RUIZ VS DIMAILIG
FACTS:
(Bernardo) was the registered owner of a parcel of
land. he entrusted the owner's copy of the said TCT to
his brother, Jovannie, 5 who in turn gave the title to
Editha, a broker, for its intended sale. However the
property was mortgaged to (Evelyn) as evidenced by a
Deed of REM without Bernardo's knowledge and
consent. Hence, Bernardo instituted this suit for
annulment of the Deed of REM
Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she
inspected the subject property and assured her that
Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto was
genuine. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged
the property to her. She also insisted that as a
mortgagee in good faith and for value, the REM cannot
be annulled and that she had the right to keep the
owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 until the loan was
fully paid to her
Bernardo argued that his alleged signature appearing
therein was merely forged 11 as he was still abroad at
that time. When he learned in September or November
1998 that Editha mortgaged the subject property, he
personally told Evelyn that the REM was fake and
demanded the return of his title. Not heeding his
request, he led a complaint for estafa through falsi
cation of public document against Editha and Evelyn.
Jovannie also took the witness stand. He testi ed that
Editha convinced him to surrender the owner's copy of
TCT which she would show her buyer. 14
Subsequently, however, Editha informed him that she
misplaced the title. Hence, he executed an af davit of
loss and registered it with the Register of Deeds (RD).
Editha nally admitted that the title was not lost but
was in Evelyn's possession because of the REM. 17
Upon learning this, Jovannie inquired from Evelyn if
Editha mortgaged Bernardo's property to her.
Purportedly, Evelyn con rmed said mortgage and told
him that she would not return the owner's copy of TCT
unless Editha pay the loan. 18 Jovannie also alleged
that he told Evelyn that Bernardo's alleged signature in
the REM was not genuine since he was abroad at the
time of its execution.
Evelyn maintained that she was a mortgagee in good
faith.She testi ed that sales agents — Editha, Corazon
Encarnacion, and a certain Parani, — and a person
introducing himself as "Bernardo" mortgaged the
subject property to her. "Bernardo" failed to pay the
loan
Evelyn narrated that before accepting the mortgage of
the subject property, she, the sales agents, her aunt,
and "Bernardo," visited the property. She pointed out
that her companions inspected it while she stayed in
the vehicle as she was still recuperating from an
operation. 22 She admitted that she neither veri ed
from the neighborhood the owner of the property nor
approached the occupant thereof
Evelyn asserted that when the Deed of REM was
executed, the person who introduced himself as
Bernardo presented a community tax certi cate and his
picture as proof of identity. 24 She admitted that she
did not ask for any identi cation card from "Bernardo.
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Evelyn clari ed that she met Jovannie for the rst time
when he went to her house and told her that Bernardo
could not have mortgaged the property to her as he
was abroad
RTC:
RTC dismissed the Complaint. It held that while
Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject
property, Evelyn was a mortgagee in good faith
because she was unaware that the person who
represented himself as Bernardo was an impostor. It
noted that Evelyn caused the veri cation of the title of
the property with the RD and found the same to be
free from any lien or encumbranc
RTC declared that there was no showing of any
circumstance that would cause Evelyn to doubt the
validity of the title or the property covered by it
CA: REVERSED
innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value
protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by
virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner
himself, not by a forged deed." 31 Since the Deed of
REM was forged, and the title to the subject property
is still in the name of the rightful owner, and the
mortgagor is a different person who only pretended to
be the owner, then Evelyn cannot seek protection from
the cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith.
CA further decreed that Evelyn's claim of good faith
cannot stand as she failed to verify the real identity of
the person introduced by Editha as Bernardo. It noted
that the impostor did not even exhibit any identi cation
card to prove his identity; and, by Evelyn's admission,
she merely relied on the representation of Editha
relative to the identity of "Bernardo." It also held that
Evelyn transacted only with Editha despite the fact that
the purported owner was present during the inspection
of the property, and during the execution of the REM
ISSUE: WON [T]he Court of Appeals erred in holding
that petitioner is not a mortgagee in good faith despite
the presence of substantial evidence to support such
conclusion of fact.
RULING:
No valid mortgage will arise unless the mortgagor has
a valid title or ownership over the mortgaged property.
By way of exception, a mortgagee can invoke that he
or she derived title even if the mortgagor's title on the
property is defective, if he or she acted in good faith.
In such instance, the mortgagee must prove that no
circumstance that should have aroused her suspicion
on the veracity of the mortgagor's title on the property
was disregarded
the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith assumes that
the title to the subject property had already been
transferred or registered in the name of the impostor
who thereafter transacts with a mortgagee who acted
in good faith. In the case at bench, it must be
emphasized that the title remained to be registered in
the name of Bernardo, the rightful and real owner, and
not in the name of the impostor
The burden of proof that one is a mortgagee in good
faith and for value lies with the person who claims such
status
In this case, Evelyn insists that she is a mortgagee in
good faith and for value. Thus, she has the burden to
prove such claim and must provide necessary evidence
to support the same. Unfortunately, Evelyn failed to
discharge her burden.
First, the Deed of REM was established to be a forged
instrument. As aptly discussed by the CA, Bernardo did
not and could not have executed it as he was abroad
at the time of its execution
It was only an impostor — representing himself as
Bernardo — who mortgaged the property. This
impostor is not only without rightful ownership on the
mortgaged property, he also has no Torrens title in his
own name involving said property
Second, Evelyn cannot invoke the protection given to a
mortgagee in good faith. As discussed, the title to the
subject property remained registered in the name of
Bernardo. It was not transferred to the impostor's
name when Evelyn transacted with the latter. Hence,
the principle of mortgagee in good faith nds no
application; correspondingly, Evelyn cannot not seek
refuge therefrom.
Third, even assuming that the impostor has caused the
property to be titled in his name as if he had rightful
ownership thereof, Evelyn would still not be deemed a
mortgagee in good faith. This is because Evelyn did not
take the necessary steps to determine any defect in the
title of the alleged owner of the mortgaged property.
She deliberately ignored pertinent facts that should
have aroused suspicion on the veracity of the title of
the mortgagor "Bernardo." 43
One, while "Bernardo" introduced himself to Evelyn as
the owner of the property, he did not present any proof
of identi cation. To recall, he only exhibited his
community tax certi cate and a picture when he
introduced himself to Evelyn. "Bernardo's" failure to suf
ciently establish his identity should have aroused
suspicion on the part of Evelyn whether the person she
was transacting with is the real Bernardo or a mere
impostor. She should have investigated further and veri
ed the identity of "Bernardo" but she failed to do so.
She even admitted that she did not at all ask for any
identi cation card from "Bernardo."
Two, Evelyn also ignored the fact that "Bernardo" did
not participate in the negotiations/transactions leading
to the execution of the Deed of REM. Notably, no power
of attorney was given to Editha who supposedly
transacted in behalf of Bernardo. Despite "Bernardo's"
