Professional Documents
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Two Cannos Road PDF
Two Cannos Road PDF
Spring 2017
Recommended Citation
Kruthoff, Bryson. "Two canoes: a case study in organizational change failure and the implications for future population health
initiatives." MS (Master of Science) thesis, University of Iowa, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.fj8g2cl7
by
Bryson Kruthoff
May 2017
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL
____________________________
MASTER'S THESIS
_________________
Bryson Kruthoff
____________________________________________
Xi Zhu
____________________________________________
Linda Lee
ABSTRACT
Organizational change is undeniably difficult, and change efforts often fail to overcome
the status quo processes and routines. By threatening these structures, change becomes an
existential danger to organizations, who often respond with significant resistance. Organizations
will look to their experiences with past change efforts to inform future changes, limiting the
ability of change actors who seek to implement change beyond this narrow scope.
The “Heart Failure Lite” model was a change effort that exceeded the scope of previous
changes at an organization with deeply embedded routines and processes. This model threatened
the traditional revenue streams that had benefited the organization for years. The resistance
exhibited by the organization when presented with the change was consistent with the underlying
theory.
Although change failure is common, proactive efforts on the part of change actors can
help break down the organizational barriers. Conceptual models like PARiHS can be utilized to
identify the evidence supporting the change, the contextual environment in which the change will
be introduced, and the facilitation efforts needed to guide the project to a successful conclusion.
The “Heart Failure Lite” team failed to survey the organizational landscape and tailor the project
Shifting clinical practices toward a population health model presents a unique opportunity
for healthcare organizations. A concerted effort from all stakeholders to find common ground
will allow change agents to overcome the traditional barriers, and will help organizations to truly
ii
PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Organizational change is undeniably difficult, and change efforts often fail to overcome
the status quo processes and routines. By threatening these structures, change becomes an
existential danger to organizations, who often respond with significant resistance. Organizations
will look to their experiences with past change efforts to inform future changes, limiting the
ability of change actors who seek to implement change beyond this narrow scope.
The “Heart Failure Lite” model was a change effort that exceeded the scope of previous
changes at an organization with deeply embedded routines and processes. This model threatened
the traditional revenue streams that had benefited the organization for years. The resistance
exhibited by the organization when presented with the change was consistent with the underlying
theory.
Although change failure is common, proactive efforts on the part of change actors can
help break down the organizational barriers. Conceptual models like PARiHS can be utilized to
identify the evidence supporting the change, the contextual environment in which the change will
be introduced, and the facilitation efforts needed to guide the project to a successful conclusion.
The “Heart Failure Lite” team failed to survey the organizational landscape and tailor the project
Shifting clinical practices toward a population health model presents a unique opportunity
for healthcare organizations. A concerted effort from all stakeholders to find common ground
will allow change agents to overcome the traditional barriers, and will help organizations to truly
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2. Estimated Inpatient CVD Procedures and Mean Hospital Charges - 2010 ...................... 3
Table 3. Mortality Percentages for Cardiovascular Disease in Adults in the United States ........... 6
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 7. Scale for Measuring High/Low Evidence: Clinical Experience Sub-Element .............. 34
vi
CHAPTER 1
Living a life filled with alcoholic beverages, unhealthy meal selections, cigarette
smoking, and no exercise led James Young II down a precarious path. Weight gain, swollen legs,
and labored breathing became the norm. Young chose to forego treatment, not understanding the
danger these warning signs presented. When Young finally sought medical advice, he was
diagnosed with hypertension, Type 2 diabetes, pneumonia, and kidney disease. Further
monitoring from his physician revealed Young’s heart was functioning at 30 percent of normal.
Shortly thereafter, Young’s heart function dropped to 20 percent. Young was admitted to
hospital where he was informed had he waited much longer to seek treatment, he would have
died.
This brush with death was all the motivation Young needed to make the necessary
changes in his life. Alcohol, smoking, and fast food turned into health greens, protein, and
exercise. Though the process was long and laborious, Young was able to build his stamina to the
His experience with heart failure exemplifies how easy it is for individuals to exhibit
risky behaviors that endanger their well-being. Young’s success in overcoming his illness
highlights the possibility of altering these behaviors, and the benefit that can be derived from this
transformation. Providers, payers, and patients can work together to develop a system of care
that helps individuals struggling to make the necessary alterations to their risky behaviors to
1
Cardiovascular Disease in the United States
As of the 2017 Update from the American Heart Association, 92.1 million American
adults have one or more cardiovascular diseases (CVD). (Benjamin, et al., 2017); (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). The diseases and diagnoses included in the total CVD
count—as determined by the American Heart Association—include, but are not limited to, high
blood pressure, coronary heart disease, myocardial infarction, chest pain, heart failure, and stroke
(Benjamin, et al., 2017); (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).
With CVD expenditures equating to roughly 17% of all healthcare related expenditures in
the US, treating and managing these diseases and their associated complications places a
significant economic burden on the non-provider stakeholders who maintain the responsiblity for
financing the care (Ojeifo & Berkowitz, 2015). Data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) calculates the total economic impact—direct and indirect costs—at nearly $316.1 billion
(Benjamin, et al., 2017). Direct costs equate to $189.7 billion, with the largest percentage of that
total being attributed to inpatient stays at $88.3 billion (Benjamin, et al., 2017). Visits to an
ambulatory clinic for CVD-related issues totaled $41.5 billion, and prescription medication costs
2
were $32.4 billion (Benjamin, et al., 2017). Indirect costs attributed to lost productivity equaled
$126.4 billion (Benjamin, et al., 2017). The American Heart Association projects increases in
these costs over the next decade. By 2030, projections indicate the direct medical cost of CVD
will reach $918 billion, and the indirect costs will reach $290 billion (Benjamin, et al., 2017). In
each scenario, the high costs placed upon patients, payers, and other non-provider stakeholders
translates into significant revenue for hospitals, physicians, and other practitioners.
A large portion of these high costs can be attributed to the volume of services and
procedures used to treat CVD, which has grown significantly over time. From 1979 to 2003,
inpatient procedures for CVD-related illnesses increased 470% (Mensah & Brown, 2007). From
2000 to 2010, the number of inpatient procedures for CVD-related illnesses rose from an
estimated 5,939,000 to an estimated 7,588,000, a 28% increase (Benjamin, et al., 2017). The
charges for these procedures have increased in a similar fashion, and are often financial drivers
3
Table 2. cont.
Endarterectomy 100,000 $41,873.00
The high costs associated with cardiovascular diseases can be attributed to the complexity
and inherent variability associated with these illnesses, leading to significant downstream
utilization of care. For example, data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) shows three different CVD diagnoses—congestive heart failure, cardiac dysrhythmias,
and acute myocardial infarction—within the top ten conditions related to all-cause, 30-day
readmissions (Hines, Barrett, Jiang, & Steiner, 2014). Further studies support this propensity for
high utilization rates among diagnosed patients. One study that included nearly 40,000 patients
who were admitted to the hospital with a heart failure diagnosis showed a 24% readmission rate
among these patients within 30 days (McHugh & Ma, 2013). Similarly, results from the same
study showed a 20% 30-day readmission rate among nearly 12,000 patients admitted to the
hospital with acute myocardial infarction (McHugh & Ma, 2013). Other studies that include data
for all Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries found the 30-day readmission rates for acute
myocardial infarction and heart failure was 19.9% and 24.4%, respectively (Krumholz, et al.,
2009). Beyond the standard 30-day measurement, researchers have found that 45% of patients
discharged with a heart failure diagnosis were readmitted to the hospital within six months
chest pain, congestive heart failure, cardiac dysrhythmias—were among the primary reasons for
4
ED visits resulting in hospital admissions for individuals age 45-85+ (Weiss, Wier, Stocks, &
Blanchard, 2014). Emergency department visits for CVD-related complications resulted in $9.2
billion in direct medical costs (Benjamin, et al., 2017). Patients with a heart failure diagnosis
present to the emergency department an average of 958,167 times each year (Storrow, et al.,
2014). After presenting to the emergency department, 83.7% of these patients are admitted to the
hospital (Storrow, et al., 2014). Substantial regional variation exists in the treatment of these
patients meaning heart failure may have significantly different experiences in care depending on
which part of the country they reside (Storrow, et al., 2014). These variations impact each
patient’s health status, and also carry financial implications for the patient through elevated
costs, and for the provider organizations through increased revenue. Efforts can be made to help
patients avoid unnecessary emergency care. Researchers in Germany found that almost 20% of
all emergency department visits are preventable, and of that number nearly half of the
preventable visits were for angina, heart failure, and hypertension (Mockel, 2016). Reducing
unnecessary utilization of these services will have significant financial implications, and patients
Death is a common result of the presence of these diseases. For the past 116 years—
excluding 1918—CVD has been the leading cause of death in the United States for both men and
women (Benjamin, et al., 2017). The latest data indicates CVD accounts for more than 800,000
deaths per year, or one out of every three deaths (Table 3) (Benjamin, et al., 2017). Table 3
details the mortality percentages for the diseases and diagnoses included in the total CVD count.
Statistics indicate improvements in CVD mortality. From 2004-2014, the death rate per
100,000 from CVD declined almost 25.3%, while the number of actual deaths decreased nearly
6% (Benjamin, et al., 2017). This decrease follows a similar trend that began in the 1960s when
5
CVD death rates were at their highest (Luepker, 2016). Debate continues about the causality
behind this decrease with many researchers arguing in favor of primary preventive techniques,
and others arguing in favor of secondary prevention efforts (Luepker, 2016). Regardless of the
cause of the decline, if all cases of CVD were eliminated, life expectancy would increase by
nearly seven years (Benjamin, et al., 2017). For comparison purposes, if all cancer cases were
eliminated, the increase in life expectancy would increase roughly three years (Benjamin, et al.,
2017).
