Batch Three Case Digests convincing, and the conclusion of the lower court that the appellee is not
er court that the appellee is not liable
EH 502
1. Boudard vs. Tait
From: AA
Facts: The appellant Emilie Elmira Renee Boudard, in her capacity as widow of
Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of her co appellants, her
children born during her marriage with the deceased, obtained a judgment in
their favor from the civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French
Indo-China, on June 27, 1934, for the sum of 40,000 piastras, equivalent, P56,
905.77 plus interest. Mari Theodore Boudard died in the hands of Tait although
"outside the fulfillment of duty".The judgment was rendered against Stewart
Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial
before said court.
When this judgment was executed in the Philippines, the lower court dismissed
and ordered them to pay costs. The plaintiffs appealed saying that the court erred
declaring that it was indispensable for the defendants to be served summons in
Hanoi; erred in declaring that service by publication with personal service by the
French Consul in Manila was not sufficient.
It was proved by the evidence that said Theodore Boudard was not an employee
of the respondent and neither did the appellee, his agents nor employees were
ever in Hanoi French Indo-China.
Issues: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the case.
Held: The lower court did not err.
As for the exhibits presented by the plaintiff:
1. failed to show that proceedings were in accordance with French laws then in
force.
2. copies submitted of the H to M1 exhibits were not copies of the judicial
proceedings against appellee in the court hanoi duly certified by the proper
authorities there, whose signatures should be authenticated by the Consul or
some consular agent of the United States in said country.
3. argument that papers were original document and of confirmation by the
Honorable French Consul is not sufficient to deviate from a rule sanctioned by
law. To comply with the rule, the best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings is
a certified copy of the same with all the formalities required in said sections 304
and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely sure of the authenticity of the record.
On the other hand said exhibits or documents, if admitted, would only
corroborate and strengthen the evidence of the appellee which in itself is
for the amount to which he was sentenced, as alleged, for he was not duly tried
or even summoned in conformity with the law. It is said that the French law
regarding summons, according to its English translation presented by the
appellants.
As to the summons:
Tait was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned by the appellants,nor his
employees or representatives. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial
proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective
against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country
before the proceedings.
Rule to sustain money judgment: jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents must
be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.
The process of a court of one state cannot run into another and summon a party
there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent outside the
state to a nonresident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him
personally for money recovery. There must be actual service within the State of
notice upon him or upon some one authorized to accept service for him.
A personal judgment rendered against a nonresident, who has neither been
served with process nor appeared in the suit, is without validity.
The effect of a judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, is as follows:
1. In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
2. In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Sec.
311of Act No. 190.)
The decision of the court of Hanoi is only valid to the extent that it cannot be
contested, it is only a prima facie evidence of the appellant's claim, and as such it
naturally admits proof to the contrary.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 1
 2. Northwest Orient Airlines vs. CA
From: PB
Facts: Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to
enforce in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54,
Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation
incorporated under Philippine laws.
Plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its
Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets.
Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of
the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued
defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket
sales, with claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil Department,
Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Taiheiyo
Building, 3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa
Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the
bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed
to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila and would be back on
April 24, 1980.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the
summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was no longer
an employee of the defendant.
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at
the head office of the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the Director of the
Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons
through diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the
writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's
complaint and on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate
of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed.
Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the merits. After the
plaintiff rested its case, defendant on April 21, 1989, filed a Motion for Judgment
on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two grounds:
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want of
jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law and public
policy and rendered without due process of law. Plaintiff filed its opposition after
which the court a quo rendered the now assailed decision dated June 21, 1989
granting the demurrer motion and dismissing the complaint.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the
latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait 4 wherein it was held that "the process
of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state
NORTHWEST elevated the case to this Court contending that the respondent
court erred in holding that SHARP was not a resident of Japan and that summons
on SHARP could only be validly served within that country
Issue: The principal issue here is whether a Japanese court can acquire
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving
summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its
principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
failed.
