!G.R. No.

184789 February 23, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY, Accused-Appellant.
!FACTS:
!Version of the Prosecution
!At the trial, the State presented as witnesses poseur buyer PO1 Percival Mendoza, and Makati Anti-Drug
Abuse Council (MADAC) Operative Miguel Castillo.
!The police and MADAC operatives apprehended the appellant during a buy-bust operation conducted on
Guiho Street, Barangay Cembo, Makati City at around 4:40 p.m. on March 14, 2005.6 The buy-bust team
had been formed with prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) after P/
Insp. Marietto Valerio, the Action Officer of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force
(SAID-SOTF), had received information from a concerned citizen about the appellant,7 whose name was
on the police watch list, engaging in the illegal sale of drugs.8 The buy-bust money, which consisted of
two ₱100.00 bills marked with C4, the acronym for Cluster 4 of the MADAC demarcating the area of
operation,9 was handed over to PO1 Mendoza as the designated poseur-buyer.10 The buy-bust team and
the confidential informant then proceeded to the target area on board a Toyota Revo.11 The informant and
PO1 Mendoza alighted from the Toyota Revo upon reaching Guiho Street to await the arrival of the
appellant.12 When she finally arrived, the informant introduced PO1 Mendoza to her as someone in need
of shabu.13 She asked PO1 Mendoza how much he wanted to buy.14 The latter replied: Katorse lang po.15
She asked for the payment; hence, PO1 Mendoza gave her the marked bills.16 Upon receiving the marked
bills, she went into an alley and returned shortly thereafter with two plastic sachets containing suspected
shabu.17 Picking one of the plastic sachets, PO1 Mendoza tucked it in his right front secret pocket, which
was the pre-arranged signal to alert the rest of the buy-bust team about the consummation of the sale.18 At
the same time, PO1 Mendoza held her by the hand to arrest her.19 Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal,
the rest of the buy-bust team, including MADAC Operative Castillo, rushed forward, and assisted PO1
Mendoza in apprehending her. After apprising her of her constitutional rights, PO1 Mendoza asked her to
empty her pockets, and when she complied, here covered the buy-bust money from her.20 He also
recovered the other plastic sachet from her right hand.21
PO1 Mendoza required the appellant to board the Toyota Revo. It was inside the vehicle where he marked
the plastic sachets with his initials PCM for the sachet subject of the sale, and PCM-1 for the sachet
recovered from her right hand.22
The buy-bust team brought the appellant and the confiscated items to the office of the SAID-SOTF for
documentation and investigation.23 The team later brought her and the confiscated items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for testing and examination.24 Her urine sample and the white crystalline substances contained
in the two plastic sachets tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu.25
!!
Version of the Defense
!The appellant was the lone witness of the Defense.
The appellant denied the charges, and insisted that she had been the victim of a frame-up. According to
her, she was cleaning the house of Gona Gonzales at No. 94 Guiho Street, Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
for whom she worked as househelper.26 She later on went out to buy rice and on her way to the store, two
men approached and announced her that they were able to buy shabu from her.27 One of the men poked
his gun at her. They then brought her to the basketball court, where they frisked and ordered her to bring
out the shabu.28 They recovered money amounting to ₱180.00 from her.29 They asked if she knew anyone
selling shabu, but she answered them in the negative.30 They brought her to the MADAC office where she
remained for a day.31 She was later taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug testing. She admitted
using shabu only once, a year prior to her arrest.32
Judgment of the RTC
On September 15, 2006, the RTC convicted the appellant of the two offenses charged, ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is rendered as follows:
!1. In Criminal Case No. 05-568, the Court finds accused BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentences her to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱500,000.00) PESOS.
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-569, the Court finds the accused BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentences her to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum
to Fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱300,000.00) PESOS.
The period during which the accused was under detention shall be considered in her favor pursuant to
existing rules.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to submit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) the
two (2) plastic sachets of shabu with a combined weight of zero point eighteen (0.18) gram for said
agency’s appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.33
!Decision of the CA
The appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the Prosecution’s patent non-compliance with the
requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 warranted her acquittal.
On May 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the conviction of the appellant,34 holding that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items had been safeguarded notwithstanding the Prosecution’s failure
to comply with the requirements prescribed under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165; and that her mere
denial and unsubstantiated defenses did not overcome the presumption of regularity of the buy-bust
operation over.
Issue
Did the CA err in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 2 and
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 charged?
!!
