Student's Name : Muhammad Imam Room-Scenario Paper

Student’s ID : 100179409
Course : Asia’s Security Environment and the EU

Crisis scenarios taking place in 2021:

1. North Korean ballistic missile accidentally hits the island of Kunashiri in a failed test
(Japan’s Northern Territory, disputed with Russia)
2. Oil spill caused by a Chinese tanker in the Spratly Islands > spreads quickly to the
Philippines’s shores
3. Montenegro goes bankrupt/ falls into Chinese debt trap (shortly before the country’s
possible accession to the EU)
4. Cyber-attack on Tokyo subway system (unknown origin)
5. Violent clash between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the
Paracel Islands kills 10 Vietnamese fishermen and 2 Chinese.
6. China blocks the Strait of Hormuz among escalating tensions between the US and Iran
7. Terrorist attack on the Embassy of the Netherlands in Jakarta (suspected Jemaah
Islamiya – part of a growing Al Qaida network in SEA)
8. Beijing decides to annex Taiwan > sends troops

Please, coordinate among yourselves to create groups of 3 students (24 students enrolled, 8
topics).

Clues:

- Think carefully about the geographical location where the incidents take place (natural
features, neighbours, history, etc.)

- Pay attention to the date. The scenarios take place in 2021, which is in a not-too-
distant future – i.e. think of what leaders will be in power (some/ many may be the same,
some may not); major events scheduled (2021 is the 100thanniversary of the CCP, Beijing
will be hosting winter Olympics in 2022, etc.)

- Think creatively about domestic political situations in countries involved (chances for
regime change? Democratic prospects?)

- Consider the evolving global and regional geopolitical environment (the likely, the
plausible)

- Anything is possible, as long as you justify how you got there

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 Oil spill caused by a Chinese tanker in the Spratly Islands > spreads quickly to the
Philippines’s shores

Scenarios are a method in foresight which is much more narrative and narrow than horizon-scanning – essentially,
they are stories. The advantage of storytelling in foresight is twofold: first, is allows us to highlight relationships and
trends that quantitative data can never catch. They are therefore particularly suited to cases where human beings
shape events, as scenarios can incorporate values, motivations and behaviour that raw data does not reflect.

Second, they can generate the emotion which is necessary to overcome denial itself one of the strongest obstacles to
changing perceptions on a matter. The best way to do this is to take advantage of a human feature, the ‘willing
suspension of disbelief’ which occurs when we hear or watch a fictional story. A vivid scenario can capture the attention
and imagination of decision-makers more easily than vague trends precisely because it can overcome denial and
generate emotion.

In order to be useful, a scenario must fulfil certain criteria: it needs to be, of course, plausible, and within the limits of
what can conceivably happen. For instance, a scenario might be possible – such as a huge asteroid hitting earth – but it
is not very plausible. The scenarios presented here are therefore not like the now (in)famous Black Swans or Wild
Cards – highly improbable events with equally serious strategic implications – but rather Grey Swans.3 Grey Swans
share with Black Swans a high level of strategic impact, but there is more evidence to support the idea that they are
actually possible. That said, although there is more data for Grey Swans, they are still often considered unlikely to
happen and are often dismissed as fantastical – simply because humans, like the bureaucracies they built, cannot
function with catastrophic thinking at all times.

But this is precisely the reason that these potentially strategic developments are fleshed out in this Chaillot Paper. After
all, if these events were more foreseeable (a little bit like the weather forecast), they would not be part of foresight. In
that sense, imagination is to foresight what creative genius is to a painter: without it, the exercise is more or less futile.
Without imagination, information gathered in horizon-scanning is just that: dry data without implications for the
future. It is imagination, not facts alone, that takes developments, joins them together and projects them into the future.
This is, for instance, why the 9/11 commission stated that the failure to anticipate the attacks on New York and
Washington D.C. was first and foremost ‘a failure of imagination’.4 The facts were mostly available: it was linking them
together in a creative way that did not occur. An elaborate scenario should therefore not be disqualified due to its
unexpected nature – what matters is that it is rooted in evidence and built on a logical coherence of thought.

