EN BANC

[G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000

RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman,

PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO,
as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs;
ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA
IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of
appointments), Respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner
Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks
to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and
the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an
order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain
matters. chanrobles virtual law library

On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as
Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents,
who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with
this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000,
whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision. chanrobles virtual law
library

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform chanrobles virtual law library

The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President

Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.[1 Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a law.[2 Secondly, petitioner asserts that
by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally
excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.3 chanrobles
virtual law library

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot
and academic. We agree. chanrobles virtual law library
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead.[4 Under E.O. No. 43, the
PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.[5 However, on
February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which
extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz chanrobles
virtual law library

SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows: chanrobles virtual law

library

Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and
complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its
report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from
31 December 1999. chanrobles virtual law library

The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and
was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted
to it.[6 Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent
events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. chanrobles
virtual law library

The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of
granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin
the PCCR from acting as such.7 Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the
body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a
preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[8 At
this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory
opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. chanrobles
virtual law library

In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another
obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is
concerned. chanrobles virtual law library

The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[9 In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and
70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.10 A citizen acquires standing
only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.[11 In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12 we denied standing to petitioners
who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that, chanrobles
virtual law library

in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987,
standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as
Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held, chanrobles virtual law library
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor
children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges
as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the
Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained
of. chanrobles virtual law library

We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present

petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for
bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders
to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d
2. chanrobles virtual law library

Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all,
it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since,
according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to
create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that
his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial
redress as a citizen. chanrobles virtual law library

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is

established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or
the Constitution.[13, Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.14 This was our ruling in a recent
case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of
B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and
television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the
campaign period.[15 The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as
a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of
Congress.[16 chanrobles virtual law library

Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon
whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature.
In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17 the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a
taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees promulgated by then President
Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court
explaining that chanrobles virtual law library

...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of
such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful
expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that
personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. chanrobles
virtual law library

In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution
Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to question
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives
and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.[18 And in Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works,[19 the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing
the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the
construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these
cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law. chanrobles virtual
law library

Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,[20 the Court

declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an
action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the
contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City of Dagupan
and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing
to bring such taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary,
the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public
funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. chanrobles
virtual law library

Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by
virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the
amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the
funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states - chanrobles virtual law
library

Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby

appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from
funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon
submission of requirements for expenditures. chanrobles virtual law library

The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In
fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been
defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to
the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be
used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21 The funds used
for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of
article VI of the Constitution. chanrobles virtual law library

In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide
whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.[22 In the case at bar, there being no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to
question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must
establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[23 In other words,
petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. 24 Nowhere in
his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. chanrobles virtual
law library

II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants chanrobles virtual law library

The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner
alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of
the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants,
twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential
assistants.[25 Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not
have the power to create these positions.26 chanrobles virtual law library

Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have
the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of
such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so
as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular
issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner
does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order,
administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create
the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear
what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner
merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the
names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his
petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be
improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the
allegations in the Petition. chanrobles virtual law library

III. Right to Information chanrobles virtual law library

Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary

Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4, 1999 requesting for
the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their
appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of
Customs and turned over to Malacanang.[27 chanrobles virtual law library
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides
that chanrobles virtual law library

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. chanrobles virtual law library

Under both the 197328 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can
be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission,[29 wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public
right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However,
Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such
limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on
March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen
(15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public
documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonable claims of confidentiality.[30 chanrobles virtual law library

Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v.
Dimaano[31 that [t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information
is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The
information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of public
concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[32 chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter
dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments
made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioners
request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is
obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable
limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.33 chanrobles virtual law
library

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is
ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested. chanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. chanrobles virtual law
library

Bellosillo, J., abroad, on official business. chanrobles virtual law library

Puno, J., vote to dismiss on the ground that the case is moot.

G.R. No. 170914 April 13, 2011

STEFAN TITO MIÑOZA Petitioner,

vs.
Hon. CESAR TOMAS LOPEZ, in his official capacity as Mayor and Chair, Loon Cockpit Arena
Bidding and Awards Committee, its Members namely: HERMINIGILDO M. CALIFORNIA, NOEL
CASTROJO, JESSE SEVILLA, FORTUNATO GARAY, PERFECTO MANTE, ROGELIO
GANADOS, P/INSP. JASEN MAGARAN, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF LOON, BOHOL,
represented by its Presiding Officer, Vice Mayor RAUL BARBARONA, and MARCELO
EPE, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from the alleged
offender is not even the offended party.

