ For the charges of Estafa, the prosecution must prove the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
■ RTC and the CA correctly found Cayabyab guilty as the prosecution
proved that Cayabyab deceived the private complainants into
believing that he had the authority and capability to send them
abroad for employment when in truth and in fact, he was not
licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
● His act of requiring them to submit certain documents
as requirements
for employment and even accompanying some of them
in completing their medical
examination led them to believe that his operations were
legitimate.
■ Because of his actions, they paid him the amounts of P20,000 for
Gabriel Cabesas and P15,000.00 for Luzviminda Cabesas, to cover
the supposed placement fees, among others.
■ Clearly, these acts constitute estafa punishable under Article 315
(2)(a) of RPC.
● However, while CA's modification of the penalty is not erroneous at the time of its
promulgation, the subsequent passage of RA 10951 which took effect on September
14, 2017 calls for its further modification applying Section 100 thereof which reads:
SECTION 100. Retroactive Effect. — This Act shall have retroactive effect to
the extent that it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence by final
judgment.
● Under RA 10951, particularly Section 85 thereof, the penalty to be imposed for the crime
of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) where the amount does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (P40,000), for which appellant was convicted, is arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
● As between the original penalty imposed under the RPC (prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, i.e., from 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day to 8 years) and the new penalty (arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, i.e. 2 months and 1 day to 6 months), the new period is markedly shorter than
the original.
● While it is true that the new penalty bars appellant form benefiting from the
Indeterminate Sentence Law since said law specifically removes from its operation
imprisonment with a maximum term that does not exceed one year, still, the new
penalty is more beneficial to the appellant, it being shorter than the original penalty even
after application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
● Clearly beneficial to the appellant, We apply RA 10951 pursuant to Sec. 100
thereof.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
[94] PEOPLE v. CAGALINGAN
G.R. No. 198664 | 23 November 2016 | Bersamin, J.
PROVISIONS:
● XXX, Art. XXX. kdjhskfhlk
SUMMARY: Spouses Cagalingan were charged with illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa.
They allegedly represented themselves to the complainants to have the capacity to hire and
transport Filipino workers for employment in Macau, China; that for a fee, they recruited and
promised employment/job placement to the complainants; that the accused spouses had not
secured or obtained the required license or authority from the government agency. The RTC found
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The CA and SC affirmed the
conviction
DOCTRINE: To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually
or as a group.
FACTS:
● Accused-appellants Owen and Beatriz (accused spouses) were charged with Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale before the Regional Trial Court (Cagayan de Oro City). The
complaint was initiated by private complainants: Reynalyn B. Cagalingan (Reynalyn),
Roselle Q. Cagalingan (Roselle), Laarni E. Sanchez (Laarni), Norma R. Cagalingan
(Norma); and Arcele J. Bacorro (Arcele).
● It was alleged that on October up to November, 2002, the accused spouses represented
themselves to have the capacity to hire and transport Filipino workers for employment
in Macau, China; that for a fee, they recruited and promised employment/job placement
to the complainants; that the accused spouses had not secured or obtained the required
license or authority from the government agency.
○ Hence, in violation of Section 6, in relation to Section 7(b) of RA 8042, the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
○ Accused-appellants were also accused of 3 counts of Estafa.
● On different dates and occasions, private complainants were recruited by accused
spouses to work in Macau for a fee.
● Arcele’s Testimony:
○ Private complainant Arcele met accused spouses on October 28, 2002 at
Norma’s house. Norma introduced Owen & Beatriz to her. She was told by
Owen that her wife was asked by her employer to hire office workers to work
at Mandarin Oriental Hotel. Owen explained to her the job and the
requirements including an amount of P40,000.00 for roundtrip tickets and
documentation fees. Arcele paid P20,000.00 to Owen.
○ On November 23, 2002, she paid in full and departure for Manila was
scheduled on November 29, 2002 at 3 o’clock. Unfortunately, accused
spouses failed to appear on the said date.
○ Hence, she decided to proceed to CDO airport and look for accused spouses
but the latter were not around. Instead, she met the other recruits at the
airport and they all realized that they were victims of illegal recruitment. She
and the other private complainants went home aggrieved and humiliated.
● Reynalyn’s Testimony:
○ Reynalyn was told that she could be assigned at the laundry section with a
salary rate equivalent to P18,000.00 per month. She was likewise required to
pay P40,000.00 for plane tickets and other documents.
● Laarni’s Testimony:
○ Laarni is an AB Journalism graduate, and took up computer informatics. She
was assured that she could work in Macau. offered as office secretary for a
two (2) years contract with a salary of P18,000.00 a month. She was required
to pay P40,000.00 she was able to raise only P11,500.00. Nonetheless,
Accused Spouses accepted the said amount on the agreement that the
balance would be deducted from her salary.
○ The flight to Manila was scheduled on November 29, 2002. She was told that
they would just meet at the airport. However, on the said date, she did not find
accused spouses at the airport and upon inquiry from the airline counter, she
was informed that their names were not on the plane manifest.
● Roselle’s Testimony:
○ Roselle was promised a monthly salary of P22,000.00. It was her first time to
meet them, yet, she trusted them because Owen was the first cousin of his
husband. Upon the request of accused spouses, a “despidida” party was held
at the house of private complainant Reynalyn, just beside the house of her
mother-in-law. The accused spouses left to attend another “despidida” party
and told them that they would just meet at the airport.
○ The spouses failed to appear, and they waited until 5 o’clock in the afternoon.
○ The family checked the bag of accused spouses which was left at the house
of her mother-in-law and to their surprise, the bag contained pillows only.
Hence, she reported the incident and upon verification with the POEA she
learned that Accused Spouses were not licensed recruiters.
● Leonardo’s testimony:
○ Leonardo issued certifications upon requests of private complainants
Reynalyn, Roselle, Arcele and Norma certifying that accused spouses were
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers and/or applicants for
employment abroad.
○ Accused spouses denied the charges against them. They argued that they
neither recruited nor promised the complainants any work in Macau as it was
very difficult to find work in Macau, unless they have relatives or siblings
working. Albeit they admitted to be in CDO sometime in August and
September 2002, they denied being in CDO sometime in October and
November 2002
○ They also argued that they did not offer any work nor required complainants
to submit any documents and pay any amount for possible work in Macau.
○ They likewise denied having received any money.
