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AA Flight 587 - Accident Analysis

American Airlines Flight 587 crashed on Monday November 12, 2001 at around 09:16:15

Eastern Standard Time. It was an Airbus A300-600R operated as AA Flight 587. It crashed into

Belle Harbor area shortly after taking off from the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New

York City. The aircraft, unfortunately, crashed when it was on its regular scheduled flight to

Santo Domingo in Dominican Republic. Aboard the plane included 251 passengers and 9

crewmembers, all of whom died during the crashed. Amongst the dead passengers included five

young children. There were also five people killed on the ground. As part of its route, AA Flight

587 was regularly scheduled to fly passengers to Santo Domingo and Dominican Republic. In

particular, the flight was caught in turbulent air immediately after taking off just right behind a

Japan Airlines Boeing 747 that was apparently on the same runway (Annual Report to Congress

99).

During the crash, First Officer Sten Molin made a first attempt to stabilize the aircraft but

that did not help. Instead, the vertical stabilizer snapped off thereby causing the plane to spiral

out of control several times. The rudder and composite vertical stabilizer of the plane completely

separated before it could impact on the ground. This was largely seen as a result of the
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inappropriate First Officer’s action to stabilize the aircraft. Initial analysis indicated that the AA

Flight 587 accident was the first peculiar commercial crash that was occasioned by the failure of

the primary structure of the composite materials. Several investigations were immediately

commenced to confirm the exact cause of the accident. A team from NASA Langley Research

Center (LaRC) was responsible for conducting the primary investigation into the AA Flight 587

crash. LaRC was chosen because they had high technical expertise in high-fidelity structural

analysis.

According to the finding of the investigators, human factors played significant roles in

the American Airlines Flight 587 crashed. As was determined by the National Transportation

Safety Board, the most probable cause of the AA Flight 587 crash was the in-flight separation of

the flight’s vertical stabilizer due to human errors. First, the First Officer made an inappropriate

decision to stabilize the aircraft. The separation of the vertical stabilizer was also occasioned by

loading the aircraft beyond the allowable ultimate design. In addition, the First Office created

excessively and unnecessarily rudder in the pedal inputs. All these human factors occasioned and

facilitated the crash immediately after takeoff. It became apparent that the aircraft was operated

below its design maneuvering speed also contributing to the unprecedented crash.

OVERVIEW OF THE EVENTS

The ill-fated American Airlines Flight 587 arrived at John F. Kennedy International

Airport at about 10.31 pm the night prior to the accident. On that night, the plane was

successfully flown from San Jose in Costa Rica to JFK in New York City for another flight to

Santo Domingo scheduled the flowing morning. While from San Jose, the accident plane had

stopped in Miami, Florida, at Miami International Airport. After arriving at JFK, the pilots of the
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ill-fated flight indicated during the post-accident interviews that everything in the flight was

smooth. Thus, there was no cause for alarm with regards to the aircraft’s safety.

On that fateful morning, it was the first scheduled a 1-day routine round-trip for the flight

crew. As indicated in the American Airlines records, the arrived for a flight at around 0614 while

the First Officer checked in at around 0630 for the first round-trip. Also, the records indicated

that the gate agent working for the AA Flight 587 was at the airport’s departure gate by 0645 for

the commencement of the flight. According to the gate agent, she found the flight attendants

already aboard the ill-fated plane at the time she arrived. She noted that the First Officer and

flight captain arrived at the gate at around 0700 (Power-Waters and Brian 104).

Thereafter, they started fueling the aircraft at about 0710 in readiness for the first flight to

Santo Domingo. At the fuelling station, one of the pilots was noticed performing an exterior

inspection to the AA Flight 587. This account was given by the fueler. The fueling process was

completed at around 0745. The fueler did not see anything unusual in the plane. However,

according to the statement provided by American Airlines to the New Jersey’s Port Authority and

New York Police Department, the aircraft captain reported at exactly 0800 that the yaw damper

system and number 2 pitch trim would not engage properly. Two avionics technicians were

immediately sent to investigate the exact problem. The Auto Flight System analysis that was

performed by the two technicians indicated that there was a likely fault within the flight

augmentation computer number 2. This fault was corrected, and no other fault was detected.

