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Locke The Way of Ideas
Locke The Way of Ideas
Locke The Way of Ideas
A N D T H E W A Y OF
IDEAS
BY
J O H N W. Y O L T O N
OXFORD
» A T T H E C L A R E N D O N PRESS
F I R S T P U B L I S H E D i956 I N T H E
JULIUS R.WEINBERG
PREFACE
I
O C K E is usually treated by intellectual historians as a
member of the philosophical tradition stemming from
^/Descartes and going on to Berkeley, Hume, and Kant.
There can be very little doubt that his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding defined the area of problems for his
successors and specified the terminology i n which those
problems were to be discussed. From the time of Locke
to the present day it is possible to trace a steady empirical
descent which, though it would be extravagant to claim i t as
the sole direction of Locke's own thought, owes its impetus
to the formulation Locke gave to many empirical doctrines.
The roots of Locke's analyses i n his predecessors cannot so
readily be traced. The terminology of ideas which found its
most forceful statement i n the Essay finds many prior formu-
lators both i n England and in France. The Cartesian influence
seems most evident here. There are many other doctrines
invoked by Locke which also had had a long history before he
began to reflect about problems of knowledge and reality, a
history which i n some cases goes back into the Middle Ages.
Locke was widely read and his travels i n France in 1675-9
brought him into contact with many ideas which found a
sympathetic exposition in the Essay. I t is correct, then, to
treat the Essay as a major philosophical work related to the
traditional problems of philosophy handled by his prede
cessors and successors.
But there is another side to Locke's philosophical analyses
which is usually ignored or only insufficiently remarked. For
all the cosmopolitanism of his analysis of knowledge, it had
an immediate effect upon his own contemporaries i n England,
the nature of which strongly suggests that Locke himself was
not unmindful of the relevance of his theory of knowledge
to the problems and debates on morality and religion en
gaged i n by his friends and associates. Locke in fact tells
viii P R E F A C E
I. T H E N A T U R E A N D SCOPE O F T H E R E A C T I O N i
TO T H E ESSAY
II. T H E D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E 26
§ 3. Conclusion 64
III. E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M 72
$i.EmpiricismandRationalism 72
IV. R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M 115
V. E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N 167
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 209
I N D E X 238
I
summary were not all favourable. Locke later wrote, ' I have
been told, that a short epitome of this treatise, which was
printed i n 1688, was by some condemmed without reading,
because innate ideas were denied in i t . ' The letters of Christian
2
1
Locke to Lady E . Guise, Rotterdam, 21 June 1688. MS. Locke, C . 2 4 ,ff.5 1 ,
52. The references to Locke manuscript material thus indicated are to the Love
lace Collection in the Bodleian Library.
2
Lady E . Guise to Locke, Utrecht, 10 May 1688. MS. Locke, C . 11, f. 130.
3
Lady Guise to Locke, 17 April 1688. MS. Locke, C . 11, f. 129.
4
Cf. Lady Guise's reference to Locke's praise in hef letter of 17 April.
5
Limborch to Locke, Amsterdam, 3 April 1688. MS. Locke, C . 14, f. 13.
cH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 3
1
Guenellon to Locke, Amsterdam, 25 March 1687/8. MS. Locke, C. 11, f. 5.
2
Enclosed in Tyrrell's letter to Locke, 2 7 January 1689/90. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 ,
f.80.
3
Tyrrell to Locke, Oxford, 20 December 1689. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f.72. It is
apparent from this letter of Tyrrell that the Essay was already appearing in its
first edition form as early as the middle of December 1689.
4
Tyrrell to Locke, 18 February 1 6 8 9 / 9 0 . MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f. 8 2 . Cf. his
letter of February 1683/4, MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f. 50, where he speaks of having
seen an early draft of the Essay.
4 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
The reception from Oxford was not all praise, however, for
Locke was even charged with plagiarism, a charge probably
false, but one that shows the recognition by Locke's contem
poraries of the continuity of his thought with that of his
predecessors. Tyrrell wrote i n March 1690 that
a friend told m e the other day that h e h a d it f r o m one w h o p r e t e n d s to be
a great J u d g e of bookes: that y o u h a d taken all that w a s good i n i t ; f r o m
oeseftr4es [sic] divers m o d e r n e french A u t h o u r s , not o n l y as to the notions
but the m a n n e r of c o n n e c t i o n of t h e m . 1
But as early as 1692 the Essay was being used by Dr. Ashe,
friend of Molyneux, in the university of Dublin as required
reading for all bachelors, By 1697 it had made its appearance
2
1
Tyrrell to Locke, 18 March 1689/90. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , ff. 8 6 - 8 7 .
2
Molyneux to Locke, 2 2 December 1692, in Works, vol. ix, p. 2 9 9 . Thomas
Hearne confirms this point. See Hearne's Collections, entry for 21 November
1734, vol. xi, p. 3 9 4 .
3
See John Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted ( 1 6 9 7 ) , P· [xv]. Cf. Hearne's
Collections, ibid., 'Mr. John Wynne . . . was a great Tutor in Jesus College when
he abridged Locke's Essay ofHuman Understanding, and being a great Lockist,
he read the same to his Pupils and got many other Tutors in the University to
read it. . .
4
Some Considerations On the Principal Objections ( 1 6 9 9 ) , p. 1.
5
An interesting absorption of the Lockean and Cartesian logics through the
intermediary of LeClerc is to be found in J. P. de Crousaz's La Logique ( 1 7 1 2 ) .
cH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 5
it stood and the assurance that Locke was the person best fitted
tojudge concerning alterations and additions. Hemadeitplain
that he and his learned friends with whom he discussed the
Essay all thought well of Locke's book and could find nothing
to which to take exception. Molyneux did later take issue
with Locke's analysis ofpersonal identity; but i n the end he
seems to have been convinced that Locke's arguments i n this
connexion were, with one or two qualifications, sound. The
whole exchange of letters on the subject was friendly and co
operative. Judging from Locke's letters to Molyneux, we can
say that Locke was always anxiousto have Molyneux's reac
tions to his material before publication, ostensibly because he
felt him to be such a good critic. But Molyneux's 'criticisms'
were usually a restatement of Locke's doctrines and a con
demnation of Locke's critics. Molyneux provided solace for
Locke i n the face of the many dissenting critics who ques
tioned the teachings of the Essay. More than once, Locke
confided i n him his disappointment over the kind of attacks
räised against him. I t is significant that the critics whom
Locke acknowledged as valuable were those friends who very
seldom had anything more than praise for the Essay, and who
consistently made the assertion that the men who wrote against
Locke were incomprehensible.