Put simply, we travel to the future in order to see what we could change today to prevent these events from coming
true, or to prepare ourselves for their impact. The analogy with the 1985 film ‘Back to the Future’ is pure coincidence,
of course – but just as in the film, we sometimes need to take a trip to the future to inform our decision-making today.

All the scenarios in this Chaillot Paper reflect the expertise and imagination of the researchers who wrote them: some
explore potential conflicts, while others look at disruptive political developments, or indeed at crises with significant
ramifications. That said, all are designed for European decision-makers, in the hope of drawing their attention to
foreign and security policy aspects which are potentially overlooked, and all are extrapolated from ongoing and recent
developments. Just like the first EUISS Report ‘What if... Conceivable crises: Unpredictable in 2017, unmanageable in
2020?’,5 the scenarios follow the same structure, presenting three strategic instants in time: the moment the event itself
takes place (2021), the years following it (2021-2025), and the time where the developments leading to it are taking
place (2019).

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 This is Fiery Cross island. It's a little more than one square mile in size and it's home
to a Chinese military base. There's a 10,000 foot airstrip, an advanced radar station, a missile
defense system, and about 200 troops. But the strangest thing about Fiery Cross Island is that
two years ago, it didn't exist. And neither did the six other Chinese military bases that have
been built on man-made islands in the South China Sea. If you look at this satellite image from
2014, you can see huge Chinese ships collecting around remote reefs in the Spratly Islands.
An archipelago in the South China Sea. In this image, these ships are rapidly pumping sand
and rock up onto the reef. They're building islands. And less than a year later, the Chinese had
seaports air bases and buildings on their new islands and the world had taken notice. We
continue our look this morning on what China does not want you to see the superpower is
reclaiming land in seven spots in the South China Sea adding on average more than three-
and-a-half acres every day. With these island times trying to lay claim to one of the most
important areas of ocean in the world the South China Sea.
The South China Sea is incredibly rich in natural resources 11 billion barrels of oil, 190
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and ten percent of the world's fisheries. Most importantly
though, 30% of the world's shipping trade flows through here to the booming population
center and economic markets of Southeast Asia. It's an extremely important body of water
and right now five countries lay claim to some part of it. Now, most countries base their claim
off the UN Law of the Seas, which says a country's territorial waters extend 200 miles off their
shore. An area called the exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. Countries have exclusive rights to
all the resources and trade in there EEZ. It's their sovereign territory. So for example, any oil
that's found within 200 miles off the coast of Vietnam belongs exclusively to Vietnam. But any
area that isn't in an EEZ is regarded as international waters and it falls under UN maritime law
which means everybody shares it. Now, every country in the South China Sea region uses this
200-mile EEZ threshold to determine its claims. All except China.
China argued they have a historical claim to the South China Sea dating back to naval
expeditions in the 15th century. And they mark it using a really confusing border called the
nine-dash line. Following World War II, Japan who had dominated the entire region, lost all
control of its surrounding seas. China used the moment to claim the South China Sea by
drawing this imprecise line on the map that encompassed ninety percent of the South China
Sea. It became known as the nine-dash line. When the UN established the 200-mile EEZ in
1973 China stuck to its own line, refusing to clarify its boundaries and ignoring claims by other
countries.
Now that brings us to the Spratly Islands. It's a remote barely inhabited cluster of
islands currently claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The Spratlys are
both geographically and symbolically at the heart of South China Sea. That's because any
country that can claim the Spratly islands can extend their EEZs to include them and gain
exclusive rights to the surrounding territory. But it's really hard to legitimately claim
uninhabited piles of sand so a few nations have built small buildings and ports on their
claimed islands and even stuck a few people there. But China believes all the Spratly Islands
belong to them which brings us back to why they're building islands there. Installing military
bases on these new artificial islands took the dispute to a whole new level showing how
China's potentially willing to defend its claims with force.
Now this is about when the United States took notice. While the US has no claim in
the South China Sea, it is the world's lone superpower and uses its massive Navy to defend
international waters. China sees the US presence in the area as an encroachment in their
backyard. When a US destroyer ship sailed just 12 miles off the shore of one of China's man-

