Jurisdiction Fullcases Electoral Comelec Coa CSC

September 20, 2016. G.R. No. 221538.
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES,
respondents.
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; Exclusive, original jurisdiction over
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling
within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals.—
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested
in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the
election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as
_______________
* EN BANC.
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
of the President and the Vice President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal) may be initiated. The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of
any review. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole” judge
must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is allowed in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
as an independent civil action.—A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House
Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a
continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition
for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. The viability of such a petition
is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” The term “grave abuse of
discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; There is grave abuse of discretion when
a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) or the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that
critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.—There
is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual
inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or
not accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory
provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence,
is also considered grave abuse
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of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Same; Same; Same; Writs of certiorari have been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s
approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a
gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment
of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used”; “(c) where
the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.—Writs of certiorarihave,
therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation,
of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and]
based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete
with standards that can be used”; “(c) where the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in
resolving an issue.
Constitutional Law; Senators; Natural-born Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she]
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”
Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already
sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or
validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.—At the heart of this
controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological parents,
either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
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foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional
interpretation. Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the
sovereign’s purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same
text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words — text —
and how they are situated within the whole document — context — govern. Secondarily,
when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous
construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain
text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means
for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Verba Legis Doctrine; Words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.—To the extent possible, words must be given
their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. The
Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act
of the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People’s
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: We look to
the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in
the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Same; Same; The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular,
whole unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat.—Reading a constitutional provision requires
awareness of its relation with the
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whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater
whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components
through the dynamism of these components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is
the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be
appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each
provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the
Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.
Same; Same; Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system.”—Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has
previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic
principle that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of [our] legal system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law.
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of
the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the
contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect. Nevertheless, one must not fall into
the temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.
Same; Same; Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may
be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.—Contemporaneous
construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is
capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can go beyond the strict
boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been
ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to
verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
Same; Same; On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific
provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV,
Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s
enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be
appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.—Though her parents are unknown,
private respondent is a
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Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution
making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of
the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not
even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. On an initial
level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally
governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born
citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes
a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the
factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of
private respondent’s Filipino parentage.
Same; Citizenship; The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to
hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.—
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It
is one’s personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the
right to petition the government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails
obligations to the political community of which one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is
intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits
and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have
been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen’s birth.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV,
Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized
citizen is one who is not natural-born.—A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV,
Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a natural-
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ized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), articulates this definition by dichotomy: [O]nly
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on
the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized
citizens, he stated, are “former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in
which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino
citizens.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Although the Revised Rules on
Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings,
the Supreme Court (SC) has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in
other proceedings.—Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of
circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless
sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. There is no rational basis
for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings. In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a
conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the
highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to
satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Words and Phrases; Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law.—“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
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defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party
making the allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue” Burden
of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This
shift happens when a party makes a prima faciecase in his or her favor. The other party
then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has
ostensibly been established against him or her.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Foundlings; The presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother
(and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one
reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.”—The
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a
Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial
proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its]
whole purpose.” As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with
Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in
isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being
of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for
public service, and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the
Constitution’s reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further,
this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments.
Same; Same; Same; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens
is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens; Concluding
that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are
made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.—Concluding that foundlings
are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest
possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations.
These conse-
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quences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present
politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an
inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their
own.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee
that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in
terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’”—The equal protection clause serves
as a guarantee that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee
against ‘undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
oppression of inequality.’” Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no
substantial distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents.
They are both entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their
birth. Foundlings’ misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them — an
inability arising from no fault of their own — cannot be the foundation of a rule that
reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not
entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who know their parents.
Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those
who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and
deprivation.
Same; Citizenship; Foundlings; Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case
of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and
reaffirmed through various official public acts.—Our statutes on adoption allow for the
recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from
this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete
the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens. Specifically
regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural-
born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until
circumstances made it appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the
Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares,
private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various
official public acts. First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and
benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted
an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the
Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philip-
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pines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.
Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No.
9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically “to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”—“Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Commonwealth Act
No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen
on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her
Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7,
2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.
Shortly after, this Petition was granted. Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth
Act No. 63 and Republic Act No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is,
keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to
exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities
(i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated
in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and
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may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities.—Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship,
although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities
attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other
requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other
hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and
capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section
2’s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that
leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore
natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites which Natural-born Filipinos who Have Been
Naturalized Elsewhere and Wish to Run for Elective Public Office Must Comply.—Natural-
born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public
office must comply with all of the following requirements: First, taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a
natural-born Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights,
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. Second, compliance
with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate
the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. Third, “mak[ing]
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.” This, along with satisfying the other qualification
requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to
comply with Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a
natural-born, Filipino citizen.—It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having
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had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than
a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act
No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. To do so is to completely
disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in Section
2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume
that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible
termination of his or her natural-born status.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not
limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional
solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not
for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.—Although Bengson was
decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic
Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” In Bengson’s words,
the once naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural-born status.
There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he
or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates
this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the
point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine
citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Republic
Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance
and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the
enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no
singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.
PERLAS-BERNABEJ. ,, Dissenting Opinion:
Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as committed with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—An act of a court
or
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tribunal can only be considered as committed with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. In this relation, “grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.”
Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that in this case, respondent failed to
present competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent
which is necessary to determine natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus
sanguinis principle.—In this case, respondent failed to present competent and sufficient
evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine
natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. This notwithstanding,
the ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are substantial evidence justifying
the inference that respondent’s biological parents are Filipino.
Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot make a definitive pronouncement on a
candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino.—Case
law holds that “[m]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be
strictly complied with.” The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a candidate’s
qualifications must therefore be solid. This Court cannot make a definitive pronouncement
on a candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino.
The circumstances surrounding respondent’s abandonment (both as to the milieu of time
and place), as well as her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By parity
of reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the
Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her physical features only
tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain if
their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the statistics cited — assuming the same to be true
— do not account for all births but only of those recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain how
“encompassing” was the Philippine’s civil registration system at that time — in 1968 — to
be able to conclude
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that those statistics logically reflect a credible and representative sample size. And
even assuming it to be so, 1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering it factually possible
that respondent belonged to this class. Ultimately, the opposition against respondent’s
natural-born citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact that her parents are unknown
directly puts into question her Filipino citizenship because she has no prima facie link to a
Filipino parent from which she could have traced her Filipino citizenship.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that while the predicament of foundlings of
having their parents unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of
proving their Filipino parentage, the current state of the law which requires evidence of
blood relation to a Filipino parent to establish natural-born citizenship under the jus
sanguinis principle must be respected at all costs.—While the predicament of foundlings of
having their parents unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of
proving their Filipino parentage, the current state of the law which requires evidence of
blood relation to a Filipino parent to establish natural-born citizenship under the jus
sanguinis principle must be respected at all costs. This is not to say that the position of
foundlings in relation to their endeavors for high public offices has been overlooked in this
discourse. Rather, the correction of this seeming “misfortune” — as the ponencia would
suppose — lies in legislative revision, not judicial supplication. For surely, it is not for this
Court to step in and supply additional meaning when clarity is evoked in the citizenship
provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that the jus sanguinis principle of citizenship
established in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or generally
accepted principle of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are
accorded natural-born citizenship in the State in which they are found, the same,
nonetheless, could not be given effect as it would contravene the Constitution.—It bears
stressing that they jus sanguinis principle of citizenship established in the 1935
Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or generally accepted
principle of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are accorded
natural-born citizenship in the
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State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect as it
would contravene the Constitution. To recall, should international law be adopted in this
jurisdiction, it would only form part of the sphere of domestic law. Being relegated to the
same level as domestic laws, they could not modify or alter, much less prevail, over the
express mandate of the Constitution. In this relation, I deem it fitting to echo the point
made by Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, likewise in her Separate
Opinion before the SET: Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international
conventions cited but will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or
legislative enactment, so that the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is
citizenship by naturalization. There must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired. By
no means can this citizenship be considered that of a natural-born character under the
principle of jus sanguinis in the Philippine Constitution.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuelito R. Luna for petitioner.
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes and George Erwin M. Garcia for
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares.
LEONEN,J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to
callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be
discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is
presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the
quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of
his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these
inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the
exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the
qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave
abuse of discretion remediable by either
450
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the
Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship
of every single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of
each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that
a foundling is not natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political powers, as devised
by the Constitution, are likewise different from the other ways to
raise questions of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner
Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification of the
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET
Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David,
3
which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-

Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold
such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution.
The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution5denied David’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she
was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Id., at p. 73.
3 Id., at pp. 227-258.
4 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 3 provides:
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of
the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. 3. SECTION
5 Rollo, pp. 80-83.
6 Id., at p. 8.
451
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 451
Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3,
1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs.
Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6,
1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live
Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic]
OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND
THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO
MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO . . .11
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal

promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of
Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known
as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly
known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also ordered the change in
Senator Poe’s name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar
to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of
Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become
final in a Certificate of Finality.14
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the
Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on
Senator Poe’s foundling certificate that she was
_______________
7 Id. See also Id., at p. 227, SET Decision.

8 Id.
9 Id., at p. 227.
10 Id., at p. 681, Poe Comment.
11 Id., at p. 8.
12 Id., at p. 681.
13 Id.
14 Id.
452
adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-
written notation appears on Senator Poe’s foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per
Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May
13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.16
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan,

Metro Manila when she turned 18 years old.17The Commission on
Elections issued her a Voter’s Identification Card for Precinct No.
196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986. 18
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a
Philippine passport.19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993,
May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18,
2014.20 Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine
diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United States in
1988 to obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor’s
degree in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.23
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino na-
_______________
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 9.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 228.
21 Id., at p. 682.
22 Id., at pp. 9 and 682.
23 Id., at p. 9.
453
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 453
tional since birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe
returned to the United States with her husband.26 For some time,
she lived with her husband and children in the United States.27
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian
Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika
(Anika).28 Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992.
Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both
Hanna and Anika were born in the Philippines.29
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship
on October 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States
passport.31
Senator Poe’s adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National
Elections.32 To support her father’s candidacy, Senator Poe and her
daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8,
2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the United States on
July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she
gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and
eventually “slipped into a coma.”36 Senator Poe returned
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 682-683.

25 Id., at p. 228.
26 Id.
27 Id., at p. 9.
28 Id., at p. 683.
29 Id.
30 Id., at p. 9.
31 Id.
32 Id., at p. 683.
33 Id., at p. 9.
34 Id.
35 Id., at p. 683.
36 Id., at p. 10.
454
to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004,
her father died.38 She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005
to attend her father’s funeral and to attend to the settling of his
estate.39
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States.
She never looked for work again in the United States.40
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After consulting
her children, they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support
the grieving Susan Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and
Hanna’s schools Virginia, United States that they would be
transferring to the Philippines the following semester.43 She came
back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to
“finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family
home there.”46
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22,
2005.47
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the
_______________
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id., at p. 684.
41 Id., at p. 228.
42 Id., at p. 684.
43 Id.
44 Id., at p. 685.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id., at p. 228.
48 Id., at p. 10.
455
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 455
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.49
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention

and/or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic
Act No. 9225.50 She also “filed applications for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below
eighteen (18) years of age at that time.”51
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr.:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate
that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
parents and is presumed to be a naturalborn Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an
American citizen and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR
and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and
so is thereby deemed to have reacquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the
original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe’s children were “deemed

Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225.”54 Until now, the Order “has not
_______________
49 Id., at p. 685.
50 Id., at p. 228.
51 Id., at p. 686.
52 Id., at p. 228.
53 Id., at p. 686.
54 Id.
456
been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other agency of
Government.”55
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her
children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a “citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No.
AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated
July 18, 2006.”57
Senator Poe became a registered voter of BarangaySanta Lucia,
San Juan City on August 31, 2006.58
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America
between 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport No.
170377935.59 She used her passport “after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic on 7 July 2006, but not after she has
formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October
2010.”60 The following are the flight records given by the Bureau of
Immigration:
_______________
55 Id.
56 Id., at pp. 686-687.
57 Id., at p. 687.
58 Id.
59 Id., at p. 256.
60 Id.
457
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 457
Arrivals Flight No.

November 4, 2006 SQ076
July 23, 2007 PR731
November 5, 2007 PR337
May 8, 2008 PR103
October 5, 2008 PR359
May 21, 2009 PR105
August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15, 2009 PR10361
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III

appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010,
Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship,63 stating:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at
No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I
hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American
citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity
thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own
free will, free of any duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on
October 21, 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath
_______________
61 Id.
62 Id., at p. 10.
63 Id., at p. 687.
64 Id., at pp. 687-688.
65 Id., at p. 688.
458
of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26,
2010.66 Her oath of office stated:
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan

bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na
nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan,
ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan
nito’y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at
ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito;
na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga
sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong
babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010,
Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of

Nationality of the United States68 in the presence of Vice Consul
Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she
also filled out the Questionnaire Information for Determining
Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice
Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
for Senator Poe.71 The certificate was ap-
_______________
68 Id., at p. 229.
66 Id., at p. 229.
67 Id., at p. 689, Poe Comment.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
459
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 459
proved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
February 3, 2012.72
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.73 On
September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy,
which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on October 2,
2012.74 She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16,
2013.75
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He contested the election of Senator
Poe for failing to “comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.”77
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No.
15-01 requiring David “to correct the formal defects of his
petition.”78 David filed his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee,
ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon
Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended Petition.80
Pending the filing of Senator Poe’s answer, David filed a Motion
Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition
and related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August
25, 2015.81 The documents requested in-
_______________
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id., at p. 230.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
460
cluded Senator Poe’s record of travels and NSO kept Birth
Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion.83 The same
Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a
subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of Immigration
and the National Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the
officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the
Office of the Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the
requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied with by both
the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on
September 1, 2015.86
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified
Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for
Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct
Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of
Court.87
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary
conference brief on or before September 9, 2015. 88 The Resolution
also set the Preliminary Conference on September 11,
2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference, the parties “agreed to
drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription.”90
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
September 21, 2015.91 The parties were then “required to
_______________
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id., at p. 231.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
461
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 461
submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the
submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30)
days from the said date.”92
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days
the submission of DNA test results.93 The Senate Electoral
Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through
Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a
Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing,95 which stated
that “none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that
would shed light to the real identity of her biological
parents.”96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to
continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe
submitted “the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a
foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her
submissions to the Tribunal.”97 On November 6, 2015, through
Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal “noted the
[M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for resolution.”98
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
Senator.99 The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and
continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution,
_______________
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id., at p. 257.
462
as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.
....
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,

Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the “final act” to reacquire
natural-born Philippine citizenship.
....
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced
her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino
citizen from that time on until today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The

Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on
November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on
the Motion for Reconsideration.102
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103 David’s Motion for
_______________
100 Id., at pp. 253-257.

101 Id., at pp. 84-100.
102 Id., at p. 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
103 Id., at p. 81.
463
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 463
Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
December 3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23
November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November
2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the
Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the
motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo
de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier
submitted by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
entitled “Amado D. Valdez, Petitioner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llaman[z]ares, Respondent.”
SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s Resolution

was received by David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the
present Petition for Certiorari before this Court.107
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the Petition “within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice.”108 The
Resolution also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016. 109 The
Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, submitted its Comment on December
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 80-83.

105 Id., at p. 82.
106 Id., at p. 7.
107 Id., at pp. 7-8.
108 Id., at p. 647, SET Comment.
109 Id.
464
30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4,
2016.111
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
Commission on Elections case on the issue of private respondent’s
citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral
Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator under
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial

review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its
findings and conclusions on private respondent’s citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner’s plea for post-judgment relief calls for a
consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court’s
competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle — a petition
for certiorari — through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
_______________
110 Id., at p. 669.

111 Id., at pp. 677-828.
465
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 465
I.A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
....
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the 17. SECTION sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from

all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly,
_______________
112 A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice President was also created
by the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 4 provides:
. . . 4. SECTION
....
The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
466
courts and the Commission on Elections)113 the power to rule on
contests114 relating to the election, returns, and qualifica-
_______________
113 Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of local elective offices.
CONST., Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2) provides:
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: 2. SECTION
....
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
involving elective (2) barangayofficials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
114 The term “contest” refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission on Elections,
468 Phil. 421; 424 SCRA 277 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court referring to the
counterpart electoral tribunal for the President and Vice President — the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal — explained: “Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the whining
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise. . . .
“The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice President,” of the Philippines, and
not of “candidates” for President or Vice President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally defined
as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
467
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 467
tions of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of
Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and
distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s power. The power to
resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body. The resolution
of such contests is its only task; it performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to
introduce into our legal system an “independent, impartial and
nonpartisan body attached to the legislature and specially created
for that singular purpose.”115 The 1935 Constitution similarly
created an Electoral Commission, independent from the National
Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to members
of the National Assembly.116 This
_______________
a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post election scenario.
In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post
election scenario.
“It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not
include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice presidency before the elections are held.”
115 Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399; 168 SCRA 391, 401 (1988).
[Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
116 CONST. (1935), Art. VI, Sec. 4 provides:
There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be
its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the 4. SECTIONsole judge of all contests
relating to the elec
468
was a departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts
enforced under American colonial rule — namely: the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 — which vested the power
to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935
Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral
legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for there to be
separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress. 117 The
1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they
have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions — under the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions — which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have
been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be
the “sole” judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as “intended to be as
_______________
tion, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

117 CONST. (1935 amended), Art. VI, Sec. 11 provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
11. SECTIONsole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in
each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
118 Supra note 115.
469
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 469
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]” Earlier, this
grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as “full, clear and
complete.” . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed
upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling
within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral
tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges
against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and
Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice
President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may
be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any
review. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’
being the “sole” judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” Judicial review is, therefore, still possible.
In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that “. . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any
final ac-
_______________
119 Id., at pp. 399-400; p. 401.

120 347 Phil. 797; 283 SCRA 520 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
470
tion taken by the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.”
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases.
In Robles v. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that
while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so,
however, but only “in the exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the Tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be a remedy for such abuse.”
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero v. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the
power of the Electoral Commission “is beyond judicial interference except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a
denial of due process.” The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co v. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate
a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than
the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral

Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate juris-
_______________
121 Id., at pp. 804-805; pp. 529-530.
471
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 471
diction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there
has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
I.B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House

Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through
the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the
proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A
petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
an independent civil action.122 The viability of such a petition is
premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.”123
_______________
122 See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No.
222702, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 442, 462-463 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and
in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755
SCRA 182, 237 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
123 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1 provides:
1. SECTIONPetition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
472
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to
refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ

such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on
Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences
such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless
properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the
subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.125
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of
statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of
the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the
current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or
frivolously departs from settled principles engenders a strong
suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against
a party.
_______________
124 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777; 622 SCRA 744, 765 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En
Banc].
125 Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division),
670 Phil. 136, 151; 654 SCRA 505, 519 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
126 Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015, 772
SCRA 638, 649 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
473
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 473
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the
tribunal’s approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading,
if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal’s
assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on
very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is
replete with standards that can be used”;128 “(c) where the
tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable”;129 and (d)
_______________
127 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 124 at pp. 777-778, 782; pp. 771-772, 778.
128 Id., at p. 787; p. 777.
129 Id., at p. 778; p. 767. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for relying on very
select facts that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a manner as to make it appear that
the candidate whose residence was in question was not qualified. Viewing these facts in isolation
indicated a practically deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at sustaining a previously-conceived myopic
conclusion:
“In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically focused solely on its
consideration of Mitra’s residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs of the premises.
In the [Commission on Elections’] view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by
the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra’s residence because it is cold and
utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s personality and that it lacks loving attention and details
inherent in every home to make it one’s residence. This was the main reason that the [Commission on
Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
“Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and
examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the [Commission on Elections] thereby
determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person’s residence based solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling
qualifies as a residence — i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to
remain — his or her capac
474
where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations
in resolving an issue.130
I.C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral

Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with
a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that
proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its
provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal
question: the citizenship status of children whose biological
parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article
IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one’s father or
mother. It was compelled to exercise its original jurisdiction in the
face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without
judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only
asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while
heedfully considering the established personal circum-
_______________
ity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.”

130 In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315; 617 SCRA 214, 238-239 (2010)
[Per J. Brion, En Banc], this Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1214, 1226; 575
SCRA 634, 649 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] stated: “[A] court abuses its discretion when it lacks
jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on
clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much
weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal
conclusions.”
475
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 475
stances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool’s
errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it
arose because private respondent’s parentage was unknown and
has remained so throughout her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening private respondent with
conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months,
the one thing that she has never been in a position to know
throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the
implications of all other facts known about her finding. Therefore,
it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of
proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not
absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.”131
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all
children with the misfortune of having been abandoned by their
biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class
citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the
Constitution’s aims of promoting and defending the well-being of
children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public
service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the

requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she]
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born
citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of
_______________
131 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
476
the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a
foundling whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails to
satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to
establish her Filipino “blood line,” which is supposedly the essence
of the Constitution’s determination of who are natural-born
citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion,
petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-
born citizen, she could never leave reverted to natural-born status
despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner’s case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are
Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies
as citizens “[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.” Petitioner similarly claims that, as private
respondent’s foundling status is settled, the burden to prove
Filipino parentage was upon her. With private respondent having
supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable
conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.

Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of
whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings,
they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this
controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be
Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains
unknown.132 Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional
interpretation.
_______________
132 CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 1(2):

The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. SECTION
....
477
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 477
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering
the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify which among competing
interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable
construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they
are situated within the whole document — context — govern.
Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain text
(i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle
what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the
plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may
still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear
textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
III.A
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision

must necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the
provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this
Court determines constitutional intent.133
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary
meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba
legis.134 The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was
ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their
right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The
preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is
the People’s consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-
legal, understanding. Thus:
_______________
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.] (2)

133 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308, 338; 359 SCRA
698, 724 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
134 See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478, 501-523;
696 SCRA 496, 546 (2013) [Per J.Mendoza, En Banc].
478
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. 135(Emphasis
supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its

relation with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional
provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its
components through the dynamism of these components’
interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document,
not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore,
be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis
valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and
effected in a way that gives life to all
_______________
135 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,
460 Phil. 830, 885; 415 SCRA 44, 126 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393; 31 SCRA 413 (1970) [Per J.Fernando, Second
Division]. This was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA
241 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
136 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., id., at p. 886; p. 127.
479
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 479
that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to
its finest fixings.137
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its
values color each provision at the heart of a controversy in an
actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence

that has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our
legal system is founded on the basic principle that “judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of [our] legal system.”140 Juris-
_______________
137 La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 773; 445 SCRA 1, 79 (2004)
(Resolution) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] states that “[t]he Constitution should be read in broad, life-
giving strokes.”
138 272 Phil. 147; 194 SCRA 317 (1991) [Per CJ. Fernan, En Banc].
139 Id., at p. 162; pp. 330-331, as cited in Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326,
341; 635 SCRA 783, 798-799 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
140 CIVIL CODE, Art. 8.
480
prudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless,
judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text
itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because
judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that
the text brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the
temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into
how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions
are the result of the readoption — often with accompanying
recalibration — of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly
novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the
inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text by comparing
its current iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly
taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more
conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion
of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the
use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the
imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency
and change galvanizes meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates
who are citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with
counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even
in organic laws142 and in similar mechanisms143 in-
_______________
141 Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
142 The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, crystallized the concept of “Philippine citizens.” See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra note
114 at pp. 467-468; p. 331.
143 For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on December 18, 1889,
making the first categorical
481
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 481
troduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still
resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation
of legal interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is
not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc.
v. Commission on Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a
holistic approach in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively)
construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)’s text on the part of COMELEC, that the
use of the words “paid for” evinces no distinction between direct purchasers and those who
purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)’s
desistance from actually using the word “subscriber” means that subscribers are beyond its
contemplation. The variance in the parties’ positions, considering that they are both
banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act’s plain meaning, is the best evidence
of an extant ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments
absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to
legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are
fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A
pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative
wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous.
In reality, univer-
_______________
listing on who were Spanish citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, id., at p. 465; p. 329.
144 G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 124 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
482
sality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that
language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than
parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence
of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal
apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution.
Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution — saligan— demonstrates
this imperative of constitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we
consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the
statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We
consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative
effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from
the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III.B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the

text may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable
meanings.146 It is only then that one can go beyond the strict
boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has
already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text,
contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate the
meaning yielded by such reading.
_______________
145 Id., at pp. 166-167.

146 Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421; 678 SCRA 267, 282 (2012)
[Per J. Reyes, En Banc]: “Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to
be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible meanings.”
483
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 483
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by
the realization that the business of understanding the Constitution
is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of
our constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of
government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and
are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a
justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in
order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be
sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however,
judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or
deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle
underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing
advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only
constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve
an actual case, may be entertained.147
When permissible then, one may consider analogous
jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on similar, but not the
very same, matters or concerns),148 as well as thematically similar
statutes and international norms that form part of our legal
system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text
in light of the specific facts under consideration. It is also only at
this juncture — when external aids may be consulted — that the
supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as articulated
through records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be
illuminating.
_______________
147 See, for example, In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal
Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal
Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 352 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J. Leonen,
Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
148 Cf. what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the very same text.
484
III.C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation,

inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or
fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The
alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that
have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in
interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a
proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in
complete agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is
even possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on
entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding
can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of
actions made within specific historical episodes through detached,
and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution
is not always uniform with the original understanding of the
People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper in-
485
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 485
terpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framer’s understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a

Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the
Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its
plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not
even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the
implications of international legal instruments. This reading
proceeds from several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the
specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s
actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.”
This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration,
which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must
then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.
The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately
justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are
natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary.
This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the
whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This
includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to
opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as
well as its reasons for requiring natural-
_______________
149 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc., supra note 135 at p. 887; pp. 128-129, citingCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note
138 at pp. 169-170; pp. 337-338.
486
born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related
legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’

commencement from birth means that private respondent never
had to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is
natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired
her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of
Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic.
V.A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who
are citizens of the Philippines:
The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Section
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
_______________
150 The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the
present Constitution provides clarity for “natural-born” status. For comparison, the
1935 provisions state:
The following are citizens of the Philippines. 1. SECTION
487
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 487
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Natural-born citizens are those who are 2. Sec. citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2’s significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of

the term “natural-born citizens.” This is distinct from Section 1’s
enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1’s generic
listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count
themselves as natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are
better appreciated when supplemented with an understanding of
how our concepts of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have
evolved. As will be seen, the term “natural-born citizen” was a
transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.
V.B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the

“right to have rights.”151 It is one’s personal and . . .
_______________
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (1)
Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (2)
Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (3)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship. (4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (5)
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. 2. SECTION
151 CJ. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
488
permanent membership in a political community. . . . The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right
to participate in government principally through the right to vote,
the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievance.152
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of
which one is part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with
the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits
and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these
benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the
citizen’s birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the historical
development of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish
colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as “Spanish
subjects.”156Church records show that native inhabitants were
referred to as “indios.” The alternative identification of native
inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial
master’s regard for native inhabitants as inferior.157 Natives were,
thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within
Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered
Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine
Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was
to be governed by special laws.158 It
_______________
152 Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, 149
[Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, A Commentary (2009 ed.).
153 Id.
154 Supra note 114.
155 Id., at pp. 464-470; p. 326.
156 Id., at p. 464; p. 330.
157 Id.
158 Id., at p. 465; p. 329.
489
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 489
was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,159thus:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine

Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States of America under
the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898.
The Treaty of Paris did not automatically convert the native
inhabitants to American citizens.161 Instead, it left the
determination of the native inhabitants’ status to the Congress of
the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by
the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or
may remove therefrom . . . . In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and
to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
Thus —
_______________
159 Id.
160 Id., at pp. 465-466; p. 329, citing The Civil Code of Spain, Art. 17.
161 Id., at pp. 466-467; p. 329, citing Velayo, Ramon M., Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization,
pp. 22-23 (1965).
490
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.162
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native

inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were “issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled
to the protection of the United States.”163
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” first appeared in
legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the
Philippine Bill of 1902:164
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, 4. Section shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of
children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were
Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account
for the status of children born in the Islands to parents who were
not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common law
concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was
operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165
_______________
162 Id., at p. 466; p. 329, citing Velayo, Ramon M., id.

163 Id., at p. 467; p. 330.
164 Id., at pp. 467-468; p. 330.
165 Id.
491
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 491
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include
a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring
citizenship. This provisoread:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.166
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the

Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated
the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
amended:167
2. SectionPhilippine Citizenship and Naturalization—
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
_______________
166 Id., at p. 468; p. 331.

167 Id.
492
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of

the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was “(1) a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said
date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.”168
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode
of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made
sole reference to parentage vis-à-vis the determination of
citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. SECTION
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
_______________
168 Id., at p. 469; p. 332.
169 Id.
493
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 493
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term “natural-born citizen” first appeared in this

jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution’s provision stipulating the
qualifications for President and Vice President of the Philippines.
Article VII, Section 3 read:
No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice President, unless he be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has
been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.
3. SECTION
While it used the term “natural-born citizen,” the 1935

Constitution did not define the term.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution — read with the
then civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of
Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands — was
discriminatory towards women.170The 1973 Constitution rectified
this problematic situation:
The following are citizens of the Philippines: SECTION 1.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
citizenship, 2. SECTION
_______________
170 Id.
494
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
citizenship.171
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually

define the term “natural-born citizen.” Article III, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution provided:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. 4. SECTION172
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the

1973 Constitution on citizenship, “except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.”173
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174

_______________
171 CONST. (1973), Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2.

172 Id., Sec. 4.
173 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra note 114 at p. 470; p. 333.
174 The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the provisions are now
substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the present Constitution provides
495
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 495
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution’s
previous definition of natural-born citizens, as follows:
Natural-born citizens are those who are 2. Sec. citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of “natural-born” citizenship is a “foreign”

concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the
1935 Constitution’s eligibility requirements for President and Vice
President of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept
originated, the term “natural-born citizen” appears in only a single
instance: as an eligibility requirement for the presidency.175 It is not
defined in that Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and
rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the presidency are not
even found in the records of consti-
_______________
clarity for “natural-born” status. For comparison, the 1935 provisions state:
The following are citizens of the Philippines. 1. SECTION
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (1)
Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (2)
Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (3)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship. (4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (5)
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. 2. SECTION
175 See Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md.
L. Rev. 1, 5 (1968).
496
tutional deliberations.176 However, it has been suggested that, as
the United States was under British colonial rule before its
independence, the requirement of being natural-born was
introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the
administration of national government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a
letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25,
1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong

check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national
Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American
army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural-born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served
valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay.
Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded
to rumors that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
monarch.177
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli,

not jus sanguinis.
V.C
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:

natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one
who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without
_______________
176 Id., at pp. 3-4.

177 Id., at p. 5.
497
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 497
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one
who is not natural-born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition by dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from
the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino.179
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light

on the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion
in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are “former aliens or
foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had
to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in
order to become Filipino citizens.”180
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization
is generally required to file a verified petition.181 He or
_______________
178 409 Phil. 633; 357 SCRA 545 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
179 Id., at p. 651; pp. 557-558.
180 Id., at p. 656; pp. 552-554.
181 See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), Sec. 5 provides:
5. SECTIONPetition for Citizenship.—(1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine, citizenship
under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6
hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by
him/her, with the latter’s passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and
setting forth the following:
....
498
she must establish among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of
good moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino
culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the
Philippines for a significant period of time.182
_______________
Com. Act No. 473, Sec. 7 provides:

7. SECTIONPetition for Citizenship.—Any person desiring to acquire
Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in
triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his
name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if
the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and
of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines,
the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the
ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required
by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for
naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the
requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously
in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of
his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least
two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in then opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in
any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also
set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate
of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.
182 See Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), Sec. 3 provides:
3. SECTIONQualifications.—Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the
following qualifications:
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VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 499
_______________
The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since
birth; (a)
The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
filing of his/her petition; (b)
The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence
in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as
well as with the community in (c) which he/she is living;
The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education
in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality:
(d) Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she
must have enrolled them in similar schools;
The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support
and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family:
(e) Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are
disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and (f)
The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people. (g)
Comm. Act No. 473, Sec. 2 provides:
2. SECTIONQualifications.—Subject to section four of this Act, any person
having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition;
500
Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a
threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos’ core beliefs. 183
_______________
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of

not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living;
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal Philippine languages;
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
183 Rep. Act No. 9139 (2000), Sec. 4 provides:
4. SECTIONDisqualifications.—The following are not qualified to be
naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:
Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; (a)
Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas; (b)
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (c)
Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (d)
Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (e)
501
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 501
V.D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an

enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines “natural-born
citizens.” This constitutional definition is further clarified in
_______________
Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos; (f)
Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war; and (g)
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. (h)
Com. Act No. 473 (1939), Sec. 4 provides:
4. SECTIONWho are Disqualified.—The following cannot be naturalized
as Philippine citizens:
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; (a)
Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (b)
Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (c)
Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (d)
Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(e)
Persons who, during the period of their residence in t (f)he Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war; (g)
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof. (h)
502
jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship from
naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code,
this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the
interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous intent.
Therefore, petitioner’s restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the
need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective
and myopic. It divines Section 1’s mere enumeration but blatantly
turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section’s unequivocal
definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and
Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether
private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into
whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view
of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent
the naturalization process to become a Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent
went through the actual naturalization process. There is no more
straightforward and more effective way to terminate this inquiry
than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential
approach to foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act
No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies are
misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear,
specific, and narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on
foundlings benefits children, individuals whose capacity to act is
restricted.184 It is a glaring mis-
_______________
184 The Civil Code states:

Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is 37. Article
503
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 503
take to liken them to an adult filing before the relevant authorities
a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is
contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself
adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is
premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges
natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different
premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-à-
vis natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual
process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating to citizenship.
Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled
diminution of the status of citizens.
V.E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human

thoroughbred.
_______________
lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements. 38. Article
The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion. 39. Article
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law.
503
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 503
Section 2 defines “natural-born citizens.” Section 1(2) stipulates
that to be a citizen, either one’s father or one’s mother must be a
Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics,
pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one’s parents to be natural-born
Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to conform to
traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically
Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree:
parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one’s ancestry is
irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of
Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a
proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both
of one’s parents is a Filipino citizen.
V.F
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in

these proceedings attests to how at least one — if not both — of her
biological parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent’s biological parentage is now
practically impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a
newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By
now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-
minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the
circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification of
individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is
improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
505
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 505
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for
private respondent to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through
circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference
or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken
either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a
necessary or probable consequence.186
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence:

Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in
issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of
cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for

instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
justify a conviction in criminal proceedings:
4 Section .Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
There is more than one circumstances; (a)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (b)
_______________
185 571 Phil. 170; 547 SCRA 462 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
186 Id., at pp. 189-190; p. 479, citing Lack County v. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74, p. 212; State v. Avery,
113 Mo. 475, 494, 21 S.W. 193; and Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4, p. 8.
187 374 Phil. 810; 316 SCRA 457 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
188 Id., at p. 822; p. 468.
506
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (c)
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of

circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings,
this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial
evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for
making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid
means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to
sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life,
liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof
that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard,
so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof
in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In
_______________
189 See Lua v. O’Brien, 55 Phil. 53 (1930) [Per J. Street, En Banc]; Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals,
172 Phil. 283; 82 SCRA 294 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division]; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398; 438
SCRA 80 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; and Heirs of Amado Celestial v. Heirs of Editha G.
Celestial, 455 Phil. 704; 408 SCRA 291 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
190 Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc]. Also,
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
5. SectionSubstantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
191 Rollo, p. 8.
507
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 507
1968, Iloilo, as did most — if not all — Philippine provinces, had a
predominantly Filipino population.192Private respondent is
described as having “brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face.”193 She stands
at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an
inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with
how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and
Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a
foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and
surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth
and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is
unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically
more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen
rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is
support of his statistical inference:196
Number of Foreign and Filipino Children Born in the
Philippines: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014
Year Foreign children born in the philippines Filipino children born in the philippines
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
_______________
192 See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 827-828 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id., at p. 828.
508
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
[illegible]197
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in

1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This
translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent
was born a Filipino citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of
identifying her parents after half a century, a range of substantive
proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private
respondent’s parentage.
VI
Before a discussion on how private respondent’s natural-born
status is sustained by a general assumption on foundlings arising
from a comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous
construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have just
discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private
respondent’s birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner’s
allegations that private
_______________
197 Id., at pp. 828-829.
509
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 509
respondent bore the burden of proving — through proof of her
bloodline — her natural-born status.
Petitioner’s claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private
respondent upon a mere showing that she is a foundling is a
serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential
presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in rural
areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private
respondent’s supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her
birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require proof
from private respondent borders on the absurd when there is no
dispute that the crux of the controversy — the identity of her
biological parents — is simply not known.
“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the
party making the allegations;198 that is, the party who “alleges the
affirmative of the issue.”199 Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her
favor.200 The other party then bears the “burden of going
forward”201 with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly
been established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that the
respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
_______________
198 Uytengsu III v. Baduel, 514 Phil. 1; 477 SCRA 621 (2005) [Per J.Tinga, Second Division].
199 Jison v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 138; 164 SCRA 339 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
200 Id.
201 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546; 272 SCRA 18 (1997) [Per J.Panganiban, En Banc].
510
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is
substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner’s to discharge.
Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of
evidence shifts to the respondent.
Private respondent’s admitted status as a foundling does not
establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does
establish that the identities of private respondent’s biological
parents are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither
her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of
doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing
a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private
respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent’s being a foundling,
petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that we
have previously established as substantive evidence of private
respondent’s parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a
newborn;
(3) She was found sometime in September 1968;
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was
registered as a foundling;
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent’s physical features are consistent with
those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner’s refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an

imperceptive bias. As against petitioner’s suggested con-
_______________
202 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
511
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 511
clusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at
least one of private respondent’s parents is a Filipino.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino

citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV,
Section 2’s definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)’s
reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption
that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least
either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-
born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with
Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show
that both — not just one — of a foundling’s biological parents are
not Filipino citizens.
VII.A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro’s Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015
Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in
favor of natural-born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this
case.203 He insists that it is private respondent’s duty to present
incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common
sense dictates that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless,
resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly
established in jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions.
Ruling on the allegations that former presidential candidate
Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.)
was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from
the presumptions that: first, Fernando
_______________
203 Rollo, pp. 56-58.
512
Poe Jr.’s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870,
while the country was still under Spanish colonial
rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence, as
indicated in his death certificate, must have also been his place of
residence before death, which subjected him to the “en
masse Filipinization,” or sweeping investiture of Filipino
citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902.205 This Court
then noted that Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship would have extended to
his son and Fernando Poe Jr.’s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on
these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a natural-born
Filipino as he was born while the 1935 Constitution, which
conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was
in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has
_______________
204 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, supra note 114 at pp. 473-474; p. 349.
205 Id., at pp. 473-474 and 488; p. 349.
513
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 513
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.206
It is true that there is jurisprudence — Paa v. Chan207and Go, Sr.

v. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa) — to the effect that
presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in
favor of theclaimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this

Court’s more recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that “no
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship.” This reference to “the claimant” was preceded by a
sentence specifically referencing the duty of “the respondent.” The
syntax of this Court’s pronouncement —using the definitive article
“the” — reveals that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to
his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
language. Instead of the definite article “the,” it could have used
the indefinite article “a” in that same sentence: “no presumption
can be indulged in favor of aclaimant of Philippine citizenship.” In
the alternative, it could have used other words that would show
absolute or sweeping application, for instance: “no pre-
_______________
206 Id., at pp. 487-488; p. 349.

207 128 Phil. 815; 21 SCRA 753 (1967) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
208 614 Phil. 451, 479; 598 SCRA 266, 297 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
209 Paa v. Chan, supra at p. 825; p. 762
514
sumption can be indulged in favor of any/every claimant of
Philippine citizenship”; or, “no presumption can be indulged in
favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship.”
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of
this case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents
for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that
respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an
alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish
foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In
contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or
circumstantial, of private respondent’s or of both of her parents’
foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to
make it appear that the same pronouncement was generally
applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in
favor of the state.210 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa’s essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial

translation. In any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in
Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this
Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go’s factual and even procedural
backdrops are different from those of this case. Go involved the
deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an
election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates
unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of his
siblings were adduced.
_______________
210 Go, Sr. v. Ramos, supra note 208 at p. 479; p. 297.
515
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 515
VII.B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are

born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and
are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise)
arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to
“effectuate [its] whole purpose.”211
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2

with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on
citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in
light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of
children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access
to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights.
They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices.
Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative enactments,
executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution require the state to enhance children’s well-being and
to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may
undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate includes
preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling
mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the
legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
_______________
211 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 138 at p. 162; p. 330.
516
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and 13.
SECTION shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
....
ARTICLE XV
The Family
....
The State shall defend: 3. SECTION
....
(2)The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,

and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born

citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the
following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:
(1) President;212
(2) Vice President;213
(3) Senator;214
_______________
212 CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 2 provides:

VII. ARTICLEExecutive Department
....
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election. 2. SECTION
213 CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 3.
214 CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 3 provides:
VI. ARTICLEThe Legislative Department
517
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 517
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;215
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court;216
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission;217
_______________
....
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. 3.
SECTION
215 CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 6 provides:
VI. ARTICLEThe Legislative Department
....
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election. 6. SECTION
216 CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1) provides:
VIII. ARTICLEJudicial Department
....
No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must
have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines. (1) 7. SECTION
217 CONST., Art. IX-B, Sec. 1(1) provides:
IX. ARTICLEConstitutional Commissions
....
The Civil Service Commission B.
The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty- (1) 1. SECTION
518
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections;218
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit;219
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
_______________
five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
218 CONST., Art. IX-C, Sec. 1(1) provides:
....
The Commission on Elections C.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. 1. SECTION
219 CONST., Art. IX-D, Sec. 1(1) provides:
....
Commission on Audit D.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of men-appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall
all Members of the Commission belong to the same profession. 1. SECTION
220 CONST., Art. XI, Sec. 8 provides:
XI. ARTICLEAccountability of Public Officers
....
519
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 519
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral
ngPilipinas;221 and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights.222
_______________
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the

Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of
recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar,
and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a
judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. 8. SECTION
221 CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 20 provides:
XII. ARTICLENational Economy and Patrimony
....
The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the
members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of
known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come
from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications
and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide
policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers
as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and
other institutions performing similar functions. 20. SECTION
222 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 17(2) provides:
XIII. ARTICLESocial Justice and Human Rights
....
Human Rights
SECTION 17. . . .
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who
must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall
be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law. (2)
520
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-
born citizens include, among others, city fiscals,223assistant city
fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of
the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. Certain professions
225
are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are other legally

established benefits and incentives.227
_______________
223 Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963), Sec. 1. Section thirty-eight of Republic Act
Numbered Four hundred nine, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eighteen
hundred sixty and Republic Act Numbered Three thousand ten, is further amended
to read as follows:
38. Sec.The City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscals.—There shall be in the
Office of the City Fiscal one chief to be known as the City Fiscal with the
rank, salary and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, an
assistant chief to be known as the first assistant city fiscal, three second
assistant city fiscals who shall be the chiefs of divisions, and fifty-seven
assistant fiscals, who shall discharge their duties under the general
supervision of the Secretary of Justice. To be eligible for appointment as City
Fiscal one must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have
practiced law in the Philippines for a period of not less than ten years or held
during a like period of an office in the Philippine Government requiring
admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. To be eligible
for appointment as assistant fiscal one must be a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and must have practiced law for at least five years prior to his
appointment or held during a like period an office in the Philippine
Government requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable
requisite. (Emphasis supplied)
224 Rep. Act No. 3537 (1963).
225 Examples of these are: the Land Transportation Office Commissioner, the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director, the Executive Director of Bicol River
Basin, the Board Member of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and the National
Youth Commissioner, among others.
226 Examples of these are pharmacists and officers of the Philippine Coast
Guard, among others.
227 Among these incentives are state scholarships in science and certain
investment rights.
521
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 521
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens
is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our
foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country
in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to
excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their
aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the
Constitution, not least of all through the present politically
charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to
exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of
citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of
their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and
equal access to opportunities for public service:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
The State shall 26. SECTION guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
....
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the 1. SECTION equal protection of the laws.
....
522
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that 1.
SECTION protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons
under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.’ It is a guarantee against ‘undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of
inequality.’”228
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no
substantial distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children
with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full
extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their birth.
Foundlings’ misfortune in failing to identify the parents who
abandoned them — an inability arising from no fault of their own
— cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to
statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are
not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as
those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not
only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from
the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of
desolation and deprivation.
_______________
228 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA
22, 57 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
229 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, First Division].
523
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 523
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional
organ, mandated to effect the Constitution’s dictum of defending
and promoting the well-being and development of children. It is not
our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances
of birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines,
foundlings are human persons whose dignity we value and rights
we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees 11. SECTION full
respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII.C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within

the confines of constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings
are natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial
evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling’s parents
is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of
Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as
well as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration,
Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that
foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted
mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect
children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put this
mandate into effect.
524
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, provides:
2. SEC.Declaration of State Policy.—The following State policies shall be observed at
all times:
....
The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that
will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,
especially those to which the Philippines is a party (b). Proceedings before
any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner
which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely. The
participation of children in the program and policy formulation and implementation
related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government
agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the “best
interest of the child” as the “totality of the circumstances and
conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and
feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child’s
physical, psychological and emotional development.”
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This specifically
requires the states-parties’ protection of: first, children’s rights to
immediate registration and nationality after birth; second, against
statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of their
birth status.231Pertinent portions of the Convention read:
_______________
230 Ratified on August 21, 1990.