Stroke 16.1%
High Blood Pressure 9.0%
Heart Failure 8.1%
Other 17.4%
Although the decline in mortality rates indicates movement in a positive direction, the
incidence and prevalence of CVD continues to rise (Benjamin, et al., 2017). Given the adverse
nature of CVD—both in terms of health outcomes and in terms of its economic burden—the
federal government and private payers have begun experimenting with alternative payment and
delivery arrangements to address the clinical and financial issues associated with these diseases
with an emphasis on rewarding institutions that can prevent the onset of chronic illnesses like
CVD (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017). In response, healthcare provider
organizations have been working to develop innovative treatment pathways to better manage the
6
prevalence of CVD in their communities, and to assist in reducing the economic burden
Because the economic burden of CVD is so large on patients and payers, payment and
delivery experimentation must begin to explore solutions that will significantly reduce costs in
the long-term. One of these methods is a preventive approach to CVD. Successful prevention of
CVD across significant portions of the population would result in a noticeable reduction total
healthcare expenditures, meaning fewer costs being passed on to any individual, employer, or
government entity responsible for paying for insurance coverage. A statistical analysis from the
AHRQ using data from the MEPS 2009 Full Year Consolidated Data File found that the average
cost of a patient receiving care for CVD was $4,279 (Uberoi & Cohen, 2012). Other studies
indicate even higher annual direct medical costs. A study from 2010 that included expenditure
data for 12,278 patients on the Kaiser Permanente Northwest CVD registry found the average
annual direct medical cost for CVD to be $18,953 (Nichols, Bell, Pedula, & O'Keeffe-Rosetti,
2010). Looking at more specific CVD diagnoses, a study from 2011 observed the lifetime costs
of heart failure in one county in Minnesota over the span of 19 years. Results from the study
indicate that after a heart failure diagnosis the average lifetime medical costs were $109,541
(Dunlay, et al., 2011). Lifetime costs were measured from the initial diagnosis until the patient
In any scenario, successful prevention efforts will have noticeable economic effects, and
striving to prevent one million heart attacks and strokes by 2017—relevant stakeholders have an
opportunity to take advantage of the situation to improve the well-being of their populations, and
the financial performance of their organizations (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
7
2017). A basic simulation using the cost data from the study of Minnesota residents—~$110,000
lifetime average cost for heart failure patient with an average lifetime with the disease of 4.5
years equates to ~$24,400 annual cost per patient to treat heart failure—indicates the potential
benefit for payers and providers alike in pursuing prevention efforts. If an organization treats
2,300 heart failure patients each year, the total payment to the providers and cost to the insurance
those heart failure diagnoses, and subsequently reduced the average cost of each prevented
patient to $10,000 per year, the cost savings would be nearly $1.7 million.
From the perspective of the patient, avoiding a costly and dangerous heart failure
diagnosis is a positive and desired outcome. From the perspective of the payer (insurance,
employer, government, etc.), $1.7 million likely represents significant savings and improved
financial performance and stability. From the perspective of the provider, as more and more
payers continue to tie reimbursement to cost, quality, and outcomes, this $1.7 million result
prevention effort, all involved parties must collaborate to develop mutual incentives that result in
desired outcomes for the patient, and positive financial performance for payer and provider
organizations.
continues as to it long-term effectiveness. However, studies with a more specific focus on CVD
surrounding smoking cessation and the use of statins, and can be used as the basis of a
prevention initiative (Franco, Kinderen, De Laet, Peeters, & Bonneux, 2007); (Cohen, Neumann,
& Weinstein, 2008); (Ward, et al., 2007). Using this shift toward—and potential benefit of—the
8
prevention of chronic illnesses like CVD, the following chapters will outline the clinical redesign
efforts of one cardiology outpatient clinic at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics
(UIHC). The redesign focused on transitioning away from the traditional fee-for-service delivery
model that rewarded organizations for treating individuals after they were diagnosed, to a
population health model that emphasized the prevention of these illnesses. The new model was
predicated on enhanced risk identification practices, and worked to empower patients to become
active members in the maintenance of their care. Although the change effort ultimately failed,
this case study will highlight the efforts made by the multidisciplinary team, identify the
variables that led to the demise of the project, and how a subsequent projects that focus on
9
CHAPTER 2
With the passage and implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) came a wave of experimentation with alternative payment and delivery methodologies.
Created through Section 3021 of the ACA, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
(CMMI) was developed to pilot these innovative payment and delivery models in an effort to
identify viable alternatives to the long-standing system of fee-for-service delivery. Some of the
more prominent programs developed by CMMI include the Medicare Shared Savings Program
and Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative, and the Comprehensive Primary Care Plus program, among others.
Beyond developing these new payment and delivery models, CMMI conducts yearly
evaluations of all models, determining their impact on cost and quality. Given the results, CMMI
has the authority to collaborate with other stakeholders throughout the country to further develop
these models and establish them as the primary method of payment and delivery of particular
health care services—see: mandatory bundled payments for orthopedic and cardiac conditions
and procedures. Further, a combination of positive results from these demonstrations and
provider organizations learning how to operate effectively in these environments has led to a
proliferation of payment reforms in the private sector. Regarding ACOs, in 2011 only 64 existed
across the entire country. In the first quarter of 2016, that number had increased to 838 across
public and private payers (Muhlestein & McClellan, 2016). For bundled payments, a tracking
tool from The Advisory Board Company indicates many provider organizations are participating
10
in some type of bundled payment arrangement for a variety of conditions and procedures. These
organizations are either contracting with a private payer, or are contracting directly with large
employers like Wal-Mart or Lowe’s (The Advisory Board Company). As momentum continues
to build for these alternative payment models, lagging organizations who have yet to operate in a
non-fee-for-service environment must consider how this lack of experience may affect their
At the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) the focus has been on the
organization’s inclusion in the University of Iowa Health Alliance (UIHA) ACO. The ACO is
comprised of four provider organizations in the region, and is participating in the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Track 1. Absent from the Track 1 arrangement is the threat of a
financial penalty due to poor performance relative to an established spending benchmark set by
Medicare. Other arrangements such as the MSSP Track 3 and NextGen programs include
downside risk, and are growing in popularity (Muhlestein & McClellan, 2016). The existence of
these voluntary programs that include downside risk indicates a desire on the part of the federal
government to shift to that type of arrangement on a larger scale in the future to transform the
delivery of healthcare services into a system based on the foundation of health and well-being.
Maintaining the health of the population and preventing chronic illnesses will be essential under
this type of system, and having little to no experience operating in an environment where
enhanced population health management practices will be the key to success potentially places
factors that would result in an individual requiring expensive hospitalizations and complex
procedures (Colbert, et al., 2014). Risk identification is complex and expensive, and different
11
strategies may work better depending on the characteristics of an organization (Colbert, et al.,
strategy is best situated for their organization before downside risk arrangements become more
prevalent.
CMS has begun to promote risk stratification and risk reduction with one of its more
recent demonstrations from CMMI. The Million Hearts®: Cardiovascular Disease Risk
Reduction Model was developed as a preventive approach to CVD diagnoses. This program is a
five-year demonstration with the primary goal of reducing the 10-year CVD risk within the
patient population of participating organizations, and the diffusion of the best practices used to
achieve those reductions across the industry. UIHC was selected to participate in this
demonstration that began January 1, 2017. The pursuit of a preventive approach to CVD is a
deviation from the normal fee-for-service delivery structures that are present at many
organizations, including UIHC (Table 3). Economic incentives under the traditional model
rewarded providers for delivering a higher volume of services with little regard for the
maintenance of the health and well-being of the population. Participation in this type of program
indicates a progression toward a more focused approach toward population health, and a
movement away from the approach that UIHC had become accustomed to over many years.
“Sickness Model”: Previous Method of Treating Heart Failure and Other CVD Patients
Given that the overwhelming majority of cardiovascular services delivered by UIHC are
reimbursed on a traditional fee-for-service basis, the focus has remained on generating volume
and offering the most advanced surgical procedures for the treatment of CVD. Table 4 displays
12
Table 4. Total Volume of Cardiovascular Services - UIHC
2015 2016 2017 (projected)
Heart and Vascular Center 10,850 13,106 12,721
Electrophysiology 8,702 9,561 8,918
To drive this volume, multiple pathways existed for patients to be referred into the
various clinics within the Heart and Vascular Center (HVC). First, the patient had to be referred
through a primary care provider. The most common referral pathway was to general cardiology,
but patients could also be directly referred into the multiple sub-specialty clinics within the HVC
(Figure 1). If a patient was referred to the general cardiology clinic—the most common referral
pathway—the cardiologist performed an assessment and determined the proper course of action
which usually involved a “watch and wait” strategy, or required a referral to a sub-specialty
manage associated CVD risk factors before and after the onset of a diagnosis are not present. In
this type of environment, the treatment pathway often does not begin until the onset of a CVD
diagnosis, and the post-treatment or post-procedural routines are often less robust than is
that focuses on adequate and proper post-discharge care. This program penalizes hospitals that
Understanding the benefit they could provide to their patients while simultaneously avoiding any
penalties, UIHC began a care management program within the HVC to monitor patients after
13
they had received treatment for a CVD diagnosis. Once a patient had been referred to the sub-
specialty provider, and once they had received treatment for their condition, they were referred
into the care management program associated with each sub-specialty (Figure 3).
14
Figure 3. Sub-Specialty Pathway and Care Management Program
Despite the best efforts of the care managers, the care management programs were
becoming overwhelmed by the volume of patients who required their services. For example, in
November, 2015, the heart failure care management program was at capacity with 750 patients.