3
made islands and the Spratlys. China sent out their own destroyer and a patrol boat as a
warning. China is building these islands in order to increase control around the surrounding
waters. Using a strategy that they've deemed "The Cabbage Strategy". Where they surround
a contested island with as many ships as possible. In May of 2013, China sent several ships to
Ayungin shoal, which is just 105 nautical miles off the coast of the Philippines, well within that
200 mile EEZ. The Philippines has eight soldiers stationed there. Like wrapping leaves around
a cabbage the Chinese sealed off the Philippines access to Ayungin Shoal with fishing boats,
surveillance ships, and navy destroyers creating blockade so that the Filipinos can't receive
shipments of food and supplies. By building their own man-made Islands China's essentially
building naval bases. The more Islands they have the more ships they can support and more
territory they can slowly take control of. And the Chinese cautiously use the cabbage strategy
in the Spratly islands, taking over contested territory but in small steps avoiding the possibility
of igniting a bigger conflict.
But the disputes are intensifying. Countries are now actively arresting trespassers in
waters that they claim and China could go a step further. Since 2015 they've threatened to
declare an air identification zone above the South China Sea, declaring that all aircraft that fly
through it would need Chinese permission. Now, publicly China insists that their intentions
are not militaristic but their actions say otherwise and it's heightening tensions in the region
Steve Bannon who sits on the US National Security Council and who is one of President
Trump's closest advisors is almost certain that the US will go to war in the South China Sea.
"We're going to war in the South China Sea, I was a sailor there, a naval officer, we're going
to war the South China Sea in five to ten years aren't we?" "there's no doubt about it" But for
now the disputes remain only in the legal and diplomatic realms that only occasionally break
into minor clashes. In July 2016 the international court at the Hague ruled in favor of the
Philippines who charged China with invading their rightful territory in the South China Sea.
China dismissed the ruling and enforcement of the law doesn't seem likely. Even from the US
who released a vague statement urging the two countries to "clarify their claims" and "work
together to resolve their disputes" which is another way of saying "we don't really want to
deal with this". In fact, as the conflict escalates and international courts get involved, the US
is stuck in a tricky position. On one hand, they do not want to risk provoking a conflict with
China. But on the other they want China to stop bullying their allies in the region. Up until
now the US has managed the situation by continuing to patrol through the South China Sea.
It's also likely that the US would fly fighter jets above the sea if China actually does declare an
air identification zone. These are symbolic but effective ways of keeping Chine in check while
not getting too involved in the details of the conflict. So far the disputes in the South China
Sea have not become violent but countries are starting to defend their claims by increasing
troop numbers, weaponizing their territory and provoking each other. It's a complex situation
that will continue to gain international attention for better or for worse.

4
 The South China Sea - As well as claiming disputed land, China has also claimed islands
in the South China Sea. In fact, China has taken to dredging the sea and building out
uninhabited islands such as Woody Island or the Spratly Islands to tighten its control over the
region. Six countries: The Philippines, Vietnam, China, Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia hold
different territorial, sometimes overlapping claims over the South China sea, based on various
historical accounts and geography. Adding to the tension, the US navy frequently patrols the
sea due to its alliance with several countries. China considers this to be provocation. The
South China Sea is very important to Beijing because it’s a crucial commercial passage
connecting Asia with Europe and Africa. One third of global shipping or $3.37 trillion USD
dollars of international trade passes through the South China Sea. Furthermore, the seabed
is rich with major oil and gas reserves. The US Energy Information Administration estimates
the region contains at least 11 billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas. Also the South China Sea is a vital food source, accounting for 10% of the world’s fisheries.
In July 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled that China had no “historic rights”
over the sea and that some of the rocky outcrops claimed by several countries could not
legally be used as the basis for territorial claims. Beijing rejected the ruling. More recently
some southeast Asian nations have considered having bilateral talks with China to settle the
dispute. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN has been working with China to
create an official code of conduct to avoid clashes in the disputed waters.

