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Regionalism and Colonialism in Contemporary Oceania

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The Round Table, 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1296710

Regionalism and Colonialism in Contemporary Oceania

Stephanie Lawson
Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Regionalism in Oceania emerged in a context shaped both by the French Pacific; Indonesia;
decolonisation movement as well as the Cold War, the dynamics Pacific Islands Forum; West
of which are still being played out today. This article considers two Papua; self-determination;
cases of particular interest in current regional politics which illustrate regionalism; colonialism;
Australia; New Zealand; the
a number of important contradictions in conventional approaches Canberra Agreement
to the analysis of colonialism. The first involves the two larger French
territories in the region – New Caledonia and French Polynesia –
which have recently been admitted to full membership of the Pacific
Islands Forum despite falling short of the technical requirements for
such membership, namely independent status. The second concerns
Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over West Papua. Although this claim
has been recognised in international law since 1969, its basis is highly
suspect and Indonesia’s record from the start is arguably tantamount
to a repressive form of colonialism enabled by the United Nations itself.
Placed in comparative perspective, these cases invite us to reconsider
just what colonialism on the one hand and self-determination on the
other really mean in the contemporary period.

Introduction
The history of regionalisation processes and accompanying ideologies in Oceania has
been one of constant adjustment and readjustment to changing circumstances at national,
regional and international levels. Many of the significant changes, especially from the 1960s
through to the 1980s, were mediated by decolonisation, a phenomenon that reached Oceania
rather later than the rest of the former (European) colonial world, and which in some cases
is still ongoing. Cold War dynamics also had a significant impact over the same period. The
contemporary Pacific’s premier regional institution, the Pacific Islands Forum (hereafter
the Forum), was founded following profound frustration with the colonially dominated
and rigidly non-political South Pacific Commission (SPC) for the express purpose of dis-
cussing political issues, including decolonisation itself. The Forum’s membership was also
specifically restricted to independent states which, at the time, consisted mainly of western
Polynesian countries as well as Australia and New Zealand, although the latter two occupied
an ambiguous position, being both former colonies themselves as well as colonial powers
in their own right. From the mid-1970s, as the Melanesian states achieved independence,
they formed a political grouping of their own which eventually became formalised as the

CONTACT  Stephanie Lawson  stephanie.lawson@mq.edu.au

© 2017 The Round Table Ltd
2   S. LAWSON

Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). Its founding ideology and political agenda were more
explicitly anti-colonial than the Forum as well as being based on a strong sense of Melanesian
solidarity across the sub-region.
While the Pacific Community has remained steadfastly non-political according to its
original charter, recent events have seen the founding principles of both the Forum and
the MSG effectively overturned. In a move which surprised many observers, the Forum’s
47th summit in September 2016 voted to admit New Caledonia and French Polynesia as
full members, despite their non-independent status. Previously, in an equally surprising
move, the MSG admitted Indonesia – arguably a colonising power in relation to the indig-
enous Melanesian population of its provinces of Papua and West Papua (hereafter simply
West Papua) – to associate membership at its June 2015 summit in Honiara. At the same
time it awarded only observer status to the United Liberation Movement for West Papua
(ULMWP). The latter body again petitioned the MSG for full membership in early 2016,
but a decision was deferred. Indonesia also aspires to full membership. The admission of
Indonesia to even associate membership and the fobbing off of the ULMWP, however, are
actions that seem entirely inconsistent with the MSG’s earlier embracing of the Front de
Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) – an umbrella organisation of pro-inde-
pendence groups in New Caledonia – as a full member. It is certainly a significant departure
from the MSG’s founding ideology of Melanesian solidarity and anti-colonialism. Equally
notable is the fact that the Melanesian members of the Forum endorsed New Caledonia’s
and French Polynesia’s accession to full Forum membership.
These developments raise some interesting questions about the dynamics of regionalism
and colonialism in Oceania. First, does the admission of the French territories to the Forum
mean that the French presence in Oceania, through these territories, is no longer regarded
by Forum members as constituting a genuine form of colonialism? Second, with respect to
West Papua, although both the Forum and the MSG have expressed concerns over human
rights abuses, they have stopped well short of treating Indonesia as an oppressive colo-
nial power despite its record. In approaching these issues, this article reviews the relevant
background to regional developments, beginning with the early post-war period and the
establishment of the SPC. Next, it recounts the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, the rise
of the Forum as a regional political platform for the island leaders in light of the perceived
deficiencies of the SPC, and moving then to the emergence of the MSG and its own moti-
vations for asserting a distinctive and politically attuned Melanesian sub-regional identity.
The penultimate section considers the nature of French colonialism and transformations
over the last few decades while the conclusion places the cases in comparative perspective.

