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TOOL KIT
Landing Distances
W hen discussing landing distance, two categories must
be considered:
Dry runway
braking to a complete stop (on a dry runway) after crossing Wet runway
flight safety foundation ALAR tool kit | ALAR briefing Note 8.3 |1
slush sprayed by tires onto the aircraft), it also affects braking
Required Runway Length — U.K. CAA efficiency.
The following landing distance factors are typical:
Required runway length (dry or wet) = actual landing distance (dry) x 1.92 Wind Conditions
Certification regulations and operating regulations require
CAA = Civil Aviation Authority
correction factors to be applied to actual landing distances to
Source: FSF ALAR Task Force
compensate for:
Figure 2 • Fifty percent of the head wind component; and,
• Landing technique (e.g., height and airspeed over the thresh- • One hundred fifty percent of the tail wind component.
old, thrust reduction and flare);
• Standard operating procedures (SOPs) deviations (e.g., failure Type of Braking
to arm ground spoilers/speed brakes); Actual landing distances are determined during certification
flight testing under the following conditions:
• Minimum equipment list (MEL)/dispatch deviation guide
(DDG) conditions (e.g., thrust reversers, brake unit, anti-skid • Flying an optimum flight segment from 50 feet over the run-
or ground spoilers/speed brakes inoperative); and, way threshold to the flare;
• System malfunctions (e.g., increasing final approach speed • Achieving a firm touchdown (i.e., not extending the flare); and,
and/or affecting lift-dumping capability and/or braking • Using maximum pedal braking, beginning at main-landing-
capability). gear touchdown.
The approximate effects of these factors on landing distance are
shown in Figure 3. Published actual landing distances seldom can be achieved in
line operations.
Airport Elevation Landing distances published for automatic landings with
High airport elevation or high density altitude results in a autobrakes are more achievable in line operations.
higher true airspeed (TAS) and groundspeed, and a correspond-
ing longer landing distance, compared to low airport elevation Airspeed Over Runway Threshold
or low density altitude. A 10 percent increase in final approach speed results in a 20
For example, at 1,000 feet airport elevation, a landing dis- percent increase in landing distance. This assumes a normal
tance factor of 1.05 to 1.10 (depending on runway condition) flare and touchdown (i.e., not allowing the aircraft to float and
must be applied to the landing distance achieved at sea-level bleed excess airspeed).
airport elevation.
Height Over Threshold
Runway Slope Crossing the runway threshold at 100 feet (50 feet higher than
Runway slope (gradient) has a direct effect on landing distance. recommended) results in an increase in landing distance of
For example, a 1 percent downhill slope increases landing about 1,000 feet (305 meters), regardless of runway condition
distance by 10 percent (factor of 1.1). However, this effect is and aircraft model (Figure 4).
accounted for in performance computations only if the runway
downhill slope exceeds 2 percent. Flare Technique
Extending the flare (i.e., allowing the aircraft to float and bleed
Runway Conditions excess airspeed) increases the landing distance.
Although runway contamination increases rolling resistance For example, a 5 percent increase in final approach speed
and spray-impingement drag (i.e., drag caused by water or increases landing distance by:
2| flight safety foundation ALAR Tool Kit | ALAR Briefing Note 8.3
• Ten percent, if a normal flare and touchdown are conducted Ground Spoilers/Speed Brakes Not Armed
(deceleration on the ground); or, Several runway-overrun events have been caused by ground
• Thirty percent, if touchdown is delayed (deceleration during spoilers/speed brakes not being armed while the aircraft
an extended flare). were being operated with thrust reversers inoperative.
Reference
(no reverse thrust)
Final approach
speed +10 knots
Long flare
No ground spoilers
Wet runway
Compacted snow
Icy runway
Figure 3
flight safety foundation ALAR tool kit | ALAR briefing Note 8.3 |3
• Increased landing distance because of inoperative normal
Effect of Threshold-Crossing Height braking system (braking capability).
on Landing Distance
The aircraft operating manual (AOM) and the quick reference
handbook (QRH) provide the applicable landing speed correc-
1,000 feet
(300 meters) tions and landing distance corrections for many malfunctions
(including their effects).
100 feet at threshold
50 feet at threshold
Landing Distance Factors
Landing distance factors result from either:
• A landing speed correction (e.g., because of a failure affecting
Source: FSF ALAR Task Force stall margin or maneuverability); or,
• Reduced lift-dumping capability or reduced braking capabil-
Figure 4
ity (e.g., because of a failure affecting ground spoilers/speed
On most transport category aircraft, the ground spoilers/ brakes or brakes).
speed brakes extend when reverse thrust is selected (regardless Whether published in the AOM/QRH or computed by the pilot,
of whether the ground spoilers/speed brakes are armed or not); the combination of landing distance factors for multiple failures
this design feature must not be relied upon. The ground spoilers/ usually complies with the following:
speed brakes must be armed per SOPs. • If landing speed corrections are added, the corresponding
Failure to arm the spoilers results in a typical landing distance landing distance factors must be multiplied;
factor of 1.3 (1.4 if combined with inoperative thrust reversers).