The many criticisms which appeared after the publication
of the second edition were all considered by Locke to be
fallacious for one reason or another. They received much the
same treatment as the remarks of William King. I n a letter to
Molyneux dated 28 June 1694, Locke said:
T h e r e appears to m e to b e so little material i n the objections that I
have seen i n p r i n t against m e , that I h a v e p a s s e d t h e m a l l b y b u t o n e
gentleman's, w h o s e book not c o m i n g to m y h a n d till those parts o f m i n e
were p r i n t e d that he questions, I w a s fain to p u t m y a n s w e r i n the latter
end o f the epistle. 1
1
Works, vol. ix, p. 396. Dr. S. is William Sherlock, later Bishop of London.
He published his charge of atheism against Locke in 1704 in his 'Digression
Concerning Connate Ideas, or Inbred Knowledge' (pp. 1 2 4 - 6 4 of his Discourse
Concerning the Happiness of Good Men, part i).
2
Leibniz wrote three short sets of remarks on the Essay which Gerhardt dates,
with insufficient supporting evidence, 1696 and 1 6 9 8 . (Cf. Die Philosophischen
Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. by C. J . Gerhardt, 1 8 7 5 - 9 0 , bd.
ν, p. 6 for his dating; and bd. v, pp. 1 4 - 2 5 for his reprinting of the remarks.)
Locke was enabled to examine the first set of remarks on two different occasions.
Leibniz sent them to Thomas Burnet in his letter of 7/17 March 1696, and
Burnet sent them to Locke via Mr. Cunningham (letter of Burnet to Leibniz,
30 November 1696) and again in a letter to Locke directly (cf. Burnet to
Leibniz, 3 May 1697). These letters are reprinted by Gerhardt in bd. iii, pp. 1 7 4 ¬
9 , pp. 1 8 5 - 6 , and pp. 1 9 7 - 9 . Besides these and the 1698 remarks, Leibniz wrote
long comments on the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy. (Cf. Leibniz to Burnet,
2 0 / 3 0 January 1699, Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 2 4 3 - 5 3 , pp. 2 2 3 - 4 3 , and pp. 2 5 6 - 6 1 . )
cH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 9
Locke was incorrect in claiming that his book crept into the
world without any opposition, for even the short epitome in
LeClerc'sjournal was subjected to criticism; but he was right
in pointing out that criticisms had increased by 1697. Samuel
Bold, whose defence I have already referred to, expressed the
same surprise at the number of attacks which were being made
on the Essay by the end of the century. Nor was he sure of the
explanation for the great outcry against Locke's doctrines, but
he suggests that the fact that so many 'hands should be em
ployed, just at the same time, to Attack and Batter this Essay\
is significant, implying, as Locke also had done, that some sort
of malicious plot was under way to cry down the Essay. Moly 3
Locke had expressed the same fears i n his short reply to the
first of Thomas Burnet's attacks i n 1697. 1
Tyrrell went on to point out that the order was not enforced.
Although the proposal to ban the Essay at Oxford was
1
J. Gailhard, The Epistle and Preface To the Book against the . . . Socinian
Heresie ( 1 6 9 8 ) , reproduces the edict, pp. 8 2 - 8 3 . It is also referred to in A Free but
Modest Censure On the late Controversial Writings and Debates ( 1 6 9 8 ) by one
F.B., M.A., of Cambridge, p. 15.
2
Collins to Locke, 18 February 1703/4, MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 18.
Tyrrell to Locke, April 1704, MS. Locke, C. 22, f. 167. Reprinted in King's
3
1
Hearne's Collections
f vol. xi, p. 3 9 4 . Entry for 21 November 1734.
2
Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 2 8 1 - 2 . Entry for 6 October 1709.
3
Ibid., vol. ii, p. 283. Hearne to T . Smith, 6 October 1709.
4
Ibid., vol. i, pp. 2 9 3 - 4 . Entry for 9 October 1706.
cH.i T H ER E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 13
1
A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Benjamin Prat ( 1 7 0 7 ) , p. 2 4 .
2
Cf. his Socinianism Unmask'd ( 1 6 9 6 ) and Some Thoughts Concerning the
Several Causes and Occasions ofAtheism (1695).
3
Tyrrell to Locke, 27 July 1690. MS. Locke, C . 2 2 , f. 9 3 .
4
Locke to Tyrrell, 4 August 1690, in King's Life of Locke vol. i, pp. 3 6 6 - 7 .
y
824331 C
i4 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
1
SecondRemarks(1697),p. 10.
2
Locke to Molyneux, 10 April 1697. Reprinted in Works, ix, p. 407. The
cH.i T H ER E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 15
work referred to in the Acta Eruditorum (November 1684 issue) is the Medita-
tionesDe Cognitione, Veritate, & Ideis, which Leibniz had recommended to Locke
in hisfirstcomments. Cf. Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. iv, pp. 4 2 2 - 6 .
1
Locke first declared that he was honoured that a man of Leibniz's stature
had made remarks upon his work. Later he pleaded that he was too busy with
other matters to find the time requisite for making proper and detailed com
ments. Cf. Burnet to Leibniz, 30 November 1696; Burnet to Leibniz, 3 May
1 6 9 7 ; and Burnet to Leibniz,23 October 1700 (Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 1 8 5 - 6 ;
1 9 7 - 9 ; and 2 7 3 ) . Locke even solicited, indirectly, Leibniz'sjudgement on his
controversy with Stillingfieet. Cf. Burnet to Leibniz, 26 July 1698, Gerhardt,
bd. iii, p. 242. Locke continued to express to Leibniz his high esteem of his per
son and of his philosophy. Cf. Lady Masham to Leibniz, 3 June 1704, Gerhardt,
bd. iii, pp. 3 4 - 5 2 .
8
2
Molyneux to Locke, 16 March 1696/7. Reprinted in Works, vol. ix, p. 4 0 4 .
