CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE NUMBER 4

The venue for real actions being determined by the place where the real property is situated and, for
personal actions, by the residence of the parties, with special provisions for non-resident
defendants.

Where the subject-matter of the action involves various parcels of land situated in different
provinces, the venue is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving
said parcels of land. Thus, where said parcels are the objects of one and the same transaction, the
venue was in the the Court of First Instance of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is
situated (El Hogar Filipino vs. Seva, 57 Phil. 873).

If the parcels of land are subject of separate and distinct transactions, there is no common venue
and separate actions should be laid in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein each
parcel of land is situated. (Mijares, et al. vs. Piccio, etc., et al., 101 Phil. 142).

Actions for the annulment or rescission of a sale and the retur n of realty (Muhoz vs. Llamas,
et al., 87 Phil. 737; Gavieres vs. Sanchez, et al., 94 Phil. 760; Punsalan vs. Vda. de Lacsamana,
et al., G.R. No. 55729, Mar. 28, 1983), to compel the vendor to accept payment of the
purchas e price of the land (Lizares vs. Caluag, et al., L-17699, Mar. 30, 1962), or to compel the
vendor to deliver the certificate of title to the land (Espineli, et al. vs. Santiago, et al., 107
Phil. 830) are real actions and the location of the land determines the venue of the action. But
actions only to recover the purchase price of the land (Garcia vs. Velasco, 72 Phil. 248) or for
recovery against the Assurance Fund (Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil., 50 Phil. 16) are
personal actions.

An action for the annulment of the cancellation of the award of a lot in favor of the plaintiff,
which he was prepare d to pay for pursuan t to said award, does not involve the issue of
possession or title to the property, hence it is a personal action.

An action for the review of an administrative decision involving real property should b e brought
in the Regional Trial Court of the place where the officer who rendered the decision holds
office, and not where the land is situated (Salud vs. Executive Secretary, L-25446, May 22,
1969), such as where the matter in dispute is a fishpond permit (Digon vs. Bayona, 98 Phil.
442; Sarabia vs. Secretary, 104 Phil. 115) or the right to a timber concession (Suarez
vs. Reyes, L-19828, Feb. 28, 1963), the location of the property being immaterial.

An action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for the consequent cancellation of
a real estate mortgage is a personal action, if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and
the mortgagor is in possession of the premises, since neither the plaintiff mortgagor' s title to
nor possession of the property is in question (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,
L-29791, Jan. 10, 1978; cf. Chua vs. Total Office Products, etc. Inc., G.R. No. 152808,
Sept. 30, 2005), otherwise, it is a real action.
An^ action by the landowner against the subdivision developer for the rescission and termination of
their contract and the return to the plaintiff of all documents and titles, with damages by reason
of the defendant' s contractual breach, is a real action as the relief sought will necessarily entail
the recovery by the plaintiff of possession of the land or such unsold portions thereof, hence the
venue of the action is determined by the location of the real property (Tenorio vs. Paho, et al,
L-48117, Nov. 27, 1986).

An action filed by the husband for damages, based on the wife's adulterous acts, and for his share
in the fruits of the conjugal partnership, with a prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain her from
selling real propert y belonging to the conjugal partnership , is a personal action as he does not
thereby ask to be declared the owner thereof, nor for possession or partition of the same, but
merely seeks to exercise his right as administrator of the conjugal partnership (De Guzman, et al. vs.
Genato, et al., L-42260, April 10, 1979).

The rules of venue for personal actions in the inferior courts an d in the Regional Trial Court s
ar e generally made to depend on the residence of the parties. The residence referred to is the
place where the party actually resides at the time the action is instituted (De la Rosa vs. De Borja,
53 Phil. 998), not his permanent home or domicile (Koh vs. CA, et al, L-40428, Dec. 17, 1975; cf.
Arevalo vs. Quilatan, G.R. No. 57892, Sept. 21, 1982, regarding service of summons at
defendant' s residence).

The residence of the person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode (Fule, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-40502, Nov. 29, 1976), whether permanen t or
temporary as long as he resides with continuity and consistency therein

Sec . 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents.

It will be observed that when there is more than one defendant or plaintiff in the case, the
residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining the proper venue.
Otherwise, the purpose of the Rule would be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded
in the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action
which would warrant and entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case.

Where, on the other hand, i t is the defendant who is a nonresident and is not found in the
Philippines, civil actions are proper only when the action affects the persona l statu s o f th e
plaintif f o r propert y o f th e defendant, in which case Sec. 2 determines the venue. See Sec. 15,
Rule 14 regarding service of summon s in these cases.

An exception to th e general rules on venue is found in civil actions for damages in case of libel,
whether a criminal action therefor has been filed or not, as special rules of venue are provided
in Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as last amended by R.A. 4363. Said venue provisions apply
to both resident s and nonresidents , assumin g tha t jurisdictio n over th e latte r ha s been
acquired (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, et al., supra).

It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs is fixed to attain th e greates t
convenience possible to th e litigant s by takin g into consideration the maximum accessibility to
them of the courts of justice (Koh vs. CA, et al, L-40428, Dec. 17, 1975). Venu e in persona l
action s i s fixed for th e convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of
justice. Where the contract, subject of the suit, was executed at the time when both plaintiff and
defendant had their business addresses in the City of Manila and contained a proviso tha t all actions
on said contrac t "may be brough t i n an d submitte d t o th e jurisdiction of the proper courts in the
City of Manila," but at the time of suit thereon all the parties had their respective offices or
residences within the jurisdiction of the Province of Rizal, the action thus instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal should not be dismissed o n th e groun d o f imprope r venu e as , unde r suc
h circumstances, the ends of justice can not be served or promoted by confining the situs of the
action in Manila

Contracts of adhesion are not prohibited , but the factual circumstance s of each case must be
carefully scrutinized to determin e the respective claims of the parties as to their efficacy (see
National Dev. Co. vs. Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corp., G.R. No. 148332, Sept. 30, 2003).

The former Court of First Instance of Quezon City had jurisdiction where the defendant electric
corporation has its principal office in Quezon City, although the acts complained of wer e
committed by its electric plan t in Dagupa n City, since corporate decisions are made in Quezon
City and the employees in Dagupan City merely carry out said orders, hence the acts sought to
be restrained are being committed in Quezon City

In actions involving domestic corporations, for purpose s of venue , wha t i s controllin g i s

the location of its principal place of business stated in its articles of incorporation, not the branch
office or place of business thereof.

Where the chattel mortgage had been fully paid, but the mortgagee still sent a telegram
demanding payment from the mortgagor, the venue for the latter' s action for damages is not
governed by the venue stipulation in the chattel mortgage since the suit is not based on said
contract but on defendant' s act of sending the telegram (Zoleta vs. Romillo, G.R. No. 58080,
Feb. 15, 1982).

Since a third-party complaint is but ancillary to a main action, the rules on jurisdiction and venue do
not apply to it. Thus, a third-party complaint yields to the jurisdiction and venue of the main action
even if said third-party complaint is based on a separate agreement which specifies a different
venue for suits arising from said agreement (Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. Cui, et
al., G.R. No. 54452, July 20, 1981).