● Accused-Appellants’ Arguments
○ The accused-appellants insist that the complainants well knew that they were
not connected to any recruitment agency, or that they were not recruiters
themselves; that they did not represent themselves to the latter as having the
 capability to deploy workers overseas; that they did not commit any act of
fraudulent misrepresentations essential in the estafa for which they were
convicted; and that they simply assisted in processing the papers of the latter
to help them realize their desire to work abroad.
● RTC convicted the accused- appellants;
○ They found Owen and Beatriz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 6 of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as “Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995”.
○ They were also found guilty of the three Estafa charges. They were GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
○ The Court declined to award damages in estafa cases since they were
provided already in the case of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
● CA affirmed the convictions of the accused-appellants.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] WON the CA gravely erred in affirming the RTC decision finding the accused-appellants guilty
of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of the crimes charged - NO, CA did not err in affirming RTC decision finding the
accused-appellants GBYD of the crimes charged.
Re: ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
● To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:
(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
“recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same Code (now
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and
(c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.
● All 3 elements were established during trial.
○ First, it the accused spouses were not licensed or authorized to engage in
recruitment activities. This was substantiated by POEA’s Certifications and
as testified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the POEA who issued the same.
○ Second, private complainants testified and proved that indeed accused
spouses undertook acts constituting recruitment and placement as defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. They testified that they were induced,
offered and promised by accused spouses employment in Macau, China for
2 years for a fee. They paid accused spouses for documentation and
processing fees, yet, they were unable to go abroad.
○ Third, there are 5 complainants against whom accused spouses are alleged
to have recruited.
Re: ESTAFA
● There are 3 ways of committing estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code:
(1) by using a fictitious name;
(2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and
(3) by means of other similar deceits.
● Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. Likewise, it
is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes
the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with
the thing of value.
● With these misrepresentations, false assurances and deceit, they suffered
damages and they were forced to part with their hard-earned money:
○ Private complainants were led to believe by accused spouses that
they possessed the power and qualifications to provide them with
work in Macau when in fact they were neither licensed nor
authorized to do so.
○ Accused spouses made it appear to private complainants that
Beatriz was requested by her employer to hire workers for Macau,
when in fact she was not.
○ Private complainants were deceived by accused spouses by
pretending that the latter could arrange their employment in
Macau, China.
● Accused spouses’ defense was merely alibi and denial.
○ Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and it is not at all
persuasive.
○ Denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not outright
rejection. This dismissive judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue
of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to
make.
○ Accused spouses did not deny being in Cagayan de Oro City, albeit
they asserted to have arrived months earlier than the alleged date,
and they likewise did not deny having met private complainants on
different occasions as some of the private complainants were even
relatives of accused Owen.
○ Denial, to be worthy of consideration at all, should be substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence.
○ Accused-appellants offered only denial. Hence, the appeal of the
accused should also fail because it relied solely on negative and
self-serving negations.
[2] WON CA properly affirmed the imposition of the penalties for illegal recruitment in large scale
and the three counts of estafa - NO, CA did not properly affirm RTC’s imposititon of penalties.
Re: ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
● Under Section 7(b)15 of the Migrant Workers’ Act, the penalty for illegal recruitment in
large scale is life imprisonment and fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than
P1,000,000.00. Although Republic Act No. 10022, approved on March 8, 2010, has
since introduced an amendment to the Migrant Workers’ Act to raise the imposable fine
to not less than P2,000,000.00 nor more than P5,000,000.00, the amendment does not
apply herein because the illegal recruitment subject of this case was committed in
October and November, 2002, or long before the amendment took effect.
● Accordingly, SC held that the RTC and CA correctly imposed life imprisonment and fine
of P1,000,000.00.
Re: ESTAFA
● For the three counts of estafa , the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each
count of estafa is fixed within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which is prisión correccional in its minimum
period to prisión correccional in its medium period (i.e., 6 mos. and 1 day to 4 yrs. and
2 mos.).
● The RTC imposed the minimum of 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days of prision
correccional, thereby exceeding the legal range for the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence.
○ Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is reduced to four
years of prisión correccional considering the absence of any modifying
circumstance.
● As to the maximum term for each count of Estafa under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty is first determined, and the
incremental penalty of one year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 is then added, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
○ Based on the computation, the maximum period for prisión correccional
maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days
to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of
the court.
○ In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be
subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00.
Any fraction of a year is disregarded.
○ For the maximum term of the three counts of estafa, the RTC imposed nine
years.
● The SC noted that the RTC ordered the gravest imposable penalty within the range
(eight years of prisión mayor plus the one year incremental penalty). However, because
neither the RTC nor the CA found any modifying circumstance, the SC reduced the
maximum to 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days of prisión mayor and add the incremental
penalty of one year, or a total of 7 years, 8 months, and 21 days.

RULING: asd
[95] PEOPLE v. MARISSA BAYKER
G.R. No. 170192 | February 10, 2016 | Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: Accused Marissa Bayker was charged and convicted of illegal recruitment and
estafa for promising and recruiting complainants, Basilio T. Miparanum, Virgilio T. Caniazares
and Reynaldo E. Dahab, overseas job abroad but failing to send the complainants abroad and
despite demands to reimburse or return the amount of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00
which complainants paid as processing fees, accused did then and there refuse and fail to
reimburse or return to complainants the aforesaid amounts. The accused insisted on her
innocence arguing her limited participation in the unlicensed agency.
The Court ruled that the State was able to sufficiently prove her guilt and that the
contention of her limited participation was without basis. Being an employee of a company or
corporation engaged in illegal recruitment made her criminally liable. Furthermore, her conviction
in both cases of illegal recruitment and estafa did not amount to double jeopardy since the two
did not have the same elements.
DOCTRINES: Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment
could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was
shown that he had actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.
Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-
appellant for the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa considering that they were entirely
distinct from each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from
their elements being different.
FACTS:
● The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Makati two informations charging the accused-appellant and her two co-accused,
namely: Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo with illegal recruitment and estafa. Only
the accused-appellant and Langreo were arrested because Bermudez, who eluded
arrest, continues to remain at large. However, the trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant because of the lack of notification of subsequent proceedings to
Langreo.
