Persons and Family Relations Sample Q&As: by Atty. Virgilio Alconera

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS SAMPLE Q&As
By Atty. Virgilio Alconera
*During the married life of A and B, A, the husband had a child with C. In the suit filed by the child against him, A was
ordered to provide a monthly support to the child in the amount of P5,000.00. After paying monthly support for three
years, A’s exclusive properties were exhausted, but the absolute community property had enough assets to pay the
monthly support.
Yes, the absolute community property is liable.
Under the law, the absolute community property is liable only for the support the spouses, the common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse. However, if the parent of the illegitimate child has no or insufficient exclusive property, the
expenses for the r support of the illegitimate child may be enforced against the partnership assets, provided that all the primary
accounts enumerated in the Family Code chargeable against the community property have been paid, subject to reimbursement by
the parent spouse at the time of liquidation.
In this case, the illegitimate child needs support, but the parent spouse has no exclusive property, Hence, the community
property is liable.
* M married N in 1990. In 2000 N met an accident as a result of which her mental faculties were impaired. One the
properties acquired by the couple after their marriage was a piece of land. To meet the expenses for the care of N, M sold
the land to O. Five years after the sale, N died. The heirs of N sued O for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Will the
action prosper?
Yes, the action will prosper.
Under the law, in the event of incapacity on the part of one spouse, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration, but such powers do not include to sell community properties without the consent of the other. In case consent
cannot be given by reason of incapacity, court authority must be obtained. In the absence of such consent or authority, the sale is
void. (Art. 96, Family Code)
In this case, the sale of the property was made by M without court authority, hence the sale is void. The heirs, therefore,
have a valid cause of action against O.
*Q married R in 1990. In 1995 R went abroad leaving Q and their 2-year old child, S, and a rice field which R inherited
from her parents in 1988. Can Q, who is jobless, sell the land so that the proceeds thereof can be used to support the
family?
No, Q cannot sell the land.
Under the regime of absolute community of property, a spouse can-not sell a community property without the consent of
the other even where the other spouse is absent. The present spouse merely exercises the powers of administration which do not
include the power to sell any community property. The present spouse may sell only upon court authority. In the absence of such
authority, the sale is void.
In this case, Q and R, being married in 1990, are governed by the property regime of absolute community of property.
Having been acquired by R before the marriage, the Riceland is a community property. It is not shown that Q has obtained
authority from the court to sell the land, hence, Q cannot sell it.
*R and S were spouses whose property relations were governed by the absolute community property. S died leaving
behind R and their 6- year old child T. A few days after S died, R offered to sell to you a parcel of land. You were
interested to buy the land. What advise will you give to R so that you may be able to buy the land?
I will advise R to liquidate first the community property.
Under the law, upon the termination of the marriage by the death of a spouse, the surviving spouse should liquidate the
community property either judicially or extra judicially within 1 year from the date of death. Any disposition of, or encumbrance
on, any community property without liquidation is void.
In this case, the community has not been liquidated, so any disposition made by S is void.
*True or False: (a) In a marriage settlement, the spouses can agree that the property regime of absolute com-munity of
property shall start at the precise moment of the celebration of the marriage and shall be changed to the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains ten years after.
False. The absolute community of property indeed commences at the precise moment of the celebration of the marriage
AND the parties cannot change and the parties cannot change it to any other regime, except when they file for a judicial separation
of property. If there is any change to be made in the agreed property regime, it must be done before the celebration of the
marriage. (Arts. 75, 76, and 77, Family Code)
* X married Y in 1990 without any marriage settlement. Before the marriage X took a loan from Z Bank. X lost all the
proceeds of the loan on gambling. X failed to pay the loan and Z Bank sued him for collection. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the bank. Thereafter, the sheriff, in order to have the judgment satisfied, levied on execution on a land owned by
Y before she married X. Y sued the sheriff to prevent him from auctioning the land. Will Y’s action prosper?
If X has no exclusive property, or is insufficient to pay for the judgment debt, the Y’s action will not prosper.
As the marriage between took place after the effectivity of the Family Code (The Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988), the spouse are governed by the property regime of absolute community of property. Under the regime, the community
property is liable for ante nuptial debts contracted by either spouse, even if the debts did not redound to the benefit of the family,
if the debtor spouse has insufficient or no exclusive property to pay for the same, but the payment therefore is considered as an
advance to be deducted from his or her share upon the liquidation of the community property. (Art. 94 [9], Family Code)
In this case, the judgment debt of X is an ante nuptial debt that did not redound to the benefit of the family.
(Note: Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the conjugal partnership is not liable for ante nuptial debts that did not
redound to the benefit of the family. The logic here is that under the conjugal partnership of gains, each spouses owns his or her
property and obligations before the marriage; under the absolute community of property, the community property own the
properties and obligations that the spouses own or are liable. That the debtor spouse, upon liquidation, will pay for what had
been paid for his personally account, is in consonance with justice --- because the family did not benefit from said debt).
*X married Y in 1990. Y died in 2008. In 2009 X married Z, but before the marriage X and Z entered into a marriage
settlement whereby they agreed to adopt the conjugal partnership of gains as the regime to govern their property
relations. Is the marriage settlement valid?
If the absolute community of property of X and Y had not been liquidated, the marriage settlement is not valid.
Under the law, where the marriage is terminated by death of one of the spouses, and the property regime of absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, is not liquidated, and the surviving spouse marries
again, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property governs the relations of the subsequent marriage. (Art, 103; 130,
Family Code)
In this case, since the law imposes upon X and Z the property regime of complete separation of property, any agreement
adopting a regime different from this one is void. Contracts contrary to law are void.
*The marriage between A and B was annulled, and in the liquidation of the absolute community of property, A waived in
favor of B his share in the community property. You are a creditor of B who had not been paid your credit. What will you
do to protect your interest?
I will sue B either for collection with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment or for the rescission of the waiver.
Under the law, upon liquidation of the absolute community of property (or of the conjugal partnership of gains), a spouse
may waive his share in the community property, the waiver to be contained in a public in a public instrument recorded in the local
civil registry and the registry of property, and any creditor prejudiced by the waiver may sue for the rescission thereof. (Art. 89,
Family Code)
If the formal requirement is not complied with, the waiver is ineffective against B’s creditors. So, I will file a complaint
against B for collection, with prayer for a writ of attachment, so that, if the writ is issued, the share of B will be taken by the court
in its custody, pending the result of the litigation. With the writ, A cannot dispose B’s share.
If the formal requirement has been complied with, then the waiver is valid and effective as against the creditors of B if
they will do anything about. I will file an action for rescission against A and B, on the ground that the waiver was made in fraud of
creditors, up to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount fo my credit.
* X and Y were married in 1990. During the marriage, a rci aunt donated to X a 12-hectare land. A and B engaged in
business, but years later the business went bankrupt, leaving millions of pesos in unpaid debts. C Bank sued X and Y for
the collection of an unpaid P5 million-loan. Judgment was rendered in favor of the bank. A writ of execution was issued by
the court in favor of the bank, and on the basis thereof, the sheriff levied the land on execution. X filed a motion to lift the
levy over the land. Resolve the motion.
I will grant the motion.
Under the law: (1) The absolute community of property is liable for debts and obligations contracted by the spouses
during the marriage (Art. 94 [2], Family Code); and
(2) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits thereof, is exclusive property
of the grantee, unless it is expressly provided by the grantor that the property be-long to the community property.
In this case, the property is an exclusive property of X for the following reasons: First, the property regime that govern
the relations between X and Y is, by operation of law, the absolute community of property because they were married in 1990 (the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988) without a marriage settlement. Second, X acquired the property by gratuitous title (by
donation) and his aunt the donor did not expressly state that the property should belong to the community property. As the
property is exclusive property of X, it cannot be used to satisfy an obligation of the community, unless the community property is
insufficient which fact is not shown in this case.
* A married B in 1990. Ten years later, B filed a petition for legal separation against A on the ground of in-fidelity on the
part of A. The court granted the petition and in the liquidation of the community property, the court granted the waiver
by A to B of his share in the net assets of the absolute community. Is the court correct?
Yes, the court is correct. (Do not repeat what the court did, time is precious).
Under the law, a spouse may not waive his rights, interests, shares and effects in the community property during the
marriage, except in case of judicial separation of property, however, waiver on these things may be made in the liquidation of the
community property resulting from the termination of the marriage.
In this case, the waiver by A of his share was made not during the marriage but in the liquidation of the community
property.
* A is a widow who has a legitimate child with his de-ceased wife. During their marriage, he and his deceased wife had
acquired a parcel of land. A then married C. Can this land be used to support his present family?
Yes, C may use the land to support his present family, but only if the community property or the conjugal partnership
property is insufficient to provide support to his family.
Under the law, if the community property or conjugal partnership property is insufficient to provide support to the
family, the spouses are solidarily liable with their exclusive properties for such support. (Arts. 94 and 121, Family Code).
In this case, the land is the exclusive property of A for the reason that properties acquired before the marriage by either
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage property, are exclusive properties of said spouse --- regardless of
whatever property regime governs his subsequent marriage. (Arts. 92 [3], 116, and 144, Family Code). Hence, upon such
condition of insufficiency, the land may be charged for the support of the family.
---Alternative answer, using your improved “trunk” law:

Under the law, properties acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage property, are exclusive properties of said spouse --- regardless of whatever property regime governs his subsequent
marriage. (Arts. 92 [3], 116, and 144, Family Code).
In this case, the land is the exclusive property of A, and under the law, if the community property or conjugal partnership
property is insufficient to provide support to the family, the exclusive properties of the spouses can be charged for such support.
(Arts. 94 and 121, Family Code). Hence, upon such condition of insufficiency, the land may be used to provide support for the
family.
* A married B in 1990. While driving his car at top speed to take his wife to the hospital, A hit a pedestrian with his car.
The pedestrian died after a month of treatment at the hospital. A paid the hospitalization and burial expenses amounting
to P900,000.00 from his savings in the bank. When A died years later, and during the liquidation of the absolute
community property, the heirs of A wanted to charge the P900,000 to the community property. Are the heirs correct?
The heirs are correct.
The marriage between A and B having taken place after the effectivity of the Family Code (the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988), the property regime that governed the marriage was the absolute community of property. While it is true that
under this regime, the liability of either spouse for quasi-delict, as in this case, is chargeable against the exclusive properties of the
spouse involved (Art. 94 [9]), the rule does not apply in cases where the quasi-delict occurred as a direct result of the performance
by the spouse of a family obligation.
In this case, A hit the pedestrian while he was in the performance of his obligation to give love and support to his wife.
The expenses arising out of the incident should be charged against the community property.
* X and Y were married in 1990, and they agreed on a property regime of conjugal partnership of gains. X, without the
knowledge and consent of Y, bought on credit construction materials valued at P100,000.00 for the repair of their house. Y
did not approve of the purchase. Despite Y’s disapproval, X proceeded in having the house repaired by a contractor with a
contract price of P50,000.00. Against whose property is the P150,000.00 chargeable.
The P150,000 is chargeable against the community property.
Under the law, all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor repairs are chargeable upon the conjugal
partnership.
In this case, the spouses X and Y agreed on a property regime of conjugal partnership of gains, therefore, their house is a
conjugal property. Consequently, the conjugal partnership property or funds ARE liable for expenses on the repair thereof. (Art.
121 [4]) THAT Y DID NOT CONSENT TO THE REPAIR IS OF NO MOMENT. WHAT IS OF PRIME CONSIDERATION IS
THAT THE REPAIRS HAVE REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. IF SHE WAS SO MINDED, Y SHOULD
HAVE FILED AN ACTION IN COURT TO STOP THE REPAIR FROM BEING UNDERTAKEN. UNDER THE LAW, THE WIFE
MAY HAVE RECOURSE TO THE COURT IN CASE OF DISAGREEMENT WITH THE HUSBAND ON MATTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY. (Art. 124, Family Code).
* X and Y got married in 1990. Prior thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of
con-jugal partnership of gains. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential house and lot, In 1995, they decided to change
their prop-erty relations to the regime of complete separation of property. Y consented, as she was then engaged in a
lucrative business. The spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal partnership and agreeing on a
complete separation of property. Thereafter, X, Gabby acquired a mansion which he registered exclusively in his name.
Y’s business went bankrupt leaving behind million of pesos in unpaid debts. What properties may be held answerable for
Y obligations?
Assuming that the amount of Y’s indebtedness exceeds the value of the house and lot and the mansion, both properties
are answerable for Y’s obligations.
Under the law, once the spouses agree upon the celebration of the marriage on a property regime under a marriage
settlement, the spouses may no longer change by contract the property regime agreed upon. (Art. 76, Family Code). In this case,
therefore, the con-tract entered into by X and Y changing their property regime is void. Their property regime has always been the
conjugal partnership of gains.
Under the conjugal partnership of gains, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts contracted during the marriage
both or by one of them, as in this case. (Art. 121 [2], Family Code). From the proceeds of the auction, however, will be deducted
and delivered to X and Y such amount as is sufficient to build a family home pursuant to the provisions of the Family Code. (Arts.
157 and 160, Family Code)
* X and were married in 1990. One year after their marriage, X while supervising the clearing of Y’s inherited land upon
the latter'’ request, accidentally found the treasure on the property of Y. To whom shall the treasure belong?
One-half of the treasure belongs to the absolute community of property, the remaining half to Y as her exclusive
property.
Under the regime of absolute community of property, properties owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and those acquired thereafter belong to the community property, except that are excluded by law. (Art. 91, Family
Code). Also, under the law, hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land; anyone, who is not a trespasser, who finds hidden
treasure by chance on one’s property is entitled to one-half of the property and the owner of the property the remaining one-half.
(Art. 438, Civil Code)
In this case, the property regime that governs the marriage is the absolute community of property, the marriage having
taken place after the Family Code took effect (the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988), and there being no agreement
between the spouses as what property regime would govern them. Art. 75, Family Code). X’s share in the treasure, therefore,
belongs to the community proper-ty as he acquired it by chance and industry after the celebration of the marriage. On the other
hand, Y’s share in the treasure belongs to her exclusively, having acquired it by reason of his being the owner of the property
which she also exclusively owned.
* X and Y were married in 1990. They agreed that their property relations be governed by the conjugal partner-ship of
gains. In the liquidation of the community property of X and the deceased Y, X objected to the deduction from the
community property the total amount of support Y had given her parents during her lifetime. Is X correct?
X is correct.
Under the law, the conjugal partnership is not liable for personal obligations incurred by either spouse, unless said
obligations redound to the benefit of the family. (Art. 122, Family Code)
In this case, to support her parents is a personal obligation of Y. It cannot be said that the expenses for the support had
redounded to the material, as distinguished from filial, benefit of the family. As the expenses for the support are not authorized,
they should not be allowed as deductions from the partnership assets.
* Bridegroom X, whose net assets was only P50,000.00, and bride Y, whose net assets was P15 million, orally agreed that
the property regime that would govern them in their married life was the conjugal partnership of gains. One year after the
celebration of the marriage, Y gave birth to a son. Five years after the celebration of the marriage, Y filed a petition for
legal separation against X, and a decree of legal separation was issued in her favor. In the liquidation of the union, X
insisted that the property regime that governed them was the absolute community of property as their marriage settlement
was merely oral. Y said that the agreement was valid, and added that X had no basis to complain for whatever kind of
regime that may be followed, he had no share as his share was forfeited in favor of their child. Is X correct? Is Y correct?
X is wrong in saying that the prenuptial agreement is not valid for being merely oral. While it is true that the law states
that a prenuptial agreement or marriage settlement “shall be in writing” (Art. 77, Family Code), the law does not say that if it is
void if it is not in writing. Under the law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they are entered into, provided all the
requisites for their validity are present. (Art. 1356, Civil Code) For a contract to be void for failure to comply with the formal
requisite of it being in writing, it is not enough that the law requires that the contract be in writing, the law must further prescribe
that without the writing the contract is not valid. (Hernaez vs. De Los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27010, April 30, 1969)
Y is wrong in saying that X had no share in the community property as his share was forfeited in favor of their child.
Under the law, what is forfeited by the guilty spouse in a legal proceeding in favor of the common children is his or her share in
the net profits. (Arts. 63 [2] and 43 [2])
*True or False: (a) Under a regime of absolute community of property, the expenses for support for an illegitimate child of
a spouse may be charge against the exclusive property of the other spouse. (b) Under the regime of absolute community of
property, all properties owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage are owned by the community
property.
(a) FALSE. While the expenses for support for an illegitimate child of a spouse may be charged against the community
property, where the parent spouse has insufficient or no exclusive property, and the community propetry being sufficient, such
expenses, together with the parent spouse’s personal liability for damages arising from quasi-delict and from ante-nuptial debts
that did not redound to the benefit of the family, are excluded as a charges for which the other spouse is liable. (Art. 94 [10],
Family Code)
(b) FALSE. Not all properties owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage are owned by the
community property. Excepted are the property of personal and exclusive use of either spouse and property acquired before the
marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property. (Art. 92, Family Code)
*(a) In a regime of conjugal partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the couple during the marriage by onerous
title are owned by the community property. (b) In a regime of absolute community of property, when one of the spouses is
incapacitated to give consent, and the sale of a community property is of extreme urgency, the other spouse, alone, may
sell the property.
(a) false. while it is true that those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses, the source of funds used to acquire determines
whether or not the property is for conjugal ownership or not. Hence, if the money used is conjugal the property acquired is
conjugal; if the money is exclusively owned by the spouse, then the property is his exclusive property.
(b) False. When one of the spouses is incapacitated, the other may assume sole administratorship but may not sell or
dispose or encumber the same without the consent of the other spouse or authority from the court.
* X filed a suit for legal separation against her husband. Y. Judgment was rendered against Y, and when the judgment
became final, the absolute community was liquidated. X claimed that the amount she spent for attorney’s fees and other
expenses she incurred in relation to the case be charged against the community property be charged of these expenses?
Yes, the expenses of X can be charged to the community property or conjugal partnership property, as the case may be.
Under the law, expenses of litigation between the spouses are chargeable against the community property or the conjugal
partnership property, unless the suit is found to be groundless.
In this case, the suit of X against Y for legal separation succeeded.
*When does personality begin?