231 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child (visited March 7,
2016).
525
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 525
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the
human person, and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
....
Have agreed as follows:
....
Article 2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any
kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
526
2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of
the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal
guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as
is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties
of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for
him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative
measures.
....
Article 7
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birthand shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance

with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with the Conven-
_______________
232 Ratified on October 23, 1986.
527
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 527
tion on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be
allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
nationality. It similarly defends them against discrimination:
24. . . . Article
1.Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures
of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State.
Every child shall be 2. registered immediately after birthand shall have a name.
Every child has the 3. right to acquire a nationality.
....
26. ArticleAll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any groundsuch as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are “international agreement[s] concluded between

states in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation.”233 Under
Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require
concurrence by the Senate before they became binding:
_______________
233 See Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657-660; 342 SCRA 449,
488-489 (2000) [Per J. Buena, En Banc], citing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties.
528
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. 21. SECTION
The Senate’s ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and

binding by transformation. It then has the force and effect of a
statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a
processprescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be
applied to domestic conflicts.235(Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action,
legislative or otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of
government — including the judiciary — is duty-bound to abide by
the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings
cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
_______________
234 561 Phil. 386; 535 SCRA 265 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
235 Id., at pp. 397-398; p. 289.
529
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 529
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To
deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render
them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and
undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being
of children and protecting them from discrimination. Other
legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings
as Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino
Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism
to “provide alternative protection and assistance through foster
care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
abandoned.”236
Foundlings are explicitly among the “Filipino children” covered
by Republic Act No. 8552:237
_______________
236 Rep. Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 2(b) provides:

In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide
alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is
neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. 2(b). Section
237 See also Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), AN ACT REQUIRING THE CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A “CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION” AS
A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR
530
5. SECTIONLocation of Unknown Parent(s).—It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody
of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological
parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a
foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings
where he/she shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as

the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act
No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among “Filipino
children” who may be adopted:
8. SECTIONWho May Be Adopted.—Only a legally free child may be the
subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be
considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted: to
the Board:
_______________
THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISION OF REP. ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRES. DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Rep. Act No. 9523 (2009), Sec. 2 provides:
2. SECTIONDefinition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency
charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole
authority to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for
adoption. (1)
....
Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at
least three (3) continuous months, which includes a foundling. (3)
531
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 531
a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented

in lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement
for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their
adoption by foreigners:
If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the Court
Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as
issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be
required. In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the
following, shall be required: 5. SECTION
a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death
Certificate of the child’s parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed
after the birth of the child.
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.238(Emphasis supplied)

Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings’
Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from
this without having to do any act to perfect their
_______________
238 DFA Order No. 11-97, Implementing Rules and Regulations for Rep. Act No. 8239 (1997),
Philippine Passport Act.
532
citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization
process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of
executive organs have recognized her natural-born status. This
status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until
circumstances made it appear that she was a viable candidate for
President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings
in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent’s
natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through
various official public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and
benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18,
2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of
Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the
Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an office that
requires natural-born citizenship.239
_______________
239 Pres. Decree No. 1986, Sec. 2 provides:

2. SectionComposition; qualifications; benefits.—The BOARD shall be
composed of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and thirty (30) members, who shall all
be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman, the Vice
Chairman, and the members of the BOARD, shall hold office for a term of one (1)
year, unless sooner removed by the President for any cause; Provided, That they
shall be eligible for reappointment after the expiration of their term. If the
Chairman, or the Vice Chairman or any member of the BOARD fails to complete his
term, any person appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the BOARD member whom he succeeds.
No person shall be appointed to the BOARD, unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, not less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and of good moral
character and standing in the community; Provided, That in the selection of the
members of the BOARD due consideration shall be given to such qualifications as
would produce a multi-sectoral combination of expertise in the various areas of
motion picture and television; Provided, further, That at least five (5) members of
the BOARD shall be members of the Phil-
533
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 533
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent’s being a foundling is not

a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner’s proposition as to her
inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private
respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, reacquired natural-
born Filipino citizenship when, following her naturalization as a
citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites of
Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII.A
“Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner

provided by law.”240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect
when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on
October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign
country.” Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship
when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July
7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3)
days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241
_______________
ippine Bar. Provided, finally, That at least fifteen (15) members of the BOARD may
come from the movie and television industry to be nominated by legitimate
associations representing the various sectors of said industry.
The Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the other members of the BOARD shall
be entitled to transportation, representation and other allowances which shall in no
case exceed FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) per month.
240 CONST, Art. IV, Sec. 3.
241 Rollo, pp. 685-686.
534
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No.
63242 and Republic Act No. 8171243 specifically “to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries.”244
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is
designed, in its own words, to ensure “that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship.”245 This Court shed light on this
in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:246 “[w]hat Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens
who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.”247
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos’ status
permanent and immutable despite naturalization as citizens of
other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
provides:
3. SEC.Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
_______________
242 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED.
243 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
244 See Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS)
Member v. Datumanong, 551 Phil. 110, 117-118; 523 SCRA 108, 116 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc]
in which this Court stated that this was the clear intent of the legislature when it enacted Republic Act
No. 9225.
245 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 2.
246 Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS)
Member v. Datumanong, supra.
247 Id., at p. 118; p. 116.
535
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 535
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
“I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and

defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 3’s implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine

citizens who, after Republic Act No. 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this
status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and
other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated
in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of
another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225
“reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may exercise
attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a
policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration
that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was
never lost at all.
536
VIII.B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or

reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the
enjoyment of civil and political rights, “subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities.”248 However, other conditions must
be met for the exercise of other faculties:
5. Sec.Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as “the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
_______________
248 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 5.

537
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 537
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the

armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized

elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must comply
with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects
the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.250
_______________
249 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 3, par. 2:

3. SectionRetention of Philippine Citizenship.—. . .
....
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
250 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 5 provides:
5. SectionCivil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all at-
538
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws.
This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to
allow for voting in elections.252
Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.”253 This, along with satisfying the other
_______________
tendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines

and the following conditions:
....
251 CONST., Art. V, Sec. 1 provides:
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage. 1. Section
252 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 5(1) provides:
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and
other existing laws. (1)
253 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 5(2) provides:
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
....
Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by (2)
539
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 539
qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible
for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on
Elections,254 this required sworn renunciation is intended to
complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
“[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law.”255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly
bars those who seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who
are serving in the armed forces of other countries from being
appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
VIII.C
Private respondent has complied with all of these

requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.256 Second, on August
31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia,
San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the
country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation
_______________
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
254 Supra note 146.
255 Id., at p. 428; p. 288.
256 Rollo, p. 10.
257 Id., at p. 687.
540
of American Citizenship.258 This was complemented by her
execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the United States259 before Vice Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on
July 12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason
Galian’s issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on
December 9, 2011261and the approval of this certificate by the
Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3,
2012.262
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired
natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the
other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as
stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII.D
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had

to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a
naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is
wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225
signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to
erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born
citizenship. The prefix “re” signifies reference to the preceding
state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that one
_______________
258 Id.
259 Id., at p. 229.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
541
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 541
returns. “Re”-acquiring can only mean a reversion to “the way
things were.” Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a
word such as “reacquire.” Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does
not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship commences
only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation,
ruled that repatriation involves the restoration of former status or
the recovery of one’s original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.263(Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63

was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s
policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.”264 In Bengson’s words, the once naturalized citizen is
“restored” or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There
may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as,
in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the
restoration of natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact.
Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the
point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is
recognized, de
_______________
263 Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 178 at p. 649; p. 556.
264 Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 2.
542
jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening
fact may have consequences de facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not
limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance
with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the
enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is
markedly different from naturalization as there is no singular,
extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must
comply.
IX
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is

stateless265 is not only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It
is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual,
and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By
the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility
of those gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their
very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution
that can never be truly remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we
an never tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an
even greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The
Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by
mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be
deployed against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law.
It does command us to consider legal text, but always with justice
in mind.
_______________
265 Rollo, p. 35.
543
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 543
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the
Constitution that we must always sustain. Not only will this
manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us,
as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of
its constitutional competence when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of
the Republic. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, there is no basis
for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-
born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin,
Perez and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Brion, JJ., No part.
Del Castillo, J., Not natural-born until proven otherwise.
Mendoza, J., With some reservation.
Reyes, J., Dissenting.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., In result.
544
DISSENTING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
I dissent.
I respectfully submit that the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (respondent) was a
natural-born citizen and, thus, qualified to hold office as Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines.1
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.2 In this relation, “grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”3
The advent of the 1935 Constitution established the principle
of jus sanguinis as basis for acquiring Philippine
citizenship.4 Following this principle, citizenship is conferred by
virtue of blood relationship to a Filipino parent.5
_______________
1 See Section 3, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

2 Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774
SCRA 431, citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482; 652 SCRA 341, 348 (2011).
3 Id., citing Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 558; 693 SCRA
574, 599-600 (2013).
4 Valles v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 327, 336; 337 SCRA 543, 551 (2000).
5 Id.
545
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 545
It was admitted that respondent was a foundling with unknown
facts of birth and parentage. On its face, Section 1, Article IV of the
1935 Constitution — the applicable law to respondent’s case — did
not include foundlings in the enumeration of those who are
considered Filipino citizens. It reads:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
This case was originally a quo warranto proceeding before the

SET.6 The initial burden, thus, fell upon petitioner Rizalito Y.
David to show that respondent lacked the qualifications of a
Senator. However, upon respondent’s voluntary admission that she
was a foundling, the burden of evidence was shifted to her. In his
Dissenting Opinion before the SET, Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion pertinently explains:
[I]n quo warranto, the petitioner who challenges the respondent’s
qualification to office carries the burden of proving, by preponderance of
evidence, the facts constituting the disqualification. Upon such proof, the
burden
_______________
6 Docketed as SET Case No. 001-15.

546
shifts to the respondent who must now present opposing evidence constituting his or her
defense or establishing his or her affirmative defense.
xxxx
In the present case, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent is a foundling. He
posits that, as a foundling has no known parents from whom to trace the origins of her
citizenship, the respondent is not a Filipino citizen and is, therefore, not eligible for the
position of senator.
Significantly, the respondent admitted her status as a foundling, thus, lifting the
petitioner’s burden of proving his claim that she is a foundling. With the admission, the fact
necessary to establish the petitioner’s claim is considered established.7
In this case, respondent failed to present competent and

sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent
which is necessary to determine natural-born citizenship pursuant
to the jus sanguinis principle. This notwithstanding,
the ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are
substantial evidence justifying the inference that respondent’s
biological parents are Filipino:8
(a )Circumstances of abandonment: Respondent was found
as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on
September 3, 1968. In 1968, Iloilo, as did most if not all other
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. In
1968, there was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
(b )Physical features: She is described as having “brown
almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an
oval-shaped face.” She stands at only 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
_______________
7 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brion in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET Case No. 001-15,
November 17, 2015, pp. 12-13.
8 See ponencia, pp. 506-508.
547
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 547
(c )Statistical inference: in the related case of Poe-
Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,9 former Solicitor General
Florin T. Hilbay underscored how it was statistically more
probable that respondent was born a Filipino citizen, submitting
that out of 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, over
1,595 or 0.18% were foreigners. This translates to, roughly, a
99.8% probability that respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
However, the foregoing “circumstantial evidence” do not
adequately prove the determination sought to be established: that
is, whether or not respondent can trace her parentage to a Filipino
citizen. These circumstances can be easily debunked by contrary
but likewise rationally-sounding suppositions. Case law holds that
“[m]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must
be strictly complied with.”10 The proof to hurdle a substantial
challenge against a candidate’s qualifications must therefore be
solid. This Court cannot make a definitive pronouncement on a
candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming possibility that
he/she is not Filipino. The circumstances surrounding respondent’s
abandonment (both as to the milieu of time and place), as well as
her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By
parity of reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a
Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement
of her foundling status, while her physical features only tend to
prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it
remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the
statistics cited — assuming the same to be true — do not account
for all births but only of those recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain
how “encompassing” was the Philippine’s civil registration system
at that time — in 1968 — to be able to conclude that those
statistics logi-
_______________
9 See G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-221700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1.
10 See Arnado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015, 767 SCRA 168.
548
cally reflect a credible and representative sample size. And even
assuming it to be so, 1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering
it factually possible that respondent belonged to this class.
Ultimately, the opposition against respondent’s natural-born
citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact that her parents
are unknown directly puts into question her Filipino citizenship
because she has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from which
she could have traced her Filipino citizenship.
Absent satisfactory proof establishing any blood relation to a
Filipino parent, and without any mention in the 1935 Constitution
that foundlings are considered or even presumed to be Filipino
citizens at birth, it is my view that, under the auspices of the 1935
Constitution, respondent could not be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. As worded, the provisions of Section 1, Article IV
of the 1935 Constitution are clear, direct, and unambiguous. This
Court should therefore apply the statutory construction principles
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and verba legis non est
recedendum. Consequently, it would be unnecessary to resort to
the constitutional deliberations or to examine the underlying
intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. In Civil Liberties
Union v. The Executive Secretary,11 this Court remarked that:
Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it [is] safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face.”12
_______________
11 272 Phil. 147; 194 SCRA 317 (1991).

12 Id., at pp. 169-170; p. 337.
549
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 549
In fact, it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it
was adopted in its final form, never carried over any proposed
provision on foundlings being considered or presumed to
be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of
the framers’ prevailing intent.13 The ponencia’s theorized
“harmonization”14 of the constitutional provisions on citizenship
with the provisions on the promotion of children’s well-
being,15 equal protection,16 public service,17and even human dignity
and human rights18 appears to be a tailor-fitted advocacy for
allowing
_______________
13 Id., at p. 157; p. 329.

14 Ponencia, pp. 515-516.
15 Section 13, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. 13.
Section
Section 3, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution also provides:
The State shall defend: 3. Section
xxxx
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; (3)
xxxx
16 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 1. Section
17 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. 26. Section
18 Section 1, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all 1. Section
550
foundlings to run for key national posts that, quite frankly,
stretches the import of these distinct provisions to the separate
and unique matter of citizenship. There seems to be an evident
logical problem with the argument that since the Constitution
protects its children, and respects human rights and equality to
run for office, then ergo, foundlings should be presumed to be
natural-born. It appears that this approach aims to collate all
possibly related constitutional text, albeit far-flung, just to divine a
presumption when unfortunately, there is none.
Moreover, as Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice
Carpio) aptly pointed out in his Dissenting Opinion before the SET,
it would be insensible to suppose that the framers of the 1935
Constitution intended that foundlings be considered as natural-
born citizens:
[N]one of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born in relation
to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those whose
fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born citizens. Those who were born
of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine citizenship,
preventing them from being natural-born citizens. If, as respondent would like us to
believe, the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens,
this would create an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be
placed in a better position than child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino
citizen. The
_______________
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
xxxx
Section 11, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
11. Section
551
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 551
framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such absurdity.19
While the predicament of foundlings of having their parents

unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task
of proving their Filipino parentage, the current state of the law
which requires evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent to
establish natural-born citizenship under the jus
sanguinis principle must be respected at all costs. This is not to say
that the position of foundlings in relation to their endeavors for
high public offices has been overlooked in this discourse. Rather,
the correction of this seeming “misfortune” — as
the ponencia would suppose20 — lies in legislative revision, not
judicial supplication. For surely, it is not for this Court to step in
and supply additional meaning when clarity is evoked in the
citizenship provisions of the Constitution.
For another, I would also like to express my reservations on
the ponencia’s reliance on Tecson v. Commission on
Elections21 (Tecson) wherein this Court resolved that respondent’s
adoptive father, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, more popularly known as
Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ), was qualified to run for the presidential
post during the 2004 National Elections which, according to
the ponencia,22 was based on the basis of “presumptions” that
proved his status as a natural-born citizen. In that case, the
identity of FPJ’s parents, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, was
never questioned. More importantly, there was direct documentary
evidence to trace Allan F. Poe’s parentage to Lorenzo Pou, whose
death certificate identified him to be a Filipino. Thus, by that
direct proof alone, there was a substantial trace of Allan F. Poe’s
parentage to a Filipino (Lorenzo Pou), which in turn, allowed the
substantial tracing
_______________
19 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET Case No. 001-15,
November 17, 2015, pp. 28-29.
21 468 Phil. 421; 424 SCRA 277 (2004).
552
of FPJ’s parentage to a Filipino (Allan F. Poe). As such, FPJ was
declared qualified to run for the presidential post in 2004. The
Court further explained that while the birth certificate of FPJ’s
grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was not presented, it could be assumed
that the latter was born in 1870 while the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. This inference was drawn from the fact that
Lorezo Pou died at the age of 84 years old in 1954. Thus, absent
any evidence to the contrary, and against petitioner therein’s bare
allegation, Lorenzo Pou was deemed to be a resident of the
Philippines and hence, a Filipino citizen by operation of the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902,23 on the premise that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before his death. In any event, the certified true copy of
the original death certificate of Lorenzo Pou reflecting that he was
a Filipino citizen was enough basis to trace FPJ’s Filipino natural-
born citizenship. As the Court aptly cited, according to Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, “entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
In contrast, by her admission as a foundling whose parents are
unknown, and without presenting any other evidence to show any
substantial tracing of Filipino parentage similar to FPJ, the legal
and factual nuances of respondent’s case should be treated
differently. Accordingly, Tecson provides no authoritative
jurisprudential anchorage to this case.
Finally, it bears stressing that they jus sanguinis principle of
citizenship established in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently
carried over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987 Con-
_______________
23 See Section 4 of the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, entitled “AN ACT TEMPORARILY TO PROVIDE FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.”
553
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 553
stitutions.24 Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or
generally accepted principle of international law which purportedly
evince that foundlings are accorded natural-born citizenship in the
State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be
given effect as it would contravene the Constitution. To recall,
should international law be adopted in this jurisdiction, it would
only form part of the sphere of domestic law.25 Being relegated to
the same level as domestic laws, they could not modify or alter,
much less prevail, over the express mandate of the Constitution. In
this relation, I deem it fitting to echo the point made by Associate
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, likewise in her Separate
Opinion before the SET:
Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions cited but
will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so
that the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by
naturalization. There must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired. By no means can
this citizenship be considered that of a natural-born character under the principle of jus
sanguinis in the Philippine Constitution.26
For all these reasons, I unfortunately depart from the ruling of

the majority and perforce submit that the SET committed grave
abuse of discretion in declaring respondent a natural-born citizen.
The majority ruling runs afoul of and even distorts the plain
language of the Constitution which firmly and consistently follows
the jus sanguinis principle. In the final analysis, since respondent
has not presented any compe-
_______________
24 Supra note 4 at pp. 336-337; p. 551.

25 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 397-398;
535 SCRA 265, 289 (2007).
26 See Separate Opinion of Justice De Castro in David v. Poe-Llamanzares, SET Case No. 001-15,
November 17, 2015, p. 18.
554
tent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino
parent in these proceedings, she should not be deemed to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, which, thus, renders the
instant petition meritorious. Nonetheless, it is important to point
out that respondent is not precluded from later on proving her
natural-born citizenship through such necessary evidence in the
appropriate proceeding therefor, considering that a decision
determining natural-born citizenship never becomes final.27 I reach
these conclusions solely under the peculiar auspices of this case
and through nothing but my honest and conscientious assessment
of the facts parallel to the applicable legal principles. As a
magistrate of this High Court, I am impelled to do no less than
fulfill my duty to faithfully interpret the laws and the Constitution,
bereft of any politics or controversy, or of any regard to the tides of
popularity or gleam of any personality.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) on August
29, 2003. (David vs. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526 [2015])
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided
they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. (Id.)
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO

T. SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ,
SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE
GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO
& JONATHAN DEQUINA, in their individual capacities, and as
legitimate members and officers of ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD
NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST),
petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC
and the self-styled sham ATING KOOP PARTYLIST represented
by AMPARO T. RIMAS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress.—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office
as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in
the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Same; Party-List System; A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona
fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election.—In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop,
_______________
* EN BANC.
597
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 597
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must
have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in
the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for
public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the
officer’s entire tenure.
Same; Same; An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization should become
effective only upon approval by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).—A party-list
organization owes its existence to the State and the latter’s approval must be obtained
through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC, 689 SCRA 412,
We declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a
party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State, through the
COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-list organization
and its members — the Constitution and Bylaws — such that any amendment to these
contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An
amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization should become effective only upon
approval by the COMELEC.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Equiponderance of Evidence; When the evidence in an issue of
fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly
balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue.—Accordingly, as neither
group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This
rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the
respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden
of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side
prevails. The courts are left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The
consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the complaint/petition.

598
Ma. Rosario L. Payumo, Eric C. Opriasa and Nadine Faye C.
Miralles for petitioners.
Francisco B. Sibayan and Yasser B. Lumbos for private
respondent.
SERENO,CJ.:
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve

the seemingly elementary matter of the Commission on Elections’
(COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list
representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one
hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list
organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating
Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the
Lico Group), who represents the organization in the House of
Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas
(respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in relation

to Rule 65,2 seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039
dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
_______________
1 Rule 64 of the Rules of Court deals with review of judgments and final orders
or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
2 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court relates to the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
599
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 599
The Antecedent Facts
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was

registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest
policy-making body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is
not in session.3
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
for the 10 May 2010 Elections.4On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascariña as second nominee.
_______________
3 Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution of Ating Koop and Section I, Article V

of its Amended Constitution. Rollo, pp. 384 and 1621. For the years 2010-2013, the
Central Committee and officers of Ating Koop consisted of the following:
Fr. Mario DJ Arenas as President; 1.
Atty. Proculo Sarmen as Executive Vice President; 2.
Mr. Eduardo C. Bato as Vice President for Luzon; 3.
Dra. Sylvia Flores as Vice President for Visayas; 4.
Mr. Isagani Daba as Vice President for Mindanao; 5.
Ms. Erlinda Duque as Treasurer; 6.
Mr. Reynaldo C. Golo as Auditor; 7.
Mr. Roberto C. Mascariña as Executive Director; 8.
Fr. Anton CT. Pascual as Independent Director; 9.
Mr. Aurelio Jose as Head, Political Affairs Committee; 10.
Ms. Cristina R. Salvosa as Head, Rules Committee; 11.
Ms. Emma Dela Cerna as Head, Platform and Program; 12.
Mr. Rito Fabella as Head, Finance Committee; 13.
Ms. Amparo Rimas as Head, Membership; 14.
Atty. James dela Vega as Secretary General. 15. Id., at pp. 193-194.
4 Id., at p. 1511.
600
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one
of the winning party-list groups.5 Based on the procedure provided
in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC,6Ating Koop earned a seat in
the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took
his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives,7 and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning
party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued
Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-
sharing agreement signed by its nominees.8 Under the agreement,
petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the
first year of the three-year term.9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National
Convention, during which it introduced amendments to its
Constitution and Bylaws. Among the salient changes was the
composition of the Central Committee,10 which would still be
composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming from
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation).11 The
amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of
Central Committee members within six months after the Second
National Convention.12
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the
incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central
Committee) of the Central Committee.13The Interim Central
Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
_______________
5 Id., at p. 299.
6 G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009, 595 SCRA 477.
7 Rollo, p. 300.
8 Id., at pp. 1578-1585.
9 Id., at pp. 1578-1583.
10 Id., at pp. 384 and 1621.
11 Id., at pp. 384 and 1621-1622.
12 Id., at p. 1632.
13 Id., at p. 1622.
601
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 601
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico
had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him
from Ating Koop for disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico’s refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as
factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop’s Amended Constitution and Bylaws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Interim Central Committee,16which
subsequently denied the same in a Resolution dated 29 December
2011.17
14 Id., at p. 689.
15 Id., at p. 1454; Comment, p. 7.
16 Id., at p. 689.
17 Id., at pp. 117-120.
While petitioner Lico’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending,

the Lico Group held a special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu
meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the said meeting, new members
of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of officers, were
elected.18 The election was purportedly held for the purpose of
implementing the 5-5-5 equal representation amendment made
during the Second National Convention.19
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 1549-1558.

19 Id., at p. 1556; the following were the new members of the Central
Committee:
Amelito L. Revuelta Luzon 1.
Tirso C. Buenaventura Luzon 2.
Rafael A. Puentespina Visayas 3.
William C. Ybanez Visayas 4.
Rodolfo E. Perez Visayas 5.
Hipolito R. Quillan Visayas 6.
Jonathan B. Dequina Visayas 7.
Lydia B. Tubella Mindanao 8.
Atty. Proculo T. Sarmen Mindanao 9.
Silverio J. Sanchez Mindanao 10.
602
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National

Convention in Parañaque City20 (the Parañaque convention), at
which a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted.21 Members of the Rimas Group won the election and
occupied all the corresponding seats.
Proceedings Before the COMELEC

Second Division
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent

Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition against petitioner
Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039.22 The said Petition, which was
subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that petitioner
Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee,
Roberto Mascariña as Ating Koop’s representative in the House.
The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC on 14 May 2012, this time impleading not only
petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group. The Amended Petition
also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election conducted at
the Cebu meeting and recognize the Parañaque convention.
In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group
alleged that Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts
inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and
corruption, and that he had “boldly displayed his recalcitrance to
honor party commitment to be upright and consistently honest,
thus violating basic principles of the Ating Koop.23 The Amended
Petition stated further
_______________
Reynold S. Alejo Mindanao 11.

Francis C. Loque Mindanao 12.
20 Id., at p. 155.
21 Id., at p. 237.
22 Id., at p. 78.
23 Id., at p. 150.
603
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 603
that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice and
quorum requirements.24
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,25 the COMELEC Second
Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop
and declared Mascariña as the duly qualified nominee of the party-
list group.26 The Second Division characterized the issue of the
validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an
intra-party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties.27
Proceedings Before the COMELEC
En Banc
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration

from the Second Division’s Resolution, which the COMELEC En
Banc denied on 31 January 2013. The dispositive portion of its
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVES, as it
hereby RESOLVED, to:
a.DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of
Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of
ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascariña as its Party Representative, for lack of
jurisdiction;
b.UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP Party-list
Group; [and]
c.UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T.
Rimas, as the legiti-
_______________
24 Id., at p. 154.
25 Id., at pp. 687-696.
26 Id., at p. 696.
27 Id., at p. 692.
604
mate Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on Elections, to the
exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A. Puentespina,
Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C. Ybanez, Silverio J.
Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan,
Rodolfo E. Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C.
Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella, and Jonathan Dequina.28
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that

it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of
Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop
affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it
was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that
had jurisdiction over the Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of
petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when
the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the
said Committee’s members remained in holdover capacity even
after their terms had expired;29 and that the COMELEC was not in
a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with
respect to the cause of the expulsion.30
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as
the legitimate representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it
found nothing in the records to show that the Lico Group made a
valid call for the special election of Central Committee members as
required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws;31 2) there
is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended
the Cebu meeting;32 and 3)
_______________
28 Id., at p. 726.
29 Id., at p. 725; Resolution dated 31 January 2013, p. 4.
30 Id., at p. 726; id., at p. 5.
31 Id., at p. 725.
32 Id., at pp. 725-726; Resolution dated 31 January 2013, pp. 4-5.
605
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 605
the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop’s
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us,
praying for a review of the COMELEC Resolutions.
The Court’s Ruling
On the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over

the expulsion of a Member of the
House of Representatives from his
party-list organization
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the

Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives
for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule
upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop — a matter
beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion
of petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the
succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the
question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifi-
_______________
33 Id., at p. 726.
34 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be
the 17. SECTION sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the
606
cations of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner
Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC,
that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of
the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the
HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These
findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list
nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to
be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the
expulsion, by relying on the rule that it can decide intra-party
matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted powers and
functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when
the resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or
incidental to the performance of the constitutionally-granted
functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and exercise
jurisdiction over the intra-party matter.36 The Lokin case, however,
involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the
present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of
Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the
matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
_______________
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
35 Infra note 41.
36 G.R. No. 193808, 26 June 2012, 674 SCRA 538.
607
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 607
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the
HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence
on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the
HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide
the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.37
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s expulsion
from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion
from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others,
a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election.38 Needless to say, bona
fide membership in the party-list group is
a continuingqualification. We have ruled that qualifications for
public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements.
They must be possessed not only at
_______________
37 Javier v. COMELEC, Nos. L-68379-81, 22 September 1986, 144 SCRA 194.

38 The requirement is found under Section 9 of the Party-List Law, which reads as follows:
9. Sec.Qualification of Party-list Nominees.—No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
608
the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but
during the officer’s entire tenure.39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the
issue of HRET jurisdiction over the requirements for bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v.
HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to the
marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should
represent; as such, they could not be properly considered bona
fide members of their respective party-list organizations. The
Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of
the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it
comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.41
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue
on the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop is
integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in Congress. This is
not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by
a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC should not have encroached
into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.
Distinguished from Reyes

v. COMELEC
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako

Reyes v. Commission on Elections.43 In that case, We
_______________
39 Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
40 G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 375.
41 Id., at pp. 381-385.
42 Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014, 713 SCRA 52.
43 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 708 SCRA 197.
609
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 609
upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner Reyes,
even as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the
time she filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We
rejected the argument that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET.
In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May
2013 Elections, and took her oath of office before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. However, the Court ruled on her
qualifications since she was not yet a member of the House of
Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the
term of which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when
she filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status
Quo AnteOrder dated 7 June 2013 assailing the Resolutions
ordering the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the
present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office,
and assumption of office were satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution
disqualifying petitioner on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency had become final and executory when petitioner
elevated it to this Court.44 It should be mentioned that when
petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the
COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5 June 2013, already issued a
Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013 Resolution
disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case
on the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the
question of whether petitioner Lico remains a member of the
House of Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop
is a subsisting issue.
_______________
44 The assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013 became final
and executory as early as 19 May 2013, based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The provision gives a five-day period, to be reckoned
from promulgation, within which to file a Rule 64 petition with this Court.
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. She filed it only on 10 June 2013.
610
Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the
HRET to be a non-issue, since the recourse of the petitioner to the
Court appeared to be a mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC
from implementing a final and executory judgment. We said that
the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance,
considering that she sought remedy before the Court, and yet
asserted that it is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the
case.45In this case, the question on the validity of petitioner Lico’s
expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the
jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his
qualifications as party-list representative.
On which group legitimately represents

Ating Koop
We now pass upon the question of which, between the two

contending groups, is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group’s argument that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding
groups is to be recognized, and that it is the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. Indeed,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership
within the party is well-established. This power to rule upon
questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers.46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the
legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the
amendments to the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating Koop
were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the
elections held during the Cebu meeting and
_______________
45 Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 43.

46 Supra note 48.
611
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 611
the Parañaque conference pursuant to the said amendments, were
valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that
their respective elections were conducted pursuant to the
amendment introduced in the Second National Convention held on
14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of Ating Koop’s
Bylaws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee
members within six months after the Second National
Convention.47
There is no showing, however, that the amendments were
actually filed with the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the
latter’s approval must be obtained through its agent, the
COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC,48 We declared
that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that breathes
life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that
the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal
contracts entered into by the party-list organization and its
members — the Constitution and Bylaws — such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation
requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An amendment to
the bylaws of a party-list organization should become effective only
upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of
the amended bylaws and subsequent conformity thereto of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under corporation law.
Under the Corporation Code, an amendment to a bylaw provision
must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be effective only
upon the issuance by the SEC of a
_______________
47 Rollo, p. 1632. The provision states:

A special election of the members of the Central Committee, after due notice, shall be conducted six
months after the approval of the amendments of this Constitution. 1. SECTION
48 G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 412.
612
certification that it is not inconsistent with the Corporation Code.49
There being no showing that the amendments on the
bylaws of Ating Koop were filed with and subsequently approved
by the COMELEC, any election conducted pursuant thereto may
not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither the
Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set
of officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a
special election were effective, this Court still cannot declare any of
the feuding groups as the legitimate set of officers considering that
the respective sets of evidence presented were evenly balanced.
With respect to the Lico Group’s Cebu meeting, the COMELEC
correctly found — and the records bear out — that the notices sent
were deficient and that there was no sufficient proof of quorum.
Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to be invalid. On the other
hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the
Parañaque convention suffered from the same infirmity: the
records of the said convention, consisting merely of the Minutes
thereof, likewise fail to establish due notice and a quorum.50
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to
legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This rule
provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise,
that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are
evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that
issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither
side prevails. The courts are left with no other option but to leave
them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of
the complaint/petition.51
_______________
49 Section 48, Corporation Code.

50 Rollo, pp. 1568-1576.
51 Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734; 284 SCRA 673 (1998).
613
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 613
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC,
had the burden of proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico
Group, that is the legitimate group. As the evidence of both parties
are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge its burden.
The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas
Group insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group
representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Parañaque convention
“appeared to be in conformity” with Ating Koop’s Amended
Constitution and By-Laws.52 It should be stressed that the
COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion.53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence.54But when the
COMELEC’s assessment of the evidence is so grossly unreasonable
that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to
intervene and correct the error.55
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able
to establish its legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the
COMELEC in deciding the issue of which group legitimately
represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable, which
amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied
by certiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if
neither of the two groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating
Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central
Committee, whose members remain as such in a holdover capacity.
_______________
52 Id., at p. 726; p. 682.

53 Id.
54 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
55 Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 664.
614
In Señeres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of
Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List through its President, Roger
Robles, was questioned on the ground that his term had expired at
the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the default rule
in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a
corporation holdover after the expiration of their terms until such
time as their successors are elected or appointed.57 Señeres ruled
that the holdover principle applies in the absence of a provision in
the constitution or bylaws of the party-list organization prohibiting
its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and
Bylaws of Ating Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding,
either expressly or impliedly, the application of the holdover rule.
Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the existing Interim
Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to
bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of
the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no successors
had been validly elected at the time, or since.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31
January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution
dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of
Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING
KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T.
Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central
Committee and set of officers legitimately representing Ating Koop
are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to the
split of Ating Koop.
_______________
56 603 Phil. 532; 585 SCRA 557 (2009).
57 Id., at pp. 568-570; pp. 574-575.
615
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 615
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama,
Jr., Perez and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., On
Official Leave.
Brion and Reyes, JJ., On Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
Petition granted.
Notes.—In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. (Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency [BANAT]
vs. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 210 [2009])
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.” (Id.)
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (TESDA), petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO TAN,
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., and
COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA); Jurisdiction; The
Constitution vests Commission on Audit (COA), as guardian of public
funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.—The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public
funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in
the exercise of its constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its
decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to
enforce. Only when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may
the Court grant a petition assailing COA’s actions. There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
_______________
* EN BANC.
403refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation

of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism.
Administrative Agencies; Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA); Under Section 33 of the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act is included in the annual General
Appropriations Acts (GAA); hence, the Technical Education and Skills
Development Project (TESDP) Fund, being sourced from the Treasury, are
funds belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands
of public officials.—The TESDA is an instrumentality of the government
established under Republic Act No. 7796 or the TESDA Act of 1994. Under
Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation
of the Act is included in the annual GAA; hence, the TESDP Fund, being
sourced from the Treasury, are funds belonging to the government, or any
of its departments, in the hands of public officials. The Constitution
provides, “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.” The State Audit Code, which prescribes
the guidelines in disbursing public funds, reiterates this important
Constitutional provision that there should be an appropriation law or
other statutes specifically authorizing payment out of any public funds.
Administrative Law; Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA); Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME);
Designation; The Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) officials were merely designated with additional duties, which
designation did not entitle them to additional Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses (EME).—The TESDA officials were, in fact,
merely designated with additional duties, which designation did not
entitle them to additional EME. In Dimaandal v. COA, 291 SCRA 322
(1998), we held that designation is a mere imposition of additional duties,
which does not entail payment of additional benefits. Since the TESDA
officials were merely designated with additional duties, the ruling
in Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 (1974), on de facto officers need not be
discussed.
Same; Same; Same; Applying by analogy the Blaquera,
Casal and Velasco rulings, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and
Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, the Supreme Court holds the
404approving officers of Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) liable for the excess Extraordinary and Miscellaneous
Expenses (EME) received by them.—In Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366
(1998), the Court no longer required the officials and employees of
different government departments and agencies to refund the productivity
incentive bonus they received because there was no indicia of bad faith
and the disbursement was made in the honest belief that the recipients
deserved the amounts. We, however, qualified this Blaquera ruling
in Casal v. COA, 509 SCRA 138 (2006), where we held the approving
officials liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent
disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of COA.
In Casal, we ruled that the officials’ failure to observe the issuances
amounted to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption
of good faith. We applied the Casal ruling in Velasco v. COA, 681 SCRA
102 (2012), to wit: x x x the blatant failure of the petitioners-
approving officers to abide with the provisions of AO 103 and AO
161 overcame the presumption of good faith. The deliberate
disregard of these issuances is equivalent to gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. Therefore, the petitioners-approving officers
are accountable for the refund of the subject incentives which they
received. However, with regard to the employees who had no participation
in the approval of the subject incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor
were they grossly negligent for having received the benefits under the
circumstances. The approving officers’ allowance of the said awards
certainly tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these
employees. Being in good faith, they are therefore under no obligation to
refund the subject benefits which they received. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying by analogy the Blaquera, Casal and Velasco rulings, as well as
Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts,
we hold the approving officers of TESDA liable for the excess EME
received by them.
Same; Same; Same; Gross Negligence; The Director-General’s blatant
violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004-2007 General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) and the Commission on Audit (COA) circulars
is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. He is required to
refund the Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) he received
from the Technical Education and Skills Development Project
(TESDP) Fund for himself.—Accord-
405ingly, the Director-General’s blatant violation of the clear
provisions of the Constitution, the 2004-2007 GAAs and the COA
circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for
himself. As for the TESDA officials who had no participation in the
approval of the excessive EME, they acted in good faith since they had no
hand in the approval of the unauthorized EME. They also honestly
believed that the additional EME were reimbursement for their
designation as project officers by the Director-General. Being in good faith,
they need not refund the excess EME they received.
BRION ,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Commission on Audit
(COA); View that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions changed the nature of
the remedy by providing that the Commission on Audit (COA)’s decision,
order or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.—Under
the 1935 Constitution, the decisions of the Auditor General of the General
Auditing Office — the COA’s precursor — “may be appealed to the
President whose action shall be final.” The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,
however changed the nature of the remedy by providing that the COA’s
decision, order or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari. This change of remedy narrowed down the scope and extent
of the inquiry that the Court may undertake to what is strictly the office
of certiorari as distinguished from review. A Rule 65 petition is a unique
and special rule because it commands a limited review of the question
raised. As an extraordinary remedy, its purpose is simply to keep the
public respondent within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to relieve the
petitioner from the public respondent’s arbitrary acts. In this review, the
Court is confined solely to questions of jurisdiction whenever a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In concrete terms, the questioned ruling
must stand unless there is absolutely no evidence to support the
public respondent’s finding or unless the evidence does not meet
the quantum of proof required by the rules. The commission of mere
abuse of discretion and mere errors of judgment does not warrant the issu-
406ance of a writ of certiorari to set aside or modify the questioned
ruling.
Administrative Law; View that a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as
a public trust that renders them at all times accountable to the people they
are sworn to serve.—Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution declares
that the Philippines is a democratic and republican state
where sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. A republican government is a responsible
government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust that renders them at all times accountable to the people they are
sworn to serve. This principle of accountability proceeds from the
constitutional tenet that public office is a public trust and its corollary
that the stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil
servants to serve their constituencies well.
Same; Public Officers; View that public officers are stewards who must
use government resources efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically
to avoid the wastage of public funds.—Public officers are stewards who
must use government resources efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically to avoid the wastage of public funds. The prudent and
cautious use of these funds is dictated by their nature as funds and
property held in trust by the public officers for the benefit of the
sovereign trustees — the people themselves — and for the specific public
purposes for which they are appropriated. Thus, Article VI, Section 29(1)
of the Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of any public
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit (COA); Jurisdiction;
View that the Constitution empowered the Commission on Audit (COA) to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned, held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government and its instrumentalities.—To
ensure accountability enforcement in the disbursement of public funds, the
1987 Constitution created the COA as an independent constitutional office
charged to audit government financial transactions. The Constitution
empowered the
407COA to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned, held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government and
its instrumentalities. Furthermore, our Constitution exclusively
authorized the COA to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Disbursements; View that
Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code expressly states
that the approving public officers and the recipients of illegal
disbursements must solidarily refund the disbursed amounts to the
government.—Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code
expressly states that the approving public officers and the recipients of
illegal disbursements must solidarily refund the disbursed amounts to the
government. The obligation to refund also finds support under the
principle of solutio indebiti which enunciates the rule that the obligation
to return arises if something is received when there is no right to demand
it, and when it was unduly delivered through mistake.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V
of the Administrative Code expressly provides that only persons who are
directly responsible for the illegal expenditures of public funds shall be
liable.—Interestingly, while the Civil Code provisions on solutio indebiti,
in general, and Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative
Code, in particular, impose upon public officials and employees the
solidary obligation to refund the illegal disbursements, Section 52,
Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative Code expressly provides
that only persons who are directly responsible for the illegal
expenditures of public funds shall be liable: General Liability for
Unlawful Expenditures.—Expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible
therefor.
Same; Same; Same; View that for the Commission on Audit (COA) to
hold these passive recipients liable despite the lack of evidence showing
their direct responsibility in the illegal disbursements
408(much less, the lack of evidence that they had acted in bad faith
together with the rest of the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) approving officers) is an act of grave abuse of
discretion.—I agree with the ponencia that the COA committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the TESDA employees,
who were mere passive recipients of the excess EME, to refund the
amounts they had received. For the COA to hold these passive
recipients liable despite the lack of evidence showing their direct
responsibility in the illegal disbursements (much less, the lack of
evidence that they had acted in bad faith together with the rest of
the TESDA approving officers) is an act of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the imprimatur given by the approving officers on the
excess EME even gave the disbursement a color of legality from the
perspective of these recipients. Since mere passive recipients of disallowed
amounts are generally exempted from personal liability, direct
responsibility can only possibly lie at the upper levels of an agency’s
administrative structure. These public officers are largely the approving
officials who are directly responsible for the disbursement of public funds.
Same; Same; Same; View that a finding that a public officer failed to
exercise ordinary diligence should not automatically translate into a
personal obligation to refund as the public officer, to avoid personal
liability, may still invoke the twin presumptions of regularity and good
faith in the performance of official duties.—A finding that a public officer
failed to exercise ordinary diligence should not automatically translate
into a personal obligation to refund as the public officer, to avoid personal
liability, may still invoke the twin presumptions of regularity and good
faith in the performance of official duties. These are merely
presumptions juris tantum, however, and may be rebutted by contrary
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; View that if there is a clear Commission on Audit
(COA) finding, express or implied, that the public officer acted with bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith that resulted
in the illegal disbursement of public funds, then the defense of presumption
of good faith should be deemed completely rebutted.—If there is a clear
COA finding, express or implied, that the public officer acted with
bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith
that resulted in the illegal disbursement of public funds, then the
defense of pres-
409umption of good faith should be deemed completely
rebutted. If this element of bad faith is established, then the public
officer’s mantle of immunity is removed because his act is considered to be
outside the scope of his official duties.
Same; Same; Same; View that the petitioner’s perfunctory reliance on
the presumption of good faith would not warrant the setting aside of the
Commission on Audit (COA)’s disallowance.—In resolving a petition of this
nature, the Court must proceed on the premise that the COA’s finding of
an illegal disbursement coupled with its finding of bad faith on the
part of the approving officers should give rise to their personal
obligation to refund the disallowed amounts. Since a petitioner in
a certiorari proceeding has the burden of proving the public respondent’s
grave abuse of discretion, then to the petitioner likewise falls the
burden of re-establishing his good faith that has already been
rebutted by the COA’s findings. Simply stated, the petitioner’s
perfunctory reliance on the presumption of good faith would not warrant
the setting aside of the COA’s disallowance.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code expressly provides that every official or employee
authorizing or making an illegal payment and every person receiving the
illegal payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the Government for
the full amount so paid or received.—Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code expressly provides that every official or
employee authorizing or making an illegal payment and every
person receiving the illegal payment shall be jointly and severally
liable to the Government for the full amount so paid or received. This
provision should be interpreted in relation with Section 52, Chapter IX,
Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative Code and Section 103 of PD 1445
which state that illegal expenditures of public funds shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible for
the illegal disbursements. As the ponencia itself ruled, this direct
responsibility only attaches to public officers who actively and maliciously
participated in the illegal disbursement of funds. In the present case,
the ponencia correctly found that only the approving officers (among them,
the Director Generals) are liable for the disbursement of the excess EME.
410
Same; Same; Same; View that this case sets a dangerous precedent that
the approving officers would have to receive an illegal disbursement first
before they can be made civilly liable in disallowance cases.—I fear that
the Court dangerously treads in judicial legislation by deviating from the
clear mandate of the law. This case sets a dangerous precedent that the
approving officers would have to receive an illegal disbursement first
before they can be made civilly liable in disallowance cases. This subverts
the clear provisions of the law and would render inutile the COA
disallowances in cases where the grossly negligent approving
officers do not receive any portion of the illegal disbursement and
where the payees are mere passive recipients. Under this
scenario, no public officer shall refund the government for the
unwarranted wastage of its coffers. Furthermore, this ruling ignores
the reality that the approving officers can easily evade liability by merely
ordering or colluding with others so that their receipt of the portion of the
illegal disbursement is not documented. I believe that the law does not
intend the approving officers to go scot-free for their acts or omissions that
are detrimental to the public interest. This offends the very core of the law
on public officers that public office exacts the highest standards of
accountability and service.