The South China Sea is 5,000 kilometers away from Australia it's one of the world's
largest global trading routes and there are large oil and gas reserves there that are contested
and eyed by various countries around that maritime area but the biggest problem for
Australia it's emerged as a flashpoint for two of our largest trading and security partners since
the Trump administration has come in the war of words over the South China Sea has certainly
been raised especially after the new US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said this during his
confirmation hearing China's Island building the South China Sea is an illegal taking of
disputed areas without regard for international norms the Trump administration has since
dialed back see rhetoric and has said that dialogue is the proper means for resolving disputes
this is the series of dashes that seem to encircle the South China Sea that have been appearing
on Chinese maps since 1947 and they say that it highlights China's historical maritime claims
to this area the main groups of islands that you'll be hearing about have been the Scarborough
Shoal and the Spratly Islands the Spratlys about 500 miles from China the Scarborough Shoal
is probably seen as closer to the Philippines and was forcibly seized in 2012 by the Chinese
from the Philippines so what's quite everyone so upset a whole group of countries Vietnam
the Philippines Taiwan and China have been variously occupying and building on these this
group of islands for some time what has really raised tensions is China's recent activity over
the last few years to build airstrip to build up Islands and to allegedly militarize some analysts
have argued that China's buildup in the South China Sea has been a direct response to the
Obama administration in 2011 using the Australian Parliament in Canberra to announce
America's pivot to Asia as a Pacific nation the United States will play a larger and long-term
role in shaping this region and its future year after China seized control of this scar patrol the
Philippines lodged a dispute with the hague to try and determine once and for all this chinese
claim of sovereignty based on the nine dash line in 2016 the hague finally delivered its verdict

5
dismissing any Chinese historical claims in the South China Sea and criticizing the Chinese
government for the environmental damage that had been inflicted on the islands by this land
reclamation activity the Chinese government dismissed The Hague ruling as illegal and said it
would ignore it and in the Philippines a change in the Philippine government has seen a
dramatic change of events the new president has drawn closer to China and has said that he
would like to see the dispute resolved in negotiations between the two countries Australia
has been under pressure from the United States to join it on its so called freedom of
navigation patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese claim territory in the South China
Sea today to Australia has not done so so what's Australia's position being the Australian
government has repeated that Australia doesn't take sides it's asked all claimants in this
dispute in the South China Sea to respect the international rules based order it believes in
unimpeded trade and in freedom of navigation questions are now being asked about whether
Australia traditionally backed by the u.s. in the Pacific from a defense point of view needs to
be pursuing a far more independent defence policy

Since 2001, the "ASEAN Summit" takes place annually. It is a meeting of the heads of state
and government, where current problems are discussed and solutions are worked out. On
15th December, 2008, the ASEAN Charter came into force, giving the association the status
of a legal person. Principles of non-intervention and consensual decision-taking remained
unchanged by the Charter and became part of it. (This neutrality, being of top priority shall
protect the economic cooperation but also faces criticism, since it means that in very few
cases decisions are taken). Decisions are generally made by consensus; no member can be
forced to something. As a result, the group rarely appears to be closed.