Ruling: It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating
to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum. 8 In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where
the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial
service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of
law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact. 9Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it
may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated
copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what
that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption 10
may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be
similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 2
on the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in
the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the
case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office
or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal
proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such
copy is a necessary part of the service.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered
that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippine's after the
two attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan
sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese
Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at
its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such
manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court
was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
3. Nargarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela
From: KB
Facts: NAGARMULL (International Seller) has a contract to sell of Hessian bags
to BINALBANGAN (PHL buyer). Shipment of these bags was to be made in equal
installment. Nagarmull failed to deliver a total of 154 bales for July August and
Septamber. Binalbagan asked Nagarmull to to pay 5% of the value of the 154
bales defaulted as penalty which plaintiff did. Binalbagan increased credit for
increase export duty. Nagarmull requested for further increase to cover for
increased export taxes implemented on September. Binalbagan received a letter
from Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India for
arbitration regarding the claim of Nagarmull. Tribunal ruled in favor of Nagarmull.
Nagarmull attempted to enforce the said award through the Philippine Charge de
Affaires in Calcutta, the Indian Legation here in the Philippines, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs. BINALBAGAN refuses to pay because the claim has
no foundation in law and in fact.
Issue: The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the decision of the
Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by the
High Court of Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines.
Ruling: Decision will not be enforced. SC for the purpose of the decision assume
that appellee has the right to sue in PHL courts. It is true that under the
provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a sum of
money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but
when suit for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact". Upon the facts of record, SC are
constrained to hold that the decision sought to be enforced was rendered upon a
"clear mistake of law" and because of that it makes appellant — an innocent party
— suffer the consequences of the default or breach of contract committed by
appellee. Nagarmull is guilty of breach when it failed to deliver according to the
contract and it is equally clear beyond doubt that the increase in the export tax
would not have been imposed if it was delivered on time. When Binalbagan
demanded that Nagarmull deliver the shortage of 154 bales, it did nothing more
than to demand that to which it was entitled as a matter of right. The breach of
contract committed by Nagarmull gave Binalbagan, under the law and even under
general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for its
specific performance, in either case with right to demand damages. Part of the
damages appellant was clearly entitled to recover from appellee growing out of
the latter's breach of the contract consists precisely of the amount of the increase
decreed in the export tax due on the shortage — which, because of appellee's
fault, had to be delivered after the effectivity of the increased export tax. Decision
of the tribunal should be impeached on the ground of clear mistake of law for
failure to apply fundamental principles of the contract. SC cannot sanction a clear
mistake of law that would work an obvious injustice upon Binalbagan.
4. Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated
From: BB
Facts: Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left
among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a
corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator,
refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 3
to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet
Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet
Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost
as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company
of New York.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper.
Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.
Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of
all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in
an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have
more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning
property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than
that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the
deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary
administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares
of stocks is in the Philippines.
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares
... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...."
be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation
owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its
shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from
lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it.
Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any
existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law.
It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a
higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately
refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the
judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American
law still of persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the
ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the
appropriate Court Action to enforce its rights. Correlatively, it is not immune from
judicial control in those instances, where a duty under the law as ascertained in
an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is
to confer upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot
be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the
source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental
organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a claim
cannot possibly merit approval.
5. Oil Natural Gas Commission vs. CA
From: AC
Facts: The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The present conflict
between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a contract
entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the
private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the
petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS
($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit
in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV
SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay
and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the
private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point
destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already
received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the
private respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. The petitioner then
informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator
pursuant to Clause 16 (Arbitration Clause) of their contract that the venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 4

On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the
dispute in petitioner's favour. To enable the petitioner to execute the above
award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra
Dun. India (hereinafter referred to as the foreign court for brevity), praying that
the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India which was
GRANTED.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the
foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that
the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus,
the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner
filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Held: As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No.
3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration that the
foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained
in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive
discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties, and the
arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have
been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the appellate court was in
error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision containing literally,
only the dispositive portion".
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt
by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions
of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such
judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an
Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary
docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the
foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL
GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is
REVERSED,
6. Asiawest Merchant Bankers vs. CA
From: DC
Facts: The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National
Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under
Philippine laws.
It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against
private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up
in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project
and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division)
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent
which is also designated therein as the 2nd Defendant. The judgment reads in
full:
IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the 2nd defendant do pay the Plaintiffs the sum
of $5,108,290.23 (Ringgit Five million one hundred and eight thousand two
hundred and ninety and Sen twenty-three) together with interest at the rate of
12% per annum on: -
a) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983 to the date
of payment; and
b) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March 1983 to the date
of payment; and $350.00 (Ringgit Three Hundred and Fifty) costs.
