E.

Surnames; 174, 176, 189, 369; 364-380 NCC; RA
9255; Sec 5(d), RA 8239; RA 9048, RA 10172
1) Alfon v Republic, GR No. 51201, 29 May 1980
2) Yasin vs Shari’a District Court, supra
3) Wang v Registrar, GR No. 159966, 30 Mar 2005
4) Bar Matter No. 1625 Re Petition of Josephine
Uy-Timosa, 13 July 2006
5) Remo v Secretary of Foreign Affairs, GR No.
169202, 5 Mar 2010
6) Grande vs Antonio, supra
VIII. Parental Authority;
sec. 12, art. II, Const.; RA 6809; 209-233; 2180, 2182, 2176, 19-21
NCC; A.M. No. 03-04-04 SC; A.M. No. 02-11-12 SC; sec. 25, Rule
130; arts. 11-12, 101-103 RPC, sec. 1 Rule 111
A. Liability of parents
7) Libi v IAC, GR No. 70890, 18 Sep 1992
FACTS: ---ibpzn ART 220-233
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
the former broke up with the latter after she found out the
Wendell were irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him
to resort to threats. One day, they were found dead from a
single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The
parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial
court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
RULING:
Yes. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for
the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages.
Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as
so modified.
Since the parents failed to establish in its defense, the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damage, the court held that the civil liability of
the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary
and not subsidiary.
B. Liability of teachers; heads
8) Palisoc vs Brillantes, GR No. 29025, 4 Oct 1971
FACTS:
for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the
head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in
charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a
member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor
of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the
other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so long
as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards
with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control and
responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the
father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was
based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based
its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that
Article 2180 was not applicable in this case,
as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials
at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Who must be held liable for damages for the death
of Dominador together with the defendant?
HELD:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton
and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and
severally with the Virgilio for damages. No
liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the
MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable
since it had not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students
remain in their custody” means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability
to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act
must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of
Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied
are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such
liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain
extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child.” In this case, The unfortunate death resulting from the
fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of
providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from
harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption
to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was
modified, while claim for compensatory damages was
increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the
claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross
negligence on the part of the said defendants.

Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio

Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the Manila
Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966
during recess, an altercation transpired between the
deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident,
Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already
of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador
looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that
Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador
slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting
severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the
latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter
died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic
fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador filed an action
9) Amadora vs CA, GR No. 47745, 15 Apr 1988
FACTS: - ibpzn
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was
mortally hit by a gun by PablitoDaffon resulting to the former’s
death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a
civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the
physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent
Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI
Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school
was an academic institution of learning and not a school of
arts and trades 2. Those students were not in the custody of
the school since the semester has already ended 3. There
was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any
event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline. Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son
was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of
Physics reports).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be
held liable.
RULING:
No. Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should not be held
liable.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that “teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody. Responsibility shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.”
Even though at the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in
the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened; it
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement. What was important is that he was there
for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high
school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined
in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority
over the students and not direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear
negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily
link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable
under the provision because only the teacher of the head of
school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed,
none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
10) St. Mary’s Acad v Carpitanos, GR#.143363, 2/6/2002
FACTS: - ibpzn
Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of
the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin
died due to this accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the
damages.
RULING:
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under
Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed
that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that
there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be
the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death
of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused
while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Wherefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for
determination of the liability of the defendants excluding
herein petitioner.
C. Liability of schools
11) St. Joseph v Miranda, GR No. 182353, 29 Jun 2010
12) PSBA vs CA, GR No. 84698, 4 Feb 1992
Facts:
Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and
its officers liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year
commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises
of PSBA by elements from outside the school. Private
respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging
the school and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack
of safety precautions before, during, and after the attack on
the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were
denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
NO.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school’s academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a
finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only.
D. Custody
i. Stranger
13) Medina v Makabili, GR No. L-26953, 28 Mar 1969
14) Luna v IAC, GR No. 68374, 18 Jun 1985
ii. Illegitimate mother
15) Briones vs Miguel, GR No. 156343, 18 Oct 2004
16) David vs CA, GR 111180, 16 Nov 1995
FACTS: -ibpzn
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City.
Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate
one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on
March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two
more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9,
1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent’s wife
when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar’s house at Villa
Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him
to Villar’s legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar
to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal
family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to
give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J.
at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on
behalf of Christopher J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mother has the rightful custody of the
child.
RULING:
Yes. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent; she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all
other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor
child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the
latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art.213 of the Family Code, “no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at
the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken
from the mother’s custody. Even now that the child is over
seven years of age, the mother’s custody over him will have
to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother.
iii. Letigimate mother
17) Espiritu vs CA, GR No. 115640, 15 Mar 1995
FACTS: - ibpzn
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain
a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita
works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary
post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a
year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation
when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a
second child named Reginald.