ISSUE: Did the CA err in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of
Section 2 and Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 charged? (YES)
!HELD:
!x x x x
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165,
states:
xxxx
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;
!x x x x
The foregoing procedure underscores the value of preserving the chain of custody in relation to the
dangerous drugs. To give effect to the procedure, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), which is the policy-
making and strategy-formulating body in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug
prevention and control tasked to develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced
national drug abuse prevention and control strategy,37 has defined chain of custody involving the
dangerous drugs and other substances in Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 200238 thusly:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition; (Emphasis supplied)
!With this concern for the due recording of the authorized movement and custody of the seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation as
evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs.39 This materiality derives from the dangerous drugs being themselves
the corpus delicti. Indeed, proof of the corpus delicti is essential in every judgment of conviction.40
Without proof of the corpus delicti, there is uncertainty about whether the crime really transpired
or not. To eliminate the uncertainty, the Prosecution should account for every link in the chain of
custody; otherwise, the crime is not established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section
5 of Republic Act No. 9165 either when the dangerous drugs are missing or when there are
substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.41
!A reading of the record indicates that the buy-bust team did not observe the procedures laid down
by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. The marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody because it is
the starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a two-fold function, the first
being togive to succeeding handlers of the specimens a reference, and the second being to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the
accused until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting,"
or contamination of evidence.42 This requirement of marking as laid down by the law was not complied
with. Firstly, PO1 Mendoza simply stated that he did the marking of the confiscated items with his
initials inside the Toyota Revo. Although the appellant was also inside the Toyota Revo at that time,
43 he did not state if his marking was done within the view of the appellant, or within the view of

any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected public official. Secondly,
both he and MADAC Operative Castillo did not indicate if any media or DOJ representative or
elected public official had been present during the buy-bust operation and when the drugs were
recovered from the appellant at the scene of the apprehension. The law unequivocally required such
presence. Thirdly, there was also no showing of any inventory of the confiscated items being undertaken
or prepared. The lack of the inventory was confirmed by the absence of any certificate of inventory being
formally offered as evidence by the Prosecution.44 Lastly, the Prosecution did not produce any
photographs taken of the sachets of shabu immediately following their seizure.
!The last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 provides a saving
mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the safeguards to preserve the chain of
custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution’s case against the accused. However, in order for such
saving mechanism to apply, the Prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses in the prescribed
procedures and then explain the lapse or lapses.45 Here, however, the Prosecution did not bother to show
that a media representative, DOJ representative or elected public official had been notified of the buy-bust
operation or, assuming that the DOJ representative or public official had been so priorly informed, the
lawmen did not explain why none of such representatives was around to witness the actual marking of the
evidence. Indeed, the Prosecution did not even try to show that the application of the saving mechanism
provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 would be justified. Under the
circumstances, the identification of the seized evidence in court during the trial became ambiguous and
unreliable, rendering the proof of the links in the chain of custody of the corpus delicti unworthy of belief.
Where the State did not establish a preserved chain of custody of the dangerous drugs according to the
statutory procedure for doing so, we have no need to review the claim of the appellant about her being
framed up on trumped-up charges. In view of the presumption of her innocence, she did not need to
explain her arrest for the crimes charged against her. The presumption should be overcome only by strong
evidence of her guilt.
!DISPOSTIVE:
!WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 28, 2008 by
the Court of Appeals; ACQUITS appellant BEVERLY ALAGARME y CITOY on the ground of the
failure of the Prosecution to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and ORDERS her IMMEDIATE
RELEASE from the Correctional Institute for Women of the Bureau of Corrections, unless she is confined
for another lawful cause.
!!
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!
!!
!!
!People vs. Bio G.R. No. 195850 (2015)
!!
Summary:
Abola Bio was arrested in a buy-bust operation. He was found guilty of violation of Sec. 5 (Illegal Sale)
and Sec. 11 (illegal possession) under RA 9165. One of his defenses is that he was denied due process
because he was not assisted with counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings.The Court held
that the fact that he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings does not
in any way affect his culpability.
!Doctrines:
It has already been held that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. Here, appellant’s conviction
was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution
witness.
!Facts:
At around 9:00 p.m. of September 8, 2003, an asset reported to Police Superintendent Nilo Wong, Chief
of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Unit (SAID-SOTU), Novaliches Police Station,
the alleged illegal drugs activities of Abola Bio.
!
