RESEARCH ON ACCION PUBLICIANA

Facts: There is a Decision from the Court. It is a case for Recovery of Possession (accion
publiciana) and Ownership. The Decision merely states that our client is granted possession of
the property. However, there are other occupants of the property.

Question: Will the Decision of the Court bind the other occupants of the property not included in
the case?

LAWS APPLICABLE

1. New Civil Code

Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it.

2. Rules of Court
Rule 39

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —

c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall demand of the person
against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all
persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within three (3) working
days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, the officer shall oust all
such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and
employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded
by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (49a)

3. Other Sources
Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Property
 Justice Edgardo L. Paras

A writ of possession used in connection with the Land Registration Law is an order
directing the sheriff to place a successful registrant under the Torrens system in possession of the
property covered by decree of court.

JURISPRUDENCE

1. Pasay Estate Co. vs. Del Rosario

11 Phil., 391

WRIT OF POSSESSION; WHO MAY ASK FOR, AND AGAINST WHOM WRIT
MAY BE ISSUED. — After the registration of the land is decreed in favor of the applicant, the
latter may ask the proper court for the issuance of a writ of possession, provided the same has not
been issued before. (Manlapas v. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298). The writ of possession may be issued,
not only against the person who has been defeated in the registration case but also against anyone
occupying the land or portion thereof during the registration proceeding.

2. G.R. No. L-14134 May 25, 1960

Bishop of Legaspi vs. Hon. Manuel Calleja

Indeed, a writ of possession in land registration cases may be issued only against the
person defeated in the registration case and against "anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying
the land or any portion thereof, during the proceeding up to the issuance of the final decree"
(Demorar vs. Ibañez and Porras, 97 Phil., 72; 51 Off. Gaz., 2872; Pasay Estate Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 11 Phil., 391)

3. 97 Phil 72; G.R. No. L-16995

Demorar vs. Ibañez; Julio Lucero vs. Jaime L. Loot, et al.

The reason why the writ of possession can be issued against any such adverse possessor
is clear: the issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it
is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely
occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial
ejectment by means of a writ of possession, and it is the duty of the registration court to issue
said writ when asked for by the successful claimant.

4. In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title
were aware of the other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
 5. Puruganan vs. Martin, 8 Phil. 519;
Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil. 394

NOTE: When each of the contending parties seriously asserts his right to ownership to
certain property, in order to decide the question, it is enough to determine who of the two is the
owner. It is true that to be respected in possession of the thing, ordinarily, mere possession is
enough, unless a better right is established by another individual. Still, from the time it is shown
that such possession is unlawful and to the prejudice of the real owner who has proved his claim
by means of a lawful title, the property usurped must, in justice, be restored to the true owner. An
action for recovery is indeed a right pertaining to the owner, the ownership being duly proven,
and lies against any person in possession who, without title, unlawfully detains the property of
the plaintiff.

6. Cesareo Perez, et al. vs. Vicente Evite, et al.

L-16003, March 29, 1961

Facts: Vicente Evite, et al., were declared in a civil case as owners of a certain parcel of land.
The writ of execution ordered the sheriff to deliver the land to them, but the possessors (Cesareo
Perez, el al.) refused on the theory that while the judgment spoke of ownership, it did not
mention anything concerning possession did not give any other reason why they wanted to retain
possession.

Issue: Should the possessors surrender their possession?

Held: Yes, for under Sec. 47 (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment is not confined to
what appears upon the face of the decision, but also to those necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

In support of their theory that the adjudication of ownership does not include possession of the
property, the possessors rely on the cases of Telena vs. Garcia (87 Phil. 173) and Jabon, et al. (L-
5094, Aug. 7, 1952) Said decisions however, cannot apply because in both of them, the Supreme
Court underscored the possibility that the actual possessor therein had some rights which had to
be respected and defined. Thus, the pronouncement that ownership does not necessarily include
possession – was made in the said cases, having in mind instances where the actual possessor has
a valid right (such that of a tenant or lessee) over the property, a right enforceable even against
the owner thereof. In the present case, no such right for continued possession. Indeed, it would
frustrate the ends of substantial justice where the owners are required to submit to a new
litigation.