presence during the ocular inspection of the property
and execution of the mortgage contract, it was Editha
who transacted with Evelyn
Three, Evelyn likewise failed to ascertain the supposed
title of "Bernardo" over the property. Evelyn admitted
that during the ocular inspection, she remained in the
vehicle. She did not inquire from the subject property's
occupant or from the occupants of the surrounding
properties if they knew "Bernardo" and whether or not
he owned the subject property.
Notably, the RTC misapprehended certain facts when
it held that Evelyn inspected the property and met
Jovannie during the inspection. By her own account,
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Evelyn clari ed that she met Jovannie for the rst time
only when the latter visited her house to inform her
that an impostor mortgaged Bernardo's property to
her.
Four, the Court observes that Evelyn hastily granted
the loan and entered into the mortgage contract. As
also testi ed by Corazon, a day after the supposed
ocular inspection on the property, Evelyn and
"Bernardo" executed the Deed of REM even without
Evelyn verifying the identity of the property's occupant
as well as the right of the mortgagor, if any, over the
same. Indeed, where the mortgagee acted with haste
in granting the loan, without rst determining the
ownership of the property being mortgaged, the
mortgagee cannot be considered as an innocent
mortgagee in good faith
ESGUERRA VS TRINIDAD
FACTS:
Esguerra spouses) were the owners of several parcels
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 10374, half of
which (17,642 square meters) they sold to their
grandchildren, herein petitioners Esguerra; and a
23,989-square meter parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 12080, 23,489 square meters of which
they also sold to petitioners, and the remaining 500
square meters they sold to their other grandchildren,
Trinidad brothers.
Also sold to the Trinidad brothers were a 7,048-square
meter parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
9059, a 4,618-square meter parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 12081, and a 768-square meter
parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13989.
Esguerra spouses executed the necessary Deed of Sale
in favor of petitioners and that in favor of the Trinidad
brothers. Both documents were executed before notary
public Maximo Abaño
Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share of the land to his
daughters-respondents herein. A portion of the land
consisting of 1,693 square meters was later assigned
Lot No. 3593 during a cadastral survey conducted in
the late 1960s.
On respondents' application for registration of title, CFI
awarded Lot No. 3593 in their favor. CT No. 0-3631
was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, Trinidad spouses) a portion of about 5,000
square meters of the 23,489-square meter of land
which they previously acquired from the Esguerra
spouses
OCT No. 06498 9 in the name of Trinidad. Upon the
death of the Trinidad spouses, Lot No. 3591 covered
by OCT No. 0-6498 was transmitted to respondents by
succession.
Petitioners, alleging that upon veri cation with the LRA
they discovered the issuance of the above-stated two
OCTs, led two separate complaints for their nulli
cation on the ground that they were procured through
fraud or misrepresentation.
appellate court found no fraud in respondents'
acquisition and registration of the land:
the evidence shows that appellees acquired title over
the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by their father Eulalio Trinidad in their favor.
T]hey failed to establish that appellees' acquisition of
the certi cate of title is fraudulent. In fact, in their two
complaints, appellants acknowledged that appellees
observed and took the initial procedural steps in the
registration of the land, thus ruling out fraud in the
acquisition of the certificate of title. . .
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS FRAUD IN THE CASE
AT BAR
RULING:
Fraud being a serious charge, it must be supported by
clear and convincing proof. 26 Petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of proof, however.
On the questioned interpretation and application by the
appellate court of Article 1542 of the Civil Code
reading:
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not
at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the
price, although there be a greater or less areas or
number than that stated in the contract.
while petitioners admittedly sold Lot No. 3591 to the
Trinidad spouses, they contend that what they sold
were only 5,000 square meters and not 6,268 square
meters, and thus claim the excess of 1,268 square
meters.
In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose
between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price
contract wherein the purchase price is determined by
way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g.,
P1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum contract
which states a full purchase price for an immovable the
area of which may be declared based on an estimate
or where both the area and boundaries are stated
In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;
. . . In a unit price contract, the statement of area of
immovable is not conclusive and the price may be
reduced or increased depending on the area actually
delivered.
Xxx
Where both the area and the boundaries of the
immovable are declared, the area covered within the
boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated
area. What really de nes a piece of ground is not the
area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned
in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down,
as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The courts below correctly characterized the sale of Lot
No. 3591 as one involving a lump sum contract. The
Bilihan ng Lupa shows that the parties agreed on the
purchase price of P1,000.00 on a predetermined, albeit
unsurveyed, area of 5,000 square meters and not on a
particular rate per unit area
under Article 1542, what is controlling is the entire land
included within the boundaries, regardless of whether
the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. This is particularly true since the
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area of the land in OCT No. 0-6498 was described in
the deed as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less
The use of "more or less" or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess
or de ciency
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of
unreasonableness of the excess or de ciency in area
In OCT No. 0-6498, the increase by a fourth of a
fraction of the area indicated in the deed of sale cannot
be considered as an unreasonable excess. Most
importantly, the circumstances attendant to the
inclusion of the excess area bare nothing atypical or
signi cant to hint at unreasonableness. It must be
noted that the land was not yet technically surveyed at
the time of the sale. As vendors who themselves
executed the Bilihan ng Lupa, petitioners may rightly
be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of the
value and area of the bahaging palayan.
the appellate court, in nding that the complaints were
time-barred, noted that when the complaints were led
in 1994, more than 27 years had elapsed from the
issuance of OCT No. 0-3631 and more than 20 years
from the issuance of OCT No. 0-6498. The prescriptive
period of one (1) year had thus set in
Even assuming that petitioners' actions are in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, which is
imprescriptible, the actions still necessarily fail since
petitioners failed to establish the existence of fraud.
IN FINE, it is a fundamental principle in land
registration that a certi cate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. Such indefeasibility commences after the lapse
or expiration of one year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration when all persons are considered
to have a constructive notice of the title to the
property. After the lapse of one year, therefore, title to
the property can no longer be contested. This system
was so effected in order to quiet title to land
ARCAINA VS INGRAM
FACTS:
Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property in 2004,
her attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a contract
