FULL TEXT: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/dec2009/gr_176951_2009.

html

Legislative Debates and Committee Reports

League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009,
Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.

SYLLABUS:

FACTS

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,
each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10,
Article X and the equal protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one
of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone
established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.11 By Resolution of March
31, 2009, a divided Court (6-6) denied the motion for reconsideration. The motion is denied since there is no
majority that voted to overturn the Resolution.
The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro
noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual
premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per
the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have
already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision
of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of
the said decision;
The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the
tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly
argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional–– remains unresolved; and pursuant
to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by
the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

ISSUES

1. W/N the tied 6-6 vote suffice the majority requirement to declare the constitutionality of a law?
2. W/N the cityhood laws are constitutional?

RULING
1. NO. It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members"
contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

As per Lambino v. Commission on Elections, it states "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority
and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value." Even though on the procedural basis,
it says that “If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.”
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, it "shall be decided with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
 in the instant cases and voted thereon." Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the
attainment of justice.. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application
of the rules is in order. The Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.

2. YES. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws
in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been
organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting
events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside
the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main
arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood
bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject
cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA
9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to
exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic
aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a
continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used
as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA
9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law,
as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other
municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income
level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

FALLO

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend
the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further
Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435,
9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.