Personality begins at birth. To be considered born:
a) The child, who had an intra-uterine life of 7 months or more, has to be completely delivered alive from the mother’s
womb; or
b) The child, who had an intra-uterine life of less than 7 months, has to live more than twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb; or
c) For all purposes favorable to him/her, at the time of conception, provided he/she be physically born later under any of
the foregoing conditions.
(Note: The law provides, “Birth determines personality.” This statement means that if there is no physical birth, there is no civil
personality. For a child who is a beneficiary of some civil acts, he has two births: one, at the time he is conceived (conceptual)
and second, at the time he is physically born (physical)). In the acquisition of civil personality, the conceptual is useless without
the physical).
* X married Y in 1990. They had agreed that their property relations be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains. Before the marriage, X had bought a parcel of land on installment basis where the owner of the land retained
ownership of the land which ownership would become vested in X upon full payment of the purchase price. After the
marriage X paid the monthly installments from out of his salary until the purchase price was fully paid five years later. Y
died after the full payment was made. During the liquidation of the community property, the children of X and Y wanted
the land to be included in the community property, while X claimed that the land is his exclusive property and should be
excluded in the inventory of the community property. Is X correct?
No, X is wrong.
Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, if a spouse buys property before the marriage and the purchase price
is paid partly from his or her exclusive funds and partly from conjugal funds, he or she owns the property if the property becomes
vested before the marriage and the conjugal partnership if after, with the spouse or the conjugal partnership having the right of
reimbursement.
In this case, the ownership of the property became vested after the marriage, hence, the conjugal partnership owns the
property, with X having the right of reimbursement for the exclusive funds he had paid for the property.
* Spouses X and Y were governed by the property regime of absolute community property. Since their marriage five years
ago, Y, the wife, had been the sole breadwinner of the family. X had been jobless and just did household chores and took
care of the children. Y wants to have separation of their property. Y comes to you for advice. What advice will you give
him?
I will advise Y to convince X to agree and join her in a petition for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community
of property and for the separation of their common properties.
The remedy of voluntary separation of the common properties is allowed under the law.
I will not advise her to pursue the remedy of involuntary separation of the common properties because there exists no
sufficient cause therefore. Being jobless for a long time, a predicament X is now in, is not one of the sufficient successes
recognized by law. It cannot be said that X has failed to comply with his obligations to the family, one of the sufficient causes
recognized by law, because he had been doing household chores and taking care of the children.
* X, a married man, hired Y in 1990 as accountant of his two corporations. The two later became intimate and eventually
they lived as husband and wife. They had two children. After the birth of the second child the relations between the two
soured until they parted ways. X intended to file a complaint against Y for reconveyance of a parcel of land for the reason
that the property was acquired during his union with her using his exclusive funds. X hires you as his counsel. What pieces
of evidence will you ask of him?
I will ask Y to bring to me all documents showing, or witnesses who can testify, that he exclusively owned the money
used in buying the property. An example would be a check drawn by him payable to the order of the seller and the check voucher
showing the transaction of sale over the property.
This documents or witnesses are necessary because the cohabitation between X and Y is one where the parties or one of
them are incapacitated to marry, in which case, one can claim a property or a part thereof only if he has actually contributed to the
acquisition thereof.
In this case, the land is registered in the name of Y (this can be deduced by the action of reconveyance X had filed), and
unless X can present these pieces of evidence, his action for reconveyance will fail because as the registered owner of the
property, Y is presumed to be the true owner thereof.
* X, a police officer, married Y in 1990 without a marriage license. Y just managed the household. In 2000 X left Y and
married Z who, like Y, only managed the household. In 2009 X died leaving behind P5 million in death benefits. Who owns
the P5 million?
Y owns half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the other half.
Under the law, where two parties, who are incapacitated to marry, live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage, a spouse can share only in those properties the acquisition of which he or she has actually contributed. (Art. 148, Family
Code)
In this case, X was incapacitated to marry Z because his marriage to Y had not been judicially declared a nullity. Since Z
had not actually contributed to the acquisition of the P5 million, as these were benefits derived as a result of X’s employment, Z
had no share in it.
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and maintenance of the family and of the household
rendered by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code) Since X and Y were
capacitated to marry, and Y managed the household, she owns one-half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the other half.
ago, Y, the wife, had earned five times more than X had earned. During the period X had illicit relations with girls, one of
them being married. Y wanted a regime of separation of property. Y comes to you for advice, what will you advice her?
I will not advise her to pursue the remedy of involuntary separation of the common properties because their exists no
sufficient cause there-for. Earning less than what the other earns and having illicit relations with girls, even if one of them is
married, are not recognized by law as sufficient causes for involuntary separation of property.
* Spouses X and Y were governed by the regime of absolute community of property. During the marriage, X, the husband,
borrowed money from Z Bank payable in 3 years. One year after X obtained the loan, the spouses obtained a decree of
separation and the absolute community of property was liquidated and the net assets equally shared by the spouses. When
the loan matured, X had no more money or property left with which to pay the loan. Z Bank sued Y for the collection of
the loan. Will the action prosper?
Yes the action will prosper, BUT ONLY UP TO THE EXTENT OF ONE-HALF OF THE LOAN OBLIGATION.
Under the law, the judicial separation of property obtained by one or both spouses does not prejudice the rights
previously acquired by the creditors. (Art. 140, Family Code).
In this case, Z Bank had the right to be paid of X’s loan obligation , even if the loan proceeds did not redound to the
benefit of the family because under the previous regime of absolute community of property, said loan is chargeable against the
community property. (Art. 94 [9]), Family Code) This right to be paid out of the community property is what is being protected by
law, such that if the community property is now gone, because it has been liquidated to give way to the regime of separation of
property, the credit can now be collected against the exclusive property of Y, the whole or a portion of which was derived from
the liquidated community property. HOWEVER, Y IS ONLY LIABLE FOR ONE-HALF OF THE LOAN OBLIGATION BECAUSE
ONE-HALF OF THE NET ASSETS OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY WENT TO X AS HIS SHARE.
* Years after X and Y were granted a decree of separation of property, they jointly filed a joint petition in court to revert
to their original property regime of absolute community of property. After trial, the court rendered judgment which says:
“WHEREFORE, on the basis of the mutual consent of the petitioners, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition,
and petitioners are ordered not to change during their lifetime the property regime herein established.” Is the judgment
correct?
As regards the first part of the judgment, the judgment is correct if the petition for separation of property was a voluntary
one, but it is wrong if it was involuntary.
Under the law, the spouses may, after the grant of their voluntary petition for separation of property, file a motion for the
revival of their property regime before the separation of property (Art. 141 [7], Family Code), If the petition was involuntary, the
petition for revival may be filed and granted only upon the grounds specified by law, none of which is mere agreement of the
spouses. (The recognized grounds are the negations of the grounds for involuntary separation of property). (Art. 141, Family
Code)
The second part of the judgment is wrong.