The Regionalisation of Oceania

Proposals for the region’s first formal organisation were initially canvassed towards the
end of World War II with Australia and New Zealand taking the lead, as reflected in the
Canberra Pact of 1944 which set out what both saw as a viable regional order in the post-
war period. Security had been linked with economic and social welfare issues which came
to be reflected in the trusteeship values later embedded in the UN Charter of 1945. Other
relevant colonial powers of the time, namely the US, the UK, France and the Netherlands,
soon endorsed the idea of a South Seas Regional Commission, but emphasising technical
development and welfare issues only. Thus a key feature of the SPC, established in 1947,
 THE ROUND TABLE   3

was the prohibition of any discussion of political matters, including trade, security or inde-
pendence. The French were particularly insistent on this.
The Canberra Agreement specifically provided for a South Pacific Conference of indig-
enous leaders. However, it was to meet separately from the Commission itself with com-
petence limited to making recommendations to the Commission on its programme which,
in accord with its mandate, was confined strictly to welfare issues including health, edu-
cation, agricultural production and so forth. The first South Pacific Conference of island
delegates was convened in Suva in 1950 with representation from Papua, New Guinea,
Nauru, New Caledonia and Dependencies, French Oceania (French Polynesia), Netherlands
New Guinea, Western Samoa, Tokelau, Cooks Islands, Niue, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Gilbert
Islands, Ellice Islands, American Samoa, the New Hebrides and Tonga – an inclusive gath-
ering by any measure. Much of its significance lay in the fact that it was the first time ever
that indigenous islanders had an opportunity to come together in any formal (or informal)
way. The French territories, however, sent Europeans to speak for their indigenous people,
the only one of the colonial powers to do so (Fry, 1997, pp. 183–186). This move spoke
volumes about French attitudes of the time.
In the meantime, the international climate was changing rapidly. In 1960, the UN
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples formally
delegitimised colonialism in all its forms. In Oceania, Western Samoa took the lead, gaining
independence in 1962, with Nauru following in 1968 and Fiji in 1970. Tonga moved from
protected status to full independence in the same year. Kiribati and Tuvalu, formerly the
Gilbert and Ellice islands, became separate independent entities in 1976. The Cook Islands
and Niue chose Free Association with New Zealand in 1965 and 1974, respectively, while
Tokelau remains a self-governing New Zealand territory. Independence for Melanesian
states took from the mid-1970s to the 1980s while for Micronesian states under US control
it took until well into the 1990s. American Samoa and Guam remain unincorporated US
territories, the Northern Mariana Islands have ‘commonwealth’ status (like Puerto Rico)
while Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia are associated states.
Some of these arrangements reflect continuities from the various colonial pasts of the
island groups, and clearly fall short of full independence, but they are voluntary and satisfy
basic criteria for self-determination. Apart from considerable subsidies, such arrangements
generally afford the islanders free access to the US or New Zealand as either citizens or
nationals. The sole remaining British dependency in Oceania is Pitcairn, with a population
of around 50 administered by the British High Commissioner in New Zealand. It remains
under the purview of the SPC – renamed the Pacific Community in 1997 – despite Britain’s
formal departure from the organisation in 2004. Rapa Nui (Easter Island/Isla de Pascua),
with a population of around, 6,000 lies at the most south-eastern point of the Polynesian
triangle. Annexed by Chile in 1888, it remains a special territory but is not listed by the UN
for decolonisation, nor is it usually considered part of the regional organisational scene.
The general picture of post-war decolonisation showed increasing enthusiasm on the
part of Britain, Australia and New Zealand to divest themselves of formal colonial respon-
sibilities. The US evinced less enthusiasm while France remained intensely resistant to
change. A study of contrasting attitudes on the part of Britain and France noted that while
Britain had established a tradition of meeting colonial discontent by allowing participation
of subject peoples in their own government, eventually paving the way for independence,
the French steadfastly refused to contemplate any move which might give their colonial
4   S. LAWSON