At the same time, nearly 2,300 more patients that received care in the heart failure clinic who
were inhibited from those services because of capacity issues. Statements from nurse
management indicated that nearly all of these patients would have benefited from the care
management services. As was noted above, the threat of unintended readmissions and emergency
department utilization is significantly increased for CVD patients, and the limited capacity of the
care management programs only compounds the issues faced by individuals following CVD
treatments and procedures. Efforts can be made before and after the diagnosis and treatment of
CVD to both assist in preventing the onset of these diseases, and to ensure patients receive
The traditional modalities of care delivery under the “sickness model” directly
contradicted the preventive nature of the Million Hearts® demonstration, and limited the ability
of the organization to succeed within the program, both clinically and financially. To better
15
operate within the parameters set by the demonstration, UIHC was forced to develop a new
delivery model that would align the practice patterns of the participating providers with the
desired outcome of the program. The change process associated with this new delivery model
was a unique opportunity to examine the dynamics involved with organizational change, and the
amount of effort required to overcome deeply institutionalized behaviors and attitudes associated
In February, 2015, it was announced that UIHC had acquired a local cardiology practice,
and in May of the same year the four cardiologists and two nurse practitioners associated with
that practice began seeing patients at their new location. Shortly after the acquisition, the lead
physician of this practice approached members of the College of Public Health about assisting in
the development of population health principles within the outpatient cardiology clinic. A small
multi-disciplinary team comprised of the lead physician, three nurses, an administrator, and two
public health researchers was developed to explore the best opportunities for the clinic and for
UIHC. After brainstorming possible interventions, the team decided to focus its efforts on the
prevention of heart failure with an emphasis on risk identification, patient self-management, and
Affecting nearly 6 million adults in the United States each year, heart failure is an
expensive and dangerous diagnosis. Nearly half of the individuals who develop heart failure in a
given year will die within five years of that diagnosis, and data from the American Heart
Association indicates that heart failure was listed a contributor in the cause of death for 1 in 8
deaths (Benjamin, et al., 2017) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). Heart failure
has a significant financial impact on the healthcare industry due to the increase in the utilization
16
of services, the expensive medications required, and the amount of work an individual must
miss. Estimates put the total cost of heart failure at almost $40 billion per year (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). Understanding the burden that capacity issues placed on
the heart failure care management program at UIHC, the project team believed targeting heart
failure would help alleviate this strain. Further, because the risk factors for heart failure are
similar to those of other CVD illnesses, by successfully modifying those risk factors through
prevention efforts, not only would the prevalence of heart failure be reduced in the population,
but reductions in the prevalence of other CVD-related illnesses would also be realized (American
Recalling the pathways depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, patients were primarily
funneled through the general cardiology clinic where they followed two pathways, either wait
and monitor any concerns, or they were referred to high cost sub-specialty clinics like the heart
failure clinic. The project team proposed a pathway that would allow for a diversion from the
traditional heart failure pathway (Figure 4). This pathway would be utilized by individuals who
had not yet been diagnosed with heart failure or any other form of CVD, but exhibited certain
risk factors that indicated a likelihood of disease progression in the near future. Preventive
interventions within this pathway included an enhanced patient education platform and also
included wearable technology, allowing for patient engagement outside of the clinic. By
providing the infrastructure and resources, the project team hoped to develop an understanding of
heart failure at the individual level. Using this knowledge as a foundation, the goal was to instill
enough confidence in each patient that if they were confronted with any complications (e.g.
weight gain, swelling, dyspnea, etc.) they would be able to manage the symptoms without
provider intervention.
17
Figure 4. Prevention Pathway
To further alleviate the burden placed on care managers under the previous “sickness
model,” we proposed an enhanced care management pathway. This pathway would improve the
care management already being delivered, and would also provide a pathway for those
individuals with a moderate risk profile who had not yet been diagnosed with heart failure, but
were also not likely to succeed in the patient education and self-management pathway. This
enhanced care management strategy would include the services of a pharmacist and social
worker in addition to traditional cardiology services to ensure all of the patient’s biopsychosocial
With these developments, the final “Heart Failure Lite” proposed model was comprised
of four distinct pathways that would be utilized by different patients depending on their risk
profile and other individual characteristics (Figure 5). The first pathway was for individuals who
exhibited very few risk factors, but still had enough concerns that they sought the care of a
18
cardiologist. Clinicians on the team often referred to these patients as the “worried well.” The
second and third pathways were the previously described patient self-management and care
management programs. The final pathway was for individuals who exhibited too many risk
factors and were likely beyond the scope of our preventive approach, and would likely need
treatment for a diagnosis in the near future. Risk calculation used for pathway selection was
derived from the American College of Cardiology and American Heart Association Heart Risk
Calculator which played a central role in the aforementioned Million Hearts® demonstration.
Using historical patient data on roughly 1,600 patients, the project team was able to
conduct an initial risk assessment to develop a better understanding of the breakdown of pathway
utilization. This initial assessment indicated that 5% and 22% of patients would be directed into
the first and fourth pathways, respectively. For the low-to-moderate risk pathway and the
moderate-high risk pathway, 41% and 32% of patients would be funneled into those respective
services. Considering these two pathways were the primary focus of our project, and a significant
deviation from the traditional delivery methods, these high percentages were a strong indication
When considering how UIHC could best inhibit the onset of heart failure and other heart
diseases, the project team believed emphasis should be placed on modifiable risk factors. In
specifically education level and health literacy—play a critical role in the development of these
illnesses (Lee, Paultre, & Mosca, 2005). Evidence shows that individuals with lower health
literacy capabilities face greater difficulties related to their general physical and mental function
(Wolf, Gazmararian, & Baker, 2005). This decrease in general health and well-being has
19
downstream effects on higher acuity diseases and diagnoses. A lower education level and poor
health literacy not only leads to a higher prevalence of heart disease, but it also inhibits
preventive efforts like the ones proposed in the “Heart Failure Lite” model (Zavertnik, 2014)
(Bennett, Chen, Soroui, & White, 2009). Health literacy has been defined as a basic level of skill
and ability that a person needs to function within the environment of care (Berkman, Sheridan,
Donahue, Halpern, & Crotty, 2011). Further, the applicable skills and abilities include, but are
not limited to, reading comprehension, quantitative understanding, and medication adherence
(Berkman, Sheridan, Donahue, Halpern, & Crotty, 2011). An important aspect of the proposed
preventive approach is the adherence to a medication regimen. As some studies have shown,
individuals with lower health literacy scores are more likely to exhibit poor behaviors related to
20
To address these issues associated with lower education levels and poor health literacy,
the project team partnered with a local patient education organization to develop a well-defined
patient education product that went beyond a typical informational brochure or other handouts.
The goal was to build upon the company’s existing heart failure products (Figure 6) to create
something that aligned with the focus of prevention. One aspect the project team wanted to add
to the existing modules was an interactive quiz/testing application. This application would ensure
that the patient was fully focused on the educational module, and would also allow the care team
to assess how well each patient was understanding the materials. If a patient was not completing
the modules or was not successfully passing the quizzes, steps could be taken by the care team to
remedy any issues or concerns. The education program was comprised of multiple modules that
were completed in succession. This longitudinal focus would create a stronger learning
environment and would improve the chances of the patient truly understanding heart failure as an
To ensure that the patient understood how to properly access and utilize the education
modules, they would complete the first module in the clinic with nurse supervision. Subsequent
modules would then be completed by the patient outside of the clinic at their convenience. The
modules could be accessed through any multimedia platform so long as the patient had access to
the internet. Notice of completion and the results from the embedded quizzes would be self-
reported by the patient through the patient portal. Patients without internet access would be
excluded from the patient education pathway. The ideal result from this educational program
would be to provide the patient with enough information and knowledge that if they were
confronted with a heart issue they would have the capacity to manage the situation on their own
21
Figure 6. Example of Education Module
The primary focus of self-management programs is to enhance the ability of the patient to
identify the symptoms related to their condition, and to provide the knowledge and protocol as to
how to respond to those symptoms. Self-management programs have been implemented for a
variety of illnesses including diabetes, asthma, and COPD, but many programs have also been
developed to manage heart failure (Barnason, Zimmerman, & Young, 2011). Studies have shown
have for coping with heart failure, including reduced utilization and improved quality of life
(Moser, Dickson, Jaarsma, & Lee, 2012); (Riegel, et al., 2009); (Dickson, et al., 2014). In
addition to improved health literacy, self-management programs can be enhanced through patient
activation where the patient plays a critical and active role in the care process.
Patient activation is a relatively new concept developed by Judith Hibbard and her
colleagues. Hibbard and her team were responsible for the development of the Patient Activation
Measure, which is a tool designed to capture a patient’s “knowledge, skill, and confidence
related to managing his or her health and health care” (Hibbard, Mahoney, Stockard, & Tusler,
2004); (Green, Hibbard, Sacks, Overton, & Parrotta, 2015). The growing body of literature
22
indicates a strong relationship between activation and healthy behaviors (Rask, et al., 2009);
(Hibbard & Greene, 2013). A study in 2012 from Hibbard and Jessica Greene measured the
clinical measures, and expensive utilization. The results showed that in 12 of the 13 outcomes,
activation was related in the expected direction (Hibbard & Greene, 2012).
Critical to the conceptual framework of the “Heart Failure Lite” proposal is the relation
particular illness. First, a study from 2007 indicates that the Patient Activation Measure provides
a more accurate representation of how patients will respond under a self-management program,
and has been shown to be an effective tool in making determinations about self-management
(Mosen, et al., 2007). Second, a study from Hibbard and her colleagues measured the effect of
health literacy and activation on healthy behaviors and self-management behaviors. The findings
from this study show a positive relationship between literacy and the behavioral outcomes
(Greene, Hibbard, & Tusler, 2005). This study then went one step further and found that patient
(Greene, Hibbard, & Tusler, 2005). Building off this research, the project team at UIHC
proposed tracking activation levels and measuring the impact different activation levels would
Despite the scientific evidence supporting the development of this alternative delivery
model, the initial request for financial support to fund the project and build the necessary
infrastructure was not made available when the project was initially proposed. Heart failure is a
valuable revenue stream and its associated treatments and procedures provide great financial
benefit to the organization. The “Heart Failure Lite” model stood in direct contrast to the
23
traditional delivery model, and therefore presented a restriction on the valuable heart failure
revenue stream. Verbal support was given to further develop this delivery model, but the project
team was forced to seek external resources to build the final product. The Million Hearts®
demonstration put forth by CMS both aligned with the goal of preventing the onset of CVD, and
provided the financial resources to assist the operations of the new delivery model at UIHC.
First announced in the summer of 2015, the Million Hearts® initiative is a randomized
controlled trial where healthcare providers are encouraged to develop population health
strategies to combat the issues associated with CVD. Participating organizations utilize risk
stratification and predictive modelling techniques to better understand the total risk within their
patient population, and to identify those individuals who are most at risk of developing a serious
illness. The program targets all Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries who are 40-79 years of
age, with limited exclusion criteria. CMMI received 762 applications, and after the review
process, 516 organizations were selected to participate. After randomization, the organizations
were split 260 to 256 for the intervention and control groups, respectively (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2017). In total, CMMI expects nearly 3.3 million individuals to be
included in the trial that will last until December 2022 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2017).