Virgilio Caniazares
● He and Dahab had met the accused-appellant at the house of a friend in Makati City in
January 2001, and she had then represented herself to be recruiting workers for
overseas employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada;
● On January 27, 2001, he had gone to her residence in Pembo, Makati City to pay
P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then accompanied him to the
Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose
● On March 30, 2001, she had gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed
as a seaman instead but that he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the
P6,000.00 to her, for which she had issued a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had
called him about his deployment on April 21, 2001;
● On the promised date, he had gone to her office at GNB Marketing in Makati but no one
was around; that he had then proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that
his seaman’s application would not push through;
● The two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his certificates of
employment, and that it was there that she had introduced him to her manager, the
accused Bermudez, who promised his deployment in Hong Kong within two weeks;
● Because he had not been deployed as promised, he had gone to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), where he had learned that the accused, Bermudez
and Langreo, had not been issued the license to recruit and place people overseas; and
that he had then decided to charge them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the
Philippine National Police-Crime Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
Reynaldo Dahab
● On January 27, 2001, he had met the accused -appellant at the Guadalupe Branch of
Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination; A week later, he had undergone
the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00; that she had
then demanded from him the placement fee of P25,000.00; and that after he had not
been able to raise the amount, he never saw her again; and that Caniazares soon called
him to urge that he should complain against the accused in the PNP-CIDG.
Basilio Miparanum
● He met the accused-appellant through Caniazares, who was his cousin. Caniazares
arrived at his house with her in tow in order to borrow money for his placement fee. On
that occasion, she told Miparanum that she could help him find work abroad and even
leave ahead of Caniazares if he had the money.
● Convinced, Miparanum went to her residence on April 11, 2001 to apply as a seaman.
On April 17, 2001, he delivered to her P6,000.00 for his seaman’s book. She again asked
an additional P6,000.00 for the seaman’s book, and P40,000.00 as the placement fee.
● On April 20, 2001, Miparanum went to her office where he met Bermudez. There, he
handed the P46,000.00 to the accused-appellant but it was Bermudez who issued the
corresponding receipt. The accused - appellant and Bermudez told him to wait for his
deployment to Hong Kong as an ordinary seaman within two weeks.
● Miparanum followed up on his application after two weeks, but was instead made to
undergo training, and he paid P2,700.00 for his certificate. Sensing that he was being
defrauded, Miparanum later proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.
PO3 Raul Bolido
● In July, 2001, the complainants went to Camp Crame to file their complaints against the
accused-appellant, Bermudez and Langreo. PO3 Bolido, along with SPO4 Pedro Velasco
and Team Leader Police Inspector Romualdo Iringan, conducted an entrapment
operation against the accused.
● They prepared 10 marked P100 bills dusted with ultraviolet powder and gave the same
to Miparanum. On July 23, 2001, the entrapment team proceeded with Miparanum to
Jollibee- Guadalupe where Miparanum was to meet the accused-appellant.
● The team immediately arrested her upon her receiving the marked bills. The PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted its examination for traces of ultraviolet powder on her person,
and the results of the examination were positive for the presence of ultraviolet powder.
● The RTC convicted Bayker of illegal recruitment and estafa and this judgment was
subsequently affirmed by the CA.
● The accused-appellant insists on her innocence, and points to Langreo and Bermudez
as the persons who had directly engaged in illegal recruitment. She argues that her
 participation had been limited to signing the receipts as a witness, and to receiving 2. In Criminal Case No. 01-1781, for estafa, the accused- appellant is sentenced to suffer the
payments for the medical examinations. indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prisión correccional, as the minimum, to
nine years, eight months and 21 days of prisión mayor, as the maximum;
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO: 3. The accused-appellant shall indemnify complainants Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab and
[1] W/N Bayker was guilty of illegal recruitment. — YES. Basilio Miparanum in the respective amounts of P6,000.00, P2,500.00, and P54,700.00 plus
● The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment 4. The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
against at least three persons (namely: Caniazares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her
not having been duly licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
● o The accused-appellant’s insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment
of the complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State
established her having personally promised foreign employment either as hotel porters
or seafarers to the complainants despite her having no license or authority to recruit
from the POEA. The records made it clear enough that her participation was anything
but limited, for she herself had accompanied them to their respective medical
examinations at their own expense.
● Her claim of having been only casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude
her criminal liability for the crimes charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment could be held liable, along with
the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because
recruitment and placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.

[2] W/N Bayker was guilty of estafa. — YES.

● The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale
did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy.
● The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
● Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-
appellant for the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa considering that they were
entirely distinct from each other not only from their being punished under different
statutes but also from their elements being different.
● The active representation by the accused- appellant of having the capacity to deploy
Miparanum abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA
constituted deceit as the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim
to part with his money, resulting in damage that is the second element of the estafa.
Considering that the damage resulted from the deceit, the CA’s affirmance of her guilt
for estafa as charged was in order.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 28, 2005 subject to
the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780, for illegal recruitment committed in large scale, the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 is imposed on the accused -appellant;
[96] PEOPLE v. MATEO AND LAPIZ
GR NO. 198012 | April 22, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
PROVISIONS:
● XXX, Art. XXX. kdjhskfhlk
SUMMARY: Complainants met with appellants to apply for overseas employment when the latter
offered jobs in Japan for a fee. After the payment of the fees, appellants failed to secure the jobs
promised, and also failed to return the money given. Complainants, then, checked with POEA
whether appellants were registered recruiters which they were not. Complainants then filed a
complaint with the NBI. RTC and CA found appellants guilty. The Court held that all the elements
of illegal recruitment in large are present in this case. Likewise, money is not material to a
prosecution of illegal recruitment since the law includes the phrase, “for profit or not.”
DOCTRINE: Money is not material to a prosecution of illegal recruitment since the law includes
the phrase, “for profit or not.
● According to the Court, all the elements of illegal recruitment in large are present in this
case.
(1) The person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under
Sec., RA 8042 – RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment
activity when they promised complainants employment in Japan for a fee.
(2) Accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers – the Certification issued by POEA unmistakable
reveals that appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers
for overseas employment.
(3) Accused committed the same against three or more persons individually
or as a group – it was established that there were five complainants.
● Money is not material to a prosecution of illegal recruitment since the law includes the
phrase, “for profit or not.”
● Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the law may,
for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the
RPC

FACTS: RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 17, 2011 of the
● 5 complainants met with appellants to apply for overseas employment. Appellant Court of Appeals in C.A.- G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms, promised them amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 shall each earn an interest of 6% per
employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
● Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private complainants’ employment
as direct hires and assured their departure within three weeks.
● However, after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00
to P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them.
Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants’ money.
● This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) where he was issued a Certification stating that appellants are not licensed to
recruit applicants for overseas employment.
● Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and executed their respective
affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred the charges
to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable cause against
appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa and accordingly filed the
corresponding Informations for the same before the RTC of Manila.
● RTC – guilty;
● CA – In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended
that Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him; that
there is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which
money he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were
holding office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that their
transactions with Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel
documents

ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:

WON respondent-appellants are guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale -- YES. According to the
Court, all the elements of illegal recruitment in large are present in this case.
[97] PEOPLE v. OCDEN
G.R. No. 162839 | October 12, 2006 | Panganiban, J.
PROVISIONS:
● XXX, Art. XXX. kdjhskfhlk
SUMMARY: Dolores Ocden recruited and promised employment without securing the necessary
license or authority from the DOLE. She was accused of large scale illegal recruitment for
victimizing at least 6 people. Her modus operandi was to promise work in Italy, charge them
employment fee and other processing fee, and send them to Zamboanga for supposed processing
of visa but actually meant to strand them there without funds. It is not necessary for the
prosecution to present a certification that Dolores is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section 6(m) of RA 8042 provides
that illegal recruitment can be committed by any person, even a licensed recruiter.
DOCTRINE: The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by RA 8042 broadened the concept
of illegal recruitment and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic
sabotage. It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability send complainants abroad
for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
FACTS:
● Several complaints were filed against Dolores accusing her of promising to the
applicants employment to a stuffed toy factory in Italy, wherein she asks for 70k from
each as placement fee. After the applicants pay, they will be sent to Zamboanga on the
assurance that they will be first sent to Malaysia for easier processing of their visas,
and then to Italy, which never materialized.
● Specifically, the complainants were:
Name of Complainant Date of Commission of the offense Amount
Defrauded
Howard Golidan Sometime during the period from P70,000.00
October to December 1998
Norma Pedro Sometime in May, 1998 P65,000.00
medical examination. Upon submitting her bio-data and passport, Marilyn
paid Dolores P500 for her certificate of employment and P20k as down
payment for her placement fee. On September 8, 1998, Dolores accompanied
Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila for their
medical examinations, for which each of the applicants paid P3k. Marilyn also
paid to Dolores P22k as the 2nd installment on her placement fee. When
Josephine Lawanag, Marilyn’s sister, withdrew her application, Josephine’s
P15k placement fee, already paid to Dolores, was credited to Marilyn.
○ Rizalina Ferrer: she and her daughter Jennilyn, together with Fely Alipio, were
interested to work overseas and had the same fate with Marilyn. Money were
asked from them as placement fee or fee for processing of their employment
such as medical examination to be done in Manila. In Manila, they were
introduced by Dolores to Erlinda Ramos. Dolores and Erlinda then
accompanied Rizalina, Jennilyn, and Fely to the airport where they took a
flight to Zamboanga. Dolores explained to Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Fely that they
would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application for Italy would
be processed. Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn
decided to get a refund of their money, but Dolores couldn’t provide a refund.
○ Julia Golidan (mother of Jeffries and Howard): she brought her sons to
Dolores seeking for job abroad for them. After getting money from them, they
were scheduled for flights. The scheduled flight was delayed due to alleged
insufficiency of funds and later, Jeffries was stranded in Zamboanga
because Erlinda wont give him a passport. Due to this incident, Golidan tried
to refund the money but they couldn’t recover in full so they went POEA where
they discovered Dolores was not a licensed recruiter.
■ As her defense, denied recruiting complainants and claims that she
was also applying as an overseas worker, and that the illegal
recruiter was Erlinda Ramos, the one who briefed the applicants.
Dolores’ defense were self-serving and unsubstantiated, therefore,
deserves no merit.
● RTC found Dolores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment
in large scale and three counts of estafa. Aggrieved by the above decision, Dolores filed
with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. The RTC erroneously sent the records of the cases to
the CA, which, in turn, correctly forwarded the said records to SC.

Milan O. Daring Sometime during the period P70,000.00 ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
from November13, 1998 to Won Dolores is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale -- YES.
December 10, 1998 ● [Illegal recruitment in a large scale] To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that
appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to
Rizalina Ferrer Sometime in September P70,000.00
send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with
Marilyn Mana-a Sometime in September P70,000.00
their money in order to be employed. As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan,
1998
Ocden gave such an impression as seen in the testimony of the witnesses. Under the
last paragraph of Section 6, RA 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
● All seven cases against Dolores were consolidated on July 31, 2000 and were tried involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against
jointly after Dolores pleaded not guilty. three or more persons individually or as a group. Conviction
● Witnesses presented by the prosecution were:
○ Marilyn Mana-a: testified she and Isabel Dao-as went to Dolores’ house in
Baguio to apply for work as factory workers in Italy. They were required to RULING: asd
submit their bio-data and passports, pay the placement fee, and to undergo
[98] RUTCHER DAGASDAS v. GRAND PLACEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 205727 | January 18, 2017 | Del Castillo, J
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE:
● LABOR CODE, Art. 18. Ban on Direct-Hiring. - No employer may hire a Filipino worker
for overseas employment except through the Boards and entities authorized by the
Secretary of Labor. Direct-hiring by members of the diplomatic corps, international
organizations and such other employers as may be allowed by the Secretary of Labor
is exempted from this provision.
SUMMARY: Mr. Rutcher, a civil engineering professional, was originally hired “on paper” as a
Network Technician. Since ITM (Saudi company) allegedly cannot afford the visa for an engineer,
they had to resort to a one for a network technician instead. Upon landing in Saudi, Mr. Rutcher
and ITM entered into a new contract novating the old one in favor of placing him as a
Superintendent. There is a stipulation in the contract that he will be placed under probationary
status for three months. However, there was a job mismatch as apparently the tasks that he was
asked to perform were those for a Mechanical Engineer. He requested to be transferred to Civil
Engineering and was given a temporary position for one month. After which, he was
subsequently dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract wherein ITM can terminate
any employee with the 3 months probationary period without notice. The SC held his dismissal
as illegal wherein: 1) the new contract violates the security of tenure, 2) the new contract was
not shown to have been processed through the POEA, and 3) Dagasdas was not afforded
procedural due process when he was dismissed from work.