subjects ideas about autonomy. These attitudes held across the political spectrum from
right to left, supported by a strong ideology about the necessity of shoring up France’s
‘international greatness’ in the post-war period, especially following the humiliation of the
occupation (Smith, 1978, pp. 73, 80). France maintains territories in Oceania to this day –
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and the uninhabited (and virtually
uninhabitable) Clipperton Island off the coast of Mexico.
By the early 1960s the extent of dominance by the colonial powers in the SPC was becom-
ing a source of discontent among island leaders. At the 1965 Conference, Ratu Mara of Fiji
led a walk-out of island delegates protesting about a lack of islander control, due primarily
to French intransigence. A reform process eventually led to the Conference becoming the
governing body in 1974. The SPC/Pacific Community has experienced further organisational
reforms over the years, but remains primarily concerned with the delivery of aid, development
and services and is still strictly apolitical in the sense that it makes no value judgements when
it comes to issues such as domestic political concerns or decolonisation issues (Diver, 2016).
While the value of a politically neutral organisation dedicated to development issues
clearly has advantages, frustration on the part of island leaders in the earlier period with
the lack of a formal venue for political dialogue and the pursuit of trade matters demanded
an outlet of some kind. In 1965, island leaders from Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa formed
a small body of their own – the Pacific Island Producers’ Association (PIPA) – to act as
a commercial pressure group to improve returns on exports, especially to New Zealand
(Tarte, 1989, p. 183). PIPA was a prelude to more significant moves to establish a broader
body with a political agenda, namely, the South Pacific Forum, which we discuss shortly.

Indonesia and West Papua

Events in the north-western corner of the SPC’s original geographical reach had seen
Indonesia formally annex the western part of the island of New Guinea, previously
Netherlands New Guinea, ostensibly as part of the decolonisation process. The territory
has since been through various name changes, and is now technically divided into the two
Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, although these are still known collectively as
West Papua, at least outside Indonesia. The territory had not been part of negotiations over
Indonesian independence in 1949, the Dutch having argued that the Melanesian people were
not only ethnically very different from the Malay people of the Indonesian archipelago and
occupying a separate land mass, but also had in any case been administered separately from
Netherlands East Indies. Indonesia’s President Sukarno was to take a very different view,
claiming that the entire area formerly occupied by the Netherlands was now Indonesian
by virtue of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which held that the territorial boundaries of
post-colonial states should follow those of the former colonial state, the purpose being to
minimise territorial disputes (Saltford, 2003, p. 8).
In 1961, Sukarno threatened to deploy armed force to ‘liberate West Irian from the
strangle-hold of Dutch imperialism’ (Sukarno, 1961). A military intrusion into the territory
in 1962 prompted concerns about the possibility of large-scale conflict while the UN, now
heavily influenced by proponents of the decolonisation movement – most of whom appar-
ently did not see Indonesia as an agent of colonisation itself – pressured the Netherlands
to meet Indonesian demands, as did the US, concerned with the spread of communist
influence in Indonesia. Australia, formerly a supporter of the Dutch and their plans for the
 THE ROUND TABLE   5