The two discourses of Leibniz here referred to are the 'De primae philosophiae
Emendatione, & de Notione Substantiae' (Acta Eruditorum, March 1694, pp. 110¬
12, reprinted in Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 4 6 8 - 7 0 ) , and 'Specimen Dynamicum, pro
admirandis Naturae legibus' (Acta Eruditorum, April 1695, PP· H 5 " 5 7 ) ·
3
LeClerc to Locke, 19 April 1697. MS. Locke, C . 13, f. 113. Locke's
letter containing this quotation from LeClerc is reprinted in Works, vol. ix,
p.417.
l6 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F CH. I
slips w h i c h p e r h a p s I m e t w i t h i n h i m . A l w a y s I t h i n k e t h i s i s d u e to
every o n e that h i s w o r d s s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d i n the m o s t favourable &
m o s t consistent m e a n i n g c o u l d be p u t u p o n t h e m . 1
1
Anti-Scepticism (1702).
1
Locke's copy of this book is now in the St. John's College library at Cam
bridge. For a discussion of some of these marginal notes, see my article, 'Locke's
Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant', Journal of the History of Ideas
(October 1 9 5 1 ) , vol. xii, pp. 5 2 8 - 5 9 .
3
These have been published, not too satisfactorily, by Noah Porter, 'Mar
ginalia Locke-a-na', in New Englander and Yale Review, July 1887, vol. xi, N.s.
PP· 33-49·
4
Locke also wrote a careful attack upon the philosophy of Malebranche,
Norris's archetype. Neither this nor his reply to Norris was published during
his lifetime. It is undoubtedly to one or the other of these papers that Robert
South refers in his letter to Locke (6 December 1699, MS. Locke, C. 18, f. 173).
Locke had apparently sent his remarks on Norris, or those on Malebranche, to
South for his critical opinion. South recommended that Locke's opponent should
not receive a reply, advice which Locke seems to have followed.
The opponents of Locke to whom Bold replied in 1699 are not named. Mrs.
5
Cockburn's defence was written against Burnet's Remarks, while LeClerc de
fended Locke, after his death, against Pierre Bayle. Tyrrell suggested that Mrs.
20 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F
style in which the Essay was written had much to do with its
popularity. Burthogge probably suffered because his manner
of writing was not so polished as that of Locke, but his ob
scurity was also very probably due to the way in which his
epistemological discussions w ere obvious digressions from his
T
years of its first appearance, the Essay and the first published
attack on it had received close attention in a popular journal
in England.
The widespread foreign reception of the Essay is traceable
quite definitely to the publication of reviews of it in the French
journals of Holland. I t was the abridgement i n the Bibliotheque
Universelle that had first called Leibniz's attention to Locke. 3
Apparently Norris did not realize that this was a translation of the French review,
for in the third edition of his Practical Discourses ( 1 6 9 4 ) his 'Cursory Reflections'
are reprinted with a reply to the Athenian Society against their unjust attack
upon him. 3
Cf. Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. v, p. 6.
Histoire
4
des Ouvrages des Savans, June 1695, p. 4 4 1 .
CH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 23
other works and of the various attacks upon him were also
recorded by Basnage. I n the October 1697 issue of Nouvelhs
1
THE D O C T R I N E OF INNATE
KNOWLEDGE
cizes Locke for attacking the theory i n its 'crudest form' and
for failing to recognize the need for a doctrine of innateness
in order to account for man's relations with the divine or the
infinite. Gibson emphasizes the prevalence of the doctrine of
2
ever held in its na'ive form. Cassirer has advanced the novel
suggestion that Locke really had no one in mind i n Book One.
'Das System der "angeborenen Ideen" das Lockevor Augen
hat, ist indessen in seinen Einzelheiten keine geschichtliche
Realität, sondern eine polemische Konstruktion, die er als
Erläuterung und als Gegenbild der eigenen Anschauung
braucht.' Aaron has returned to the traditional answer and
2
men of the period, but none of the critics of Locke has indicated
just how prevalent its acceptance was. When we cease to search
far and wide for opponents of Locke's polemic and concen
trate our attentionupon his own contemporaries and immediate
predecessors i n England, we find that the doctrine of innate
knowledge was held, in one form or another, to be necessary
for religion and especially for morality from the early years of
the century right through to the end and into the beginning of
the following century. The doctrine underwent, i n general, a
1
quite true that the issue of innate knowledge had been debated
extensively by Locke's contemporaries and many of his own
criticisms anticipated. No clearer evidence for the existence of
the na'ive form of innateness could be found, save its formula
tion in the writings of many men, than the repeated denials of
its validity. The fact that we do find the theory formulated i n
this form, that the language of these formulations and the
language of the criticisms against the nai've form made prior to
1688 are incorporated into the Essay, would seem to establish
the identity of the referents of Book One of that work. A n
awareness of the role of the theory of innateness i n the moral
ists and theologians of the early half of the century is essential
for a full appreciation of the intimate connexion between
Locke's epistemology and the contemporary debates of which
he was aware, and for understanding m a n y o f the criticisms
made against Locke's polemic by his contemporaries.
the doctrine explicitly said that they did not mean that chil
dren are born with completed ideas ready for use. But even these
writers employ a vocabulary for expressing the doctrine which
must have been rigid and universally accepted. Some variant
of the theory can be found i n almost any pamphlet of the early
part of the century dealing with morality, conscience, the ex
istence of God, or natural law. For many men of the period,
natural law required a natural conscience to enable men to
recognize the laws laid down by God. Without a natural
conscience supplied by God with the ability of leading men
towards good and away from evil, there would be no sure
foundation for morality. Richard Carpenter expressed this
point of view i n his The Conscionabk Christian (1623), where,
in the preface 'To the Reader', he says:
N o w the w h o l e a n d intire w o r k o f c o n s c i e n c e . . . consists, as I c o n -
ceiue it, i n a p r a c t i c a l l s y l l o g i s m e : t h e maior proposition whereof
a r i s e t h . f r o m the Synteresis or treasury of morall principles, a n d of
s a c r e d rules w h e r e w i t h the p r a c t i c a l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s f u r n i s h e d , for the
s a v i n g direction of u s i n all actions ( p . [ 2 ] ) .
raised against this doctrine even in the early part of the century,
but the essentials were retained. I n his A Key to the Key of
Scripture (1611), William Sclater couples conscience with the
law of nature and asserts that 'The law of nature, is that rule of
pietie, and honestie, that the Lord hath written i n the hearts of
all men: whereby they know confusedly, and i n generall, what
is good; what is euill; what to be done; what to be forborn.'