From ASEAN point of view, the Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea is very
important step in a resolution or leading to resolution, and COC must be substantive, it must
be effective and it must comply with the International Rule of Law. These are fundamental
principles upon which, you know, all consensus building mechanism or agreement must be
based on.
First, of course, is to build confidence. We have to know each other despite the differences,
to find way to build confidences, if not trust, and pushing for multilateral exercises and indeed
we have had multilateral exercise in fighting terrorism. We have been doing ASEAN-China
multilateral exercise, ASEAN-China multilateral exercise. The goal is to work out confidence-
building measure between ASEAN and US and ASEAN and China, in terms of avoiding
attentions and avoiding conflicts or accidents.
But you are right frictions between US and China have been encouraging both sides to find
common ground and more ways to communicate.
10 ADM, 10 AFM

Well during ADM, ASEAN is confidence to finish the draft by 2021.

6
Phillipines’ position->

China’s position-> By 2021, Beijing already controlled the entirety of the South China Sea
(SCS) militarily: large military bases were present on Woody Island, Mischief Reef and Fiery
Cross Reef, in addition to advanced outposts on seven other atolls in the Spratly Island group,
which were equipped with missile defence systems, airfields and communications facilities.

China has aimed to elevate bilateral trade with ASEAN to US$ 1 trillion by 2020. Indeed,
China–ASEAN trade volume increased to almost US$500 billion in 2015. China has also been
ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, while ASEAN has remained China’s third largest
trading partner since 2011. The two-way trade reached US$443.6 billion in 2013, increasing
11% year on year and accounting for about 15% of ASEAN’s total trade. China–ASEAN trade
increased 8.23% in 2014, with US$480.4 billion (Huaxia, 2015). In 2013, China contributed a
measly 2.3% of ASEAN’s total foreign direct investment inflows, while ASEAN received US$8.9
billion in foreign direct investment inflows from China, accounting for 7.1% of total inflows to
ASEAN in 2014.

China has become a major source of tourists for ASEAN. According to ASEAN statistics, ASEAN
received around 12.65 million tourists from China in 2013, or a growth of 36.3% compared
with 9.28 million in 2012.

A strong, effective, and united ASEAN remains the best option of development to navigate
the region’s unprecedented changes with a way of ASEAN centrality. With the advocacy of
ASEAN centrality, it will enhance the ASEAN to play a stronger role towards great powers.
Simply put, the regional consensus of ASEAN centrality is a strategy not too dependent on
either China or the United States. Such a genuine balance between world powers may ensure
and enhance peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

US’ position-> in the past three years China has rapidly expanded construction on reefs in
waters claimed by several nations we must push back on problematic behavior a Senate
hearing this week heard Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel and other officials urged
China to stop the Construction US officials see building on the reefs as a power play to exert
control over international waters we claim the right of innocent passage in such areas and we
exercise that right regularly both in the South China Sea and globally and we're going to
continue exercising that right both on the surface of the water and in the air images from
Google Earth have documented China's work on four reefs Assistant Secretary of Defense
shear and Assistant Secretary of State Russel assured lawmakers the US would continue to
maintain military superiority through the deployment of aircraft and combat ships in the
region we'll have no shortage of capabilities and assets throughout the region to back our
diplomacy and ensure deterrence and ensure national security the US and others are greatly
interested in maintaining the international status of the waters as the South China Sea is one
of the world's busiest shipping routes our strategy and our actions are designed to protect
rules not protect rocks Shearer testified that the US has time to convince China to stop
construction on the reefs since the Chinese won't near completion of an air-filled project in
the sea until at least 2017 or 2018 but some lawmakers are concerned u.s. efforts to deter
China from building structures might soon be too little too late

7
ASEAN’s position-> ASEAN has been maintaining strong relations with traditional players like
US Japan and the EU since the foundation of ASEAN. They have been working with Japan US
and EU very closely, at the same time ASEAN also outreaching emerging powers like China
and India especially with the China in the belt and road initiative. So, ASEAN is trying to
outreach basically to everyone and therefore it is known as the ASEAN Centrality, like
mentioned by many state’s leader in their speech. In that sense, ASEAN is trying to maintain
peace and prosperity by working with all the partied concerned
Despite the existence of a binding Code of Conduct in the SCS, adopted in early 20212 to
prevent the escalation of tensions, dip- lomatic channels and emergency hotlines were of
little value as they only applied to military manoeuvres and governmental vessels.