territory, followed US policy. In August 1962 the New York Agreement officially transferred
the administration of the territory to a UN Temporary Executive Authority with provision
for the phased transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. Further provision
was made for an eventual Act of Free Choice by the Papuan people, to be conducted by the
Indonesian authorities under UN observation (United Nations, 1962).
Before the Indonesian takeover, and with Dutch cooperation, a semi-representative New
Guinea Council had been established, a date set for independence in 1970 and the Morning
Star flag raised as a symbol of independence. But any public support for independence after
1962 was violently repressed by Indonesian security forces. In the period leading up to 1969,
when the Act of Free Choice eventually took place, one report estimates that around 30,000
Papuans were killed by Indonesian security forces (Robinson, 2012). The violence contin-
ues to this day. The Act of Free Choice itself is widely considered to have been a complete
farce, conducted by the Indonesian authorities and consisting of assembling just over 1,000
hand-picked Papuans who voted unanimously for incorporation into Indonesia under the
watchful eye of armed Indonesian security forces. The doubts of the UN observers about the
integrity of the process were reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s report, but Indonesia,
the country that had convened the 1955 Bandung Conference and urged all to unite in the
fight against colonialism, had strong support at the General Assembly which endorsed the
process. It was opposed only by a few African states sympathetic to West Papuan claims.
Formal Indonesian sovereignty over the territory was now established in international law
(Lawson, 2016, pp. 506–524).
Indonesian security forces have continued to act with virtual impunity to this day. Some
estimates put the numbers killed at around half a million. While one source suggests the
number may be much lower, it nonetheless notes well-documented atrocities including
rape, torture, forced cannibalism and sexual mutilation (Braithwaite et al., 2010, pp. 61–63).
Policies of transmigration from other parts of Indonesia, especially Java, and forced reloca-
tion of local communities from traditional lands to what amounts to reservations, continue
unabated. A projection to the year 2020 predicts that Papuans will then number just under
30% of the population (Elmslie, 2010). It is not unreasonable to view this as an egregious
abuse of colonial power over a subject population.
By contrast, the current UN position is that French Polynesia and New Caledonia are
classified as non-self-governing territories and remain listed for decolonisation. Consistent
with its attitudes in the post-war period, France has never recognised the legitimacy of the
UN Decolonisation Committee, although it has cooperated on New Caledonia, which is
scheduled to hold a referendum on independence in 2018. Despite achieving autonomous
status in 1996, French Polynesia was relisted in 2013 as a non-self-governing territory
following a campaign by pro-independence factions. On the other hand, regardless of the
fraudulent nature of the Indonesian takeover, continuing atrocities and the quest by activ-
ists whose grievances are well-documented by Amnesty International and other respected
organisations – notwithstanding Indonesian denials and attempts at cover-ups – West Papua
has no such recognition.

The Rise of Political Regionalism

We saw earlier that indigenous leaders in some parts of Oceania had, by the mid-1960s,
started to forge strategies of their own to move beyond the strictures of the SPC. The
6   S. LAWSON