Imelda T. Ong for petitioner.
Winnie Rose H. Encalallado and Richard Alfred N. Palma for
respondents.
CARPIO,J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
_______________
[1] Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
411to annul Decision No. 2012-210[2] of the Commission on Audit

(COA). The COA disallowed payments of Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) by the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA) to its officials.
The Facts
Upon post audit, the TESDA audit team leader discovered that
for the calendar years 2004-2007, TESDA paid EME twice each
year to its officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund for
locally-funded projects, and (2) the Technical Education and Skills
Development Project (TESDP) Fund for the foreign-assisted
projects. The payment of EME was authorized under the General
Provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 2004,
2005,[3] 2006 and 2007 (2004-2007 GAAs), subject to certain
conditions:
x x x Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses.—Appropriations

authorized herein may be used for extraordinary expenses of the
following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
authorized by the DBM, not exceeding:
P180,000 for each Department Secretary; (a)
P65,000 for each Department Undersecretary; (b)
P35,000 for each Department Assistant Secretary; (c)
_______________
[2] Rollo, pp. 25-29. Signed by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan, Commissioner
Juanito G. Espino, Jr., and Commissioner Heidi L. Mendoza.
[3] In Republic Act No. 9336 or the 2005 GAA, there was a specific appropriation for
TESDA’s confidential, intelligence, extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P2,582,000.00 for locally-funded projects and P2,562,000.00 for the foreign-assisted
projects.
412
P30,000 for each head of bureau or organization of equal
rank to a bureau and for each Department Regional
Director; (d)
P18,000 for each Bureau Regional Director; and (e)
P13,000 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, and Shari’a Circuit
Court Judge. (f)
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000) for each of the offices under the above named
officials are authorized.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
On 15 May 2008, the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance
No. 08-002-101 (04-06)[5] disallowing the payment of EME
amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the amount
_______________
[4] Republic Act No. 9206 or the 2003 GAA (Reenacted for 2004), Section 23;
Republic Act No. 9336 or the 2005-2006 GAAs, Section 25; and Republic Act No.
9401 or the 2007 GAA, Section 26, where the amounts were increased to:
xxxx
(a) P220,000 for each Department Secretary;
(b) P90,000 for each Department Undersecretary;
(c) P50,000 for each Department Assistant Secretary;
(d) P38,000 for each head of bureau or organization of equivalent
rank, and for each head of a Department Regional Office;
(e) P22,000 for each head of a Bureau Regional Office or organization
of equivalent rank; and
(f) P16,000 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge, and Shari’a Circuit Court Judge.
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000) for each of the offices under the above named officials are herein
authorized.”
[5] Rollo, pp. 37-39.
413allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. In addition, the EME were

disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of
equivalent ranks as authorized by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), contrary to the provisions of the 2004-2007
GAAs. Notice of Disallowance No. 08-002-101 (04-06) indicated the
persons liable for the excessive payment of EME: the approving
officers, payees and the accountants.[6]
On 4 July 2008, TESDA, through its then Director-General
Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., filed an Appeal Memorandum[7] arguing
that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the General
Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not
exceeded for each fund. According to TESDA, the General Fund
and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA
officials who were designated as
_______________
[6] Id., at pp. 38-39 and 50. The following persons were determined to be liable as
payees and approving officers: Director-Generals Alcestis Guiang and Augusto
Boboy Syjuco, Jr. The other payees are: Deputy Director Generals Milagros Dawa
Hernandez, Santiago M. Yabut, Jr., Rogelio C. Peyuan, and Pastor Guiao; Executive
Directors Augusto A. Capio, Clifford Paragua, Juanito Cuerva, Valerio D.
Rola, Gaspar Gayona, Orlando Naag, Marta M. Hernandez, Edwin Gatinao, Noel
Villaflor, Ma. Susan dela Rama, Ernesto Beltran, Yerma Saulon, Maria Paz Urcia,
Agrifina F. Zafra, Washington M. Agustin, Teodoro Sanico, Elmer K. Talavera, Pilar
G. de Leon, Irene M. Isaac, Gabriel Genaro Bordado, Cecile B. Gutierrez, Marissa
Legaspi, Lourdes T. Reyes, Brenda Furagganan, Imelda B. Taganas and Antonio B.
del Rosario; Assistant Project Director Raul K. Tanchico; Assistant Executive
Director Francisco B. Jucar, Jr.; PMO Project Manager Anselmo G. Pegtuan; PMO
Project Legal Officer Atty. Marjorie Docdocil; and PMO Deputy Project Manager
Ma. Magdalena P. Butad. The accountants liable for certifying that the
disbursement vouchers were supported by the necessary documents are: Accounting
Division Chiefs Cariza A. Dacuma and Guillermina L. Aguilar.
[7]Id., at pp. 61-67.

414project officers concurrently with their regular functions were
entitled to separate EME from both funds.
The Ruling of the Commission on Audit

In a Decision dated 5 September 2008,[8] the COA Cluster
Director, Cluster VII, National Government Sector, denied the
appeal for lack of merit. The COA Cluster Director ruled that:
On the first issue, the GAA provision on EME is very clear to the effect
that payment of EME may be taken from any authorized appropriation
but shall not exceed the ceiling stated therein. It had been consistently
held that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal it should
be given its common and ordinary meaning. If the legislative intent is to
grant officials EME of unlimited amount, no limit or ceiling should have
been included in the GAA. On the other hand, the Audit Team Leader
stated that the inclusion in TESDA budget for EME in TESDP Fund,
which was actually found only in the GAA for FY 2005 could not serve as
basis for the grant of EME, should not be treated distinctly and separately
from EME provision under the General Provisions of the GAA as the
officials who were paid the EME from [TESDP Fund] are the same TESDA
officials who were already paid EME out [of the General Fund]. It should
be emphasized that the designation of TESDA officials as Project
Managers in concurrent capacities to offices under TESDP, forms part
only of their additional functions without another appointment. The EME
is covered by the compensation attached to his principal office and not for
every project handled. x x x.
On the second issue whether officials who are not of equivalent rank as
authorized by the DBM, the Audit Team Leader informed that the officials
were designated for [positions] which are not included in the Personnel
_______________
[8] Id., at pp. 42-45.
415Service Itemization (PSI) and the creation of said positions [was] not
supported with authority or approval from the DBM. Neither was there a
DBM document identifying the equivalent ranks of these positions as basis
for ascertaining the amount of EME to be paid.
On the third issue whether the Regional Directors who were not
performing as head of the Bureau or a regional office or organization unit
of equal rank, because of their reassignment to the Office of the Director[-
]General, the same were not entitled to receive EME since the Director[-
]General and its office are already claiming the said amount. There could
be no two officials entitled to receive EME although they are listed in the
GAA as entitled to receive the same.[9]
On 4 December 2008, TESDA, through its Director-General, filed

a petition for review with COA.
In a Decision dated 15 November 2012,[10] COA denied TESDA’s
petition for lack of merit. The COA adopted the findings of both the
TESDA audit team and the COA Cluster Director that the grant of
EME exceeded the allowable limit in the 2004-2007 GAAs. The
COA emphasized that the provision in the 2004-2007 GAAs that
granted EME clearly provided a ceiling for its grant. Accordingly,
the COA ruled that the failure of the TESDA officials to adhere to
the 2004-2007 GAAs negated their claim of good faith. Thus, the
COA ordered them to refund the excess EME they received.
_______________
[9] Id., at pp. 43-44.
[10] Id., at pp. 25-29. The dispositive portion of the COA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, ND No. [08-002-101 (04-06)] dated
May 15, 2008 disallowing the payment of EME to TESDA personnel for CYs 2004-
2007 amounting to P5,498,706.60 is AFFIRMED.
416
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2013,[11] the Court En
Banc resolved to excuse the Office of the Solicitor General from
representing the COA due to conflict of interest considering that
both COA and TESDA are government agencies being represented
by it.
The Issues
In this petition, TESDA seeks a reversal and raises the following
issues for resolution:
THE [COA] GRAVELY ERRED IN DISALLOWING THE PAYMENTS

MADE BY TESDA TO ITS OFFICIALS OF THEIR [EME] FROM BOTH
[GENERAL FUND] AND [TESDP FUND]; A.
THE [COA] LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE
OFFICERS OF TESDA INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR THE TOTAL
DISALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,498,706.60 EVEN IF THEY
MAY BE RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED AS B. DE FACTO OFFICERS
IN GOOD FAITH WHO ARE ENTITLED TO EME FOR ACTUAL
SERVICES RENDERED;
THE [C C.OA] LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSIDERING THE CEILING SET FORTH BY SECTIONS 23[, 25]
AND 26 OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE [2004-2007 GAAS],
THE CONCERNED TESDA OFFICIALS’ CLAIMS FOR EME ARE
UNAUTHORIZED AND EXCESSIVE;
FINALLY, THE [COA] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONCERNED TESDA OFFICIALS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS
D. DE FACTO OFFICERS IN GOOD FAITH AND IN DISREGARDING
THE RELEVANT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE
OF CA[N]TILLO VS. ARRIETA.[12]
_______________
[11] Id., at p. 82-A.
[12] Id., at p. 9.
417
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with
enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.[13] The COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional
duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition
of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.[14]
Only when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may the Court grant a petition assailing COA’s
actions. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim
and despotism.[15]
We do not find any grave abuse of discretion when COA
disallowed the disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for
_______________
[13] The 1987 Constitution, Article IX-D, Section 2 provides:
xxxx
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques
and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and
regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties. 2.
[14] Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, 29 January 2013, 689 SCRA 385; Yap v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 154; Sanchez v.
Commission on Audit, 575 Phil. 428; 552 SCRA 471 (2008).
[15] Yap v. Commission on Audit, supra note 14, citing Ferrer v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 583 Phil. 50; 561 SCRA 51 (2008).
418beingexcessive and unauthorized by law, specifically the 2004-
2007 GAAs, to wit:
x x x Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses.—Appropriations

authorized herein may be used for extraordinary expenses of the
following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
authorized by the DBM, not exceeding:
P180,000 for each Department Secretary; (a)
P65,000 for each Department Undersecretary; (b)
P35,000 for each Department Assistant Secretary; (c)
P30,000 for each head of bureau or organization of equal
rank to a bureau and for each Department Regional
Director; (d)
P18,000 for each Bureau Regional Director; and (e)
P13,000 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, and Shari’a Circuit
Court Judge. (f)
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000) for each of the offices under the above named
officials are authorized.[16] (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The GAA provisions are clear that the EME shall not
exceed the amounts fixed in the GAA. The GAA provisions
are also clear that only the officials named in the GAA, the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the
DBM, and the offices under them are entitled to claim EME
not exceeding the amount provided in the GAA.
_______________
[16] Supra note 4.
419
The COA faithfully implemented the GAA provisions. COA
Circular No. 2012-001[17] states that the amount fixed under the
GAA for the National Government offices and officials shall be the
ceiling in the disbursement of EME. COA Circular No. 89-
300,[18] prescribing the guidelines in the disbursement of EME,
likewise states that the amount fixed by the GAA shall be the basis
for the control in the disbursement of these funds.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed
the EME that were reimbursed to officers who were not entitled to
the EME, or who received EME in excess of the allowable amount.
When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, there should
be no room for interpretation but only its application.
However, TESDA insists on its interpretation justifying its
payment of EME out of the TESDP Fund. It argues that the 2004-
2007 GAAs did not prohibit its officials from receiving additional
EME chargeable against an authorized funding, the TESDP Fund
in this case, for another office to which they have been designated.
We do not find merit in TESDA’s argument.
The TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established
under Republic Act No. 7796 or the TESDA Act of 1994. Under
Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act is included in the annual GAA; hence,
the TESDP Fund, being sourced from the Treasury, are funds
belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the
hands of public officials.[19]The Constitution provides, “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except
_______________
[17] Dated 14 June 2012.
[18] Dated 21 March 1989.
[19] Professional Video, Inc. v. Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83.
420in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”[20] The State

Audit Code, which prescribes the guidelines in disbursing public
funds, reiterates this important Constitutional provision that there
should be an appropriation law or other statutes specifically
authorizing payment out of any public funds.[21]
In this case, TESDA failed to point out the law specifically
authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for EME from the
TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the
Constitution and the law. In Yap v. Commission on Audit,[22] we
upheld COA’s disallowance of medical expenses and other benefits
such as car maintenance, gasoline allowance and driver’s subsidy
due to petitioner’s failure to point out the law specifically
authorizing the same. There is nothing in the 2004-2007 GAAs
which allows TESDA to grant its officials another set of EME
from another source of fund like the TESDP Fund. COA aptly
pointed out that not even TESDA’s inclusion of EME from both the
General Fund and the TESDP Fund in the 2005 GAA justified its
payment of excessive EME from 2004 up to 2007.[23] The 2005 GAA
provided for a ceiling on EME that TESDA still had to comply
despite the grant of EME in the 2005 GAA for foreign-assisted
projects.
The position of project officer is not among those listed or
authorized to be entitled to EME, namely, the officials named in
the GAA, the officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by
the DBM, and the offices under them. The underlying principle
behind the EME is to enable those occupying key positions in the
government to meet various financial demands.[24] As pointed out
by COA, the position of project officer is not even included in the
Personnel Service Itemization or
_______________
[20] 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 29.
[21] Presidential Decree No. 1445, Section 4.
[22] Supra note 14.
[23] Rollo, p. 49.
[24] COA Circular No. 89-300.
421created with authority from the DBM.[25] Thus, the TESDA

officials were, in fact, merely designated with additional duties,
which designation did not entitle them to additional EME.
In Dimaandal v. COA,[26] we held that designation is a mere
imposition of additional duties, which does not entail payment of
additional benefits. Since the TESDA officials were merely
designated with additional duties, the ruling in Cantillo v.
Arrieta[27] on de facto officers need not be discussed.
Having settled that COA properly disallowed the payment of
excessive EME by TESDA, we proceed to determine whether the
TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to them.
In Blaquera v. Alcala,[28] the Court no longer required the
officials and employees of different government departments and
agencies to refund the productivity incentive bonus they received
because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement
was made in the honest belief that the recipients deserved the
amounts. We, however, qualified this Blaquera ruling in Casal v.
COA,[29] where we held the approving officials liable for the refund
of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the
issuances of the President and the directives of COA. In Casal, we
ruled that the officials’ failure to observe the issuances amounted
to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption of
good faith. We applied the Casal ruling in Velasco v. COA,[30] to
wit:
x x x the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers to

abide with the provisions of AO 103 and AO 161 overcame the
presumption of good faith. The deliberate disregard of these issu-
_______________
[25] Rollo, p. 49.
[26] 353 Phil. 525; 291 SCRA 322 (1998).
[27] 158 Phil. 714; 61 SCRA 55 (1974).
[28] 356 Phil. 678; 295 SCRA 366 (1998).
[29] 538 Phil. 634; 509 SCRA 138 (2006).
[30] G.R. No. 189774, 18 September 2012, 681 SCRA 102.
422ances is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Therefore, the petitioners-approving officers are accountable for the refund
of the subject incentives which they received.
However, with regard to the employees who had no participation in the
approval of the subject incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were
they grossly negligent for having received the benefits under the
circumstances. The approving officers’ allowance of the said awards
certainly tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these
employees. Being in good faith, they are therefore under no obligation to
refund the subject benefits which they received.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying by analogy the Blaquera, Casal and Velasco rulings, as
well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement
of Accounts,[32] we hold the approving officers of TESDA liable for
the excess EME received by them.
The TESDA Act provides that the TESDA Secretariat, headed by
the Director-General, shall propose the specific allocation of
resources for the programs and projects it shall undertake
pursuant to approved national technical education and skills
development plan.[33] As chief executive officer of the TESDA
Secretariat, the Director-General shall likewise exer-
_______________
[31] Id., at p. 117.
[32] 16. SectionDetermination of Persons Responsible/Liable.
The liability of public officers and other persons for audit disallowances/charges
shall be determined on the basis of (a) the nature of the disallowance/charge; (b)
the duties and responsibilities or obligations of officers/employees concerned; (c)
the extent of their participation in the disallowed/charged transaction; and (d)
the amount of damage or loss to the government, thus: Section 16.1
xxxx
Public officers who approve or authorize expenditures shall be held liable for
losses arising out of their negligence or failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family. 16.1.3
[33] TESDA Act of 1994, Sections 10 (b), (d) and 11.
423cise general supervision and control over its technical and

administrative personnel.[34]
In the petition filed before the Court, TESDA alleged that the
various memoranda issued by the Director-General authorized the
TESDA officials designated as TESDP project officers to claim
EME under the TESDP Fund.[35] TESDA did not cite a specific
provision of law authorizing such EME, but claimed that its grant
had been an “institutional practice,”[36] showing the lack of
statutory authority to pay such EME. Despite this lack of authority
for granting additional EME, the then Director-General still
permitted EME in excess of the allowable amount and extended
EME to officials not entitled to it, patently contrary to the 2004-
2007 GAAs. The then Director-General himself received EME from
the TESDP Fund amounting to P809,691.11,[37] contrary to his
claim that only executive directors, regional directors or officials
holding equivalent positions assigned by him as project officers
were entitled to EME from the TESDP Fund.[38]The then Director-
General likewise insisted on his own interpretation of the 2004-
2007 GAAs disregarding the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law is clear, there should be no room
for interpretation but only its application. If there was any
ambiguity in the law, the then Director-General should have
sought clarification from DBM and should not have
_______________
[34] TESDA Act of 1994, Section 11.
[35] Rollo, p. 7. TESDA stated: “x x x pursuant to the various memoranda issued
by the then TESDA Director-General Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., in his capacity as
TESDP Project Director, TESDA Officials who were designated as TESDP Project
Officers were authorized to claim EME under [TESDP Fund] in connection with the
discharge of their functions related to the implementation of the TESDP. x x x.”
[36] Id., at p. 11.
[37] Id., at p. 37.
[38] Id., at p. 62.
424simply relied on his own interpretation, which was self-serving.

Accordingly, the Director-General’s blatant violation of
the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004-2007 GAAs
and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he
received from the TESDP Fund for himself. As for the TESDA
officials who had no participation in the approval of the excessive
EME, they acted in good faith since they had no hand in the
approval of the unauthorized EME. They also honestly believed
that the additional EME were reimbursement for their designation
as project officers by the Director-General. Being in good faith,
they need not refund the excess EME they received.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Commission on Audit Decision
No. 2012-210 dated 15 November 2012 with MODIFICATION.
Only the Director-Generals[39] of the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority who approved the excess or
unauthorized extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses are
ordered to refund the excess extraordinary and miscellaneous
expenses which they received for themselves.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., I dissent.
_______________
[39] Director-General Alcestis Guiang and Director-General Augusto Boboy
Syjuco, Jr.
425
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION,J.:
The Court once again faces another case where government
employees invoke good faith to avoid the refund of illegally and
excessively disbursed government funds.
I concur with the ponencia’s ruling disallowing the payment of

excess Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) to the
officials and employees of the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA). I likewise agree with
the ponencia’s conclusion that only the approving officers who
acted in bad faith or with gross negligence amounting to bad faith
should refund the illegal expenditures of public funds.
I dissent, however, from the ponencia’s ruling that the
approving officers’ legal obligation to refund the illegal
disbursement shall be limited to the amount that they illegally
received. The Court’s finding that the approving officers acted in
bad faith in allowing the unauthorized expenditure of public funds
necessarily dictates that these officers be also held liable for
the full amount of the disallowance, as expressly prescribed by
the Administrative Code in relation to Presidential Decree
No. 1445 (PD 1445).
The Case
TESDA paid its officials and personnel EME amounting
to P5,498,706.60 from 2004 to 2007. The EME came from the
General Fund for locally-funded projects, and from the Technical
Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP) Fund for
foreign-assisted projects.
The TESDA audit team disallowed the payment of EME
for exceeding the allowable limit in the 2004-2007 General
Appropriation Acts (GAAs). Furthermore, the EME was disbursed
to the TESDA officials and personnel who were
426neither enumerated in the GAAs nor considered as
project officers occupying equivalent ranks as authorized by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).[1] Thus,
the TESDA audit team ordered the payees and the TESDA
approving officials to refund the excess EME.
TESDA appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit
(COA) Cluster Director, arguing that it did not exceed the ceiling
in the GAAs. It pointed out that the GAAs and the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual do not prohibit the charging of
the excess EME against the TESDP Fund — an authorized source
of funding separate from the General Fund.
The COA Cluster Director, Cluster VII, National Government
Sector, affirmed the disallowance, adding that the TESDA
officials and personnel (who were designated as project officers)
were not included in the Personnel Service Itemization. There was
not even a DBM document identifying the equivalent ranks of the
designated positions as basis for the disbursement of EME.
Subsequently, TESDA appealed the case to the COA.
_______________
[1] Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses.—Appropriations authorized herein may be used for
extraordinary expenses of the following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the
DBM, not exceeding:
(a) P180,000.00 for each Department Secretary;
(b) P65,000.00 for each Department Undersecretary;
(c) P35,000.00 for each head of bureau or organization of equal rank to a bureau and for each
Department Regional Director
(d) P18,000.00 for each Bureau Regional Director; and
(e) P13,000.00 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, and
Shari’a Circuit Court Judge.
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for each of the
offices under the above named officials are authorized.
427
The COA likewise affirmed the disallowance of the
disbursement of EME for being illegal and excessive. It
emphasized that the failure of the TESDA officials and personnel
to comply with the GAAs negated their claim of good faith. It
thus ordered the TESDA approving officials and payees to
refund the excess EME that they received.
TESDA went to this Court on certiorari and posited that its
officials and personnel should not refund the amount paid to them
because they believed in good faith that they deserved the
payment, even though the payment turned out to have no legal
basis.
The Ponencia
The ponencia affirmed the disallowance of the excess EME, but
exempted the payees, who did not participate in the approval of the
excess EME, from the COA’s order of refund. The ponencia found
that these payees acted in good faith in receiving the excess EME
because they honestly believed that the amount was a
reimbursement for the expenses that they incurred as project
officers.
In affirming the disallowance, the ponencia ruled that the
disbursement of EME to the TESDA officials and personnel
was excessive since the GAAs, COA Circular No. 2012-001 and
COA Circular No. 89-300 expressly provide the limits for the
amounts of EME that may be disbursed.
The ponencia also found the disbursement to be
unauthorized by law. The TESDA officials and personnel who
received the disallowed amounts were merely designated as project
officers, contrary to what the GAA provides — that only those
officials named in the GAAs, the officers of equivalent rank as may
be authorized by the DBM, and the offices under these officials are
entitled to EME. TESDA failed to point to a specific law that
allows it to charge the excess EME
428from the TESDP Fund, contrary to Section 29(1), Article 6 of
the 1987 Constitution.[2]
The ponencia likewise ordered TESDA Director Generals
Alcestis Guiang and Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., who
negligently approved the illegal disbursements, to refund
the excess EME that they received. The ponencia observed that
the Director Generals personally received the excess EME in the
amount of P809,691.11 despite their position that only TESDA
officials and personnel designated as project officers were entitled
to these payments.
I. Framework of review of the COA’s ruling in
disallowance cases: the constitutional
remedy against the COA’s ruling and the
confines of a Rule 65 certioraripetition
A. Procedural framework: The COA did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion
that would justify the setting aside of its
order to refund
Under the 1935 Constitution,[3] the decisions of the Auditor
General of the General Auditing Office — the COA’s precursor —
“may be appealed to the President whose action shall be final.” The
1973 and 1987 Constitutions,[4] however changed
_______________
[2] No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
[3] Article XI, General Auditing Office, Section 3.
[4] Section 2(2), Article XII-D of the 1973 Constitution reads:
x x x Unless otherwise provided by law, any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within days from his receipt of a copy
thereof. [italics ours]
429the nature of the remedy by providing that the COA’s decision,

order or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
This change of remedy narrowed down the scope and extent of the
inquiry that the Court may undertake to what is strictly the office
of certiorari as distinguished from review.[5]
A Rule 65 petition is a unique and special rule because it
commands a limited review of the question raised. As an
extraordinary remedy, its purpose is simply to keep the public
respondent within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to relieve the
petitioner from the public respondent’s arbitrary acts. In this
review, the Court is confined solely to questions of jurisdiction
whenever a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acts without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.[6] In concrete terms, the questioned ruling must
stand unless there is absolutely no evidence to support the
public respondent’s finding or unless the evidence does not
meet the quantum of proof required by the rules. The
commission of mere abuse of discretion and mere errors of
judgment does not warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari to
set aside or modify the questioned ruling.
The limitation of the Court’s power of review over the COA
rulings merely complements its nature as an independent
constitutional body that is tasked to safeguard the proper use of
the government and, ultimately, the people’s property by vesting it
with the power to (i) determine whether government entities
comply with the law and the rules in disbursing public funds; and
(ii) disallow illegal disbursements of these funds.[7]
_______________
5] Aratuc v. Comelec, 177 Phil. 205, 223; 88 SCRA 251, 270 (1979).
[6] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 1.
[7] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812, 818-819; 403 SCRA 666, 672 (2003), citing Caltex
Philippines, Inc. v.Commission
430Unfortunately, I observe that our jurisprudence has not laid

down a clear legal framework in treating disallowance cases from a
Rule 65 petition perspective. A review of jurisprudence[8] also
shows that the Court has not really made a
_______________
on Audit, G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 726. See 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Rule 2, Section 1(a).
[8] The following summarizes some of the relevant disallowance cases that followed after the Court’s
promulgation of Blaquera:
In De Jesus v. Commission on Audit (supra), the Catbalogan Water District’s interim Board of
Directors awarded themselves additional allowances and bonuses pursuant to a resolution they issued.
The Court disallowed the disbursements for being illegal. However, the Court did not order a refund
because the board members honestly believed that they were entitled to these amounts under the
resolution and because the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District v. COA — where the Court
ruled that the water district’s board members were only entitled to per diems — when the grant was
made. (See Magno v. COA)
In HDMF v. COA, the HDMF entered into three successive contracts (1995, 1996 and 1997 Contracts)
with DBP Service Corporation (DBPSC) for manpower services. In mid-1997, the HDMF Board of
Trustees approved a resolution granting amelioration allowance to DBPSC personnel that were assigned
to the HDMF’s head office and charged it against the HDMF’s 1996 approved budget. The Court
disallowed the payment to DBPSC personnel for lack of legal basis. It also held that the HDMF could not
invoke the 1997 Contract to justify the disbursement for 1996. However, the Court did not order the
refund of the disbursed amounts despite its finding that the HDMF trustees were negligent in not
examining the 1996 Contract. It also found that the DBPSC personnel acted in good faith because they
performed the work of regular government employees and received the amount in the belief that they
were entitled to the allowance.
In Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) v. COA (517 Phil. 677; 482 SCRA 490 [2006]), the PPA granted
hazard pay to its officials and employees from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 1997 through a special order,
issued pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 34-95 and DBM National Compensation Circular No.
76. The Court disallowed
431concrete ruling in terms of setting clear and definite stan-

_______________
the disbursement because President Ramos had vetoed the hazard pay provision in the GAA. However,
the disbursement was done in good faith because President Ramos only vetoed the hazard pay provision
on February 2, 1997. Furthermore, the DBM only issued DBM Circular Letter No. 13-97 apprising the
government entities of the presidential veto on December 15, 1997. Thus, the officials and employees
honestly believed that the grant was authorized by PPA Special Order No. 407-97.
In Lumayna v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 185001, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 163), the DBM
issued Local Budget Circular No. 74 (LBC 74) authorizing a 5% adjustment in the salaries of local
government personnel. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan of Mayoyao, Ifugao appropriated the
salaries for newly created positions in Resolution No. 41. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Ifugao declared the appropriations operative subject to certain conditions. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Bayan approved Resolution No. 66 implementing the salary increase for its personnel. The Court found
that the salary increase exceeded the total allowable appropriations under the law. However, the
municipality personnel disbursed the amount under the color of resolutions that were issued pursuant to
LBC No. 74. Furthermore, the approving officers disbursed the amount only after the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had declared the appropriations operative. (See also Singson v. COA, Veloso v.
COA, Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa [KMG] v. COA).
In Nazareth v. Villar (G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385), the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST) Regional Office released Magna Carta benefits to its officials and employees
despite the absence of a specific appropriation in the GAA and without prior authority from the President
to utilize the DOST’s savings. After the COA disallowed the payment of benefits, the OP authorized the
DOST to utilize its savings to pay the benefits. The Court held that the payment of benefits without a
specific item in the GAA and without the President’s prior authority was repugnant to Republic Act No.
8439 (RA 8439), the 1987 Constitution, and the GAA. However, the approving officers and the recipients
acted in good faith because they honestly believed that Section 7 of RA 8439 allowed the payment of these
benefits. Furthermore, the DOST earnestly asked for authorization from the OP after the disallowance.
432dards to determine when good faith exists in disallowance
cases. Furthermore, jurisprudence is obscure on the exact amount
that the responsible public officers shall refund in
disallowances.[9] For these reasons, I submit this Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion.
B. Substantive framework: Refund of

amounts disallowed in audit is the legal
norm
1. Constitutional tenet: The trust
resulting from holding public
office demands
______________
[9] In at least two cases, however, the Court ordered a refund of the amount on the basis of bad faith.
In Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) v. COA (483 Phil. 666; 432 SCRA 126 [2004]), the HDMF
granted productivity incentive bonus to all its personnel pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 (RA 6971) and
its implementing rules. The Court disallowed the disbursement on the ground that RA 6971 does not
cover government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charter as stated in
jurisprudence. The Court also ordered the refund of the disbursed amounts because the HDMF still
granted the bonus despite the DBM’s advice to await a definite ruling on this matter. In Casal v. COA, the
National Museum granted an incentive award to its officials and employees pursuant to Provision No. 8 of
Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System which the CSC had approved. The Court disallowed
the award for being illegal. However, the Court distinguished on who should refund the disallowed
amounts. Accordingly, the approving officers should refund the disallowed amounts for acting in bad faith
in allowing the disbursements. In so ruling, the Court made factual distinctions
between Casal and Blaquera. In Blaquera, the incentive benefits were paid prior to the issuance of AO No.
29. In Casal, these benefits were released subsequent to the issuance of AO 29. Moreover, the CSC
notified the National Museum of the prohibition in AO No. 268. On the other hand, the Court ruled that
the recipients who did not participate in the approval of the award should not refund the amounts they
received. The approving officers’ imprimatur gave the award a color of legality.
433accountability from the public officer

Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution declares that the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state where sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them. A republican government is a responsible government whose
officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust that
renders them at all times accountable to the people they are sworn
to serve.[10] This principle of accountability proceeds from the
constitutional tenet that public office is a public trust[11]and its
corollary that the stability of our public institutions relies on the
ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.[12]
Public officers are stewards who must use government resources
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically to avoid the
wastage of public funds.[13] The prudent and cautious use of these
funds is dictated by their nature as funds and property held in
trust by the public officers for the benefit of the sovereign trustees
— the people themselves — and for the specific public purposes for
which they are appropriated.[14] Thus, Article VI, Section 29(1) of
the Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of any
public treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority.
To ensure accountability enforcement in the disbursement of
public funds,[15] the 1987 Constitution created the COA as an
_______________
[10] Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 52.
[11] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.
[12] Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 539, 557.
[13] REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713, Section 4.
[14] Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, etc. v. Commission on Audit, etc., G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013, 701
SCRA 318.
[15] Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, 656 SCRA 767, 776.
434independent constitutional office charged to audit government

financial transactions. The Constitution empowered the COA
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned, held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government and its instrumentalities. Furthermore, our
Constitution exclusively authorized the COA to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
2. Standard of diligence in the

utilization of public funds; the
obligation to return
To maintain inviolate the public trust reposed on them, public
officers must exercise ordinary diligence or the diligence of a
good father of a family.[16] This means that they should observe
the relevant laws and rules as well as exercise ordinary care and
prudence in the disbursement of public funds.[17] If they do not, the
disbursed amounts are disallowed in audit, and the law[18]imposes
upon public officers the obligation to return these amounts.
Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code
expressly states that the approving public officers and the
_______________
[55] PD 1445, Section 104. See also Section 8, par. 3, Rule 6 of the Rules Implementing the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[56] Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Phils. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 100599,
April 8, 1992, 207 SCRA 801, 812.
[57] THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book VI, Chapter V, Section 43.
435recipients of illegal disbursements must solidarily refund the

disbursed amounts to the government. The obligation to refund
also finds support under the principle of solutio indebiti which
enunciates the rule that the obligation to return arises if
something is received when there is no right to demand it, and
when it was unduly delivered through mistake.[19]
Despite this clear obligation to refund, the Court, in several
cases, has spared the public officers from this duty if they acted in
“good faith” in disbursing and/or receiving the illegal
disbursements. Decided in 1998, Blaquera v. Hon. Alcala[20] was
the first instance when the Court used the good faith of the
recipients and the approving officers as a consideration in
determining whether they should be required to refund the
disallowed amounts.
In Blaquera, the respondents (Alcala, et al.), as heads of several
government agencies, caused the deduction from the petitioners’
(government employees) salaries the amounts allegedly in excess of
those authorized under the challenged administrative orders
pursuant to which the respondents acted. To prevent further
deduction, the petitioners went to this Court and challenged the
constitutionality of the administrative orders. The Court upheld
the administrative orders and, in effect, gave its approval to the
refund that the respondents already carried out.
Nonetheless, the Court did not allow further refunds because it
found that “all the parties x x x acted in good faith.”[21]
A closer look at Blaquera shows that it rests on the following
circumstances that justified a ruling against the further refund of
the disallowed amounts, without actual regard to the good faith of
the recipients in that case: first, Blaquera involved numerous
petitioners, numbering in several hundreds, that would make a
refund very cumbersome; second, it
_______________
[58] CIVIL CODE, Article 2154.
[59] 356 Phil. 678; 295 SCRA 366 (1998).
[60] Id., at p. 765; p. 448.
436involved small amounts (about P1,000.00 per plaintiff) whose

aggregate sum was not commensurate with the administrative
costs of enforcing the refund; and third, the Court adopted a policy
in favor of labor as a matter of equity. In other words, there
were practical and equitable considerations that rendered
unnecessary the application of the legal concept of good
faith to those who were merely recipients of the disallowed
amounts.
On the part of the approving officers, Blaquera simply stated
that “the officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed the
incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were
due to the recipients.”[22] In short, Blaquera found them to
have acted in good faith.
II. Application of the legal norm: balancing

with other considerations
A. Direct Responsibility
Interestingly, while the Civil Code provisions on solutio indebiti,
in general, and Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code, in particular, impose upon public officials
and employees the solidary obligation to refund the illegal
disbursements, Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the
Administrative Code[23] expressly provides that only persons who
are directly responsible for the illegal expenditures of
public funds shall be liable:
_______________
[22] Id., at p. 766; p. 448.
[23] 23 Section 103 of PD 1445 similarly provides:
General liability for unlawful expenditures.—Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor.
437
General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—Expenditures of government funds or
uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
The imposition of this direct responsibility for

expenditures in violation of law and/or regulations justified
the creation of a jurisprudential exception[24] (from the
obligation to refund) in favor of mere payees of amounts
disallowed in audit.[25]Notwithstanding the payee’s liability for
disallowances, these mere passive recipients of good graces have
every right to rely on the presumptions of regularity and good faith
accorded to the public officers directly responsible for the
disbursement and expenditure of public funds. As mere passive
recipients, they could not possibly fail to meet the legal standard of
ordinary diligence. The presumption is, in fact, irrelevant to them
for the reason that they are merely at the receiving end of the
disbursement process. A contrary construction of these interrelated
legal provisions and principles would lead to an inequi-
_______________
[24] See MIAA v. COA, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012, 665 SCRA 655, 677-678.
[25] Payees of disallowed disbursements may, however be held liable to return the amount they have
received based on the other grounds stated in COA Circular 2009-006, to wit:
Public officers and other persons 16.1.4. who confederated or conspired in a
transaction which is disadvantageous or prejudicial to the government shall be held liable
jointly and severally with those who benefited therefrom.
16.1.5.The payee of an expenditure shall be personally liable for a disallowance where the
ground thereof is his failure to submit the required documents, and the Auditor is
convinced that the disallowed transaction did not occur or has no basis in
fact. [emphases ours]
438table and unduly burdensome result that would oblige a
mass of public officials and employees to refund amounts
received through no fault (direct or indirect) of their own.
Based on these premises, I agree with the ponencia that
the COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the TESDA employees, who were mere passive
recipients of the excess EME, to refund the amounts they
had received. For the COA to hold these passive recipients
liable despite the lack of evidence showing their direct
responsibility in the illegal disbursements (much less, the
lack of evidence that they had acted in bad faith together
with the rest of the TESDA approving officers) is an act of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the imprimaturgiven by the
approving officers on the excess EME even gave the disbursement
a color of legality from the perspective of these recipients.[26]
Since mere passive recipients of disallowed amounts are
generally exempted from personal liability, direct responsibility
can only possibly lie at the upper levels of an agency’s
administrative structure. These public officers are largely the
approving officials who are directly responsiblefor the
disbursement of public funds. The following elements must be
established before a public officer can be held personally liable for
illegal expenditures of public funds:
1. There must be an expenditure of government funds or use of
government property;
2. The expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and
_______________
[26] Executive Director Casal v. Commission on Audit, 538 Phil. 634, 801; 509 SCRA 138, 150 (2006).
439
3. The public officer is directly responsible for the irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
disbursement of public funds.[27]
With respect to the third element, Section 19 of COA Circular
No. 94-001 provides the determinants of “direct responsibility”:
19. SECTION DETERMINATION OF PERSONS LIABLE FOR AUDIT
DISALLOWANCES OR CHARGES
The liability of public officers and other persons for 19.1. audit disallowances shall
be determined on the basis of: (a) the nature of the disallowance; (b) the duties,
responsibilities or obligations of the officers/persons concerned; (c) the extent of
their participation or involvement in the disallowed transaction; (d) the amount of
losses or damages suffered by the government thereby. The following are illustrative
examples:
xxxx
Public officers who approve or authorize transactions
involving the expenditure of government funds and uses of
government properties shall be liable for all losses arising out of
their negligence or failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family 19.1.3..
What the statutory requirement of direct responsibility and its

determinants show is that personal liability does not
automatically attach simply because one took part in the
disbursement approval process. Both the public officer’s duties
and the extent of his participation in the disallowed transaction
significantly impact on the possible defenses that he may raise
against his potential liability. This
_______________
[27] Albert v. Gangan, 406 Phil. 231, 245; 353 SCRA 673, 683-684 (2001).
440means that direct responsibility is anchored on his

failure to exercise ordinary diligence.
1. Valid Defense: Public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and of good
faith
A finding that a public officer failed to exercise ordinary
diligence should not automatically translate into a personal
obligation to refund as the public officer, to avoid personal liability,
may still invoke the twin presumptions of regularity and good faith
in the performance of official duties.[28] These are merely
presumptions juris tantum, however, and may be rebutted by
contrary evidence.
What the presumption of regularity establishes is
merely compliance with the ordinary procedures and the usual
standards in the processing and approval of a disbursement. On
the other hand, the presumption of good faith aids the public
officer in establishing substantial or colorable compliance with the
law that would exempt him from pecuniary liability even if he had
erred in the application of the law or even if he had been found
guilty of simple negligence in the performance of his duties. In this
respect, good faith denotes freedom from knowledge of
circumstances that ought to put the responsible public officer on
inquiry and the honest intention to abstain
_______________
[28] The presumption is indulged by law for the following reasons: first, innocence, and not
wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of
government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and
confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such department or agent,
at least to the extent of such presumption. The presumption evidences a rule of convenient public policy,
without which great distress would spring in the affairs of men. (People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 796, 798-799.)
441from taking advantage of another — in the present case, of the

government — even through technicalities of law, together with
absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
render a transaction irregular.[29]
2. The required diligence of a good father
of a family and the presumption of good
faith
Should the COA, on audit, find nothing illegal or irregular in the
disbursement of public funds, the presumption of good faith in
favor of the public officer is deemed confirmed: the COA’s finding
shows that the public officer had indeed exercised ordinary
diligence.
An audit disallowance, however, is an entirely different matter.
When the COA issues a notice of disallowance, it disapproves the
transaction for being illegal, irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable, and, determines the persons liable
for the disallowed amounts.[30] Two scenarios may arise: first, the
Court agrees with the disallowance; and second, the Court
disagrees with the disallowance.
The Court agrees with the disallowance
and/or the finding of bad faith 2a.
For emphasis, at any time before the final approval of the
disbursement, a public officer must exercise ordinary diligence in
ensuring that the disbursement is in accordance with the
laws.[31] However, once the COA disallows the disburse-
_______________
[29] Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) v. Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 189767, July
3, 2012, 657 SCRA 514, 524.
[30] COA Circular 2009-006, Sec. 4.17.
[31] The fact that a disbursement turns out to be illegal does not automatically mean that all of the
approving officials did not exer-
442ment, the presumption of good faith[32] assumes significance as