While it is true that under the law, once a decree of revival has been granted, no voluntary separation may thereafter be
granted, the court may not order the spouses not to changed the property regime therein established, for the reason that,
notwithstanding the grant of revival, any one of the spouses may still file an involuntary petition for separation of property under
any of the grounds recognized by law.
* A and B, both of legal age, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. A, the common law
husband, was employed as an executive in a company. B, the common law wife, was never employed. She spent all her time
in the love and care of A and their home. They had no children. Twenty years after their union, they decided to separate.
At the time of separation, the union had accumulated a net asset of P1 million.
a) If A and B were not related by blood to each other, how much is the share of B in the P1 million?
Assuming that A and B are capacitated to marry, B shares one-half of the P1 million.
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live together without
the benefit of marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and maintenance of the family and of the household rendered
by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code)
In this case, B, having spent all her time in the love and care of A and their home, is deemed to have contributed to the
acquisition of the P1 million.
b) B does not share anything in the P1 million.
Where two parties, who are incapacitated to marry, cohabit together as husband and wife, only those properties the
acquisition of which they have actually contributed, can be shared by them in proportion to their respective contributions. (Art.
148, Family Code)
In this case, B has not actually contributed in the acquisition of the P 1 million; hence, she has no share in it.
of gains. One year before the marriage, X and Z executed a contract of sale over the latter’s land on installment basis After
the marriage X paid the monthly installments from out of his salary until the purchase price was fully paid five years later.
Y died after the full payment was made. During the liquidation of the community property, the children of X and Y
wanted the land to be included in the community property, while X claimed that the land is his exclusive property and
should be excluded in the inventory of the community property. Is X correct?
Yes, X is correct.
Under the property regime of conjugal partnership of gains, property bought on installments from exclusive funds of a
spouse and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer if ownership thereof was vested before the marriage and to the
conjugal partnership if ownership thereof was vested after the marriage, with the buyer of the partnership having the right of
reimbursement. (Art. 118, Family Code) In his case, X entered into a contract of sale, as distinguished from a contract to sell,
which vests upon the buyer ownership over the property even if the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Hence, X owns the
land, and it should not be included in the community property. However, X has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership for the conjugal funds used to pay his monthly obligations.
* In Country X, A, Filipino, orally sold to B, Filipino, his land located in the Philippines. A received the purchase price to
his full satisfaction. In Country X sale of real property must be in writing, otherwise the sale is void. When A and B
returned to the Philippines, A sued B for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Will the action prosper?
The action will not prosper. The sale is valid.
While it is true that under the law, the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments are
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed (Art. 17, Civil Code), this rule does not apply to transactions that
involve real or personal properties which transactions are governed by the laws of the place where they are situated. (Art. 16, Civil
Code)
In this case, the land is located in the Philippines and under Philippine law, contracts are obligatory, in whatever form
they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present, unless the law requires that a
contract be in some form in order that it may be valid. (Art. 1356, Civil Code). There is no law that declares void a contract of sale
of land that is not in writing.
(Note: The principle of lex re sitae is an exception to the principle of lex loci celebraciones. Also, testamentary
dispositions)
* A tax law provides that “[T]his law shall take effect upon its approval.” The law was approved on January 2 and
published on January 14. Taxpayer X claims that the law took effect on January 30. On the other hand, the BIR, invoking
the phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” contained in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, claims that the law took effect on
January 2. Is the BIR correct?)
No, the BIR is wrong.
The Civil Code provides that laws takes effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, “unless it is otherwise provided”. If the view of
the BIR is to be followed, then the tax law has to take effect even without publication. This cannot be.
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. That is what the clause means. (Yaokasin vs.
Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 84111 Dec. 22, 1989)
* (a) Can courts legislate? (b) You are the civil registrar, and you know that the applicant for marriage license has a legal
impediment to marry, will you issue him the license?
Yes and No.
a) No, because the Constitution assigns the function of lawmaking to Congress, hence, the courts may not initiate and
participate in the process of actual lawmaking or they may not read into the law a purpose that is not intended.
Yes, for two reasons: One, because judicial decisions form part of the legal system and have the force of law. (Art. 8,
Civil Code) Second, judges are authorized to render judgment even in the absence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws, and
such judgment becomes part of the law of the land. (Art. 9, Civil Code)
b)Yes, I will issue the license.
Under the law, once the requirements are complied with by the applicants and in the absence of any court order
preventing him or her from so doing, it is ministerial on the part of the civil registrar to issue the license, his personal knowledge
on the matter notwithstanding. His duty, aside from to issue the license, is to note down the particulars of the impediment and his
findings thereon in the application for license. (Art. 18, Family Code)
* A Chinese woman, in trying to prove the fact and validity of her marriage to another Chinese (so that she may be
considered his heir and her children with him his legitimate heirs), testified that in China¬ she and her husband were
married before a village chief. She also presented a witness who testified that he witnessed the marriage ceremony of the
marriage. Is the Chinese woman considered married to the Chinese man?
No, the Chinese woman is not considered married to the Chinese man.
Under the principle of processual presumption or presumed-identity approach in private international law, where a
foreign law is pleaded to be applicable to a particular jural matter, and the foreign law is not proved, it is presumed that the foreign
law on the matter is the same as the local law.
In this case, the Chinese woman claims that she and the Chinese man were married in China before a village chief. Under
Philippine law, a village chief is one not of those authorized to solemnize marriage, and absence of authority on the part of the
solemnizing officer makes the marriage void. (Arts. 3 and 7, Family Code).
* Y, a citizen of the country Y and domiciled in the Philippines had two children, one legitimate and the other illegitimate.
In his will X bequeathed all his properties, some located in the Philippines and others located abroad, to his legitimate
child. Is the disposition of the properties valid?
If the law of country X disallows illegitimate children to inherit from their parents and makes that law applicable to its
citizens who are domiciled abroad, then the disposition of the properties is valid.
Under the law, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, are governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Art. 16, Civil Code) If the conflict of laws of country X makes the law of the country where Y is domiciled to
apply, then the validity of the disposition is determined by internal law of that country.
(Note: One’s national law consists of two parts: the internal law, that which governs its citizens who are also domiciled
thereat; and conflict of laws, that which governs its citizens domiciled in foreign countries).
* A. Reyes, a Filipino citizen, and R. Upton, an American citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972. After their marriage,
they resided in the Philippines. In 1982 the couple obtained a divorce in Nevada, U.S.A. After the divorce, Reyes married
T. Van Dorn. In 1983 Upton sued Van Dorn in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for accounting of a business located in
Manila which he alleged to be conjugal property. Will the action prosper?
No, the action will not prosper.
While it is true that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines (Art. 15, Civil Code), e.g., the law against absolute divorce binds them, the rule does not
apply where the alien spouse of the Filipino has obtained a valid divorce abroad, thus making him or her, under his or her national
law, no longer the spouse of the Filipino.
In this case, Upton, having obtained divorce of his marriage with Reyes, has lost all his rights as her is husband,
including the right to sue to exercise control over conjugal assets. To consider Reyes to be still the wife of Upton subject to a
wife’s obligations under our laws cannot be just. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, Oct. 8, 1985)
* A few days after he came to know her, X started to court Y, a virgin who never had a boyfriend before. X proposed
marriage, and Y accepted his love as well as his proposal for marriage. Y brought X along with her to her home province
and introduced him to her parents, brothers and sisters. They all agreed to his proposal to marry Y. That night X and Y
had sexual intercourse. When they returned to the city, Y joined X in his apartment. She kept reminding him of his
promise to marry until one day he told her that she could not marry her because he was already married. Is X liable to Y
for damages?
Yes, X is liable for damages.
Under the law, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy is liable for damages. (Art. 21, Civil Code)
In this case, Y surrendered her virginity and womanhood to X and lived with him upon the latter’s promise of marriage,
The pain in realizing that she had given her cherished possession to a man who, from the very beginning had no intention of
marrying her at all, whose promise to marry was a mere deceptive device to entice her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, the pain of losing her honor and reputation before her neighbors, friends and relatives must have been almost
unbearable. The manner in which X had inflicted this pain upon Y is, without doubt, contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. He is liable for damages. (Baksh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, Feb. 19, 1993)

The principle established by jurisprudence that breach of promise to marry is not actionable does not apply in this case. He is not
being made liable for breach of promise to marry but for the fraud and deceit that went with it. Besides, lust is the foundation of
that principle, and Y was not motivated by lust when she agreed to have sex with X.
* The conjugal dwelling (house and lot) of the spouses H and W located in General Santos City was worth P1 million.
Judgment was rendered against the spouses for a conjugal loan of P350,000.00. May the house and lot be levied in
execution to satisfy the judgment debt?
If at the time of the levy, the amount of P1 million or more is the “most favorable amount”, as may be determined by the
court, for the constitution of the family home, then no levy can be had.
The value of P300,000 for family homes in urban areas and P200,000 for those in rural areas provided by law is not
fixed. If the value of the currency has changed since the adoption of the Family Code in 1988, then the family home is to be
valued in such amount as is most favorable to the owners of the family home. (Art. 157, Family Code).
Even if the loan obligation is not one those enumerated by the law which excepts the family home from levy on
execution, the house can still be levied if the actual value of the family home is more than P300,000.00 or the “most favorable
amount” as the case may be. In such a case, the P300,000.00 or the “most favorable amount” is to be deducted from the proceeds
of the auction and delivered to the judgment debtors and the balance be applied to the loan obligation. (Art. 160, Family Code)
the P5 million?
Y owns half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the othe half.
Under the law, where two parties, who are incapacitated to marry, live to-gether as husband and wife under a void
Code)
had no share in it.
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capaci-tated to marry, and who live live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and mainten-ance of the family and of the household
rendered by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code) Since X and Y were
capacitated to marry, and Y managed the household, she owns one-half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the other half.
* X, a married man, hired Y in 1990 as accountant of his two corpora-tions. The two later became intimate and eventually
soured until they parted ways. X intended to file a complaint against Y for reconveyance of a parcel of land for the reason
them are incapacitated to marry, in which case, one can claim a property or a part thereof only if he has actually contributed to to
the acquisition thereof.
* Is a child born out of a bigamous marriage legitimate or illegitimate?