establishment of PIPA signalled a beginning, but by itself proved inadequate. In June 1970,
Cook Islands Premier Albert Henry declared that the region needed a new organisation,
independent of the SPC, to cater for political discussion. Henry sought Australian and New
Zealand support, without which he thought it was unlikely to succeed. These countries, he
said, were in any case an integral part of the Pacific, which the US, Britain and France were
not. He noted in particular that he had not consulted the French ‘because their attitude
is dogmatic’ (Pacific Islands Monthly, 1970, p. 26). New Zealand then took the initiative,
inviting leaders of the independent and self-governing countries – the Cook Islands, Fiji,
Nauru, Tonga and Western Samoa – as well as Australia to a meeting held in Wellington
in 1971. This was the founding moment of the South Pacific Forum (renamed the Pacific
Islands Forum in 2000).
Ratu Mara had previously launched the idea of the ‘Pacific Way’ during his first address
as prime minister of independent Fiji at the UN in 1970. But it resonated mainly in the
western Polynesian sub-region of Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga and (Western) Samoa, noting
that Fiji under Mara identified much more strongly both culturally and politically with its
Polynesian neighbours. Accordingly, the Pacific Way stood as something of a proxy for a
Polynesian Way with little meaning for Melanesian countries (Natuman, 2016; see also
Lawson, 2013). As they achieved independence, the Melanesian countries began joining
the Forum. But they were joining an organisation with an established membership of fairly
conservative Polynesian countries which also tended to look down on their Melanesian
counterparts. The latter generally took a more radical anti-colonial line as well as on issues
such as nuclear testing. Taken together, these factors gave rise in due course to the articula-
tion of a ‘Melanesian Way’ as an alternative discourse, as well as a substantive sub-regional
organisation in the form of the MSG (Lawson, 2013).
The MSG became consolidated as a caucus in 1986 when the heads of government of
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and an FLNKS representative met
in Goroka and agreed on the importance of solidarity ‘in spearheading regional issues of
common interest, including the FLNKS cause for political independence in New Caledonia’
(MSG, 2015). The FLNKS, though clearly not an independent state, nonetheless represented
the aspirations of Kanaks to that status, and was admitted to formal membership in 1989,
setting a precedent for the later bid by West Papuans. Fiji’s earlier identification with the
Polynesian sub-region meant that it did not join the MSG until 1996, by which time it had
undergone substantial political change. The principles of anti-colonialism and Melanesian
solidarity remain as founding principles, but have been sorely tested by the West Papua
case in recent years.
West Papua was not a major issue for the MSG in its early years, but unrelenting activism
on the part of West Papuans and their supporters in bringing to light the egregious human
rights abuses that have occurred under Indonesian rule have made it so. A major boost to
West Papua’s international profile came at the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit
in New York when leaders from Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu declared support for West
Papuan independence, the first time any countries had voiced such support at the UN since
Indonesia’s takeover (Maclellan, 2007). A group known as International Parliamentarians
for West Papua, launched in 2008, has added weight to the cause, declaring on their web-
site that ‘West Papua is a decolonisation issue. The Act of Free Choice (in 1969) was …
basically a sham’ (www.ipwp.org/). It is pushing for the UN to act not only to set up an
 THE ROUND TABLE   7