DOCTRINE: Under our Labor Code, employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. (see provisions
applicable) Unless the employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA, the same
does not bind the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly
the State has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into
even before the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it cannot
supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions, including reserving in favor of the
employer the right to terminate an employee without notice during the probationary period, are
void.
FACTS:
Dramatis Personae:
● Rutcher Dagasdas - Filipino who got hired to work as a Superintendent for Industrial &
Management Technology Methods Co. Ltd. (ITM)
● Industrial & Management Technology Methods Co. Ltd. (ITM) - a company based in
Saudi Arabia
● Grand Placement and General Services Corp. (GPGS) - licensed recruitment or
placement agency in the Philippines
● Saudi Aramco (Aramco) - its counterpart in Saudi Arabia
● In November 2007, GPGS, for and on behalf of ITM, employed Dagasdas as Network
Technician.
○ one-year contract
○ monthly salary of Saudi Riyal (SR) 5,112.00.
○ Before leaving the Philippines, Dagasdas underwent skill training and pre-
departure orientation as Network Technician.
○ his Job Offer indicated that he was accepted by Aramco and ITM for the
position of "Supt."
● Despite the position under his contract was as a Network Technician, he alleges that he
actually applied for and was engaged as a Civil Engineer
○ his transcript of records, diploma as well as his curriculum vitae showed that
he had a degree in Civil Engineering, and his work experiences were all related
to this field.
● Purportedly, the position of Network Technician was only for the purpose of securing a
visa for Saudi Arabia because ITM could not support visa application for Civil Engineers.
● On February 8, 2008, Dagasdas arrived in Saudi Arabia.
● Thereafter, he signed with ITM a new employment contract which stipulates:
○ the latter contracted him as Superintendent or in any capacity within the
scope of his abilities
○ salary of SR5,112.00 and allowance of SR2,045.00 per month.
○ three-month probationary period;
○ new contract shall cancel all contracts prior to its date from any source.
● On February 11, 2008, Dagasdas reported at ITM's worksite.
● There, he was allegedly given tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer, which were
foreign to the job he applied for and to his work experience.
● He raised the aforementioned concerns to his Supervisor in the Mechanical Engineering
Department.
● Consequently, he was transferred to the Civil Engineering Department, was temporarily
given a position as Civil Construction Engineer, and was issued an ID good for one
month.
● On March 9, 2008, Rashid H. Siddiqui (Siddiqui), the Site Coordinator Manager, promised
to secure him the position he applied for. However, before Dagasdas' case was
investigated, Siddiqui had severed his employment with ITM.
● In April 2008, Dagasdas returned to Al-Khobar and stayed at the ITM Office. Later, ITM
gave him a termination notice indicating that his last day of work was on April 30, 2008,
and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract,
○ “ITM reserves the right to terminate any employee within the three-month
probationary period without need of any notice to the employee”.
● Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of Quitclaim with Final Settlement
stating that:
○ ITM paid him all the salaries and benefits for his services from February 11,
2008 to April 30, 2008 in the total amount of SR7,156.80,
○ ITM was relieved from all financial obligations due to Dagasdas.
Mr. Ruthcher Objected and filed a case for illegal dismissal with the LA
Mr. Rutcher’s allegations
● accused GPGS, ITM, and Aramco of misrepresentation, which resulted in the mismatch
in the work assigned to him.
○ He contended that such claim was supported by exchanges of electronic mail
(e-mail) establishing that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco were aware of the job
mismatch that had befallen him.
● argued he was still entitled to security of tenure for the duration of his contract.
 ● claimed that he was dismissed without cause and due process of law.
○ maintained that GPGS, ITM, and Aramco merely invented "imaginary cause/s"
to terminate him.
GPGS, ITM and Aramco’s defense
● Said Dagasdas was legally dismissed.
○ Dagasdas was aware that he was employed as Network Technician but he
could not perform his work in accordance with the standards of his employer.
○ Dagasdas was informed of his poor performance, and he conformed to his
termination as evidenced by his quitclaim.
○ They also stressed that Dagasdas was only a probationary employee since
he worked for ITM for less than three months
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
● When Dagasdas signed his new employment contract in Saudi Arabia, he accepted its
stipulations, including the fact that he had to undergo probationary status.
● In fact, the new contract was more advantageous for Dagasdas as his position was
upgraded to that of a Superintendent, and he was likewise given an allowance of
SR2,045.00 aside from his salary of SR5,112.00 per month. Being more favorable to the
laborer, the new contract is not against the law.
● Falling short of the expected work performance; as such, his employer dismissed him
as part of its management prerogative.
● Mr Rutcher appeals to the MLRC
NLRC reverses the LA and says the dismissal is illegal
● While ITM has the prerogative to continue the employment of individuals only if they
were qualified, Dagasdas' dismissal amounted to illegal termination since the
mismatch between his qualifications and the job given him was no fault of his.
● Dagasdas was "recruited on paper" by GPGS as Network Technician but the real
understanding between the parties was to hire him as Superintendent.
● GPGS erroneously recruited Dagasdas, and failed to inform him that he was hired as a
"Mechanical Superintendent" meant for a Mechanical Engineer.
● GPGS appeals to the CA
CA reverses the NLRC and reinstates the Decision of the LA
● When he arrived in Saudi Arabia and signed a new contract for the position of
Superintendent, the agreement was with no participation of GPGS, and said new
contract was only between Dagasdas and ITM.
● Seemingly, it was [Dagasdas] himself who voluntarily withdrew from his assigned work
for lack of competence.
● CA gave credence to Dagasdas' Statement of Quitclaim and Final Settlement. It ruled
that for having voluntarily accepted money from his employer, Dagasdas accepted his
termination and released his employer from future financial obligations arising from his
past employment with it.
● *enter SC*
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[0.5] (not really an issue) Can Philippine laws apply to OFWs? - YES
● Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly the overseas Filipino workers
(OFW), work in a different jurisdiction.
● Since the employment contracts of OFWs are perfected in the Philippines, and following
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made),
these contracts are governed by Philippine laws
● The Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor,
whether local or overseas.
● Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure,
among other constitutional rights.