(p. 170) But Sclaterwas reluctant to espouse the bold form of
the theory, even though his use of the vivid language seemed
to involve no other interpretation. The knowledge of the law of
nature is, he said, 'vouchsafed vnto all by a generall influence
of Gods grace, which is indeed as common as nature; and
therefore called the law of nature*. (Ibid.) Just what form this
influence takes was left obscure by Sclater, probably because he
could think of no alternative save that of its being inborn in
man. But conscience meant for him the same function as for
Carpenter, informing man of good and evil. He never relin
quishes the literal language, repeating many times that the
principles of conscience are 'imprinted i n the vnderstanding4
The theory prevailed and grew as the century moved on. The
language of conscience and synteresis was not always invoked;
but the foundation of morality in the internal nature of man, the
inscription of specific injunctions, was constantly championed.
Writing i n 1677, Sir Matthew Hale (The Primitive Origination
of Mankind) distinguished between sensation, ratiocination,
and intuition as sources of knowledge. Of intuition he said:
T h e r e are some t r u t h s so p l a i n a n d evident, a n d o p e n , that n e e d not
any process of ratiocination to e v i d e n c e o r evince t h e m ; t h e y s e e m to be
objected to the I n t e l l e c t i v e N a t u r e w h e n it is g r o w n perfect a n d fit for
intellectual operation, as the O b j e c t s of L i g h t o r C o l o u r are objected
to the E y e w h e n it i s o p e n ( p . 2 ) .
1
The body of doctrine ofwhich these terms were an integral part is scholastic,
although uses of synteresis and prolepsis (another term in the doctrine) can be
traced to the Stoics. Liddell and Scott cite Periander and Bias as having used
syneidesis in the sense of conscience. Synteresis or synderesis is used by St.
Thomas as a habit of mind concerned with the precepts of the natural law
SECT. I PRIOR •TO 1688 35
1
The OxfordEnglish
See Dictionary article on 'prolepsis'. Cf. Thomas Jackson,
f
Works, vol. vi, 1844, p. 2 7 9 , containing a sermon originally preached in 1637, and
John Ray, Miscellaneous Discourses ( 1 6 9 2 ) , p. 109.
2
Nouveaux Essais, p. 4 2 , in Gerhardt's edition, bd. v.
SECT.i P R I O R T O 1688 37
1
Histoire, t. i, p. 377. Cf. Cicero's De Natura Deorum, bk. 1, xvi, xvii.
3 8 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.п
of sense;.. .' But South argues (1) that since these notions are
1
it w i l l n o t b e a c c o u n t e d p a r a d o x i c a l i n m e to affirm, that I m m a t e r i a l
Objects are m o s t g e n u i n e a n d n a t u r a l to t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ; especially
since Des Cartes h a t h i r r e f u t a b l y d e m o n s t r a t e d , that t h e K n o w l e d g e w e
have o f t h e existence o f t h e S u p r e m e B e i n g , a n d o f o u r o w n S o u l s , i s
not o n l y P r o l e p t i c a l a n d I n n a t e i n t h e M i n d o f m a n , b u t also m o r e
certain, clear, a n d distinct, t h a n t h e K n o w l e d g e of any Corporeal
N a t u r e w h a t e v e r ( p . 119).
N o w to w h a t p u r p o s e s h o u l d P r o v i d e n c e i m p r i n t s u c h obvious a n d
apparent N o t i c e s as this [that the w h o l e is greater t h a n its parts] u p o n
the m i n d s of M e n , w h e n as b u t to o p e n o u r eyes, is e n o u g h to discover
t h e i r u n d o u b t e d T r u t h a n d E v i d e n c e ? . . . B u t suppose that w e w e r e
b o r n w i t h these congenite A n t i c i p a t i o n s , a n d that they take R o o t i n o u r
v e r y F a c u l t i e s , yet h o w c a n I be certain of their T r u t h a n d V e r a c i t y ?
F o r 'tis not impossible b u t the seeds o f E r r o r m i g h t have been the
n a t u r a l R e s u l t s of m y F a c u l t i e s , as W e e d s are the first a n d n a t u r a l
I s s u e s of the best Soyles, h o w t h e n s h a l l w e be s u r e that these spontaneous
N o t i o n s are not false a n d s p u r i o u s ? 2
The law of nature accordingly lost its innate basis; but i n the
minds of those who defended this concept of a law of nature,
the force and certainty of the law were not rendered any the less
powerful. When Locke came to reflect upon the problems of
knowledge and religion, he found appealing this new attitude
towards a simple naturalistic religion and an empirical basis for
values. The old nai've form of the doctrine of an innate basis for
values had been thoroughly exploded by i688. Locke merely
gave to these arguments their classic and most thorough state
ment. He had been preceded in this statement of the arguments
against the naive form of the theory by More, Culverwel, and
Parker, and a number of lesser-known men. Burthogge, too,
had gone far towards summarizing the older point of view on
this issue. I n Causa Dei (1675), Burthogge had insisted that
the general articles of religion
w h e r e i n all m e n the W o r l d over c o m m o n l y agree, a n d w h i c h are t h e r e
fore called common sentiments though they be not (what b y some t h e y b e
i m a g i n e d ) Innate Idea's o r N o t i o n s ingrafted a n d i m p r i n t e d o n t h e
M i n d s o f M e n b y N a t u r e , b u t . . . main andsubstantial Points of thefirst
Tradition (pp. 3 4 0 - 1 ) .
Like Locke, he put his finger upon the customary basis of the
religious values of his age. I n Organum Vetus & Novum (1678),
Burthogge referred to both sides of the doctrine, to the prac
tical and speculative maxims claimed to be innate. He remarks
that some men have been convinced that theunderstanding
has been furnished with
Anticipations, that is, with Connatural a n d Ingrafted Notions;
P r i n c i p l e s designedly i m p l a n t e d i n the M i n d e , to be a rule to it to direct
it. T h u s i n the speculative U n d e r s t a n d i n g they h a v e set u p a habit, w h i c h
1
Essays on the Law ofNature, ed. by W. von Leyden, Oxford, 1954, p. i 3 3 i
cf. p. 151.
sECT.i P R I O R T O 1688 47
child drawing back from fire the very first time it experiences
heat, thus showing that the child has an idea of heat framed i n
his mind.
1
MS. L o c k e , C . 2 8 , f. 100.
2
Ibid., ff. 9 9 - 1 0 0 .