investigation into human rights abuses but also to conduct an internationally supervised
vote on self-determination.
In 2000, a month after the UN Millennium Summit, the Nauru delegation to the
Forum summit included four West Papuans, resulting in the Forum, while acknowledging
Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua, issuing ‘an unprecedented statement calling for
peaceful dialogue on the future of the country, and an end to human rights abuses’ (Oxfam
Community Aid Abroad, 2002, p. 26). Expressions of concern over human rights abuses
appeared in subsequent Forum communiqués until 2008, but there has been little attention
to the issue since then. This is almost certainly due to increasing Indonesian influence in the
region, especially since it became a post-Forum Dialogue Partner in 2001. The Indonesian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website’s reference to the Forum (which has not been updated
since 2010) declares its desire to ‘get closer to’ Pacific islands countries ‘especially in order
to maintain the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia’ as well as ‘to improve the
image of Indonesia … [and] garner support for Indonesia in international fora’ (www.kemlu.
go.id/en/kebijakan/kerjasama-regional/Pages/PIF.aspx).
At the Forum’s most recent summit in 2016, West Papua was once again on the agenda,
with the final communiqué stating that ‘Leaders recognised the political sensitivities of the
issue of West Papua (Papua) and agreed the issue of alleged human rights violations in West
Papua (Papua) should remain on their agenda. Leaders also agreed on the importance of
an open and constructive dialogue with Indonesia’ (Pacific Islands Forum, 2016). Although
couched in mild diplomatic language, it is nonetheless a statement of recognition of ongoing
abuses and serves notice that the issue ‘is not going to go away’, especially in view of the
‘significant amount of support for the West Papuan cause around the Pacific’ (Taylor, 2016).
This support comes not only from a number of governments, but also, increasingly, from
civil society groups around the region. A major problem with getting anything stronger
from the Forum as a whole, though, is the strong support that Indonesia gets from Australia
and New Zealand. But others, such as Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa, have also been
reluctant for the Forum to get more involved. ‘It must be understood that West Papua is
part of Indonesia and any other way of handling it is interfering with Indonesia’s national
interests … the only way to do this is through the United Nations under the right to self-de-
termination’ (quoted in Maclellan, 2016). But the UN itself will only act under pressure, and
stronger support from Oceania’s premier political organisation is important.
It is the MSG, however, which one might expect to have made most of the running
on West Papua, and there is no question that some of its individual members have been
especially active over the years. Vanuatu stands out as the strongest of the independent
Melanesian countries in support of West Papuans, followed by the Solomon Islands. The
FLNKS has also been consistent in its support – it could scarcely be otherwise given its
own status. The other two MSG members, PNG and Fiji, however, have generally backed
Indonesia, although PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill has occasionally expressed con-
cerns about human rights. Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama’s approach has been
especially disappointing for West Papua. For reasons concerning his own political agenda,
Bainimarama has consistently supported Indonesia, and is reported, along with PNG, as
backing its application for full MSG membership (Pewarta, 2016). Pressure from PNG and
Fiji is the principal reason why Indonesia gained associate membership of the MSG in 2015,
while the ULMWP was granted only observer status. While Bainimarama still refuses to
participate in the Forum while Australia and New Zealand – which he frequently describes
8   S. LAWSON

as neo-colonial powers in Oceania – remain members, he clearly has no problem with

Indonesia vis-à-vis West Papua. An MSG meeting to further consider membership issues
was scheduled for December 2016, but appears to have been deferred once again.

French colonialism in Oceania

There is no doubt that, from a contemporary perspective, France’s historic record, like that
of most colonising countries, is a sorry one, and the record shows that it has been especially
dogmatic in its attitudes to decolonisation over many years. A decade of real crisis in its
Oceanic territories beginning in the 1970s, however, prompted some serious rethinking of
the various options available (Aldrich, 1993, p. xi). Since then, French attitudes have under-
gone a marked change and, as Britain had done at least two decades earlier, national interests
began to be redefined in response to both the financial cost of maintaining its imperial status
as well as reputational costs in international relations more generally. This involved shifting
away from the ‘long-established obsession with la grandeur Française’ (Taylor, 2010, p. 52).
In Oceania, by the late 1990s, France had adopted a much more flexible approach,
although this occurred only after concerted opposition in New Caledonia, including vio-
lence, and a long campaign against nuclear testing in French Polynesia – which finally ceased
in 1996 – accompanied by broader regional activism and ongoing international criticism
(Fisher, 2013, p. 2). France has now devolved considerable power to its two larger territo-
ries in Oceania. In New Caledonia and French Polynesia, this has been to the point where
both are virtually self-governing with very few powers still retained by France, although
the ones that it does retain – relating primarily to defence, security and the administration
of justice – are clearly important. Given that the final competencies in these respects are
not held by the governments of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, which therefore
cannot be considered properly independent, they are not technically eligible for Forum
membership (Taylor, 2016).
While French attitudes perhaps retain more than just a vestige of imperialism, the
contrast with past approaches is significant, becoming ever more apparent in the early
years of the 20th century and making a substantial difference to how New Caledonia’s and
French Polynesia’s applications for full membership were viewed in the region. In 2006,
New Caledonia and French Polynesia were admitted to the Forum as associate members.
The governments of both territories then worked assiduously, as did France, to persuade
member states that their degree of autonomy was sufficient for them to be considered for
full membership. Current president of the New Caledonian government, Philippe Germain,
has argued that the country not only has complete autonomy in economic, financial, envi-
ronmental and cultural issues, but it also has its own regional and international relations
and can sign treaties. ‘This is what made it possible for the island members of the Forum
to see that we were autonomous enough to become a full member on an equal basis’
(Germain, 2016).
Another New Caledonian government official has noted that while it is true that New
Caledonia has not yet made an act of self-determination according to UN criteria, it is
nonetheless on an irreversible trajectory to self-determination. This is why MSG countries
supported the admission of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Bockel, 2016). In
fact, only one group within the FLNKS opposed it while the FLNKS as a whole had no
official position. In the end, then, all MSG member countries (with the exception of Fiji,
 THE ROUND TABLE   9