● In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the Philippines, Dagasdas was
made to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival
in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. Nonetheless, this new
contract, which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void.
[1] W/N Dagasdas was validly dismissed from work - NO
1. The new contract violates security of tenure
● To allow employers to reserve a right to terminate employees without cause
is violative of this guarantee of security of tenure.
● To recall, Article 297 [282] lists the instances for dismissing an employee for
just cause.
● However, ITM terminated him for violating clause 17.4.3 of his new contract
which provides that The Company reserves the right to terminate this
agreement without serving any notice to the Consultant x x x If the Consultant
is terminated by company or its client within the probation period of 3
months.
● The above-cited clause is contrary to law because as discussed, our
Constitution guarantees that employees, local or overseas, are entitled to
security of tenure
● As regards a probationary employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only
if there is just cause or such reason to conclude that the employee fails to
qualify as regular employee pursuant to reasonable standards made known
to the employee at the time of engagement
● Herein, ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined
standards from which his work will be gauged.
○ No job description or such duties and responsibilities attached to
either position was adduced in evidence. It thus means that the job
for which Dagasdas was hired was not definite from the beginning.
○ Dagasdas was not sufficiently informed of the work standards for
which his performance will be measured
● Simply put, ITM failed to show that it set and communicated work standards
for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his efficiency (or the lack thereof) may
be determined
2. The new contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA.
(see the doctrine for the entirety of what the Court says about this part)
● POEA must review every contract to check the suitability of foreign laws to
OFWs
3. Dagasdas was not afforded procedural due process when he was dismissed from work.
 ● A valid dismissal requires substantive and procedural due process. As
regards the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at least
two notices before his or her termination.
● Moreover, the employee must be accorded the opportunity to be heard
● Here, no prior notice of purported infraction, and such opportunity to explain
on any accusation against him was given to Dagasdas.
● In fact, it appears that ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement as evidenced in the aforementioned stipulation in the contract.

[2] W/N the waiver precludes Mr Rutcher from filing the suit - NO
● the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from demanding
benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case. This is
because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned upon for being
contrary to public policy.
● Unless it can be established that the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with
full understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and credible consideration, the
same is not a valid and binding undertaking.
● The burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 26, 2012 and
Resolution dated January 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 29, 2010 and June 2, 2010 Resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-10 are REINSTATED.
[NLRC Dispositive Portion]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the respondent[s] are hereby
ordered to pay the complainant the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract
amounting to SR46,008 (SR5112 x 9 months, or from May 1, 2008 to January 31, 2009), plus ten
percent (10%) thereof as attorney's foes. The respondents are jointly and severally liable for the
judgment awards, which are payable in Philippine currency converted on the basis of the exchange
rate prevailing at the time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED

Other statements:
Moreover, it is well-settled that employers have the prerogative to impose standards on the work
quantity and quality of their employees and provide measures to ensure compliance therewith.
Non-compliance with work standards may thus be a valid cause for dismissing an employee.
Nonetheless, to ensure that employers will not abuse their prerogatives, the same is tempered by
security of tenure whereby the employees are guaranteed substantive and procedural due process
before they are dismissed from work.
[99] SULIMAN v. PEOPLE
G.R No. 190970 | November 24, 2014 | Peralta J.
PROVISION:
● SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and
includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or non-
holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than
that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any
act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority
under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his
employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to
liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any
worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to
public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures
and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an
officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency
or to be engaged directly orindirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before
departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those
authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where
the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories.1âwphi1 In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable.
SUMMARY: Vilma Suliman was charged with two counts of illegal recruitment and three counts
of estafa by the RTC of Manila. The Court affirmed the decision of the RTC and found that Vilma
was guilty of said crimes beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
FACTS:
● In 6 Informations, on June 6, 2003, petitioner Vilma Suliman and Luz Garcia were
charged before RTC Manila with 2 counts of illegal recruitment under Sec. 6 par. (a), (i),
and (m) of RA 8042 aka Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act as well as 4 count
of estafa under Art. 315 par 2 (a) of RPC.
● Only petitioner was brought to trial since co-accused Garcia remained at-large. The 6
cases were consolidated and after trial the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 2 counts of illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa and
accordingly cancelled the bond posted for her provisional liberty.
● Her period of detention was credited in the service of her sentence.
● Petitioner filed an MR but RTC denied for lack of merit on Jan. 23, 2007. Her appeal to
CA was also denied with modifications on the penalty imposed. Petitioner’s counsel got
a copy of the CA decision on May 26, 2009 but neither petitioner nor her counsel filed
an MR within the 15-day reglementary period for filing such. So the decision became
final on June 11, 2009.
● On July 3, 2009, thru her new counsel, she filed a Motion to Admit Attached MR praying
that the same be admitted in the interest of substantial justice and due process.
Petitioner argued that her former counsel acted in gross neglect of his duty as counsel
in failing to promptly inform petitioner of the receipt of the CA ruling, depriving her of
the right to file an MR that led to a violation of her right to due process.
● CA denied the said Motion. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING
[1] W/N Petitioner is bound by negligent act of her former counsel in not informing her of the
receipt of the CA decision – YES
● Petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in monitoring the case’s
progress. She did not make any effort to follow up on her appeal with counsel. She just
 relied on Conrad Lucero, the one who referred the counsel to her, regarding the
updates.SC relied on Bejarasco Jr v People, to wit:
● “The general rule is that a client is bound, including mistakes in procedure. The rationale
is that a counsel holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or incidental to the
prosecution of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act or omission by counsel within the
scope of authority is deemed as the act or omission of the client. The exception to this
rule is when gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process. But the
gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s own fault or malice. Client
has the duty to be vigilant of his interests and keep himself updated on the case’s
status.”
● The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and exercised only in the manner provided by law. Deviations from
the Rules of Court cannot be tolerated. The purpose is to facilitate orderly disposition
of appealed cases. In the case at bar, petitioner remained adamant in non-observance
of said Rules. SC found that on this basis alone, without going into the merits, the case
is dismissible.

[2] W/N the CA erred in denying the MR and thus convicting petitioner – NO
● Even is SC bends the procederal Rules to allow the present petition, SC still finds no
reason to depart from the ruling of the CA. Evidence on record show that lower courts
committed no error in convicting petitioner of estafa and illegal recruitment. Factual
findings of the RTC and CA are binding and the exceptional circumstances to review
such findings by SC are not present in this case.