In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for
second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them
with his sister.When Teresita returned in the Philippines
sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the
children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the two children should be
awarded to the mother.
RULING:
No. In cases of care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern
and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered
to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child
under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the
time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both
over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered.
It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to
give the children the kind of attention and care which their
mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit
relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and
personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, the custody of the minors was reinstated to their
father.
18) Perez vs CA, GR No. 118870, 29 Mar 1996
(Special Proceedings – Custody: A child under seven years
shall not be separated from his mother)
Facts:
Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner
mother, a registered nurse working in the US are married
couples who are separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking
respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC
issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child
to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to him
ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner
custody over the child even under seven years old. It held
that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the
child’s best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents
that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states
that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefore.
Issue:
WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held:
No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child
under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the
term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil
Code that a child below seven years old shall not be
separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly
repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth
Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.
19) Pablo-Gualberto v Gualberto, GR No.154994, 6/28/05
FACTS:
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn, with
prayer for custody of their four year old son. Joycelyn
took their child with her to San Jose, Mindoro. At that
time, the child was enrolled in Parañaque City. Joycelyn
and her child are presently staying with her step father
residence in Mindoro. Crisanto hired a Security to
conduct surveillance on Joycelyn. And according to
findings, Joycelyn was having a lesbian relationship with
one Noreen in Cebu City. And she does not taking care
of the child as she is very often goes out of the house.
The CA believes that Joycelyn had no reason to take
the child with her. Therefore, the court awards custody
of the child to his father, Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto.
Joycelyn filed a petition for the custody of her minor
child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joycelyn is right in claiming that she
should have the custody of their minor child?
HELD:
The Court held yes, Joycelyn was right in claiming that
she should have the custody of their minor child.
According to Article 213 Paragraph 2, “No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reason to order
otherwise”.
In this case, the custody was awarded to Joycelyn
because their child was below seven years of age and
being a lesbian was not a compelling reason to separate
her from her child. There was no evidence that the child
was exposed to Joycelyn’s alleged lesbian relationship
that suffer his moral and psychological development.
20) Dacasin vs Dacasin, GR No. 168785, 5 Feb 2010
F ACTS:
Petit ioner, Herald Dacasin, an Am erican
citizen f iled the case f or review, the dismissal
of a suit toenf orce a post-f oreign divorce child
custody agreement f or their daughter,
Stephanie, whose solecustody was awarded to
the respondent, a Filipino cit izen, f iled in
Illinois court f or lack of jurisdiction.Pet itioner
sued respondent in RTC Makati to enf orce the
agreement (contract ) executed by theparties
in Manila that modif ied the terms of the post-
divorce decree f rom sole custody of
theirdaughter to joint custody, alleging the
respondent ’s retention of sole custody.The
respondent sought f or the dismissal of the
case f or lack of jurisdict ion because the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdict ion to
enf orce decree even af ter the respondent
undertook the relinquishment of the Illinois
court’s jurisdiction t o the Philippine courts.
Hence, the agreementboth part ies executed is
void. The RTC dismissed the caseThe
petit ioner sought reconsideration. His
content ion is that the divorce decree sought
by therespondent in Illinois court is void.
Hence, the post-f oreign divorce decr ee is also
void citing the National it y Rule under Art.
15 of the Civil Code. The RTC denied the
motion. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
- W ON the RTC has the jurisdict ion over the
case.
- W ON the Agreement (contract) execut ed in
Manila is valid.
RULI NG:
The RTC has j urisdiction to entertain
petit ioner’s suit but not to enf orce the
Agreement which is Void. However, f actual
and equit y considerations militat e against the
dism issal of petitioner’s suit and call for the
remand of the case to settle the questi on of
Stephanie’s custody.
The RTC has jurisdi ction
Parties to a contract are f ree to stipulate the
terms of agreementsubject to the minimum
ban on stipulat ions contrar y to law, morals,
good customs, public order,or public policy.
The agreement is void.
At the time the parties executed
the Agreement on 28 Januar y 2002,t wo f acts
are undisputed:(1) Stephanie was under
seven years old (having been born on
21 September 1995). Thisis in contrar y to law
as stated in Art. 213 of the Civil Code; and(2)
petit ioner and respondent were no longer
married under the laws of the United
Statesbecause of the divorce decree.
Based on Art. 15 or the Nationalit y Rule,
petit ioner cannot rely on t he divorce decree’s
alleged invalidit y- not because the I llinois
court lacked jurisdiction or that the divor ce
decree violated I llinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse.