_______________
cise ordinary diligence. For instance, the mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not
necessarily mean that he is inescapably liable in case of disallowance of expenses for questionable
transactions of his agency. Personal liability for the disallowed amounts does not automatically attach
simply because the public officer was the final approving authority of the transaction in question and that
the erring officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his supervision. As stated in the
seminal case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan (259 Phil. 797; 180 SCRA 309 [1989]), practical necessity affords
all heads of offices the right to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of
those who took part to consummate the disbursement of public funds. Arias requires that —
There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of
even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are
hundreds of document, letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger
offices or departments is even more appalling. (Id. at pp. 801-802; p. 316.
The Court has since applied the Arias ruling to determine not only criminal (Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,
310 Phil. 14; 240 SCRA 13 [1995], a case involving estafa through falsification of public documents) civil
(Leycano, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 517 Phil. 426; 482 SCRA 215 [2006]; and Albert v.
Gangan, supra note 27), and administrative (Alfonso v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 150091, April 2,
2007, 520 SCRA 64) liability, but even the existence of probable cause to file an information (Sistoza v.
Desierto, 437 Phil. 117; 388 SCRA 307 [2002]), in the context of an allegation of conspiracy. In this
instance, what constitutes reliance to a “reasonable extent” thus depends on a case-to-case basis.
[32] If an approving official has exercised ordinary diligence in the performance of his official duties,
his good faith would enjoy a stronger presumption. If he failed to exercise ordinary diligence, however,
this does not mean that his good faith presumption becomes weaker. Presumption of good faith stands
unless rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
443a matter of defense. The public officer can claim that he

exercised ordinary diligence in the performance of his official
duties to avoid liability. If he is shown to have exercised the
diligence required of him, then no personal liability will attach.
However, if he is shown to have failed to exercise ordinary
diligence, then the public officer can rely on the presumption of
good faith that is consistent with simple negligence. To
reiterate, the public officer’s failure to exercise ordinary diligence
does not automatically mean that he has acted in bad faith because
good faith is a presumption of law. If the COA’s findings show that
the required diligence has not been observed, then the Court,
on certiorari, must consider whether the presumption of good faith
has also been overcome based on the COA’s findings.
If there is a clear COA finding, express or implied, that the
public officer acted with bad faith or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith that resulted in the
illegal disbursement of public funds, then the defense of
presumption of good faith should be deemed completely
rebutted.[33] If this element of bad faith is established, then the
public officer’s mantle of immunity is removed because his act is
considered to be outside the scope of his official duties.[34]
If the Court disagrees with the
disallowance 2b.
If the Court finds that the COA gravely abused its discretion in
disallowing the disbursement, it necessarily follows that any
discussion of good faith is irrelevant since there would be no order
of refund. Similarly, if the Court finds that
_______________
[33] See Lumayna v. Commission on Audit, supra note 8, at pp. 182-183; p. 182; and Albert v.
Gangan, supra note 27, at pp. 245-246; pp. 684-685.
[34] Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 82220, 82251 and 83059, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162,
174.
444the COA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that bad

faith existed for lack of factual and legal bases, then the issue of
refund cannot possibly arise since the presumption of good faith
should rightfully come to the public officer’s aid.
3. The valid defenses vis-à-vis the legal
consequence of the COA’s disallowance:
its interface under a certiorari petition
In resolving a petition of this nature, the Court must proceed on
the premise that the COA’s finding of an illegal
disbursement coupled with its finding of bad faith on the
part of the approving officers should give rise to their personal
obligation to refund the disallowed amounts. Since a petitioner in
a certiorari proceeding has the burden of proving the public
respondent’s grave abuse of discretion, then to the petitioner
likewise falls the burden of re-establishing his good faith
that has already been rebutted by the COA’s findings. Simply
stated, the petitioner’s perfunctory reliance on the presumption of
good faith would not warrant the setting aside of the COA’s
disallowance.
III. The TESDA approving officials should be
held personally and solidarily liable for
the full amount of the disallowed amounts
A.The point of concurrence
Based on these discussions, I agree with the ponencia that no
reason exists to find that the COA capriciously and whimsically
exercised its judgment when it found bad faith on the part of the
approving officers and, consequently, ordered these TESDA
officials to refund the amount disallowed in audit.
445
The COA emphasized that the GAAs clearly provide a ceiling
for the grant of EME and expressly state that only officials
named in the GAAs, officers of equivalent rank as may be
authorized by the DBM, and offices under these officials are
entitled to EME. In other words, the COA did not abuse its
discretion but merely applied the clear provisions of the law that
the TESDA approving officials patently violated. These are very
clear standards where violations are not difficult to determine and
which the COA, in fact, fully accounted for and determined.
B.The point of dissent
However, contrary to the ponencia’s conclusion, I submit
that the approving officers should be held personally liable
for the full amount of the disallowance. My disagreement with
the ponencia’sruling on the approving officers’ extent of liability
stems from the observation that the ponencia departed from the
clear provisions of the law.
To reiterate, Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code expressly provides that every official or
employee authorizing or making an illegal payment and
every person receiving the illegal payment shall be jointly and
severally liable to the Government for the full amount so paid
or received. This provision should be interpreted in relation with
Section 52, Chapter IX, Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative
Code and Section 103 of PD 1445 which state that illegal
expenditures of public funds shall be a personal liabilityof the
official or employee found to be directly responsible for the
illegal disbursements. As the ponencia itself ruled, this direct
responsibility only attaches to public officers who actively and
maliciously participated in the illegal disbursement of funds. In
the present case, the ponencia correctly found that only the
approving officers (among them, the Director Generals) are liable
for the disbursement of the excess EME.
446
A plain reading of Section 42, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code shows that this provision does not
qualify that the approving officer must first receive the
illegal disbursement as a necessary prerequisite for his
personal and solidary liability in disallowances. This
provision unequivocably holds a public officer personally and
solidarily liable with other responsible officers
for merely authorizing or making an illegal payment of public
funds. That the approving officer must receive a portion of
the disallowed amount is not an element of liability under
the Administrative Code. The ponencia’s conclusion in this
regard is plainly and patently incorrect.
I also stress that Section 42, Chapter V, Book VI of the
Administrative Code used the phrase “the full amount so paid
or received.” This phrase directly refers to the earlier phrase
“every person receiving the illegal payment.” Indisputably, the law
holds the public officer who merely authorized the illegal payment
personally liable for the full amount of the illegal
expenditures. The law clearly intended to hold the approving
officers liable, not just for the amount that they received, if
any, but also for the illegal payments that the payees have
received. In fact, the law characterizes the responsible officers’
pecuniary liability as direct, personal and solidary; this strict
pecuniary liability embodies the spirit and intent of the law to
subject the public officers to the highest standards of
accountability and service. He who occupies public office should
render service to the people and must not abuse the public trust as
a means to promote his personal interests.
My disagreement with the ponencia’s imposition of limited civil
liability arises from the observation that this conclusion has no
legal or jurisprudential basis. The ponencia’s requirement that
the approving officers must have received an amount from an
illegal expenditure and limiting his solidary liability to this
amount does not find any support in the law. By adding this
requirement, the ponencia ignored
447the basic principle in statutory construction that where the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its
literal application and applied without additional interpretation.[35]
If any distinction should be made between the approving officials
who received a portion of the disallowed amounts and those who
did not, the former should bear the additional liability of paying
legal interests on the disallowed amount received, as provided by
law.[36] The Court should not give an “incentive” to a public official
to care less in approving the disbursement of public funds by
exempting him from the obligation to refund simply because he did
not receive any amount, however grossly negligent he may have
been.
I fear that the Court dangerously treads in judicial legislation by
deviating from the clear mandate of the law. This case sets a
dangerous precedent that the approving officers would have to
receive an illegal disbursement first before they can be made civilly
liable in disallowance cases. This subverts the clear provisions of
the law and would render inutile the COA disallowances in
cases where the grossly negligent approving officers do not
receive any portion of the illegal disbursement and where
the payees are mere passive recipients. Under this
scenario, no public officer shall refund the government for
the unwarranted wastage of its coffers. Furthermore, this
ruling ignores the reality that the approving officers can easily
evade liability by merely ordering or colluding with others so
_______________
[35] Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429, 437.
[36] CIVIL CODEWhoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall pay legal interest if a sum of
money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits received or which should have been received if the thing
produces fruits. 2159. , Art.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause, and for
damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is recovered.
448that their receipt of the portion of the illegal disbursement is

not documented. I believe that the law does not intend the
approving officers to go scot-free for their acts or omissions that are
detrimental to the public interest. This offends the very core of the
law on public officers that public office exacts the highest
standards of accountability and service.
Also, Section 102 of PD 1442 provides that the agency head
directing any illegal disposition of funds or property shall be
immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds
and property pertaining to his agency. Similar to the
Administrative Code, PD 1442 unequivocably holds the agency
head responsible for allillegally disposed funds and property.
The approving officers in this case are not ordinarypublic
employees. The TESDA Director General is the chief executive
officer of the TESDA Secretariat; he occupies one of the highest
positions in TESDA. He exercises general supervision and control
over TESDA’s technical and administrative personnel. He also
heads the TESDA Secretariat which proposes the specific
allocation of its resources. In other words, the Director General, as
the head of a government agency, is charged with the duty of
diligently supervising the accountable officers and other
subordinates to prevent the loss of government funds or
property.[37] His approval or disapproval to the disbursement of
TESDA’s funds is a core function that he has to discharge in the
performance of his official duties. Pursuant to Section 102 of PD
1442, the Director General’s functions dictate that he be
immediately and primarily liable for the full amount of the excess
EME.
The consequences for the government of any contrary
ruling are to deplete the government’s coffers and to render
the COA’s auditing functions meaningless. In blunter terms,
notices of disallowance would eventually serve no practical
purpose if the Court lim-
_______________
[37] PD 1445, Sections 104 and 105.
449its the refund of disallowed disbursements to the

amounts that the responsible officer has received. This
kind of ruling would result in impunity for those who did
not receive but carelessly approved the illegal
expenditures, not to mention the level of comfort it would
add to those who, in case of doubt, would allow the
payment of public funds because the Court would
ultimately not order any refund anyway.
In these lights, due deference and respect for the Constitution
and the laws demand that we strictly scrutinize the good faith
defense before us vis-à-vis the COA’s own finding of bad faith
before we recognize this type of defense in disallowance cases. In
other words, any disbursement contrary to the provisions
of the law should be declared illegal and the parties
responsible for the illegal disbursement should refund the
full amount of the disallowance. It is only in those clearly
meritorious cases where the COA’s own findings are not
inconsistent with good faith or where the COA gravely
abused its discretion in concluding, expressly or impliedly,
that bad faith exists that they may be relieved from the
obligation to refund. As for mere passive recipients, they are
generally not liable to refund the amount they
received unless they themselves participated in the illegal
disbursement.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. (Soriano vs. Marcelo, 592
SCRA 394 [2009])
——o0o——
January 29, 2013. G.R. No. 188635.*

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.,
(COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and
DIR. KHEM M. INOK, respondents.
Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology
Personnel in the Government (R.A. No. 8439); Science and Technology; The salary scale of
science and technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of
government employees under the existing law.—R.A. No. 8439 was enacted as a
manifestation of the State’s recognition of science and technology as an essential component
for the attainment of national development and progress. The law offers a program of
human resources development in science and technology to help realize and maintain a
sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the initiative for total science and
technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not only ensures scholarship
programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords incentives for
those pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science and
technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of
government employees under the existing law.
Constitutional Law; Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares
that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”—Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.” This constitutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise
in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No.
8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be appropriated by
the GAA only meant that such funding
_______________
* EN BANC.
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must be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for
the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A.
No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned
agency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what complies with
the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits
because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of
funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the
appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not have needed to
request the OP for the express authority to use the savings to pay
the Magna Carta benefits.
General Appropriations Act (GAA); The President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment
any item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.—In the funding of current
activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary
amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as
sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found
in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings
in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional
restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of as
untenable.
Same; Commission on Audit (COA); The Commission on Audit (COA) is endowed with
sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.—The COA is endowed
with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the
power to ascertain
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whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended
by law. The “Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with
broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the
uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations”. Thus, the COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to
examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly
beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of
administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the recognition that such
administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings especially when
their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Commission on Audit (COA); Only
when the Commission on Audit (COA) has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain
and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.—Only when the COA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition
for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, demands
that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA
gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
388

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arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant
the issuance of the writ.

BERSAMIN,J.:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.1 A violation of this constitutional
edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the
refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a
covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred
by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its
being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by
the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045
entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director,
Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX,
Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005
and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006
on disallowances of subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits
in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2 affirming the issuance of
notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of COA
Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of
bene-
_______________
1 Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
2 Rollo, pp. 18-22.
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Nazareth vs. Villar
fits to covered officials and employees of the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the
savings of the DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare
the decision dated June 4, 2009 “null and void,” and prays for the
lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY
2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No.
8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists,
Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology
Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the
strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for
the purpose.
Antecedents
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to

address the policy of the State to provide a program for human
resources development in science and technology in order to
achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and
technology mastery.3 Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the
following additional allowances and benefits (Magna
Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST,
to wit:
(a)Honorarium.—S & T personnel who rendered services beyond the established irregular workload
of scientists, technologists, researchers and technicians whose broad and superior knowledge,
expertise or professional standing in a specific field contributes to productivity and
innovativeness shall be entitled to receive honorarium subject to rules to be set by the
Department;
(b)Share in royalties.—S & T scientists, engineers, researchers and other S & T personnel shall be
entitled to
_______________
3 Section 2, RA No. 8439.
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Nazareth vs. Villar
receive share in royalties subject to guidelines of the Department. The share in royalties shall be on a
sixty percent-forty percent (60%-40%) basis in favor of the Government and the personnel
involved in the technology/ activity which has been produced or undertaken during the regular
performance of their functions. For the purpose of this Act, share in royalties shall be defined as
a share in the proceeds of royalty payments arising from patents, copyrights and other
intellectual property rights;
If the researcher works with a private company and the program of activities to be undertaken has
been mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned, any royalty arising therefrom shall be
divided according to the equity share in the research project;
(c)Hazard allowance. —S & T personnel involved in hazardous undertakings or assigned in hazardous
workplaces, shall be paid hazard allowances ranging from ten (10%) to thirty (30%) percent of
their monthly basic salary depending on the nature and extent of the hazard involved. The
following shall be considered hazardous workplaces:
Radiation-exposed laboratories and service workshops; (1)
Remote/depressed areas; (2)
Areas declared under a state of calamity or emergency; (3)
Strife-torn or embattled areas; (4)
Laboratories and other disease-infested areas. (5)
(d)Subsistence allowance.—S & T personnel shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance equivalent
to three (3) meals a day, which may be computed and implemented in accordance with the
criteria to be provided in the implementing rules and regulations. Those assigned out of their
regular work stations shall be entitled to per diem in place of the allowance;
(e)Laundry allowance.—S & T personnel who are required to wear a prescribed uniform during office
hours shall be
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Nazareth vs. Villar
entitled to a laundry allowance of not less than One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) a month;
(f)Housing and quarter allowance.—S & T personnel who are on duty in laboratories, research and
development centers and other government facilities shall be entitled to free living quarters
within the government facility where they are stationed: Provided, That the personnel have their
residence outside of the fifty (50)-kilometer radius from such government facility;
(g)Longevity pay.—A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic
salary shall be paid to S & T personnel for every five (5) years of continuous and meritorious
service as determined by the Secretary of the Department; and
(h)Medical examination.—During the tenure of their employment, S & T personnel shall be given a
compulsory free medical examination once a year and immunization as the case may warrant.
The medical examination shall include:
Complete physical examination; (1)
Routine laboratory, Chest X-ray and ECG; (2)
Psychometric examination; (3)
Dental examination; (4)
Other indicated examination. (5)
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of

the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of
R.A. No. 8439.4
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released
the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and
_______________
4 20. SectionFunding.—The amount necessary to fully implement this Act shall be provided in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following its enactment into law under the budgetary
appropriations of the DOST and concerned agencies.
392
Nazareth vs. Villar
employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific
appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following
the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas
on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27,
2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001,
several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of
the Magna Cartabenefits. The justifications for the disallowance
were stated in the post-audit report, as follows:
ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-105-101 (98) [Payment of Subsistence and Laundry
Allowances and Hazard Pay for the months of February-November 1998]—The State
Auditor claims that no funds were appropriated in the 1998 General Appropriations Act for
the said purpose notwithstanding the effectivity of the Magna Carta, providing for payment
of allowances and benefits, among others, to Science and Technology Personnel in the
Government; a)
Allowances and Hazard Pay for the months of January-June 1999]—The State Auditor
claims that no Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Civil Service
Commission (CSC) guidelines were issued by the said Departments on the payment thereof;
b)
Allowances, Hazard Pay and Health Care Program for the month of October 1999 and
January-September 2000]—The State Auditor claims that there was no basis for the
payment of the said allowances because the President vetoed provisions of the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) regarding the use of savings for the payment of benefits; c)
ND Nos. 2001-014-101(00) to 2001-025-101 (00) [Payment of Subsistence and Laundry
Allowances, Hazard Pay and Medical Benefits for the months of January-October 2001—
The provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by
the President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or
benefits according to the State Auditor. d)5
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 6.
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The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary
Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for
Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits
as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the authority to utilize the DOST’s
savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient portions of
the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in
the following manner:
x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Act’s effectivity, the Department had
paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current year’s savings as provided for in the Budget
Issuances of the Department of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC benefits were
likewise sourced from the year’s savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA.
The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore,
cannot continue the payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The
DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellency’s favorable consideration for the
payment of said MC benefits, being part of the administration’s 10-point action program to
quote “I will order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and
Technology Personnel in Government)” as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20,
1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive

Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President,
approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.,7 viz:
With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to use
savings from the appropriations of that Department and its agencies for the payment of
Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said
request is hereby approved.
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 132-133.
7 Id., at p. 7.
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Nazareth vs. Villar
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST
Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA
Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering
CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her
appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary
Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998,8 to wit:
56. SectionPriority in the Use of Savings.—In the use of savings, priority shall be
given to the augmentation of the amounts set aside for compensation, bonus, retirement
gratuity, terminal leave, old age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits
authorized by law and those expenditure items authorized in agency Special Provisions and
in Sec. 16 and in other sections of the General Provisions of this Act.9
In support of her appeal, the petitioner contended that the DOST

Regional Office had “considered the subsistence and laundry
allowance as falling into the category ‘other personnel benefits
authorized by law,’ hence the payment of such allowances were
charged to account 100-900 for Other Benefits (Honoraria), which
was declared to be the savings of our Office.”10 She argued that the
April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora not
only ratified the payment of the Magna Carta benefits out of the
savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and allowed the use of the
savings for CY 2000, but also operated as a continuing
endorsement of the use of sav-
_______________
8 Republic Act No. 8522 (An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines from January 1 to December 31, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Eight, and for
Other Purposes).
9 The provision is a recurrent provision in subsequent GAAs like Republic Act No. 8745 (GAA of 1999)
and Republic Act No. 8760 (GAA of 2000).
10 Rollo, p. 27.
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Nazareth vs. Villar
ings to cover the Magna Carta benefits in succeeding calendar
years.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication
Director (RLAD), COA Regional Office IX in Zamboanga City,
which denied the appeal and affirmed the grounds stated in the
NDs.
Not satisfied with the result, the petitioner elevated the matter
to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office in Quezon City.
On September 15, 2005, respondent Director Khem N. Inok of
the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision in
LAO-N-2005-308,11 denying the petitioner’s appeal with the
modification that only the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits
for CY 2000 were to be set aside in view of the authorization under
the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 issued by Executive Secretary
Zamora as the alter ego of the President. The decision explained
itself as follows:
In resolving the case, the following issues should first be resolved:
Whether or not the “approval” made by the Executive Secretary on April 12,
2000 on the request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the
benefits, was valid; and 1.
Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its
savings for the years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA 8522 (General
Appropriations Act of 1998 [GAA]) were legal and valid. 2.
Anent the first issue, the law in point is Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987
Constitution, which aptly provides that:
“(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 34-37.
396

Nazareth vs. Villar
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”
Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings
from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control
and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use
savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch.
Such power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under
the “doctrine of qualified political agency” enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the
official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the
President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agency’s savings for the
year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted
on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.
On the second issue, the payments of benefits made by the agency in 1998 and
1999 were admittedly premised on the provisions of the General Appropriations
Acts (GAA) for CY 1998 and 1999 regarding the use of savings which states that:
“In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentationof the
amount set aside for compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity, terminal leave,
old age pensions of veterans and other personal benefits x x x.” (Underscoring
ours.)
It can be noted, however, that augmentation was likewise a requisite to make
payments for such benefits which means that Presidential approval was necessary
in accordance with the above-cited provision of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore,
the acts of the agency in using its savings to pay the said benefits without the said
presidential approval were illegal considering that during those years there was no
appropriations provided in the GAA to pay such benefits.
Further, COA Decision Nos. 2003-060 dated March 18, 2003 and 2002-022 dated
January 11, 2002, where this Commission lifted the DOST disallowance on the
payments of similar benefits in 1992 to 1995, can not be applied in the instant case.
The disallowances
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Nazareth vs. Villar
therein dealt more on the classification of the agency as health
related or not while the instant case deals mainly on the
availability of appropriated funds for the benefits under RA 8439
and the guidelines for their payments.
Likewise, the certification of the DOST Secretary declaring work areas of S and
T personnel as hazardous for purposes of entitlement to hazard allowance is not
valid and may be considered as self-serving. Under RA 7305 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulation[s] (Magna Carta of Public Health Workers), the
determination which agencies are considered health-related establishments is
within the competence of the Secretary of Health which was used by this
Commission in COA Decision No. 2003-060, supra, to wit:
xxxx
“It bears emphasis to state herein that it is within the competence of the
Secretary of Health as mandated by RA 7305 and its IRR to determine which
agencies are health-related establishments. Corollary thereto, the
certifications dated October 10, 1994 issued by then DOH Secretary Juan M.
Flavier that certain DOST personnel identified by DOST Secretary Padolina
in his letter dated September 29, 1994 to be engaged in health and health-
related work and that of Secretary Hilarion J. Ramiro dated December 12,
1996 confirming the staff and personnel of the DOST and its attached
agencies to be engaged in health-related work and further certified to be a
health-related establishment were sufficient basis for reconsideration of the
disallowance on subsistence and laundry allowances paid for 1992, 1993 and
1995.”
xxxx
Assuming that the situation in the DOST and its attached agencies did not
change as to consider it health-related establishment for its entitlement to magna
carta benefits, still the payments of the benefits cannot be sustained in audit not
only for lack of said certification from the Secretary of Department of Health for the
years 1998 and 1999 but more importantly, for lack of funding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Appeal is DENIEDwith
modification. NDs Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) issued for the
payments of benefits for CY 2000 are hereby SET ASIDEwhile NDs pertaining to
benefits paid for CY 1998, 1999 and 2001 shall STAY.
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Nazareth vs. Villar
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration in the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National
in Quezon City.
By resolution dated May 12, 2006,12 the COA Legal and
Adjudication Office-National denied the motion for reconsideration.
Thence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA
Head Office, insisting that the payment of Magna Carta benefits to
qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX officials and employees had
been allowed under R.A. No. 8349.
On June 4, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision,
further modifying the decision of respondent Director Inok by also
lifting and setting aside the NDs covering
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999 for the same
reason applicable to the lifting of the NDs for CY 2000, but
maintaining the disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001 on the
ground that they were not covered by the authorization granted by
the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 of Executive Secretary Zamora.
The pertinent portions of the decision are quoted below, to wit:
Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the main argument that
the payment of Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX employees
is allowed pursuant to RA No. 8439.
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the payment of Magna Carta benefits for
CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and legal.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 38-39.
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DISCUSSION
It is clear that the funds utilized for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits came from
the savings of the agency. The approval by the Executive Secretary of the request for
authority to use the said savings for payments of the benefits was an affirmation that the
payments were authorized. The Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 of the DOST Secretary
requested for the approval of the payment out of savings of the CY 2000 benefits. Likewise,
the same Memorandum mentioned the 1998 Magna Carta benefits which were paid out of
its current year’s savings as provided for in the budget issuances of the DBM and the 1999
Magna Carta benefits which were sourced from the year’s savings as authorized in the 1999
GAA. When such memorandum request was approved by the Executive Secretary in a
Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, it was clear that the approval covered the periods
stated in the request, which were the 1998, 1999 and 2000 Magna Carta benefits.
Thus, this Commission hereby affirms LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated
September 15, 2005 which lifted ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) for the
payments of Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 and which sustained the NDs for payments
in 2001. However, for the disallowances covering payments in 1998 and 1999, this
Commission is inclined to lift the same. This is in view of the approval made by the
Executive Secretary for the agency to use its savings to pay the benefits for the years
covered. Thus, when the Executive Secretary granted the request of the DOST Secretary for
the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to its qualified personnel, the said payments
became lawful for the periods covered in the request, that is, CYs 1998, 1999 and 2000.
Since the Magna Carta benefits paid in 2001 were not covered by the approval, the same
were correctly disallowed in audit.
In a previous COA Decision-No. 2006-015 dated January 31, 2006, the payment of
hazard, subsistence and laundry allowances given to personnel of the DOST, Regional
Office No. VI, Iloilo City, was granted. The same decision also stated that in (sic) no doubt
the DOST personnel, who are qualified, are entitled to receive the Magna Carta benefits.
The 1999 GAA did not prohibit the grant of these benefits but merely emphasized the
discretion of the agency head, upon authority of the President, to use savings from the
Department’s appropriation, to implement the payment of benefits pursuant to the DOST
Charter.400

Nazareth vs. Villar
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal on the payment of Magna
Carta benefits for CYs 1998 and 1999 which were disallowed in ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to
99-015-101 (98) and 2000-001-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99), is hereby GRANTED.
Likewise, the lifting of ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) as embodied in
LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 is hereby CONFIRMED.
While the disallowances on the payment of said benefits for 2001 as covered by ND Nos.
2001-014-101 (01) to 2001-032-101 (01) are hereby AFFIRMED.
Issues
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner
insisting that the COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of
R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12,
2000 did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY
2001.
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND No.
2001-014-101(01) to ND No. 2001-032-101(01)?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

R.A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the State’s
recognition of science and technology as an essential component for
the attainment of national development and progress. The law
offers a program of human resources development in science and
technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient pool of talent
and manpower that will sustain the initiative for total science and
technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not
only ensures scholarship programs and improved science and
engineering education, but also affords incentives for those
pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary
scale of science
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Nazareth vs. Villar
and technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from
the salary scales of government employees under the existing law.
As earlier mentioned, Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 confers
the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional allowances and
benefits to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium,
share in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and
quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical examination. But
the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper benefits
without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA.
The petitioner urges the Court to treat the authority granted in
the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora as
a continuing authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay
We cannot agree with the petitioner.
The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority
from the OP to pay the benefits out of the DOST’s savings.
Although the Memorandum was silent as to the period covered by
the request for authority to use the DOST’s savings, it was clear
just the same that the Memorandum encompassed only CY 1998,
CY 1999 and CY 2000. The limitation of its applicability to those
calendar years was based on the tenor of the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr. to the effect that the DOST had previously used its
savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits in CY 1998 and CY 1999;
that the 2000 GAA did not provide for the use of savings; and that
the DOST personnel were looking forward to the President’s
favorable consideration. The Memorandum could only be read as
an authority covering the limited period until and inclusive of CY
2000. The text of the Memorandum was also bereft of any
indication that the authorization was to be indefinitely extended to
any calendar year beyond CY 2000.
As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand.
Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly
402
Nazareth vs. Villar
declares that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” This constitutional
edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise
in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the requirement under
Section 2013 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund
the Magna Cartabenefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only
meant that such funding must be purposefully, deliberately, and
precisely included in the GAA. The funding for
the MagnaCarta benefits would not materialize as a matter of
course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially be
proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for
submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what
complies with the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could
not fund the payment of the benefits because the GAA did not
mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of
funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged
the absolute need for the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise,
Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for
the express authority to use the savings to pay
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the
general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in
the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as
sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency.
The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),14 Article VI of the
Constitution, by which the President,
_______________
13 Supra note 4.
14 Section 25.
xxxx
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropria- (5)
403
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 403
Nazareth vs. Villar
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective
offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction
leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which we should now
dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high
officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another
item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive.
As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections:15
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule,
the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as
their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute
with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts
may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the
scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of
such general
_______________
tions law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
xxxx
15 G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385, 409-410; see also Samson v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999, 303 SCRA 508, 515.
404
Nazareth vs. Villar
words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the
statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against
the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many
circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or
abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
The claim of the petitioner that the payment of the

2001 Magna Carta benefits was upon the authorization extended
by the OP through the 12 April 2000 Memorandum of Executive
Secretary Zamora was outrightly bereft of legal basis. In so saying,
she inexplicably, but self-servingly, ignored the important
provisions in the 2000 GAA on the use of savings, to wit:
54. Sec.Use of Savings.—The President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman and the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights are
hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
55. Sec.Meaning of Savings and Augmentation.—Savings refer to portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free of any obligation or
encumbrance still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or
purpose with an appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation
of needed resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-
existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be funded by
augmentation from savings or by
405
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Nazareth vs. Villar
the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this Act. (Bold emphases added)
Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President

was subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of
appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected.
The first required that there must be savings from the authorized
appropriation of the agency. The second demanded that there must
be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be
transferred for augmentation purposes only.
At any rate, the proposition of the petitioner that savings could
and should be presumed from the mere transfer of funds is plainly
incompatible with the doctrine laid down in Demetria v. Alba,16 in
which the petition challenged the constitutionality of paragraph 1
of Section 4417 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977) in view of the express prohibition contained in
Section 16(5)18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution against the
transfer of appropria-
_______________
16 G.R. No. L-71977, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 208, 214-215.
17 Paragraph 1 of Section 44 states: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.”
18x x x Section 16.
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commission
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. [5]
406
Nazareth vs. Villar
tions except to augment out of savings,19 with the Court declaring
the questioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 1177 “null and
void for being unconstitutional” upon the following reasoning, to
wit:
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment
of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from
savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional
body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose
of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,
project, or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of

appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a
_______________
19 Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is similar to Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
current Constitution.
407
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 407
Nazareth vs. Villar
specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority
from the President to utilize the DOST’s savings in other items for
the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and
the re-enacted GAA for 2001.
The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for
the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The
“Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds
and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope
of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and
methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations”.20 Thus, the COA is generally
accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional
duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of
public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what
is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions
of administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general
policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities
held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to
enforce.21 The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality
to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse
of discretion.22
_______________
20 Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 154, 167-168.
21 Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661; Tagum Doctors
Enterprises v. Apsay, G.R. No. 81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154.
22 Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489.
408
Nazareth vs. Villar
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition
for certiorari brought to assail its actions.23Section 1 of Rule
65,24 Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must show
that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the
sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should
establish that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
_______________
23 Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 517.
24 1. SectionPetition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
409
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 409
Nazareth vs. Villar
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 25 Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ.26
The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden. We
conclude and declare, therefore, that the COA’s assailed decision
was issued in steadfast compliance of its duty under the
Constitution and in the judicious exercise of its general audit
power conferred to it by the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who
caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered
officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that
there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits.
Evincing their good faith even after receiving the NDs from the
COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the OP
for the authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials and
employees received the benefits because they considered
themselves rightfully deserving of the benefits under the long-
awaited law.
The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits
received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government.
This accords with consistent pronouncements of the Court, like
that issued in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,27 to wit:
_______________
25 Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684
SCRA 410; United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA
322, 331.
26 Tan v. Antazo, G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 337, 342.
27 451 Phil. 812; 403 SCRA 666 (2003).
410
Nazareth vs. Villar
Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala28supports petitioners’ position on
the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA
disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993
prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the
disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot
countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which
amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be
detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of
offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the
amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with
gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the
additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA
Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received
the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water
District [v. Commission on Audit.]29 Petitioners had no knowledge that such
payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not
refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.
Also, in Veloso v. Commission on Audit30 the Court, relying on a

slew of jurisprudence,31 ruled that the recipients of the
_______________
28 G.R. No. 109406, 11 September 1998, 295 SCRA 366.
29 425 Phil. 326; 374 SCRA 482 (2002).
30 G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, 656 SCRA 767, 782.
31 To wit: Singson v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 36; Molen, Jr.
v. Commission on Audit, 493 Phil. 874; 453 SCRA 769 (2005); Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal
and Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI, Pavia, Iloilo City, G.R. No. 159299, July 7, 2004, 433
SCRA 769; De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 466 Phil. 912; 422 SCRA 287 (2004);
411
VOL. 689, JANUARY 29, 2013 411
Nazareth vs. Villar
disallowed retirement and gratuity pay remuneration need not
refund whatever they had received:
x x x because all the parties acted in good faith. In this case, the questioned
disbursement was made pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as December
7, 2000 although deemed approved only on August 22, 2002. The city officials
disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest belief that
the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same
with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such reward.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition

for certiorari for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision issued on
June 4, 2009 by the Commission Proper of the Commission on
Audit in COA Case No. 2009-045; and DECLARES that the
covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and
Technology who received the Magna Carta benefits for calendar
year 2001 are not required to refund the disallowed benefits
received.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Where the public officials acted in good faith in the
disbursement of funds which were subsequently disallowed by the
Commission on Audit (COA), they should not be ordered to refund
the same. (Lumayna vs. Commission on Audit, 601 SCRA 163
[2009])
_______________
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 461 Phil.
737; 416 SCRA 245 (2003).
412

Nazareth vs. Villar
Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of
government funds or uses of government property in violation of
law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or
employee found to be directly responsible therefor. (Vicencio vs.
Villar, 675 SCRA 468 [2012])
April 11, 2013. G.R. No. 174788.*
THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A rule of thumb for every petition
brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of an appeal or any “plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy.”—A rule of thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of
an appeal or any “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.” Certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that historically require extraordinary facts to
be shown in order to correct errors of jurisdiction. The law also dictates the necessary steps
before an extraordinary remedy may be issued. To be sure, the availability of other
remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65 petition. If, for instance,
the remedy is insufficient or would be proven useless, then the petition will be given due
course.
_______________
* EN BANC.
167
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 167

Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Commission on Audit (COA); Commission on Audit (COA) itself has a
mechanism for parties who are aggrieved by its actions and are seeking redress directly from
the commission itself.—COA itself has a mechanism for parties who are aggrieved by its
actions and are seeking redress directly from the commission itself. Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 reads: Appeal from decision of auditors. Any person aggrieved
by the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or
claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the
Commission. Additionally, Rule V, Section 1 of the 1997 COA Rules provides: An aggrieved
party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a
report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement
and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit. Rule VI,
Section 1, continues the linear procedure, to wit: The party aggrieved by a final order or
decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper. This discussion of the
different procedures in place clearly shows that an administrative remedy was indeed
available. To allow a premature invocation of Rule 65 would subvert these administrative
provisions, unless they fall under the established exceptions to the general rule, some of
which are as follows: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; 10) in quo warranto proceedings.
Same; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons; The courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.—The failure to fulfill the requirements of Rule 65 disallows the CA from taking due
course of the Petition; otherwise appeals and motions for reconsideration would be rendered
meaningless, as stated time and again by this Court: [I]f resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery
168

68
can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of
the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.—
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has been empowered
to define the scope of its audit and examination and to establish the techniques and
methods required therefor; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties. Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the courts must
exercise caution when intervening with disputes involving these independent bodies, for
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them
and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is
proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has
substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.—A preliminary injunction is proper
only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has
substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. Factually, there must exist “a right
to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the
said
169
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 169

right.” As this Court has previously ruled, “[w]hile the existence of the right need not
be conclusively established, it must be clear.” Lacking a clear legal right, the provisional
remedy should not have been issued, all the more because the factual support for issuing
the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive relief, courts cannot reverse the
burden of proof, for to do so “would assume the proposition which the petitioner is
inceptively duty bound to prove.” This concern is not a mere technicality, but lies at the
heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law requires a cause of action.
Commission on Audit (COA); Jurisdiction; The Commission on Audit (COA) has “the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charter.—The COA has “the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter[.] x x x.” The Constitution further provides as follows:
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The GSIS Law Office for respondent GSIS.
170
SERENO,C.J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed on 10
November 2006, seeking to set aside two Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) of CA-G.R. SP No. 90484, dated 9 August
20062 and 23 September 2005,3 respectively, and to prohibit the CA
from proceeding with CA-G.R. SP No. 90484.
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) filed
a Petition for Prohibition with the CA dated 18 July 2005 against
petitioner Special Audit Team (SAT) of the Commission on Audit
(COA) with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO), a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and a
writ of prohibition.4 Subsequently, GSIS also submitted a
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 July 2005 detailing the
urgency of restraining the SAT.5 The CA issued a Resolution on 22
July 2005, directing petitioner SAT to submit the latter’s comment,
to be treated as an answer.6Additionally, the CA granted the
prayer of GSIS for the issuance of a TRO effective sixty (60) days
from notice.
After requiring the submission of memoranda, CA issued the
assailed Resolution dated 23 September 2005 in CA-G.R.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 23-77.
2 Id., at pp. 16-17; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, chairperson and concurred in by
Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo.
3 Id., at pp. 12-14, Penned by Associate Justice Asuncion, chairperson and concurred in by Associate
Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo.
4 Id., at pp. 184-203.
5 Id., at pp. 206-211.
6 Id., at p. 205; CA-G.R. SP No. 90484; penned by Associate Justice Asuncion, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court).
171
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 171
SP No. 90484, granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon the posting of an injunction bond.7 The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) and a Comment on the petition dated 10
October 2005, after it was notified of the case, as the SAT had been
represented in the interim by one of the team members instead of
the OSG.8 The MR was denied through a Resolution of the CA on 9
August 2006.9
The present Petition seeks to nullify both the 23 September 2005
and the 9 August 2006 CA Resolutions and to prohibit the CA from
proceeding to decide the case.
Antecedent Facts
COA created the SAT under Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)
Order No. 2004-093, which was issued by COA Assistant
Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Ramirez-Habitan.
Tasked to conduct a special audit of specific GSIS transactions, the
SAT had the avowed purpose of conducting a special audit of those
transactions for the years 2000 to 2004.10 Accordingly, the SAT
immediately initiated a conference with GSIS management and
requested copies of pertinent auditable documents, which the
latter initially agreed to furnish.11 However, due to the objection of
GSIS to the actions of SAT during the conference,12 the request
went unheeded. This prompted the latter to issue a subpoena duces
tecum.13
In response to the subpoena, the GSIS, through its President and
General Manager Winston F. Garcia, replied that while it did
recognize the authority of COA to constitute a
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 79-81; Resolution dated 23 September 2005.
8 Id., at pp. 276-321.
9 Id., at pp. 83-84; CA-G.R. SP No. 90484 Resolution.
10 Id., at pp. 85-86; dated 30 September 2004.
11 Id., at p. 28.
12 Id., at pp. 87-88.
13 Id., at p. 107.
172
team to conduct a special audit, that team should not be the SAT,
whose members were biased, partial, and hostile.14 The then-COA
Chairperson Guillermo N. Carague denied the request of GSIS on
account of the restructuring of the commission under COA
Resolution 2002-005, which formed the basis for the SAT’s
creation.15However, through a subsequent letter of Atty. Claro B.
Flores and Atty. Nelo B. Gellaco, the GSIS alleged that the SAT’s
creation was not supported by COA Resolution 2002-005, which
was without force and effect.16
The reasoning of both lawyers was based on the theory that the
1987 Constitution did not give COA the power to reorganize
itself.17 Allegedly, the commission only had the power to define the
scope of its audit and examination, as well as to promulgate rules
concerning pleading and practice.18 Even if the COA were allowed
to reorganize itself, the GSIS claimed that the subpoena required a
case to have been brought to the commission for resolution.19
Thereafter, several GSIS officials sent COA Chairperson
Carague a letter emphasizing that the special audit should be
conducted by another team and detailing how the SAT, as then
constituted, prejudged the legality of several key projects of the
GSIS20 while merely relying on hearsay and inapplicable legal
standards.21
In its Petition, the SAT claimed that due to the continued refusal
of GSIS to cooperate, the team was constrained to employ
“alternative audit procedures” by gathering documents from the
Office of the Auditor of GSIS, the House of
_______________
14 Id., at p. 87.
15 Id., at pp. 105-106.
16 Id., at p. 90.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 90-91.
20 Id., at pp. 108-142.
21 Id., at pp. 92-96.
173
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 173
Representatives, and others.22 Meanwhile, some of the audit
observations made by the SAT appeared in the newspaper Manila
Times,23 resulting in the refusal of GSIS management to attend the
SAT’s exit conference.24
Court Intervention
On 15 April 2005, GSIS filed with the COA itself a
“Petition/Request to nullify Special Audit Report dated 29 March
2005 on selected transactions of the GSIS for CY 2000 to
2004.”25 The GSIS also filed a Petition for Prohibition dated 18 July
200526 before the CA, whose Resolutions therein led to this present
Petition.
Parties’ Claims
Petitioner SAT anchors its claims on the following grounds:
First, the grant of the preliminary injunction was in grave abuse
of discretion because of procedural infirmities in the Petition.27
Second, the CA had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity or
correctness of the findings and recommendations of the SAT
because of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Additionally, judicial review over the
COA is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.28
Third, the SAT’s special audit has basis in law.29
_______________
22 Id., at p. 31.
23 Id., at p. 211.
24 Id., at p. 143.
25 Id., at pp. 160-178.
26 Id., at pp. 184-203.
27 Id., at p. 37.
28 Id., at p. 38.
29 Id.
174
Respondent GSIS, on the other hand, claims that the need for an
injunction was urgent, since the SAT’s supervisor had said that
notices for disallowance were available at the COA’s Records
Division.30 As to the procedural and substantial aspect, GSIS
claims the following:
First, the Petition for Prohibition satisfies the legal and
procedural requirements.31
Second, the CA has the power to prohibit the conduct of special
audit and the issuance of notices of disallowance.32
Third, the special audit does not have statutory basis.33
In support of the prohibitory writ, GSIS claims that it is only the
regular auditor who can conduct such audits and issue
disallowances; that it is only the commissioner of COA who can
delegate this power; and that GSIS would suffer grave and
irreparable injury, should the SAT implement the latter’s report.
Issues
We categorize the arguments in the following manner:
Whether or not prohibition is the correct remedy 1.
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was properly
issued 2.
Whether or not the SAT was validly constituted 3.
_______________
30 Id., at p. 356.
31 Id., at p. 360.
32 Id.
33 Id.
175
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 175
Ruling
PROHIBITION IS NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY.
There is an appeal or a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy available.
A rule of thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the
unavailability of an appeal or any “plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy.”34 Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are
extraordinary remedies that historically require extraordinary
facts to be shown35 in order to correct errors of jurisdiction.36 The
law also dictates the necessary steps before an extraordinary
remedy may be issued.37 To be sure, the availability of other
remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65
petition.38 If, for instance, the remedy is insufficient or would be
proven useless,39 then the petition will be given due course.40
COA itself has a mechanism for parties who are aggrieved by its
actions and are seeking redress directly from the commission itself.
_______________
34 1997 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Secs. 1, 2, & 3.
35 Separate Opinion of Justice Johnson, Garcia v. Sweeney, 4 Phil. 751, 754 (1904); Ongsitco v. Court
of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1069, 1076; 255 SCRA 703, 709 (1996).
36 Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1069, 1076; 255 SCRA 703, 709 (1996); New Frontier Sugar
Corp. v. RTC of Iloilo, 542 Phil. 587, 597; 513 SCRA 601, 610 (2007).
37 Belisle Investment & Financing Co., Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 235 Phil. 633, 640; 151
SCRA 630, 636 (1987).
38 Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30-31; 344 SCRA 136, 147 (2000).
39 Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 255.
40 People v. Lipao, G.R. No. 154557, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 52.
176
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 reads:
Appeal from decision of auditors. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of
any government agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months
from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission.
Additionally, Rule V, Section 1 of the 1997 COA Rules provides:

An aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the
Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges,
Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency
under audit.41
Rule VI, Section 1, continues the linear procedure, to wit:
The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the
Commission Proper.42
This discussion of the different procedures in place clearly shows

that an administrative remedy was indeed available. To allow a
premature invocation of Rule 65 would subvert these
administrative provisions, unless they fall under the established
exceptions to the general rule, some of which are as follows:
when the question raised is purely legal; 1)
when the administrative body is in estoppel; 2)
when the act complained of is patently illegal; 3)
when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 4)
when the claim involved is small; 5)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 6)
_______________
41 1997 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (1997 COA RULES).
42 Id.
177
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 177
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 7)
when strong public interest is involved; 8)
when the subject of the controversy is private land; 9)
in 10) quo warranto proceedings.43
GSIS claims that its case falls within the exceptions, because (a)
the SAT supervisor has threatened to issue notices of
disallowance;44 (b) GSIS did nothing to stop the threatened
issuances or the public appearances of the SAT supervisor;45 (c) the
petition/request filed with the COA has not been acted upon as of
date;46 (d) GSIS was denied due process because SAT had acted
with partiality and bias;47and (e) the special audit was illegal,
arbitrary, or oppressive, having been done without or in excess or
in grave abuse of discretion.48
All of these claims are baseless. First, a threat to issue a notice
of disallowance is speculative, absent actual proof. Moreover, even
if the threat were real, it would not fall under any of the
exceptions, because the COA rules provide an adequate remedy to
dispute a notice of disallowance:
Who May Appeal.―An aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling
rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of
disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who
has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.factual (sic) issues that require some form of
proof in order that they may be considered. (Emphasis supplied)49
_______________
43 Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Chinese General Hospital, 496 Phil. 349, 361; 456 SCRA
459, 472 (2005).
44 Rollo, pp. 365-366.
45 Id., at p. 366.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id., at pp. 366-367.
49 1997 COA RULES, Rule V, Sec. 1.
178
Second, GSIS also mentions the fact that the COA has not acted
on the former’s petition/request both in the original Petition before
the CA50 and the pleadings before this Court.51 This inaction is, of
course, explainable by the fact that the CA issued a TRO and a
writ of preliminary injunction. Moreover, the cited two (2) month
delay is not so unreasonable as to require the trampling of
procedural rules.
Third, the claim that there was a denial of due process runs
counter to the claim that there is a pending petition/
request before the COA. The fact that the petition/request was not
denied or delayed for reasons within the control of the COA
contradicts any claim that there was a due process violation
involved.
Fourth, allegations of partiality and bias are questions of fact
already before the COA. As the Court has clarified, “[t]here is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts.”52
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.53
True enough, questions of fact require evidentiary processes, the

“calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and the relevance of surrounding
_______________
50 Rollo, pp. 185 & 190.
51 Id., at p. 355.
52 Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, 18 January 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 778; Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Go, G.R. No. 168779, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 460, 468.
53 Mendoza v. People, 500 Phil. 550, 558; 462 SCRA 160, 169 (2005).
176
circumstances, and the probability of specific
situations,”54especially “[i]f the query requires x x x the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.”55Generally, these
questions of fact cannot be decided by a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65,56 because the rule applies to jurisdictional flaws
brought about by lack, excess, or grave abuse of discretion.57
The Petition before the CA did not present anything to show that
the remedies available to the GSIS were insufficient. If the Petition
itself admitted to the existence of other remedies,58 then the burden
of proving that there was an exception was on the party seeking
that exception; in the absence of proof the Petition must be
denied.59 This burden of proof is “the duty of a party to present such
amount of evidence on the facts in issue as the law deems
necessary for the establishment of his claim.”60
_______________
54 Cabaron v. People, G.R. No. 156981, 5 October 2009, 603 SCRA 1, 7.
55 Id.
56 Padua v. Ranada, 439 Phil. 538, 552; 390 SCRA 663, 677 (2002); National Power Corporation v.
Province of Quezon and Municipality of Pagbilao, G.R. No. 171586, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA
71; Olivares v. Marquez, 482 Phil. 183, 192; 438 SCRA 679, 687 (2004).
57 1997 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
58 Rollo, p. 185.
59 Teotico v. Agda, 274 Phil. 960, 979-981; 197 SCRA 675, 693 (1991).
60 Destreza v. Riñoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, 30 October 2009, 604 SCRA 775, 785; New Sun Valley
Homeowners’ Association Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay, G.R. No. 156686, 27 July 2011, 654 SCRA
438; Santos v. National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 171129, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 345.
180
The failure to fulfill the requirements of Rule 65 disallows the
CA from taking due course of the Petition;61otherwise appeals and
motions for reconsideration would be rendered meaningless, 62 as
stated time and again by this Court:
[I]f resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.63 x x x.
Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability

of other agencies of government to deal with the issues within their
respective specializations prior to any court intervention.64 The
Court has reasoned thus:
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must
allow administrative agen-
_______________
61 William Golangco Construction Corporation, v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163582, 9
August 2010, 627 SCRA 74, 82-83.
62 Dimarucot v. People, G.R. No. 183975, 20 September 2010, 630 SCRA 659, 668-669; Domdom v. Third
and Fifth Divisions of Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 182382-83, 24 February 2010, 613 SCRA 528.
63 Ongsuco v. Malones, G.R. No. 182065, 27 October 2009, 604 SCRA 499, 511-512.
64 Fua, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 175803, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 347.
181
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 181

cies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails
lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.65
The 1987 Constitution created the constitutional commissions as

independent constitutional bodies, tasked with specific roles in the
system of governance that require expertise in certain fields. 66 For
COA, this role involves
[T]he power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charter[.] x x x.67
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions,

COA has been empowered to define the scope of its audit and
examination and to establish the techniques and methods required
therefor; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.68
Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the
courts must exercise caution when intervening with disputes
involving these independent bodies, for
_______________
65 Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization Inc. v. Megaworld Properties and
Holdings Inc., G.R. No. 175039, 18 April 2012, 670 SCRA 83, 89.
66 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX.
67 Id., at Sec. 2(1).
68 National Irrigation Administration v. Enciso, 523 Phil. 237, 242; 489 SCRA 570, 575 (2006).
182
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them
and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.69
COA was not exercising judicial,

quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions when it issued LAO
Order No. 2004-093.
LAO Order No. 2004-093 reads as follows:
SUBJECT:SPECIAL AUDIT/INVESTIGATION ON
SELECTED TRANSACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) FROM CY 2000 TO
2004.
Pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated August 26, 2002, a team is hereby
constituted composed of the following personnel, namely:
xxxx
who shall conduct a special audit on selected transactions for the period 2000-2004 with
particular attention on the creation of subsidiaries such as GSIS Properties, Inc., missing
paintings, cash advances and allowances/benefits of the Officers and Members of the Board
of Trustees of the GSIS within a period of ten (10) working days and shall submit the
appropriate report thereon within five (5) days after completion of the audit to the Director,
Legal and Adjudication Office―Office of Legal Affairs who shall supervise the proper
implementation of this order.
Travel and other incidental expenses that may be incurred with this assignment shall be
charged against the appropriate funds
_______________
69 Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization Inc. v. Megaworld Properties and Holdings Inc.,
supra note 65, at p. 90.
183
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 183

of this Commission and the Team Leaders are hereby authorized to draw a cash advance of
P1,900 to defray out of pocket expenses subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules
and regulations.
By virtue of Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 in relation to Item III.A.6 of COA
Memorandum 2002-053, the team shall have the authority to administer oaths, take
testimony, summon witnesses and compel the production of documents by compulsory
processes in all matters relevant to this audit/investigation. x x x.70
This was obviously not an exercise of judicial power, which is

constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court and such other courts
as may be established by law.71 Neither was it an exercise of quasi-
judicial power, as administrative agencies exercise it “to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” 72 The
Court has made this point clear:
In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.73
Yet issuing the Order was not ministerial, because it required

the exercise of discretion. Ministerial acts do not require discretion
or the exercise of judgment, but only the performance of a duty
pursuant to a given state of facts in the manner prescribed.74 The
Order obviously involved discretion,
_______________
70 Rollo, pp. 85-86.
71 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
72 Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 156; 408
SCRA 678, 687 (2003).
73 Id., at pp. 156-157; p. 687.
74 Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 273, 277.
184
in both the choice of the personnel and the powers/functions to be
given them.
A Rule 65 petition for prohibition can only be aimed at judicial,
quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions.75 Since the issuance of the
LAO Order assailed was not characterized by any of the three
functions, as shown supra, then it follows that the GSIS chose the
wrong remedy. Moreover, “where it is the Government which is
being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the
presumption of validity, such discretion [to enjoin] must be
exercised with utmost caution.76
THE WRIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED.
Writs of injunction do not perfunctorily issue from the courts.
For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that
the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right,
the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this
case, respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. (Emphasis supplied) 77
The CA Resolution stated the following as its reason for issuing

the writ of preliminary injunction:
It should be noted that the instant petition precisely questions the creation of the
respondent SAT, and consequently, the validity of its actions. In order to completely review
and adjudicate the matters
_______________
75 1997 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2.
76 Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino, G.R. No. 177130, 7 June 2011, 651 SCRA 128, 136-140.
77 Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 163117, 18 December 2009, 608 SCRA 433, 440.
185
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 185

raised herein, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is warranted in the meantime in
order to preserve the status quo and to avoid grave and irreparable injury should the
recommendations in the AOM and special audit report regarding the notices of
disallowance of certain GSIS transactions be enforced. Furthermore, such recourse is
necessary in order not to render moot any pronouncement that this Court may render in
this petition.78
From its ruling, it is clear that the CA erred in granting a TRO

and writ of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is
proper only when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the
relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be
defended.79 Factually, there must exist “a right to be protected and
that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative
of the said right.”80 As this Court has previously ruled, “[w]hile the
existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must
be clear.”81
Lacking a clear legal right,82 the provisional remedy should not
have been issued, all the more because the factual support for
issuing the writ had not been established. In giving injunctive
relief, courts cannot reverse the burden of proof, for to do so “would
assume the proposition which the petitioner is inceptively duty
bound to prove.”83 This concern is not a mere technicality, but lies
at the heart of procedural law, for every case before a court of law
requires a cause of action.84
_______________
78 Rollo, p. 81.
79 Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 24 November 2009, 605 SCRA 196,
208.
80 National Power Corporation v. Hon. Vera, 252 Phil. 747, 752; 170 SCRA 721, 727 (1989).
81 Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon, supra note 79.
82 See Fua, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, supra note 64; Rosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89554, 10
July 1992, 211 SCRA 384, 387.
83 Government Service Insurance System v. Hon. Florendo, 258 Phil. 694, 705; 178 SCRA 76, 87 (1989).
84 Republic vs. Hon. De Los Angeles, 148-B Phil. 902, 921; 41 SCRA 422, 439 (1971).
186
Moreover, there was no urgency in the request of the GSIS for
injunctive relief, because no notice of disallowance had been issued.
The CA held that since there was a question on the validity of the
SAT and a corresponding threat of a notice of disallowance, then
the status quo must be preserved.85 Its criteria falls short of the
“clear legal right” standard. Even if there was a notice of
disallowance, the COA’s rules for contesting the issuance would
have been the proper remedy; otherwise, any administrative
dispute settlement procedure would be rendered useless by the
simple filing of an injunctive suit in court.
THE SAT WAS VALIDLY CONSTITUTED.
We come now to the crux of the dispute: the validity of the
creation of the SAT. Much as the procedural discussion already
leads this Court to a conclusion, in the interest of justice and in
consideration of the manifest desire of both parties to have the
matter dealt with in this forum, it shall rule on the validity of the
SAT, notwithstanding the procedural infirmities of the original
Petition in the CA. This power is vested in this Court when so
required by the exigencies of the case.86 The exercise of this power
is especially important in this case, because the justification of
GSIS for directly seeking court intervention is based on the alleged
invalidity of the SAT’s creation. Considering that court
intervention must be put to an end, and that the question has its
roots in the powers of a constitutional commission, we rule on the
merits of the case.
As previously discussed, the COA has “the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or per-
_______________
85 Rollo, pp. 79-81, 83-84.
86 Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, 665
SCRA 176.
187
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 187
taining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter[.] x x x.”87The Constitution
further provides as follows:
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article,
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.88
The Constitution grants the COA the exclusive authority to

define the scope of its audit and examination, and establish the
techniques and methods therefor. Pursuant to this authority, COA
Memorandum No. 2002-053 was promulgated, giving the General
Counsel the authority to deputize a special audit team, viz.:
In case the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office for the sector in the Central Office
finds that the transaction/event is a proper subject of special or fraud audit, he shall
recommend the creation of a special audit team for approval of the General Counsel who
shall sign the office order for the purpose. This memorandum shall constitute authority for
the General Counsel to deputize the team pursuant to the provisions of Section 40 of P.D.
1445.89
This Memorandum, in turn, draws its force from COA Resolution

No. 2002-005,90 the preamble of which states:
_______________
87 1987 CONSTITUTION, at Art. IX, Sec. 2(1).
88 1987 CONSTITUTION, at Art. IX-D, Sec. 2(2).
89 COA Memorandum No. 2002-053, Guidelines on the Delineation of the Auditing and Adjudication
Functions, 26 August 2002, III (A) Sec. 6.
90 COA Resolution No. 2002-005, COA Organizational Restructuring, 17 May 2002, Preamble.
188
WHEREAS, the Constitution (Article IX, D [2]) invests the Commission on Audit with
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination as well as establish
the techniques and methods required therefor;
WHEREAS, inherent in this authority is the prerogative of COA to organize its
manpower in such a manner that would be appropriate to cope with its defined scope of
audit as well as the methods and techniques it prescribes or adopts;
WHEREAS, since such scope of audit, methods and techniques vary from time to time as
the exigencies of the situation may demand, COA is impelled to continually restructure its
organization to keep abreast of the necessary changes;
WHEREAS, invoking the independence and fiscal autonomy which the Constitution
guarantees, COA has in the past successfully effected various changes in its organizational
structure within the limits of its appropriations; x x x.
The validity of the SAT, therefore, cannot be contested on the
grounds claimed by GSIS. If ever it has a cause for complaint, it
should refer to the conduct of the audit, and not to the validity of
the auditing body. And since the COA itself provides for the
procedure to contest such audit, the Court must not interfere.
Simplifying it once and for all,
The increasing pattern of law and legal development has been to entrust “special cases”
to “special bodies” rather than the courts. As we have also held, the shift of emphasis is
attributed to the need to slacken the encumbered dockets of the judiciary and so also, to
leave “special cases” to specialists and persons trained therefor. (Emphasis
supplied)91
CONCLUSION
Once again, the Court must remind the parties to judicial
disputes to adhere to the standards for litigation as set by
_______________
91 Qualitrans Limousine Service Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service, 259 Phil. 175, 189; 179 SCRA
569, 581 (1989).
189
VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 189
procedural rules. These rules exist primarily for the benefit of
litigants, in order to afford them both speedy and appropriate relief
from a body duly authorized by law to dispense the remedy. If a
litigant prematurely invokes the jurisdiction of a court, then the
potential result might be a deafening silence. Although we
recognize that justice delayed is justice denied,92 we must also bear
in mind that justice in haste is justice defiled.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
GRANTED, the Resolutions dated 9 August 2006 and 23
September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90484 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The CA is directed to dismiss the Petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 90484.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., No part.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition granted, resolutions
annulled and set aside.
Notes.―Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after
all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted; The
non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the
grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the
complaint. (National Electrification Administration vs. Villanueva,
614 SCRA 659 [2010])
_______________
August 1, 2017. G.R. No. 210669.*
HI-LON MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs.COMMISSION

ON AUDIT, respondent.
Civil Law; Easement of Right-of-Way; Words and Phrases; Under the Philippine
Highway Act of 1953, “right-of-way” is defined as the land secured and reserved to the public
for highway purposes, whereas “highway” includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage
structures, signs, guard rails, and protective structures in connection with highways.—
Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is not just an ordinary asset,
but is being used as a RROW for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project, a road
devoted for a public use since it was taken in 1978. Under the Philippine Highway Act of
1953, “right-of-way” is defined as the land secured and reserved to the public for highway
purposes, whereas “highway” includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage structures,
signs, guard rails, and protective structures in connection with highways. Article 420 of the
New Civil Code considers as property of public dominion those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character.
Same; Same; Public Dominion; Being of similar character as roads for public use, a
road right-of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public dominion, which is
outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a con-
_______________
* EN BANC.
541
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 541
Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit
tract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other
incidental matters.—Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-of-way
(RROW) can be considered as a property of public dominion, which is outside the commerce
of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract, except insofar as
they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental matters. However,
this RROW must be differentiated from the concept of easement of right-of-way under
Article 649 of the same Code, which merely gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal
interest on the property but grants no title thereto, inasmuch as the owner of the servient
estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use
the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.
Same; Same; Same; As a property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a
road right-of-way (RROW) cannot be registered in the name of private persons under the
Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title; and if erroneously included in
a Torrens Title, the land involved remains as such a property of public dominion.—As a
property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a RROW cannot be registered in
the name of private persons under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a
Torrens Title; and if erroneously included in a Torrens Title, the land involved remains as
such a property of public dominion. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), the Court declared that properties of public dominion, being
for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private
sale. “Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.”
Same; Land Registration; Torrens System; Section 39 of Act No. 496 and Section 44 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 provide for statutory liens which subsist and bind the
whole world, even without the benefit of registration under the Torrens System.—Section 39
of Act No. 496 and Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provide for statutory liens which subsist and
bind the whole world, even without the benefit of registration under the Torrens System.
Thus, even if the
542
TCTs of CIREC, PPIC, DBP and TGPI contain no annotation of such encumbrance, HI-
LON can hardly feign lack of notice of the government’s claim of ownership over the public
highway built along the RROW, and claim to be an innocent purchaser for value of the
entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property because such highway prompts actual notice of a
possible claim of the government on the RROW.
Same; Same; Easement of Right-of-Way; The failure of the government to register its
claim of road right-of-way (RROW) on the titles of Commercial and Industrial Real Estate
Corporation (CIREC), Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation (PPIC), Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and TG Property, Inc. (TGPI) is not fatal to its cause.—The
failure of the government to register its claim of RROW on the titles of CIREC, PPIC, DBP
and TGPI is not fatal to its cause. Registration is the ministerial act by which a deed,
contract, or instrument is inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and
annotated on the back of the TCT covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or
instrument. It creates a constructive notice to the whole world and binds third persons.
Nevertheless, HI-LON cannot invoke lack of notice of the government’s claim over the
29,690 sq. m. RROW simply because it has actual notice of the public highway built
thereon, which constitutes as a statutory lien on its title even if it is not inscribed on the
titles of its predecessors-in-interest, CIREC, PPIC, DBP, and TGPI. Indeed, actual notice is
equivalent to registration, because to hold otherwise would be to tolerate fraud and the
Torrens System cannot be used to shield fraud.
Eminent Domain; As a rule, the State, as represented by the government, is not estopped
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, especially true when the government’s
actions are sovereign in nature.—The mistake of the government officials in offering to buy
the 29,690 sq. m. RROW does not bind the State, let alone vest ownership of the property to
HI-LON. As a rule, the State, as represented by the government, is not estopped by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, especially true when the government’s actions
are sovereign in nature. Even as this rule admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and
fair play, none was shown to obtain in this case. Considering that only 59,380 sq. m. of the
subject property was expressly conveyed and sold by the government (through APT) to HI-
LON’s predecessor-in-interest (TGPI), HI-LON has no legal
543
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 543
right to claim ownership over the entire 89,070 sq. m. property, which includes the
29,690 sq. m. RROW taken and devoted for public use since 1978.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Where such an erroneous transfer is made, as in this
case, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real
owner of the land.—HI-LON’s assertion that the titles issued to TGPI and HI-LON
conclusively show that they are the registered owners of the entire 89,070 sq. m. property
in Calamba, Laguna, including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW is anathema to the purpose of the
Torrens System, which is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the
certificate of registration, but cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real
owner of the registered land. On point is the case of Balangcad v. Court of Appeals, 206
SCRA 169 (1992), where it was held that “the system merely confirms ownership and does
not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the
purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or
recognized by law. Where such an erroneous transfer is made, as in this case, the law
presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the
land.”
Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that “Commission
on Audit (COA) is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a
government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public
funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally
permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied
upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned.—COA may delve into the question
of ownership although this was not an original ground for the issuance of the Notice of
Disallowance, but only the proper valuation of the just compensation based on the date of
actual taking of the property. In Yap v. Commission on Audit, 619 SCRA 154 (2010), the
Court ruled that “COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by
a government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public
funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally
permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its
544
own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict
itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government
agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render the COA’s vital constitutional power
unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.” Tasked to be vigilant and conscientious
in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s and ultimately the people’s property,
the COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Considering that findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, it is only when the Court of Appeals (COA) acted with such abuse of discretion
that the Supreme Court (SC) entertains a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.—It is the policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on
the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the
laws they are entrusted to enforce. Considering that findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion, it is only when the COA
acted with such abuse of discretion that the Court entertains a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.—Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise
of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
545
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 545
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. No
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the COA when it affirmed the Notice of
Disallowance issued by the LAO-N in line with its constitutional authority and jurisdiction
over cases involving “disallowance of expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties found to be illegal, irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable.” Having determined that HI-LON does, not own the disputed RROW, the
COA correctly ruled that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just compensation and must
accordingly refund the partial payment made by the DPWH in the amount of
P10,461,338.00. To stress, even if HI-LON is the registered owner of the subject property
under TCT No. T-383819 with an area of 89,070 sq. m., the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29
October 1987 clearly shows that only the 59,380 sq. m. portion of the subject property, and
not 29,690 sq. m. portion used as RROW, was sold and conveyed by the government
(through APT) to HI-LON’s immediate predecessor-in-interest (TGPI).

Manuel C. Fausto, Jr. and Mary Claire M. Hernandezfor
complainant.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERALTA,J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to annul and set aside
the Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2011-0031 dated
January 20, 2011, which denied HI-LON Manufacturing, Inc.’s
(HI-LON) petition for review, and affirmed with modification the
Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2004-032 dated January 29, 2004
of COA’s Legal and Adjudication Office-National Legal and
Adjudication Section (LAO-
_______________
1 Signed by Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar, and Commissioners Juanito G. Espino, Jr. and Evelyn R.
Buenaventura.
546
N). The LAO-N disallowed the amount of P9,937,596.20,
representing the difference between the partial payment of
P10,461,338.00 by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) and the auditor’s valuation of P523,741.80, as just
compensation for the 29,690-square-meter road right-of-way taken
by the government in 1978 from the subject property with a total
area of 89,070 square meters (sq. m/s) supposedly owned by HI-
LON. The dispositive portion of the assailed COA’s Decision No.
2011-003 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, ND No. 2004-32 dated January 29, 2004
amounting to P9,937,596.20 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the reason thereof
that the claimant is not entitled thereto.
On the other hand, the Special Audit Team constituted under COA Office Order No.
2009-494 dated July 16, 2009 is hereby instructed to issue a ND for the P523,741.80
payment to Hi-Lon not covered by ND No. 2004-032 without prejudice to the other findings
to be embodied in the special audit report.2
This Petition likewise assails COA’s Decision3 No. 2013-212

dated December 3, 2013 which denied HI-LON’s motion for
reconsideration, affirmed with finality COA’s Decision No. 2011-
003, and required it to refund payment made by DPWH in the
amount of P10,461,338.00. The dispositive portion of the assailed
COA’s Decision No. 2013-212 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, Commission on Audit’s Decision No. 2011-003 dated January 20, 2011 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH FINAL-
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 49.
3 Signed by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan and Commissioners Heidi L. Mendoza and
Rowena V. Guanzon.
547
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 547
ITY. Hi-Lon Manufacturing Co., Inc. is hereby required to refund the payment made by the
Department of Public Works and Highways in the amount of P10,461,338.00.4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, the government, through the then Ministry of
Public Works and Highways (now DPWH), converted to a road
right-of-way (RROW) a 29,690 sq. m. portion of the 89,070 sq. m.
parcel of land (subject property) located in Mayapa, Calamba,
Laguna, for the Manila South Expressway Extension Project. The
subject property was registered in the name of Commercial and
Industrial Real Estate Corporation (CIREC) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40999.
Later on, Philippine Polymide Industrial Corporation (PPIC)
acquired the subject property, which led to the cancellation of TCT
No. T-40999 and the issuance of TCT No. T-120988 under its name.
PPIC then mortgaged the subject property with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government financing institution,
which later acquired the property in a foreclosure proceeding on
September 6, 1985. TCT No. T-120988, under PPIC’s name, was
then cancelled, and TCT No. T-151837 was issued in favor of DBP.
Despite the use of the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the property as
RROW, the government neither annotated its claim or lien on the
titles of CIREC, PPIC and DBP nor initiated expropriation
proceedings, much less paid just compensation to the registered
owners.
Upon issuance of Administrative Order No. 14 dated February 3,
1987, entitled “Approving the Identification of and Transfer to the
National Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Bank,” the DBP submitted all its acquired assets, including the
subject property, to the Asset
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 234.
548
Privatization Trust (APT) for disposal, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 50 dated 8 December 1986.
On June 30, 1987, APT disposed of a portion of the subject
property in a public bidding. The Abstract of Bids5indicated that
Fibertex Corporation (Fibertex), through Ester H. Tanco, submitted
a P154,000,000.00 bid for the asset formerly belonging to PPIC
located in Calamba, Laguna, i.e., “Land (5.9 hectares) TCT 4099,
buildings & improvements, whole mill,” while TNC Philippines,
Inc. and P. Lim Investment, Inc. submitted a bid of
P106,666,000.00 and P138,000,000.00, respectively. With respect
to the former assets of Texfiber Corporation (Texfiber) in Taytay,
Rizal, i.e., “Land (214,062 sq. m. TCT [493917] 506665, buildings &
improvements, whole mill),” only Fibertex submitted a bid of
P210,000,000.00.
In a Certification6 dated July 1, 1987, APT certified that Fibertex
was the highest bidder of PPIC and Texfiber assets for
P370,000,000.00, and recommended to the Committee on
Privatization to award said assets to Fibertex. In a Letter7 dated
November 10, 1988, APT certified that Fibertex paid APT
P370,000,000.00 for the purchase of the said assets formerly
belonging to PPIC and Texfiber.
Meanwhile, Fibertex allegedly requested APT to exclude
separate deeds of sale for the parcel of land and for improvements
under the subject property covered by TCT No. 151837 in the name
of DBP. Having been paid the full bid amount, APT supposedly
agreed with Fibertex that the land would be registered in the name
of TG Property, Inc. (TGPI) and the improvements to Fibertex.
Thus, APT executed two (2) separate Deeds of Sale with TGPI and
Fibertex with regard to the property, namely:
_______________
5 Id., p. 172.
6 Id., at p. 173.
7 Id., at p. 176.
549
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 549
a. Deed of Sale between APT and TGPI executed on October 29,
1987 for the sale of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
151837 for a consideration of P2,222,967.00.
b. Deed of Sale between APT and Fibertex executed on 19
August 1987 for the sale of improvements (machinery,
equipment and other properties) on the same property for a
consideration of P154,315,615.39.
Upon complete submission of the required documents and proof
of tax payments on December 9, 1987, the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna, cancelled DBP’s TCT No. 151837 and issued
TCT No. T-158786 in the name of TGPI, covering the entire 89,070
sq. m. subject property, including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW. From
1987 to 1996, TGPI had paid real property taxes for the entire
89,070 sq. m. property, as shown by the Tax Declarations and the
Official Receipt issued by the City Assessor’s Office and Office of
the City Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna, respectively.
On April 16, 1995, TGPI executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of HI-LON over the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property for a
consideration of P44,535,000.00. HI-LON registered the Deed with
the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, which issued in its
name TCT No. 383819.
Sometime in 1998, Rupert P. Quijano, Attorney-in-Fact of HI-
LON, requested assistance from the Urban Road Project Office
(URPO) DPWH for payment of just compensation for the 29,690 sq.
m. portion of the subject property converted to a RROW. The
DPWH created an Ad Hoc Committee which valued the RROW at
P2,500/sq. m. based on the 1999 Bureau of/ Internal Revenue (BIR)
zonal valuation.
On December 21, 2001, a Deed of Sale was executed between HI-
LON and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Lope S.
Adriano, URPO-PMO Director, by authority of the DPWH
Secretary, covering the 29,690 sq. m. parcel of land converted to
RROW for a total consideration of P67,492,500.00. On January 23,
2002, the Republic, through the DPWH, made
550
the first partial payment to HI-LON in the amount of
P10,461,338.00.
On post audit, the Supervising Auditor of the DPWH issued
Audit Observation Memorandum No. NGS VIII-A-03-001 dated
April 2, 2003 which noted that the use of the 1999 zonal valuation
of P2,500.00/sq. m. as basis for the determination of just
compensation was unrealistic, considering that as of said year, the
value of the subject property had already been “glossed over by the
consequential benefits” it has obtained from the years of having
been used as RROW. The auditor pointed out that the just
compensation should be based on the value of said property at the
time of its actual taking in 1978. Taking into account the average
value between the 1978 and 1980 Tax Declarations covering the
subject land, the Auditor arrived at the amount of P19.40/sq. m. as
reasonable compensation and, thus, recommended the recovery of
excess payments.
Upon review of the auditor’s observations, the Director of the
LAO-N issued on January 29, 2004 ND No. 2004-32 in the amount
of P9,937,596.20, representing the difference between the partial
payment of P10,461,338.00 to HI-LON and the amount of
P532,741.80, which should have been paid as just compensation for
the conversion of the RROW.
Acting on the request of Dir. Lope S. Adriano, Project Director
(URPO-PMO) for the lifting of ND No. 2004-032 dated January 29,
2004, the LAO-N rendered Decision No. 2004-172 dated May 12,
2004, affirming the same ND, and stating the value of the property
must be computed from the time of the actual taking.
Resolving (1) the motions for reconsideration and request for
exclusion from liability of former DPWH Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar, et al. (2) the request for lifting, of Notice of Disallowance
No. 2004-032 of OIC Director Leonora J. Cuenca; (3) the motion to
lift the disallowance and/or exclusion as person liable of Ms.
Teresita S. de Vera, Head, Accounting Unit, DPWH; and (4) the
appeal from ND No. 2004-032 of former Assistant Secre-
551
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 551
tary Joel C. Altea and of Mr. Rupert P. Quijano, Attorney-in-Fact
of HI-LON, the LAO-N issued Decision No. 2008-172-A dated June
25, 2008, which denied the appeal and affirmed the same ND with
modification that payment of interest is appropriate under the
circumstances.
Aggrieved, HI-LON filed a petition for review before the COA. In
its regular meeting on June 9, 2009, the COA deferred the
resolution of the petition, and instructed its Legal Service Section
to create a Special Audit Team from the Fraud Audit and
Investigation Office to investigate and validate HI-LON’s claim.
In its assailed Decision No. 2011-003 dated January 20, 2011,
the COA denied for lack of merit HI-LON’s petition for review of
the LAO-N Decision No. 2008-172-A, and affirmed ND No. 2004-
032 dated July 29, 2004 with modification declaring the claimant
not entitled to just compensation. The COA also instructed the
Special Audit Team to issue an ND for the P523,741.80 payment to
HI-LON not covered by ND No. 2004-032, without prejudice to the
other findings embodied by the special audit report.
On the issue of whether or not HI-LON is entitled to just
compensation for the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property,
the COA found that the evidence gathered by the Special Audit
Team are fatal to the claim for such compensation.
First, the COA noted that the transfer of the subject property in
favor of TGPI, the parent corporation of HI-LON, was tainted with
anomalies because records show that TGPI did not participate in
the public bidding held on June 30, 1987, as only three (3) bidders
participated, namely: Fibertex Corporation, TNC Philippines, Inc.,
and P. Lim Investment, Inc.
Second, the COA pointed out that the Deed of Sale between APT
and Fibertex has a disclosure that “The subject of this Deed of
Absolute Sale, therefore, as fully disclosed in the APT
552
Asset Catalogue, is the total useable area of 59,380 sq.
m.,”8 excluding for the purpose the 29,690 sq. m. converted to
RROW. The COA added that such exclusion was corroborated by
the Abstract of Bids duly signed by the then APT Executive
Assistant and Associate Executive Trustee, showing that the land
covered by TCT No. T-151387 was offered to the public bidding for
its useable portion of 5.9 hectares only, excluding the subject
29,690 sq. m. converted to RROW.
Third, the COA observed that HI-LON is a mere subsidiary
corporation which cannot acquire better title than its parent
corporation TGPI. The COA stressed that for more than (7) seven
years that the subject property was under the name of TGPI from
its registration on December 9, 1987 until it was transferred to HI-
LON on April 16, 1995, TGPI did not attempt to file a claim for just
compensation because it was estopped to do so as the Deed of Sale
executed between APT and TGPI clearly stated that the 29,690 sq.
m. RROW was excluded from the sale and remains a government
property. Applying the principle of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction since TGPI owns 99.9% of HI-LON, the COA ruled that HI-
LON cannot claim ignorance that the 29,690 sq. m. RROW was
excluded from the public auction.
Having determined that HI-LON or its predecessor-in-interest
TGPI does not own the RROW in question, as it has been the
property of the Republic of the Philippines since its acquisition by
the DBP up to the present, the COA concluded that the proper
valuation of the claim for just compensation is irrelevant as HI-
LON is not entitled thereto in the first place.
Dissatisfied, HI-LON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of COA
Decision No. 2011-003 and a Supplement thereto.
On December 3, 2013, the COA issued the assailed Decision No.
2013-212 denying HI-LON’s motion, for reconsideration, affirming
with finality its assailed Decision No. 2011-
_______________
8 Id., at p. 47.
553
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 553
003, and requiring HI-LON to refund the payment made by DPWH
in the amount of P10,461,338.00.
In this Petition for Certiorari, HI-LON argues that the COA
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it held (1) that there was no property owned by
HI-LON that was taken by the government for public use; (2) that
the 89,070 sq. m. subject parcel of land, including the 29,690 sq. m.
portion used as RROW by the government, had been the property
of the Republic of the Philippines; (3) that HI-LON is not entitled
to payment of just compensation; and (4) that it collaterally
attacked HI-LON’s ownership of the subject land, including the
RROW.9
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the COA
acted within its jurisdiction when it evaluated and eventually
disallowed what it found to be an irregular, anomalous and
unnecessary disbursement of public funds. The OSG agrees with
the COA that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just
compensation because the 29,690 sq. m. portion used as RROW is
already owned by the Republic since 1987 when DBP transferred
the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property to APT, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 14. The OSG emphasizes that the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1987 between the Republic
(through APT) and TGPI clearly stated that the subject thereof, as
fully disclosed in the APT Asset Specific Catalogue, is the total
useable area of 59,380 sq. m., hence, the 29,690 sq. m. portion used
as RROW was expressly excluded from the sale. Besides, the OSG
notes that the COA aptly found that there were only three bidders
who participated in APT’s public bidding of the subject property
and TGPI was not one of the bidders. There being an anomaly in
the transfer of the property from APT to TGPI, the OSG posits that
HI-LON, as TGPI’s successor-in-interest, is not entitled to just
compensation.
_______________
9 Id., at p. 21.
554
Stating that the intention of Proclamation No. 50 was to transfer
the nonperforming assets of DBP to the national government, the
OSG maintains that APT has no authority to offer for sale the said
portion because it is a performing asset, having been used by the
government as RROW for the Manila South Expressway since
1978. Considering that the said 29,690 sq. m. portion was not sold
and transferred by APT to TGPI, the OSG submits that TGPI
cannot also transfer the same portion to its subsidiary, HI-LON.
The OSG concludes that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just
compensation as it is not the owner of the said portion, and that
the COA properly ordered full disallowance of the P10,461,338.00
paid to HI-LON.
HI-LON’s Petition for Certiorari is devoid of merit.
In support of its claim of entitlement to just compensation, HI-
LON relies on the Deed of Sale dated October 29, 1987, and insists
that its predecessor-in-interest (TGPI) acquired from the national
government, through APT, the entire 89,070 sq. m. property, which
was previously registered in the name of DBP under TCT No.
151837. HI-LON asserts that the 29,690 sq. m. RROW was not
excluded from the sale because: (1) APT referred to the entire
property in the Whereas Clauses as one of the subject of the sale;
(2) APT made an express warranty in the said Deed that the
properties sold are clear of liens and encumbrances, which
discounts the need to investigate on the real status of the subject
property; and (3) the title registered in the name of DBP, as well as
the titles of the previous owners, CIREC and PPIC, contains no
annotation as regards any government’s claim over the RROW.
HI-LON’s assertions are contradicted by the clear and
unequivocal terms of the Deed of Sale10 dated 29 October 1987
between APT and TGPI, which state that the subject thereof is the
total usable area of 59,380 sq. m. of the subject property. Contrary
to HI-LON’s claim, nothing in the Whereas Clauses of the Deed
indicates that the object of the sale is the
_______________
10 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 188-191.
555
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 555
entire 89,070 sq. m. property, considering that the 29,690 sq. m.
portion thereof had been used as road right-of-way (RROW) for the
South Expressway, to wit:
xxxx
WHEREAS, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was the mortgagee of a
parcel of land (hereafter to be referred to as the “PROPERTY”) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-151837 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Laguna
(Calamba Branch), more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 2-D-I-J of the subd. plan Psd-39402, being a portion of Lot
2-D-l, described on plan Psd-18888, LRC (GLRO Rec: No. 9933, situated in the Bo. of
Mayapa & San Cristobal, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna. Bounded on
the N.E. by Lot No. 2-D-1-I; of the subd. plan; on the S., by the Provincial Road; on
the SW., by Lot 2-D-l-K of the subd. plan and on the NW., by Lot No. 2-B of plan
Psd-925. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being S. 62 deg. 03’W., 1946.22
from L.M. 5, Calamba Estate; Thence — N. 64 deg. 35’E., 200.27 m. to point 2; S.21
deg. 03’E. 166.82 m. to point 3; S. 12 deg. 30’E, 141.01 m. to point 4; S. 10 deg. 25’E,
168.29 m. to point 5; N. 84 deg. 47’W, 215.01 m. to point 6; N. 13 deg. 44’W., 150.99
m. Thence — to point 7; N. 13 deg. 45’W., 27.66 m. to the point of beginning;
containing an area of EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY (89,070) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground by PLS. cyl. cone. mons. bearings true detloop deg. 03’E., date
of original survey Jan. 1906 — Jan. 1908 and Sept. 1913 and that of subd. survey,
Aug. 23-25, 1953.
[As per Tax Declaration No. 9114, an area of 29,690 sq. m. had been used (road
right-of-
556
way) for the South Expressway. The subject of this Deed of Absolute Sale, therefore, as fully
disclosed in the APT Asset Specific Catalogue, is the total useable area of 59,380 sq. m.] 11
WHEREAS, the PROPERTY was subsequently acquired by DBP

at public auction in a foreclosure sale as evidenced by a Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated September 6, 1985 issued by Mr.
Godofredo E. Quiling, Deputy Provincial Sheriff, Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna, Philippines. x x x
WHEREAS, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14 issued on
February 3, 1987 [Approving the Identification of and Transfer to
the National Government of Certain Assets and Liabilities of the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Bank], DBP’s ownership and interest over the PROPERTY were
transferred to the National Government through the ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT), a public trust created under
Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8, 1986.
WHEREAS, in the public bidding conducted by the APT on June
30, 1987, the VENDEE [TGPI] made the highest cash bid for the
PROPERTY and was declared the winning bidder.
WHEREAS, the sale of the PROPERTY has been authorized by
the COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION under Notice of Approval
dated July 21, 1987 of the APT;
WHEREAS, the VENDEE [TGPI] has fully paid the VENDOR
[Government of the Republic of the Philippines, through APT] the
purchase price of the PROPERTY in the amount of PESOS: TWO
MILLION TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (P2,222,967.00).
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above
premises and for the sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOU-
_______________
11 Emphasis and underscoring added.
557
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 557
SAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN (P2,222,967.00),
Philippine Currency, paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR, the
VENDOR does by these presents sell, transfer and convey the
PROPERTY hereinabove described unto the VENDEE, its
successors and assigns, subject to the following conditions:
The VENDOR hereby warrant that the PROPERTIES shall be sold and transferred
free and clear of 1. liens and encumbrances accruing before August 18, 1987, and
that all taxes or charges accruing or becoming due on the PROPERTIES before said
date have or shall be fully paid by the VENDOR;
Documentary Stamp Taxes, Transfer Taxes, Registration fees, and all other
expenses arising out of or relating to the execution and delivery of this Deed shall be
for the account of and paid by the VENDEE; 2.
Capital gains tax, if any, payable on or in respect of the transfer of the PROPERTY
to the VENDEE shall be for the account of and paid by the VENDOR. 3.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be signed at
Makati, Metro Manila this [29th] day of [October], 1987.12
As the Deed of Sale dated October 29, 1987 is very specific that
the object of the sale is the 59,380. sq. m. portion of the subject
property, HI-LON cannot insist to have acquired more than what
its predecessor-in-interest (TGPI) acquired from APT. Article 1370
of the New Civil Code provides that if the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. Every
contracting party is presumed to know the contents of the contract
before signing and
_______________
12 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 188-190.
558
delivering it,13 and that the words used therein embody the will of
the parties. Where the terms of the contract are simple and clearly
appears to have been executed with all the solemnities of the law,
clear and convincing evidence is required to impugn it. 14 Perforce,
HI-LON’s bare allegation that the object of the Deed of Sale is the
entire 89,070 sq. m. area of the subject property, is self-serving and
deserves short shrift.
The Court thus agrees with the COA in rejecting HI-LON’s claim
of ownership over the 29,690 sq. m. RROW portion of the subject
property in this wise:
xxxx
As clearly shown in the Abstract of Bids, the subject of the bidding was 59,380 sq. m.
only. The Deed of Sale expressly states that —
[As per Tax Declaration No. 9114, an area of 29,690 sq. m. had been used (road
right-of-way) for the South Expressway. The subject of this Deed of Absolute
Sale, therefore, as fully disclosed in the APT Asset Specific Catalogue, is
the total useable area of 59,380 sq. ms.]
The government cannot enter into a contract with the highest bidder and incorporate
substantial provisions beneficial to the latter which are not included or contemplated in the
terms and specifications upon which the bids were solicited. It is contrary to the very
concept of public bidding to permit an inconsistency between the terms and conditions
under which the bids were solicited and those under which the bids were solicited and those
under which proposals are submitted and accepted. Moreover, the substantive amendment
of the terms and conditions of the contract bid out, after the bidding proc-
_______________
13 Conde v. Court of Appeals, 204 Phil. 589, 597; 119 SCRA 245, 252 (1982).
14 Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Merchandising Corporation, 148B Phil. 310, 331;
40 SCRA 624, 645 (1971).
559
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 559
ess had been concluded, is violative of the principles in public bidding and will render the
government vulnerable to the complaints from the losing bidders.
Thus, since the area of [29,690 sq. m. which later became] 26,997 sq. m. covered by the
ROW was not subject of the public bidding, Hi-Lon cannot validly acquire and own the
same. The owner of this property is still the Republic of the Philippines.
x x x x15
Citing Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization16 where it was

held that Proclamation No. 50 does not prohibit APT from selling
and disposing other kinds of assets whether they are performing or
nonperforming, necessary or appropriate, HI-LON contends that
regardless of whether or not the RROW is a performing or
nonperforming asset, it could not have been excluded in the sale of
the entire 89,070 sq. m. property pursuant to the said
Proclamation.
Concededly, the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property is
not just an ordinary asset, but is being used as a RROW for the
Manila South Expressway Extension Project, a road devoted for a
public use since it was taken in 1978. Under the Philippine
Highway Act of 1953, “right-of-way” is defined as the land secured
and reserved to the public for highway purposes, whereas
“highway” includes rights-of-way, bridges, ferries, drainage
structures, signs, guard rails, and protective structures in
connection with highways.17 Article 420 of the New Civil Code
considers as property of public dominion those intended for public
use, such as roads, canals, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character.
Being of similar character as roads for public use, a road right-
of-way (RROW) can be considered as a property of public
_______________
15 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 232. (Emphasis in the original).

16 G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 334, 347.
17 Article 11, Section 3(a) and (k), Republic Act No. 917.
560
dominion, which is outside the commerce of man, and cannot be
leased, donated, sold, or be the object of a contract,18 except insofar
as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other
incidental matters. However, this RROW must be differentiated
from the concept of easement of right-of-way under Article 64919 of
the same Code, which merely gives the holder of the easement an
incorporeal interest on the property but grants no title
thereto,20 inasmuch as the owner of the servient estate retains
ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of
the easement.21
As a property of public dominion akin to a public thoroughfare, a
RROW cannot be registered in the name of private persons under
the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title;
and if erroneously included in a Torrens Title, the
_______________
18 Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, 607 (1915).