The model uses a risk calculator developed by the American College of Cardiology and
the American Heart Association as the primary risk identification tool. The calculator includes
ten different variables to determine each patient’s 10-year CVD risk score (Table 5). The
algorithm used in calculating the risk score was originally published in the 2013 ACC/AHA
Guideline on the Assessment of Cardiovascular Disease Risk (Goff, et al., 2013). Participating
24
organizations in the intervention group receive a one-time $10 payment for every eligible
beneficiary who receives a risk calculation. In year one, CMMI will make monthly $10 payments
per beneficiary for the management of the highest risk patients (30% chance of developing CVD
in 10 years). In years 2-5, the payment fluctuates based on how much the aggregate risk score for
the population decreases. If the aggregate score decrease is greater than 10%, the organization
receives $10 per beneficiary. If the score decreases 2%-10%, the organization receives $5 per
UIHC submitted the application to participate in the trial in September 2015, received the
notice of acceptance into the program in early 2016, and was randomized into the intervention
group shortly after. The participating providers included 9 cardiologists and nurse practitioners,
and an initial assessment indicated that this group would expect to see roughly 2,100 eligible
beneficiaries. This assessment also provided an estimate of the expected cash flows for the
various scenarios (Table 6). These cash flow models were used to try and convince the
leadership of UIHC to lend resources and support to the project. Although these numbers were
derived from historical data, and were predicated on the hypothetical success of the new model,
25
the project team believed the potential financial value presented by this initiative was
meaningful.
promote the desired goal and how the new change will help the organization arrive at that goal
(Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). The project team for the Million Hearts®
demonstration was effective in arranging meetings with multiple members of the leadership team
meetings included social work, legal, nurse management, care management, eHealth &
eNovation, and pharmacy, among others. Many of the meetings involved presentations outlining
the inadequacies of the current process, the future changes as established by the ACA, and the
potential gains for the patient and the organization that would accompany the successful
Similar presentations were made to the administrative and clinical leadership of the HVC
and of the organization at-large in an attempt to draw down necessary resources. These
individuals believed the elements of this project were a step in the right direction regarding
population health practices. The project team was instructed to construct a project charter and
budget detailing the steps needed to develop the program as well as the financial requirements
needed to fund the team and build the infrastructure. These documents were distributed to
members of the leadership team, and updates were made to the document as steps were
completed. As the project team progressed through the development process, the need for
financial support grew increasingly more apparent, yet no money had been made available from
26
the organization, and the earliest any payment would be received from CMS related to the
Million Hearts® demonstration was more than a year-and-a-half away. The project team
and data management capabilities were in place by the projected start date.
Intervention Group Cash Flows 2-10% 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Cardiovascular Disease Risk Stratification Payment $49,260 $21,181.80 $21,181.80 $21,181.80 $21,181.80
Year 1 high-risk participant $59,112
Per Member/Per Month (years 2-5) $29,556 $29,556 $29,556 $29,556
Expense
Net Cash Flow $0 $108,372 $50,738 $50,738 $50,738 $50,738
Intervention Group Cash Flows >10% 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Cardiovascular Disease Risk Stratification Payment $49,260 $21,181.80 $21,181.80 $21,181.80 $21,181.80
Year 1 high-risk participant $59,112
Per Member/Per Month (years 2-5) $59,112 $59,112 $59,112 $59,112
Expense
Net Cash Flow $0 $108,372 $80,294 $80,294 $80,294 $80,294
Late in the project schedule, unexpected obstacles related to data aggregation and risk
calculation began to manifest. In November 2016, roughly six weeks before the Million Hearts®
demonstration was set to go-live, data analysis was conducted over a two week period on a set of
patients to trial the data capturing capabilities within the clinic. Results of the analysis indicated
a major problem with the ability to collect all necessary data points needed for the risk
27
calculation. Data for 79% of the patients each week was missing, and therefore a risk calculation
could not be completed. Because of the rural nature of the state of Iowa, many of the patients
seen in the cardiology clinic had traveled significant distances for this specialty care. Many of
these patients receive primary care closer to their place of residence, and often have their lab
tests performed in these settings, not at UIHC. Therefore, their cholesterol data had not been
entered into UIHC’s electronic health record system. One response to this issue was to draw labs
for every patient included in the trial while they are being seen in the clinic. However, Medicare
payment policy stipulates they will only pay for one lab draw per year, and any costs incurred for
Not wanting to commit to this expense, the project team sought another solution to this
issue, the addition of a part-time nurse who would be solely responsible for collecting missing
data. A time analysis conducted by the clinical members of the project team indicated that the
workload for this individual to collect all missing data was equivalent to a .6 FTE. Placing this
additional responsibility on the existing clinical staff would create an undue burden. An offer
was made to have an available graduate student with nursing certification fulfill these services as
a graduate assistantship, but the offer was never acknowledged. A request was placed with
members of the leadership team for additional personnel, but the hiring practices at the
organization were a significant obstacle. These practices require permission and approval at
multiple levels of the organization with the chief executive officer making the final
determination of every hire. The request for additional personnel was summarily denied.
The inability to collect the necessary information and the failure to obtain additional
support greatly affected the number of patients that the providers would be able to include in the
demonstration, significantly deflating the initial cash flow projections. Further, as more
28
information became available from CMS about the clinical requirements and financial payments,
concerns arose from members of the leadership about how this demonstration would affect the
spending threshold for the ACO. The charges associated with the clinic visits that would be
necessary to collect the requisite data would be used against the benchmark, and the payment
received for successfully reducing the aggregate risk was also believed to be counted against the
benchmark. The ACO was of much greater stature and importance within the organization, and
any threat to its success was cause for concern for members of the leadership team. These issues
created a perfect storm that led to the eventual demise of the Million Hearts® demonstration, and
Although the “Heart Failure Lite” model was developed using sound scientific evidence,
the contextual environment was unfavorable toward this type of change from the outset.
Organizational change theory states that contextual environments that present obstacles to
progressive population health changes can be overcome with strategic planning and guidance
through the change process. Individuals leading change efforts must proactively survey the
environment in which the change will be functioning to frame the manner in which it will be
initiative.
29
CHAPTER 3
To fully assess why this initiative did not succeed, the failure must be viewed through the
lens of organizational change theory and implementation science. From the outset, the change
process faced strong organizational resistance in that it challenged the long-standing institutional
structures and processes. The change presented a direct threat to the organization and the service
delivery structures that had proven profitable over time. Successfully implementing the new
delivery model would have require a detailed diagnostic evaluation of the evidence on which the
model was predicated, the contextual environment in which it was introduced, and the
individuals charged with shepherding the program through the process. A detailed
determine the strengths and weaknesses associated with this change process. Ultimately, the
“Heart Failure Lite” model was unable to leverage its scientific base to overcome the complex
and interwoven institutional structures, and would have benefited from more refined facilitation
practices.
When organizing a change effort, the project team must take critical steps to overcome
the natural tendencies that cause organizations to resist change. These natural tendencies are
derived from the idea that the day-to-day operations of an organization persist—and therefore the
Freeman, 1984) (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). Consumers prefer the reliability that
results from this routinization, and any disruptions in the stability of these routines presents the
30
possibility of consumers being disrupted. Therefore, changes or disruptions are direct threats to
the existence of the organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett,
1993).
As routines become more institutionalized over longer periods of time, the organization
has a greater chance of achieving the reliability that is preferred by consumers that allows
organizations to sustain their existence. When an organization maintains its existence over these
long periods of time, its routines and processes become embedded to the extent that a change
becomes more hazardous than it would to a younger organization with less developed routines
(Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). This is demonstrated in the formalized routines and clinical
processes within UIHC which have provided the organization significant levels of financial
success. Regarding the clinical redesign project, the “Heart Failure Lite” model presented a
significant disruption to the standard delivery methods that have proven fruitful over long
periods of time. Further, proposing a delivery model that would ultimately shift the focus to
prevention and population health would not only affect internal processes, but it would also
significantly alter the external relationships, routines, and processes UIHC has maintained with
maintaining the status quo, both internal and external processes remain stable, the participating
organizations are reaffirmed in their ability to operate reliably within the current structures, and
plentiful, and new ideas for change can often benefit from previous examples where the
associated with that successful change are formalized by the organization, and are likely to
31
resurface in future changes (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). Implementation scientists have
labeled this formalization process as “modification routine,” and use it to demonstrate the idea
that organizations learn to change through previous changes, and those previous changes foster
similar changes in the future (Nelson & Winter, 1982); (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993).
When proposing the “Heart Failure Lite” model, the project team was working without a
previous change of a similar kind to use as a model or guide. In the absence of similar change
precedence, the project team was unable to offer previous experiences that could be used as
change guideposts. As a consequence, because the implementation of the “Heart Failure Lite”
model failed, its impact on individuals and teams within the organization who seek similar
changes will be limited, and therefore similar change efforts in the future will have a greater
chance of experiencing similar failures. This death spiral of proactive and alternative change
efforts further exacerbates the persistence of structural inertia and the status quo.
Recognizing the dynamics and nuances associated with these inherent survival
mechanisms is important for the project team in overcoming these forces associated with
structural inertia. Previous organizational change theory demonstrated the need for a change
agent to help drive change and to lead the effort against structural inertia. This individual is
responsible for proactively building support and enthusiasm for a potential change by influencing
the long-standing attitudes, principles, and behaviors of the organization that led to the
formalization of the status quo processes (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). For the
“Heart Failure Lite” model, the change agent was the lead cardiologist of the newly acquired
practice. In addition to leading the development of the clinical operations within the model, this
individual was responsible for communicating the message and purpose of our change. Beyond
the identification of change agents, more recent developments in implementation science have
32
provided more robust frameworks for project teams to organize and pursue change processes,
Health Services (PARiHS) framework sought to identify the structures present in the
implementation of scientific research (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). The dynamic
forces between three primary elements—Evidence, Context, and Facilitation—will lead to either
and validity of the research and evidence being presented, and was broadly defined under the
and patient preferences (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Context describes the
organizational setting in which the evidence is to be introduced, and was originally defined as,
Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Finally, facilitation is the procedural steps taken to enable
successful implementation, and was originally defined as “a technique by which one person
makes things easier for others” (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Facilitators are different
from local opinion leaders or primary change agents in that opinion leaders often occupy that
position because of their title or status within the organization, whereas facilitators rely more on
enhanced communication skills to help drive individual and group effort and performance.
