Sec 1 Art III,

PBM Employees vs PBM

Facts:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners
claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to
an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should
be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No.
875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held
guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees
and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated,
the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against
policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution.
Balacuit vs Court of First Instance GR L-38429 30 June 1988

Mar 2015

Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Ordinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any
person , group of persons , entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie…
to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one
half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality
of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favor of the respondents hence the petition for review.
Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair ,
unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 – prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children 7-12
y/o at full price is constitutional or not?

Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be
held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it
must be for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and adoptive means must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within
the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they
think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Lozano v Martinez

Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in
one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt

2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract

3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22
is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against
which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is
therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For
this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such
confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or
may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful”
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem
day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or
is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of
the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs
Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
Del Rosario vs Bengzon

GR L-88265 21December 1989

Facts: RA 6675 requiring the use of generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing,
dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines. Petitioners, officers of Philippine Medical
Association assailed the constitutionality of the said statute and petitioned for declaratory relief. Court
treated it as petition for prohibition. Petitioner’s argument of the RA favouring private sector and giving
the act of prescribing the correct medicine a duty of the salesgirl were all stricken down as
misinterpretation of the RA.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 6675 (Generics Act of 1988), requiring the use of generic names in all
transactions relating to drugs and medicines constitutional?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Generics Act of 1988 constitutional. RA 6675 secures the
patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is
allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. The respondent is
implementing the constitutional mandate of the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the
people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost.”
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control
and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in
Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

xxx

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which
shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a
record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance
to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued
by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools
of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for
admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order
— of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical
safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective
of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development,
are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando

Facts:

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.

There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance.

The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.

Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:

"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter
on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.

In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.

Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.

The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.

What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."
Velasco vs Villegas

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila,
which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts
to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power

Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-
appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No.
3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts.
Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with
its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a
sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Tano vs Socrates

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
n 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as
bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers
that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as
tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot
prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as
provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote
morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection
Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis,
banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and
holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing
penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified
vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of
“undue delegation of legislative power.”

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is
violative of certain constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not
ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the
impounding of a vehicle.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, digested

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Equal Protection)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs
more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection
because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a
valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety
and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause
because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and
more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.
MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested

GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law – Police Power)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of
motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide
scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that
the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways
will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the
police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact
definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable
restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.
ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION VS. LAZARO, digested

GR # L-54958 September 2, 1983 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Stevedoring)

FACTS: Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating contractors
engaged in stevedoring services and have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling
services in Manila South Harbor to insure efficiency and economy in cargo-handling operation and
provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the government as
well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by PPA
resulted to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered into
with local and foreign clients or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive stevedoring contract in
favor of respondent OTSI.

HELD: Yes. Manila South Harbor is a public property owned by the State, wherein operations of the port
including stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and interest of
the general welfare. In addition, the contract clause cannot override the police power enacting public
regulations intended for the general welfare.

Petition Denied.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC., digested

GR # 145742 July 14, 2010 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Stevedoring)

FACTS: PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the
ports around the country, which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner. Respondent with
hold-over permits for the continuance of its stevedoring business, contends that the administrative
order above violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA AO No. 03-90 violated the non-impairment clause.

HELD: Petition Granted. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the state’s
police power. In the legitimate exercise of the police power, all contracts are subject to the overriding
demands, needs and interest of the general public as may be determined by the State.

Note: Contract Clause cannot override Police Power doctrine.

Chavez vs Romulo GR 157036 09 June 2004

Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance
pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying
firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the
implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the
banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to
impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it
does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.

The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside
of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply
for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed.
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and
claiming that such expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered
with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority
to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to
ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire
into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor;
that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the
value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany,
and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs.
Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right
of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the
right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs.
City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals

268 SCRA 586 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Disapproval by SP of SB
Resolution

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan
passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of
Moday’s land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor
approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which
disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other
lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the
expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case,
is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated
to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The
only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council
or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that
there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the
Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System
and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a
valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an
easement of right of way.
Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor

334 SCRA 127 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Eminent Domain – Expropriation – BP 129

In 1997, Brgy. San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay
against the heirs of Franco Pastor. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do
not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such
cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Jose Soberano, Jr. denied the suit as
he ruled that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the
RTC. The judge also concluded that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of
the subject property was less than P20,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.

HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; . . . . .” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that
such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an
order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard.”

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of
“the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the
basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is
the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary
period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and
occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in
1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more
than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The
law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified
the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
National Power Corporation vs Gutierrez GR 60077 18 January 1991

Facts: National Power Corporation a gocc vested with ED power initiated negotiations for ight of
easement to construct transmission lines to several lots. The commissioners appointed recommended
1.xx easement fee for Guiterrez lot. This was countered by Gutierrez with 10.xx as disturbance
compensation. Court countered with 5.xx. Lower court granted 10.xx this was appealed and was
reduced to 5.xx. Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA.

NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not totally deprived
of the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that would
result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required,
then full transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.

Issue: Whether or not full compensation should be paid on the ground of deprivation of use of Gutierrez
property?

Decision: While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the
plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is
allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines,
danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to
cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes
due on said affected portion of their property.

The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation.
U.S vs Causby

Facts of the case

Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located
near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport
regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem
became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the
common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a
basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying
planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation,
thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted
Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.

Question

Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the
ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the
Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the
unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if
the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights
over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low,
frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's rights,
and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert
H. Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)