The Battle of Longewala (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the

western sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between

assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in
the Thar Desert of Rajasthan state in India.The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers
accompanied by 4 Hunter fighter aircraft and 2000-3000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 40-
45 tanks.
A (reinforced) Company of the Indian Army's 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, commanded by
Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until
reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a Pakistani mechanised infantry force.[9] Choosing the former,
Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly deployed, and made the most use of his
strong defensive position, as well as weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was
also fortunate in that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct
aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.
The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of
their strategic intelligence to foresee availability of Indian strike aircraft in the Longewala area,
exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a
tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance[citation needed]. This led to the
Pakistani brigade group being left extremely vulnerable to air attack, vehicles becoming bogged
in terrain not suitable for the movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single
track, these being more susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in tactical
combat, attempting to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry being surprised
by obstacles to troop movement causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial
hours of darkness, when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from
Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire.[citation needed]

Contents

 1Background
 2Prelude
o 2.1The Western sector
o 2.2Tactical plan
o 2.3Indian defensive planning
 3Battle
 4Aftermath
 5In popular culture
 6See also
 7Citations and notes
 8References
 9Further reading
 10External links

Background[edit]
The main thrust of the Indian Army during the 1971 war was directed towards the eastern
theatre, with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army
from achieving any success that would allow the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, any
bargaining tool to trade against the captured territories in the east. By the last week of November
1971, the Indian Army had launched offensive manoeuvres at Atgram against Pakistani border
posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an
offensive on Jessore at this time.[10] It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was
inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run.[11] Yahya Khan chose at this
point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy – "The
defence of East Pakistan lies in the West".[12]
Prelude[edit]
The Western sector[edit]
Khan's policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due
to International pressure, and that since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should
be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool
at the negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and
the PAF's "overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive".[citation needed] The initial
plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under
which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging
in and consolidating their positions. To support Khan's troops, the PAF had launched pre-
emptive strikes on the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities.
In the western theatre, the town of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border, formed a
critical communication centre for Khan's forces and, situated on the Sindh — Punjab railway,
remained a vulnerable link in Khan's logistics. The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would
cut off the rail as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab, starving Khan's forces of fuel and
ammunition delivered to Karachi.
Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with the 12th Indian division
towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure
Rahim Yar Khan, which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab, but also
in the Jammu & Kashmir Sector, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh
sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.[13]
Pakistan, which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence
network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground
with a pre-emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of
Ramgarh[13]. Pakistani intelligence was able to infiltrate the operations area posing as local
people and pass on information. However, these sources failed to pass on information on the
Longewala post which, originally a BSF post, was now held by a company of the Punjab
Regiment. Longewala formed a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a
pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front.

Tactical plan[edit]
Pakistan's tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help
Pakistan's 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command
also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable
as it was close to the border. A Combined Arms Plan was decided upon. This involved two
Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed
for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an
Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala, a junction
on the Indian road system and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Cavalry (Pakistan Army
Armoured Corps) to operate beyond Longewala to capture Jaisalmer.[14]
The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer. The plan was far-fetched
from the start, if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not
preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance, and the armoured troops were therefore
unaware of the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective. As
the day unfolded, Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest losses in a battle for Pakistan
despite overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle, largely due to the vehicles
becoming bogged down in soft sand.

Indian defensive planning[edit]

On the Indian side, the post was held by A Company, 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, led by
Maj. Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the
area that was largely intractable to vehicles.[9] The post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence
of three stands. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17 km north-east of the
Longewala post. Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each
of MMGs and L16 81mm mortar, and one Jeep-mounted RCL. His two other recoilless rifle
teams of the anti-tank section were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri
also had under his command a four-man team of the camel Border Security Force division.[15] The
Longewala post had no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of
170 Field Regiment (Veer Rajput) tasked in direct support to the battalion, and 168 Field
Regiment which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support
battery was attached to 168 Field Regiment and served as its "Sierra" Battery. Immediately after
PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December, Chandpuri dispatched a 20-man strong patrol
under 2Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, on the international border. This
patrol was to play an important part in detecting the advances of Pakistani forces.