● In the crime of illegal recruitment, the lower courts found that the prosecution duly
established the petitioner and co-accused did the acts enumerated under Sec. 6 (a), (i),
and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the
amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they
failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they
failed to reimburse the said complainants after such failure to deploy.
● In the charge of estafa, all the elements were present in this case (see notes for
elements of estafa). It was proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner and co-
accused falsely pretended they had capacity to deploy the complainants for
employment. Such misrepresentation was made prior to complainants’ payment of
placement fees, and the same induced complainants to part with their money.
Complainants suffered damages as the promised employment never happened and the
money was never recovered.
● Indeed, of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private
complainants had any ill motive against petitioner other than to bring her to the bar of
justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated July 21, 2009 and January 8, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30693, are AFFIRMED.
[100] PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC. V. VINUYA
G.R. No. 197528 | September 5, 2012 | Brion, J.
SUMMARY: Vinuya et. Al filed for illegal dismissal against Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc.
(agency) and Modern Metal (principal). They were deployed to work in Dubai with a contract
stipulating their working hours, wages, and benefits. Upon arriving in Dubai, they were met with
dismal and substandard working and living conditions. Modern Metal, later on, made them sign
an appointment letter that decreased their salary and increased their work period. The stipulations
in the letter were reflected on a new contract that were also signed by Vinuya et al, due to their
expenses and financial obligations. They expressed their intent to resign. They were made to sign
affidavits of quitclaims and release. Once back in Manila, they instituted their complaint. The LA
dismissed the petition finding that they voluntarily resigned. The NLRC reversed finding out that
they were constructively dismissed due to their substandard living and working conditions and
the substitution of their original contract to an inferior one. The CA and the Court affirmed the
decision of the NLRC.
DOCTRINE: It is illegal for an employer to require its employees to execute new employment
papers, especially those which provide benefits that are inferior to the POEA approved contracts.
PROVISIONS:
● LABOR CODE, Art. 34. – Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, license, or holder of authority:
a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received
by him as a loan or advance;
b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation
to recruitment or employment;
c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any
act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority
under this Code.
d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his
employment in order to offer him to another unless the transfer is designed
to liberate the worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
e) To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any
worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to
public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by
his duly authorized representatives;
h) To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures
and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of
Labor.
i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of
the Secretary of Labor;
j) To become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in
travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a
travel agency; and
k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before
departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those
authorized under this Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
FACTS:
● Armando Vinuya, Louie Ordovez, Arsenio Lumanta, Jr., Robelito Anipan, Virgilio
Alcantara, Marion Era, Sandy Enjambre, and Noel Ladea (respondents) filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. (agency) and its
President Romeo P. Nacino.
● The agency deployed the respondents to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the
agency’s principal, Modern Metal Solutions LLC/MMS Modern Metal Solution LLC
(Modern Metal) in Dubai.
● The employment contracts, approved by Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), provided:
o Two-year employment, nine hours a day.
o Salary of 1, 350 AED (United Arab Emirates Dirham) with overtime pay, food
allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free transportation, free
laundry, and free medical and dental services
● Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters with terms different
from the employment contracts which they signed at the agency’s office in the
Philippines.
o Under the letters, their employment were increased to three years at 1k to
1.2k AED and food allowance of 200 AED.
● Respondents were shocked to find out what their working and living conditions were in
Dubai.
o Required to work 6:30AM – 6:30PM with a break of only one hour to one and
a half hours.
o Rendered overtime work, most of the time either underpaid or not paid at all
o Housing accommodations were cramped and were shared with 27 other
occupants
o Lodging house was in Sharjah, far from the jobsite in Dubai, leaving only three
to four hours of sleep because of the long hours of travel
o No potable water and the air was polluted.
● When respondents received their first salaries, they called up the agency and
complained about their predicament. The agency assured to address their concerns but
nothing happened.
● Modern Metal required them to sign new employment contracts, except for Era who
was made to sign later.
o The new contracts contained the terms of the appointment letters.
o Because of their expenses and financial obligations, they were left no choice
but to sign the contracts.
▪ This matter was raised with the agency, which again took no
action.
● Respondents expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign, citing personal or family
problems, out of fear that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and release
papers.
 o Except for Era, mentioning the real reason: he does not like the company
policy.
● Respondent all returned to Manila and shouldered their own airfare, except for Ordovez
and Enjambre.
● The agency stated that the respondents were not illegally dismissed since they
voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job.
o It claimed that they applied for another company offering a higher pay but it
failed to materialize.
● The agency further alleges that the respondents voluntarily signed affidavits of
quitclaim and release after they resigned. Thus, their claim for benefits, damages, and
attorney’s fees is unfounded.
● LA (Ancheta): Dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal finding that respondents
resigned from their jobs.
o Alcantara, Era, Anipan, and Lumanta executed a compromise agreement
before POEA. The LA considered this as a case of forum shopping.
● NLRC: Granted the appeal. It ruled that there is illegal dismissal anchoring on the new
employment contracts that the respondents signed in Dubai.
o It is illegal for an employer to require its employees to execute new
employment papers, especially those which provide benefits that are inferior
to the POEA approved contracts.
o The NLRC rejected the quitclaim and release for they were executed by the
respondents under duress as they were afraid that they would not be allowed
to return to the Philippines.
o The compromise agreement before the POEA covered only refund of their
airfare, not the respondents’ other money claims for their case of illegal
dismissal. Thus, they were not guilty of forum shopping.
▪ Ordered the agency and Modern Metal to pay, jointly and severally,
the respondents.
o The agency moved for reconsideration but was denied.
o The respondents moved for partial reconsideration, maintaining that their
salaries should have covered the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts, pursuant to Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. The ruling
declared unconstitutional the clause. “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less,” in Sec. 10, par.5, RA 8042, limiting the
entitlement of illegally dismissed overseas Filipino workers to their salaries
for the unexpired term of their contract or three months, whichever is less.
▪ The NLRC modified the respondents’ salary entitlement.
▪ The agency, in the reconsideration, questioned the application of
the Serrano ruling because it was not yet final and executory. The
NLRC denied the motion.
● CA: Dismissed agency’s petition for lack of merit and upheld the NLRC decision.
o Filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.