When petitioner’s suit for annulment of bidding of a cockpit franchise and for damages was
dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he is not the real party in interest, he now comes
before this Court to assert his legal personality to sue.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 29, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83894 which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. Likewise
assailed is the December 2, 2005 Resolution2 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

Factual Antecedents

For several years since 1988, petitioner Stefan Tito Miñoza was the duly licensed owner and
operator3 of the Loon Cockpit Arena in Cogon Norte, Loon, Bohol. Because of the dilapidation of the
building, the increasing rentals and the lot owner’s notice for him to vacate by October 2001,
petitioner transferred his business operation to Bgy. Lintuan in Loon. In March 2001, petitioner
began the construction of a new cockpit after securing from the municipal officials a building permit,
an electrical permit4 and a fencing permit.5 By the end of 2001, the cockpit was certified by the
municipal engineer as 65% complete.6 On January 11, 2002, respondent Municipal Mayor Cesar
Tomas Lopez (Mayor Lopez) issued in favor of petitioner a temporary permit to hold cockfights at the
newly-built cockfighting arena in Bgy. Lintuan beginning January 13, 2002.7

Six days later, however, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 02-016, Series of
20028 declaring the cockpit in Bgy. Lintuan as unlicensed and that the only licensed cockpit is the
one in Cogon Norte. The resolution likewise stated that the cockpit in Bgy. Lintuan has no benches,
toilets, or eateries and that the place is prone to vehicular accidents for lack of parking space. As a
result, Mayor Lopez revoked petitioner’s temporary license to operate.

Subsequently, Municipal Ordinance No. 03-001 Series of 2003 or the "Cockfighting Ordinance of
Loon"9 was approved to regulate cockfighting in the municipality. Pursuant thereto, the Sangguniang
Bayan enacted Resolution No. 03-161, Series of 200310 which opened for public bidding a 25-year
franchise of the cockpit operation in Loon. The Loon Cockpit and Awards Bidding Committee
scheduled for August 25, 2003 the prequalification conference and actual bidding of the franchise of
the Loon Cockpit.11

Four qualified parties submitted their cash bids namely, Ricardo Togonon, Ricky Masamayor,
Marcelo Epe (Marcelo), and petitioner’s uncle, Jose Uy (Jose).12 According to petitioner, he did not
personally join the bidding since he knew that Mayor Lopez will only thwart his bid because of the
case he filed against him before the Ombudsman in line with the cancellation of the temporary
permit earlier issued to him. Hence, it was petitioner’s uncle who submitted the bid for and on his
behalf.

During the conduct of the public bidding, Marcelo was declared the winner13 and a franchise for the
cockpit operation in Loon was granted in his favor by way of Municipal Ordinance No. 03-007, Series
of 2003.14

On January 29, 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint15 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol in
Tagbilaran City against Mayor Lopez, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, the members of the
Loon Cockpit Bidding and Awards Committee, and the franchise awardee, Marcelo, for Annulment of
both the bidding process and Municipal Ordinance No. 03-007, Series of 2003 and for Damages.
Petitioner alleged that the bidding was rigged and fraudulently manipulated to benefit Marcelo,
Mayor Lopez’s rumored business partner and financial backer. Considering the rigged bidding,
petitioner claimed that the ordinance awarding the franchise to Marcelo has no basis.

Anent his claim for damages, petitioner alleged that respondents acted in bad faith in granting him
the necessary permits to construct a cockpit in Bgy. Lintuan only to revoke them when his new
cockpit was about to be finished and after he had already spent approximately a million pesos for
construction. Because of these unjust, illegal and malicious acts of respondents, petitioner claimed
that he suffered great anxiety and extreme prejudice which entitles him to moral damages of
₱200,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱150,000.00 and actual damages equivalent to the amount
spent for the construction of his new cockpit or ₱1,000,000.00.

Respondents did not file their Answer except for Marcelo who filed an Answer-in-
Intervention16 averring that the suit was meant to harass and to block the grand cock derby that he
was about to stage. He maintained that no irregularity occurred in the bidding as the officials
judiciously performed their duties.

Marcelo subsequently moved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint mainly for lack of cause of action and
for estoppel,17 arguing that petitioner was not even one of the bidders and that he never filed any
protest during the bidding.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 9, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner was not the
proper party to sue since he was not even a bidding participant in the alleged rigged bidding of the
cockpit franchise. The trial court also found petitioner undeserving of damages. The RTC
ratiocinated in this wise:
In the case of the cockpit arena of plaintiff in Lintuan, it is to be noted that the Sangguniang Bayan,
under Municipal Ordinance No. 02-016, S-2002, had earlier declared it unfit and sub-standard being
lacking of [sic] facilities and prone to vehicular accident which considerations the Court finds not only
[untenable] but of paramount importance as it is the bounden duty of any local government or any
business proprietor for that matter to ensure the safety of the life and limbs of the users to maintain
public patronage. And having awarded the franchise to defendant Marcelo Epe, plaintiff has no
business to question the judgment of the Sangguniang Bayan on the matter as it did not impair any
contract or right granted to third persons much less the plaintiff as the permit granted to him by the
Mayor was only temporary that did not confer a vested right for the issuance of a franchise. But even
granting arguendo that the bidding was rigged, the incident should have been questioned right then
and there or reasonably after the submission of the Bidding Report to the Sangguniang Bayan, yet,
the records shows the contrary. In fact, it took plaintiff five months later to do it and surprisingly in
time for the opening activity of the Grand Derby which would only suggest that plaintiff [sic] intention
was malicious and in bad faith and was only out to put defendant in public shame and
embarrassment had his application for temporary restraining order succeeded. Besides, plaintiff did
not personally participate in the bidding, so that, it is correct to say that he is not a party-in-interest
thereto and, thus, estopped to bring the action himself in court. Furthermore, he was afforded all
legal remedies therefor, having taken his cause to the Ombudsman but the same was dismissed for
being bereft of propriety. If ever he suffered damages in the construction of his new cockpit in
Lintuan, it was his fault for not [sic] cautious enough to invest in the enterprise without first obtaining
a franchise.