19 The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which
is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the
proper indemnity. 649. Art.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs
of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the
land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
20 Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 285, 300; 407 SCRA 518, 526 (2003).
21 Article 630 of the NEW CIVIL CODE.
561
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 561
land involved remains as such a property of public
dominion.22 In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of
Appeals,23 the Court declared that properties of public dominion,
being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. “Any encumbrance, levy
on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is
void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services
will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.”24
It is, therefore, inconceivable that the government, through APT,
would even sell in a public bidding the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the
subject property, as long as the RROW remains as property for
public use. Hence, HI-LON’s contention that the RROW is included
in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 October 1987, regardless
whether the property is a performing or non-performing asset, has
no legal basis.
Neither can HI-LON harp on the express warranty in the Deed
of Sale that the subject property is clear from any encumbrance,
and the lack of annotation of the government’s claim of RROW on
the TCTs of CIREC, PPIC and DBP covering the subject property,
to bolster its claim of having acquired ownership of such property
in good faith.
There is no dispute as to the finding of COA Commissioner
Juanito G. Espino and DPWH Officer-in-Charge Manuel M.
Bonoan based on the examination of land titles of the subject
property that the entire 89,070 sq. m. area thereof was never
reduced in the process of seven (7) transfers of ownership from
Emerito Banatin, et al., in 1971 to HI-LON in 1996, nor was there
an annotation of a RROW encumbrance on the TCTs of CIREC,
PPIC, DBP and TGPI. Be that as it may, HI-
_______________
22 Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, 150A Phil. 806, 816; 45 SCRA 418, 428 (1972); Paras,
Edgardo L., Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Volume II, p. 47, 2008.
23 528 Phil. 181, 214; 495 SCRA 591, 624 (2006).
24 Id.
562
LON cannot overlook the fact that the RROW was taken upon the
directive of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways in 1978 for
the construction of the Manila South Expressway Extension
project. Such public highway constitutes as a statutory lien on the
said TCTs, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) and Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree
(Presidential Decree No. 1529):
Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value
in good faith, shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: 39.
Section
First .Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands
cannot require to appear of record in the registry.
SecondTaxes within two years after the same have become due and payable. .
Third .Any public highway, way, or private way established by law, where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or way have
been determined. But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of
registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights
shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with
the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any
other manner.
xxxx
44. SECTIONStatutory Liens Affecting Title.—Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser
of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same
free from
563
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 563
all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following
encumbrances which maybe subsisting, namely:
First .Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the
Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in
order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
SecondUnpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately
preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period
from the delinquent taxpayer alone. .
Third .Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state
that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been
determined.
FourthAny disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
.25
Section 39 of Act No. 496 and Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provide
for statutory liens which subsist and bind the whole world, even
without the benefit of registration under the Torrens System.
Thus, even if the TCTs of CIREC, PPIC, DBP and TGPI contain no
annotation of such encumbrance, HI-LON can hardly feign lack of
notice of the government’s claim of ownership over the public
highway built along the RROW, and claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value of the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property
because such highway prompts actual notice of a possible claim of
the government on the RROW.
_______________
25 Emphasis added.
564
Given that prospective buyers dealing with registered lands are
normally not required by law to inquire further than what appears
on the face of the TCTs on file with the Register of Deeds, it is
equally settled that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known
facts that should have put a reasonable person on guard.26 Their
mere refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them
innocent purchasers for value, if it later becomes apparent that the
title was defective, and that they would have discovered the fact,
had they acted with the measure of precaution required of a
prudent person in a like situation.27 Having actual notice of a
public highway built on the RROW portion of the subject property,
HI-LON cannot afford to ignore the possible claim of encumbrance
thereon by the government, much less fail to inquire into the
status of such property.
Invoking the principle of estoppel by laches, HI-LON posits that
the government’s failure to assert its right of ownership over the
RROW by registering its claim on the titles of CIREC, PPIC, and
DBP since the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the property was converted
to a RROW way back in 1978 until the purported sale of the entire
89,070 sq. m. property to TGPI in 1987, bars it from claiming
ownership of the RROW because it slept over its rights for almost
nine (9) years. HI-LON states that if it were true that the
government was convinced that it acquired the RROW, it would
have lost no time in registering its claim before the Register of
Deeds, instead of surrendering to TGPI the owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 151837 in the name of DBP, to facilitate the issuance of a
new title over the entire 89,070 sq. m. property, which includes the
29,690 sq. m. RROW. HI-LON further claims that the government
is estopped from claiming its alleged right of ownership of the
RROW because the DPWH itself offered to buy
_______________
26 Domingo v. Reed, 513 Phil. 339, 341; 477 SCRA 227, 229 (2005).
27 Id.
565
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 565
and, in fact, executed a Deed of Sale, thereby acknowledging that
the RROW is a private property owned by HI-LON.
The failure of the government to register its claim of RROW on
the titles of CIREC, PPIC, DBP and TGPI is not fatal to its cause.
Registration is the ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or
instrument is inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds and annotated on the back of the TCT covering the land
subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.28 It creates a
constructive notice to the whole world and binds third
persons.29Nevertheless, HI-LON cannot invoke lack of notice of the
government’s claim over the 29,690 sq. m. RROW simply because it
has actual notice of the public highway built thereon, which
constitutes as a statutory lien on its title even if it is not inscribed
on the titles of its predecessors-in-interest, CIREC, PPIC, DBP,
and TGPI. Indeed, actual notice is equivalent to registration,
because to hold otherwise would be to tolerate fraud and the
Torrens System cannot be used to shield fraud.30
Meanwhile, the mistake of the government officials in offering to
buy the 29,690 sq. m. RROW does not bind the State, let alone vest
ownership of the property to HI-LON. As a rule, the State, as
represented by the government, is not estopped by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents, especially true when the
government’s actions are sovereign in nature.31 Even as this rule
admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fair play, none
was shown to obtain in this case. Considering that only 59,380 sq.
m. of the subject property was expressly conveyed and sold by the
government (through APT) to HI-LON’s predecessor-in-interest
(TGPI), HI-LON has no legal right to claim ownership over the
entire 89,070 sq. m. property,
_______________
28 Tecklo v. Rural Bank of Pamplona, Inc., 635 Phil. 249, 259; 621 SCRA 262, 270 (2010).
29 Id.
30 Lavides v. Pre, 419 Phil. 665, 672; 367 SCRA 382, 388 (2001).
31 Heirs of Atty. Jose C. Reyes v. Republic, 529 Phil. 510, 519-520; 497 SCRA 520, 528 (2006).
566
which includes the 29,690 sq. m. RROW taken and devoted for
public use since 1978.
In arguing that the government had no legal title over the
RROW, HI-LON points out that the government acquired title
thereto only in 2001 when a Deed of Sale was executed between
HI-LON and the DPWH. HI-LON claims that when the
government used the 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property
as RROW in 1978, it never acquired legal title because it did not
institute any expropriation proceeding, let alone pay the registered
owner just compensation for the use thereof.
HI-LON’s claim of ownership over the said RROW has been duly
rejected by the COA in this manner:
xxxx
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14, S. 1987, pursuant to Section 23 of
Proclamation No. 50, the 89,070 sq. m. subject parcel of land, including the 29,690 sq. m.
which had been used as ROW by the Government, was transferred to and owned by the
National Government. TG Property, Inc. cannot acquire a portion of the parcel of land
without authority and consent of the Philippine Government, being the owner and seller of
the said property. Hi-Lon cannot even claim ownership on the portion of the subject land
without the said deed of sale executed by the Government in favor of TG Property, Inc. The
facts would show that the ROW has been the property of the Republic of the
Philippines since its transfer from DBP in 1987.
x x x32
It bears emphasis that the right to claim just compensation for

the 29,690 sq. m. portion which was not exercised by CIREC or
PPIC, ceased to exist when DBP acquired the entire 89,070 sq. m.
property in a foreclosure sale and later trans-
_______________
32 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 232. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis added).
567
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 567
ferred it to the national government (through APT) in 1987,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 50. Having consolidated its title over
the entire property, there is no more need for the government to
initiate an action to determine just compensation for such private
property which it previously took for public use sans expropriation
proceedings.
Citing Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which bars collateral attack to
certificates of title, HI-LON asserts that COA erred in ruling that
there was no property owned by HI-LON that was taken by the
government for public use, despite the fact that: (a) the ownership
of the subject property was not raised before the Commission
Proper of the COA; and (b) COA has no jurisdiction over issues of
ownership and entitlement to just compensation. HI-LON stresses
that the titles issued to TGPI and HI-LON conclusively show that
they are the registered owners of the entire 89,070 sq. m. property
in Calamba, Laguna, including the 29,690 sq. m. RROW. Absent
any proceeding directly assailing the said titles, the ownership of
the said property by HI-LON and TGPI is beyond dispute. HI-LON
further states that Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of
Appeals33 cited by the OSG is inapplicable because a notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the title subject of the case, unlike the
titles of TGPI and HI-LON which contain no annotation of claims
of ownership by the Republic.
Suffice it to state that there is no merit in HI-LON’s argument
that the TCTs issued in its name and that of its predecessor-in-
interest (TGPI) have become incontrovertible and indefeasible, and
can no longer be altered, cancelled or modified or subject to any
collateral attack after the expiration of one (1) year from the date
of entry of the decree of registration, pursuant to Section 32 of P.D.
No. 1529. In Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente
Ermac,34 the Court clarified the foregoing principle, viz.:
_______________
33 G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544.

34 451 Phil. 368; 403 SCRA 291 (2003). (Citations omitted)
568
x x x While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration
becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a
remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized
to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of
land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by
the registered owner.35
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.,36 the Court noted that what cannot be

collaterally attacked is the certificate of title, and not the title
itself:
x x x The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often
than not, represented by that document. x x x Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.
In Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo,37 the Court defined collateral attack

on the title, as follows:
x x x When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 376-377; pp. 297-298. (Citations omitted)

36 661 Phil. 307, 317; 645 SCRA 677, 689 (2011).
37 389 Phil. 153; 333 SCRA 628 (2000), cited in Caraan v. Court of Appeals, 511 Phil. 162, 170; 474
SCRA 543, 549 (2005).
569
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 569
which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding
is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.38
In this case, what is being assailed by the COA when it

sustained the Notice of Disallowance for payment of just
compensation is HI-LON’s claim of ownership over the 29,690 sq.
m. portion of the property, and not the TCT of TGPI from which
HI-LON derived its title. Granted that there is an error in the
registration of the entire 89,070 sq. m. subject property previously
in the name of TGPI under TCT No. 15678639 and currently in the
name of HI-LON under TCT No. T-38381940 because the 29,690 sq.
m. RROW portion belonging to the government was mistakenly
included, a judicial pronouncement is still necessary in order to
have said portion excluded from the Torrens title.41
HI-LON’s assertion that the titles issued to TGPI and HI-LON
conclusively show that they are the registered owners of the entire
89,070 sq. m. property in Calamba, Laguna, including the 29,690
sq. m. RROW is anathema to the purpose of the Torrens System,
which is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of
the certificate of registration, but cannot be used for the
perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered
land.42 On point is the case of Balangcad v. Court of
Appeals43 where it was held that “the system merely confirms
ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to
divest the lawful owner of his
_______________
38 Id., at p. 165; p. 640.

39 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
40 Id., at pp. 294-295.
41 Zobel v. Mercado, 108 Phil. 240, 242 (1960).
42 Balangcad v. Justice of the Court of Appeals, 283 Phil. 59, 65; 206 SCRA 169, 175 (1992).
43 Id.
570
title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not
acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law.
Where such an erroneous transfer is made, as in this case, the law
presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in
the real owner of the land.”
It is also not amiss to cite Ledesma v. Municipality of
Iloilo44 where it was ruled that “if a person obtains title, under the
Torrens system, which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not,
by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the land
illegally included.” Inasmuch as the inclusion of public highways in
the certificate of title under the Torrens system does not thereby
give to the holder of such certificate said public highways, 45 the
same holds true with respect to RROWs which are of similar
character as roads for public use.
Assuming arguendo that collateral attack of said titles are
allowed, HI-LON claims that its right of ownership of the subject
RROW can no longer be assailed by the COA because it never
questioned such right until after it denied the petition for review.
HI-LON notes that ND No. 2004-032 was issued and it was denied
payment of just compensation for the RROW solely on the ground
that such compensation should be based on the value of the lot at
the time of the actual taking by the government in 1978. HI-LON
avers that it was surprised to find out that in the Decision dated 20
January 2011, the COA Commission Proper assailed for the first
time TGPI’s and HI-LON’s right of ownership over the RROW,
instead of merely finding whether or not the valuation of the
property should be based on the value at the time of the taking in
1978 or the value of the P2,500.00/sq. m.
HI-LON’s arguments fail to persuade.
_______________
44 49 Phil. 769, 773 (1926).

45 Id., at p. 774.
571
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 571
COA may delve into the question of ownership although this was
not an original ground for the issuance of the Notice of
Disallowance, but only the proper valuation of the just
compensation based on the date of actual taking of the property.
In Yap v. Commission on Audit,46 the Court ruled that “COA is not
required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a
government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain
disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general
audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but
is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the
disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing
the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the
government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render the
COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby
useless and ineffective.” Tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government’s and ultimately
the people’s property, the COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.47
It is the policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally
created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.48 Considering
that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse
of discretion, it is only when the COA acted with such abuse of
discretion that the Court enter-
_______________
46 633 Phil. 174; 619 SCRA 154 (2010).

47 Delos Santos v. Commission on Audit, 716 Phil. 322, 332; 703 SCRA 501, 512 (2013).
48 Id., at pp. 332-333; p. 513.
572
tains a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.49
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;50 and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.51 No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
against the COA when it affirmed the Notice of Disallowance
issued by the LAO-N in line with its constitutional authority52 and
jurisdic-
_______________
49 Id.
50 Espinas v. Commission on Audit, 731 Phil. 67, 77; 720 SCRA 302, 314 (2014),
citing Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
51 Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 657 Phil. 209, 236; 642 SCRA 210, 236-237
(2011).
52 Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution states:
The Commission on Audit shall have the 2(1). Sectionpower, authority and
duty to examine, audit, and settles all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or -controlled corporations with original charters, and on post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or -controlled Corporations and their subsidiaries; and
(d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly,
from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting,
institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
xxx
The Commission shall have (2)exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
573
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 573
tion over cases involving “disallowance of expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties found to be illegal, irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.”53 Having
determined that HI-LON does, not own the disputed RROW, the
COA correctly ruled that HI-LON is not entitled to payment of just
compensation and must accordingly refund the partial payment
made by the DPWH in the amount of P10,461,338.00. To stress,
even if HI-LON is the registered owner of the subject property
under TCT No. T-383819 with an area of 89,070 sq. m., the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 29 October 1987 clearly shows that only the
59,380 sq. m. portion of the subject property, and not 29,690 sq. m.
portion used as RROW, was sold and conveyed by the government
(through APT) to HI-LON’s immediate predecessor-in-interest
(TGPI).
In light of the foregoing disquisition, HI-LON’s prayer for
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Injunction
must necessarily be denied for lack of clear and unmistakable right
over the disputed 29,690 sq. m. portion of the subject property.
Lastly, from the finality of the Court’s decision until full
payment, the total amount to be refunded by HI-LON shall earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, pursuant
to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013, because such interest is
and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties. (Emphasis added)
53 Section 1, Rule II, 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit.
574
imposed by reason of the Court’s decision and takes the nature of a
judicial debt.54
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Commission on
Audit’s Decision No. 2011-003 dated January 20, 2011 and
Decision No. 2013-212 dated December 3, 2013 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that a legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid, is
imposed on the amount of P10,461,338.00 that HI-LON
Manufacturing Co., Inc. is required to refund to the Department of
Public Works and Highways.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Martires, Tijam and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., No part prior OSG action.
Caguioa, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, judgments affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Section 3(A) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended,
substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by
transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just
compensation for such right-of-way easement shall not exceed 10
percent of the market value; As held in National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation,
437 SCRA 60 (2004), the taking of property was purely an
easement of a right-of-way, but we never-
_______________
54 Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21,
2015, 756 SCRA 389, 415; See also Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267; 703 SCRA 439 (2013).
575
VOL. 833, AUGUST 1, 2017 575
theless ruled that the full market value should be paid instead of
an easement fee. (National Power Corporation vs. Co, 578 SCRA
234 [2009])
An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot be
acquired through prescription. (Alolino vs. Flores, 788 SCRA 92
[2016])
March 7, 2017. .R. No. 197762.*
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD represented by

CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, and
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARTURO M. LACHICA,
petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION represented by
CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III and PUBLIC
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA
V. RUEDA-ACOSTA, DEPUTY CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEYS
MACAPANGCAT A. MAMA, SYLVESTRE A. MOSING,
REGIONAL PUBLIC ATTORNEYS CYNTHIA M. VARGAS,
FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, TOMAS B. PADILLA, RENATO T.
CABRIDO, SALVADOR S. HIPOLITO, ELPIDIO C. BACUYAG,
DIOSDADO S. SAVELLANO, RAMON N. GOMEZ, MARIE G-
REE R. CALINAWAN, FLORENCIO M. DILOY, EDGARDO D.
GONZALEZ, NUNILA P. GARCIA, FRANCIS A. CALATRAVA,
DATUMANONG A. DUMAMBA, EDGAR Q. BALANSAG,
PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV MARVIN R. OSIAS, PUBLIC
ATTORNEY IV HOWARD B. AREZA, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV
IMELDA C. ALFORTE-GANANCIAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Cases Where a Resort
to the Extraordinary Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition is Proper.—It
is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution entrusts to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)the
administration of the civil service, which is comprised of “all branches,
subdivi-
_______________
* EN BANC.
483
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 483
Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service Commission
sions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original
charters.”—Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC the
administration of the civil service, which is comprised of “all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original
charters.” In particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the mandate
of this independent constitutional commission: SECTION 3. The Civil
Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures
to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks,
and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.
Same; Same; Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof
enumerates the specific powers and functions of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) while recognizing its comprehensive authority over all
civil service matters.—Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12
thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while
recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters.
Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11), (14), and (19), are of particular relevance
to this dispute: SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.—The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions: (1) Administer and enforce
the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service; (2) Prescribe, amend and enforce
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and other pertinent laws; (3) Promulgate policies, standards
and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to
promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the
government; (4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration,
maintenance and implementation of position classification and
compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation and
reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions; (5) Render opinion and
rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be
binding on all heads of departments, offices
484
and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari; x x x x (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with
such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory.
Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy thereof; x x x x (14) Take appropriate action on all appointments
and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of
Service beyond retirement age; x x x x (19) Perform all functions properly
belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may
be provided by law.
Administrative Law; Career Executive Service; The Career Executive
Service (CES) was created to “form a continuing pool of well-selected and
development-oriented career administrators who shall provide competent
and faithful service.”—The CES was created to “form a continuing pool of
well-selected and development-oriented career administrators who shall
provide competent and faithful service.” The CESB was likewise
established to serve as the governing body of the CES with the following
functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the
selection, classification, compensation and career development of members
of the CES; (b) to set up the organization and operation of the civil service
in accordance with the guidelines provided in the plan; (c) to prepare a
program of training and career development for members of the CES; (d)
to investigate and adjudicate administrative complaints against members
of the CES. When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB
was given the additional authority to (a) identify other officers belonging
to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by law; and (b)
prescribe requirements for entrance to the third level.
Same; Career Executive Service Board; The specific powers of the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB) over members of the Career
Executive Service (CES) must be interpreted in a manner that takes into
account the comprehensive mandate of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
under the Constitution and other statutes.—It is a basic principle in
statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution and other laws. In this
485
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 485
case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of the CES must
be interpreted in a manner that takes into account the comprehensive
mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and other statutes.
Same; Same; Appeals; Since the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) is an attached agency of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the
former’s decisions are expressly subject to the CSC’s review on appeal.—It
must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority
to review the decisions of agencies attached to it under Section 12(11),
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code: SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have
the following powers and functions: (11) Hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and
of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply
with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory.
Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy thereof. Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC, the
former’s decisions are expressly subject to the CSC’s review on appeal.
Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision,
the contention of the CESB that its decisions may only be appealed to the
Office of the President must fail.
Same; Same; Same; The rule on appeals to the Office of the President
only covers disciplinary cases involving members of the Career Executive
Service (CES). It is evident that this special rule was created for that
particular type of case, because members of the CES are all presidential
appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the
power to discipline.—The supporting provision cited by the CESB in
support of its argument refers only to administrative cases involving
the discipline of members of the CES: 5. The Board shall promulgate rules,
standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The
Board shall set up the organization and operation of the Service in
accordance with the following guidelines: xxxx
h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative
complaints against members of the Career Executive Service shall be
governed by Article VI, Chapter II and paragraph 1(d) of Article II,
Chapter III of this Part; provided, that
486
appeals shall be made to the Career Executive Service Board instead
of the Civil Service Commission. Administrative cases involving members
of the Service on assignment with the Board shall be investigated and
adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office of the
President. (Emphasis supplied) In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals
to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary cases involving
members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for
that particular type of case, because members of the CES are all
presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries
with it the power to discipline, it is only reasonable for the president to be
given the ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this
special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB Resolution
No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the
scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly
appealed to the CSC.
Legislative Power; The authority to prescribe qualifications for
positions in the government is lodged in Congress as part of its plenary
legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet
societal demands. From this authority emanates the right to change the
qualifications for existing statutory offices.—The authority to prescribe
qualifications for positions in the government is lodged in Congress as part
of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices
to meet societal demands. From this authority emanates the right to
change the qualifications for existing statutory offices. It was in the
exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406,
which provides for the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional
Public-Attorneys.
Career Executive Service Board; While the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB) has been granted the power to prescribe entrance
requirements for the third level of the civil service, this power cannot be
construed as the authority to modify the qualifications specifically set by
law for certain positions.—It is clear that occupants of the subject PAO
positions are only mandated to comply with requirements as to age,
citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is not at
all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to impose this
additional qualification as a
487
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 487
prerequisite to permanent appointments. To do so would be to amend
the law and to overrule Congress. While the CESB has been granted the
power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third level of the civil
service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the
qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence, even
granting that the occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise
managerial and executive functions as incidents of their primary roles, the
CESB has no power to impose additional qualifications for them. It cannot
use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express
provisions of statutes enacted by the latter.
Public Attorney’s Office; Prosecutors; Section 5 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The amendment was
done to provide for “the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges” of senior officials of both
the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and the National Prosecution Service
(NPS).—This Court must likewise reject the CESB’s contention that the
declassification of positions in the NPS (as a result of the enactment of
R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a supposed difference in
their functions. This argument goes against the express terms and the
clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is therefore untenable. As stated previously,
Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The
amendment was done to provide for “the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges” of
senior officials of both the PAO and the NPS. The deliberations of
Congress on R.A. 9406 reveal its intention to establish parity between the
two offices. The lawmakers clearly viewed these officers as counterparts in
the administration of justice.
Civil Service Commission; Appeals; The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel
agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) from Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) Resolution No. 918.—To fulfill the legislative intent to accord
equal treatment to senior officials of the PAO and the NPS, parity in their
qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the
revised qualifications of those in the NPS must also be considered
applicable to those in the PAO. The declassification of positions in the NPS
should thus benefit their counterpart positions in the PAO. There is no
justification for treat-
488
ing the two offices differently, given the plain provisions and the
rationale of the law. This Court would render nugatory both the terms and
the intent of the law if it sustains the view of the CESB. We cannot
construe R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the
amendments brought about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat the
legislature’s very purpose, which is to equalize the qualifications of the
NPS and the PAO. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
CSC acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel
agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the PAO
from CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed the said resolution,
which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted,
the third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an additional
qualification for these posts contravened not only the express terms, but
also the clear intent of R.A. 9406.
Bersamin,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; View that Rule 65 also
contemplates a situation in which appeal or another remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available but such appeal or other remedy is not
plain, speedy and adequate to address the petitioner’s grievance.—Section 1
and Section 2 of Rule 65, indeed, require that “there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Yet,
the requirement does not necessarily mean that the availability of the
appeal immediately bars the resort to certiorari and prohibition. My
understanding is that Rule 65 also contemplates a situation in which
appeal or another remedy in the ordinary course of law is available but
such appeal or other remedy is not plain, speedy and adequate to address
the petitioner’s grievance. The petitioner is then called upon, to so allege
in the petition, for certiorari or prohibition and to prove that there is no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available
to him, thus: [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to
allege with certainty in his verified petition facts showing that “there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law,” because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition
for certiorari. “Being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege
and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.” Where the
existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy
489
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 489
precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner must allege
facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or
unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed
himself of such remedy. A petition forcertiorari which does not comply
with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Prohibition; View that the availability of the
appeal under Rule 43 as a recourse from the adverse decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) should not immediately preclude the petitioner’s
resort to the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition provided the
petitioner could sufficiently show that such remedy would not be beneficial,
speedy and adequate to address its grievance.—The phrase no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in
Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 65 simply means that the appeal or other
remedy available in the ordinary course of law is not equally beneficial,
speedy and adequate. The appropriate remedy should not be merely one
that at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment
complained of in thecertiorari proceeding, but one that will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the
acts of the inferior court or tribunal concerned. Consequently, the
availability of the appeal under Rule 43 as a recourse from the adverse
decision of the CSC should not immediately preclude the petitioner’s resort
to the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition provided the
petitioner could sufficiently show that such remedy would not be
beneficial, speedy and adequate to address its grievance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the requirement that there be no
other available remedy in the ordinary course of law is not an ironclad
rule. The petition for certiorari or prohibition may still prosper despite the
availability of such other remedy in certain exceptional circumstances,
like: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
dictate; (b) when the interests of substantial justice so require; or (c) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.—We need to mention, too, that the requirement that there be
no other available remedy in the ordinary course of law is not an ironclad
rule. The petition for certiorari or prohibition may still prosper despite the
availability of such other remedy in certain exceptional circumstances,
like: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
dictate; (b) when the interests of substantial justice so require; or (c) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial au-
490
thority. As I see it, the petitioner has made out a case that falls under
the third exceptional circumstance. The CSC has been alleged to have
unduly exercised its jurisdiction over the appeal filed by the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO). The petitioner vigorously expressed its opposition
to the CSC’s jurisdiction over the case. The majority opinion even cites
the Motion for Clarification of the petitioner made in the CSC to argue
against the CSC’s jurisdiction because: (a) the appeal by the PAO involved
a controversy between two government agencies regarding questions of
law; and (b) the petitioner was an autonomous agency whose decisions
were appealable to the Office of the President.
Same; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review; View that the assailed
decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) was not within the purview
of the coverage of Section 1, Rule 43, because it was not in the category of
the “awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions” that
were reviewable under Rule 43.—Section 1 of Rule 43 provides: Section
1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n) The assailed decision of the
CSC was not within the purview of the coverage of Section 1, supra,
because it was not in the category of the “awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions” that were reviewable under Rule 43. It
related to the CSC’s determination of the strictly legal question of which
between the petitioner and CSC had jurisdiction over the question in
dispute. The
491
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 491
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC reviewable
under Rule 43 concern actions and disciplinary measures by or against
civil service officers and employees. Consequently, the assailed decision of
the CSC could be challenged by petition for certiorari and prohibition
provided the requisites for the challenge were properly alleged and duly
established.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

and Prohibition.
SERENO,CJ.:
The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain

positions in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). The Court is asked
to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly
included in the Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the
occupants of these positions must obtain third-level eligibility to
qualify for permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the
Court must also delineate the respective jurisdictions granted by
law to the competing authorities involved in this case — the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB).
Factual Antecedents
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 the CESB2 seeks

the reversal of the Decision3 and Resolution4of the CSC
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed on 9 August 2011, Rollo, pp. 6-52.
2 Represented by former CSC Chairperson Bernardo P. Abesamis, Executive
Director Ma. Anthonette Velasco-Allones, and Deputy Executive Director Arturo M.
Lachica.
3 Rollo, pp. 53-70; Decision No. 110067 dated 15 February 2011 penned by
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza and concurred in by Commissioner
Francisco T. Duque III.
4 Id., at pp. 71-75; Resolution No. 1100719 dated 1 June 2011 penned by
Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza and
492
declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a
CESB Resolution5 refusing to declassify certain positions in PAO;
and (b) the PAO positions involved in the appeal do not require
third-level eligibility.
The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute.
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB
Report on the CES Occupancy of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).6 This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled
positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the
required CES eligibility.
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney
Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing) sent a letter7 to CESB
Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her
that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were
already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to the occupants
thereof.
_______________
concurred in by Commissioners Francisco T. Duque III and Rasol L. Mitmug.

5 Id., at pp. 76-80; Resolution No. 918 dated 12 January 2011.
6 Id., at pp. 451-452; Memorandum dated 13 September 2010 and attachment.
7 Id., at pp. 84-85; Letter dated 29 September 2010 sent by PAO Deputy Chief
Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette
V. Allones.
8 Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 states in relevant part:
New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, to read as follows: 6. SEC.
16-A. “SEC.Appointment.—The Chief Public Attorney and the Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys shall be appointed by
the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Public Attorney. The
Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
493
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 493
A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by
Deputy Chief Mosing to reiterate its earlier communication. The
letter also contained supplementary arguments in support of the
assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence,
their occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law.
Based on the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of
its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to
Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB, through Deputy Executive
Director Arturo M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief
Mosing that the CESB would conduct a position classification
study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether they
may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.
The DOJ Legal Opinion
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote
a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima to
_______________
Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys shall not be removed or suspended,
except for cause provided by law; Provided, That the Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
the Regional Public Attorneys and The Assistant Regional Public Attorneys, the
Provincial Public Attorneys, the City Public Attorneys and Municipal District
Public Attorney shall preferably have served as Public Attorneys for at least five (5)
years immediately prior to their appointment as such. The administrative and
support personnel and other lawyers in the Public Attorney’s Office shall be
appointed by the Chief Public Attorney, in accordance with civil service laws, rules,
and regulations.”
9 Rollo, pp. 87-88; Letter dated 9 November 2010 sent by PAO Deputy Chief
V. Allones.
10 Id., at p. 86; Letter dated 10 November 2010 sent by CESB Deputy Executive
Director Arturo M. Lachica to PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A.
Mosing.
494
inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the
CESB.11 He also reiterated the PAO’s opinion that the subject
positions must be considered permanent in nature, and not subject
to CES requirements.12
In a letter13 sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-
Acosta on 3 January 2011, Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras
III elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:
Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-
level officials of the PAO are permanent is without merit. For one, the
positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and
Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. x x x.
xxxx
Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are occupying CES positions, it is
required by law that they should be CES eligibles to become permanent
appointees to the said position. x x x.
xxxx
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments of the
Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public
Attorneys are not permanent, despite your claims to the contrary,
considering that they do not possess the required CES eligibility for the
said positions. As such, they cannot invoke their right to security of tenure
even if it was expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO Law.
xxxx
Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are temporary, they
are required
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 90-92; Letter dated 9 November 2010 sent by PAO Deputy Chief
Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing to DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima.
12 Id., at p. 91.
13 Id., at pp. 93-105; Letter dated 3 January 2011.
495
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 495
to subsequently take the CES examination. In the absence of any evidence
that would show compliance with the said condition, it is presumed that
the top-level officials of the PAO are non-CES eligibles; therefore they may
be removed from office by the appointing authority without violating their
constitutional and statutory rights to security of tenure.14
The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an

appointment does not automatically translate to an exemption
from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the authority
to exempt certain positions from CES requirements.15 The DOJ
further rejected the claim that the occupants of the subject
positions were exercising quasi-judicial functions. It explained that
while the lawyers of the PAO regularly conduct mediation,
conciliation or arbitration of disputes, their functions do not entail
the rendition of judgments or decisions — an essential element of
the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.16
The CSC Legal Opinion

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its
letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal opinion on the
same matter.17 The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the
former’s decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter to
issue no further opinion or statement, oral or written, relative to
the qualifications of the PAO officials.18
On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal
opinion.19 Citing its mandate as an independent constitutional
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 96-101.

15 Id., at pp. 101-102.
16 Id., at pp. 103-105.
17 Id., at pp. 109-112; See letter dated 7 January 2011 Re: Appropriate
Eligibility for Key Positions in PA (Legal Opinion).
18 Id., at pp. 106-107; Letter dated 10 January 2011 sent by PAO Deputy Chief
V. Allones.
19 Id., at pp. 109-112.
496
commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to
“render opinions and rulings on all personnel and other civil
service matters,” the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not
required for the subject positions in the PAO:
The law is explicit that the positions [of] Chief Public Attorney, Deputy
Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney in PAO shall have the
same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of the
Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Regional
State Prosecutor, respectively. These, of course include, the eligibility
requirement for these positions. x x x.
xxxx
The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the
Prosecutor General (the retitled position of Chief State Prosecutor) has the
same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those of the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy
State Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications
as those of an associate justice of the CA. x x x.
xxxx
No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges in the
judiciary are required, among other things, practice of law as requirement
for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the Presiding Justice and the
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) have the same
qualifications as those provided for in the Constitution for Justices of the
Supreme Court[,] which includes, among other requirements, practice of
law. This means that the Constitution and the Civil Service Law prescribe
RA 1080 (BAR) as the appropriate civil service eligibility therefor.
Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g., CESE, CSEE)
is not proper, if not, illegal under the circumstances. In fact, even in the
1997 Qualification Standards Manual of the Commission, ail of these
positions require RA 1080 BAR eligibility for purposes of appointment.
xxxx
497
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 497
Thus, it is the Commission’s opinion that for purposes of permanent
appointment to the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no third-level eligibility is
required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.20
CESB Resolution No. 918
On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No.

91821 (CESB Resolution No. 918) denying the PAO’s request to
declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification
Study22 submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the
positions in question “require leadership and managerial
competence”23 and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the
appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these
posts cannot be considered permanent. The CESB explained:
WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent
rank as CES positions, the Secretariat revisited its previous classification
as part of the CES [of] the above positions of PAO and conducted a
position classification of the above positions and arrived at the following
findings:
1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys who
are all presidential appointees fall within the criteria set under CESB
Resolution No. 299, S. 2009, namely:
a. The position is a career position;
b. The position is above division chief level;
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 110-112.

21 Resolution No. 918, id., at pp. 87-88.
22 Agenda Item No. IV-8; id., at pp. 113-116.
23 Id., at p. 114.
498
c. The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance
of executive or managerial functions.
2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which provides that:
3 SEC.. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
“Administrative Code of 1987,” to read as follows:
14-A “SEC. Powers and Functions.—The PAO shall independently
discharge its mandate to render, free of charge, legal representation,
assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the
service, the PAO may be called upon by proper government authorities
to render such service to other persons, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations.”
The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate of PAO to perform
only nonexecutive functions. All that the aforecited provision states is
that the PAO is mandated to render legal representation, assistance
and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases, free of charge. Notably,
the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys
evidently require leadership and managerial competence.
xxxx
WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject positions are CES in nature
and as such, the eligibility requirement for appointment thereto is CES
eligibility.
499
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 499
With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as
against that of the CSC, the CESB stated:
WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board
which has the mandate over Third-level positions in the Career Service
and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 provides:
8. SectionClasses of Positions in the Civil Service.—(1) Classes of
positions in the career service, appointment to which requires
examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
xxxx
(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive
Service.
x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed by the Career
Executive Service Board. (2)
WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998, February
22, 1983, 120 SCRA 760, the Supreme Court ruled that “where there are
two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict
with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be
taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act.”
WHEREAS, following the above cited rule, it is clear that Section 8,
Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 is the exception to [the] general act
pertaining to the authority of the CSC;
xxxx
500
WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in accordance with
existing laws and pertinent jurisprudence on matters pertaining to the
CES[.]24
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified

Notice of Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of Appeal26 with the CSC.
Proceedings before the CSC
Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on
the following grounds: (a) the resolution was rendered contrary to
R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071,27the 1987 Constitution and the
CSC letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB usurped the legislative
function of Congress when the former required additional
qualifications for appointment to certain PAO positions. The PAO
likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC,
because the latter had the power to review decisions and actions of
one of its attached agencies — the CESB.
In an Order28 dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the
CESB to comment on the appeal.
Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a
Motion for Clarification29 to assail the authority of the CSC to
review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no jurisdiction to
decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 77-79.

25 Id., at pp. 386-387; Urgent Notice of Appeal dated 14 January 2011.
26 Id., at pp. 389-412; Urgent Memorandum on Appeal dated 14 January 2011.
27 AN ACT STRENGTHENING AND RATIONALIZING THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION
SERVICE (2010).
28 Rollo, p. 117; Order dated 17 January 2011.
501
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 501
a controversy between two government entities regarding
questions of law;30 and (b) the CESB was an autonomous agency
whose actions were appealable to the Office of the President.31 In
addition, the CESB emphasized the inability of the CSC to render
an unbiased ruling on the case, considering the latter’s previous
legal opinion on the appropriate eligibility for key positions in the
PAO.32
In a Decision33 dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the
appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.
As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume
jurisdiction over the appeal, which involved the employment status
and qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil
service. It was supposedly a matter falling within its broad and
plenary authority under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code. The CSC also declared that the authority of the CESB over
third-level employees was limited to the imposition of entry
requirements and “should not be interpreted as cutting off the
reach of the Commission over this particular class of
positions.”34 Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the
revisory power of the CSC, given that an attached office is not
entirely and totally insulated from its mother agency.35 With
respect to the provision in the Integrated Reorganization Plan36 on
appeals from the CESB to the Office of the President, the CSC
construed this requirement as pertaining only to disciplinary
proceedings.37
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It
declared that the CESB would be in violation of R.A. 9406 if
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 118-131; Motion for Clarification dated 25 January 2011.

30 Id., at pp. 118-120.
31 Id., at pp. 120-122.
32 Id., at pp. 126-128.
33 Decision No. 110067, id., at pp. 53-70.
34 Id., at p. 65.
35 Id., at p. 66.
36 Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1.
37 Rollo, p. 66.
502
the latter would require an additional qualification — in this case,
third-level eligibility — for purposes of permanent appointments to
certain PAO positions:
The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO
positions under the existing laws. It is gleaned that nowhere in these laws
is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements for attaining tenurial security. All that the
laws uniformly prescribe for the positions in question is practice of law for
certain period of time, which presupposes a bar license. This being the
case, the CESB cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering the
policies of the third-level, validly impose qualifications in addition to what
the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of qualification
requirement which is not otherwise specified in the statutes. As an
administrative agency, the CESB can only promulgate rules and
regulations which must be consistent with and in harmony with the
provisions of the laws, and it cannot add or subtract thereto. Most
evidently, therefore, in promulgating the assailed resolution, which sets
out additional qualifications for the subject positions in the PAO, the
CESB has overstepped the bounds of its authority. x x x.
In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power of the CESB
to identify other positions equivalent to those enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 as being part of the third-level or CES for as
long as they come within the ambit of the appointing prerogative of the
President. Yet, such grant of authority is derived from a general law (the
Administrative Code) and hence, it must be deemed circumscribed or
qualified by the special law governing the PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO
Law, in conjunction with other laws, merely fixes practice of law as the
principal qualification requirement for the positions of Acosta, et al.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the CESB Resolution No. 918 dated
January 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for not being in
conformity
503
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 503
with law and jurisprudence. It is declared that the following key positions
in the Public Attorney’s Office do not require third-level eligibility and
CESO rank for purposes of tenurial security:
Chief Public Attorney; 1.
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys; 2.
Regional Public Attorneys; and 3.
Assistant Regional Public Attorneys. 4.38
The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion

was denied.39
Proceedings before this Court
On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40imputing

grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the
CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB,
given the latter’s autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB
Resolution No. 918 should have been appealed to the Office of the
President, and not to the CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part
III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO
positions are supposedly part of the CES, based on criteria
established by the CESB.41 These criteria were set pursuant to the
latter’s power to identify positions belonging to the third-level of
the civil service and to prescribe the requirements for entry
thereto. The Petition further reiterates the alleged inability of the
CSC to decide the case with impartiality.
In its Comment,42 the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the
CESB before this Court should be dismissed outright
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 68-70.

39 Resolution No. 11-00719, id., at pp. 76-80.
40 Petition for Certiorari dated 8 August 2011, id., at pp. 6-52.
41 See CESB Resolution No. 799, Omnibus Policy on the Coverage of the Career
Executive Service, 18 May 2009.
42 Rollo, pp. 572-588; Comment filed on 14 December 2011.
504
for being an improper remedy and for violating the hierarchy of
courts. The CSC further asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO’s
appeal from the CESB Resolution in this case. Citing its mandate
as the central personnel agency of the government based on the
1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, the CSC insists
that it has broad authority to administer and enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly
encompasses the power to review and revise the decisions and
actions of offices attached to it, such as the CESB. It also claims
that the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within
its jurisdiction.
Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own
Comment43 on the Petition. They assert that (a) the Petition should
be dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious procedural and
jurisdictional flaws; (b) the CSC properly exercised its jurisdiction
when it resolved the appeal in this case; and (c) CESB Resolution
No. 918 contravened R.A. 9406 in relation to the 1987 Constitution,
R.A. 10071 and the CSC letter-opinion dated 7 January 2011.
Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two
government offices, the Court likewise required the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of
the government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter.
On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required Comment. 44 On
the issue of jurisdiction, it supports the view of the CSC and the
PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code as the
sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB,
particularly with regard to personnel matters such as the
reclassification of positions.
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 256-341; Comment on the Petition for Certiorari dated 22

November 2011.
44 Id., at pp. 626-680; Comment dated 13 February 2012.
505
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 505
As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts that the subject
positions in the PAO should be declassified from the CES. It points
out that the primary function of these PAO officials — the
provision of legal assistance to the indigent — is specialized in
nature; in contrast, their managerial functions are merely
incidental to their role. The OSG further contends that the
manifest intent of the law is to require PAO officials to have the
same qualifications as their counterparts in the National
Prosecution Service (NPS). Consequently, the OSG argued that the
decision of the CESB to declassify certain posts in the NPS should
have likewise resulted in the declassification of the corresponding
positions in the PAO.
In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG,45 the CESB urges the
Court to adhere to the alleged limitations on the general authority
of the CSC over all matters concerning the civil service. In
particular, the CESB asserts its specific and exclusive mandate to
administer all matters pertaining to the third-level of the career
service. Included in these matters is the power to promulgate
rules, standards and procedures for the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of its members. Moreover,
the CESB insists that it is an agency within the Executive
Department under the Integrated Reorganization Plan; hence, its
decisions are appealable only to the Office of the President. Lastly,
the CESB maintains that the subject positions properly belong to
the CES, considering that executive and managerial functions
must be exercised by the occupants thereof.
Issues
The following issues are presented for resolution:

_______________
45 Id., Reply to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor filed on 29 May
2012; id., at pp. 688-748.
506
(1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper
remedy to question the assailed CSC Decision and Resolution;
(2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed
by the PAO and to reverse CESB Resolution No. 918;
(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it
reversed the CESB and declared that third-level eligibility is not
required for occupants of the subject PAO positions.
Our Ruling
We DENY the Petition.

At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an
improper remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC. In any event,
after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC
acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO’s appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled
that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject positions.
A petition for certiorari

and prohibition is not
the appropriate remedy
to challenge the ruling of
the CSC.
As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections

of respondents to the remedy availed of by the CESB to question
the ruling of the CSC.
Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by the CESB before this Court was improper,
because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for
review under Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB insists
507
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 507
that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is disputing the
authority and jurisdiction of the CSC.
We find in favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a
tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure requires the concurrence of both these
requisites:
1 Section .Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
2 Section .Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
508
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum, shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As

respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available to
the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 43 specifically provides
for appeals from decisions of the CSC:
1. SectionScope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are theCivil Service Commission, Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbi-
509
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 509
tration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
xxxx
5 Section. How appeal taken.—Appeal shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the
Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse
party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition
intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the
petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of
court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of
docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted
by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds
therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall
pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the denial. (Emphasis supplied)
In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, the CESB asserts that the allegations in its Petition
— the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CSC, as well as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of
discretion attending the latter’s ruling — are not suitable for an
appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds properly
pertain to a petition for certiorari and prohibition, this remedy is
more appropriate.
We find the CESB’s contention untenable. As previously
stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if both
requirements are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are
invoked; and an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
is unavailable. Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not
sufficient. This Court has, in fact, dismissed a Petition
for Certiorari assailing another CSC Reso-
510
lution precisely on this ground. In Mahinay v. Court of
Appeals,46 the Court ruled:
As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal
from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for
review filed with the CA.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its/his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence,certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error
in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion,. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution
to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43.
_______________
46 576 Phil. 170, 177-178; 553 SCRA 171, 179-180 (2008).
511
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 511
Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is improper regardless of the grounds invoked therein.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of
the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition. Indeed,
the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the
supposed transcendental importance of the issues raised, “as the
assailed CSC Decision is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the
Petitioner.” Even when confronted by respondents with regard to
the availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any
special justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal.
Instead, it opted to focus on the nature of the grounds asserted in
its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference to
grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a resort to a petition under
Rule 65.
Considering the failure of the CESB to offer a compelling
explanation for its insistence upon the special remedies
of certiorari and prohibition, the Court finds no justification for a
liberal application of the rules.
_______________
47 In Artistica Ceramica, Inc v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowners Association,
Inc., 635 Phil. 21, 33; 621 SCRA 22, 33 (2010), citing Jan-Dec Construction
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 96; 481 SCRA 556 (2006), the Court
enumerated the instances when certiorari may be resorted to despite the
availability of an appeal:
While there are instances where the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari may
be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, the long line of decisions
denying the special civil action for certiorari, either before appeal was availed
of or in instances where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumbers the
instances where certiorari was given due course. The few significant
exceptions are: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the
writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
512
In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As
will be further explained, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the PAO, the
CSC merely exercised the authority granted to it by the
Constitution as the central personnel agency of the government.
The CSC acted within

its jurisdiction when it
resolved the PAO’s ap-
peal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918.
At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the

respective authorities granted by law to two agencies involved in
the management of government personnel — the CSC and the
CESB. This particular dispute involves not only the jurisdiction of
each office over personnel belonging to the third-level of the civil
service, but also the relationship between the two offices.
On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members
of the CES. Specifically, it refers to the identification and
classification of positions belonging to the third-level, as well as the
establishment, of the qualifications for appointment to those posts.
The CESB further emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on the
basis of this Court’s ruling that its status as an attached agency
only pertains to policy and program coordination.
The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review
actions and decisions of its attached agencies, including the CESB.
The CSC further claims original and appellate jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving contested appointments, pursuant
to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government.
In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the
civil service, this Court must ensure that the respective
513
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 513
powers and functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined.
After analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to
each of these two agencies, the Court concludes that the CSC has
the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived
at this conclusion after a consideration of (a) the broad mandate of
the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code; and
(b) the specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB
in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the Administrative
Code.
As the central personnel

agency of the government,
the CSC has broad author-
ity to pass upon all civil
service matters.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC48 the
administration of the civil service, which is comprised of “all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations with original charters.”49In particular, Section 3 of
Article IX-B provides for the mandate of this independent
constitutional commission:
The Civil Service Commission, as the 3. SECTION central
personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career
service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels
and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive
to public accountability. It shall submit to the Presi-
_______________
48 Id., Section 1(1).

49 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article IX-B, Section 2(1).
514
dent and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
(Emphases supplied)
The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal

the intention to emphasize the status of the CSC as the “central
personnel agency of the Government with all powers and functions
inherent in and incidental to human resources management.” 50 As
a matter of fact, the original proposed provision on the functions of
the CSC reads:
The 3. Sec. Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the government, shall establish a career service,
promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y]
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to
compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law,
and exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental
to human resources management, to promote morale, efficiency, and
integrity in the Civil Service. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs, and perform such
other functions as may be provided by law.51(Emphases supplied)
Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in

the final version of 1987 Constitution,52 it is evident
_______________
50 Records (Vol. I), Constitutional Commission, p. 525 (14 July 1986).