with Ingram for the sale of the property. Banta showed
Ingram and the latter's attorneyin-fact, Archinue), the
metes and bounds of the property and represented
that Lot No. 3230 has an area of more or less 6,200
square meters (sq. m.) per the tax declaration covering
it. Price was P1,860,000.00, with Ingram making
installment payments for the property otaling
P1,715,000.00. 6 Banta and Ingram thereafter
executed a Memorandum of Agreement acknowledging
the previous payments and that Ingram still had an
obligation to pay the remaining balance
Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be
surveyed and discovered that Lot No. 3230 has an area
of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of
the property, Banta allegedly insisted that the
difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. This was
opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the
whole lot by virtue of the sale. 9 Thus, Archinue, on
behalf of Ingram, instituted the recovery case
Ingram alleged that upon discovery of the actual area
of the property, Banta insisted on fencing the portion
which she claimed to be unsold. Ingram further
maintained that she is ready to pay the balance of
P145,000.00 as soon as petitioners recognize her
ownership of the whole property
petitioners denied that the sale contemplates the entire
property and contended that the parties agreed that
only 6,200 sq. m. shall be sold at the rate of P300.00
per sq. m. Petitioners averred that since Ingram failed
to show that that she has a right over the unsold
portion of the property, the complaint for recovery of
possession should be dismissed
MCTC granted petitioners' demurrer and counterclaim
against Ingram
MCTC declared that the survey showed that the
property was 12,000 sq. m. or more than what was
stated in the deeds of sale. 19 For Ingram to be
awarded the excess 5,800 sq. m. portion of the
property, she should have presented evidence that she
paid for the surplus area consistent with Article 1540
of the Civil Code;
If, in the case of the preceding article, there is a greater
area or number in the immovable than that stated in
the contract, the vendee may accept the area included
in the contract and reject the rest. If he accepts the
whole area, he must pay for the same at the contract
rate
since Ingram failed to show that she paid for the value
of the excess land area, the MCTC held that she cannot
claim ownership and possession of the whole property.
the RTC held that Article 1542, which covers sale of
real estate in lump sum, applies in this case.
Having apparently sold the entire Lot No. 3230 for a
lump sum, Arcaina, as the vendor, is obligated to
deliver all the land included in the boundaries of the
property, regardless of whether the real area should be
greater or smaller than what is recited in the deeds of
sale
CA also agreed with the RTC that the sale was made
for a lump sum and not on a per-square-meter basis.
The parties merely agreed on the purchase price of
P1,860,000.00 for the 6,200 sq. m. lot, with the deed
of sale providing for the speci c boundaries of the
property
Citing Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 26 the CA
explained that in case of con ict between the area and
the boundaries of a land subject of the sale, the vendor
is obliged to deliver to the vendee everything within
the boundaries.
CA found the area in excess "substantial" which, to its
mind, "should have not escaped the discerning eye of
an ordinary vendor of a piece of land." 27 Thus, it held
that the RTC correctly ordered petitioners to deliver the
entire property to Ingram
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, raising for the
rst time the issue of prescription. They pleaded that
under Article 1543 29 of the Civil Code, Ingram should
have led the action within six months from the
delivery of the property. Counting from Arcaina's
execution of the notarized deed of absolute sale on
April 13, 2005, petitioners concluded that the ling of
the case only on January 25, 2006 is already time-
barred.
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The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
and ruled that Article 1543 does not apply because
Ingram had no intention of rescinding the sale. In fact,
she instituted the action to recover the excess portion
of the land that petitioners claimed to be unsold. Thus,
insofar as Ingram is concerned, that portion remained
undelivere
ISSUE: WON LOT 3230 WAS SOLD IN LUMP SUM
RULING: YES
Here, the Deed of Sale executed by Banta on March
21, 2005 42 and the Deed of Sale executed by Arcaina
on April 13, 2005 43 both show that the property was
conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of
P1,860,000.00. There was no indication that it was
bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article 1542
of the Civil Code governs the sale
where both the area and the boundaries of the
immovable are declared in a sale of real estate for a
lump sum, the area covered within the boundaries of
the immovable prevails over the stated area. 44 The
vendor is obliged to deliver all that is included within
the boundaries regardless of whether the actual area
is more than what was speci ed in the contract of sale;
and he/she shall do so without a corresponding
increase in the contract price. This is particularly true
when the stated area is quali ed to be approximate
only, such as when the words "more or less" were used
The deeds of sale in this case provide both the
boundaries and the estimated area of the property.
however, reveal that the actual area within the
boundaries of the property amounts to more or less
12,000 sq. m., with a difference of 5,800 sq. m. from
what was stated in the deeds of sale. With Article 1542
in mind, the RTC and the CA ordered petitioners to
deliver the excess area to Ingram. They are mistaken.
In Del Prado v. Spouses Caballero, the contract of sale
stated both the property's boundaries and estimated
area of more or less 4,000 sq. m. Later, the technical
description of the property appeared to be 14,457 sq.
m., more or less. Del Prado alleged that Spouses
Caballero were bound to deliver all that was included.
we did not apply Article 1542, Del Prado is entitled only
to the area stated in the contract of sale;
The Court, however, clari ed that the rule laid down in
Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an
exception. It held: "A caveat is in order, however. The
use of "more or less" or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or de ciency
. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description
"more or less" with reference to its area does not
thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit
price contract. In a contract of sale of land in a mass,
the speci c boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any other statement, with respect to the
area contained within its boundaries
Black's Law Dictionary de nes the phrase "more or
less" to mean:
The words are intended to cover slight or unimportant
inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954,
57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily to be interpreted as
taking care of unsubstantial differences or differences
of small importance compared to the whole number of
items transferred
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be
considered a slight difference in quantity.
In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated
to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries,
regardless of whether the real area should be greater
or smaller than that recited in the deed. 49 However,
in case there is con ict between the area actually
covered by the boundaries and the estimated area
stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so only
when the excess or de ciency between the former and
the latter is reasonable. 50
Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we nd that
the difference of 5,800 sq. m. is too substantial to be
considered reasonable. We note that only 6,200 sq. m.
was agreed upon between petitioners and Ingram.
Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole 12,000 sq.
m. on the premise that this is the actual area included
in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery of
almost twice the area stated in the deeds of sale.
Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200
sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more