The automatic extension of ground spoilers/speed brakes • If only the highest airspeed correction is considered, then only
should be monitored. Failure of the ground spoilers/speed the greatest landing distance factor must be considered; or,
brakes to deploy automatically should be called; the crew then • If two landing distance factors are considered, and one (or
should manually activate the ground spoilers/speed brakes. both) are related to lift-dumping or braking, the landing dis-
Delay in lowering the nose landing gear to the runway tance factors must be multiplied.
maintains lift, resulting in less load on the main landing gear
and, hence, less braking capability. Depending on the aircraft Figure 3 shows typical landing distance factors for various run-
design, this also delays the nosewheel spin-up signal, which way conditions and operational factors.
is required for optimum operation of the anti-skid system on
some aircraft. Summary
When assessing the landing distance for a given landing, all the
MEL/DDG Conditions following factors should be considered and should be combined
When operating with an MEL/DDG condition affecting landing as specified in the applicable AOM/QRH:
speed or braking capability, the applicable landing speed correc- • MEL/DDG dispatch conditions, as applicable;
tion and landing distance factor must be included in landing-
distance computation. • In-flight failures, as applicable;
• Weather conditions (e.g., wind and gusts, suspected wind
System Malfunctions shear, icing conditions/ice accretion);
System malfunctions, such as hydraulic system low pressure, • Runway condition;
may result in multiple adjustments to landing speed and landing
distance, such as: • Use of braking devices (e.g., thrust reversers, autobrakes); and,
• Increased landing speed because of inoperative slats/flaps • Airport elevation and runway slope.
(stall margin); The following FSF ALAR Briefing Notes provide information to
• Increased landing speed because of inoperative roll spoilers supplement this discussion:
(maneuverability); • 1.4 — Standard Calls;
• Increased landing distance because of inoperative ground • 8.2 — The Final Approach Speed;
spoilers/speed brakes (lift-dumping capability); and, • 8.4 — Braking Devices; and,
4| flight safety foundation ALAR Tool Kit | ALAR Briefing Note 8.3
• 8.5 — Wet or Contaminated Runways. Lacagnina, Mark. “High, Hot and Fixated.” AeroSafety World Volume 3
(January 2008).
The following RSI Briefing Notes also provide information to
supplement this discussion: Johnsen, Oddvard. “Improving Braking Action Reports.” AeroSafety
World Volume 2 (August 2007).
• Pilot Braking Action Reports; and,
Lacagnina, Mark. “Streaking Into Vegas.” AeroSafety World Volume 2
• Runway Condition Reporting. (April 2007).
Darby, Rick. “Keeping It on the Runway.” AeroSafety World Volume 4 FSF Editorial Staff. “B-737 Crew’s Unstabilized Approach Results
(August 2009). in Overrun of a Wet Runway.” Accident Prevention Volume 60 (July
2003).
Brotak, Ed. “Extreme Weather Makers.” AeroSafety World Volume 4 (July
2009). FSF Editorial Staff. “MD-82 Overruns Runway While Landing in
Mook, Reinhard. “Treacherous Thawing.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 Proximity of Severe Thunderstorms.” Accident Prevention Volume 59
(October 2008). (February 2002).
Lacagnina, Mark. “Missed Assessment.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 FSF Editorial Staff. “Runway Overrun Occurs After Captain Cancels Go-
(October 2008). around.” Accident Prevention Volume 58 (June 2001).
Werfelman, Linda. “Safety on the Straight and Narrow.” AeroSafety World FSF Editorial Staff. “Business Jet Overruns Wet Runway After Landing
Volume 3 (August 2008). Past Touchdown Zone.” Accident Prevention Volume 56 (December
Lacagnina, Mark. “Margin for Error.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 (August 1999).
2008). FSF Editorial Staff. “Unaware of Strong Crosswind, Fokker Crew
Lacagnina, Mark. “Overrun at Midway.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 Loses Control of Aircraft on Landing.” Accident Prevention Volume 56
(February 2008). (November 1999).
Werfelman, Linda. “Blindsided.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 (February Yager, Thomas J. “The Joint FAA/NASA Aircraft/Ground Vehicle Runway
2008). Friction Program.” Flight Safety Digest Volume 8 (March 1989).
Notice
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction autopilots, flight directors and autothrottle systems; flight management sys-
(ALAR) Task Force produced this briefing note to help prevent approach-and- tems; automatic ground spoilers; autobrakes; thrust reversers; manufacturers’/
landing accidents, including those involving controlled flight into terrain. The brief- operators’ standard operating procedures; and, two-person flight crews.
ing note is based on the task force’s data-driven conclusions and recommendations, This information is not intended to supersede operators’ or manufacturers’
as well as data from the U.S. Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s Joint Safety Analysis policies, practices or requirements, and is not intended to supersede government
Team and the European Joint Aviation Authorities Safety Strategy Initiative. regulations.
This briefing note is one of 33 briefing notes that comprise a fundamental part
Copyright © 2009 Flight Safety Foundation
of the FSF ALAR Tool Kit, which includes a variety of other safety products that also
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have been developed to help prevent approach-and-landing accidents.
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The briefing notes have been prepared primarily for operators and pilots of
turbine-powered airplanes with underwing-mounted engines, but they can be In the interest of aviation safety, this publication may be reproduced, in whole
adapted for those who operate airplanes with fuselage-mounted turbine en- or in part, in all media, but may not be offered for sale or used commercially
gines, turboprop power plants or piston engines. The briefing notes also address without the express written permission of Flight Safety Foundation’s director
operations with the following: electronic flight instrument systems; integrated of publications. All uses must credit Flight Safety Foundation.
flight safety foundation ALAR tool kit | ALAR briefing Note 8.3 |5