The ground controller at JFK airport instructed the pilots of the Japan Air Lines flight 47

at exactly 0906:53 to runway 31L. Unfortunately, this was the same runway to be used by the

American Airlines Flight 587. Thereafter, the ground controller gave instruction to the Japan
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AirLines pilots allowing him to seek the local controller at around 0908:01. Shortly afterwards,

at about 0908:58, the flight 587 pilots received instructions from the ground controller to seek

the local controller immediately after the Japan Air Lines airplane. This instruction was well

acknowledged by the first officer. The Japan AirLines plane was cleared by the local controller

and took off at about 0911:08. At exactly 0912:35, the local controller gave instructions to the

flight 587 pilots to taxi position and immediately holds for runway 31L, cautioning them of the

wake turbulence. Flight 587 was then cleared to take off at about 0913:28. The American

Airlines Flight 587 took off immediately on the same runway after the Japan Airlines Boeing

747-400. By this, eh aircraft flew directly into the larger jet’s wake, which has strong turbulent

air thus causing commotion. The First Officer immediately attempted to stabilize the airplane,

but he could not. This occasioned the crash.

Contributing and Causal Factors

The most probable cause of the American Airlines Flight 587 crash was majorly a result

of Aircraft Pilot Coupling (APC) event. In particular, the APC events occasioned the flawed

design modification of the flight. In addition, the Handling Qualities Rating Method (HQRM)

did not test the modification of the American Airlines Flight 587. It was as a result of the APC

occurrence that the aircraft developed excessive aerodynamic loads as well as the consequent

structural failure that occurred on the vertical stabilizer. This happened just within 6.5 seconds

after the flight takeoff. To a larger extent, the American Airlines Flight 587 crash was contributed

by human factors. Both the flight pilots and control officers made decisions that led to the

accident immediately after the flight takeoff.

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First, the American Airlines Flight 587 pilots were forewarned by the ground controller of

the catastrophe of preceding in-service events. However, they did not take this advice and

proceeded with the flight shortly after Japan AirLines on the same runway. Because it was a

larger plane, the Japan Airlines Boeing 747-400 caused greater jet’s wake that the AA Flight 587

could not sustain. This is an area of turbulent air in the same runway. The pilots could have

waited for the jet’s wake to calm down before taking off the flight. It was not appropriate for the

pilots to fly in the same runway immediately after a larger flight. The ground controllers are also

to blame for giving the AA Flight 587 pilots a go-ahead. They could have scheduled the flights

appropriately to allow for more time for the jet’s wake to calm down.

The First Officer also made another serious human error. After detecting the jet’s wake,

he attempted to steady the aircraft by alternating the aggressive rudder inputs. He did this not

recognizing that the strength of turbulent air flowing against the moving rudder was strong

enough to stress the aircraft's vertical stabilizer. It eventually snapped off the entire vertical

stabilizer that eventually led to a crash. The pilots were forewarned of the strong turbulent air but

took no action. Furthermore, the first officer and the flight captain were properly qualified and

certificated under federal regulations. Therefore, they were not expected to do a grotesque

mistake. There were also no evidences of preexisting medical conditions that could have affected

the flight’s crew. Lastly, the crew’s fatigue could not have been a factor because they had enough

time before the flight (United States National Transportation Safety Board 120).

The National Transportation Safety Board investigators concluded that flight crashed due

to enormous stress on the rudder that resulted from the first officer’s extreme rudder inputs. The

team of investigators also concluded that the aircraft could have stabilized if the first officer did
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not make additional inputs. Many other human factors also contributed to the American Airlines

Flight 587 crash. For instance, the Airbus crew failed to identify the dramatic changes that

occurred in the rudder control design, which apparently deviated radically from other aircraft

designs. Furthermore, the crew team failed to use the objective standards of rating the airplane

handling characteristics such as the Cooper-Harper Pilot Rating and the FAA Handling Quality

Rating Method.

Another human factor that resulted in the accident was traced to the manufacturers of the

American Airlines Flight 587. For instance, Airbus failed in their responsibility to publish

limitations on the airplane’s rudder design. Also, as the aircraft manufacturers, they did not

properly educate the operators on the aircraft’s rudder system limitations. The manufacturers are

also to blame for the failed design, an effective and appropriate redundant flight control system

that is able to provide protection to the aircraft by limiting the extent by which the rudder can

generate excessive lateral loads on its structure. This was very crucial for controlling the amount

of the allowable load on the aircraft. All these human factors led to the failure and crash of the

American Airlines Flight 587.

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Works Cited

“Official Docket 32764 on American Airlines Flight 587 Accident NTSB Identification:

DCA02MA001”. United States National Transportation Safety Board,2002,enter URL

and access date

Barkley, G.N. Annual Report to Congress: [National Transportation Safety Board], 2003.

Power-Waters and Brian X. I. 93. Seconds to Disaster: The Government's Great Cover-Up.

iUniverse, 2005.