than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable
excess that can be deemed included in the sale
AGATEP VS RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
subject property was previously owned by herein
respondent Lim. Lim mortgaged the lot to PNB. The
mortgage contract was duly annotated on TCT. Lim
was not able to pay her loan prompting PNB to
foreclose the property. It sold at public auction to PNB.
Lim failed to redeem the property. After the expiration
of the one-year redemption period allowed by law, PNB
consolidated its ownership, a TCT was issued.
while the mortgage was still in effect, Lim sold the
subject property to herein petitioner's husband,
Agatep. However, the sale was not registered. Neither
did Lim deliver the title. Nonetheless Agatep took
possession of the same, fenced it with barbed wire and
introduced improvements thereon. Subsequently,
Agatep died. his heirs, including herein petitioner,
continued to possess the property.
subject lot was included among PNB's acquired assets
for sale. Later on, an invitation to bid was duly
published. The disputed parcel of land was sold to
herein respondent Rodriguez), who is the daughter of
respondent Lim.
herein petitioner led a Complaint 10 for
"reconveyance
RTC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondents
1. Dismiss the instant complaint for
reconveyance for lack of merit;
2. Sustain the legality of TCT No. 10559 14 in
the name of defendant Roberta Rodriguez
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RTC ruled that Lim enriched herself at the expense of
petitioner and her husband by bene ting from the
proceeds of the sale but failing to deliver the object of
such sale. Hence, on grounds of justice and equity,
petitioner should be awarded an adequate
compensation for the value of the loss suffered.
CA: AFFIRMED
ISSUE: PETITIONER CONTEND THE FF ERRORS
IV.3. AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE ERROR
IV.2, THE RULING OF THE APPELLATE COURT THAT
PNB IS A MORTGAGEE, BUYER AND LATER SELLER IN
GOOD FAITH, IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IV.4. THE DECISION, ANNEX A, ERRED IN REJECTING
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS THAT PNB DID NOT
ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION;
IV.6. THE DECISION, ANNEX A, ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HER CAUSE
OF ACTION OF RECONVEYANCE
RULING:
Petitioner insists that PNB is not a mortgagee in good
faith asserting that, if it only exercised due diligence, it
would have found out that petitioner and her husband
were already in adverse possession of the subject
property as early as two years before the same was
sold to them.
This claim, however, is contradicted by no less than
petitioner's averments in her Brief led with the CA
wherein she stated that " [i]mmediately after the sale,
the land was delivered to Isaac Agatep . . . Since that
time up to the present, Isaac Agatep and after his
death, the Appellant have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse and public possession of the
said parcel of land". 24 The foregoing assertion only
shows that petitioner's husband took possession of the
subject lot only after the same was sold to him.
When the lots were mortgaged to PNB by Lim, the titles
thereto were in the latter's name, and they showed
neither vice nor in rmity. In accepting the mortgage,
PNB was not required to make any further investigation
of the titles to the properties being given as security,
and could rely entirely on what was stated in the
aforesaid title
Petitioner asserts that the execution of a public
document does not constitute su cient delivery to PNB,
considering that the subject property is in the adverse
possession, under claim of ownership, of petitioner and
her predecessor-in-interest
Petitioner further assails the ruling of the CA that PNB,
who was the buyer in the foreclosure sale, became the
absolute owner of the property purchased when it
consolidated its ownership thereof for failure of the
mortgagor Lim to redeem the subject property during
the period of one year after the registration of the sale
in Manuel R. Dulay Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, Petitioner's contention that private
respondent Torres never acquired ownership over the
subject property since the latter was never in actual
possession of the subject property nor was the
property delivered to him is also without merit.
Paragraph 1, Article 1498 of the New Civil Code
provides:
When the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred
Therefore, prior physical delivery or possession is not
legally required since the execution of the Deed of Sale
is deemed equivalent to deliver
in Spouses Sabio v. The International Corporate Bank:
Notwithstanding the presence of illegal occupants on
the subject property, transfer of ownership by symbolic
delivery under Article 1498 can still be effected through
the execution of the deed of conveyance. the key word
is control, not possession, of the subject property.
It is su cient that there are no legal impediments to
prevent petitioners from gaining physical possession of
the subject property. As stated above, prior physical
delivery or possession is not legally required and the
execution of the deed of sale or conveyance is deemed
equivalent to delivery
Thus, the execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of PNB,
after the expiration of the redemption period, is
deemed equivalent to delivery.
it must be noted that petitioner and her husband's
possession of the disputed lot is derived from their right
as buyers of the subject parcel of land.
As Lim's successors-in-interest, their possession could
not be said to be adverse to that of Lim. Thus, they are
also bound to recognize and respect the mortgage
entered into by the latter. Their possession of the
disputed lot could not, therefore, be considered as a
legal impediment which could prevent PNB from
acquiring ownership and possession thereof.
in the instant case, that Lim mortgaged the subject
property to PNB prior to selling the same to petitioner's
husband. Settled is the rule that a mortgage is an
accessory contract intended to secure the performance
of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is
that it is inseparable from the property
It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a
right in rem — a lien on the property whoever its owner
may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in
ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is
disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must
respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be
with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such
mortgage until discharged follows the property
Petitioner avers that she and her husband were not
aware of the mortgage contract which was executed
between PNB and Lim. The fact remains, however, that
the mortgage was registered and annotated on the
certificate of title covering the subject property.
It is settled that registration in the public registry is
notice to the whole world. Under the rule of notice, it
is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption may not be rebutted. This presumption
cannot be overcome by any claim of innocence or good
faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the
law requiring a record would be destroyed
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The
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rule must be absolute; any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation. 34 In the
present case, since the mortgage contract was
registered, petitioner may not claim lack of knowledge
thereof as a valid defense. The subsequent sale of the
property to petitioner's husband cannot defeat the
rights of PNB as the mortgagee and, subsequently, the
purchaser at the auction sale whose rights were
derived from a prior mortgage validly registered
Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA that an
action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its
rightful and legal owner. based on the evidence on
record, there was no wrongful registration of the
property, rst in the name of PNB as the purchaser
when the property was auctioned and, subsequently,
in the name of respondent Rodriguez who bought the
subject property when the same was offered for sale
by PNB. Hence, the CA did not commit error in a rming