which did not participate) were persuaded that the case for New Caledonian and French
Polynesian membership was sufficiently strong, and joined with Australia, New Zealand
and the Micronesian and Polynesian members in supporting a consensus decision.1
There are also geostrategic reasons for bringing the two French territories into the Forum
fold: it creates a stronger link between a major European and world power with the region
and helps to balance other forces operating in the region, something which Australia and
New Zealand, in particular, are obviously concerned with. Another major factor is French
and EU financial support, both for the French territories as well as the broader region. From
the Forum’s point of view, the admission of the two French territories to full membership
also enhances its breadth as a regional organisation. These factors highlight the extent to
which the Forum’s founding principles have now given way to pragmatism.

Conclusion
The developments sketched above raise key questions about regionalism and contemporary
forms of colonialism in Oceania. With respect to France, its history as a colonising power
in the region since the end of World War II shows a marked resistance to international
trends in decolonisation. But various pressures, including a need to reassess its own national
self-interest, have led finally to the stage where its two largest Oceanic territories, although
still decidedly ‘French’, have now been accepted by virtually all other regional countries as
political entities in their own right with the ability to participate autonomously in regional
politics. Certainly, the Forum’s actions indicate that they are no longer regarded as mere
colonies even though they do not meet the technical requirements for membership as fully
independent countries.
The behaviour of France over the last few decades also contrasts with that of Indonesia in
relation to West Papua. Although technically not a colony in international law, the evidence
shows not just the fraudulent nature of Indonesia’s claims to the territory via the 1969 ‘Act
of Free Choice’, but subsequent behaviour towards an indigenous population rivalling the
worst excesses of European colonialism in any part of the world and at almost any time in
its history. Moreover, it shows little sign of abating. The only argument Indonesia is capable
of advancing in relation to the situation, apart from flat denials of human rights abuses, is
that it effectively ‘owns’ sovereignty over the land and people of West Papua and is therefore
entitled to non-interference in its internal affairs.
This brings us to the question of why Indonesia is not treated as a colonising power at
an ideological level. Looking back at the history of decolonisation in the 20th century, it is
clear enough that it was all about bringing about an end to European colonisation. There
was obviously good reason for this, but the rush to do so created new forms of colonialism
and ignored the fact that Europeans were not the only ones capable of exploiting imperialist
opportunities. The UN played a key role in creating a situation in which non-European
powers such as Indonesia could take advantage of such opportunities, yet, in a third decade
dedicated to the eradication of colonialism, its own complicity in these cases has barely
come under scrutiny. Instead, it devotes much time and energy to pursuing cases for decol-
onisation on behalf of small territories, mostly under the control of Britain, the US and
France. Many of these have no desire for independence whatsoever and have indicated this
through referendums or other forms of self-determination. Contemporary post-colonial
approaches to the analysis of international politics would do well to address such issues
10   S. LAWSON

more seriously and, in the process, to reconsider the meaning of colonialism, sovereignty
and self-determination in the contemporary era.

Note
1. 
Noting that ‘consensus’ can often mask dissenting minority positions. Several confidential
sources have mentioned to the author that Nauru did not favour admission of the French
territories and that Tonga and Tuvalu also had reservations.

Funding
Research for this article was funded by the Australian Research Council [DP140101227].

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