So D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
Essay and had many words of praise for Locke, but he admitted
that he lacked the time required for making himself familiar
enough with the terminology and the required distinctions to
warrant his making extended and detailed criticisms. He does,
however, indicate that he finds the rejection of innate ideas in
the Essay difficult to accept, since for him the very concept of a
soul entails the concept of ideas within the soul. T o speak of the
soul as a tabula rasa 'without previously created ideas' distorts
the very meaning of the term. Leenhof belonged to atradition
in which the doctrine of innate knowledge was so firmly rooted
that it was taken for granted. Although he does not indicate the
specific details of the doctrine which he accepted, it is probable
that itwas similar to that formulated by Knorr von Rosenroth.
1
MS. Locke, C. 13, fT.14-15. Knorr von Rosenroth was a well-known Judaic
scholar, author of Kabbala Denudata ( 1 6 7 7 - 8 4 ) .
2
MS. Locke, C. 13, f. 152. These comments are in the form of a letter, the
recipient of the letter being undoubtedly Peter Guenellon, friend of Locke and
Leenhof. Guenellon also refers to them in one of his letters to Locke. (Cf. MS.
Locke, C. i l , f. 5.) Leenhof was a prominent minister and mathematician of
Holland ( 1 6 4 7 - 1 7 1 2 ) , interested in Descartes and Spinoza, whogotintotrouble
with his book, Den Hemel op Aaide ( 1 7 0 3 ) . For further information concerning
him, cf. Biographisch Woodenboek der Nederlanden.
52 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
1
T y r r e l l to L o c k e , 18 F e b r u a r y 1689/90. M S . L o c k e C . 2 2 , f. 8 2 .
sECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 53
Lowde attacked Parker along with Locke, insisting that 'it must
be granted, that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths
upon the minds of M e n : and i f so then it cannot be done any-
other way, than by making 'em thus plain and self evident'
(p. 56). I t was Lowde's conviction that God 'hath communi
cated something of a Divine Ray, relating both to Intellectual
and Moral Notices, into the very constitution of our humane
Nature, something that is both a light and a law unto us' (pp.
63-64). Innate ideas are not 'super-induc'd or imprinted upon
the Soul, I n esse completo' but are 'native Properties and
Qualifications of the Soul' (p. 82).
Lowde went on to charge Locke with reducing the founda
tion of morality to custom, a charge which Locke stoutly
denied. Moral goodness and evil for Locke were grounded i n
the law of nature; but his denial of the naive form of innate
ness led many of his readers to interpret him as uprooting the
traditional and, in their eyes, the only legitimate basis for
morality. Locke insisted that he was not opposed to the dis
positional version of the theory of innateness. He only wished
to point out that in this form the theory claimed so little that it
no longer meritedthename 'innate'. Lowde's doctrine asserted,
he pointed out in his reply, that 'there are certain propositions
which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is
born, does not know, yet "by assistance from the outward
senses, and the help of some previous cultivation", it may
afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no
more than what I have affirmed i n my First Book'. But Lowde
did not wish to assert only this minimal claim. Locke was
pointing out in effect that the test for dispositional innateness
can only come after experience and that then, as Parker had
observed, the claim for innateness becomes pointless. But with
this interpretation Lowde did not agree. Like many other men
in the period he believed that it was necessary and meaningful
to adhere to the dispositional form of the theory. The revisions
of Parker and Locke were too radical for most men of the
century to follow. Once innate knowledge had been denied, i n
both its naive and its dispositional forms, the readers of the
54 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн-.н
1
Tyrrell to Locke, 30 June 1690, MS. Locke, C. 22, ff. 90-91.
sECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 55
For Locke there were just two alternatives. Either ideas and
principles are innate i n the sense of full-blown and perfect
ideas, or they can be only tendencies which arise with ex
perience. The former is absurd and false, the latter trivial and
of no consequence. ^
I f m o r a l I d e a s or m o r a l r u l e s ( w h i c h are the m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s I d e n y
to be innate) are innate, I s a y c h i l d r e n m u s t k n o w t h e m as w e l l as
m e n . I f b y m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s y o u m e a n a faculty to finde out i n t i m e the
m o r a l difference o f actions. B e s i d e s that this i s a n i m p r o p e r w a y o f
s p e a k i n g to cal a p o w e r p r i n c i p l e s ; I n e v e r d e n y ' d s u c h a p o w e r to b e
innate, b u t that w h i c h I d e n y ' d w a s that a n y I d e a s o r c o n n e c t i o n o f
I d e a s w a s innate (note ix, p . 8 ) .
1
Locke's copy of Burnet's third set of Remarks, with Locke's marginal notes,
is in the Yale University Library. The manuscript notes have been published
by Noah Porter. The numbering of the notes is mine and refers to their order of
appearance in Locke's copy. The pagination refers to their location in Burnet's
text.
sECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 57
But Collins failed to see the very real antithesis which existed
between Locke and his critics on this issue. The conviction
held by Lowde, Burnet, and others was that there exists in the
mind a disposition which, independent of experience, leads
man towards good and away from evil. Locke was no more
willing to subscribe to this dictum than he was to the na'ive
form of the theory of innate knowledge. John Milner (An
Account of Mr. Lock's Religion, 1700) seems to have under
stood this fundamental difference which existed between
Locke and those who held even to the dispositional form of the
theory. Milner was concerned to defend Lord Herbert of
Cherbury against Locke's analysis as well as to defend the
modified version of the theory. But Milner could not square
Locke's total rejection of innate knowledge with his retention
of the concept of a law of nature.
I t is k n o w n to be M r . Lock's d a r l i n g N o t i o n , T h a t there are no innate
I d e a s , a n d no innate L a w , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , a c c o r d i n g to h i m , the L a w
1
Collins to Locke, 15 March 1703/4. MS. Locke C. 7, f. 26.
S8 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
The test for innateness for Milner was the ready andprone
assent of reason.
N o w of s u c h things, as so soon as they are alledged, all M e n a c k n o w -
l e d g e t h e m to be t r u e o r good, they r e q u i r e no P r o o f or farther D i s c o u r s e
to be assured of the T r u t h or G o o d n e s s of t h e m , w e n e e d not fear to
say, that they s e e m to have a good T i t l e , to be r e c e i v ' d for c o m m o n
N o t i o n s or C a t h o l i c k T r u t h s w r i t t e n i n the hearts of M e n ; w h i c h is all
that the L o r d Herbert contends for (p. 177).
1
Lee, op. cit., p. 3 7 .