Evidence suggests that opinion leaders often hold significant levels of influence within their own
unit, but that influence does not necessarily translate across other units (Kitson, Harvey, &
McCormack, 1998).
33
The authors argue that prior to the development of this conceptual model, the prevailing
belief was that the thoroughness and veracity of the evidence was the most important element to
consider, and that the presence of such evidence would be the primary driver of change. Similar
to the failure of the “Heart Failure Lite” model, change efforts supported by scientific evidence
often fail because stakeholders in the change process are unable to translate the complexities of
the content into practice (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Thus, at the conceptual level,
the PARiHS model assumes all three elements maintain equal influence on the change process
(Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). The primary function of the framework is for informing
the change process and allowing change agents to identify the necessary steps needed to achieve
successful implementation.
Based on the original conceptual model, the Evidence, Context, and Facilitation elements
are broken down into three sub-elements to further refine the definition of each, and to further
inform the process that change agents must pursue when implementing action on research
(Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). These sub-elements are measured using a horizontal
axis with higher levels of the given sub-element falling on the right, and the lower levels of a
given sub-element falling on the left. One example is the “Clinical Experience” sub-element
within the Evidence element (Figure 7). In this sub-element, when professional opinion on a
given matter is relatively aligned, evidence would be considered high, and when opinion is
splintered across different groups, evidence is considered low (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack,
1998).
34
The authors developed a 3D matrix to help change agents better understand the dynamics
involved with a given change (Figure 8). The position of that change is based on the
change if possesses low levels of evidence, the figure below only depicts situations in the upper
Since its inception in 1998, the PARiHS framework has been used as a method of driving
change, and the scientific literature is beginning to develop a better understanding of the
functionality of the framework. Examinations of each element reveal that strong evidence and
Malone, et al., 2013). However, this level of evidence was not sufficient for change, and change
actors are forced to implement their change within the parameters of the greater organizational
35
Additional studies have revealed some of the strengths of the framework (Helfrich, et al.,
2010) (Ullrich, Sahay, & Stetler, 2014). Users of the PARiHS framework praised the efficacy of
the model in diagnosing the Evidence and Context elements, and its ability to be applied in a
myriad of settings was viewed positively (Helfrich, et al., 2010). The framework is easy for users
to understand and utilize, and users state that it works well in conjunction with other
Regarding some of the weaknesses of the framework, though many users believed the
elements and sub-elements were adequate in describing the change process, the need for a
clearer, more refined conceptual design was needed due to the evidence of overlap among the
sub-elements (Helfrich, et al., 2010). Additionally, the primary limitation of the research thus far
is the scarcity of prospective applications of this framework. The original framework called for
the prospective diagnostic evaluation of the elements to examine the parameters within which the
change would be introduced, yet most of the scientific literature have been retrospective analyses
In response to the lack of conceptual clarity, other implementation scientists have built
upon the existing PARiHS framework to further delineate the role of each element in the change
process, and to provide a more comprehensive tool to help inform and guide implementation
(Stetler, Damschroder, Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011) (Rycroft-Malone, et al., 2002). One of the
more thorough revisions to the original framework was conducted by Stetler and colleagues in
2011. This update was an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the framework and increase the
chances of a successful change implementation. The more robust sub-elements and newly
developed reference tools within this updated framework will increase the capacity of change
36
Evidence, Context, and Facilitation: Definitions Updated
Published in 2011, the update from Stetler made adjustments to all of these elements and
Evidence, Context, and Facilitation (Table 7). In addition to the increased conceptual clarity,
Stetler and colleagues developed reference tools for each element that detail the updated
conceptual definitions, provide commentary for each updated element and sub-element. More
importantly, the updated framework provides a menu of questions associated with each new
element and sub-elements that can be proactively answered by the project team to guide the
evaluation and processes (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Like the original concept from
Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, organizations can select various questions from the menu of
each element and sub-element to diagnose and evaluate the organizational landscape, and
develop a change process that aligns with the results of that evaluation.
Prior to the development of the “Heart Failure Lite” model, no prospective analysis was
conducted to understand the change environment as originally intended under the framework.
Therefore the project team had to navigate the change process without a complete understanding
of the situation. Because no there was no prospective evaluation conducted using any of the
the root cause(s) of the failure using the revised PARiHS framework from Stetler, et al.
37
Table 7. Stetler, et al. PARiHS Update
Elements Sub-elements Originial Sub-Elements
E: Evidence and EBP Characteristics • Research and published guidelines • Research
• Clinical experiences and perceptions • Clinical experience
• Patient experiences and perceptions • Patient preferences
• Local practice information
• Characteristics of the targeted EBP:
• Relative advantage
• Observability
• Compatibility
• Complexity
• Trialability
• Design, quality, and packaging
• Costs
C: Contextual Readiness for Targeted • Leadership • Culture
EBP Implementation • Culture • Leadership
• Evaluation capabilities • Measurement
• Receptivity to the targeted change
F: Facilitator Role of Facilitator • Characteristics
• Purpose, external and/or internal • Role
• Expectations and activities • Style
• Skills and attributes of facilitator
The foundation for every piece of the “Heart Failure Lite” model was rooted in scientific
research and evidence-based practices. This scientific evidence was critical in building support
for a delivery model that subverted the traditional clinical processes. Responses to the questions
derived from the Stetler, et al. revised PARiHS model indicate high levels of evidence
EQ1) To what extent are stakeholders aware or knowledgeable regarding this evidence?
The multidisciplinary structure of the project team allowed for a diverse understanding of
the multiple variables that reside in the “Heart Failure Lite” model. The cardiologists, nurses and
other clinicians were knowledgeable about all clinical matters related to the project. The risk
calculator that was central to the risk stratification process within the CMMI model had already
38
been in use by some cardiologists within the clinic. Their support and advocacy of the efficacy of
the risk calculator lent credence to the project. Members of the team with a greater understanding
of public health provided the knowledge base for the non-clinical variables like self-management
and education, and were able to incorporate previous research of their own to support the
viability of this project. Further, the organization responsible for developing the patient
education materials had been providing these valuable to resources to similar healthcare
This diversity of knowledge allowed for stronger presentations where project team
members could speak to their areas of expertise and connect with other stakeholders receiving
the presentation (i.e. clinicians connect with other clinicians, non-clinicians with other non-
clinicians). Because this type of delivery model was unique and unprecedented within the
organization, the understanding of the science and research was not at an ideal level when trying
to overcome institutional barriers and formalized attitudes. Establishing connections with similar
individuals who were not part of the project team was critical in helping those less-informed
individuals build an understanding of the nuances and intricacies of the “Heart Failure Lite”
model, and how a successful implementation could mutually benefit the patient and the
organization. Whether these stakeholders were receptive to the research and evidence as it
compared to the traditional processes and beliefs of the institution was an additional
consideration.
The approach to treating heart failure and other CVD diagnoses mirrored the approach of
all other service lines within the organization in that care was delivered after the onset of a
particular illness or diagnosis with little to no regard for what occurred prior to treatment. This
39
method had proven to be financially advantageous for the organization, and allowed for the
sustainability of long-term growth. Because payers had not presented any economic signals or
incentives for the organization to deviate from this approach, the care processes and the attitudes
The “Heart Failure Lite” model was a subversion of these attitudes and behaviors, but
was backed by peer-reviewed research and evidence from reputable sources. Because UIHC acts
as the primary teaching hospital in the state of Iowa, it is closely associated with the research arm
of the university’s college of medicine. The hospital is supportive of scientific endeavors and
often promotes any groundbreaking advancements or significant findings that take place at the
university. What is unclear is the extent to which these findings affect the actual delivery of care
in the way the “Heart Failure Lite” model intended. The validity of the evidence supporting the
model was never questioned, but because the model directly contradicted the deeply rooted
financial structures, the long-held beliefs about the most effective form of delivery were difficult
to overcome. Research and scientific discovery are held in high esteem at the university, but the
practical application remains difficult when the financial incentives and signals are misaligned.
EQ3) To what extent do opinion leaders in the “unit” support this change/EBP?
The development of the “Heart Failure Lite” model was at the behest of the lead
cardiologist in the clinic who reinforced the importance of population health, and believed
population health initiatives could succeed at the organization. This cardiologist acted as the lead
change agent and was the primary point of contact when interfacing with both the leadership of
the HVC and of the ACO. Having this physician champion helped garner support across all
levels of the clinic. To create greater economic return, a greater number of clinicians were
needed to provide an access point for patients to be included in the demonstration. Individual
40
meetings between the physician champion and the other providers helped build the base needed
to drive the potential economic return. Further, nurses were the most critical part of the “Heart
Failure Lite” model, and having the support of these cardiologists allowed the support and
enthusiasm for the project to permeate throughout the clinic. Despite not being able to overcome
the larger institutional forces, the unit-level support was a major factor in allowing the project to
agents must adequately address the need for change by identifying the areas in which the
organization is failing to achieve a desired goal (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). In this
instance, the project team argued that UIHC was not prepared to operate effectively in a
population-health environment that was predicated on alternative payment and delivery reforms.
Many of the developments in payment reform were the product of positive results within
previous CMMI demonstrations, and the rollout of the Million Hearts® demonstration indicated
further alterations to payment and delivery standards in the future. In anticipation of these
changes, the project team felt it prudent to experiment with delivering services in an unfamiliar
environment. Because there was no downside risk associated with the Million Hearts®
demonstration, this experimentation would provide a safe environment that would help UIHC
identify its strengths and weaknesses, and would provide adequate time to adjust prior to
widespread changes.
Statements from members of the leadership team indicate a division in the rationale for
pursuing the Million Hearts® demonstration, and the value it would provide the organization.