P/Supt. Wong immediately formed a team. The team then proceeded to the designated area along Ramirez
St., Brgy. Nova Proper. Upon arrival thereat an hour later, the asset introduced PO2 Salonga to the
appellant as a buyer of shabu.
!After a brief conversation, appellant agreed to the sale. PO2 Salonga handed to appellant the two 100-
peso bills and, in turn, the latter gave the former a plastic sachet.
!After trial, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It ruled that the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs have been established.
!CA affirmed.
!Issue:
WON the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime. (NO)
!WON appellant was denied due process because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation
and inquest proceedings (NO, see Ratio)
!Ratio:
As correctly observed by the CA, this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without offending
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
!Besides, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings does
not in any way affect his culpability.
!It has already been held that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
!Here, appellant’s conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on the
testimony of the prosecution witness.
!Dispositive: CA decision affirmed.
!!
! ——o0o——
!!
People vs. Galleno
G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998.
!
!
FACTS:
!Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to leave the
province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her younger
brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and
aunt, Penicola Obligar.
!
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral
Galleno, known well to Evelyn’s family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars’ abode as he was paying
court to Emeterio’s eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the sugarcane plantation owned
by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all earlier left for school. The only persons left in the
house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his
pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars’ residence and found the two children left
to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said
residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in
profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution’s version of what took place at the Obligars’ residence is based on the testimony of
Evelyn herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her.
Accused-appellant’s father Raul Galleno was also called to the witness stand and he testified that he
learned about the arrest of his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995, p. 6). The following day, he
went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened to her. The child allegedly answeredthat a
finger was accidentally inserted into her genital organ, but that Penicola who was then present, butted into
the conversation and told Raul Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted (Ibid., p.
8).
!ISSUES:
!1.) WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY
AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED
PARTY’S VAGINA
!2.)
WON THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED THE RIGHT
OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN
THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED
!HELD:
!1.) One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim, and more especially so for a
5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our consideration of the matter before us, we set aside
emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in drawing conclusions.
Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the three expert witnesses
presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr. Machael
Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended party, is not
impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not
sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim’s vagina; that Dr. Lañada herself testified that Evelyn
told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition, accused-
appellant banks on the victim’s testimonyon cross-examination, that it was the finger of accused-appellant
which caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to accused-appellant’s father, Raul Galleno.
We are not persuaded.
!As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court’s
duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved (Francisco,
Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of
witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that
either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a
judgment (Ibid., p. 886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of
doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim’s laceration, but also the testimony
of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely
solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes
of the victim’s laceration does not mean that the trial court’s inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis
which was inserted in the victim’s vagina (People vs. Cañada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). In rape, the
important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the
male organ (People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the
part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding
of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn’s declarations, particularly as to what really caused the
laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
!2) Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that he was deprived of a fair and impartial
trial since the trial court showed bias by discounting his testimony, and by actually participating in the
cross-examination of accused-appellant.
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198 [1996]) that a judge may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify
obscure and incomplete details after the witness has given direct testimony. And such discretion to
question witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their testimony cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue
interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge extensively propounds questions to the
witnesses which will have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for one of the parties. We
have, however, carefully examined the record and transcript of stenographic notes of the instant case. The
trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did propound questions but this was done only for
clarification purposes and not to build the case for one of the parties. For instance, accused-appellant, in
his brief, refers to the questions propounded by the trial court on his act of cajoling the child. A perusal of
the line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the trial court, but pure clarification.
!DISPOSITIVE:
!WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
!!
!!
——o0o——
!!
!
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158203. March 31, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG,
Appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152, convicting appellants Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang of
two counts of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering them to pay damages to the heirs of the victims.
Appellants were charged under an Information which reads:
That on or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Pamplona Coconut
Plantation, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab
and hack ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos, with which the said
accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon ALICIA CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the temporal bones 4 inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital bone and the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm
and upon SANTIAGO CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the ear to the lateral part of the
orbital bones.
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall measuring 4 inches in depth 2
inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel protruding the intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1 inch in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six) inches below the armpit 5 inches in
depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring finger.
which wounds or injuries caused the death of said ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY shortly
thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.2
On arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr. Rogelio Kadili, and Alexander Ebias.3
Their testimonies constitute the version of the case according to the prosecution's point of view.