Only Philippine nat ionals are cover ed by the
policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and m oralit y. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid accordingto their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent f rom themarriage f rom the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Call for the Remand of the Case.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the caseoutside of the ambit of the
mandator y maternal custody regime under
Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of
the def ault standard on child custody
proceedings – t h e be s t i nt er es t of th ec hi l d
IX. Support; 194-208; 305, 2164, 2164-66 NCC
21) Dolina vs Vallecera, GR No. 182367, December 15, 2010
SUMMARY: The filiation of the child to the parent
must first be established before support from said
parent can be granted by the court
FACTS: -projectjurisprudence
Antonia Perla filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against the
respondent for alleged woman and child abuse under
RA 9262 and asked for financial support.
She alleged that respondent is the father of her child.
The man, however, made a denial of the claim of his
being the father of the child and that the signature
appearing in the child Certificate of Live Birth is not his
signature. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that there is no prior judgment establishing the
filiation of the child hence, there is no basis to order
support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC made error in judgment in
dismissing the case and in requiring the petitioner to
first prove filiation before support is granted
RULING:
No, the RTC made no error in so doing.
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain
support for her child. The object of RA 9262 under
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of
women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence. Although the issuance of a protection order
against the respondent in the case can include the grant
of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal
support.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in
order to establish filiation and then demand support.
Alternatively, she may directly file an action for
support, where the issue of compulsory recognition
may be integrated and resolved.
What is the proper remedy?
[1] Action for Compulsory Recognition to Establish
Filiation. Afterwards, she can demand support; or
[2] Action for Support, where one of the issues is
filiation.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter
is not entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. (Art. 195, Family Code). The child’s
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for
compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation.. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly
proved.
2) DOCTRINE: - lawtechworld
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation.
FACTS:
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn
Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse
under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a
prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such
prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed
Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount
of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition
was essentially one for financial support rather than for
protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not
the child’s father and that the signature in the
birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition
is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the
child as his and therefore give financial support.
RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action
for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child?
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived
with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if
he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved
his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
22) Valino vs Adriano, GR No. 182894, 22 Apr 2014
SUMMARY:
Atty. Adriano died. His 30 years common-law wife Fe buried
his remains in her family mausoleum without waiting for the
legal family. The legal wife Rosario and their children filed
petition for transfer of the corpse to the family plot. Both
claimed that they are just following the expressed wish of the
deceased. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the legal
wife Rosario. The expressed wish of the deceased provided
in Article 307 (NCC) is not absolute. Article 305 (NCC)
provides the limitation.
DOCTRINES:
Article 307 (NCC) provides that the funeral shall be in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased.
Article 305 (NCC) provides that the duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support under
Article 294 (now 199 of FC). Article 199 (FC) provides the
following order: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the
nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and (4) The brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario (the legal wife) and Valino (common-
law wife) is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano. The legal
wife Rosario.
FACTS:
1) Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6
children.
2) Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned
sour and they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years
later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until
they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite
such arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children.
3) Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in
the US.
4) None of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses
for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death
of her husband, she immediately called Valino and
requested that she delay the interment for a few days but
her request was not heeded. Respondents were not able
to attend the interment.
5) Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view
the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that
his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino
praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to
the family plot.
6) In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty.
Adriano had been separated for more than twenty (20)
years before he courted her. Valino claimed that
throughout the time they were together, he had introduced
her to his friends and associates as his wife.
7) RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
ISSUE:
Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner, who
has taken care of and lived with the deceased at the time
of illness and subsequent death, has better right over the
body?
HELD:
The legal spouse
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the
Civil Code provides who has rights over funeral
arrangements. The SC stated that the law simply confines
the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of ones common
law partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving
legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States
when he died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right
and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end.9While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano
and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more
often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness
once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in
making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment
for a few days so they could attend the service and view
the remains of the deceased.
23) Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, Gr No. 193707, 12/10/ 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately,
their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where
the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint
against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the
latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint
since the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he
being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support
his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen
of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that
Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying
the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A
9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.
X. Summary Proceedings
24) Republic vs Narceda, GR No. 182760, 10 Apr 2013
FACTS:
Robert and Marina Narceda got married on July 22, 1987.
Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and never returned. Robert
tried to look for her but he could not find her. It was after
several years that he was informed by a town mate who came
home from Singapore that his wife was already living with a
Singaporean husband.
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry,
Robert filed with the RTC a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The court then
approved the petition. Petitioner appealed and claimed that
the respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with diligence required by law. The CA dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the judgment of the court in the summary
proceeding is immediately final and executory. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition.
HELD:
No. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in
a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party
may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
25) Republic vs Olaybar, GR No. 189538, 10 Feb 2014
26) Fujiki vs Marinay, supra