2
See Collins's remark in his letter to Locke, 13 June 1704. 'Dr. Sherlock in
a book that will be publish'd in two or three days, hath printed some part of
what he formerly preach'd against your Essay &c: & I presume intends more by
his calling this afirstpart.Whatrelates to you I have read over & since there are
several new & extraordinary Arguments & Questions put to you I shall transcribe
a little whereby you mayjudge of the rest.' (MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 45.)
3
Collins to Locke, 20 June 1704. MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 47. Tyrrell commented on
Sherlock as follows: ' I have not yet Read what Dr. Sherlock has written against
your thoughts of Innate Ideas, but if that book be no better than others I have
seen of the same Author's, I cannot from the character I have received of it, but
think he had done much better to have confin'd himself to practical rather than
polemick divinity . . . ( T y r r e l l to Locke, 4 July 1704. MS. Locke, C. 22, f. 169.)
Robert South urged Locke to reply to Sherlock in forceful terms, so erroneous
and damaging did hethinkthecharge of atheism was. (South to Locke, 18 July
1704, MS. Locke, C . 18, ff. 1 7 5 - 6 . )
sECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 61
na'ive form, the form that Locke had challenged and sought to
refute. Writing after Locke's extended polemic, Edwards's
defence of the doctrine did not differ from that of his many
predecessors i n the first part of the century.
T h a t a l l m e n w e r e b o r n w i t h these I d e a s , a n d h a d t h e m e v e n i n t h e
State of I n f a n c y a n d C h i l d h o o d appears f r o m this, that at thefirst asking
t h e m a b o u t t h e m , or at the veryfirstproposal of the G e n e r a l P r i n c i p l e s
of T r u t h to t h e m , w h e n t h e y c o m e to a n y m a t u r i t y of years, a n d m a k e
use o f S p e e c h , t h e y freely give their assent to t h e m , a n d a c k n o w l e d g e
t h e m for T r u t h (p. 37).
§ 3—Conclusion
Isaac Watts wrote in 1726 in his Logick: Or, The Right Use
of Reason:
T h e r e h a s b e e n a great C o n t r o v e r s y , about the Origin of Ideas, ( v i z )
w h e t h e r a n y o f o u r I d e a s are innate o r n o , i.e., b o r n w i t h u s , a n d n a t u r a l l y
belonging to o u r M i n d s . M r . Locke utterly denies i t ; others as positively
affirm it (p. 2 8 ) .
1
Bayle to Coste, 27 December 1703, in CEuvres Diverses (1728), t. iv, p. 834.
70 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.п
1
The Religion ofNature Delineated, p. 17.
sECT.iii C O N C L U S I O N 71
century by an anonymous writer i n A Dissertation on Deistical
and Arian Corruption (1742).
B u t yet w e m u s t allow that the S o u l of every M a n has the K n o w l e d g e ,
the L a w a n d L o v e of G o d naturally w r o t e within, a n d so i n t e r w o v e n , as
I m a y say, into its v e r y B e i n g , that it cannot be a rational S o u l w i t h o u t
i t ; so that this i n t e r n a l , or innate L i g h t is essential to every reasonable
S o u l , as a reasonable a n d M o r a l B e i n g (p. 2 8 ) .
EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM
Τ
Η Ε reaction to Locke's denial of innate knowledge was
based almost entirely, as we have seen, upon the danger
ous consequences such a position boded for religion and
especially for morality. A few critics, like Norris, objected
to Book One of the Essay on the grounds that the thorough
empiricism implied by i t and continued i n the rest of the
work would not account for all our knowledge and all our
ideas, citing the non-sensible idea of God, and mathematics,
as evidence. Most of the critics went on to show how the
positive epistemological features of the Essay were just as
unacceptable as the rejection of innate knowledge. Later i n
this study, I shall be concerned with the way i n which these
doctrines of the Essay were believed to lead to religious
scepticism and disbelief. But before we pursue that aspect
of the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century reaction to
Locke's epistemology, we must examine the charge of epistemo
logical scepticism which was made by many critics quite
apart from a charge of religious scepticism. Not all the critics
examined i n this chapter were detached from religion; very
few could be said to have made their criticisms of Locke i n
abstraction from religion altogether, but the majority of them
were content to point out first the epistemological scepticism
inherent i n the Essay. They could then go on to show the
ways i n which this scepticism led to religious and moral
scepticism.
§ ι — E m p i r i c i s m and Rationalism
While the greater number of Locke's non-theological critics
hastened to call attention to the difficulties of establishing
the reality of knowledge, to the problems of the meaning and
function of ideas, and to the idealism entailed by the definition
sECT.i E M P I R I C I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M 73
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 3 6 8 .
E M P I R I C I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M 81
m e a n i n g to a n y w o r d h a s it no d o u b t w h i l s t he h a s it. B u t h e that v a r y s
the m e a n i n g o f h i s t e r m s o r k n o w s not precisely w h a t he m e a n s b y t h e m
(as noe t h i n g i s m o r e o r d i n a r y ) fills h i s discourse w i t h o b s c u r e & c o n
fused I d e a s . ( L o c k e , Notes, nos. 84, 85, p p . 372, 374.)
point had he fully understood it, for we have seen that he did
not rule out maxims completely and that he recognized the
necessity of man's being able to distinguish objects from one
another. Had he taken the arguments of his objectors more
seriously he might have been able to make explicit the exact
roles of empirical and rational procedures i n his system.
§ 2 — T h e Nature of Ideas
Locke's empiricism was attacked because it was deemed
insufficient in accounting for knowledge and in explaining its
foundation. Lee, Leibniz, and Sergeant were concerned with
laying bare what they took to be the necessary rational pre
suppositions of any theory of knowledge. A l l three were
sECT.ii T H E N A T U R E O F I D E A S 87
I t was not only the term 'idea' which troubled Lee: the
entire Essay was written i n an unfamiliar language. He sum
marized his distrust of this language as follows:
S o that w h e n t h e matter c o m e s to t h e P u s h a l l t h i s P u d d e r a n d C o n
fusion arises f r o m these n e w i n c h a n t i n g W o r d s , Ideas a n d E s s e n c e . F o r
suppose, that instead o f h i s P h r a s e o f c o m p l e x Ideas o f S u b s t a n c e s , one
s h o u ' d say, several Q u a l i t i e s a n d P r o p e r t i e s u n i t e d o r c o m b i n ' d , instead
of s i m p l e Ideas, single Q u a l i t i e s ; instead o f E s s e n c e , a l l t h e P r o p e r t i e s ,
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 1, preface. Cf. p. 48.
