Ongsiaco v.

Ongsiaco (Emerson)

CARIDAD ONGSIACO, et.al., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
EMILIA ONGSIACO, et.al., defendants-appellees

G.R. No. L-7510 – March 30, 1957 - Reyes, J.B.L., J.

SUMMARY: Upon dissolution of their partnership, the partners divided their share in a
hacienda. Each of the 3 partners then distributed their share amongst their family members. This
case involved the family of one of the partners. The share of the partner was divided among the
mother and the 8 children. Later, the mother donated her share to her children on the condition
that the land will be held in usufruct for their father and that the children will support their father
with a pension. Sometime in 1937-38, two children who occupied the catchbasin areas built
dikes which prevented the natural flow of rainwater, and stopped supporting their father. This led
the mother to revoke the donation as to them without judicial declaration. In 1951, one of the
children sued the “prodigal” siblings, to revoke the donation and compel them to provide an
easement of drainage. The lower court dismissed the case for prescription of cause of action. The
SC upheld this decision, holding inter alia that a continuous easement, as defined, does not
depend upon acts of man. Continuous easements such as that of drainage are extinguished by
non-user for 10 years. If they were really prejudiced by the dikes, the plaintiffs should have filed
their action much earlier, considering that they waited for 13 years before filing the present
action.

FACTS: The partnership Ongsiaco, Lim y Cia. owned 1/3 of the Hacienda Esperanza in Nueva
Ecija. On Mar. 25, 1929, the partners agreed to dissolve the partnership and divide their share
among themselves. 4/9 went to the Ongsiacos and the Lims while 5/9 went to the Santoses. Later
the Ongsiacos and Lims divided their 4/9 share among themselves. In said partition, plaintiff-
appellant Caridad received Lot 7 with 565 ha. while defendant-appellee Emilia got lots 9 and 9A
with 826 ha. On Jul. 31, 1929, the mother of herein parties, Doña Gorgonia Ongsiaco executed a
deed of donation, turning over her whole 3/18 interest in the Hacienda to her heirs, on the
conditions that: it will be held in usufruct in favor of their father Don Lucio Ongsiaco; and that
each of the heirs must give their father a 1000-peso annual pension. Titles to the subdivided lots
were subsequently issued.
On July 7, 1941, Doña Gorgonia rescinded the donation as to two of her children (Ramon and
Emilia) for flooding the land of their sister Caridad by building dikes on their own lands and not
contributing to the monthly pension. In the same deed, Doña Gorgonia adjudicated the land to
Caridad and the other 6 children. According to the record, Emilia was not notified of the deed.
No action for revocation of donation was filed even after Doña Gorgonia died on Nov. 6, 1950.
On April 25, 1951, Caridad and her husband filed the present action before the Nueva Ecija CFI
against Emilia et.al., alleging the following causes of action: 1) violating the conditions of the
deed of donation; 2) violating the legal easement of drainage by building dikes which prevented
water from flowing off Caridad’s land (which was higher in elevation than that of Emilia’s); and
3) depriving Caridad of 27 ha. of land by manipulation and fraudulent changing of boundary
markers by Emilia’s husband. Emilia et.al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
causes of action had been barred by extinctive prescription. The CFI ruled in favor of Emilia
et.al., hence this appeal.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) Has the action for revocation of donation prescribed? (YES)
2) Has the cause of action for violation of the legal easement of drainage been barred by
prescription? (YES)
3) Did defendants illegally and fraudulently deprive plaintiffs of land by altering boundary
markers to include public lands? (NO, but the cause of action has been barred by prescription
anyway)

RATIO
1) Jurisprudence interpreting NCC 647 has held that a donor may revoke a donation unilaterally
only if such revocation is approved by court judgment or by consent of the donee; and that the
action to revoke a donation prescribes in 10 years. In this case, Emilia’s consent was not
obtained; and no court judgment has been issued to affirm the revocation even long after the
donor died. Actions to revoke a written contract prescribe in 10 years. The cause of action in this
case accrued from the date of first violation, that is, on Sep. 30, 1930; hence the filing of the
action on Apr. 25, 1951 is long overdue. The subsequent instances of violation of the conditions
did not constitute new causes of action so as to extend the prescriptive period.
To circumvent the prescriptive period, plaintiffs assert that: a) their action is for recovery of land
inherited by Caridad through the 1941 deed, therefore the applicable prescriptive period is 30
years (of adverse possessors in bad faith) and b) Emilia held the property in an implied trust
subject to the donor’s rights.
a) Caridad cannot lay claim to the land through the 1941 deed, because the donation was never
revoked in a proper court action. Thus, the applicable prescriptive period is still that for
revocation of donation for breach of stipulations, which is 10 years. The claim that the applicable
period is that for adverse possessors in bad faith is incorrect, since Emilia remains the lawful
owner of the property until the donation is properly revoked.
b) The implied trust contemplated in NCC 1456 refers to property acquired through mistake or
fraud. Emilia acquired the property legally; and her subsequent violation of the conditions of the
donation did not taint her previous acquisition.

2) Emilia received a larger share in the partition because the land assigned to her served as
catchbasin for the higher areas, such as that assigned to Caridad. It was found that Emilia built
dikes on her land between 1937 and 1938. Such act is covered by the provision on legal
easement of drainage of rural lands, OCC 552. Such easement does not depend upon acts of man
but upon the natural flow of rainwater from higher to lower areas. It is thus a continuous
easement which is extinguished by non-user for 10 years (20 years under the Old Code; the
period was reduced by Act 190). The cause for action therefore arose in 1937 or 1938 and has
already prescribed when the present suit was filed.
The dikes cannot be considered a nuisance as plaintiffs assert, first, because their complaint does
not adduce facts in support of such allegation. Second, because assuming that the dikes were a
nuisance, in this case the nuisance arises from the interference of plaintiffs’ right to drainage and
the action for easement against such nuisance has also prescribed by 1951 (NCC 631, which is
an exception to the general rule of NCC 698 that lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance). The
Philippine law on nuisance is derived from US law, which holds that private nuisances can
prescribe.

3) This allegation is unsupported by the record. The plaintiffs have not objected to the original
1929 partition and kept their title. Caridad’s husband is an “attorney of note” and should have
known if they were being cheated with respect to the partition. It was also proven that Caridad
was able to receive government lots in Manila through exchange of 5 of their lots, including
those now claimed by them to public land. These circumstances evince the lack of equity in
appellants’ position. Furthermore, assuming that there was fraud, the action has prescribed. This
cause of action accrues from the date of partition in 1929. Granting that a case filed against
Emilia’s husband for appropriation of lands in 1937 stemmed the running of the period, the
action remains prescribed since the case was dismissed in 1939 by agreement of the parties. The
plaintiffs’ action was filed simply way too late.

DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.