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his neighbors, the spouses
Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the
Pamplona Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that Santiago saw appellants
drinking tuba inside Ana's store, and offered them a glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just
drank the glass of beer he was offering.4 After that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a
shortcut through the coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning something sinister
because they followed too closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno cautioned
Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about appellants.5 Magno and the spouses simply
continued walking for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway that let water from
the river into the plantation. Magno removed his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses.
Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because Santiago had to remove his shoes.6
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his companions and
saw appellants attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago on the head and
stabbed his abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.7
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he reached Alexander
Ebias's house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio Makapa, Mangoto,
Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.8 He decided to
spend the night there.9
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or Rolando about what he saw at the
waterway because he was afraid. Magno added that he left Rolando's house around 6:30 the next morning
to report the incident at the municipal hall in the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning
by members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of Picio Yan, where he had to attend to
some personal business. Magno declared that he did not report to them that appellants killed the spouses.
10 It was only after he was turned over to the police authorities of Pamplona and brought to the police

station that he reported what he saw the day before at the waterway in the plantation.11
Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural Health Unit, Pamplona, Negros Oriental,
testified that he conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims at around 7:00 a.m. on July 15,
1991.12 The results of his examination showed the wounds on Santiago and Alicia Catipay as follows:
[Santiago Catipay]
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the ear to the lateral part of the
orbital bones
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall measuring 4 inches in depth 2
inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel protruding the intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1 inch in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six) inches below the armpit 5 inches in
depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring finger;13
[Alicia Catipay]
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the temporal bones 4 inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital bone and the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm.14
Dr. Kadili likewise identified the death certificates of Santiago and Alicia Catipay which showed the
cause of death as hemorrhage shock.15
Alexander Ebias, who lives near the waterway at the Pamplona Coconut Plantation, testified that around
the time Santiago and Alicia were murdered, he heard noise from the direction of the waterway, but did
not do anything to investigate. Moments later, he heard Magno calling from outside the house. Magno
wanted some dried coconut leaves to make a torch. He gave Magno what he wanted then asked about the
noise from the waterway. Magno said he did not know.16
For its part, the defense contradicted the version of the prosecution and presented Analyn Andagan,
Conchito Nilas,17 Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that appellants were nowhere near the waterway
at the precise time that Santiago and Alicia Catipay were murdered.
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending the store of her mother, Ana Andagan, at
Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and Omatang arrived with
one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a gallon of tuba and started drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno
and the spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer and immediately left after finishing their beers.
Analyn further testified that appellants did not follow Magno, Santiago and Alicia when the three left her
mother's store. Appellant Omatang stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two companions,
appellant Calumpang and Conchito Nilas. He left when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph
Rabor, came to fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped
her close the store. He walked home with her and Conchito Nilas.18
Conchito Nilas's testimony dovetailed Analyn Andagan's testimony. He added that he saw his friend
appellant Calumpang go inside the latter's house.19
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyn's testimony that he fetched his uncle, appellant Omatang, from the
store around 7:00 p.m. upon the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant Omatang slept in the
same room that night.20
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyn's testimony that he left around 7:00 p.m. with Joseph.
He also claimed he had nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred that he was at home in
the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the spouses were murdered. He claimed that he learned of the
murders only upon his arrest the next day.21
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He declared that Santiago and Alicia had no
known enemies and were good people. He corroborated all of Analyn's testimony, and added that Magno
and Santiago were arguing when the two came into the store. Appellant Calumpang likewise averred that
after helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper, and went to bed.22
In addition to the above witnesses, the defense presented Rolando Retada and Visitacion Rabor. Rolando
confirmed that Magno spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very early the next morning
without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on the other hand, testified that she overheard Santiago
berating Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 1991. Santiago was mad at
Magno because Magno did not want to help Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno
was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued calling Magno useless at Ana's store until Alicia
prevailed upon Santiago to go home. When Santiago and Alicia left, Magno followed them.23
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of the murders.