EU’s position -> on June 30th the EU and Vietnam signed a historic defense agreement the
first in Southeast Asia the agreement paves the way for Viet Nam's participation in European
military missions peacekeeping operations and tighter defense cooperation and comes as
Europe extends its strategic ambition to East Asia just when China is challenging the existing
order the European powers are keen on maintaining robust and fruitful relations with Beijing
they have rightly shown their willingness to uphold a rules-based order in the region in recent
years the UK and France have stepped up their naval presence in China's adjacent waters
while the EU and its key members have fortified economic and strategic relations with smaller
Southeast Asian states. there are reasons for European to get involved in East Asia it is
consistent with the EU is principles and strategic doctrine Wallet has remained neutral
about territorial and maritime spats in the South China Sea its 2016 global strategy calls on
member states to uphold freedom of navigation respect the law of the sea and encourage
the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes moreover its 2014 maritime security strategy
expects EU members armed forces to play a strategic role at sea and from the sea
undertaking the full spectrum of maritime responsibilities this includes crucially supporting
freedom of navigation in international waters and deterring illicit activities. given its
additional commitment to maintaining maritime security in the South China Sea it certainly
seems that China's relentless militarization of the disputes poses a direct threat to these basic
values the EU has already signed similar defense deals with key US allies such as Australia
which have also raised concerns over Chinese assertiveness in their neighborhood both
powers however have signaled their deep commitment to uphold freedom of navigation and
overflight in China's maritime backyard in fact the UK has announced its intention to deploy
the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier to the South China Sea while working with France on joint
maritime exercises and enhancing the ability to operate together in military situations with
Japan India and Australia across the Indo Pacific the greater European contribution to peace
and stability in the region makes it clear that rising tensions in East Asia are not being left to
a cynical sino-american superpower rivalry instead we are witnessing multilateral efforts
among like-minded powers to protect international public goods and constrain China's
maritime ambitions Europe should become a bigger part of this collective movement to
preserve a rules-based order in Asia.

The European Union, a global trading power, has significant economic, political, and
principled stakes in the SCS. Dependent on maritime traffic and trade with its partners in East
Asia, the EU has a vital interest in maintaining a stable, open and safe regional maritime
security environment. As a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and a founding
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Union also has solid legal and political

8
foundations for its argument to play a greater role in security developments in East Asia.
Finally, Brussels is strongly posi tioned as a defender of a rules-based international order,
which is also anchored in its new Global Strategy. The latter is essential in light of the ongoing
arbitration case. While not taking a position on sovereignty, the EU has always promoted
peaceful solutions to the territorial disputes in the SCS, urging parties to cooperate, exercise
self-restraint, and abide by international law (and UNCLOS especially) when resolv- ing their
disputes. When preparing its statement for the upcoming award, the Union needs to remain
consistent with its own principles and adopt a firm, united position.

It was the conclusion of this panel that in order to help manage disputes in the short term, it
is imperative for each stakeholder to show restraint (on the seas and at the negotiating table),
continue to develop bilateral and multilateral relations, show respect for one another, always
be ready and willing to have consultation, and to emphasize cooperation.

The panel concluded by looking at the development of ocean governance in the South China
Sea and debated the role of UNCLOS in the region. Most of the time, when academics discuss
the South China Sea, they overwhelmingly look at just the disputes. Discussions on the role
of ocean governance are typically not given the weight it needs. Each coastal nation in the
South China Sea tries very hard to manage the region under what it considers to be its national
boundaries and limits and each of these states also has different interpretations of how
international policy should be implemented. Examples of ocean governance initiatives include
ecosystem-based management, marine protected areas, the Coral Triangle Initiative, and
community-based management. In situations where these initiatives or other situations lead
to the potential of igniting potential disputes, UNCLOS has a dual role: it should
simultaneously be utilized as an international regime that allows for internal coherence and
external relations. However, as a framework for ocean governance and dispute settlement in
the South China Sea, its effectiveness will largely be based on state practice.