7. G.R. No. L-100 November 16, 1945

Francisco de la Cruz, et al. vs. Mamerto Roxas, et al.

Facts: Francisco de la Cruz, the real tenant, has left the premises already. His house guest,
petitioner Alonzo, from the point of view of owner Quesada, is no more than a mere intruder. If
he has any right to stay in the house the right was subsidiary to that of tenant Francisco de la
Cruz, he being a mere house guest of the same. After Francisco de la Cruz, left the house Alonzo
has absolutely no legal standing to remain in the house.

Issue: Whether or not Alonzo is correct in alleging that he should not be ejected.
Held: No, Alonzo is not correct. Guests, friends and relatives (staying on the premises) are
privies to an action against the tenant (whom their right to stay is derived), and are therefore not
entitled to separate independent legal process of ejectment. Once Francisco was ordered to
vacate, this meant Alonzo (the guest of Francsisco) should also vacate. It is wrong to say that
Alonzo has been deprived of constitutional protection of due process of law.

8. G.R. No. L-32164 January 31, 1973

Florenda Ariem vs. Hon. Walfrido De Los Angeles

The cases cited by the petitioner to bolster up her claim that she cannot be deprived of the
land involved without prior hearing to determine the extent of her right thereto, are not in point.
They deal with rights of possessors in good faith who were not parties to the action involving
title to the property and, hence, not bound by the judgment. Such possessors were not relatives or
privies of the defendants and did not derive their right from the latter. Here, petitioner Florenda
Ariem is a privy to Nicasio Barles who is her son-in-law. The respondent Judge in the hearing of
the petition to lift the writ of execution gave ample opportunity to the petitioner to be heard as
regards her alleged bona fide possession. But the Court did not believe her, it being evident that
her claim was merely a pretext to frustrate the execution of the judgment ousting Barles who is a
squatter on the land owned by respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation.

9. G.R. No. L-906 January 30, 1947

Corazon Gozon Y Sra. De Gozon (Rosario Lam), vs. M. L. De La Rosa, Pura Kalaw
Ledesma

After the deadline set in the sentence to vacate the property expired, the defendant requested an
extension until June 15, 1946. With the consent of the applicant, the Court granted the petition.
And after this second term has expired, the defendant also does not evict the farm. At the request
of the applicant, the judge issued the corresponding execution order. Upon becoming the estate
to carry out the execution, the sheriff found Corazon Gozon and Rosario Lam who claimed that
they are the tenants of Pura Kalaw Ledesma; they did not want to vacate the farm because they
had not been parties to the case against Amparo Gozon. The sheriff reported this to the Court.
Corazon Gozon and Rosario Lam were summoned by the Court to appear to explain their
reasons why they should not be ordered to vacate the farm. Noting that they challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court, they raided to be asked.

The defendant and all members of his family, such as a wife, children, relatives, along with their
servants, employees and their sub-tenants who occupy the farm by their consent, may be ordered
to vacate the estate by varying the execution order (Freeman on Executions, section 475;
Huerstal vs. Muir, 63 Cal., 450; Gray vs. Nunan, 63 Cal., 220; Saunders vs. Webber, 39 Cal.,
287; Fiske vs. Chamberlain, 103 Mass., 495; Johnson vs. Fullerton, 44 Pa. St., 466 [Note No. 17
in 1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 1049].) The appellants who are relatives of Amparo Gozon and
who managed to live in the house for the simple hospitality of this, they cannot claim possession
in good faith and can be thrown together with the defendant Amparo Gozon in a release order.

We believe that the Court does not abuse its discretion, nor does it work outside its jurisdiction.
Work in accordance with the procedure indicated by this Court in the aforementioned cases.