Said the trial court:
The testimony of the lone eyewitness describing vividly the events prior, during and after the killing
offers a complete picture of the incident that only an eyewitness could supply. Moreover, the actuation of
witness Magno Gomez of not telling other people of the crime he just experience[d] for fear of his life,
and his coming back to town after sunrise. Even declining Retada's offer of a cup of coffee [and] to report
to the authorities the incident that he witnessed the night before, is consistent with human behavior and
should be accorded great respect and given more weight. (sic) His conduct after the incident added more
credibility to his testimony. As to the fear he exhibited after the killing of the spouses, the Supreme Court
has this to say "there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident
especially if the assailant (assailants in this case) is physically near. No standard form of behavioral
response, quite often said, could be expected from everyone when confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful occurrence.24
In its judgment dated November 29, 2002, the trial court convicted appellants as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, each accused, RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL
OMATANG are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and further ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay
the amount of PhP100,000.00, and to pay moral damages in the amount of PhP100,000.00. The bail bond
posted by both accused for their temporary liberty during the trial of this case is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant now assigns the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF MAGNO GOMEZ SINCE HE
WAS A PRINCIPAL SUSPECT HIMSELF. HIS TESTIMONY IS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES, AND MANY OF HIS CLAIMS ARE CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE; AND
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN CONCENTRATING ON THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE VAGUENESS AND
WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION'S LONE
EYEWITNESS.26
Essentially, for our resolution is the issue of whether the appellants' guilt for double murder has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to Magno Gomez's testimony, which is false
and unbelievable. They stress that Magno's testimony that he never saw Santiago try to escape during the
attacks contradicts his statements in his affidavit, executed during preliminary examination, that Santiago
tried to escape but was overtaken by appellants.27 They suspect that Magno was himself the killer, and
posit that because he was already a prime suspect, Magno accused appellants of the murder to save
himself.28 Appellants likewise argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi on the
ground that it was a weak defense.29
Significantly, for the State, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that reasonable doubt concerning
the guilt of the appellants exist in this case. The OSG stresses that material inconsistencies exist between
Magno's testimony in court and his affidavit, which he executed during the preliminary examination.30
The OSG cites that Magno testified that the spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with
appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang attacking Alicia. However, during the
preliminary examination, Magno declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that Santiago was
hacked because Santiago attempted to save his wife.31 Further, the fact that Magno was a principal
suspect and that he did not choose to exonerate himself right away when he was arrested for questioning
by members of the Philippine Army, render his credibility suspect.32 In addition, the OSG stresses that it
was not shown in this case that appellants had any ill motive to kill Santiago and Alicia Catipay.33 The
OSG concludes that appellants deserve acquittal on reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court overlooked pertinent pieces
of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded several significant facts and circumstances that cast
doubt on the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution's lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a
departure from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this Court.34
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that serious
discrepancies attended Magno's testimony in court and his sworn statement,35 executed during the
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Ananson E. Jayme on July 15, 1991, at the 1st Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose, Negros Oriental.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants "hacked Alicia Catipay first" and that
Santiago was attacked after "he attempted to save his wife." Magno declared that Santiago "attempted to
run away but he was chased" and "was overtaken and was hacked by both accused." Magno also claimed
that appellants tried to hack him after they had hacked Santiago. Magno said,
Q How did the hacking incident happen?cralawlibrary
A At first, it was Alicia who was hacked and followed by stabbing immediately Santiago was also
hacked and when he attempted to flee by crossing the [waterway] both accused stabbed Santiago and he
fell to the river.
Q When Alicia Catipay was hacked was she hit?cralawlibrary
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?cralawlibrary
A On [the] left side of her ear.
Q And who hacked her?cralawlibrary
A Both accused hacked her.
Q And who stabbed Alicia Catipay?cralawlibrary
A [Jovenal] Omatang.
Q Was Alicia Catipay hit?cralawlibrary
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?cralawlibrary
A At the stomach.
Q What weapon did Jovenal Omatang use in hacking and stabbing Alicia Catipay?cralawlibrary
A Bolo.
Q You said both accused hacked Alicia Catipay first, what did Santiago Catipay do?cralawlibrary
A He attempted to save his wife and instead he was hacked.
Q You said Santiago Catipay was hit what part of his body was hit when he was hacked by the accused?
cralawlibrary
A He was hit on his arm.
Q After he was hit on his arm what did he do?cralawlibrary
A He attempted to run away but he was chased.
Q Did Santiago Catipay succeed in escaping?cralawlibrary
A No, he was overtaken and was hacked by both accused.
Q When [Santiago] was overtaken by the accused what part of his body was hit when he was hacked?
cralawlibrary
A I know he was hit but I do not know what part of his body was hit.
Q When both accused hacked and stabbed Santiago Catipay while running, what happened to Santiago
Catipay?cralawlibrary
A He fell to the edge of the river.