2
Ibid., p. 260.
88 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
Q u a l i t i e s , o r A c c i d e n t s b y w h i c h one i n d i v i d u a l S u b s t a n c e is d i s t i n g u i s h
able f r o m a n o t h e r ; instead of abstract Idea, one s h o u ' d p u t Genus or
Species . . . t h e n all t h i s S m o k e w i l l v a n i s h , w e s h a l l b o t h see one
another a n d p l a i n l y discover that o u r K n o w l e d g e of S u b s t a n c e s a n d
t h e i r M o d e s . . . i s not o n l y real a n d certain, but is the A U w e h a v e or c a n
a t t a i n ; a n d that all other is m e e r w h i m s y , is a n e w N a m e for N o t h i n g . 1
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 2 6 1 .
2
A Letter in Answer to . . . Christianity not Mysterious ( 1 6 9 7 ) , pp. 2-3.
3
A Discourse in Vindication ofthe . . . Trinity ( 1 6 9 7 ) , p. 2 7 3 .
4
Mr. Locke's Reply to the . . . Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter (1697).
sECT.ii г T H E N A T U R E O F I D E A S 89
' M r . Lock had made his Essay more easie and intelligible to
all sorts of Readers, i f he had made use of other Terms, and
not fiird every Page almost with the mention of Ideas' (p. 15).
George Hickes, who accused Locke of borrowing from the
scholastics, urged that 'there is not one sound Notion i n it
[the Essay], under his affected new Terms, to improve Human
Understanding ( I say, to improve, not to Poyson it) which the
School Logicks, and Metaphysicks, which are Subordinate to
one another, have not taught under the old'. 1
1
Carroll,William. Spinoza Reviv'd(iyog), p. [34] of 'Prelim. Discourse' by
Hickes.
2
The important doctrine of real and nominal essence ofBook Three was much
discussed, together with the doctrine of substance. Cf. below, pp. 1 2 6 e t s e q .
sECT.ii T H E N A T U R E O F I D E A S 91
I t will not do, Locke points out, to say dogmatically that upon
the occasion of objects being presented to us God causes us
to have their perception, for this conclusion is precisely what
awaits proof.
B u t the s u n b e i n g risen, a n d the horse b r o u g h t w i t h i n convenient d i s
tance, a n d so being present to m y eyes, G o d s h o w s m e their ideas i n
h i m s e l f : a n d I say G o d s h o w s m e these ideas w h e n h e pleases, w i t h o u t
the presence of a n y s u c h bodies to m y eyes. F o r w h e n I t h i n k I see a star
at s u c h a distance f r o m m e ; w h i c h t r u l y I do not see, b u t the idea of it
1
Works, vol. ix, p. 2 5 3 .
sECT. i n I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 99
w h i c h G o d s h o w s m e ; I w o u l d h a v e it p r o v e d to m e that there is s u c h a
star existing a m i l l i o n of m i l l i o n of m i l e s f r o m m e w h e n I t h i n k I see it,
m o r e t h a n w h e n I d r e a m of s u c h a star. F o r u n t i l it be p r o v e d that there
is a candle i n the r o o m b y w h i c h I w r i t e this, the s u p p o s i t i o n of m y
seeing i n G o d the p y r a m i d i c a l idea of its flame, u p o n o c c a s i o n of the
c a n d l e ' s b e i n g there, is begging w h a t is i n q u e s t i o n . 1
2
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 2 6 4 . Ibid., preface.
3
Ibid., p. 235. There is an error in the pagination at this point, the pages 235
io2 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. [25] of the Preface.
2
The Method to Science, p. 3.
SECT.iii I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 105
simple level does not take place until the impressions of the
senses have been communicated to the soul. The apprehension
is simple because it involves no judgement. Sergeant does not
work out a semiotic theory whereby what is communicated to
the mind becomes a meaning-sign, but he does say that 'mean
ing' is synonymous with 'notion'; notions affect the mind,
'which only can mean or intend\ I t is mainly i n this sense that
he defines notions as simple apprehensions, but apparently
he meant to use the term in a still wider sense, as concep
tions, because the mind conceives or breeds these notions as
'the Embryo's of Knowledge'. When the impressions of sense
reach the mind, the conception which takes place amounts to
a simple apprehension of a sign conveying meaning to the
mind. The only difference between notions i n the mind and
the things of which they are notions is that the former have
a different manner of existing. T o avoid the epistemological
dualism which he found i n the ideists' method, Sergeant
refused to convert the simply apprehended meanings into
media of knowledge which communicate the natures of
things external to the observer. The meanings are the things
themselves. We intend or mean not some idea but the thing
itself when we assert something about the world. The things
themselves exist in our mind i n the form of notions. There is
no difficulty i n this view, Sergeant hastens to add, when we
recognize that 'the same Ens or Thing may have diverse
Manners of Existing; one Corporeal, the other Intellectual or
Spiritual; since the Thing . . . abstracts even from Existence
it self (Ibid.). There is nothing contained in the notion or the
meaning apprehended by the mind which signifies that the
thing exists or does not exist. The only notion which entails
existence is that of God. A word or sign i n cognition implies a
meaning, but existence is not contained in that meaning. The
fact that the thing external to the mind has a corporeal exist
ence while the notion of it in the mind has an immaterial
existence does not mean that we do not know the thing directly
in experience, since what is essential to the thing is contained
in the notion of that thing and is precisely the thing itself
io6 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
the various sense organs. The material and the spiritual parts
of man come together at some point, such as at Descartes's
pineal gland. Following scholastic tradition, Sergeant terms
it the 'seat of knowledge'. Every effect which alters the material
part of man at this point (the brain or nearby regions) also
creates an effect i n the spiritual part. This effect is the union of
matter and form. The material effluvia do not enter the form
or spiritual part. Rather, a Spinozistic parallelism takes place
in which the alterations in the spiritual part correspond with
and duplicate therein the alterations in the material section.