The child is illegitimate.
Under the law, those conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided by law.
(Art. 165, Family Code)
Those born outside a valid marriage declared by law to be legitimate are only the following: (a) those born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of a marriage by reason of psychological incapacity of any one of the parties; (Art. 54, Family Code )
(b) those born of a subse-quent marriage which is void because the judgment of annulment or of nullity of the previous marriage,
the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes were not
recorded in the civil registry and the registries of property; (Arts. 53 and 54, Family Code) and (c) those born of a subsequent
marriage made under the authority of judicial declaration of presumptive death of a spouse of a previous marriage which is void
because both parties in the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith. (Arts. 43 (1) and 44, Family Code of the Philippines). The child
of a bigamous marriage does not belong to any of the above-mentioned categories. What is not included is deemed excluded. He
is illegitimate.
* A and B, both of legal age, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. A, the common law
a) Assuming that A and B are capacitated to marry, B shares one-half of the P1 million.
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live live together
without the benefit of marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and mainten-ance of the family and of the household
rendered by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code)
b) If A and B were "first cousins", how much is the share of B?
148, Family Code)
In this case, B has not actually contributed in the acquisition of the P 1 million, hence, she has no share in it.
of gains. Before the marriage, X had bought a parcel of land on installment basis where the owner of the land retained
the land to be included in the community property, while X claimed that the land is his exclusive proper-ty and should be
No, X is wrong.
reimbursement.
*Years after X and Y were granted a decree of separation of property, they jointly filed a joint petition in court to revert
correct?
As regards the first part fo the judgment, the judgment is correct if the petition for separation of property was a voluntary
Code)
*X married Y in 1990. They had agreed that their property relations be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. Before the marriage, X had bought a parcel of land on installment basis where the owner of the land retained
the land to be included in the community property, while X claimed that the land is his exclusive property and should be
No, X is wrong.
reimbursement.
*Marietta was married to James in 1946. James disappeared in 1947 and had not been heard of or seen since then. In
1958, Marietta, without securing a declaration of presumptive death of James, married Teodorico. In 1992 Teodorico died
leaving substantial properties. Antonia, the sole surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition in court praying that the
whole estate of his brother be adjudicated to her, the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico being bigamous, hence
null and void. Will the action prosper?
No. The marriage is valid.
The provision in the Family Code on the necessity of a judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be applied
retroactively when in so doing vested rights are impaired. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was
solemnized in 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code (the Family Code took effect only on
August 3, 1988). Under the Civil Code, a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse was not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of seven years absence was met and the spouse contracting the later marriage acted in good faith. Marietta's first
husband, James, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid, notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James.
* Spouses X and Y were governed by the regime of abso-lute community of property. During the marriage, X, the
husband, borrowed money from Z Bank payable in 3 years. One year after X obtained the loan, the spouses obtained a
decree of separation and the absolute ...community of property was liquidated and the net assets equally shared by the
spouses. When the loan matured, X had no more money or property left with which to pay the loan. Z Bank sued Y for the
collection of the loan. Will the action prosper?
Yes the action will prosper, but only up to the extent of one-half of the loan obligation.
Under the law, the judicial separation of property obtained by one or both spouses does not prejudice the rights
previously acquired by the creditors. (Art. 140, Family Code).
In this case, Z Bank had the right to be paid of X’s loan obligation , even if the loan proceeds did not redound to the
benefit of the family because under the previous regime of absolute community of property, said loan is chargeable against the
community property. (Art. 94 [9]), Family Code) This right to be paid out of the community property is what is being protected by
law, such that if the community property is now gone, because it has been liquidated to give way to the regime of separation of
property, the credit can now be collected against the exclusive property of Y, the whole or a portion of which was derived from
the liquidated community property. However, Y is only liable for one-half of the loan obligation because one-half of the net assets
of the community property went to X as his share. The "trunk" law is Art. 140, Family Code, while the "branch" law is Art. 94
[9]), Family Code.
 Community Property; Conjugal partnership property