51 Proposed Resolution No. 468, id., at p. 524.
52 Article IX-B, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the Presi- 3.
SECTION
515
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 515
from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a “central
personnel agency” was considered all-encompassing. The concept
was understood to be sufficiently broad as to include the authority
to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, to classify
positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in and
incidental to human resources management:
MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the
Civil Service as embodied in our original draft?
MS. AQUINO. No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35 to 40
of page 2 until line 1 of page 3 would not in any way minimize
the powers of the Civil Service [Commission] because they are
deemed implicitly included in the all-embracing definition and
concept of “central personnel agency of the government.” I
believe that the lines we have mentioned are but redundant articulation
of that same concept, unnecessary surplusage.
MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to promulgate policies
on personnel actions be encompassed by the Commissioner’s
amendment?
MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining lines 33 to
35. I proposed an amendment after the words “career service.” I am only
doing away with unnecessary redundancy.
MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in the
original provision are still being granted by the Civil Service
Commission despite the elimination of the listing of these
powers and functions?
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a central
personnel agency, it would
_______________
dent and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
516
have to necessarily execute all of these functions.
MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions be a
source of ambiguity and controversies later on as to the extent of the
powers and functions of the commission?
MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of ambiguity
because the concept of a central personnel agency is a generally
accepted concept and as experience would bear out, this function is
actually being carried out already by the Civil Service Commission,
except that we are integrating this concept. I do not think that it would
be susceptible of any ambiguity.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Yes, Commissioner Regalado is
recognized.
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification.
The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of the
Civil Service Commission — to promulgate and enforce policies
on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino kindly indicate to us
the corresponding provisions and her proposed amendment which would
encompass the powers to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions?
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already
subsumed under the concept of a central personnel agency.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functionsenumerated from
line 35 on page 2 to line 1 of page 3 inclusive,are understood to be
encompassed in the phrase “central personnel agency of the
government.”
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2
and line 1 of the subsequent page, it was only subjected to a little
modification.
517
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 517
MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase “. .
. promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to
compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be
provided by law” isunderstood to be subsumed under and
included in the concept of a central personnel agency.
MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that.53 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of

the CSC should therefore be read as the comprehensive authority
to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient
administration of the entire civil service, including the CES.
The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view.
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof
enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while
recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service
matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11), (14), and (19), are of
particular relevance to this dispute:
12 SECTION. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions
on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service; (1)
Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws; (2)
Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service
and adopt plans and programs (3)
_______________
53 Records (Vol. I), Constitutional Commission, pp. 592-593 (July 15, 1986).
518
to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel
administration in the government;
Formulate policies and regulations for the administration,
maintenance and implementation of position classification and
compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation
and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions; (4)
Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service
(5) matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments,
offices and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari;
xxxx
Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before
it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such
decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the
Supreme Court on (11) certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
xxxx
Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
matters in the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond
retirement age; (14)
xxxx
Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel
agency and such other functions as may be provided by law. (19)
It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory

provisions that the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
519
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 519
the government, has been granted the broad authority and the
specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. The question
before the Court today is whether this broad authority
encompasses matters pertaining to the CES and are, as such,
recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the CESB.
To allow us to understand the legal framework governing the
two agencies and to harmonize the provisions of law, it is now
necessary for the Court to examine the history and the mandate of
the CESB. It may thereby determine the proper relation between
the CSC and the CESB.
The CESB has been granted

specific and limited powers
under the law.
On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435 authorizing

the President to reorganize different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government. The statute also created a Commission on
Reorganization with the mandate to study and investigate the
status of all offices in the executive branch. This commission was
also tasked to submit an integrated reorganization plan to the
President, and later on to Congress, for approval. The Commission
was given until 31 December 1970 to present its plan to the
President.54
After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a proposed
Integrated Reorganization Plan55 was submitted to then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970. The plan included a
proposal to develop a professionalized and competent civil service
through the establishment of the CES — a group of senior
administrators carefully selected for
_______________
54 See Section 4 of R.A. No. 5435 as amended by R.A. Nos. 6076 and 6172.
55 Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972).
520
managerial posts in the higher levels.56 To promulgate standards
for the CES, the Commission on Reorganization recommended the
creation of the CESB:
To promulgate standards, rules and procedures regarding the

selection, classification, compensation and career development of
members of the Career Executive Service, a Board is proposed to
be established. The Board shall be composed of high-level officials
to provide a government-wide view and to ensure effective support
for the establishment and development of a corps of highly
competent, professional administrators.57
The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review, but
Martial Law was declared before the proposal could be acted upon. Four
days after the declaration of Martial Law, however, the Integrated
Reorganization Plan was approved by former President Marcos through
Presidential Decree No. 1.58 This approved plan included the creation of
the CES and the CESB.
The CES was created to “form a continuing pool of well-selected
and development-oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.”59 The CESB was likewise
established to serve as the governing body of the CES60 with the
following functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards and
procedures for the selection, classification, compensation and
career development of members of the CES;61 (b) to set up
56 Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National
Government: Summary Justifications and Supporting Tables (1972), p. III-
3.
57 Id., at p. III-4.
58 Presidential Decree No. 1, REORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (24 September 1972).
59 Integrated Reorganization Plan, Part III, Chapter I, Article IV(1).
60 Id., Article IV(2).
61 Id., Article IV(5).
521
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 521
the organization and operation of the civil service in accordance
with the guidelines provided in the plan;62 (c) to prepare a program
of training and career development for members of the CES; 63 (d) to
investigate and adjudicate administrative complaints against
members of the CES.64
When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB
was given the additional authority to (a) identify other officers
belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by
law;65 and (b) prescribe requirements for entrance to the third-
level.66
_______________
62 Id.
63 Id., Article IV 5(g).
64 Id., Article IV 5(h)
65 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section
7, states in relevant part:
7. SECTIONCareer Service.—The Career Service shall be characterized by (1)
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:
xxxx
Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President; (3)
66 Id., Section 8, states:
8. SECTIONClasses of Positions in the Career Service.—(1) Classes of positions in
the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped
into three major levels as follows:
xxxx
522
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers
granted to the CESB are specific and limited. This Court must now
determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers in
harmony with the broad constitutional mandate of the CSC.
The specific powers of the CESB

must be narrowly interpreted as
exceptions to the comprehensive
authority granted to the CSC by the
Constitution and relevant statutes.
As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the broad

mandate of the CSC and the specific authority granted to the
CESB is at the root of this controversy. The question we must
resolve, in particular, is whether the CSC had the authority to
review and ultimately reverse CESB Resolution No. 918, upon the
appeal of the PAO.
For its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code have granted it
the exclusive authority to identify the positions belonging to the
third-level of the civil service and to prescribe the eligibility
requirements for appointments thereto.67 It thus asserts that the
foregoing matters are beyond the revisory jurisdiction of the CSC,
and must instead be appealed to the Office of the President in
accordance with the specific provisions of the
_______________
The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (c)
Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be
through competitive examinations, which shall tie open to those inside and outside
the service who meet the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher
level does not require previous qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the
third-level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. (2)
67 Petition, Rollo, pp. 27-28, 34-35.
523
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 523
aforementioned laws. This special mandate must allegedly prevail
over the general authority granted to the CSC.
As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this
Court’s pronouncement in Eugenio v. CSC68 on its autonomy from
its mother agency. The CESB contends that its attachment to the
CSC is only for the purpose of “policy and program
coordination.”69 Allegedly, this attachment does not mean that the
former’s decisions, particularly CESB Resolution No. 918, are
subject to the CSC’s review.
On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon
the appeal from CESB Resolution No. 918 by virtue of its status as
the central personnel agency of the government. It contends that
the CESB’s authority to prescribe entrance requirements for the
third-level of the civil service does not mean that the CSC no
longer has jurisdiction over that class of positions. It also points
out that the case involves a personnel action that is within the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law.
We uphold the position of the CSC.
It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes
must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and other
laws.70 In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members
of the CES must be interpreted in a manner that takes into
account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC under the
Constitution and other statutes.
The present case involves the classification of positions
belonging to the CES and the qualifications for these posts. These
are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted to the
CESB under the Administrative Code and the
_______________
68 312 Phil. 1145; 243 SCRA 196 (1995).

69 Petition, Rollo, p. 21.
70 See Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.
Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, 21 April 2015, 756 SCRA 513,
citing Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 297; 319 SCRA 283
(1999).
524
Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact alone does not
push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC.
As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the government, is given the comprehensive mandate to
administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the
Administrative Code. It has also been expressly granted the power
to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil
service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personnel and
other civil service matters.71
Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong
to the CES is clearly a civil service matter falling within the
comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the
repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those
occupying the posts in question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over
personnel actions is implicated.
It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted
the authority to review the decisions of agencies attached to it
under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code:
12 SECTION. Powers and Functions.—The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before
it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such
decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be (11)
_______________
71 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section

12(3), (5).
525
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 525
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former’s

decisions are expressly subject to the CSC’s review on appeal.
Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing
provision, the contention of the CESB that its decisions may only
be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We note that
the supporting provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its
argument refers only to administrative cases involving
the disciplineof members of the CES:
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the
selection, classification, compensation and career development of
members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall set up the
organization and operation of the Service in accordance with the
following guidelines:
xxxx
h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative
complaints against members of the Career Executive Service shall
be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and paragraph 1(d) of Article
II, Chapter III of this Part; provided, that appeals shall be made to
the Career Executive Service Board instead of the Civil Service
Commission. Administrative cases involving members of the Service
on assignment with the Board shall be investigated and adjudicated
by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
72 See Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 68.

73 Integrated Reorganization Plan, Article IV(5).
526
In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the
President only covers disciplinary cases involving members of the
CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that
particular type of case, because members of the CES are all
presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally
carries with it the power to discipline,74 it is only reasonable for the
president to be given the ultimate authority to discipline
presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the
matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve
a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the scope of the
foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly
appealed to the CSC.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted
within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO’s appeal. The
arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.
The CSC correctly ruled that

third level eligibility is not re-
quired for the subject positions.
The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution — whether
the CSC ruled in accordance with law when the latter declared
that it was not necessary for occupants of the subject PAO posts to
possess third-level eligibility.
On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is
required for the positions pursuant to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A.
10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and
Assistant Regional Public Attorneys to have the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and
retirement privileges as the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutor and Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor of the NPS
_______________
74 Aguirre, Jr. v. De Castro, 378 Phil. 714; 321 SCRA 95 (1999).
527
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 527
under P.D. 1275. The latter law is the old one that governs the
NPS and requires third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial
posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply, because
R.A. 9406 could not have referred to a law that had not yet been
enacted at the time. It also asserts that the subsequent
declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit members of the PAO,
because the prosecutors exercise quasi-judicial functions while the
PAO members do not.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406,
P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a
reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification
requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the
provisions of these laws, which only require the practice of law for
a certain period of time and presuppose a bar license. The PAO, for
its part, maintains that the posts concerned are highly technical in
nature because they primarily involve legal practice, and any
managerial functions performed are merely incidental to their
principal roles. It also claims that the legislature could never have
intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the
subject posts when it enacted R.A. 9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules,
this Court agrees with the conclusion of the CSC. To require the
occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level
eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and
intent.
The CESB effectively amended

the law when it required the
occupants of the subject PAO
positions to obtain third-level
eligibility.
528
The authority to prescribe qualifications for positions in the
government is lodged in Congress75 as part of its plenary legislative
power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet societal
demands.76 From this authority emanates the right to change the
qualifications for existing statutory offices.77
It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted
Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which provides for the qualifications for the
Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional
Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public-Attorneys:
Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: 5. SEC.
16. SEC.The Chief Public Attorney and Other PAO Officials.—The
PAO shall be headed by a Chief Public Attorney and shall be
assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys. Each PAO
Regional Office established in each of the administrative regions of
the country shall be headed by a Regional Public Attorney who shall
be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public Attorney. The authority
and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for
the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Chief
Public Attorney.
xxxx
The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement
privileges as those of the Chief State Prose-
_______________
75 See Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, 22 June 1993, 223 SCRA
568;Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 (1954).
76 The Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales, 714 Phil. 468;
701 SCRA 635 (2011).
77 Id.
529
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 529
cutor of the National Prosecution Service. TheDeputy Chief
Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges
as those of theAssistant Chief State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service.
xxxx
The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional
Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges
as those of a Regional State Prosecutor and the Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service
respectively.
At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications of

officials of the NPS, to which the foregoing provision referred, were
provided by Section 3 of P.D. 1275:
3 Section. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications,
Appointment.—The Prosecution Staff shall be composed of prosecuting
officers in such number as hereinbelow determined. It shall be headed by a
Chief State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief
State Prosecutors.
The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State
Prosecutors; and the members of the Prosecution Staff shall be selected
from among qualified and professionally trained members of the legal
profession who are of proven integrity and competence and have been in
the actual practice of the legal profession for at least five (5) years
prior to their appointment or have held during like period, any
position requiring the qualifications of a lawyer. (Emphases
supplied)
530
Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of
201078 was passed. In updating the qualifications for senior
positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another set
of positions, this time in the judiciary:
14. SECTIONQualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor
General.—The Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries,
allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and
other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and
shall be appointed by the President.
15. SECTIONRanks of Prosecutors.—The Prosecutors in the National
Prosecution Service shall have the following ranks:
_______________
78 Republic Act No. 10071, AN ACT STRENGTHENING AND RATIONALIZING THE

NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE (2010).
531
VOL. 819, 531
MARCH 7, 2017
provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors;
and Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area
established by law.
xxxx
16. SECTIONQualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors
and Other Prosecution Officers.—Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor
V shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other
privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications,
and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of
anAssociate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade
and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject
to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same
retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Regional Trial
Court.
A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice

and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals79are required to
have the same qualifications as the members of this Court. 80 On the
other hand, judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a
separate provision.81
_______________
79 Section 7 of B.P. Blg. 129 states:

7. SectionQualifications.—The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice
shall have the same qualifications as those provided in Constitution for
Justice of the Supreme Court.
80 Article VIII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
7.(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any
lower colle- SECTION
532
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject
PAO positions are only mandated to comply with requirements as
to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level
eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper
for the CESB to impose this additional qualification as a
prerequisite to permanent appointments.82 To do so would be to
amend the law and to overrule Congress.
_______________
giate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member

of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been
for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but
no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (2)
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. (3)
81 Section 15 of B.P. Blg. 129 states:
15. SectionQualifications.—No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial
Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-
five years of age, and for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
82 In Juliano v. Subido, (159 Phil. 534; 62 SCRA 480 [1975]), the Court
explained:
As was pointed out by petitioners, in the absence of a statute enabling
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to require as a condition for
eligibility to such position at least four years of trial work at a court of first
instance level, then his actuation calls for nullification. It is undoubted that
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service could not locate the source of such
authority in the Constitution. In its
533
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 533
While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe
entrance requirements for the third-level of the civil service, this
power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the
qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence,
even granting that the occupants of the subject positions indeed
exercise managerial and executive functions as incidents of their
primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional
qualifications for them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by
Congress itself to defeat the express provisions of statutes enacted
by the latter.
It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule
the specific qualifications imposed by Congress for the subject
positions. The legislature must be deemed to have considered the
entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted
R.A. 9406 and prescribed the relevant qualifications for each
position. The choice not to require third-level eligibility in this
instance must be respected — not only by the CESB but also by
this Court — as a matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy
of a statute.83
The intent of R.A. 9406 to

establish and maintain the
parity in qualifications be-
tween the senior officials of
the PAO and the NPS must
be respected.
This Court must likewise reject the CESB’s contention that the
declassification of positions in the NPS (as a result of the
enactment of R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a
supposed difference in their functions. This argument goes
_______________
absence, he must look to an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines.

There is none. x x x.
83 See Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, 725 Phil. 380;
714 SCRA 611 (2014).
534
against the express terms and the clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is
therefore untenable.
As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the
Administrative Code of 1987. The amendment was done to provide
for “the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges” of senior officials of both the
PAO and the NPS. The deliberations of Congress on R.A. 9406
reveal its intention to establish parity between the two offices. The
lawmakers clearly viewed these officers as counterparts in the
administration of justice:
Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should
equalize the prosecution and the defense. The PAO Office is
actually an arm of the same government to protect those who need
protection.
Senator Pimentel. That is right.
Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the arm
of the government to punish those who would need punishment.
So, these two perform the same class of service for the nation and
they should be equalized.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that, that is why precisely I
made this observation that talking alone of starting pay, the level of
starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be lower than the starting pay of
a prosecutor.
Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that amendment.
Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed
amendment.84 (Emphases supplied)
During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator

Franklin M. Drilon explained that equal treatment of the two
offices was essential:
_______________
84 Records (Vol. II), Senate 13th Congressional Session, p. 386 (13 November
2006).
535
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 535
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should
have the same salary as the Chief State Prosecutor and down the line, the
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera. And I want to put this on record
because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO lawyers here before
us and we want to explain why we have placed this.
xxxx
SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said — you know, I want to put on record
why we had tried to streamline the salary structure and place it at the
same level as the Chief State Prosecutor. Because we do not want a salary
distortion in the Department of Justice where you have the PAO higher
than the prosecutors. That’s why we want to put them on equal footing
rather than mag — you know, there’ll be whipsawing. You place the
prosecutors below the PAO. I can assure you that tomorrow the PAO will
come to us — the prosecutors will come to us and say, “Put us higher than
the PAO lawyers.” So you will have whipsawing here.85
Although these statements were made to address the specific

issue of salary, this Court considers them as manifestations of the
intent to create and maintain parity between prosecutors and
public attorneys. In Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso,86 this Court considered
similar provisions in other laws as confirmations of the legislative
intent to grant equal treatment to certain classes of public officers:
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the
qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries,
privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public
officers in the Executive Department, such as the following:
_______________
85 Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate

Bill No. 2171 and House Bill No. 5921 (Re: Reorganizing and Strengthening the
Public Attorney’s Office), pp. 53-54.
86 A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC & 13-02-07-SC, 26 July 2016, 798 SCRA
179. (Resolution)
536
the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG); and (a)
the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel,
the Chief State Prosecutor, and the members of the National
Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice. (b)
The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications
required, the rank conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to
members of the Judiciary and the public officers covered by the said laws.
The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific public officers in
the executive department and the Judges and Justices who are covered
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In
effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly
identified in the laws by the special nature of their official functions
render services which are as important as the services rendered by the
Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public
officers and of the members of the Judiciary in the promotion of justice
and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial systems.
To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to

senior officials of the PAO and the NPS, parity in their
qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly,
the revised qualifications of those in the NPS must also be
considered applicable to those in the PAO. The declassification of
positions in the NPS should thus benefit their counterpart
positions in the PAO. There is no justification for treating the two
offices differently, given the plain provisions and the rationale of
the law.
This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent
of the law if it sustains the view of the CESB. We cannot construe
R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the
amendments brought about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat
the legislature’s very purpose, which is to equalize the
qualifications of the NPS and the PAO.
537
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 537
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC
acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel
agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by
the PAO from CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed
the said resolution, which refused to declassify the subject PAO
positions. As the CSC noted, the third-level eligibility required by
the CESB as an additional qualification for these posts
contravened not only the express terms, but also the clear intent of
R.A. 9406.
For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the
improper remedy the CESB has resorted to, this Court must
dismiss the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. CSC Decision No. 110067 and
Resolution No. 1100719 dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June 2011,
respectively, are herebyAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Bersamin, J., With Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN,J.:
I CONCUR in the result, but I have to tender a different view

concerning the procedural aspect of the case.
538
The case was commenced by petition for certiorari and
prohibition in order to assail the decision of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC): (a) assuming jurisdiction over the appeal from
the decision of petitioner Career Executive Service Board (CESB);
and (b) ruling that certain positions within the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) do not require third-level eligibility.
The main opinion holds that the petitioner’s choice of the special
civil actions for certiorari and prohibition was inappropriate. It
reminds that Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court require the concurrence of a showing: (a) of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent; and (b) that there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It holds that the absence of one of the requirements
will render the resort to the remedies of the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition inappropriate. CitingMahinay v.
Court of Appeals,1 it declares that because the decisions of the CSC
could be appealed by petition for review in accordance with Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, the petitioner should not have resorted
to certiorari and prohibition, even if grave abuse of discretion was
alleged.
It is in respect of this holding that I offer a contrary view.
Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 65, indeed, require that “there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Yet, the requirement does not necessarily
mean that the availability of the appeal immediately bars the
resort to certiorari and prohibition. My understanding is that Rule
65 also contemplates a situation in which appeal or another
remedy in the ordinary course of law is available but such appeal
or other remedy is not plain, speedy and adequate to address the
petitioner’s grievance. The petitioner is then called upon, to so
allege in the petition, for certiorari or prohibition and to prove that
there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to him, thus:
_______________
1 G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 171.
539
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 539
[I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with
certainty in his verified petition facts showing that “there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,”
because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition
for certiorari. “Being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege
and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.” Where the
existence of a remedy by appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the petitioner
must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible
or unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed
himself of such remedy. A petition for certiorari which does not comply
with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed.2 (Bold underscoring
is supplied for emphasis)
The phrase no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law in Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 65
simply means that the appeal or other remedy available in the
ordinary course of law is not equally beneficial, speedy and
adequate. The appropriate remedy should not be merely one that
at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the
judgment complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but one that
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal
concerned.3
Consequently, the availability of the appeal under Rule 43 as a
recourse from the adverse decision of the CSC should not
immediately preclude the petitioner’s resort to the special
_______________
2 Candelaria v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City of San Fernando,

(Pampanga), G.R. No. 173861, July 14, 2014, 730 SCRA 1, 7; citing Visca v.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 40464, May 9, 1989, 173
SCRA 222, 225.
3 A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014, 714
SCRA 514, 521, citing Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134441, May 19, 1999,
307 SCRA 486, 495.
540
civil actions for certiorari and prohibition provided the petitioner
could sufficiently show that such remedy would not be beneficial,
speedy and adequate to address its grievance.
We need to mention, too, that the requirement that there be no
other available remedy in the ordinary course of law is not an
ironclad rule. The petition for certiorari or prohibition may still
prosper despite the availability of such other remedy in certain
exceptional circumstances, like: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy so dictate; (b) when the interests of
substantial justice so require; or (c) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.4
As I see it, the petitioner has made out a case that falls under
the third exceptional circumstance. The CSC has been alleged to
have unduly exercised its jurisdiction over the appeal filed by the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). The petitioner vigorously expressed
its opposition to the CSC’s jurisdiction over the case. The majority
opinion even cites the Motion for Clarification of the petitioner
made in the CSC to argue against the CSC’s jurisdiction because:
(a) the appeal by the PAO involved a controversy between two
government agencies regarding questions of law; and (b) the
petitioner was an autonomous agency whose decisions were
appealable to the Office of the President.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition laid down the issue of
which between the petitioner and the CSC had jurisdiction to
resolve the question of eligibility for certain officials of the PAO.
On one hand, the CSC asserted its constitutional mandate to
exercise jurisdiction over all personnel matters involving
government employees; on the other, the petitioner claimed it had
jurisdiction over civil service eligibility concerns. Accordingly, the
Court should hold instead that the petition for certiorari and
prohibition was an
_______________
4 Philippine Basketball Association v. Gaite, G.R. No. 170312, June 26, 2009,
591 SCRA 149, 157-158.
541
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 541
appropriate remedy for the petitioner because of its allegation that
the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed decision.5 It was of no significance that questions of law or
of fact, or mixed questions of law or fact may be raised through the
petition for review under Rule 43.6
3. Section Where to appeal.—An appeal under this Rule may be
taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (n)
The majority opinion cites Mahinay v. Court of Appeals,7where
the Court opined that the remedy against the decision of the CSC
was an appeal by petition for review under Rule 43;
hence, certiorari did not avail even if the stated ground was grave
abuse of discretion.
In my humble view, Mahinay is not an apt authority for the case
at bar. Mahinay involved the bringing of a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA)
preparatory to assailing the adverse decision rendered by the CSC
affirming the petitioner’s dismissal from the service. The CA
denied the motion on the basis that certiorari was the wrong mode
to challenge the decision of the CSC and because the motion for
extension of time had been filed late. The CA pointed out that the
proper mode of appeal was the petition for review under Rule 43 to
be filed within 15 days from notice of the resolution considering
that the resolution to be assailed was one issued by a quasi-judicial
body. The CA later dismissed the petition for certiorari ultimately
filed by the petitioner to annul the decision of the CSC.
This brings me to my other point for this separate opinion.
Section 1 of Rule 43 provides:
_______________
5 See Laurel v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 168707, September 15, 2010,
630 SCRA 464.
6 Section 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court states:
7 Mahinay v. Court of Appeals, supra note 1.
542
1. SectionScope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and fromawards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these
agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
The assailed decision of the CSC was not within the purview of
the coverage of Section 1, supra, because it was not in the category
of the “awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions” that were reviewable under Rule 43. It related
to the CSC’s determination of the strictly legal question of which
between the petitioner and CSC had jurisdiction over the question
in dispute. The awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the CSC reviewable under Rule 43 concern actions and disciplinary
measures by or against civil service officers and employees.
Consequently, the assailed decision of the CSC could be challenged
by petition forcertiorari and prohibition provided the requisites for
the challenge were properly alleged and duly established.
Nonetheless, I VOTE TO DISMISS the petition because the
main opinion is otherwise correct.
Petition dismissed.
543
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 543
Notes.—For a position to be considered as Career Executive
Service (CES), two (2) elements are required, namely: (a) The
position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle
A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987 or a
position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB) to be such position of
equal rank; and (b) The holder of the position is a presidential
appointee. (Señeres vs. Sabido IX, 773 SCRA 370 [2015])
There are also two (2) requisites that must concur for an
employee in the Career Executive Service (CES) to attain security
of tenure, to wit: (a) CES eligibility; and (b) Appointment to the
appropriate CES rank. (Id.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
June 16, 2015. G.R. No. 194192.*
DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT, represented by its General

Manager, RODORA N. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs.RODRIGO L.
ARANJUEZ, GREGORIO S. CAGULA, CELESTINO A. BONDOC,
DANILO L. BUHAY, PEDRO E. ALCALA, JOSEPH A. VALDEZ,
TITO V. SABANGAN, MARCELINO B. ANINO, JUANITO C.
PANSACALA, JOEMARIE B. ALBA, ANTERO M. YMAS,
ROLANDO L. LARGO, RENEBOY U. ESTEBAN, MANUEL B.
LIBANG, ROMEORICO A. LLANOS, ARTHUR C. BACHILLER,
SOCRATES V. CORCUERA, ALEJANDRO C. PICHON,
GRACIANO A. MONCADA, ROLANDO K. ESCORIAL, NOEL A.
DAGALE, EMILIO S. MOLINA, SHERWIN S. SOLAMO,
FULGENCIO I. DYGUAZO, GUALBERTO S. PAGATPAT,
JOSEPH B. ARTAJO, FELIXBERTO Q. OBENZA, FLORANTE A.
FERRAREN, ELSA A. ELORDE, CARLOS P. MORRE, JAMES
AQUILINO M. COLOMA, JOAQUIN O. CADORNA, JR., LORNA
M. MAXINO, ROMULO A. REYES, NOEL G. LEGASPI,
ELEANOR R. LAMOSTE, WELMER E. CRASCO, DELIO T.
OLAER, VICENTE R. MASUCOL, IRENEO A. CUBAL, EDWIN
A. DELA PEÑA, JIMMY A. TROCIO, WILFREDO L. TORREON,
ALEJANDRITO M. ALO, RAUL S. SAGA, JOSELITO P.
RICONALLA, TRISEBAL Q. AGUILAR, ARMAN N. LORENZO,
SR. and PEDRO C. GUNTING, respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; The Supreme
Court (SC) finds that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the agency
directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court of Appeals
(CA) on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal
from the decision of petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD), thereby
ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of petitioner that the appeal
should be dismissed for lack of proof of payment of appeal.—We find that
the Civil Service Commission, the
_______________
* EN BANC.
236
Davao City Water District vs. Aranjuez
agency directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court
of Appeals on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent’s
appeal from the decision of petitioner DCWD, thereby ruling against,
if sub silentio, the argument of petitioner that the appeal should be
dismissed for lack of proof of payment of appeal. The Civil Service
Commission and the Court of Appeals considered the procedural issue
raised by petitioner as a surmountable bar to the resolution of the main
issue of respondents’ constitutional right to free expression as amplified
with specificity by their guaranteed right as workers to peaceful concerted
activity and their entitlement to security of tenure.
Government Employees; Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions; The time
and place of the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether
done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is
without any intent at work stoppage.—DCWD argues that since the
concerted or mass action was done within government office hours, such
act was not permissible, therefore prohibited. Otherwise stated, a
concerted activity done within the regular government office hours is
automatically a violation of Section 6 of the Resolution. Notably, however,
a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of Resolution
No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof. Thus: Section 5. Definition of Prohibited
Concerted Mass Action.—As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase
‘‘prohibited concerted activity or mass action’’ shall be understood to refer
to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by
themselves or through their employees organizations, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from
their respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass
leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (Emphasis ours) The
operative phrases are “any collective activity” and “work stoppage or
service disruption.” Without the intent at work stoppage or service
disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of
the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within
government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any
intent at work stoppage.
Same; Same; It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run
in t-shirts with inscriptions on Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA)
incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the
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service.—It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in
t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work
stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they
followed the advice of GM Gamboa “to be there” at the fun run.
Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports
attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government
employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. This, then, being the fact, we have to rule against the findings
of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with
grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules
and Regulations.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; It is correct
to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a
different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however,
it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of
expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their
employment.—It is correct to conclude that those who enter government
service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to
speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of
their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just
by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” But
there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they
cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the
Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
Same; Same; Office Memorandums; In line with the civil service rules
and jurisprudence, the Supreme Court (SC) concludes that a violation of an
office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the
area for posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a light
offense punishable by reprimand.—Under Section 52(C)(3), Rule IV of
Resolution No. 991936, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
is punishable with reprimand on the first offense and suspension ranging
from one to thirty days for the second offense. In Re: Failure of Various
Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or Departure from Office
in the Chronolog Machine, 631 SCRA 316 (2010), the charged court
employees were penalized for violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations due
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VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 238
to their violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 36-
2001 requiring all employees to register their daily attendance, in the
Chronolog Time Recorder Machine (CTRM) and in the logbook of their
respective offices. Following Resolution No. 991936 that violation of
reasonable rules and regulations is a light offense, the Court penalized its
erring employees with the penalty of reprimand. Thus, in line with the
civil service rules and jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation of an
office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the
area for posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a light
offense punishable by reprimand.
Same; Penalties; As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension
exceeds thirty (30) days or the fine imposed is in an amount over 30-day
salary, the decision will only attain finality after the lapse of the
reglementary period in the absence of any motion for reconsideration or
appeal. Penalties within the 30-day threshold are immediately executory
penalties.—As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension exceeds
thirty days or the fine imposed is in an amount over thirty-day salary, the
decision will only attain finality after the lapse of the reglementary period
in the absence of any motion for reconsideration or appeal. Penalties
within the 30-day threshold are immediately executory penalties. In this
case, the members and officials, except the casual employees who were not
meted with penalty as the renewal of their employment was held in
abeyance, were sanctioned with penalties ranging from suspension of work
from one (1) month and one (1) day to dismissal from service. Evidently,
the finality and execution of the judgment did not take place after the
lapse of the reglementary period because as previously discussed, the
members and officials were able to file their consolidated appeal in lieu of
notice of appeal. As clear as the provision on the finality of decisions is
Section 42 of Resolution No. 991936 on the effect of motions for
reconsideration. Thus: Section 42. Effect of Filing.—The filing of a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days shall stay the execution of the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Statutory Construction; If the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity as the quoted provision, there is no room for construction or
interpretation.—The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply
the law. If the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity as the
quoted provision, there is no room for construction or interpretation. The
letter must be taken to mean
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VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 239
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its
mandate is obeyed.
Leonen,J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that freedom to
express one’s views enjoys a level of primacy among our constitutional
guarantees, but it has never been considered to be absolute and immune
from reasonable regulation.—Freedom to express one’s views enjoys a level
of primacy among our constitutional guarantees, but it has never been
considered to be absolute and immune from reasonable regulation.
However, there is always a higher degree of judicial review of regulation
that affects speech to ensure, among others, that it does not amount to a
disguised form of censorship or that its exercise does not burden the same
exercise of the same rights by others. Even civil service regulations should
hew closely to the parameters of the freedoms guaranteed in our
Constitution. Exercising one’s right to air grievances in relation to
employment in the public sector, as in this case, should also be given
protection but with the added requirement that the exercise of the
guarantee of freedom to express does not unduly deter the government
agency’s primary functions.
Same; Government Employees; Right to Organize; View that Executive
Order (EO) No. 180 was enacted in June 1, 1987 entitled Providing
Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government
Employees, Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management Council, and for
Other Purposes. This order “applies to all employees of all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original
charters.”—Executive Order No. 180 was enacted in June 1, 1987 entitled
Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of
Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, and for Other Purposes. This order “applies to all employees of all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with
original charters.” Also enacted in 1987, our present Constitution provides
that “the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees[,]” and the state “shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
240
law.” The Constitution’s Bill of Rights also provides that “[n]o law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
government for redress of grievances.” We read this constitutional
provision on the right to freedom of expression together with the other
constitutional provisions, laws, jurisprudence, and implementing rules and
regulations that reflect the state’s policy on the different government
employees’ right to peaceful concerted activities and to self-organization
for purposes of collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; View that freedom of expression is
guaranteed in its fullest outside government but, perhaps, more regulated
when one assumes the role of a public officer.—Freedom of expression is
guaranteed in its fullest outside government but, perhaps, more regulated
when one assumes the role of a public officer. The right to speech is
inherent. However, the act of joining a government office should be
construed as an understanding that the individual’s exercise of this basic
right is subsumed by the necessity of providing public services to the
greater majority. The limits are inherent in the nature of governance. The
Constitution states that “[p]ublic officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.”
Same; Same; Same; View that GSIS v. Villaviza, 625 SCRA 669
(2010), involving Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) employees
held that “[n]ot all collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited[;] [o]therwise, we would be totally depriving our
brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right
to freedom of expression.”—GSIS v. Villaviza, 625 SCRA 669 (2010),
involving Government Service Insurance System employees held that
“[n]ot all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees
is prohibited[;] [o]therwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and
sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.” This court explained that “[i]t would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or
waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only
but can never be taken away.” Thus, “CSC’s Resolution No. 02-1316
defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only
tempered or regulated these rights.”
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Same; Same; Same; View that employees of government-owned and -
controlled corporation can freely exercise their right to freedom of
expression, subject to law, including Civil Service Commission (CSC)
issuances that prohibit mass actions causing work stoppage.—Employees
of government-owned and -controlled corporation can freely exercise their
right to freedom of expression, subject to law, including Civil Service
Commission issuances that prohibit mass actions causing work stoppage.
Government employees must uphold their commitment to public interest
and act in accordance with the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees. This level of limitation or regulation also
applies to governmental financial institutions, often grouped with
government-owned and -controlled corporations.
Same; Same; Same; View that law-making involves deliberating on
political questions, thus, the extent of freedom of speech appears wider for
those in Congress.—Some hold public office based on popular vote such as
elected Senators and Representatives of Congress. These public officials
are in the position to pass laws for better employment benefits for all
government employees. Law-making involves deliberating on political
questions, thus, the extent of freedom of speech appears wider for those in
Congress. The Constitution even provides that “[n]o Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.”
Same; Same; Same; View that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the Judiciary.—Members of the judiciary must
maintain independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety, equality,
competence, and diligence. “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.” Thus, they must “refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency.” “Judges shall not knowingly, while a
proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that
might
242
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the process.” These standards present a
more limited freedom of expression for judges.
Same; Same; Same; View that the strictest limitation applies to those in
the military and the police. They maintain peace and prevent crime.—The
strictest limitation applies to those in the military and the police. They
maintain peace and prevent crime. Those in the military are subject to
Commonwealth Act No. 408 known as the Articles of War. Article 96
provides that “[a]ny officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying
cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the
service.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional right to freedom of
expression belongs to all. But its exercise may be reasonably regulated.—
The constitutional right to freedom of expression belongs to all. But its
exercise may be reasonably regulated. Those who chose public service
embraced the public’s interest with a priority higher than their own. Their
oaths signify a commitment to public accountability. This obligation
necessarily imposes more regulation of the exercise of their freedom of
expression. The extent of this regulation and its parameters will need to
be more clearly defined in a more appropriate case.
Jardeleza,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; View that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because the Court is not a trier
of facts. However, there are exceptions to this rule, which are present in this
case, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the lower
courts’ judgment and when the conclusion arrived upon by the lower courts
are based on speculation, surmises and conjectures.—Questions of fact are
not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
because the Court is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions to
this rule, which are present in this case, among them, the lack of sufficient
support in evidence of the lower courts’ judgment and when the conclusion
arrived upon by the lower courts are based on speculation, surmises and
conjectures. Furthermore, although DCWD did not raise in its
243
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 243
petition this factual issue, Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence permit us to review matters not assigned as errors on
appeal, provided, among others, that consideration of the error is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and a complete resolution of the
case, or the error is closely related to an error assigned.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that considering that
there is no testimonial or physical evidence shown that Cagula or any
other Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District
(NAMADACWAD) member attached the union posters outside designated
areas, there is no basis to hold them liable in violation of Memorandum
Circular No. 33.—The DCWD Administrative Committee itself found that
no one saw who posted in this area. Like Dumalag, Leonida admitted that
he only took the pictures when the posters were already attached. For that
matter, considering that there is no testimonial or physical evidence
shown that Cagula or any other NAMADACWAD member attached the
union posters outside designated areas, there is no basis to hold them
liable in violation of Memorandum Circular No. 33.
Same; Same; Strikes; View that liability for unlawful or prohibited acts
committed in a strike or other concerted mass action is legally determined
individually, not collectively.—Even assuming for the sake of argument
that Cagula or any other NAMADACWAD member indeed attached the
union posters outside the designated areas, the conclusion that
“NAMADACWAD and its officials are responsible for an act of any of its
officials or members” is wrong as a matter of law. Liability for unlawful or
prohibited acts committed in a strike or other concerted mass action is
legally determined individually, not collectively. Article 277 of the Labor
Code does not hold the officers of a union responsible for an illegal act of
another officer.
Same; Same; Same; View that a strike or mass action which is legal
does not become illegal merely because it is tainted by prohibited acts.—A
strike or mass action which is legal does not become illegal merely because
it is tainted by prohibited acts. Here, there was no prohibited mass action,
and thus the union officers who wore shirts with the inscription were not
held liable. Further, the alleged prohibited act of posting is not proven.
244
Administrative Law; Government Employees; Penalties; Reprimand;
View that although a reprimand may be a slight form of penalty, it still
goes into the record of the employee. It is unjust to impose even the slightest
form of penalty to an employee, whether or not in the government, where the
alleged infraction is not proven with substantial evidence.—A reprimand is
a public and formal censure or severe reproof administered to a person at
fault by his superior officer or a body to which he belongs. Although a
reprimand may be a slight form of penalty, it still goes into the record of
the employee. It is unjust to impose even the slightest form of penalty to
an employee, whether or not in the government, where the alleged
infraction is not proven with substantial evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals, 23rd Division.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Richard D. Tumanda and Bernardo D. Delima, Jr. for
petitioner.
Philip S. Pantojan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ,J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 of the

Twenty Third Division of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 02793-MIN dated 7 October 2010, affirming the 14 January
2009 Resolution No. 09-0047 rendered by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
_______________
1 Rule on Civil Procedure, Rule 45.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices
Angelita A. Gacutan and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring; CA Rollo, pp.
774-791.
245
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 245
The Facts
Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a government-

owned and -controlled corporation in Davao City represented by its
General Manager Engr. Rodora N. Gamboa (GM Gamboa).
The private respondents, namely, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio
S. Cagula, Celestino A. Bondoc, Danilo L. Buhay, Pedro E. Alcala,
Joseph A. Valdez, Tito V. Sabangan, Marcelino B. Anino, Juanito
C. Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba, Antero M. Ymas, Rolando L.
Largo, Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B. Libang, Romeorico A.
Llanos, Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V. Corcuera, Alejandro C.
Pichon, Graciano A . Moncada, Rolando K. Escorial, Noel A.
Dagale, Emilio S. Molina, Sherwin S. Solamo, Fulgencio I.
Dyguazo, Gualberto S. Pagatpat, Joseph B. Artajo, Felixberto Q.
Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa A. Elorde, Carlos P. Morre,
James Aquilino M. Coloma, Joaquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M.
Maxino, Romulo A. Reyes, Noel G. Legaspi, Eleanor R. Lamoste,
Welmer E. Crasco, Delio T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo A.
Cubal, Edwin A. dela Peña, Jimmy A. Trocio, Wilfredo L. Torreon,
Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito P. Riconalla, Trisebal Q.
Aguilar, Arman N. Lorenzo, Sr. and Pedro C. Gunting (Aranjuez, et
al.) are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were
charged with several administrative cases due to acts committed
during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-
shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the
designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees’
grievances.
The records show that as early as 16 May 2007, the members
and officers of NAMADACWAD have been staging pickets in front
of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air their
grievances about the nonpayment of their Collective Negotiation
Agreement (CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD’s
privatization and proposed One Hundred Million Peso Loan.
246
On 31 October 2007, GM Gamboa issued an Office Memorandum

addressed to all department managers concerning the different
activities that would take place during DCWD’s then upcoming
anniversary celebration. The Memorandum reads:
Please be informed that the opening activities of our 34thanniversary
this coming 09 November 2007 are the motorcade and the fun run. The
assembly area will be at the Victoria Plaza Mall parking, in front of
Cynthia’s Lechon Hauz, 6:00 o’clock in the morning.
In view of this, everybody is expected to be there except only those who
are assigned as a skeletal force. All carpool vehicles are also enjoined to
proceed at the said area. The participants are free to wear any sports
attire. Further, you are advised to sign in the attendance sheet provided
by the HRD.3
On 8 November 2007, the officers and members of

NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly and they
agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-shirts with inscriptions stating,
“CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!” on the day
of the anniversary.4
Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-shirts
with inscriptions “CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza
Pahawa Na!” at the beginning of the Fun Run at Victoria Plaza at
around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the same inside
the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours. Also, one
of the members of the Board of Directors of NAMADACWAD
Gregorio S. Cagula (Cagula), with the help of some of its members,
attached similar inscriptions and posters of employees’ grievances
to a post in the motor
_______________
3 CA Rollo, p. 118.
4 Id., at p. 119.
247
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 247
pool area, an area not among the officially designated places 5 for
posting6 of grievances as prescribed by DCWD’s Office
Memorandum7 dated 8 February 1996 and pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 33,8 Series of 1994 (MC No. 33).
As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a
Memorandum dated 14 November 2007 addressed to the officers
and members of NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain the
reasons for the attire they wore during the anniversary
celebration. Through a collective letter dated 19 November 2007,
the officers and members explained that the Memorandum only
required the employees to wear any sports attire, though theirs
were with additional inscriptions containing grievances. They
countered that the inscriptions were but manifestations of their
constitutional rights of free speech and freedom of expression.9
On 23 November 2007, another Memorandum was sent to the
officers of NAMADACWAD requiring them to explain within 72-
hours why they should not be held liable for the actions committed
by Cagula.10
Finding prima facie case against them, GM Gamboa filed formal
charges against the officers and members of NAMADACWAD as
follow:
1. For DCWD Administrative Case No. 34-2007 against the
officials of NAMADACWAD for violation of Exist
_______________
5 The designated places pursuant to Office Memorandum dated February 8,

1996 are: (1) The bulletin board at the motor pool area below the Office of the
Purchasing Division, and (2) the side of the office building beside the guardhouse
where the bundy clock is located; id., at pp. 29, 782.
6 Id.
7 Rules to Govern Posting and Hanging Posters, Placards, Streamersand Other
Similar Materials; id., at pp. 29-30.
8 Id., at p. 170.
9 Letter Explanation to the Memorandum; id., at p. 120.
10 Id., at p. 160.
248
ing Civil Service Law and Rules of Serious Nature defined under
Section 46[12], Book V of Executive Order No. 292,11 in relation to
Rule IV, Section 52[B][4] of the Civil Service Resolution No.
99193612 dated August 31, 1999 and Civil Service Resolution No.
02131613 dated October 11, 2002 and MC No. 33 dated October 21,
1994.14
2. For DCWD Administrative Case Nos. 11-2007 to 33-2007 and
35-2007 to 44-2007 involving the individual members of
NAMADACWAD for violation of Existing Civil Service Law and
Rules of Serious Nature defined under Section 46[12], Book V of
Executive Order No. 292,15 in relation to Rule IV, Section 52[B][4]
of the Civil Service Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999
and Civil Service Resolution No. 021316 dated October 11, 2002.
After giving those concerned the opportunity to explain through
several hearings and submission of additional evidence, the
Hearing Committee, through the authority given by DCWD to hear
the administrative charges, filed on 14
_______________
11 46 Section. Discipline: General ProvisionsNo officer or employee in the

Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law
and after due process. .—(a)
The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: (b)
Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules or reasonable office regulations.
(12)
12 B. The following are less grave offenses with the corresponding penalties:
4. Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules of serious nature
1st offense — Suspension from 1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.
2nd offense — Dismissal
13 Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector.
14 CA Rollo, pp. 144-145.
15 Book V/Title I/Subtitle A/Chapter 7-Discipline.
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VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 249
March 2008 its Consolidated Resolution and Recommendation
finding the officers and members of the NAMADACWAD guilty as
charged with penalties ranging from suspension to dismissal from
service with all accessory penalties under the CSC Law and
Rules.16
On 19 March 2008, GM Gamboa issued several Orders17adopting
the recommendation submitted by the Hearing Committee but
modifying some of the corresponding penalties in view of
mitigating circumstances such as first infraction and substantial
justice. However, three officials namely Rodrigo L. Aranjuez,
Cagula and Celestino A. Bondoc were penalized with dismissal
from the service for the reason that the infraction was the second
administrative offense of serious nature.18
Aggrieved, Aranjuez, et al., filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration19 with Prayer to Suspend the Immediate Execution
of the Orders dated 19 March 2008. The Motion for
Reconsideration was thereafter submitted for resolution after the
Hearing Committee waived the filing of a Comment. On 17 April
2008, the Motion was denied by DCWD.
On 2 May 2008, Aranjuez, et al., filed an appeal before the CSC
bringing up, among other issues, the violation of their
constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of
grievances.20
In its Comment, DCWD defended the Orders on the basis of
Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 02131621 which provides
_______________
16 CA Rollo, pp. 144-180.