On the same day, the High Court of Malaya issued an Order directing the private
respondent (also designated therein as the 2nd Defendant) to pay petitioner
interest on the sums covered by the said Judgment.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent
under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988 the complaint
before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the
High Court of Malaya.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 5
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and
there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial
court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission to
the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee.
Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the
High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Malaysian High Court acquired jurisdiction over the
PNCC or the private respondent.
Ruling: Petition is GRANTED. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis
of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court
and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the
foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with
the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Vinayak
Prabhakar Pradhan was presented as petitioner’s sole witness. In addition to the
said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the various documentary
evidence.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and
authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive
validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein
private respondent, to prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to
prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that
jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private
respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent
and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and represent private
respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident
collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the
requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that
the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription
that the every decision must state the facts and law on which it is based.
Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2) witnesses, namely,
Mr. Alfredo N. Calupitan, an accountant of private respondent, and Virginia
Abelardo, Executive Secretary and a member of the staff of the Corporate
Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal Division, of private respondent, both of
whom failed to shed light and amplify its defense or claim for non-enforcement of
the foreign judgment against it.
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing
enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters
of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit
for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be
accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service
of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, the law of Malaysia in
this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private
respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian
procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to
what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 6
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of
Malaya must stand.
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and Gledhill to
represent private respondent, not only did the private respondents witnesses
admit that the said law firm of Allen and Gledhill were its counsels in its
transactions in Malaysia, but of greater significance is the fact that petitioner
offered in evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudenceto the effect that (a) it is not
necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the Malaysian High
Court to submit a special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a client
before said court, (b) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court has
full authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel appearing before the
Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as required
under Philippine law to appear and compromise judgments on behalf of their
clients before said court.
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law tainted the
judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was
adduced or shown. Furthermore, even when the foreign judgment is based on the
drafts prepared by counsel for the successful party, such is not per se indicative
of collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a
foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or
resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is
rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious defense.
Evidence is wanting on the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated
allegation cannot give rise to liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not
enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which
the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure. Considering
that under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment
may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon
which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise.
7. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA
From: JJ
Facts: Milagros Morada was hired as a flight attendant. Along with the Thamer
and Allah, she went clubbing. After that they went back to their hotel. They ate
breakfast together at Thamer's room, but their other companion, Allah Al-Gazzawi
left the two, giving Thamer the opportunity to rape her. Fortunately roomboy and
several hotel personnel heard her cry for help and rescued her.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back
to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. She was informed
that the Indonesian government deported the two to Saudi.
Later, she was asked to see one Mr. Ali Meniewy in Jeddah. She was asked about
the incident that happened in Jakarta. Her passport was taken. She was made to
testify in court and made to sign documents she did not understand, later on, it
was found out that it she was actually tried of a crime violating the islamic laws of
the country and adultery.
Later, the Prince of Makkah allowed her to leave on the ground that she was
wrongfully convicted. Moreover, the airlines fired hired her. So she filed damages
against the airlines in the RTC of Auezon.
Petitioner SAUDIA alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the
instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by
virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
Issues: 1. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO
HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE
2. WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE
CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN
Held:
1. The RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is
quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or
oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would
be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 7
i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover by filing in the said court and by the respondents submission of its
response, they have effectively submitted themselves under the jurisdiction of the
said court.
2. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties,
act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs
of the alleged tort.
With the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability [61] have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern
theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the most
significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply
now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
8. People vs. Wong Cheng
From: MM
This is an appeal to revoke the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sustaining the demurrer to the information that initiated this case and in which
the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila
Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Issue: WON the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crimes committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
Ruling: Yes.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law:
a. the French rule: crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels
should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory;
b. the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the
United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. .
Of the two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States are authority in the
Philippines, which at that time was a territory of the United States.
To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here, because it causes
such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.
9. U.S vs. Bull
From: JM
Facts: On December 2, 1908, a Norwegian steamship vessel named Stanford
engaged in the transport of animals, commanded by its master, H.N. Bull docked
in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng,
Formosa going to the city of Manila, Philippines, carried 677 heads of cattle
without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit so as
to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals. H.N Bull failed to
provide stalls, caused some of the animals to be tied by means of rings passed
through their noses, and failed to provide all with animals with bedding. His
neglect to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit
caused the noses of some of said animals to be torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 8
and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. Thus, H.N Bull was accused and
criminally charged for violating such laws.