the RTC's dismissal of herein petitioner's complaint for
reconveyance
ALEJANDRO VS CA
FACTS:
the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica
Labunos left their six children a 219-square-meter lot
in Mambaling, Cebu City. Upon the demise of the
Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been
divided among their children with each child having a
share of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of
the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance
with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly
purchased 12.17 square meters of Gregorio's share,
36.50 square meters of Ciriaco's share and 12.17
square meters of Abundio's share thereby giving her a
total area of 97.43 square meters, including her own
share of 36.50 square meters. a third party named
Licerio Nique, the private respondent in this case, also
purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50
square meters from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters
from Gregorio "through Laurencia," 12.17 square
meters from Abundio also "through Laurencia" and
36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area of
121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property
However, Laurencia later questioned the sale in an
action for quieting of title and damages against private
respondent Nique
TRIAL COURT: Court hereby renders judgment in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff
Meanwhile, petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino led a
complaint for redemption and recovery of properties
with damages against private respondent Nique.
The amended complaint alleged that private
respondent Nique never noti ed petitioner Mauricia of
the purchase of 121.67 square meters of the undivided
Lot No. 2798 nor did he give petitioner Mauricia the
preemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the
same lot. As such co-owner, petitioner Mauricia
manifested her willingness to deposit with the court the
amount of P29,777.78, the acquisition cost of the
portion purchased by private respondent Nique
in the meantime, private respondent led a motion for
the segregation of the 146-square-meter portion of the
property that had been declared by the trial court as
his own by virtue of purchase. An order was issued for
segregation.
Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower
court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction led before the Court of Appeals –
DISMISSED
ISSUE: whether or not as an heir of the
Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell
specific portions thereof to a third party
RULING:
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there
are two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. The underlying
rationale is that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to
his use and enjoyment of the same.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue
of inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion
thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that
provides:
"ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were noti ed in writing of the sale
by the vendor."
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary
rights in selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798.
However, because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could be identi ed as
yet and delineated as the object of the sale.
co-owner has the right to alienate his proindiviso share
in the co-owned property even without the consent of
the other coowners. Nevertheless, as a mere part
owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-
owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary
rule that 'no one can give what he does not have.
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other coowners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil
Case No. CEB-7038. When private respondent led a
motion for the segregation of the portions of the
property that were adjudged in his favor, private
respondent was in effect calling for the partition of the
property. However, under the law, partition of the
estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the
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heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an
estate in an action for quieting of title. As there is no
pending administration proceedings, the property of
the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the
heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was offered before the trial court.
Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the
execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She
only questions its validity on account of the absence of
notarization of the document and the non-publication
thereof
"ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction."
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells
his inchoate right in the coownership, he expresses his
intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-
heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be
evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing
his right over the property regardless of the form it
takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to
terminate the co-ownership by selling her share to
private respondent. Moreover, the execution of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
re ected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner
Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them
had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore
it was only the two of them that needed to settle the
estate. The fact that the document was not notarized
is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of
them. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document. In this regard,
Tolentino subscribes:
public instrument is not essential to the validity of the
partition. The public instrument is necessary only for
the registration of the contract, but not for its validity.
The validity of an oral contract among the heirs,
terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized by
the Supreme Court. 'An agreement among the heirs
that a certain lot should be sold and its proceeds paid
to one of them is a valid oral contract, and the same
has the force of law between the parties from and after
the original assent thereto, and no one of them may
withdraw or oppose its execution without the consent
of all.'
The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by
Mauricia and Laurencia evidence their intention to
partition the property. It delineates what portion of the
property belongs to each other
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion
in issuing the order for the segregation of the property.
In so doing, it was merely reiterating the partition of
the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister
Laurencia that was embodied in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate
OTHERS (FORUM-SHOPPING):
The Court nds no merit in the issue of forum shopping
raised by private respondent. Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a nal judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. 17 Because the judgment in Civil
Case No. CEB-7028 is already nal and executory, the
existence of res judicata is determinative of whether or
not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the
principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be
present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is nal; and (4)
the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter
and causes of action. 18 The fourth element is not
present in this case. The parties are not identical
because petitioner was not impleaded in Civil Case No.
CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the same
property of the Alejandrino spouses, the causes of
action are different. Civil Case No. CEB7028 is an action
for quieting of title and damages while Civil Case No.
CEB-11673 is for redemption and recovery of
properties.
It appears moreover, that private respondent's
argument on forum shopping is anchored on the fact
that counsel for both plaintiffs in those two cases is one
and the same, thereby implying that the same counsel
merely wanted to prevail in the second case after
having failed to do so in the first. The records show,
however, that Laurencia executed an a davit 19
consenting to the appearance of her counsel in any