Q When Santiago Catipay fell to the water, what did the accused do?cralawlibrary
A They also hacked me but I ran away.36
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of how the murders happened. Magno
testified at direct examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago and that Alicia was hacked
only by appellant Omatang. More important, he averred that the victims were attacked simultaneously.
Magno testified:
Q According to you, Santiago Catipay and Alicia Catipay were quarreled by Rico Calumpang and Jovenal
Omatang. How was Santiago Catipay quarreled?cralawlibrary
A He was hacked at the head.
Q Who hacked him at the head?cralawlibrary
A Rico Calumpang.
Q What did Rico Calumpang use in hacking Santiago Catipay?cralawlibrary
A A bolo.
Q How many times did Rico Calumpang hack Santiago Catipay?cralawlibrary
A Santiago Catipay was stabbed once and he was hacked also once.
Q And where was Santiago Catipay hit by the hacking of Rico Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Head.
Q Will you please point to the portion where Santiago Catipay was hit by the hacking of Rico
Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Witness pointing at the left side of his head.
Q And according to you, he was also stabbed by Rico Calumpang, where was Santiago Catipay hit by the
stabbing?cralawlibrary
A Here - witness pointing to this abdomen which is the lower part on the right side to the breast.
...
Q You testified that Alicia was killed, how was she killed?cralawlibrary
A She [was] hacked and stabbed.
Q Who hacked and stabbed her?cralawlibrary
A It was Jovenal Omatang.
Q According to you Alicia Catipay was hacked and stabbed by Jovenal Omatang, was Alicia hit by the
hacking of Jovenal Omatang?cralawlibrary
A Yes, she was hit.
...
Q Was the attack of Santiago Catipay by Rico Calumpang and the attack of Jovenal Omatang on Alicia
Catipay simultaneous or they were hacking and stabbing almost at the same time by these two accused
performing their own individual acts? (sic)
A Yes, it was simultaneous.
Q After seeing Santiago Catipay hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang and Alicia Catipay hacked and
stabbed by Jovenal Omatang, what did you do?cralawlibrary
A I ran.
Q You ran after they were killed or they were still under attack?cralawlibrary
A They were still attacking when I ran away.37
Magno never said that appellants also tried to hack him and even claimed that they were still hacking the
victims when he ran away. Magno also never mentioned that Santiago tried to save his wife or that
Santiago was chased or even that Santiago tried to run. In fact, during cross-examination, he averred that
he never saw Santiago run away. Magno testified,
Q During that hacking of Santiago Catipay, was Santiago Catipay able to run?cralawlibrary
A I do not know whether he was able to run or not. What I saw is that he was hacked and stabbed.
Q And you are very sure of that, Mr. Gomez, that you did not see Santiago Catipay run?cralawlibrary
A That is what I can say. What I saw was he was hacked and stabbed. After that, I ran away.
Q That is why you told this Honorable Court that you did not see Santiago Catipay run when he was
being hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Regarding that question, what I can say is that I saw the hacking and stabbing incident. After that, I ran
away.38
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate
or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however,
forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn
statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a person's participation in a serious
imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness' account.39
The trial court believed that Magno's accusations against appellants are true, basing on the fact that
Magno was able to testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack wound on
Santiago's head and the stab wound on his abdomen.40 But the court failed to consider that at the
preliminary examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked the same questions asked in
court, but could not even recall where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No explanation was
given how Magno was able to supply during the trial the precise location of Santiago's wounds 19 months
after the incident.41
Similarly, several portions of Magno's testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to be no explanation
as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him42 considering that he was only five feet away
when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no
sense why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him, Magno
chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not
run after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebias's house, called out to Alexander, asked for
some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magno's actions were certainly not the
actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out
to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from. Magno's
claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from
credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when
members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself'such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.43
Finally, no convincing proof could show that appellants had any reason to kill Santiago and Alicia in cold
blood. As the OSG points out, the supposed grudge, which Magno claimed could have motivated
appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be believed. It is highly improbable that appellants would
murder the spouses because Santiago had offered appellants a glass of beer and they refused him.44 If
anybody should harbor a grudge from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose offer
appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge between Santiago and the appellants, and as
Magno testified, Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.45
Appellants' defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their relatives
and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the incident.
However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift
the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.46 Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.47 There being no sufficient evidence
beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants' presumed
innocence stands.
!WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152 is REVERSED. Appellants Rico Calumpang and Jovenal
Omatang are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. They are ordered released from custody immediately,
unless they are being lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.