Bull contended that the information was insufficient because it does not state that
the court was sitting was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or
that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under
the laws of the Philippine Islands. He alleges that the complaint is defective it
does not state that animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, which is
essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port.
Issues: (1) Whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character,
committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and
omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was
within the territorial waters of the United States.
(2) Whether or not jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship.
Held: YES; and NO.
Ruling: (1) No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines
which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and
a new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper
political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the
line which determines these waters the Standard must have travelled at least 25
miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of
the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on
the high seas.
(2) Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities,
unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one
country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves
to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as
well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
Neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of
the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are
the courts of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the information in this case.
As to H.N Bull’s contention that the complaint does not allege that the animals
were disembarked in the port of Manila, the Supreme Court ruled that the
disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are
bought. Disembarkation did not constitute an element to the offense.
H.N Bull was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
10. People vs. Tulin
From: SO
Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned
by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of
kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro
near Silonay Island. The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain
Libo-on, was suddenly boarded, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates,
including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with
rifles, caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete
control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front
and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San
Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore. On March 28, 1991,
the "M/T Tabangao" anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the
crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo.
On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with
the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a
period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. On April
12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. A
series of arrests was thereafter effected. They are charged with qualified piracy or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters). The trial
court rendered a decision convicting t heaccused-appellants of the crime charged,
finding the accused Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 9
reasonable doubt, as principals, and the accused Chong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime.
Cheong San Hong argues, among others, that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Sec.4 of P.D. No.
532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); and that the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to
convict, and sentence. He explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts
done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal
jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
Issue: Did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-
appellant Cheong? Can the accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice
when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
Ruling: We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he argued that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of P.D. No. 532 because R.A. No. 7659 which amended Article 122 of
the RPC, has impliedly superseded P.D. No. 532. He reasons out that P.D. No.
532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of
RPC, as amended, and P.D. No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters.
He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of P.D. No. 532 must be omitted such that P.D. No.
532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas R.A. No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are
neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence,
excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the RPC, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine
waters." On the other hand, under P.D. No. 532, the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. R.A. No.
7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under P.D. No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the
intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against
the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of P.D. No. 532,
piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as
amended, and piracy under P.D. No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold.
And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although P.D. No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the
vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same
need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, P.D.
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, P.D. No. 532 should
be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole
world.
11. Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) vs. People of the Philippines
From: AA
Facts: Jeffrey was an economist working in the Asian Development Bank. Two
counts of oral defamation was filed against him for uttering defamatory words
against Joyce Cabal, a fellow ADB worker. After that, a DFA released a protocol
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
(hereinafter Agreement) in the country. So he was released.
Issue: Whether or not Jeffre Liang may be held liable notwithstanding the office
of protocol from the DFA.
Held: Not impressed with Merit.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 10

In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process
was violated. It should be noted that dueprocess is a right of the accused as
much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitionerwas acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to bepresented at the proper time.1 At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause
doesnot ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
Immunity mentioned under Sec 45,
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performingmissions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges
and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacityexcept when the Bank waives the immunity."
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official
capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, theprosecution should have been given the chance
to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunityto present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in
the name of official duty.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such,enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
12. U.S vs. Fowler
From: PB
Facts: The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of
champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the
transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne
formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian
Lindsay.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney
being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented
a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try
the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime
was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the
territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to
which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that
the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the
court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six
month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders
of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all
crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been
vested in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the
court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have
been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the
discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Court has Jurisdiction
Ruling: This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of
justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56,
consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as
follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in
the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this
law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases
for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed.
13. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. IAC
From: KB
Facts: Two cases for recovery of value of cargo insurance when M/S Asiatica
(operated by Eastern Shipping) sank and caught fire.
1st case: 5k pcs of calorized lance pipes and 7 spare parts are loaded which were
insured by respondent Development Insurance and Surety Corporation.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 11
2nd case: 128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories were insured by
respondent Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 2 surveying cases insured by
Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
The respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance
values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto the rights of
the latter as the insured.
Eastern Shipping denied liability in the first case on the ground that loss was due
to extraordinary fortuitous event thus, not liable.