When we say “The community property (or conjugal partnership property) is insufficient ,,,”, the term “community property” (or
“conjugal partnership property”) is used to mean the mass of community properties or of conjugal partnership properties (in
same way that when... we say “Under the law, …”, the term “law” is used to mean the mass of laws in a particular field of law.
The term “community property” (or “conjugal partnership property”) should also be distinguished from “absolute community of
property” or “conjugal partnership of gains” which is a regime or relationship.
 Corrections to comment on Article 54
Hi, All! Please note the following corrections to the text, re comment on Article 54: Art. 54 ... Footnote # 51 ibid. should be “Art.
53, Family Code of the Philippines Footnote # 52 ibid. should be “Arts. 53 and 54, Family Code of the Philippines”
 Correction on Textbook
The sentence contained in the comment on Article 159 which reads: "... However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159:..." should read: "... However, three requisites must concur before MINOR
BENEFICIARIES ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF ART. 159:..."
 When conjugal dwelling rule not applicable.
The rule that in the liquidation of the community property or conjugal partnership of gains, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
upon which it stands are to be adjudicated to spouse with whom majority of the common children choose to remain, does not
apply to the liquidate...ion of the properties acquired by the spouses of a marriage declared a nulllity by reason of psychological
incapacity on the part of one or both of them. To the union, the law on co-ownership applies.
 When conjugal dwelling rule applicable
The conjugal dwelling rule is applicable only in case of liquidation of the absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership of gains resulting from: a) A decree of legal separation (Art. 63 [2], Family Code); b) The termination of a
subsequent marriage... entered into by a spouse on the basis of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of his or her spouse in
a previous marriage (Art. 43 [2]); c) Termination of a bigamous marriage (Art. 50, Family Code) d) Termination of a voidable
marriage (Art. 50, Family Code)
* H filed a complaint against his wife W for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
inca-pacity. Thereafter, W filed a complaint for concubinage against H and a corresponding information was filed in
court. H filed in the cri...minal action a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. Rule on
the motion.
I will deny the motion.
Under the law, the final judgment of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is necessary only for purposes of
remarriage. (Art. 41, Family Code)
What the law means is that for purposes other than remarriage, e.g., to prove one’s innocence in a criminal action for
bigamy or concubinage, other pieces of evidence to prove absolute nullity of a previous marriage is admissible. Hence, H need not
wait for the termination of the civil action for declaration of nullity to have evidence for his defense in the criminal action. This is
not to say that H will already be acquitted of the charge of concubinage once he is able to prove the nullity of his marriage with
W. If that is the only evidence that he has, he will still be guilty of bigamy for what the above-stated law also means is that only a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage can free a spouse of the criminal offense that has one of its elements his or her
being married. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity. It is only when the nullity of
the marriage is declared by the courts can it be held as void. (Beltran vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20,
2000) (NOTE: If the criminal action is for bigamy, the answer would be the same).
*Where the donor of the sperm in the artificial insemination agreed upon by the spouses is a third person, but the spouses
failed to execute a written inst...rument authorizing or ratifying the insemination before the birth of the child, what is the
status of the child? Who, in law, is his father? Explain.
1) The child is illegitimate. The law is clear. The child is legitimate only if the required writing is done. If the law is clear
apply the law. Dure lex sed lex. We only interpret the law according to the “spirit that giveth life” if there is some ambiguity in the
law. If the child is legitimate, despite the non-compliance of the requirement, then what is that provision on legitimacy for? 2) In
law, the father of the child is “unknown”. The husband cannot, in law, be the father of the child. Under the law, the husband
cannot be the father of the illegitimate child of his wife. Neither law nor jurisprudence supports the conclusion that he can be. The
third person, cannot in law, be the father of the child, even if he were identified in record of the insemination process as the donor
of the sperm. Can he be compelled to give support to child? There is no law or jurisprudence to support a yes answer to the
question. The answer is no --- not only because of the absence of law, but also because of the compelling force of equity. (Oh, my
God, I just donated my sperm to help a friend, and now I am about to be impoverished!)
I take his “legal father” as the same as my “father, in law”. How would Mr. Jurado have answered my question? You
may ask: “Is it not that under the law, the father of an illegitimate child has the obligation to support the child?” The answer is yes,
But only if he has recognized, or has been judicially compelled to recognize, the child. Cannot the third person recognize, or be
compelled to recognize, the child as his own? This may not be legally possible under our laws. Article 164 and 165 of the Family
Code speak of legitimate children as those “conceived or born during the marriage” and of illegitimate children as those
“conceived and born outside a valid marriage”. The reference of these provisions to “marriage” in defining legitimate and
illegitimate children show that, generally, children under the law are beings that are a result of sexual intercourse. Those that come
into being as a result of artificial insemination are, under the second paragraph of Article 164, an exception. Not having come into
being as a result of sexual intercourse, a child conceived and born as a result of artificial insemination, who become illegitimate
by reason of the failure of the spouses to execute the required written instrument, is not within the contemplation of Article 165.
The child becomes illegitimate simply because he is not legitimate. The reason for the law in making a father liable for support to
his illegitimate child is his having participated with a fellow human being, and the pleasure and happiness that go with it, in the
process of procreation. Outside of that, it is absurd for the owner of the sperm to be given the rights and obligations of an
illegitimate father. Under the law, is there an illegitimate child, a result of sexual intercourse, whose father is, in law, “unknown”?
Yes, he or she is one whose putative father has not recognized him or her or one who has not bothered to seek judicial remedy to
have him or her recognized by him. The artificial-insemination child join this league of illegitimate children.
* X Cruz and Y had lived as husband and wife for many years in Bacolod, Lanao del Norte. One day Z Reyes, a family
friend and government surveyor from General Santos City, came to Bacolod to do some survey work. Whe...n he came, X
and Y had already two sons, A and B, both surnamed “Cruz”. Z rented a room in the house of X and Y. During the years
that Z had lived with the Cruzes, Y gave birth to C,D,E,F and G, all surnamed “Cruz”. B. testified that throughout all the
years that he was living with them, Z had maintained illicit relations with his mother, that during times that his father was
away for work or for other reasons, Z and his mother would have sexual intercourse in the room of his parents, that he
knew this because every time Z and his mother entered the room, he would peep through a hole and see them have sex.
The baptismal and school records of C,D,E,F and G, reflect X as their father. One day, Z left Bacolod and the Cruzes and
went back to General Santos City. A few months later, Y, A,B,C,D,E,F and G followed him, leaving behind X in Bacolod.
Z and Y got married and A,B,C,D,E,F and G lived with them. At the time of the marriage, X was still alive. Z gave support
to all of them. After the marriage of Z and Y, C,D,E,F and G started to use the surname “Reyes”. Z and Y executed a joint
affidavit declaring that C,D,E,F and G were their children. Z named the children as his beneficiaries in his GSIS
application for pension. When C and D got married, their marriage certificates reflect the name of Z as their father. A
diary of Z contains the words: “My children:” followed by the names of the C,D,E,F and G and their birth dates. Z’s
parents were already dead when Z died. Z left behind lands and a residential house. Y and C,D,E,F and G took possession
of them and appropriated its fruits. M, N, and O, brothers of Z, sued Y and C,D,E,F and G for the recovery of the
possession of the properties, claiming that they own the properties as sole heirs of Z. Will the action prosper? (Assume that
all the matters testified to by B were true. Under the law, the brothers and sisters, in the absence of descendants and ascendants,
inherit from the decedent).
The action WILL PROSPER.
Under the law, children born or conceived during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Art. 164, Family Code). In
this case, C,D,E,F and G were born during the marriage of X Cruz and ...Y. X and Y are, in law, married. A man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, are presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact. (Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
57062, Jan. 24, 1992).
In this case, X and Y had lived together married couple and considered C,D,E,F and G as their legitimate children. The
baptismal and school records of the children state that their father is X. The presumption of marriage has not been rebutted. The
joint affidavit executed by Y and Z, Z’s naming of the children as beneficiaries in Z’s GSIS application for pension, the entries in
Z’s diary, the entries in the marriage certificates of C and D showing that their father was Z --- they are all irrelevant. An
admission of illegitimate filiation in a public or private document signed by an alleged parent is relevant and useful only if the
subject child does not possess the status of being a legitimate child of somebody else. But assuming that they are relevant, they
together cannot conclusively prove that C,D,E,F and G are the children of Z. For two reasons. First, it is not shown that during all
those years, it was impossible for X to have sexual intercourse with Y; and second, while the capacity of X to produce children is
proved (by the existence of A and B), there is no evidence to show that Z is similarly endowed. As regards Y, her marriage to Z is
bigamous, she is not an heir of Z. Her union with Z is governed by rule on co-ownership. Not having actually contributed to the
acquisition of the properties, she does not have any share in the properties. Not being heirs of Z, Y, C,D,E,F and G are not entitled
to share in the estate of Z. The only heirs left are M, N, and O.
* The married couple, Ernesto and Rosalina, had a daughter, Ernestina. During the marriage, Ernesto had illicit relations
with Carolina, his secretary of 23 years. The relations brought forth a son, Adrian, who was born in 1981. In 1993 both
Ernesto and Rosalina died leaving Ernestina as sole heir. In 1994, Carolina, for and in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint
against Ernestina for the declaration of Adrian as illegitimate son of Ernesto and for him (Adrian) to share in his estate.
Invoking Article 175 of the Family Code, the trial court ruled that the death of Ernesto had barred the action and ordered
the dismissal of the complaint. Adrian appealed form the order. Issue: Is the court correct?
No, the court is not correct.
Under the Family Code, which took effect in 1988, rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be
prejudiced or impaired.
In this case, Adrian was only 7 years old in 1988, his right under the Civil Code to prove his filiation within four years
from attaining majority age has already become vested. Art. 175 of the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to him. In
1994 when he filed the complaint against Ernestina, Adrian was only 13 years old. Obviously. his action has not yet been barred.
* Danilo is married to Carolina. Born during the marriage were Jacqueline and Jinkie. Their birth certificates indicated
that their parents were Danilo and Carolina. In notarized document, Juan acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie as his
illegitimate children by Carolina. Juan leaving behind considerable properties consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and real properties. Upon the strength of the instrument of acknowledgment, Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a
complaint against the legitimate heirs of Juan for partition and inventory and accounting. Will the action prosper?
The action will not prosper.
Under the law, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate.
Being born to the spouses Danilo and Carolina, they are the legitimate children of Danilo. By their complaint, Jacqueline
and Jinky tries to collaterally impugn their legitimacy. This cannot be done because only the father, or in exceptional instances the
latter’s heirs, may impugn in a direct proceeding the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
* Spouses B and G begot two offsprings. Albeit they had serious personality differences, the spouses continued to live
under one roof. B begot a son by another woman. G also begot a daughter by another man. If G gives the surname of B to
her daughter by another man, what can B do to protect their legitimate children's interests? (BAR 2010)
If more than one year has not lapsed since the birth of the daughter, B can impugn the legitimacy of G’ daughter by
another man.
Under the law, a husband may impugn the legitimacy of a child born to his wife on the ground that he is not the father of
the child within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, should the father reside in the place
where the birth took place or was recorded.
In this case, the father of the child is not B.
* H filed a complaint against his wife W for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Thereafter, W filed a complaint for concubinage against H and a corresponding information was filed in court.
H filed in the criminal action a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. Rule on the
motion.
I will deny the motion.
Under the law, the final judgment of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is necessary only for purposes of
remarriage. (Art. 41, Family Code)
What the law means is that for purposes other than remarriage, e.g., to prove one’s innocence in a criminal action for
bigamy or concubinage, other pieces of evidence to prove absolute nullity of a previous marriage is admissible. Hence, H need not
wait for the termination of the civil action for declaration of nullity to have evidence for his defense in the criminal action.
This is not to say that H will already be acquitted of the charge of concubinage once he is able to prove the nullity of his
marriage with W. If that is the only evidence that he has, he will still be guilty of bigamy for what the above-stated law also means
is that only a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage can free a spouse of the criminal offense that has one of its elements
his or her being married. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity. It is only when the
nullity of the marriage is declared by the courts can it be held as void. (Beltran vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567,
June 20, 2000)
(NOTE: If the criminal action is for bigamy, the answer would be the same).
* A and B were married 1990 and in their marriage settlement, they chose conjugal partnership of gains to govern their
property relations. In 2000, A, the husband sold a conjugal land to C without the consent of B. In 2008, B filed a
complainant against A and C for the annulment of the sale? Will the action prosper?
The action will prosper.
Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property by one spouse
without the consent of the other is void.
In this case, the sale of the land by A to C was without the consent of B, hence, void.
* A married B, and while the marriage was subsisting, A married C. In the second marriage, the marriage certificate was
signed by the judge inside the chamber while A and C and their witnesses waited for the document outside the chamber
but inside the court room. When B learned of the marriage between A and C, B sued A for bigamy. Is A guilty of bigamy?
No, A is not guilty of bigamy.
One of the requisites of bigamy is that the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.
In this case, the subsequent marriage is void, not only because of the existence of the first marriage, but also because of
the absence of a ceremony.
* True or False: (a) Under the Family Code, a void contract may still become a valid contract. (b) Under the Family Code,
the property regime of a couple may change during the marriage.
a) TRUE: Under the law, the void contract of disposition for encumbrance over a community property for lack of consent
or judicial authorization is considered continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse, and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
(b) TRUE: In case of legal separation of the spouses governed by a property regime other than complete separation of
property, the spouses shall, by operation of law, be governed by the regime of complete separation of property.
* Bridegroom X, whose net assets was only P50,000.00, and bride Y, whose net assets was P15 million, orally agreed that
the property regime that would govern them in their married life was the conjugal partnership of gains. One year after the
celebration of the marriage, Y gave birth to a son. Five years after the celebration of the marriage, Y filed a petition for
legal separation against X, and a decree of legal separation was issued in her favor. In the liquidation of the union, X
insisted that the property regime that governed them was the absolute community of property as their marriage settlement
was merely oral. Y said that the agreement was valid, and added that X had no basis to complain for whatever kind of
regime that may be followed, he had no share as his share was forfeited in favor of their child. Is X correct? Is Y correct?
X is wrong in saying that the prenuptial agreement is not valid for being merely oral. While it is true that the law states
that a prenuptial agreement or marriage settlement “shall be in writing” (Art. 77, Family Code), the law does not say that if it is
void if it is not in writing.
Under the law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they are entered into, provided all the requisites for their
validity are present. (Art. 1356, Civil Code) For a contract to be void for failure to comply with the formal requisite of it being in
writing, it is not enough that the law requires that the contract be in writing, the law must further prescribe that without the
writing the contract is not valid. (Hernaez vs. De Los Angeles, G.R. No. L-27010, April 30, 1969)
Y is wrong in saying that X had no share in the community property as his share was forfeited in favor of their child.
Under the law, what is forfeited by the guilty spouse in a legal proceeding in favor of the common children is his or her share in
the net profits. (Arts. 63 [2] and 43 [2])
contract price of P50,000.00. Against whose property is the P150,000.00 chargeable.
The P150,000 is chargeable against the community property.
partnership.
121 [4]) That Y did not consent to the repair is of no moment. What is of prime consideration is that the repairs have redounded to
the benefit of the family. if she was so minded, y should have filed an action in court to stop the repair from being undertaken.
under the law, the wife may have recourse to the court in case of disagreement with the husband on matters of administration of
conjugal property. (Art. 124, Family Code).
* Years after X and Y were granted a decree of separation of property, they jointly filed a joint petition in court to revert
correct?
As regards the first part of the judgment, the judgment is correct if the petition for separation of property was a voluntary
revival of their property regime before the separation of property (Art. 141 [7], Family Code). If the petition was involuntary, the
spouses.
(The recognized grounds are the negations of the grounds for involuntary separation of property). (Art. 141, Family Code)
The second part of the judgment is wrong. While it is true that under the law, once a decree of revival has been granted,
no voluntary separation may thereafter be granted, the court may not order the spouses not to changed the property regime therein
established, for the reason that, notwithstanding the grant of revival, any one of the spouses may still file an involuntary petition
for separation of property under any of the grounds recognized by law.
*A and B, both of legal age, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. A, the common law
At the time of separation, the union had accumulated a net asset of P1 million. a) If A and B were not related by blood to
each other, how much is the share of B in the P1 million? b) If A and B were "first cousins", how much is the share of B?
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live together without
the benefit of marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and maintenance of the family and of the household rendered
by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code)
148, Family Code)
of property and for the separation of their common properties. The remedy of voluntary separation of the common properties is
allowed under the law. I will not advise her to pursue the remedy of involuntary separation of the common properties because
there exists no sufficient cause there-for. Earning less than what the other earns and having illicit relations with girls, even if one
of them is married, are not recognized by law as sufficient causes for involuntary separation of property.