The panel began with a discussion of UNCLOS Article 197 and ocean governance and their
relationship with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Ocean governance
encompasses a wide swath of national and international institutions, which involve a
combination of lateral, top-down, and bottom-up management systems. However, it was
noted that transboundary impacts to countries outside of these agreements are often
unaccounted for, which can lead to increased tensions. The panel posited that pursuing
governance mechanisms that enhance regional security, such as promoting agreements,
treaties, or codes of conduct, can also fall in line with U.N. Sustainable Development Goal 14,
which aims to sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems from
environmental degradation.

8th Asia-Pacific/Arctic Maritime Security Forum to be held in China in 2020

Professor Aldo Chircop, the Canada Research Chair in Maritime Law and Policy (Tier 1), at
Dalhousie University’s Schulich School of Law, served as the third panel’s moderator. This
panel explored UNCLOS Article 287, which allows States that have ratified the Convention the
option to choose various forms of settlement disputes. The panel explored some of the

9
options provided, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

The panel began with a discussion on Part XV of UNCLOS and the question of whether
compulsory adjudication should be a necessary feature of law for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. Within the history of UNCLOS, it was noted that dispute settlement by adjudication
has been rare, with compulsory adjudication being even rarer. As a result, there is potential
for both procedural and substantive fragmentation, over-reach, and room for ‘salami-slicing’
tactics that could undermine maritime stability.

The panel continued with a discussion of the realities in East Asia, especially in the South
China Sea and the East China Sea and their challenge to effective dispute settlement. It was
noted that all the coastal states in this area have strengthened their construction of coast
guard and maritime law enforcement capabilities. However, given the large disparities in
capacity and management system, it would be a challenging task for countries to balance the
safeguarding of maritime rights and crisis control measures. In this regard, the panel assessed
the ICJ as a procedure of choice for maritime dispute settlement.

The panel began by addressing the U.S. experience related to maritime law enforcement.
Although the United States is not a signatory of UNCLOS, the U.S. Coast Guard respects and
acknowledges most of the essence of the UNCLOS due to the fact that the U.S. regards the
regime of the oceans as a rule-based system. This system creates a balance between coastal
states’ sovereign rights, flag state sovereignty, and the freedom of navigation on the high
seas. UNCLOS, together with other international treaties, helps define the rules that apply to
the enforcement performance of the U.S. Coast Guard.

The panel continued with a discussion of some of the key variables that the Canadian
maritime legal forces try to deal with, especially in the Arctic context. Canada is putting a lot
of effort into its law enforcement capabilities in the Arctic region. The panel pointed out that
Canada’s real focus is less on security but more on the norms. Canada concentrates on how
to deal with the complex political environment, when more and more countries are getting
involved in the Arctic region, and how to build up the norms in the Arctic for Canada to
guarantee a high functionality of its legal enforcement that protects Canada’s interests.

The panel also discussed the regional maritime enforcement agencies in Southeast Asian
waters that are tasked with duties related to maritime defense, safety and security as distinct
from navies as a non-traditional force. The discussion highlighted that lack of resources,
access, and integration of maritime law enforcement agencies among Southeast Asian
countries make their capability insufficient for properly policing Southeast Asian waters. The
panel suggested that the countries of Southeast Asia ought to fill the vacuum in their domestic
context and collaborate more with their regional partners.

The panel began with an introduction on the role of nonprofits in protecting the marine
environment through marine spatial planning. Clear Seas, a Canadian nonprofit was created
out of concern that the Canadian marine industry, such as the transport of oil and LNGs, was

10
subject to misinformation. In order to bring awareness to the public and lawmakers of the
impacts these industries have on the marine environment, Clear Seas looks at hazards related
to the transportation of all commodities in Canadian waters and informs the public on
relevant maritime laws that regulate these industries. The panelists posited that promoting
the continual improvement of the shipping industry and improving public understanding and
confidence is a critical first step towards ensuring adequate regulations and enforcement
measures are in place.