Wherefore, in view of all the foregoings, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against plaintiff.18

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 insisting that he is a party-in-interest because as a

licensed cockpit operator for several years, he stands to be benefited or injured by the court’s
judgment. The RTC nevertheless dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its March 17,
2004 Order.20

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner thus filed a Petition for Certiorari21 before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83894. He
argued that ‘not being a party-in-interest’ is not one of the enumerated grounds for dismissing a case
under the Rules of Court. And granting that it is a ground, he claimed that he was denied due
process when the RTC dismissed his action without allowing him to present evidence to prove that
he is a party-in-interest. Petitioner asserted that while he did not personally participate in the bidding,
it was Jose, his uncle, who submitted the bid on his behalf. He also asserted that Marcelo’s claims in
his motion to dismiss were matters of defense and questions of fact that necessitated a trial on the
merits which was never conducted.

In its assailed July 29, 2005 Decision,22 the CA stressed that due process does not necessarily entail
a full-blown trial, and in petitioner’s case, he was clearly given all the opportunities to be heard.
Moreover, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing
petitioner’s suit for lack of cause of action for want of personality to sue. The CA explained, viz:

As shown in the records of the case, it was the petitioner’s uncle and not the petitioner himself who
participated in the bid. The fact that the petitioner is the owner of the new and existing cockpit and a
licensed cockpit operator for the past fourteen (14) years is irrelevant.

To emphasize, the present complaint indeed has no cause of action. Settled is the doctrine that a
valid ground must appear on the face of the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court might render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
From the face of the complaint, it is manifest that the petitioner is not the real party in interest for he
was not even a participant in the August 25, 2003 bidding. Therefore, the petitioner, having no
personality to sue has no cause of action against the defendants. x x x23

Hence, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is denied due course and accordingly dismissed.
The Order dated March 9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 3, City of
Tagbilaran, in Civil Case No. 6903 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 but it was denied in a Resolution26 dated December 2,
2005.

Hence, this petition.

The Parties’ Arguments

Petitioner argues that he is a party because he stands to be prejudiced by the rigged bidding and the
assailed ordinance as he was in fact the highest bidder of the cockfight franchise, it having been
agreed by their family that his uncle, Jose, would only submit the bid on petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner
claims that his bid was the highest if Marcelo’s questionable bid was excluded.

On respondents’ part, they maintain that petitioner has no cause of action against them.27

Issue

The sole issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the standing to challenge the bidding
proceedings and the issuance of Ordinance No. 03-007, Series of 2003.

Our Ruling

It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.28

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."29 "To qualify a person to be a real party-
in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced."30

Under this definition, petitioner, not being one of the bidders clearly has no personality to contest the
alleged rigged bidding as well as to pray for the annulment of Ordinance No. 03-007, Series of 2003
which granted the franchise to Marcelo. The fact that he owns the cockpit in Bgy. Lintuan does not
clothe him with legal standing to have the bidding proceedings annulled and Marcelo stripped off of
the cockpit franchise. Even assuming that the bidding proceeding was rigged thereby disqualifying
Marcelo as a bidder, the highest bidder would still be Jose, and not the petitioner who was not even
a participant. Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Jose was his representative, records show that Jose
acted in his personal capacity when he applied to be one of the bidders of the cockpit
franchise.31 Never was it shown that he was bidding on behalf of someone else, particularly
petitioner. Petitioner’s agreement with his family and Jose, i.e., that the latter would bid on behalf of
the petitioner, does not bind the respondents. Thus, had Jose been the highest bidder, the franchise
would have been awarded in his name and not in favor of petitioner. Jose would be the one
accountable to the Sangguniang Bayan with regard to fulfillment of the obligations of said franchise.

All told, this Court finds no reason to disturb the judgment of the CA affirming the RTC’s dismissal of
petitioner’s action. Suffice it to state that on the sole basis of the allegations of the complaint, the
court may dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83894 dated July 29, 2005 and December 2, 2005, respectively, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.