41
Members of the ACO leadership team stated that they saw no “immediate value” in some of the
clinical requirements of the demonstration (Archer, 2017). They acknowledged that collecting
clinical data—in this case most of the focus was on cholesterol—and finding ways to improve
the risk factors within the patient population was beneficial. However, those benefits would not
be realized by the patient for many years into future, and there may never be a tangible economic
benefit for the organization (Archer, 2017). The lack of immediate return prevented the ability of
the project team to establish and highlight the definite need of the “Heart Failure Lite” model and
This reluctant behavior toward proactive change, in the face of external evidence that
supports change, aligns with the aforementioned “modification routine” which also includes the
tendency to rely on past behaviors and experiences even if an alternative method may be more
beneficial in the future (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993). Additional research would suggest
that this type of reluctant behavior is indicative of an adaptor rather than an innovator (Kirton,
1980). Adaptors are more receptive to changes that take place in increments, while innovators
are more likely to be receptive to the type of readiness change presented by the Million Hearts®
EQ6) To what extent do members of the targeted audience see congruence between EBP and
previous changes?
Developing a model focused on preventing the onset of a serious illness that also sought
to fully engage the patient through education modules and wearable technology had only been
attempted once at the organization, and that initiative experienced a similar outcome as the
“Heart Failure Lite” model. A basic patient education tool was embedded within the electronic
health record, but that tool did not exhibit the longitudinal and interactive qualities that were
42
present in the “Heart Failure Lite” model. A relatively new division of the organization had been
created to develop eHealth initiatives, but nothing had been put into practice at the organization,
and therefore nothing could be used as a guide in developing eHealth procedures for the “Heart
Failure Lite” model. This lack of congruence with past experiences limited the ability of the team
EQ7) To what extent do key stakeholders believe this change will improve practice/outcomes?
EQ8) To what extent will the results be observable to stakeholders?
Observability of results under the “Heart Failure Lite” model can be considered from
multiple perspectives, with each perspective displaying different outcomes and presenting
different implications for successful change implementation. The first perspective is the clinical
and financial results derived from the Million Hearts® demonstration. Clinical success is
observable within this perspective if the aggregate risk score for the population decreases year
over year, and is significantly lower at the end of the five-year demonstration. If clinically
successful, positive financial results will follow. However, the financial return on clinical
success is not immediate meaning the financial improvement is often not realized for a
significant amount of time. Initial projections showed that with optimal clinical performance the
organization would realize an estimated return of $297,919.41. That total was after five years, a
considerable amount of time for the full potential of a project to come to fruition, and does not
account for the possibility of sub-optimal clinical performance which would result in financial
reductions.
The second perspective was the observability of the central mission of the “Heart Failure
Lite” model, the sustained reduction of heart failure and other CVD diagnoses. This measure
would extend beyond the reductions in aggregate risk score from the Million Hearts®
43
demonstration to examine the long-term impact on CVD prevalence within the patient
population. The difficulty with this measure is the impact would not be observable for many
years, well beyond the five-year Million Hearts® demonstration. Further, in the absence of
alternative reimbursement structures, the success of the “Heart Failure Lite” model would mean
a long-term financial decline for the organization. The multiplicative effect of the amount of time
needed to determine success with the financial implications of that success create difficult
conditions when convincing an organization to pursue a shift in care delivery like “Heart Failure
Lite.”
CQ1) To what extent do leaders show active and visible support for the change?
CQ2) To what extent does the leadership communicate the priority of this change?
At the outset of the project, the administrative and clinical leadership teams of both the
HVC and ACO provided verbal support to pursue the development of an alternative model
focused on population health practices. Beyond verbal support, there were no additional
absence of sufficient resources, the project team was forced to pursue external funding, and
settled on the Million Hearts® demonstration. After presenting the details of the demonstration
and the potential cash flows resulting from successful clinical performance, more enthusiastic
support began to show among members of the various leadership teams. Administrative and
clinical leaders at the department level and in the C-suite voiced their support and offered to
assist in any way they could. However, this support never permeated beyond the walls of the
meeting rooms, and as the project team began to meet with different stakeholders who would
44
need to be involved in the program (e.g. social work, nursing, pharmacy, etc.) nobody was aware
These issues associated with tentative support were compounded by the physical location
of the project team relative to the members of the leadership who initially voiced their support.
Located primarily at an off-campus outpatient facility, the project team faced difficulties in
maintaining contact and communicating with the leadership. Although informational meetings
were held by members of the team to inform the progress of the project, the separation between
the team and the decision-makers further limited the enthusiasm surrounding this initiative.
CQ3) To what extent are the needed resources committed and provided in a timely manner?
CQ4) To what extent is the leader responsive to requests for support to eliminate barriers?
Beyond the limitation of resources at the outset of the project, subsequent requests for
capital, personnel, or any other form of assistance were met with similar forms of hesitance and
resistance. To develop the patient education infrastructure, monetary expenditures were required
to acquire the software and make the necessary changes to conform to our ideal education
platform. Four different scenarios were presented by the partnering organization responsible for
developing the modules, with prices for these scenarios ranging from $4,158.00 – $56,158.00.
The leadership within the cardiovascular department had been in previous communication with
this company to develop products for another initiative. Despite the commonalities in the
education products, the leadership was unwilling to provide the necessary funding to purchase
Beyond infrastructure development, additional staff support was necessary for this
project to succeed, particularly when confronted with the issues surrounding missing data
elements. In interviews following the demise of the project, issue was taken with lack of
45
expediency regarding hiring practices at the organization. The request for a 0.6 FTE to assist in
gathering the missing data points was denied immediately, but if the request were to make its
way through the system it would not have been processed prior to the January 1st start date for
the Million Hearts® demonstration, severely limiting the effectiveness of the model.
CQ5) What are the current organizational priorities? Does this fit?
At the time the “Heart Failure Lite” model was introduced to the HVC and ACO
leadership teams, the organization was in the midst of its cautious approach to population health
management, with the primary focus on the MSSP Track 1. According to a member of the UIHA
ACO leadership, the approach to population health has been more measured and less aggressive
as the organization works to build physician engagement and the necessary infrastructure to
operate in a riskier payment environment (Vermeer, 2017). As these developments progress, the
strategic plan is to “dip the toe” into downside risk arrangements, either with Medicare, or with
Much of this hesitant entry into more progressive population health arrangements can be
viewed through two domains, the organization’s confidence in their ability to succeed, and the
external market factors that drive change. Regarding the first domain, early performance results
from the MSSP Track 1 model indicate the organization has areas of improvement to meet the
shared savings benchmark (Vermeer, 2017). The lack of absolute success in their first population
health endeavor acts as a hindrance to further population health efforts. Regarding the second
domain, the organization feels limited pressure from payers and consumers to switch to a
population health environment. The ACO leadership believes consumers are not aware of
population health efforts within the industry, and therefore are detached and indifferent toward
any initiatives at the organizational level (Vermeer, 2017). Additionally, beyond Medicare
46
experimentation efforts, the private payers in the region have not provided any economic
indication of a move toward population health, allowing organizations like UIHC to continue to
few resources have been allocated up front to invest in population health initiatives, and this
limitation inhibits all efforts like the “Heart Failure Lite” model (Vermeer, 2017). By following
the money, one can understand the focus of the organization. In the case of UIHC, the majority
of the scarce resources are being allocated to the daily operations of the ACO (Vermeer, 2017)
(Archer, 2017). In developing a model that was misaligned with the goals of the predominant
population health apparatus in the organization, the “Heart Failure Lite” project team failed to
Had the project team conducted a proactive survey of the organizational environment, the
model may have been able to gain more traction and the change might have experienced greater
success. From the outset, the project team should have engaged directly with the UIHA ACO
instead of only with UIHC. The model would have had to been adjusted to align with the short-
term goals of the ACO, but the hesitance toward the model would have been muted in the ACO
Moving into the future, an arrangement like the “Heart Failure Lite” model might gain
more traction within the organization. UIHC has recently engaged in a partnership arrangement
with the largest private payer in the state to operate a Medicare Advantage insurance plan. Under
this arrangement, UIHC takes on the full risk of nearly 2,500 members. Further, the leadership
has indicated a strategic vision that includes alternative arrangements for the employees of the
organization, and an effort to contract directly with employers for the care of their employees
47
(Vermeer, 2017). By taking on more risk, preventive efforts similar to the “Heart Failure Lite”
After a complete understanding of the Evidence and Context have been formalized,
facilitation of the proper change processes can commence. The facilitation reference tool
published by Stetler, et al. focuses primarily on the characteristics of an external facilitator. The
limited resources prevented the use of an external facilitator for the “Heart Failure Lite” model,
but the same questions and personal characteristic requirements can be applied to an internal
facilitator.
opinion leaders and the primary facilitator. The lead cardiologist on the team assumed the role of
change agent and local opinion leader, and played a considerable role in the development of the
project. However, it would be misguided to label this individual as the facilitator, and it is
important to distinguish between these two roles. In this instance, the lead cardiologist held full-
these clinical duties. A more effective approach would have been to designate a non-clinical
team member as the primary facilitator. Once that individual has been identified, the team can
framework is to “make things easier for others” (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998).
Whereas local opinion leaders and change agents leverage their status within the organization to
influence the opinion of others, the facilitator is responsible for informing others about their
48
responsibilities as it relates to the change, and detailing the steps needed to complete that change
(Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). Successful facilitation is often predicated on the strong
interpersonal skills of the facilitator, and the ability to effectively communicate the needs and
process for change across domains. A lack of proper facilitation can have damning effects on a
particular change, even in the presence of strong evidence and a supportive contextual
environment (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998). The updated PARiHS framework expands
upon this original definition to create a more refined understanding of the role of facilitation.
This revision states the importance of identifying the appropriate individual(s) to assume the role
of facilitator based on the diagnostic evaluations of the Evidence and Context elements (Stetler,
In the case of the “Heart Failure Lite” model, the role of facilitator was never clearly
defined, and this lack of a designated facilitator led to inefficiencies in the implementation
process. One of the key responsibilities of the facilitator is to maintain strong interpersonal
relationships with the individuals and groups included in the change process. During the
development of the “Heart Failure Lite” model, team members would hold separate meetings
with stakeholders throughout. The messaging in these meetings was not cohesive, and the actions
needed from these stakeholders were not properly communicated. Further, the results of these
meetings were often not relayed to other members of the project team. These breakdowns in
communication and the disparate interactions with external stakeholders inhibited the ability of
the team to move in a unified direction, and to ensure the necessary steps in the process were
Facilitation does not need to be isolated within the unit where the change is taking place,
and can benefit from the support of the organizational leadership. The updated framework
49
acknowledges the value of this support, particularly in maintaining accountability among other
members of the organization (Stetler, Damschroder, Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011). This
leadership support was a key missing variable in the “Heart Failure Lite” model. However,
despite the absence of strong institutional support, the PARiHS model states that a facilitation
process that focuses on educating and instructing the most critical stakeholders on a routine basis
can overcome a non-conducive contextual environment (Kitson, Harvey, & McCormack, 1998).