case that petitioner Mauricia might le against private
respondent. She a rmed in that a davit that she could
be included even as a defendant in any case that
petitioner Mauricia would le because she "fully
agree(d)" with whatever cause of action Mauricia
would have against private respondent. Such a
statement can hardly constitute a proper basis for a
nding of forum shopping, much less evidence of
misconduct on the part of counsel. As noted earlier, the
two cases have different causes of action and the two
plaintiffs who would have con icting claims under the
facts of the case actually presented a united stand
against private respondent
SY VS CAPISTRANO
FACTS:
In 1980, Scott) approached respondent Capistrano)
and offered her services to help him sell his 13,785
square meters of land. Capistrano gave her a
temporary authority to sell which expired without any
sale transaction being made. To his shock, he
discovered later that TCT No. 76496, which was in his
name, had already been cancelled and a new one, TCT
No. 249959, issued over the same property on the
same date to Jose na A. Jamilar. TCT No. 249959
likewise had already been cancelled and replaced by
three (3) TCTs all in the names of the Jamilar spouses.
TCT Nos. 251524 and 251526 had also been cancelled
and replaced by TCT Nos. 262286 and 262287 issued
to Nelson Golpeo and John B. Tan
Thus, the action for reconveyance led by Capistrano,
alleging that his and his wife's signatures on the
purported deed of absolute sale in favor of Scott were
forgeries; that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
76496 in his name had always been in his possession;
and that Scott, the Jamilar spouses, Golpeo, and Tan
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were not innocent purchasers for value because they
all participated in defrauding him
Jamilar spouses denied the allegations in the complaint
and claimed that Capistrano had no cause of action
against them, as there was no privity of transaction
between them; the issuance of TCT No. 249959 in their
names was proper, valid, and legal; and that
Capistrano was in estoppel
Sy, Golpeo, and Tan denied the allegations in the
complaint and alleged that Capistrano had no cause of
action against them; that at the time they bought the
property from the Jamilars and the Gilturas as
unregistered owners, there was nothing in the certi
cates of title that would indicate any vice in its
ownership; that a buyer in good faith of a registered
realty need not look beyond the Torrens title to search
for any defect; and that they were innocent purchasers
of the land for value.
Scott denied the allegations in the complaint and
alleged that she had no knowledge or any actual
participation in the execution of the deeds of sale in
her favor and the Jamilars'; that she only knew of the
purported conveyances when she received a copy of
the complaint; that her signatures appearing in both
deeds of sale were forgeries; that when her authority
to sell the land expired, she had no other dealings with
it; that she never received any amount of money as
alleged consideration for the property; and that, even
if she were the owner, she would never have sold it at
so low a price.
TRIAL COURT: IN FAVOR OF CAPISTRANO
CA: a rmed the Decision of the trial court with the modi
cation that the Jamilar spouses were ordered to return
to Sy, Golpeo, and Tan the amount of P1,679,260.00
representing their full payment for the property, with
legal interest thereon from the date of the ling of the
complaint until full payment.
Hence, this petition with petitioners insisting that they
were innocent purchasers for value of the parcels of
land. They claim that when they negotiated with the
Jamilars for the purchase of the property, although the
title thereto was still in the name of Capistrano, the
documents shown to them — the court order directing
the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 76496, the new owner's duplicate copy thereof, the
tax declaration, the deed of absolute sale between
Capistrano and Scott, the deed of absolute sale
between Scott and Jamilar, and the real estate tax
receipts — there was nothing that aroused their
suspicion so as to compel them to look beyond the
Torrens title
ISSUE: WON PETITION HAS MERIT TO
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW
RULING:
First. The CA was correct in upholding the nding of
the trial court that the purported sale of the property
from Capistrano to Scott was a forgery, and resort to a
handwriting expert was not even necessary as the
specimen signature submitted by Capistrano during
trial showed marked variance from that found in the
deed of absolute sale. The technical procedure utilized
by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the
examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or comparison of
handwritings. 5
By the same token, we agree with the CA when it held
that the deed of sale between Scott and the Jamilars
was also forged, as it noted the stark differences
between the signatures of Scott in the deed of sale and
those in her handwritten letters to Capistrano.
Second. In nding that the Jamilar spouses were not
innocent purchasers for value of the subject property,
the CA properly held that they should have known that
the signatures of Scott and Capistrano were forgeries
due to the patent variance of the signatures in the two
deeds of sale shown to them by Scott
The CA also correctly found the Gilturas not innocent
purchasers for value, because they failed to check the
veracity of the allegation of Jamilar that he acquired
the property from Capistrano.
In ruling that Sy was not an innocent purchaser for
value, we share the observation of the appellate court
that Sy knew that the title to the property was still in
the name of Capistrano, but failed to verify the claim
of the Jamilar spouses regarding the transfer of
ownership of the property by asking for the copies of
the deeds of absolute sale between Capistrano and
Scott, and between Scott and Jamilar
Also noteworthy — and something that would have
ordinarily aroused suspicion — is the fact that even
before the supposed execution of the deed of sale by
Scott in favor of the Jamilars, the latter had already
caused the subdivision of the property into nine (9)
lots, with the title to the property still in the name of
Capistrano.
Notable likewise is that the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 76496 in the name of Capistrano had always
been in his possession since he gave Scott only a
photocopy thereof pursuant to the latter's authority to
look for a buyer of the property. On the other hand,
the Jamilars were able to acquire a new owner's
duplicate copy thereof by ling an a davit of loss and
a petition for the issuance of another owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 76496
A person who deals with registered land through
someone who is not the registered owner is expected
to look beyond the certi cate of title and examine all
the factual circumstances thereof in order to determine
if the vendor has the capacity to transfer any interest
in the land. He has the duty to ascertain the identity of
the person with whom he is dealing and the latter's
legal authority to convey
Finally, there is the questionable cancellation of the
certi cate of title of Capistrano which resulted in the
immediate issuance of a certi cate of title in favor of
the Jamilar spouses despite the claim that Capistrano
sold his property to Scott and it was Scott who sold the
same to the Jamilars.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, based on the
evidence on record, we nd no error in the ndings of
the CA as to warrant a discretionary judicial review by
this Court
LOCSIN VS HIZON
FACTS:
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Locsin) was the registered owner of a 760-sq.m. lot,
she filed an ejectment case against one Billy Aceron
(Aceron) to recover possession over the land in issue.
Eventually, the two entered into a compromise
agreement. Locsin later went to the United States
without knowing whether Aceron has complied with his
part of the bargain under the compromise agreement.
In spite of her absence, however, she continued to pay
the real property taxes on the subject lot.
In 1994, after discovering that her copy of TCT No.
235094 was missing, Locsin filed a petition for
administrative reconstruction, she then requested her