The child is illegitimate. Under the law, those conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
otherwise provided by law. (Art. 165, Family Code) Those born outside a valid marriage declared by law to be legitimate are only
the following:
(a) those born before the judgment of absolute nullity of a marriage by reason of psychological incapacity of any one of
the parties; (Art. 54, Family Code )
(b) those born of a subsequent marriage which is void because the judgment of annulment or of nullity of the previous
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes
were not recorded in the civil registry and the registries of property; (Arts. 53 and 54, Family Code)
(c) those born of a subsequent marriage made under the authority of judicial declaration of presumptive death of a spouse
of a previous marriage which is void because both parties in the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith. (Arts. 43 (1) and 44,
Family Code of the Philippines). The child of a bigamous marriage does not belong to any of the above-mentioned categories.
What is not included is deemed excluded. He is illegitimate.
* X, a married man, hired Y in 1990 as accountant of his two corporations. The two later became intimate and eventually
soured until they parted ways. X intended to file a complaint against Y for re-conveyance of a parcel of land for the reason
showing the transaction of sale over the property. This documents or witnesses are necessary because the cohabitation between X
and Y is one where the parties or one of them are incapacitated to marry, in which case, one can claim a property or a part thereof
only if he has actually contributed to the acquisition thereof. In this case, the land is registered in the name of Y (this can be
deduced by the action of reconveyance X had filed), and unless X can present these pieces of evidence, his action for
reconveyance will fail because as the registered owner of the property, Y is presumed to be the true owner thereof.
contract price of P50,000.00. Against whose property is the P150,000.00 chargeable?
The P150,000 is chargeable against the community property. Under the law, all taxes, liens, charges and expenses
including major or minor repairs are chargeable upon the conjugal partnership.
121 [4]) That Y did not consent to the repair is of no moment. what is of prime consideration is that the repairs have redounded to
* When does personality begin?

Personality begins at birth. To be considered born:
a) The child, who had an intra-uterine life of 7 months or more, has to be completely delivered alive from the mother’s
womb; or
b) The child, who had an intra-uterine life of less than 7 months, has to live more than twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb; or
c) For all purposes favorable to him/her, at the time of concep-tion, provided he/she be physically born later under any of
the foregoing conditions.
(Note: The law provides, “Birth determines personality.” This state-ment means that if there is no physical birth, there is
no civil personality. For a child who is a beneficiary of some civil acts, he has two births: one, at the time he is conceived
(conceptual) and second, at the time he is physically born (physical)). In the acquisition of civil personality, the conceptual is
useless without the physical).
* A insured his passenger bus with the B Insurance. The insurance policy provides, among others, that no payment shall
be made by the insured to any passenger or third party as indemnity for damages sustained by him without the written
consent of B Insurance. The insured bus figured in an accident which caused injuries to three passengers who agreed to be
paid a ceratin amount each. A, without getting the prior consent of B Insurance, paid each of the three, and the cases were
amicably settled. Later, A sued B Insurance for reimbursement alleging that he made the payment in order to avoid
litigation and the detention of the insured vehicle. Is B Insurance liable to A for the payment he had made to the
passengers?
No, B insurance is not liable.
Under the law, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. In this case, insurance policy provides that "no payment shall be made by the insured to any
passenger or third party as indemnity for damages sustained by him without the written consent of B Insurance."
In this case, it is very clear that A contravened the tenor of the insurance policy inasmuch as A paid the three victims
without the knowledge and consent of the Insurance Company. And in effect, the Insurance company was denied of its right and
opportunity to determine the reasonableness of the amounts paid and to set up any defenses which it may be have against liability
on their undertaking.
Yes, X is correct.
conjugal partnership if owner-ship thereof was vested after the marriage, with the buyer of the partnership having the right of
reimbursement. (Art. 118, Family Code)
In his case, X entered into a contract of sale, as distinguished from a contract to sell, which vests upon the buyer
ownership over the property even if the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Hence, X owns the land, and it should not be
included in the community property. However, X has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership for the conjugal funds
used to pay his monthly obligations.
*X married Y in 1990 without any marriage settlement. Before the marriage X took a loan from Z Bank. X lost all the
proceeds of the loan on gambling. X failed to pay the loan and Z Bank sued him for collection. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the bank. Thereafter, the sheriff, in order to have the judgment satisfied, levied on execution on a land owned by
Y before she married X. Y sued the sheriff to prevent him from auctioning the land. Will Y’s action prosper?
If X has no exclusive property, or is insufficient to pay for the judgment debt, the Y’s action will not prosper.
As the marriage between took place after the effectivity of the Family Code (The Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988), the spouse are governed by the the property regime of absolute community of property. Under the regime, the community
property is liable for ante nuptial debts contracted by either spouse, even if the debts did not redound to the benefit of the family,
if the debtor spouse has insufficient or no exclusive property to pay for the same, but the payment therefore is considered as an
advance to be deducted from his or her share upon the liquidation of the community property. (Art. 94 [9], Family Code)
In this case, the judgment debt of X is an ante nuptial debt that did not redound to the benefit of the family.
(Note: Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the conjugal partnership is not liable for ante nuptial debts that did not
redound to the benefit of the family. The logic here is that under the conjugal partnership of gains, each spouses owns his or her
property and obligations before the marriage; under the absolute community of property, the community property own the
properties and obligations that the spouses own or are liable. That the debtor spouse, upon liquidation, will pay for what had
been paid for his personal account, is in consonance with justice --- because the family did not benefit from said debt).
* X married Y in 1990. Y died in 2008. In 2009 X married Z, but before the marriage X and Z entered into a marriage
settlement whereby they agreed to adopt the conjugal partnership of gains as the regime to govern their property
relations. Is the marriage settlement valid?
If the absolute community of property of X and Y had not been liquidated, the marriage settlement is not valid.
Under the law, where the marriage is terminated by death of one of the spouses, and the property regime of absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, is not liquidated, and the surviving spouse marries
again, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property governs the relations of the subsequent marriage. (Art, 103; 130,
Family Code)
In this case, since the law imposes upon X and Z the property regime of complete separation of property, any agreement
adopting a regime different from this one is void. Contracts contrary to law are void.
* X and were married in 1990. One year after their marriage, X while supervising the clearing of Y’s inherited land upon
the latter'’ request, accidentally found the treasure on the property of Y. To whom shall the treasure belong?
One-half of the treasure belongs to the absolute community of property, the remaining half to Y as her exclusive
property.
Under the regime of absolute community of property, properties owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and those acquired thereafter belong to the community property, except that are excluded by law. (Art. 91, Family
Code). Also, under the law, hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land; anyone, who is not a trespasser, who finds hidden
treasure by chance on one’s property is entitled to one-half of the property and the owner of the property the remaining one-half.
(Art. 438, Civil Code)
In this case, the property regime that governs the marriage is the absolute community of property, the marriage having
taken place after the Family Code took effect (the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988), and there being no agreement
between the spouses as what property regime would govern them. Art. 75, Family Code) . X’s share in the treasure, therefore,
belongs to the community property as he acquired it by chance and industry after the celebration of the marriage. On the other
hand, Y’s share in the treasure belongs to her exclusively, having acquired it by reason of his being the owner of the property
which she also exclusively owned.
*X and Y got married in 1990. Prior thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential house and lot, In 1995, they decided to change
their prop-erty relations to the regime of complete separation of property. Y consented, as she was then engaged in a
lucrative business. The spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal partner-ship and agreeing on a
complete separation of property. Thereafter, X, Gabby acquired a mansion which he registered exclusively in his name.
Y’s business went bankrupt leaving behind million of pesos in unpaid debts. What properties may be held answerable for
Y obligations?
Assuming that the amount of Y’s indebtedness exceeds the value of the house and lot and the mansion, both properties
are answerable for Y’s obligations.
Under the law, once the spouses agree upon the celebration of the marriage on a property regime under a marriage
settlement, the spouses may no longer change by contract the property regime agreed upon. (Art. 76, Family Code). In this case,
therefore, the con-tract entered into by X and Y changing their property regime is void. Their property regime has always been the
conjugal partnership of gains.
Under the conjugal partnership of gains, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts contracted during the marriage
both or by one of them, as in this case. (Art. 121 [2], Family Code). From the proceeds of the auction, however, will be deducted
and delivered to X and Y such amount as is sufficient to build a family home pursuant to the provisions of the Family Code. (Arts.
157 and 160, Family Code)
* A is a widow who has a legitimate child with his deceased wife. During their marriage, he and his deceased wife had
acquired a parcel of land. A then married C. Can this land be used to support his present family?
Under the law, if the community property or conjugal partnership property is insufficient to provide support to the
family, the spouses are solidarily liable with their exclusive properties for such support. (Arts. 94 and 121, Family Code).
In this case, the land is the exclusive property of A for the reason that properties acquired before the marriage by either
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage property, are exclusive properties of said spouse -- regardless of
whatever property regime governs his subsequent marriage. (Arts. 92 [3], 116, and 144, Family Code). Hence, upon such
condition of insufficiency, the land may be charged for the support of the family.
* M married N in 1990. In 2000 N met an accident as a result of which her mental faculties were impaired. One the
properties acquired by the couple after their marriage was a piece of land. To meet the expenses for the care of N, M sold
the land to O. Five years after the sale, N died. The heirs of N sued O for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Will the
action prosper?
Under the law, in the event of incapacity on the part of one spouse, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration, but such powers do not include to sell community properties without the consent of the other. In case consent
cannot be given by reason of incapacity, court authority must be obtained. In the absence of such consent or authority, the sale is
void. (Art. 96, Family Code)
In this case, the sale of the property was made by M without court authority, hence the sale is void. The heirs, therefore,
have a valid cause of action against O.
*TRUE or FALSE: (a) In a regime of conjugal partner-ship of gains, all properties acquired by the couple during the
marriage by onerous title are owned by the community property. (b) In a regime of absolute community of property, when
one of the spouses is incapacitated to give consent, and the sale of a community property is of extreme urgency, the other
spouse, alone, may sell the property.
(a) FALSE. While it is true that those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses, the source of funds used to acquire determines
whether or not the property is for conjugal ownership or not. Hence, if the money used is conjugal the property acquired is
conjugal; if the money is exclusively owned by the spouse, then the property is his exclusive property.
(b) FALSE. When one of the spouses is incapacitated, the other may assume sole administratorship but may not sell or
dispose or encumber the same without the consent of the other spouse or authority from the court.
Yes, X is correct.
conjugal partnership if owner-ship thereof was vested after the marriage, with the buyer of the partnership having the right of
reimbursement. (Art. 118, Family Code)
In his case, X entered into a contract of sale, as distinguished from a contract to sell, which vests upon the buyer
ownership over the property even if the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Hence, X owns the land, however, he has the
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership for the conjugal funds used to pay his monthly obligations.
the P5 million?
Y owns half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the other half.
Under the law, where two parties, who are incapacitated to marry, live together as husband and wife under a void
Code)
had no share in it.
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household rendered by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code) Since X
and Y were capacitated to marry, and Y managed the household, she owns one-half of the P5 million, and the heirs of X the other
half.
*Years after X and Y were granted a decree of sepa-ration of property, they jointly filed a joint petition in court to revert
correct?
As regards the first part fo the judgment, the judgment is correct if the petition for separation of property was a voluntary
Code)