Using the reference tool from the updated PARiHS framework, a retrospective analysis can be
conducted to determine missteps on the part of the “Heart Failure Lite” project team, and the
characteristics of facilitation that would have been more appropriate for this project.
FQ1) Are you targeting awareness, knowledge, motivation, attitudes, engagement, skills,
Representing a paradigmatic shift in care delivery at UIHC, the project team was
targeting all variables related to the entrenched habits and customs within the organization. The
effort needed to overcome these forces, and their entrenched nature within the organization, is
the foundation of the role of the facilitator, and is the lens through which all other questions
FQ2) Based on the diagnostic analysis of Evidence & Context, what type of facilitator role is
needed?
be able to effectively craft and communicate the stated purpose and goals of the “Heart Failure
Lite” model to the stakeholders throughout the organization who would be critical to its success.
Communication between the facilitator and the organizational leadership needed to happen on a
50
much more frequent basis than it did during the development process where oftentimes months
would pass between correspondences with the leadership. Updates on the progress and future
needs of the project team needed to be communicated on a weekly basis to ensure the project
Much of the technical requirements of the “Heart Failure Lite” model required assistance
from other units within the organization, or from external organizations, and often informational
meetings with these individuals/teams would not be followed up in an expeditious manner. When
informed of the “Heart Failure Lite” project, these stakeholders would often respond positively
and express a willingness to help, yet the lag time between subsequent communication resulted
in diminished enthusiasm. Having a designated facilitator would have allowed for the
development of enhanced interactions and coordination between the project team and these
additional entities whose assistance was required, helping to drive the project forward and gain
Without significant support structures from the time the project was introduced, the
project team would have benefited from higher intensity facilitation to build support for the
project on its own. Indeed, higher levels of intensity would have increased the visibility of the
program to the leadership, but by increasing the intensity of the facilitation efforts at the lower
level of the organization, support can be built from the bottom and permeate its way to the top.
Additionally, a higher level of intensity can help mitigate the side-effects of structural
inertia that begin to surface during the implementation process. Without a previous change of a
similar nature for stakeholders to use as an example, the facilitator needed to be an effective
51
educator to inform members of the organization about the program, the role they would play, and
how a successful outcome would benefit all stakeholders involved. Without this level of
intensity, stakeholders are likely to turn toward their established routines and processes that stand
in direct contrast to the efforts of the “Heart Failure Lite” model (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett,
1993).
FQ4) What skills and characteristics are needed from the facilitator?
Understanding that the “Heart Failure Lite” model included many intricate parts—
cardiologists, nursing, pharmacy, social work, IT, finance, etc.—the facilitator needed to have a
basic level of understanding of each unit to be able to navigate each facet of the change process,
and to build credibility among stakeholders (Stetler, Damschroder, Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011).
After establishing the requisite knowledge base, communication becomes the next most
important skill for the facilitator (Stetler, Damschroder, Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011).
Communication was necessary between the project team and the leadership to inform members
of the progress and areas of concern. Communication among other stakeholders was important to
consistently inform them of the purpose of the project, their role within the new system, and how
that role will affect the results of the new system. Effective communication skills are the
Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011). The project team for the “Heart Failure Lite” often split the role of
primary communicator among different members of the team, leading to the lack of a cohesive
message. Lastly, the facilitator needed to have situational agility and strong problem-solving
skills to adapt to unexpected changes during the implementation process (Stetler, Damschroder,
Helfrich, & Hagedorn, 2011). The facilitator may have the inherent ability to address an
52
unexpected situation themselves, but it may also require them to seek the services of someone
The “Heart Failure Lite” project team displayed inadequate facilitation efforts that
severely limited its ability to overcome the organizational forces that stood as an obstacle from
the outset of the project. The project team failed to communicate properly on a consistent basis,
and it often resulted in fleeting support from other stakeholders. When correspondence did take
place, it was too often conducted separately by different members of the team. Failing to
establish one individual exhibiting the necessary skills and attributes for effective facilitation
prevented the project team from garnering widespread support for the project. The lack of
facilitation also prevented the foresight of future problems and the ability to adapt in an
53
CHAPTER 4
Although the attempt to shift attitudes toward a more favorable disposition regarding
population health through the “Heart Failure Lite” model ultimately failed, the leadership within
the ACO believed the underlying infrastructure could be repurposed to support a separate project
within cardiology. At the same time the “Heart Failure Lite” model was being eliminated, the UI
ACO was experiencing difficulties with increases in emergency department utilization for non-
emergent conditions that led to a hospital admission. An analysis of this problem indicated the
category most responsible for this high utilization was non-specific chest pain patients who were
recently discharged from the facility. At the time of the analysis, these patients presenting with
non-specific chest pain cost the ACO nearly $4.8 million over the prior 12 months (Archer,
2017). The leadership believed parts of the “Heart Failure Lite” model—specifically the patient
education modules and enhanced care management—could be utilized to manage these patients
Still in its infancy, this project appears to meet the conditions necessary for implementing
successful change initiatives. The strength of the scientific evidence remains the same as
previously described for the “Heart Failure Lite” model. The most significant deviation from the
experiences with the “Heart Failure Lite” model is the contextual environment in which this
change is being developed. The genesis of this project was a top-down directive of the
organization’s leadership. Contrasted with the bottom-up development of the “Heart Failure
54
Lite” model, the project team has less of an inherent resistance to overcome in developing this
change, and does not need to expend as much energy convincing the leadership and other
stakeholders about the necessity of this project. The organizational support has led to greater
acquiescence to the concerns of the project team, and has resulted in the allocation of additional
personnel to support the project, a significant difference of experiences with the “Heart Failure
Lite” project. Further, in contrast with the Million Hearts® demonstration where the overall
benefit of the project would not be realized for at least five years, this project has a much tighter
Lastly, the role of facilitation at the outset of this project was taken on by the medical
director of the ACO. This allowed the project team to focus on infrastructure development and
creating workflow and process maps. However, this facilitation from the leadership member has
begun to fade with time. The project remains a priority, but the day-to-day responsibilities that
resemble elements of facilitation have begun to shift toward the project team. Steps need to be
taken to ensure the facilitation failures of the “Heart Failure Lite” model are not repeated in this
new initiative.
For healthcare managers who do not hold executive leadership positions but still want to
contextual elements within the organization will be a key component to successful change
managers must understand where the change resides within the organization, and who the change
will affect the most. In the case of the Million Hearts® demonstration, the goals and financial
incentives did not align with the goals and financial incentives of the UI ACO. This ACO was
55
the centerpiece of the population health efforts at UIHC, and any effort that counteracted the
success of the program was likely to be resisted (Vermeer, 2017). When presented with a similar
obstacle in the future, population health advocates should demonstrate how new changes will
positively impact the more robust structures that possess a greater level of importance within the
organization.
Managers must also understand the operational and financial constraints that may present
issues in the change process. Structural inertia theory states that an alteration to these operational
and financial constraints present an existential threat to the organization (Amburgey, Kelly, &
Barnett, 1993). The “Heart Failure Lite” model challenged many of these structures, and the
leadership responded in a manner consistent with the underlying theory (Archer, 2017).
Commentary from the leadership suggested an apathetic attitude toward making a significant
institutional investment in the absence of a noticeable return, and an inability to step beyond the
These comments continue to highlight the fact that the most important variable to
healthcare managers in any change effort is the monetary value derived from the proposed
change, and the immediacy of the return on the investment. Interviews after the project was
eliminated indicated apprehension toward the cost of the program compared to the limited
returns (Archer, 2017) (Vermeer, 2017). The returns were an estimate of the best-case scenario,
and would not be realized until at least five years into the future. As one leader stated, managers
must demonstrate that “the juice is worth the squeeze” (Vermeer, 2017). Managers facilitating
future population health change need to acknowledge the importance of these constraints, and
develop a product that can help move the organization in a positive direction without significant
levels of disruption.
56
It must also be understood that a poor contextual environment can be overcome with
effective facilitation from those charged with implementing the change. The “Heart Failure Lite”
project team failed to appoint an individual whose responsibility was to shepherd the project
through the change process. The facilitation that did occur did not meet the intensity
requirements needed to overcome the strong institutional forces that were working against the
change initiative. Communication between the project team and other relevant stakeholders was
inconsistent and often spread across multiple team members. First and foremost, future change
efforts must appoint an individual who exhibits the ability to lead the facilitation efforts. This
individual must be aware of the organizational context, and understand the effort needed to
overcome any institutional obstacles. By manipulating the change effort to better align with the
organizational context, and by taking the necessary steps to guide the project through every
change step, managers can increase their chances of succeed in implementing population health
changes.
leadership can take steps to create an environment that is conducive to population health change.