The panel continued by raising the question of whether emission standards in the Arctic and
the South China Sea should be scaled up. The shipping industry emits harmful pollutants such
as nitrogen oxide, sulfur oxide, volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, and of course,
carbon dioxide. Air pollution has a clear impact on human health, the environment, and the
climate, with coastal communities being particularly vulnerable to these effects. Although
ship emissions in both regions are subject to international standards under Annex VI of
MARPOL, protections remain inadequate. The panel suggested that one mechanism that
should be explored as a potential pathway is to institute emission control areas in each region,
which would have the dual effect of promoting cooperation from participating states.

The panel continued with a discussion on potential regulatory strategies related to heavy fuel
oil (HFO) for Arctic shipping. In 2011, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted
a ban on the use and transportation of HFOs in Antarctic waters, which has come into effect.
Since then, there has been debate amongst the IMO, Arctic Council, industry associations,
and environmental NGOs about whether to adopt a similar policy for Arctic waters. However,
indigenous peoples have not directly been part of the conversation. Challenges continue to
exist that have stalled the creation of an HFO regulatory strategy, and which must be dealt
with through holistic approaches.

The panel concluded with an examination of oil spill preparedness and response cooperation
in Northeast Asia, looking at the case of the Sanchi Incident. Although there were sufficient
amounts of information sharing amongst countries involved in the response and cleanup,
such as China, Japan, and South Korea, the collective response was still considered
inadequate. There was insufficient knowledge or training on how to properly deal with the
type of oil that spilled – cargo condensate, which led to a failure in properly understanding
the scope of the spill.

While the legal battle in The Hague continues, the SCS remains largely ungoverned, and much
of its rich marine biodiversity suffers as a result. Pending the settlement of sovereignty
disputes on land, UNCLOS urges parties to put in place ‘provisional arrangements of a
practical nature’ and cooperate on the management of resourc- es. The unique marine
ecosystem of the SCS sustains the livelihood of the coastal populations, as well as offering
vast opportunities for scientific research. Joint de- velopment of resources is often advocated
for its theoretical potential to appease tensions and build confidence. Why this has not been
easy in the case of the SCS is examined by Christian Schultheiss, who offers a comprehensive
study of China’s (as well as other parties’) attitude to joint development, highlighting the
obstacles to the implementation of such initiatives. Setting borders aside, Werner Ekau, an
ex- pert on tropical marine biology, looks at the SCS from the fisheries perspective. The SCS is
part of a single Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) – a UN regime designed for ecologically

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sensitive marine areas that need to be managed in an integrated man- ner, through effective
cooperation among the coastal states

The position of international actors, and in this case of the European Union, is the last missing
piece in the broader SCS security puzzle. Mindful of its interests (and those of its member
states), Brussels maintains a common position of ‘principled neutrality’, all the while
cultivating good diplomatic relations with its trading part- ners. How can this position have a
positive impact on regional security? Mathieu Duchatel argues that the EU needs to support
its position with a consistent policy vis-à-vis China and other involved parties in order to
demonstrate its credibility as a security actor in the region.

Spratly island -> 44 of the 51 small islands and reefs close to Palawan island.
International shipping through the SCS’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), which carry
80% of global trade by volume, therefore became vulnerable, raising the risks and costs for
shipping companies.

2019: 1. Unresolved sovereignty disputes

2. Lack of collective ocean governance and sea-water management regime
3. China’s unstoppable building of artificial islands in SCS

2021: 1. Oil Spill happen due to collision of China’s military tanker with the other claimant’s
Tanker (Philippines)
2. Massive anti-China protest spread around Philippines and across Southeast Asia
3. Government of littoral countries and traditional security players loses control of
situation and escalate the conflict

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