In the 2nd case, defense was that fire causing the sinking ship is exempting
circumstance under COGSA (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act) and that when loss of
fires is established, burden of proving negligence shifts to the shipper.
Issue: What law should be applicable, Civil Law or Special Law (COGSA)
Ruling: The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the
Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil
Code. However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and
by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is
suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over goods, according to all the circumstances of each case. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: "(1)Flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; SC is of the opinion
that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as
it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. 10 It does
not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning 11 or by
other natural disaster or calamity. 12 It may even be caused by the actual fault or
privity of the carrier. Article 1680 of the Civil Code, which considers fire as an
extraordinary fortuitous event refers to leases of rural lands. As the peril of fire is
not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that
it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Having failed to
discharge the burden of proving that it had exercised the extraordinary diligence
required by law, Petitioner Carrier cannot escape liability for the loss of the cargo.
14. Fujiki vs. Marinay
From: BB
Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly,
petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they
eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara
and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to
reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was
able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)”. In this case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) The Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing
and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for
Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule
applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment.
Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the
Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and
that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General
argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that
“[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”
Issue: Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 12
Ruling: YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.
15. Corpuz vs. Tirol
From: NT
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. Gerbert filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 13
ISSUE: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
RULING: Yes.
The General Rule is that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. BUT -
direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts
for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to
law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Cancellation of the entry in the civil registry requirements:
(1) verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located
(2) civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings
(3) time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
16. Mijares vs. Hon Ranada
From: AC
Facts: On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court
(US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by
ten Filipino citizens2 who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such
as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces
during the Marcos regime. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of
all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared
while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the
class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder
of all these persons was impracticable. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District
Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty
Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents
($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December
1996.
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. On
9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada10 of the Makati
RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice.
Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject
matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite
sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees
was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had
not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the
subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an
action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 14

Held: There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in
rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be
the adjudication of a sum of money.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce
the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the
same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing
it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the
proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and
other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it
recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign
judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that
resulted in the foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the
complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final
Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the
governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only
the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
17. Edelina Ando vs. Dept. of Foreign Affairs
From: DC
Facts: On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese
National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. On 16 September
2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the
Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly
authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, said Divorce
Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila.
Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by
such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13
September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. In the
meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate
her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she can
prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory
Relief. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent she
insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her married name even
without a judicial declaration that her marriage with Ando is valid because,
according to the law, void and voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of
validity until proven otherwise. And also on that juncture, she prayed that the
court recognize her second marriage as valid.
On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground
that petitioner had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as
valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code considering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by
virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine
court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly,
the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered as valid at this
time.
Issue: Whether or not petition for Declaratory Relief should prosper.
Ruling: The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She
should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
ultimate entreaty was to question the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her
under her second husband’s name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was
adopted on 25 February 1997, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her
passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the following:
(1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one photocopy
thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated
by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place
where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 15
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a
Philippine passport under her second husband’s name.Should her application for a
passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of
R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued
by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the
Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10. Appeal- In the event that an application for a passport is
denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder
thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within
fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the
event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with
the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application "cannot be
said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by the DFA, so as to make
her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal", as instead she "was merely told" that
her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct
recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as
valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of
her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio, The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient;
both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and
like any other fact.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a
trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable
to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be
insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her
first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
18. Medina vs. Koike
From: JJ
Facts: Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married in Quezon City,
Philippines. Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce
before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan and thereby obtained
a divorce decree.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of
Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed a
petition1 for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
At the hearing no one opposed so she presented the following documents:
 "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"and "Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike" (issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and
duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines)
 certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate"
(authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, certified by City
Civil Registry Office in Manila)
 Photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English
translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan
2000"16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted
as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.
The trial court denied the petition holding that petitioner failed to prove the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The
RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rule.
Issue: whether RTC is correct.
(no definitive ruling since it was a question of fact, beyond the ambit of SC)
Held: Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. However, Article 26 of
the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 16

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven like any other fact. (remanded to CA)
19. Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luna
From: MM
Facts: ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was formerly married to intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), both in a civil ceremony and church
ceremomy. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other and agreed to separation of
property of their conjugal partnership of property through the written agreement.
Subsequently, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from a Court of First Instance in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic
and on the same date, contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife. ATTY Luna organized the law firm LUPSICON
which purchased a condominium unit in Makati but the firm was eventually
dissolved so the partners partitioned the said condo unit and Atty Luna got a
25/100 share.