counsel to check the status of the subject lot. It was
then that they discovered the following:
1. One Marylou Bolos (Bolos) had TCT No. RT-97467
cancelled on February 11, 1999, and then secured a
new one, TCT No. N200074, in her favor by registering
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 3, 1979
allegedly executed by Locsin with the Registry of
Deeds;
2. Bolos later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon
(Bernardo) for PhP 1.5 million, but it was titled under
Carlos Hizon's (Carlos'
3. The property was already occupied and was, in fact,
up for sale.
Locsin, through counsel, sent Carlos a letter requesting
the return of the property since her signature in the
purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery.
Carlos denied Locsin's request, claiming that he was
unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos' title and he is,
thus, an innocent purchaser for value and good faith.
Bernardo met with Locsin's counsel and discussed the
possibility of a compromise. He ended the meeting with
a promise to come up with a win-win situation for his
son and Locsin, a promise which turned out to be
deceitful, for, on July 15, 2002, Locsin learned that
Carlos had already sold the property to herein
respondents Sps Guevara. spouses Guevara then
immediately mortgaged the said property to DCC.
Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of
TCT No. N-237083, the cancellation of the mortgage
lien annotated thereon, and damages
TRIAL COURT: RTC rendered a Decision 6 dismissing
the complaint
that: (a) there is insufficient evidence to show that
Locsin's signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale
between her and Bolos is a forgery;
(b) the questioned deed is a public document, having
been notarized; thus, it has, in its favor, the
presumption of regularity;
(c) Locsin cannot simply rely on the apparent
difference of the signatures in the deed and in the
documents presented by her to prove her allegation of
forgery;
(d) the transfers of title from Bolos to Carlos and from
Carlos to the spouses Guevara are valid and regular;
(e) Bernardo, Carlos, and the spouses Guevara are all
buyers in good faith.
CA: it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that Locsin
failed to prove that her signature was forged. CA,
however, affirmed the RTC's finding that herein
respondents are innocent purchasers for value.
Respondents, having dealt with property registered
under the Torrens System, need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the said
certificate. CA ruled that Locsin can no longer recover
the subject lot. 8 Hence, the instant petition
ISSUE: whether or not respondents are innocent
purchasers for value
RULING:
Precautionary measures for buyers of real
property
a defective title — or one the procurement of which is
tainted with fraud and misrepresentation — may be the
source of a completely legal and valid title, provided
that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good
faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title,
or an innocent purchaser for value
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which
echoes the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. EXCEPTIONS:
The presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One
who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.
Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, 20 we emphasized
the need for prospective parties to a contract involving
titled lands to exercise the diligence of a reasonably
prudent person in ensuring the legality of the title, and
the accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lot
embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary
measures, such as:
1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and validity
of the title with the Office of the Register of Deeds and
the Land Registration Authority;
2. Engaging the services of a competent and reliable
geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and
bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the
technical description in the said title and the approved
survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;
3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of
adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal
ownership of the lot in question;
5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased,
leased, or encumbered; and
6. Undertaking such other measures to make the
general public aware that said lot will be subject to
alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
In the case at bar, Bolos' certificate of title was
concededly free from liens and encumbrances on its
face. However, the failure of Carlos and the spouses
Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in
light of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of
transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the
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application of the mirror doctrine and inspires the
Court's concurrence with petitioner's proposition.
Carlos is not an innocent purchaser for value
the Court is of the view that Bernardo negotiated with
Bolos for the property as Carlos' agent. This is
bolstered by the fact that he was the one who arranged
for the sale and eventual registration of the property in
Carlos' favor.
Consistent with the rule that the principal is chargeable
and bound by the knowledge of, or notice to, his agent
received in that capacity, 22 any information available
and known to Bernardo is deemed similarly available
and known to Carlos, including the following:
1. Bernardo knew that Bolos, from whom he purchased
the subject property, never acquired possession over
the lot. As a matter of fact, in his March 11, 2009 direct
testimony, 23 Bernardo admitted having knowledge of
Aceron's lot possession as well as the compromise
agreement between petitioner and Aceron.
2. Bolos' purported Deed of Sale was executed on
November 3, 1979 but the ejectment case commenced
by Locsin against Aceron was in 1992, or thirteen (13)
years after the property was supposedly transferred to
Bolos.
3. The August 6, 1993 Judgment, 24 issued by the MTC
on the compromise agreement between Locsin and
Aceron, clearly stated therein that "[o]n August 2,
1993, the parties [Aceron and Locsin] submitted to [the
MTC] for approval a Compromise Agreement dated July
28, 1993." It further indicated that "[Aceron]
acknowledges [Locsin's] right of possession to [the
subject property], being the registered owner thereof."
Having knowledge of the foregoing facts, Bernardo and
Carlos, to our mind, should have been impelled to
investigate the reason behind the arrangement. They
should have been pressed to inquire into the status of
the title of the property in litigation in order to protect
Carlos' interest. Instead, Bernardo and Carlos took
inconsistent positions when they argued for the validity
of the transfer of the property in favor of Bolos, but in
the same breath prayed for the enforcement of the
compromise agreement entered into by Locsin.
The spouses Guevara are not innocent
purchasers for value
As regards the transfer of the property from Carlos to
the spouses Guevara, We find the existence of the sale
highly suspicious. For one, there is a dearth of evidence
to support the respondent spouses' position that the
sale was a bona fide transaction. Even if we repeatedly
sift through the evidence on record, still we cannot find
any document, contract, or deed evidencing the sale in
favor of the spouses Guevara. The same goes for the
purported payment of the purchase price of the
property in the amount of PhP 1.5 million in favor of
Carlos
respondents proffer their own testimonies explaining
the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale. 26
However, basic is the rule that bare and self-serving
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under the Rules
Furthermore, and noticeably enough, the transfer from
Carlos to the spouses Guevara was effected only fifteen
(15) days after Locsin demanded the surrender of the
property from CarlosWhen Bernardo met with Locsin's
counsel on June 13, 2002, and personally made a
commitment to come up with a win-win situation for
his son and Locsin, he knew fully well, too, that the
property had already been purportedly transferred to
the spouses Guevara, for he, no less, facilitated the
same. This, to us, is glaring evidence of bad faith