*A and B, both of legal age, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. A, the common law
b) If A and B were "first cousins", how much is the share of B?
Under the law, properties jointly acquired by two persons who are capacitated to marry, and who live live together
without the benefit of marriage, are owned by them in equal shares, the care and mainten-ance of the family and of the household
rendered by one of them being considered a contribution in the acquisition thereof. (Art. 147, Family Code)

148, Family Code)

The child is illegitimate.
Under the law, those conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided by law.
(Art. 165, Family Code)
Those born outside a valid marriage declared by law to be legitimate are only the following: (a) those born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of a marriage by reason of psychological incapacity of any one of the parties; (Art. 54, Family Code )
(b) those born of a subse-quent marriage which is void because the judgment of annulment or of nullity of the previous marriage,
the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes were not
recorded in the civil registry and the registries of property; (Arts. 53 and 54, Family Code) and (c) those born of a subsequent
marriage made under the authority of judicial declaration of presumptive death of a spouse of a previous marriage which is void
because both parties in the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith. (Arts. 43 (1) and 44, Family Code of the Philippines). The child
of a bigamous marriage does not belong to any of the above-mentioned categories. What is not included is deemed excluded. He
is illegitimate.
*X, a married man, hired Y in 1990 as accountant of his two corporations. The two later became intimate and eventually
soured until they parted ways. X intended to file a complaint against Y for re-conveyance of a parcel of land for the reason
them are incapacitated to marry, in which case, one can claim a property or a part thereof only if he has actually contributed to the
acquisition thereof.
contract price of P50, 000.00. Against whose property is the P150, 000.00 chargeable?
The P150,000 is chargeable against the community prop-erty.
partnership.
121 [4]) That Y did not consent to the repair is of no moment. What is of prime consideration is that the repairs have redounded to
* A, who is married to C, has an affair with B. A and B have a son, X, At the age of six, X comes to live with his father with
the con-sent of. C and the children of. C and. A. X enters school using the family name of A without any objection from C
and the legitimate children. Three years later, A dies, and X goes back to his mother. The estate of A is partitioned among
C and the children of A and C to the exclusion of X. Six months after the death of. A, X , through his mother, filed a
complaint for partition against A and the children, claiming that he is an illegitimate child of A and should share in his
estate. Will the action prosper?
Under the law, the legitime of an illegitimate child consists of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Art. 176,
Family Code)
In this case, the filiation of X as the child of A and B is already established. The problem says “A and B have a son X.”
His filiation is no longer in question. As an illegitimate son of A, X has a right to his estate.
(It would have been different if the basis of X’s action for partition is soley the continuous possession by him of the status of an
illegitimate child. Then the answer would be:
No, the action will not prosper.
Under the law, when the basis of an illegitimate child’s filiation is the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, the action for recognition must be filed during the lifetime of the alleged parent, (Arts. 172 and 175, Family
Code)
In this case, the fact of continuous possession of a an illegitimate child is well established. However, A, the alleged father
of X, had already died when the action for recognition, by way of an action for partition, was filed. The death has barred the
action).
* In class, while Teacher A was writing something in the board, Pupil B hit the head of Pupil C with a hard object which
resulted to the death of Pupil C. Who is liable for damages for the death of Pupil C?
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over Pupil B are liable. Under the
law, parents and other persons exercising parental authority are civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children under their parental authority.(Art. 221, FamilyCode). While, it is true that in this case,
Pupil B was in a school activity when he committed the act that caused the death of Pupil C, the school, its administrators and the
teacher are not liable because they can only be liable if they failed to exercise the diligence required under the circumstances. It
cannot be said that these people were negligent. The teacher was writing something on the board, which is normal for a teacher to
do, and he or she could not have prevented the event from happening. (It is a different story altogether if the hard object was
brought by Pupil B into the school purposely to injure or kill Pupil C for then the security personnel were negligent in failing to
detect or confiscate it).
* The conjugal dwelling (house and lot) of the spouses H and W located in General Santos City was worth P1 million.
Judgment was rendered against the spouses for a conjugal loan of P350,000.00. May the house and lot be levied in
execution to satisfy the judgment debt?
If at the time of the levy, the amount of P1 million or more is the “most favorable amount”, as may be determined by the
court, for the constitution of the family home, then no levy can be had.
The value of P300,000 for family homes in urban areas and P200,000 for those in rural areas provided by law is not
fixed. If the value of the currency has changed since the adoption of the Family Code in 1988, then the family home is to be
valued in such amount as is most favorable to the owners of the family home. (Art. 157, Family Code).
Even if the loan obligation is not one those enumerated by the law which excepts the family home from levy on
execution, the house can still be levied if the actual value of the family home is more than P300,000.00 or the “most favorable
amount” as the case may be. Insuch a case, the P300,000.00 or the “most favorable amount” is to be deducted from the proceeds
of the auction and delivered to the judgment debtors and the balance be applied ot the loan obligation. (Art. 160, Family Code)
* Rommel filed a petition in court for the change of his name and sex, as registered in his birth certificate name, from
“Rom-mel” to “Mely” and from “male” to “female”. He alleged in his petition that: he is registered in his birth certificate
as “Rommel” and “male”; he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female”; he
had always identified himself with girls since child-hood; underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation; he underwent sex reassignment surgery; from then on he lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. All the allegations in the petition were proved. May the desired changes be made?
No, the desired changes cannot be made.
The name “Rommel” cannot be changed to “Mely”
Under the law, a change in the first name of a person may be done only for specific grounds, e.g., the name being
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. The ground invoked by Rommel, sex reassignment,
is not one of them. Also, the jurisdiction over petitions for change of first name no longer rests with the court but with the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Rommel’s petition failed in these requirements.
The sex “male” cannot be changed to “female”.
Under the law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. The entry of a person’s sex in his birth certificate can only be changed in case of error in making it, Sex
reassignment is not recognized by law as a ground for such change. Moreover, Rommel’s sex reassignment does not make him a
female. A female is the sex that produces ova or bears young a function which Rommel cannot do.

Persons and Family Relations Sample Q&As: by Atty. Virgilio Alconera

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Persons and Family Relations Sample Q&As: by Atty. Virgilio Alconera

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS SAMPLE Q&As

By Atty. Virgilio Alconera

---Alternative answer, using your improved “trunk” law:

In this case, the suit of X against Y for legal separation succeeded.

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 Community Property; Conjugal partnership property

* Is a child born out of a bigamous marriage legitimate or illegitimate?

* When does personality begin?

The second part of the judgment is wrong.

b) B does not share anything in the P1 million.

* Is a child born out of a bigamous marriage legitimate or illegitimate?

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