After the death of ATTY. LUNA, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by a son
of the first marriage, Gregorio Z. Luna. SOLEDAD alleged that those properties
were acquired during the existence of her marriage with ATTY. LUNA through
their joint efforts and since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of
the said properties to the extent of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of her 1/2
share in the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA
which was bequeathed to her in the latter's last will and testament.
Issue: WON Soledad is entitled to any share in the properties in question.
Ruling: No.
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
They were married on 1947 when the law in force was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the rule, the non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos made the Divorce Decree issued
in Dominican Republic invalid even if voluntarily obtained abroad since the
spouses were both Filipinos.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court
approval. They were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, which
subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in
Article 175 of the Civil Code,viz.: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When
there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled; (4) In
case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The approval by the court of Dominican Republic is invalid since it took place only
as an incident of the action for divorce which in itself is not valid .
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties
acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly All marriages performed outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
To establish co-ownership, therefore, the petitioner had to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, warranted no relief in her
favor.
20. Maria Rebecca Bayot vs. Vicente Bayot
From: JM
Facts: On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, were married in
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then
26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam. They had a child
name Alix born in California. As their relationship soured, Rebecca initiated
Divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
Courts ordered the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody
and guardianship over Alix. A year later, the same court issued an order settling
the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa.
A month after the issuance of the divorce decree, Rebecca petitioned for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage which she later withdrew. On May 29,
1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 17
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition with the Muntinlupa City RTC,
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. She also sought dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains with application for support for her and Alix.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed
an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time
the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22,
1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent
legal effects?
Held: NO; and YES.
Ruling: (1) Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of
repudiation of such citizenship. The compelling reasons indicative of her American
citizenship are: (1) she was born in Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is
followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are
born there; and (3) she was a holder of an American passport. Rebecca had
consistently represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during
her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an
American citizen.
On Rebecca’s contention that her Filiipino citizenship was affirmed by the DOJ,
and that that she had been issued an Identification Certificate and Philippine
Passport recognizing her as a Filipino citizen by the Bureau of Immigrations, the
Supreme Court ruled that due to some irregularities in the issuance of the ID
certificate by the Bureau and its affirmation by the DOJ, there is a strong reason
to believe that the certificate was spurious.
(2) The Divorce is valid. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree
is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this
as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
Both elements obtain in the instant case. In determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Effects of the valid divorce secured by Rebecca:
a. The divorce is gives a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction.
b. Rebecca lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit
which presupposes the existence of marriage. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony.
21. Tuna Processing Inc. vs. Philippine Kingford, Inc.
From: SO
Facts: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent,
Philippine Letters Patent, and Indonesian Patent (collectively referred to as the
"Yamaoka Patent"), and 5 Philippine tuna processors, including respondent
Kingford (collectively referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
The MOA provides that the Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent, Philippine Patent,
and Indonesian Patent, wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors for purposes of
enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those
patents, and collecting royalties. The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the
aforementioned patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, enforce those
patents and collect royalties in conjunction with Licensor. The parties hereto
agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation
established in the State of California, in order to implement the objectives of this
Agreement. Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees,
including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly
reneged on their obligations.
Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case
against respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 18
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the
RTC of Makati City. Respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to
sue in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI, a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution of the RTC be declared void.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition
on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.
Ruling: It is pursuant to Section 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines,
on Doing business without a license, that the court a quo dismissed the petition.
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition
and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic
Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York
Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these specifically requires that the party
seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.
The Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization
and regulation of private corporations. As between a general and special law, the
latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant. The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act is a law especially
enacted to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the
freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. It
specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. Inasmuch as
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the
instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international
obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both
already form part of the law.
The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides for the grounds for
refusal to recognize and enforce an award, at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked. Not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity
to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this
position. It provides that "any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court
to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition
are enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is not included.
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit
in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration
clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound
by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding
thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in
the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result.
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be
respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but
because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo
correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the
subject arbitral award, petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of
the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially
identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement. Premises
considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines,
may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance
with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.
There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that petitioner TPI
improperly raised a question of fact when it posited that its act of entering into a
MOA should not be considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose
of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign corporation’s
capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 19