Also, the fact that Lourdes Guevara and Carlos are

siblings, and that Carlos' agent in his dealings
concerning the property is his own father, renders
incredible the argument that Lourdes had no
knowledge whatsoever of Locsin's claim of ownership
at the time of the purported sale

Sps Guevara manifested lack of interest in protecting

themselves in the case. It does not even appear in their
testimonies that they, at the very least, intended to
vigilantly protect their claim over the property and
prevent Locsin take

There is also strong reason to believe that even the

mortgage in favor of DCC was a mere ploy to make it
appear that the Sps. Guevara exercised acts of
dominion over the subject property

These circumstances, taken altogether, strongly

indicate that Carlos and the spouses Guevara failed to
exercise the necessary level of caution expected of a
bona fide buyer and even performed acts that are
highly suspect

OTHERS (NOMINAL DAMAGES):

Here, the Court notes that petitioner failed to

specifically pray that moral damages be awarded. But,
we find an award for nominal damages to be in order.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, nominal damages are
"recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial
injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can
be shown." So long as there is a showing of a violation
of the right of the plaintiff, as herein petitioner, an
award of nominal damages is proper.

In the case at bar, this Court recognizes that petitioner

was unduly deprived of her ownership rights over the
property, and was compelled to litigate for its recovery,
for almost ten (10) years.

As to the amount to be awarded, it bears stressing that

the same is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
34 Considering the length of time petitioner was
deprived of her property and the bad faith attending
respondents' actuations in the extant case, we find the
amount of seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 75,000)
as sufficient

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