▪ Resignation letters are dubious for having been lopsidedly-worded
to ensure that the agency and Modern Metal are free from any
liability.
o Likewise, negated the forum shopping by the respondents.
o Nothing wrong in the adjustment of the salary award on the basis of the
unexpired portion of their contracts.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING
[1] W/N respondents were illegally dismissed. – YES.
● The agency and Modern Metal committed flagrant violations of the law on overseas
employment, as well as basic norms of decency and fair play in an employment
relationship.
o Guilty of contract substitution. Substituted the contract approved by POEA
with another contract, reducing their salaries and increasing their work
period. (Art. 34, LC)
o Breach of contract. Respondents were made to suffer substandard working
and living conditions, contrary to what was stipulated on both the old and new
contract.
o Constructive dismissal. Due to the contract substitution and oppressive
working and living conditions, respondents were compelled to resign.
▪ Resignation letters were dubious not only for being lopsidedly
worded to ensure Modern Metal be free from liability but also the
odd coincidence that all the respondents, at the same time, been
confronted with urgent family problems.
▪ Only Era was bold enough to say the real reason for his resignation
– to protest company policy.
▪ The affidavits of quitclaim and release were just to lend credence
to the resignation letters.
● Lumanta’s affidavit mentioned a G&A International
Manpower as his recruiting agency, an entity totally
unknown to the respondents.
[2] W/N respondents were guilty of forum shopping. – NO.
● The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release) before the POEA did not
foreclose the employer-employee relationship claims before the NLRC. They only
settled their claim for refund of their airfare, but not their other claims.
o This submission has not been refuted or denied by the agency.
[3] W/N the Serrano ruling can be applied. – YES.
● The agency claims that the Serrano ruling cannot be given retroactive effect. Since the
complaint against it was filed in 2007, while the ruling was handed down in March 2009,
it cannot apply.
● The respondents correctly argued that in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, the
Court sustained the retroactive application of the Serrano ruling which declared a
certain clause of RA 8042 limiting to three months the payment of salaries of illegally
dismissed OFWs unconstitutional.
o The agency counters that RA 10022, in 2010, restored the subject clause in
RA 8042.
● The amendment cannot be given retroactive effect since there is no express declaration
of retroactivity in the law and the retroactivity will result in an impairment of a right.
RULING: Petition Denied. CA Decision Affirmed.
[101] STOLT-NIELSEN v. MEDEQUILLO
G.R. No. 177498 | January 18, 2012
PROVISIONS
● POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. Sec. 4. Worker’s
Deployment. - An agency shall deploy its recruits within the deployment period as
indicated: b. 30 calendar days from the date of processing by the administration of the
employment contracts of seafarers. Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the
prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for suspension or cancellation
of license/fine. In addition, the agency shall return all documents at no cost to the
worker.
● RA 8042, Sec. 10. Money Claims – Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the
LAs of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within 90 days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages.
SUMMARY: Sulpecio was hired on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for 9 months. After 3
months of service and while the vessel was in Batangas, he was ordered to disembark and
repatriated back to Manila with no explanation. He went to the office of Stolt and was transferred
employment to the “Stolt Pride”. The 2nd Contract was noted and approved by the POEA. However,
Sulpecio was not deployed. Due to this, he went to Stolt and demanded for his employment
documents. He was only allowed to claim such documents in exchange of his signing a
document. Constrained, he signed involuntarily. He filed a case against Stolt in POEA. Case was
transferred to LA who ruled in favor of Sulpecio. LA ruled that the 2nd Contract novated the 1st, as
such Stolt was made responsible for the former only. Stolt appealed to the NLRC claiming that
Sulpecio could not have been constructively dismissed because he was not even deployed yet.
NLRC affirmed LA’s decision modifying the monetary award. Stolt appealed to the CA which
affirmed the NLRC decision. Stolt appealed to the SC, claiming that actual deployment of the
seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. Court agreed that
it was indeed a condition but the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of Stolt
and that even if there was no employer-employee relationship yet between the two, Stolt was still
liable for the right and obligations from the perfected contract. This included the 9months of
wages that was not given to Sulpecio.
DOCTRINE: POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence
“upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire.”
FACTS
● Sulpecio was hired as an Asst. Engr. on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for 9 months
(covered by 1st Contract) by Stolt in behalf of its principal, Chung.
● After 3months and while the vessel was in Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s
master to disembark and repatriated back to Manila with no explanation. He went to
the office of Stolt and was transferred employment to the “Stolt Pride” under the same
terms (2nd Contract). The 2nd Contract was noted and approved by the POEA.
● Sulpecio was not deployed even when he followed up with Stolt. Due to this, he went to
Stolt and asked for his passport, seaman’s book, and other documents. He was only
allowed to claim such documents in exchange of his signing a document. Constrained,
he signed. He filed a case against Stolt in POEA. Case was transferred to LA, because
of RA 8042, who ruled in favor
● of Sulpecio. LA ruled that the 2nd Contract novated the 1st, as such Stolt was made
responsible for the former only. Stolt appealed to the NLRC claiming they were denied
due process and that Sulpecio could not have been constructively dismissed because
he was not even deployed yet.
● NLRC affirmed LA’s decision modifying the monetary award. Stolt appealed to the CA
which affirmed the NLRC.
● Stolt appealed to the SC, claiming that, inter alia, actual deployment of the seafarer is a
suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. Court agreed that it
was indeed a condition but the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part
of Stolt.
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] WON there was novation of the 1st contract by the 2nd
● Yes there was novation. Its effects include:
○ Action has not yet prescribed;
○ There was a perfected contract between Stolt and Sulpecio.
[2] WON Sulpecio can recover damages for his dismissal
● 2nd issue: Yes. The Court differentiated perfection of an employment contract and
commencement of the employeremployee relationship. o The former, in this case,
happened when Stolt and Sulpecio agreed on the object and cause as well as the rest
of the terms and conditions;
○ The latter, would have taken place had Stolt deployed Sulpecio (see * and
Terms).
● Although there was no relationship between the two, Stolt still had an obligation to
deploy Sulpecio which it failed to do, thus it was still liable for damages. SC based its
decision on the two provisions below.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 31 January 2007 Decision of the CA in [the case]
is hereby AFFIRMED. The Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay [Sulpecio] the award of actual
damages equivalent to his salary for 9 months as provided by the 2 nd Employment Contract.