These leaders must find ways to improve communication of organizational population health
goals to ensure all members of the organization understand the purpose and direction of any
population health initiative. Executive leaders must define what “population health” is to the
organization, and establish the parameters in which future population health project should
function. The “Heart Failure Lite” model went beyond the population health parameters at UIHC
where the focus was primarily on the ACO. The stature of the ACO within the organization
meant the short-terms goals of that program would take precedence over the long-term goals of
the “Heart Failure Lite” model (Archer, 2017). Stronger communication techniques at the outset
57
of the project, and throughout the life of the project, could have presented opportunities for
adjustment to the model that better aligned with the goals of the ACO. In the future, members of
the leadership team must communicate more explicitly the population health focus of the
As one of the most integral parts of the healthcare system in the United States, hospitals
and other provider organizations can help facilitate the change to health and wellness by
changing the cultures within their own organizations. Released in January 2011, “A Call to
Action: Creating a Culture of Health” was a report from the American Hospital Association
(AHA) detailing the prevalence and structure of employee health and wellness programs in 876
hospitals. The findings indicated that although most of these organizations had wellness
programs, they typically were only comprised of health risk assessments, and were otherwise
superficial and lacked depth (AHA Long-Range Policy Committee, 2011). Programs that
contained more focused and intensive programs were rare, and that a lack of motivation on the
part of employees to utilize the services presented difficulties for these programs. Hospitals
preferred to use participation incentives compared to completion incentives, and a small minority
utilized negative incentives (AHA Long-Range Policy Committee, 2011). Many of the
but some have been able to show that these programs have been financially beneficial to the
organization (AHA Long-Range Policy Committee, 2011). Based on the findings of their survey
the AHA developed seven recommendations to help hospitals transform their culture and
develop these programs on a broader scale. By successfully shifting the internal culture toward
58
health and wellness, these organizations can begin to develop similar services for the patients
they serve to promote health and wellness for the entire population.
organizations like employers and state and federal governments—to experience significant cost
savings. The apathetic shift toward population health from providers is an impediment to savings
for these financing organizations. To propel provider organizations into a population health
environment, the financing organizations must alter the economic signals they present. Two
methods can be pursued to alter the economic signals, a mandatory but incremental change
In the first option, financing organizations begin signaling to provider organizations their
desire to shift payments away from the fee-for-service realm. However, because the change takes
place over time, provider organizations are allowed flexibility in developing the proper
infrastructure needed to operate in a new environment. An example of this type of change is the
mandatory bundles for certain orthopedic and cardiac conditions implemented by CMS. Their
experimentation with voluntary bundled payments eventually developed into a system where
certain providers throughout the country are now required to provide care under a bundled
arrangement. This incremental changes has provided organizations adequate time to adjust to the
bundles and maintain financial stability. The next step in the process will be to enforce
mandatory bundles across all physicians and hospitals that provide the designated services.
Based on the results of these programs, new mandatory payment and delivery models can be
59
developed to continue the incremental change process. Private payers and some employers have
taken similar steps to proliferate bundled payments, and can work in conjunction with public
payers to advance the movement toward population health. Bundled payments remain popular
among payers and providers, but the purpose of the programs could be defeated if providers
reduce costs to the extent where bundled operations once again become a highly profitable,
volume-based service. To prevent this situation, payers and policymakers must continue to
develop, pilot, and establish updated payment and delivery arrangements that continue the
In the second option, a mandatory full-scale switch to population health financing can be
used as a blunt instrument in forcing provider organizations to change. Full-scale change will
force timid organizations to change immediately. Although this option would be the swiftest in
shifting the system to population health, there are practical concerns that limit the viability of this
option. First, not every provider organization has shown the capability of operating in a
population health environment. Forcing an organization who does not have the capacity to
manage this change could potentially put patients in a dangerous position. Second, this option
would be most efficient if every payer made the switch at the same time, and the requirements
for providers were uniform across all payers. Given the large number of payers, this seems
improbable, and might violate anti-competition laws. Lastly, a full-scale switch without adequate
preparation will undoubtedly result in the failure of some provider organizations. The greater
economic effects of this job loss must be considered with examining this option.
population health arrangements, others have remained apprehensive and have restricted the
industry from moving forward in that environment. Insurance companies and other financing
60
organizations have significant leverage to force these reluctant organizations into changing their
approach. Efforts are underway from public and private payers to make this switch, but all
stakeholders must continue to collaborate to develop mutual incentives that create the desired
Although a large portion of medicine is focused on the diagnosis and treatment of acute
and chronic illnesses, some organizations are working to develop a more holistic and integrative
approach to both healing and prevention. Four of the most recognizable hospitals and health
(UCSF), Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Vanderbilt Health—have been designated as
Osher Centers for Integrative Medicine. These organizations are offering a variety of fitness
classes, educational sessions, support groups, and other health and wellness programs to promote
healthy lifestyles and behaviors, and to teach individuals how to maintain these lifestyles. At this
point, these programs require payment from the patient, but the success of these programs can be
used as a catalyst in transforming the industry. Participating organizations can work with payers
and other financing organizations to establish programs where health, wellness, and prevention
are rewarded at a similar level as providing the most complex procedures and treatments.
Hospitals and health systems can begin to partner and collaborate with gyms and workout
facilities in the community to provide proper access to these wellness services for patients. As
stated before, payers and financiers can help propel this transition by transforming the economic
signals they promote. This collaborative shift in healthcare delivery can benefit all organizations
61
One final alternative for policymakers, payers, and financing organizations to consider
would be to take one step beyond the community wellness partnerships between providers and
contract directly with fitness and wellness centers to prevent chronic illness in the population. If
these stakeholders believe prevention is the proper route, and if provider organizations are
unwilling to focus their efforts on that route, then a certain portion of the available funding can
be rerouted to someone who is willing to make prevention work. By seeing valuable resources
being diverted elsewhere, providers may alter their approach and place a greater focus on
prevention. Despite the potential of this model, it would be unwise for policymakers to advocate
for a wholesale switch in this direction at this time. Many questions around facility and provider
accreditation, patient allocation, prospective vs. retrospective payment, electronic health records,
prevention timeline remain unanswered and would need to be explored further. Policymakers
would need to consider the necessity for parity in underserved urban and rural settings. Further,
there is limited evidence supporting this policy idea. Unlike employee wellness programs—
which are supported in some regard by the literature—these programs would not pay patients
directly, but would provide funds to the fitness and wellness centers (Aneni, et al., 2014)
(Rothstein & Harrell, 2011). Given the lack of scientific support, policymakers would be wise to
pilot this type of program through CMMI or some other platform to test the viability and identify
any weaknesses. Similar to the first policy option stated above—incremental but mandatory
policy movement—any successful results from a demonstration could be transitioned into new
policy from CMS and other payers. Until the unanswered questions are resolved and a
demonstration can be developed, this policy option retains limited viability in the current
62
Additional Considerations for Policymakers
Many issues arose from a resistant organizational context and poor facilitation efforts
during the “Heart Failure Lite” implementation process, but incongruences between different
population health demonstrations also affected the chances of successful implementation. The
primary issues arose from UIHC’s participation in the MSSP Track 1 program, which prevented
or limited their participation in other programs and demonstrations. The requirements of the
Million Hearts® demonstration meant that some of the attributed members of the ACO would
need to receive cardiology services. This utilization of care would count against the ACO’s
organization for reducing the aggregate risk score of the population—the central focus of the
demonstration—was believed to also impact the spending benchmark of the ACO. Commentary
from members of the leadership indicates this is not their first encounter with these issues
(Archer, 2017). The organization had also shown interest in pursuing participation in the
Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) program. Once again, their participation in the MSSP
Participation in the MSSP Track 1 did not preclude the organization from participating in
the Million Hearts® demonstration, but the misaligned incentives made it difficult for the
organization to pursue both initiatives. More specifically, the MSSP Track 1 rewards
organizations for falling below an established spending threshold within a three-year window,
whereas the Million Hearts® demonstration rewards aggregate risk reduction over five years.
The incongruence between the short-term and long-term rewards made it difficult for the
organization to move in a unified direction on population health. Members of the project team
stated that the value of the Million Hearts® demonstration was not clearly defined (Lee L. ,
63
2017) (Archer, 2017). When comparing this model to the ACO, where the metrics and goals are
clearly stated, the organization was unable to incorporate the Million Hearts® demonstration into
the greater population health strategy in an adequate manner. Per the leadership, the financial
realities within UIHC and the UI ACO did not align with the intent of the Million Hearts®
demonstrations, and to help continue the shift within the industry toward population health,
strong population health management strategies, they must consider the unique characteristics
that allow some healthcare provider organizations to perform at a higher capacity than others in
these types of arrangements. At UIHC, the providers were limited in meeting the clinical
requirements of the Million Hearts® demonstration because the eligible beneficiaries were not
confined to seeing only UIHC physicians, and therefore these providers had difficulty collecting
all necessary data points. Operating within a closed system where patients are restricted to a
defined set of providers—systems like Kaiser Permanente and Geisinger Health—allows for
increased data collection capabilities and improved care management capacity. This dynamic
was not present at UIHC (Lee L. , 2017). Policymakers need to understand the constraints open
networks place on organizations who are trying to manage the health of their populations, and
identify ways to increase the sharing of data across providers who are otherwise not employed or
Conclusion
Organizational change is undeniably difficult, and like the “Heart Failure Lite” model,
change efforts often fail to overcome the status quo processes and routines. By threatening these
64
processes and routines, change efforts present existential danger to organizations, who often
respond with a significant amount of resistance. This resistance becomes more emphatic as
organizations age and their processes and routines become increasingly more institutionalized.
Organizations will look to their experiences with past change efforts to inform future changes,
limiting the ability of change actors who seek to implement change beyond this narrow scope.
The “Heart Failure Lite” model was an example of a change effort that went beyond the
scope of previous changes at a long-standing organization with deeply embedded routines and
processes. The model significantly altered the clinical delivery of care to a system predicated on
population health management techniques to prevent the onset of deadly and expensive illnesses.
Compared to the traditional paradigm of fee-for-service medicine, this model threatened the
traditional revenue streams that had benefited the organization for years. As a result, the
resistance exhibited by the organization when presented with the change was consistent with the
structural inertia theory. The project team associated with the project was unable to overcome
Although change failure is a common result, proactive efforts on the part of change actors
can help break down the organizational barriers and improve the chances of successful
implementation. Conceptual models like PARiHS can be utilized to identify the evidence needed
to support the change, the contextual environment in which the change will be introduced, and
the facilitation efforts needed to guide the project to a successful conclusion. The “Heart Failure
Lite” team failed to adequately survey the organizational landscape and tailor the project in a
manner that would have allowed for greater levels of acceptance amongst the members of the
leadership. Coupled with inadequate facilitation efforts, the project was destined to fail.
65
Shifting clinical practices toward a population health model presents a unique
opportunity for healthcare organizations to separate themselves from their competitors in the
market. Healthcare leaders, payers and financing organizations, and policymakers must work
together to identify shortcomings with the current efforts, and develop innovative delivery and
payment structures that benefit all stakeholders and healthcare consumers. A concerted effort to
find common ground will allow change agents to overcome the traditional barriers that have
prevented past change efforts, and will help organizations to truly transform the delivery of
healthcare services.
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