17 Id., at pp. 181-207.
18 Id., at p. 204.
19 Id., at pp. 212-217.
20 Id., at pp. 63-114.
21 6. SectionPermissible Concerted Mass Action.—A concerted activity or
mass action done outside of government office hours shall not be deemed a
prohibited concerted activity or mass
250
that the concerted activity like the participation of the officers
and employees during the fun run wearing t-shirts with
inscriptions was prohibited because it was done during office
hours. Moreover, the act of Cagula in posting papers with
grievances outside the designated areas was a clear violation of
MC No. 33 in relation to 8 February 1996 Office Memorandum. It
was submitted that due to Cagula’s membership in the Board of
Directors of NAMADACWAD, the other officers were solidarily
responsible for his actions.22
CSC’s Resolution
On 14 January 2009, CSC issued a Resolution23 partly granting

the consolidated appeal and held that the collective act of
respondents in wearing t-shirts with grievance inscriptions during
office hours was not within the ambit of the definition of prohibited
mass action punishable under CSC Resolution 021316 since there
was no intent to cause work stoppage. However, though not
prohibited under the Resolution, the act was considered as an
offense punishable under “Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations.” CSC further ruled that Cagula’s act of posting of
grievances outside the designated areas was a clear violation of
MC No. 33. By reason of Cagula’s position, the other officers of
NAMADACWAD were considered as having agreed and conspired
to commit the said act and as such are as liable as Cagula.
On the other hand, and contrary to the assertions of DCWD, the
violations committed by the private respondents are not serious in
nature due to the lack of any abusive, vulgar, defamatory or
libelous language. The dispositive portion reads:
_______________
action within the contemplation of this omnibus rules provided the same shall
not occasion or result in the disruption of work or service.
22 CA Rollo, pp. 363-394.
23 Id., at pp. 464-482.
251
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 251
WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Appeal filed by Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, et
al. is PARTLY GRANTED. The Orders dated March 19, 2008 issued by the
General Manager Rodora N. Gamboa finding appellants guilty of Violation
of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules of Serious Nature (Section 46[12]
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, in relation to Rule IV, Section 52[B][4]
of the CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999 and CSC
Resolution No. 021316 dated October 11, 2002 and CSC MC No. 33 dated
October 21, 1994), are hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, appellants are
hereby found liable for Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations and are meted the following penalties, to wit:
1. As to members Danilo Buhay, Pedro E. Alcala, Joseph A. Valdez, Tito
V. Sabangan, Marcelino B. Anino, Juanito C. Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba,
Antero M. Ymas, Rolando L. Largo, Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B.
Libang, Romeorico A. Llanos, Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V. Corcuera,
Alejandro C. Pichon, Graciano A. Moncada, Rolando Escorial, Noel A.
Dagale, Emilio S. Molina, Sherwin S. Solano, Danilo L. Buhay and
Fulgencio I. Dyguazo, the penalty of reprimand;
2. As to officers Gualberta S. Pagatpat, Joseph A. Artalo, Felixberto Q.
Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa A. Ilorde, Carlos P. Morre, James
Aquilino M. Coloma, Joacquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M. Maximo, Romulo
A. Reyes, Noel G. Legazpi, Eleanor R. Lamoste, Welmer E. Crasco, Delio
T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo Cubal, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio
S. Cagula and Celestino A. Bondoc, the penalty of reprimand and strong
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.
3. As to members Edwin A. dela Peña, Jimmy A. Trocio, Wilfredo A.
Torreon, Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito P. Riconalla, Trisebal
Q. Aguilar, Arman L. Lorenzo, Sr.
252
and Pedro C. Gunting, they are likewise found guilty of the offense of
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations but are not meted a
penalty considering that they are casual employees whose renewal of
appointments were held in abeyance.24
Aggrieved, DCWD filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43

before the Court of Appeals alleging procedural and substantive
infirmities of the CSC Resolution.
The Court of Appeals’ Decision

In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto25the
resolution of CSC.
The appellate court disagreed with the contention of DCWD that
there was a violation of any provision of Resolution No. 021316 in
this wise:
As correctly observed by the Civil Service Commission, the act of
respondents in sporting a t-shirt with the inscription “CNA INCENTIVE
IHATAG NA, DIRECTOR BRAGANZA, PAHAWA NA!” during the fun
run and even inside the office premises hardly qualifies as a prohibited
concerted mass action under CSC Resolution No. 021316.
xxxx
To say the least, Section 5 of Resolution No. 01316 provides a specific
guideline as to what constitutes a prohibited concerted activity. A
prohibited concerted activity must be one undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their association, with the intent
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 481-482.

25 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED, and
the January 14, 2009 Resolution No. 09-0047 rendered by the Civil Service
Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto; id., at p. 790.
253
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 253
of effecting work stoppage or service disruption, in order to realize their
demands or force concessions. In the case at hand, we can readily observe
that respondent’s participation in the fun run, as well as their behavior
inside the premises of DCWD office during the regular working hours of
that day indicate a complete absence of any intention on their part to
effect a work stoppage or disturbance. In fact, as attested by both parties,
all the respondents participated with the planned activities and festivities
on that day.26
The appellate court was likewise in agreement with the CSC

which considered as simple violation of office rules the posting of
banners outside the designated posting areas by Cagula. Also like
the CSC, it ruled that such offense is not punishable with the
penalty of dismissal.
The DCWD is now before us still with its basic arguments,
though rephrased:
I.
The court a quo failed to rule on the issue whether or not the
respondents’ Consolidated Appeal filed before the CSC was
sufficient in form and substance.
II.
The court a quo erred in ruling that the concerted mass action on
November 9, 2007 was not prohibited under Resolution No.
021316.
III.
The court a quo erred in ruling that Resolution No. 021316 and
MC No. 33 are considered “reasonable office rules and regulations”
within the purview of Section 52[C][3] of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 785-786.
254
IV.
The court a quo erred in ruling that respondents’ act of posting
white bond papers with union-related inscriptions on their t-shirts
while inside the office premises does not constitute serious
violation of Civil Service Rules but only a violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations, despite the fact that the said
Memorandum Circular No. 33 is a CSC-issued Memorandum and
not DCWD-issued Rules.
V.
The court a quo erred in ruling that MC No. 33 was not violated
by respondent Gregorio S. Cagula and the rest of the officials of
NAMADACWAD who were charged in DCWD Administrative Case
No. 34-2007.
VI.
The court a quo erred in not taking into consideration that
respondents Aranjuez, Cagula and Bondoc were second-time
offenders who were previously charged and penalized for violation
of MC No. 33, thereby justifying their dismissal from the service.
VII.
The court a quo erred when it failed to rule on the issue of
whether the decisions of a government agency, acting as
Disciplining Authority, in disciplinary cases are immediately
executory upon receipt thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Prefatorily, DCWD contends that the appeal of Aranjuez, et al.,
should have been dismissed by the CSC for noncompliance with
Section 46 of CSC Resolution No. 991936, particularly their failure
to file a notice of appeal, their failure to show
255
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 255
proof of payment of the appeal fee and the petition’s invalid
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
We are not persuaded.
Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal as
required by CSC Resolution No. 991936 or the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),27 the
Consolidated Memorandum filed by the private respondents was
enough to be considered as a sufficient compliance with the rules.
The Memorandum delineates the errors asserted against DCWD
and the discussions supporting their arguments. We find merit in
the sufficiency of the Memorandum rather than strict compliance
in view of the constitutional right of every employee to security of
tenure. A more relevant consideration of public interest is accorded
whenever the merits of a case collide with rigid application of the
rules.28
Further, we find that the Civil Service Commission, the agency
directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals on review, correctly exercised jurisdic-
_______________
27 46 Section .Perfection of an Appeal.—To perfect an appeal, the appellant

shall within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision submit the following:
Notice of appeal which shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed
from and the date of receipt thereof; a.
Three (3) copies of appeal memorandum containing the grounds relied upon for
the appeal, together with the certified true copy of the decision, resolution or order
appealed from, and certified copies of the documents or evidence; b.
Proof of service of a copy of the appeal memorandum to the disciplining office; c.
Proof of payment of the appeal fee; and d.
A statement or certificate of non-forum shopping. e.
Failure to comply with any of the above requirements within the reglementary
period shall be construed as failure to perfect an appeal and shall cause its
dismissal.
28 Adalim v. Taniñas, G.R. No. 198682, 10 April 2013, 695 SCRA 648, 656.
256
tion over respondent’s appeal from the decision of petitioner
DCWD, thereby ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of
petitioner that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of proof of
payment of appeal. The Civil Service Commission and the Court of
Appeals considered the procedural issue raised by petitioner as a
surmountable bar to the resolution of the main issue of
respondents’ constitutional right to free expression29 as amplified
with specificity by their guaranteed right as workers to peaceful
concerted activity and their entitlement to security of tenure. 30 The
decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals
are squarely supported by Adalim v. Taniñas31 stating that:
In a number of cases, we upheld the CSC’s decision relaxing its
procedural rules to render substantial justice. The Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that
administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to
the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings. The case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of
public employees protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a
resolution of
_______________
29 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. Constitution, Article III Bill of Rights,
Section 4.
30 Constitution, Article XIII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making process affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. 3. Section
31 Supra note 28.
257
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 257
the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid
application of the CSC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, both the CSC and
the CA properly allowed respondent employees’ appeal despite procedural
lapses to resolve the issue on the merits.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,32 this Court

pronounced that technical rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases,
therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to
meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. While it is
desirable that the rules of procedure are faithfully and even
meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the
orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective
they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the
parties.33
Substantial justice, in other words must prevail. In Paler,34 We
said:
When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in
order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting
the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration
of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay as in this
case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no
indication of intent to delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the
appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice
_______________
32 343 Phil. 428, 436; 277 SCRA 633, 640 (1997).

33 GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 163, 174; 266 SCRA 187, 198 (1997),
citing Mauna v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97794, 13 May 1994, 232 SCRA
388, 398.
34 Commission on Appointments v. Paler, 628 Phil. 26, 36; 614 SCRA 127, 136
(2010).
258
on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face.
We rule in favor of the allowance of respondents’ appeal because:

Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be
heard.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Quoting again the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,36we

pointed out that this Court can temper rigid rules in favor of
substantial justice. We find that pronouncement apt and fit to this
case. Thereby we are not detained by the omissions of the
respondents in their resort to the CSC, and we thus proceed to the
merits of the petitioners’ submissions.
Lastly, on the form, we find no merit in the contention that
Aranjuez was not authorized to sign on behalf of the other
petitioners. Pursuant to Union Resolution No. 015-200837 attached
as Annex A to the Appellants’ 015-2008 Consolidated
Memorandum dated 26 March 2008, the officers and members of
NAMADACWAD gave Aranjuez a general authority to represent
the organization in all legal matters to be filed for whatever
purpose it may serve. From the general and broad grant of
authority, Aranjuez possessed the specific authority to sign in
behalf of his principal the verification and certification against
non-forum shopping required of the petition.
To the kernel, then.
_______________
35 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando, 614 Phil. 553, 562-563; 598 SCRA
378, 386-387 (2009).
36 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
37 CA Rollo, pp. 115-116.
259
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 259
DCWD primarily contends that CSC and the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the concerted mass action on 9 November 2007
is not prohibited under Resolution No. 021316. We disagree.
DCWD relies on Resolution No. 021316, which states:
6 Section .Permissible Concerted Mass Action.—A concerted activity
or mass action done outside of government office hours shall not be
deemed a prohibited concerted activity or mass action within the
contemplation of this omnibus rules provided the same shall not occasion
or result in the disruption of work or service.38
DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done
within government office hours, such act was not permissible,
therefore prohibited. Otherwise stated, a concerted activity done
within the regular government office hours is automatically a
violation of Section 6 of the Resolution.
Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined
not in Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof. Thus:
5 Section .Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action.—As used
in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ‘‘prohibited concerted activity or mass
action’’ shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken
by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession,
economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of
similar nature.39 (Emphasis ours)
_______________
38 Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Action in the Public Sector.

39 Id.
260
The operative phrases are “any collective activity” and “work
stoppage or service disruption.” Without the intent at work
stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not
prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not determinative
of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a
concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work
stoppage.
We cannot isolate the provision of Section 6 of the Resolution
from definition of prohibited activity in Section 5 thereof. It is
erroneous to interpret the provisions in such a way that an act not
within the circumstances as defined under Section 5 can still be
regarded as prohibited if done within government hours. To
subscribe to the argument of DCWD would in effect expand the
definition provided by Resolution No. 021316 on what constitutes a
prohibited mass action.
It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-
shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work
stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents,
they followed the advice of GM Gamboa “to be there” at the fun
run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They
were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear.
Else, government employees would be deprived of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.40 This, then, being the
fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and
Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with grievance
inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules
and Regulations.
First off and as correctly pointed out by the charged officials and
members in their 19 November 2007 Reply Letter to DCWD, they
did not violate the 31 October 2007 Office Memorandum issued by
GM Gamboa relating to the proper attire to be worn during the fun
run. The Office Memorandum was clear in its order that the
participants are free to wear
_______________
40 Supra note 29.
261
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 261
any sports attire during the event. To reiterate, the t-shirts they
wore fall within the description of “any sports attire” that the
Memorandum allowed to be worn.
More importantly we need to refer to GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS
case).41 It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS employees wearing
similarly colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside the
GSIS Office, with clenching of fists and orating against the then
President Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited
activity but were only an exercise of their constitutional freedom of
expression.42 We repeat:
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the
GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not
amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even
added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent
reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to
regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the
concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the
“intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession.” Wearing similarly colored shirts,
attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the
guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect
work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing
their demands or force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of
such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government
_______________
41 640 Phil. 18; 625 SCRA 669 (2010).

42 Id., at p. 29; p. 680.
262
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our
brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right
to freedom of expression.43
DCWD also found that Cagula and the rest of the officials
violated MC No. 33 in relation to 8 February 1996 Office
Memorandum. DCWD also argues that a violation of this circular
constitutes as a serious violation of CSC Rules as the circular is a
CSC-issued Memorandum and not just a mere issuance of DCWD.
CSC issued MC No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the
government employees to air their grievances balanced by the
delivery of services to the public which should not be prejudiced.
MC No. 33 sets down rules governing the posting of posters and
other similar materials within the premises of government
agencies as follows:
1. All head of agencies are hereby directed to provide specific spaces
within their respective premises, preferably near the bundy clock, at the
canteen or places normally frequented by employees, where employees’
unions/associations could post their posters.
2. x x x.
3. The hanging of posters and streamers shall only be allowed in the
designated areas.
4. No poster, placard, streamer or other similar materials containing
abusive, vulgar, defamatory or libelous language shall be allowed.
Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of

DCWD issued an office memorandum designating the bulletin
board at the motorpool area below the Office of the Purchasing
Division and the side of the office building beside the
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 29-30; p. 680.
263
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 263
guard house where the bundy clock is located as the designated
areas for posting of grievances.44 Clearly, the DCWD Office
Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a
reasonable rule issued by the heads of the agencies in order to
regulate posting of grievances of the employees.
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service
are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to
speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise
enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their
employment.45 Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment “must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom.” But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental
to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for
public employment. It is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that
citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government.46
The GSIS case pronounced:
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any
person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to
be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive
them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the mem-
_______________
44 CA Rollo, p. 58.
45 Gorospe, Rene B., Constitutional Law, Volume I, 2006 ed., citing Keyishian v.
Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 605-606, 1967.
46 Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488; 180 L. Ed. 2d
408; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4564; 79 U.S.L.W. 4538; 32 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 481; 190
L.R.R.M. 3217; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 1176, 20 June 2011, citing Connick, 461
U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, Keyishian v. Board of Regents of
University of State of New York, id., 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967)
and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689
(2006).
264
bers thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom
can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.47
In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of

expression is not removal of the constitutional right.
Apparently, DCWD, not satisfied by the CSC ruling that a
violation of the memorandum is punishable with reprimand,
argues that what occurred was a serious violation implying that a
higher penalty is warranted.
Under Section 52(C)(3), Rule IV of Resolution No.
991936,48 violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is
punishable with reprimand on the first offense and suspension
ranging from one to thirty days for the second offense.
In Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of
Arrival and/or Departure from Office in the Chronolog Machine,
the charged court employees were penalized for violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations due to their violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 36-2001 requiring all
employees to register their daily attendance, in the Chronolog
Time Recorder Machine (CTRM) and in the logbook of their
respective offices. Following Resolution No. 991936 that violation
of reasonable rules and regulations is a light offense, the Court
penalized its erring employees with the penalty of reprimand.49
Thus, in line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, we
conclude that a violation of an office memorandum, which was
issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting of
grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense
punishable by reprimand.
_______________
47 GSIS v. Villaviza, supra note 41 at p. 30; p. 681.

48 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
49 In Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or
Departure From Office in the Chronolog Machine, 646 Phil. 18; 631 SCRA 396
(2010).
265
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 265
Rules and regulations are issued to attain harmony, smooth
operation, maximize efficiency and productivity, with the ultimate
objective of realizing the functions of particular offices and
agencies of the government.50
On the submissions that the decisions of a government agency,
acting as Disciplining Authority, are immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, we need merely cite Section 37 of the Resolution
No. 991936 which clearly provides that:
37 Section .Finality of Decisions.—A decision rendered by heads of
agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (30)
days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary is
imposed, shall be final and executory. However, if the penalty imposed is
suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty (30) days salary, the same shall be final and executory after the
lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.51
As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension exceeds

thirty days or the fine imposed is in an amount over thirty-day
salary, the decision will only attain finality after the lapse of the
reglementary period in the absence of any motion for
reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the
30-day threshold are immediately executory penalties.
In this case, the members and officials, except the casual
employees who were not meted with penalty as the renewal of their
employment was held in abeyance, were sanctioned with penalties
ranging from suspension of work from one (1) month and one (1)
day to dismissal from service.52Evidently, the finality and execution
of the judgment did not take place after the lapse of the
reglementary period because as previously
_______________
50 Id.
52 CA Rollo, pp. 181-208.
266
discussed, the members and officials were able to file their
consolidated appeal in lieu of notice of appeal.
As clear as the provision on the finality of decisions is Section 42
of Resolution No. 991936 on the effect of motions for
reconsideration. Thus:
42 Section .Effect of Filing.—The filing of a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days shall
stay the execution of the decision sought to be reconsidered.53 (Emphasis
ours)
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.
If the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity as the
quoted provision, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. The letter must be taken to mean exactly what it
says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed.54
The ponente appreciates the concurrence of Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen. No need was seen, though, to add to the ruling that
the present facts limited.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition for review oncertiorari.
Nonetheless, the decision of the CSC which was affirmed in toto by
the CA is MODIFIED. The finding of administrative liability of
and the penalty of reprimand against the NAMADACWAD
members namely Danilo L. Buhay, Pedro E. Alcala, Joseph A.
Valdez, Tito V. Sabangan, Marcelino B. Anino, Juanito C.
Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba, Antero M. Ymas, Rolando L. Largo,
Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B. Libang, Romeorico A. Llanos,
Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V. Corcuera, Alejandro C. Pichon,
Graciano A. Mon-
_______________

54 Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 196907, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 456, 464, citing Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378 Phil. 10, 22;
320 SCRA 279, 289 (1999).
267
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 267
cada, Rolando K. Escorial, Noel A. Dagale, Emilio S. Molina,
Sherwin S. Solamo, and Fulgencio I. Dyguazo are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The finding of liability against the casual employees namely
Edwin A. dela Peña, Jimmy A. Trocio, Wilfredo L. Torreon,
Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito P. Riconalla, Trisebal Q.
Aguilar, Arman N. Lorenzo, Sr. and Pedro C. Gunting
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
As to officers Gualberto S. Pagatpat, Joseph B. Artajo, Felixberto
Q. Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa A. Elorde, Carlos P. Morre,
James Aquilino M. Coloma, Joaquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M.
Maxino, Romulo A. Reyes, Noel G. Legaspi, Eleanor R. Lamoste,
Welmer E. Crasco, Delio T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo
Cubal, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio S. Cagula and Celestino A.
Bondoc, the penalty of reprimand and strong warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., On Official Leave.
Leonen, J.,** Left my vote. See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., Please see Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
I concur in the result.

_______________
* * On Official Leave dated 16 June 2015.
268
This case involves freedom of expression in the context of airing
workplace grievances on employment benefits in the public sector,
the constitutional right to self-organization, and peaceful concerted
activities. Specifically, during their office anniversary celebrations,
respondents wore matching t-shirts that stated their plea for
payment of CNA incentive: “CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa na!”
The ponencia1 quoted GSIS v. Villaviza2 involving Government
Service Insurance System employees who wore red during a public
hearing at their office while raising their fists and orating against
then President Winston Garcia. This court held that such act was
not constitutive of a prohibited activity but only an exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of
expression.3 The ponencia mentioned the government employees’
limited right to freedom of expression as follows:
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are
subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their
mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their
constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” But
there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they
cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the
Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
The GSIS case pronounced:
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any
person in the land to voice out their protests against
_______________
1 Ponencia, p. 261.
2 640 Phil. 18; 625 SCRA 669 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
3 Ponencia, p. 261, citing GSIS v. Villaviza, id., at p. 29; p. 680.
269
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 269
what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil
Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be
unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof
have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is
not removal of constitutional right.4
Freedom to express one’s views enjoys a level of primacy among

our constitutional guarantees, but it has never been considered to
be absolute and immune from reasonable regulation. However,
there is always a higher degree of judicial review of regulation that
affects speech to ensure, among others, that it does not amount to
a disguised form of censorship or that its exercise does not burden
the same exercise of the same rights by others. Even civil service
regulations should hew closely to the parameters of the freedoms
guaranteed in our Constitution.
Exercising one’s right to air grievances in relation to
employment in the public sector, as in this case, should also be
given protection but with the added requirement that the exercise
of the guarantee of freedom to express does not unduly deter the
government agency’s primary functions.
Thus, the pronouncements in this case must be limited only to
its context, that is, expressions in t-shirts during the office
anniversary where there was no showing that that exercise
obstructed or eroded the public functions of the government agency
involved.
In the determination of the extent of the exercise of this
fundamental freedom, the nature of the government agencies
where there may be some employment grievances should be
_______________
4 Ponencia, pp. 263-264, citations omitted.
270
taken into consideration. There are some, like the uniformed
military and police services requiring a greater degree of discipline
within its ranks, where certain forms of expression — not part of
the ambient facts of this case — may not be constitutionally
permissible.
I
Republic Act No. 875 known as the Industrial Peace Act was
passed in 1953 in order to, among others, “eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social,
and economic well-being.”5 This early law prohibited government
employees from engaging in strikes to secure changes in their
employment terms and conditions:
11. SEC.Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government.—The

terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it
is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms
and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor
organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions and not to those
employed in proprietary functions of the Government including but
not limited to governmental corporations.6 (Emphasis supplied)
The last sentence differentiates between employees of

government bodies that exercise governmental functions, and
_______________
5 Rep. Act No. 875 (1953), Sec. 1(a).

6 Rep. Act No. 875 (1953), Sec. 11.
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VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 271
employees of those that exercise proprietary functions such as
government corporations. The latter are not covered by the
prohibition.
Presidential Decree No. 442 known as the Labor Code was
passed in 1974. This changed the policy by “‘exempt[ing]’ . . .
government employees, including employees of government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations[,]”7 from the right to self-
organization for purposes of collective bargaining.8 It provides that
the Civil Service Law rules and regulations govern even the
government-owned and -controlled corporations:
276. ArticleGovernment employees.—The terms and conditions of
employment of all government employees, including employees of
government-owned and -controlled corporations, shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be
standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the new
constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of existing wages,
benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by
them at the time of the adoption of this Code.9
Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor10ruled that

petitioner government workers have the right to form associations,
shared with all in public service, “[b]ut they may not join
associations which impose the obligation to engage in concerted
activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other
emoluments higher than or different from that
_______________
7 Arizala v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-43633-34, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA
584, 593 [Per J. Narvasa, First Division], citing Implementing Rules and
Regulations, Book V, Rule 11, Sec. 1.
8 Id.
9 Pres. Decree No. 442 (1974), Sec. 276.
10 209 Phil. 1; 124 SCRA 1 (1983) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
272
provided by law and regulation.”11 Laws that allow employees of
agencies discharging proprietary functions to engage in strikes or
other concerted activities belong to the past.12
Government-owned and -controlled corporations were further
differentiated in 1986 when former President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 111 granting employees “of
government corporations established under the Corporation Code
the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their
respective employers.”13 Thus, this differentiated employees of
government corporations established by law having their own
charter from those established under the Corporation Code.
Executive Order No. 180 was enacted in June 1, 1987 entitled
Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of
Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector Labor-
Management Council, and for Other Purposes. This order “applies
to all employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations with original charters.”14
Also enacted in 1987, our present Constitution provides that “the
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees[,]”15 and the state “shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law.”16
_______________
11 Id., at p. 21.
12 Id., at p. 16.
13 Arizala v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7 at p. 595, citing Labor Code, Art.
224; Book V, Rule 11, Sec. 1, Implementing Rules and Regulations, as amended by
Sec. 3, Implementing Rules and Regulations, Exec. Order No. 111.
14 Exec. Order No. 180 (1987), Sec. 1.
15 Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5).
16 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3.
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VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 273
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights also provides that “[n]o law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition government for redress of grievances.”17
We read this constitutional provision on the right to freedom of
expression together with the other constitutional provisions, laws,
jurisprudence, and implementing rules and regulations that reflect
the state’s policy on the different government employees’ right to
peaceful concerted activities and to self-organization for purposes
of collective bargaining.
This brings us to a limited or regulated right to freedom of
expression by government employees in differing levels of
limitation depending on the nature of functions discharged by the
different government branches, departments, bureaus, offices, and
other government agencies and instrumentalities.
II
Freedom of expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside
government but, perhaps, more regulated when one assumes the
role of a public officer. The right to speech is inherent. However,
the act of joining a government office should be construed as an
understanding that the individual’s exercise of this basic right is
subsumed by the necessity of providing public services to the
greater majority.
The limits are inherent in the nature of governance. The
Constitution states that “[p]ublic officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.”18
_______________
17 Const., Art. III, Sec. 4.

18 Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1.
274
Republic Act No. 671319 known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees thus provides
for the following norms of conduct:
4. SectionNorms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees.Every
public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of
personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties: —(A)
(a)Commitment to public interest.—Public officials and employees
shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal
interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices
must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b)Professionalism.—Public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.
(c)Justness and sincerity.—Public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and
sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of
others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to
their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential
or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with
theirs.
_______________
19 This was approved on February 20, 1989.
275
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 275
(d)Political neutrality.—Public officials and employees shall provide
service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party
affiliation or preference.
(e)Responsiveness to the public.—Public officials and employees shall
extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless
otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public
officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation
of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the
depressed rural and urban areas.
(f)Nationalism and patriotism.—Public officials and employees shall
at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the
use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage
appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g)Commitment to democracy.—Public officials and employees shall
commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the
principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h)Simple living.—Public officials and employees and their families
shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They
shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any
form
The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote
(1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of
information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond
regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees rec (B)
276
ognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance
of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on
measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and
employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.
(Emphasis supplied)
Public accountability and a commitment to giving priority to the

public interest above private ones demand some level of limitation
on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression by government
employees.
III
Among a water district office, the judiciary, the police and the
military, and other government offices, there are differing levels of
expression constitutionally allowed.
Traditional classifications distinguish between those that
perform governmental or sovereign functions and those that
exercise proprietary functions.20 The Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, for example, exercises proprietary
functions. Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals21 discusses how the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority has a separate and
distinct personality from the government:
We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is an entity
invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227 reads:
3. SectionCreation of the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority.—There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the
Conversion Authority which shall have the
_______________
20 See Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, supranote 10.

21 404 Phil. 981; 352 SCRA 334 (2001) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].
277
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 277
attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of
a corporation.
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of
government have been classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare,
particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of
Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically
proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development
of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in
general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other
corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the
realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to
count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although
performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with
governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a
mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Government-owned and -controlled corporations also exercising

proprietary functions, not “mere agenc[ies] of the Government,”
should thus have a wider scope of freedom of expression compared
to other government agencies.
GSIS v. Villaviza23 involving Government Service Insurance
System employees held that “[n]ot all collective activity or mass
undertaking of government employees is prohibited[;] [o]therwise,
we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the
government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.”24 This court explained that “[i]t
_______________
22 Id., at p. 999; p. 350.

23 GSIS v. Villaviza, supra note 2.
24 Id., at p. 30; p. 680.
278
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service,
the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty.
This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be
taken away.”25 Thus, “CSC’s Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what
a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or
regulated these rights.”26
The earlier GSIS v. Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa GSIS27 was
different. The Government Service Insurance System employees
joined four days of concerted demonstrations, rallies, and en
masse walkout from October 4 to 7, 2004.28 This court held that
“any collective activity undertaken by government employees with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order
to realize their demands or force concession, economic or otherwise,
is a prohibited concerted mass action and doubtless actionable
administratively.”29 This court traced jurisprudence on the matter,
including Jacinto v. Court of Appeals30 involving public school
teachers on the following discussion:
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was
positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE)
v. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purposes of the association, the overriding considerations
of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions.
_______________
25 Id.
26 Id., at p. 32; p. 683.
27 539 Phil. 677; 510 SCRA 622 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
28 Id., at p. 684; p. 626.
29 Id., at p. 694; p. 637, citing CSC Resolution No. 021316, Sec. 5.
30 346 Phil. 656; 281 SCRA 657 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
279
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 279
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its
exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or
even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to
organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which
“enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers
and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service
law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government
service shall be observed.31 (Citations and emphases omitted)
Employees of government-owned and -controlled corporation can

freely exercise their right to freedom of expression, subject to law,
including Civil Service Commission issuances that prohibit mass
actions causing work stoppage. Government employees must
uphold their commitment to public interest and act in accordance
with the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials
and Employees. This level of limitation or regulation also applies to
governmental financial institutions, often grouped with
government-owned and -controlled corporations.
On the other hand, government bodies that perform
governmental functions can be further classified based on different
factors.
Some hold public office based on popular vote such as elected
Senators and Representatives of Congress. These public officials
are in the position to pass laws for better employment benefits for
all government employees. Law-making involves deliberating on
political questions, thus, the extent of
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 669-670; pp. 671-672.
280
freedom of speech appears wider for those in Congress. The
Constitution even provides that “[n]o Member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.”32
On the other hand, members of the judiciary must maintain
independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety, equality,
competence, and diligence.33 “Judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly,
but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.”34 Thus,
they must “refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.”35 “Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before
or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the process.”36 These standards
present a more limited freedom of expression for judges.
The strictest limitation applies to those in the military and the
police. They maintain peace and prevent crime. Those in the
military are subject to Commonwealth Act No. 408 known as the
Articles of War. Article 96 provides that “[a]ny officer, member of
the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second
lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.”
_______________
32 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 11.

33 New Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), Canon 1, Sec. 3.
35 New Code of Judicial Conduct (2007).
281
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 281
Gonzales v. Abaya37 involves the July 27, 2003 incident when
heavily armed Armed Forces of the Philippines members wearing
red armbands with the emblem “Magdalo” entered Oakwood led by
Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV.38 They announced in broadcast
media “their grievances against the administration of [then]
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, such as the graft and
corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition
to the “enemies” of the State, and the bombings in Davao City
intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government.”39 Those involved were charged with coup d’état before
the regular court, and violation of the Articles of War before the
military tribunal.
The constitutional right to freedom of expression belongs to all.
But its exercise may be reasonably regulated. Those who chose
public service embraced the public’s interest with a priority higher
than their own. Their oaths signify a commitment to public
accountability.40 This obligation necessarily imposes more
regulation of the exercise of their freedom of expression. The extent
of this regulation and its parameters will need to be more clearly
defined in a more appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JARDELEZA,J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by Davao City Water District (“DCWD”) should
be denied for lack of merit.
_______________
37 530 Phil. 189; 498 SCRA 445 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
38 Id., at p. 202; p. 466.
39 Id.
40 See Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1; Rep. Act No. 6713 (1989), Sec. 4.
282
DCWD charged respondents as follows:1 first, all respondent
members and officers of Nakahiusang Mamumuo sa
DCWD (“NAMADACWAD”) for wearing shirts with the inscription
“CNA INCENTIVE IHATAG NA, DIRECTOR
BRAGANZA PAHAWA NA!” during DCWD’s 34th anniversary
celebration in violation of Civil Service Commission (“CSC”)
Resolution No. 021316 and Memorandum Circular No.
33;2 and second, respondent union officer Gregorio S. Cagula
(“Cagula”) and all other NAMADACWAD union officers for
allegedly attaching on the same date union posters with the same
inscription outside designated areas in violation of DCWD’s Office
Memorandum dated 8 February 1996 (“Office Memorandum”)
pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 33.
I submit that Cagula and all other respondent union officers
should be exonerated from the second charge. There is no evidence
of record to support the finding of fact of the DCWD, as accepted by
the CSC and the Court of Appeals (“CA”),3 that Cagula with the
help of some NAMADACWAD members allegedly attached union
posters outside the areas designated by DCWD’s Office
Memorandum.
Exception to the general rule that only questions of law may

be reviewed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because the Court is not a trier of
facts. However, there are exceptions4to this rule,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 223-226.

2 Rules to Govern Posting and Hanging of Posters, Placards, Streamers and
Other Similar Materials (1994).
3 Rollo, p. 83.
4When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
and conjectures; (1)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
283
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 283
which are present in this case, among them, the lack of sufficient
support in evidence of the lower courts’ judgment5 and when the
conclusion arrived upon by the lower courts are based on
speculation, surmises and conjectures.
Furthermore, although DCWD did not raise in its petition this
factual issue, Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court6
_______________
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3)

When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (5)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6)
When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (7)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (8)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (9)
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (10)
When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (11)
[Cirtek Employees Labor Union v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, June
6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656, 660; Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No.
156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 10]
5 Co v. Yeung, G.R. No. 212705, September 10, 2014, 735 SCRA 66.
6 8. SectionQuestions that may be decided.—No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed
from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
(7a)
284
and jurisprudence7 permit us to review matters not assigned as
errors on appeal, provided, among others, that consideration of the
error is necessary in arriving at a just decision and a complete
resolution of the case, or the error is closely related to an error
assigned.
DCWD in its petition raised the issue of whether or not Cagula
and the other NAMADACWAD officers violated Memorandum
Circular No. 33.8 Thus, we can resolve the factual question of
whether or not Cagula and the other NAMADACWAD members
indeed attached the union posters outside the allowed areas.
Charge against respondent officers for violation of

Memorandum Circular No. 33
DCWD charged the officers of NAMADACWAD as follows:

On or about the same occasion, a NAMADACWAD official, respondent
Gregorio S. Cagula, with the help of NAMADACWAD members attached
some posters and/or similar materials bearing the inscription “CNA
Incentives IHATAG NA! Director BRAGANZA PAHAWA NA!” to a post in
the motorpool area; another poster of similar import was seen outside the
guardhouse but inside the fence; both were situated within the premises of
DCWD but outside the officially designated areas for posting. This act of
respondent Gregorio S. Cagula appears to be an act of NAMADACWAD.
As an organization, NAMADACWAD and its officials are responsible for
an act of any of its officials or members committed in occasion and as a
result of its duly approved concerted activity/mass action.
_______________
7 Martires v. Chua, G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 38, 54.
8 Rollo, p. 26.
285
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 285
This is in violation of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 33, Series of 1994, regarding the Rules to Govern Posting and Hanging
of Posters, Placards, Streamers and other Similar Materials. This
Memorandum Circular is reiterated in Section 13 of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 021316.9(Emphasis ours)
From the beginning of the case, NAMADACWAD disputed the

factual allegation that Cagula or any of its members or officers
attached the union posters:
Atty. Tumanda: Okay we take note of that, thank you counsel. Anyway,
I would like to make a recap on the factual issues. As I see it, it would
seem that the only factual issue to be resolved is the posting of banners
inside the DCWD compound. All others, are you admitting the facts?
Atty. Lopoz: Yes, your Honor only the posting of the banner is what we
contest. All the facts in relation to the acts of the respondents here of
wearing the union uniform as their understanding or interpretation of
sports attire, we have no question on that matter your Honor. But on the
fact of posting of banners, we are questioning and contesting on this your
Honor.10
To support the charge against the union officers, DCWD

presented photographs as physical evidence and the testimonies of
two employees who took the photographs. The first set of
photographs shows the posters already attached to the post in the
motorpool area, with Cagula and other NAMADACWAD members
standing nearby. The second set of photographs shows the posters
already attached to a post inside the premises of DCWD but
outside the designated areas.11
DCWD finds, and the CSC and the CA affirm, that the
photographs are substantial evidence to prove that Cagula and
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 224-225.

10 Id., at p. 229; underscoring omitted.
11 Id., at pp. 115, 127-128, 236, 250; CA Rollo, pp. 12, 379.
286
other NAMADACWAD members attached the union posters
outside the designated areas. The DCWD Administrative
Committee held:
The Committee sees the pictures unfolding a sequence of events. As
shown, there were three (3) persons standing close to one another facing
the post, with arms extended and holding some sort of white bond paper,
one of them, Board Director of NAMADACWAD. When they left the post,
it was shown that a white bond paper with inscriptions “CNA Incentive
ihatag na! Director Braganza pahawa na!” was already attached to the
post. All these show that there is substantial evidence to conclude that
respondent Gregorio S. Cagula was responsible to the posting of banner.12
I disagree with this conclusion. Unfortunately, the photographs

do not form part of the records for the Court to examine. However,
based on DCWD’s holding in relation to the first set of
photographs, one photograph allegedly shows Cagula with two
other persons near a post holding a white bond paper. Another
photograph shows a union poster already attached to the post.
These photographs do not prove that Cagula or any
NAMADACWAD member attached the union poster outside
designated areas. The two sets of photographs were taken by two
employees who testified for DCWD. Neither testified that they saw
Cagula in the act of attaching the posters.
Ms. Jennife D.P. Dumalag (“Dumalag”) and Mr. Jerell J.
Leonida (“Leonida”), the DCWD’s employees who took the
pictures, testified that they did not see who attached the union
posters outside the designated areas.13
_______________
12 Id., at p. 249.
13 Id., at pp. 233-234.
287
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 287
Posters in the Motorpool area
Dumalag, the employee who took the pictures showing the

posters in the motorpool area testified on cross-examination:
Atty. Lopoz: Could you please read the wordings in the pictures you
have taken? Particularly in Exhibit 34 “F-62.”
Ms. Dumalag: No to Privatization of Water District! Consumer Alert.
CNA Incentive Ihatag Na! Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!
xxx
Atty. Lopoz: Okay, did you really see who posted these posters
particularly in this Exhibit 34 “F-62.”
Ms. Dumalag: I could not really recall who posted those but the picture
would tell.
Atty. Lopoz: The picture would tell, but you did not see who really
posted these posters?
Ms. Dumalag: To my recollection your Honor if I may review the
picture, there could be but the way it was documented…
Atty. Lopoz: But the question is, did you see somebody who posted those
posters?
Ms. Dumalag: Those were posted already.
Atty. Lopoz: Did you see who posted these?
Ms. Dumalag: I cannot recall, but…
Atty. Lopoz: Okay, thank you. So you cannot recall and perhaps by your
recollection as you have mentioned earlier that the pictures would tell. So
you somehow presumed that somebody from those people you have taken
pictures posted that posters?
Ms. Dumalag: I did.
x x x14
(Emphasis ours)
_______________
14 Id., at p. 233.
288
DCWD concluded that the photographs showed a “sequence of
events” constituting “substantial evidence x x x that respondent
Gregorio S. Cagula was responsible to the posting of banner.”15 This
finding is erroneous and contradicts the record. There is no
showing what type of camera Dumalag used but she was on the
scene. One photograph shows Cagula and two other persons
“standing close to one another facing the post.” Another
photograph shows that “after they left the post,” the poster was
“already attached to the post.” Assuming the photographs were
indeed taken in sequence and for some reason Dumalag was
unable to take photographs of the actual posting, she was on the
scene and should have witnessed who actually attached the poster.
However, her testimony is that she cannot “recall,” as a result of
which she merely presumed it was one of “those people,” meaning
the three, among them Cagula.
Other Posters Inside DCWD’s Premises
Leonida, the other employee who took the pictures showing

posters attached to a post inside the premises of DCWD but
outside the designated areas, testified that he did not see who
attached the union posters. Leonida testified on cross-examination:
Atty. Lopoz: Na na’ay nakapilit sa poste na coupon bond, ikaw ba ng
nagpicture ani (That there was a coupon bond posted in the post)?
Mr. Leonida: Yes, Sir.
Atty. Lopoz: Sa atoa pa, nakita ka kung kinsa ang nagbutang ana (Or in
other words, you saw who placed that)?
Mr. Leonida: Wala (No), Sir.
_______________
15 Id., at p. 249.
289
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 289
Atty. Lopoz: So imoha lang gyud gi-pikturan na nakapilit na siya (So
you just purely took pictures when it was already posted)?
Atty. Lopoz: Pero wala gyud ka nakakita kung kinsa gyud nagbutang
ana (But you actually did not see who placed that)?
x x x16
(Underscoring in the original)
The DCWD Administrative Committee itself found that no one

saw who posted in this area.17 Like Dumalag, Leonida admitted
that he only took the pictures when the posters were already
attached. For that matter, considering that there is no testimonial
or physical evidence shown that Cagula or any other
NAMADACWAD member attached the union posters outside
designated areas, there is no basis to hold them liable in violation
of Memorandum Circular No. 33.
Individual liability for unlawful acts in a mass action
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Cagula or any

other NAMADACWAD member indeed attached the
union posters outside the designated areas, the conclusion that
“NAMADACWAD and its officials are responsible for an act of any
of its officials or members”18 is wrong as a matter of law.
Liability for unlawful or prohibited acts committed in a strike or
other concerted mass action is legally determined
_______________
16 Id., at p. 234.
17 Id., at p. 250.
18 Id., at pp. 224-225.
290
individually, not collectively.19 Article 27720 of the Labor Code
does not hold the officers of a union responsible for an illegal act of
another officer:
277. Art.Prohibited activities.—
No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of
this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding
Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been
obtained and reported to the Ministry. (a)
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by
the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence
of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a
lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during
such lawful strike. (Emphasis ours)
A strike or mass action which is legal does not become illegal

merely because it is tainted by prohibited acts.21Here,
_______________
19 Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., No. L-
28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276; A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of
A. Soriano Aviation, G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 189.
20 Previously Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
21 Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., supra.
291
VOL. 758, JUNE 16, 2015 291
there was no prohibited mass action, and thus the union officers
who wore shirts with the inscription were not held liable. Further,
the alleged prohibited act of posting is not proven.
A reprimand is a public and formal censure or severe reproof
administered to a person at fault by his superior officer or a body to
which he belongs.22 Although a reprimand may be a slight form of
penalty, it still goes into the record of the employee. It is unjust to
impose even the slightest form of penalty to an employee, whether
or not in the government, where the alleged infraction is not
proven with substantial evidence.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition. For the reasons
stated, I respectfully submit that we exonerate respondent Cagula
and all other respondent union officers from the charge of
attaching the union posters outside the designated areas.
Petition denied, judgment modified.
Notes.—In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem
accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system; It is only when the people have unbridled
access to information and the press that they will be capable of
rendering enlightened judgments — we cannot both be free and
ignorant. (Chavez vs. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 [2008])
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock or disturb. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission
on Elections, 618 SCRA 32 [2010])
——o0o——
_______________
22 Tobias v. Veloso, No. L-40224, September 23, 1990, 100 SCRA 177.
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September 20, 2016. G.R. No. 221538.

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL

PERLAS-BERNABEJ. ,, Dissenting Opinion:

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-

On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal

7 Id. See also Id., at p. 227, SET Decision.

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan,

24 Id., at pp. 682-683.

On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention

In the same Order, Senator Poe’s children were “deemed

Arrivals Flight No.

On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan

Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,

On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The

100 Id., at pp. 253-257.

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s Resolution

104 Id., at pp. 80-83.

Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial

110 Id., at p. 669.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of

Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from

tion, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the

119 Id., at pp. 399-400; p. 401.

This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral

121 Id., at pp. 804-805; pp. 529-530.

A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House

There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral

ity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.”

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the

131 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.

132 CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 1(2):

The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.] (2)

Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its

Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the

145 Id., at pp. 166-167.

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation,

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a

149 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150

Section 2’s significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine

Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native

162 Id., at p. 466; p. 329, citing Velayo, Ramon M., id.

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the

166 Id., at p. 468; p. 331.

The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of