T h o s e Effluviums sent out f r o m B o d i e s , h a v e the very Natures of
those B o d i e s i n t h e m , o r rather are t h e m s e l v e s L e s s e r B o d i e s o f the
Self-same N a t u r e , . . . w h i c h are c u t off b y N a t u r a l A g e n t s f r o m the great
L u m p ; a n d , therefore, b y A p p l i c a t i o n of themselves, t h e y i m p r i n t the
very Body it self, o r a B o d y o f that N a t u r e , o n that m a t e r i a l part w h i c h
i s the Seat of Knowledge. W h e n c e the S o u l being, at the s a m e t i m e ,
affected after her m a n n e r (or Knowingly) as that p a r t w a s affected, s h e
has also the very Nature o f that B o d y (as far as the S e n s e exhibits it) p u t
i n h e r b y that conformable I m p r e s s i o n , w h e n s h e h a s a Notion o f i t . 1
to say that two patches of red of exactly the same shade are
really identical. What he maintains is that there is a sameness
in all respects save number. The fact that the one, the idea or
notion of this shade of red, exists in the understanding i n
tellectually, while the other, the patch of colour, exists outside
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 2 0 . 2
Ibid., p. 36.
sECT.iii I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 109
Essay. Discussion did not clarify the problems. Thus, for the
men of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, with
the epistemological scepticism of the Essay firmly established
by several capable critics, the stage was set for the unveiling
of the religious scepticism implicit i n the acceptance of the
epistemological doctrines of that work.
IV
RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM
H
A D Locke's Essay been written during a period in
which religious controversy was less rampant (were
this conceivable), it is doubtful whether the doctrines
advanced in that work could have aroused much reaction.
Although the non-theological criticisms which we have
examined in the previous chapter showed an appreciation of
the epistemological doctrines in themselves, each of the critics
there discussed, with the exception of Leibniz, had an
ulterior purpose behind his arguments. Each wrote in defence
of religion and was concerned to break down popular acclaim
for the Essay in both the purely theoretical and the practical
spheres. The publication of the Essay, coming especially at
a time when new radical sects of natural religion were emerg
ing, led to its becoming the centre of much religious discussion;
for the parallels between the empiricism of Locke's episte-
mology and the naturalistic doctrines in religion, with their
appeal to reason, could not have been overlooked by his
contemporaries. I n many respects, Locke expounded the
epistemology and even ontology of the deistic movement.
His own sympathies were strongly in support of the new
religious theories advanced by Thomas Firmin, his friends,
and associates. The extent to which Locke wrote with the
express purpose of giving support to deism cannot, un
fortunately, be established. We have seen how prevalent was
the doctrine of innate knowledge among his contemporaries
and have found reasöns for thinking that Locke wrote the
first book of his Essay to refute this view of his fellow country
men. Since we know from his own statement that his reflec
tions upon the problems of the Essay were stimulated by
certain difficulties in religion and morality, and since we know
where his own sympathies lay in respect to religious beliefs,
Il6 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M C H . IV
Locke was drawn into the debate over the nature of the
Trinity in part through a misunderstanding aroused by
Toland's use of clear and distinct ideas, but it was neverthe
less true that Locke's epistemological doctrines were appearing
more and more in the writings of the new men of religion, as
the century came to an end. I t is difficult to consider Locke
completely sincere in his repetitious assertions of his non-
involvement in such important religious doctrines as that of
the Trinity or the role of reason and faith in religion. I t would
be most strange if a man of Locke's learning sincerely believed
he could write in the seventeenth century about such doctrines
as the method to and sources of knowledge, the nature of
substance and essence, the empirical foundations of all know
ledge, and escape an assessment of these doctrines from the
theologians, since these were all doctrines of direct relevance
to religion. Modern critics are given to seeing in Locke's
1
I n Works, vol. iv, p. 68.
cH.iv R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M 117
much stress upon one book, but there can be no doubt that
Toland's work aroused an enormous reaction which led most
of the prominent religious figures in England to reconsider
their own beliefs and either to attack or to defend the new
movement, which by then was growing in strength. The very
title of Toland's book epitomized the general attitude of the
deistic and other naturalistic sects: the claim that nothing
about the Christian religion was above reason. The attack was
directed upon such doctrines as that of the Trinity and tran-
substantiation, but Toland's main concern was with bring
ing to the front the basic dispute over the reasonableness
or mysteriousness of this religion. Locke's own work in this
field, The Reasonableness ofChristianity, had appeared in 1695
and elicited several prolix rebuttals. But the appeal of Locke
2
versy' (p. xviii). But i n a work which took as its main tenet
the belief that 'Reason is the only Foundation of all Certitude;
and that nothing reveaPd, whether as to its Manner or Exist¬
ence, is more exempted from its Disquisitions, than the
ordinary Phenomena of Nature' (p. 6), it was not a mere
digression to consider the nature and province of human
reason. The way of ideas played a prominent role in this
discussion.
E v e r y one experiences i n h i m s e l f a P o w e r or F a c u l t y of forming,
v a r i o u s I d e a s or P e r c e p t i o n s of T h i n g s ; O f affirming or d e n y i n g , a c c o r d
i n g as h e sees t h e m to agree or disagree: A n d so of l o v i n g a n d d e s i r i n g
w h a t seems good u n t o h i m ; a n d of h a t i n g a n d a v o i d i n g w h a t h e t h i n k s
evil. T h e right U s e of all these F a c u l t i e s is w h a t w e call C o m m o n S e n s e ,
or Reason i n general. B u t the bare A c t of r e c e i v i n g I d e a s into the M i n d ,
w h e t h e r by the Intromission of the Senses, as C o l o u r s , F i g u r e s , S o u n d s ,
S m e l l s , &c. or b y the Soul's considering its own Operations about what it
thus gets from without, as K n o w i n g , D o u b t i n g , Affirming, D e n y i n g , &c.
t h i s bare A c t , I say, of r e c e i v i n g s u c h I d e a s into the M i n d , is not
strictly Reason, because the S o u l h e r e i n is p u r e l y passive. ( P p . 9 - 1 0 ) .
to revealed truth, only tell us that things are possible. The only
ground we have for believing, for example, i n the flood, is that
God tells us about it (pp. 4-5). 'Now I have as little Prejudice
against clear Ideas as I have against an infallible judge; but I
am afraid that in many cases these are as hard to be found as
the other' (p. 13). The question of what constitutes being
'above reason' was bound up with the criterion of clarity and
distinctness as a basis for knowledge.
I t was, however, i n the hands of Peter Browne and the
bishop of Worcester that these epistemological principles
invoked by Toland found their ablest opponents. Browne, i n
A Letter in Answer to a Book Entituled, Christianity not
Mysterious (1697), admitted that Toland was correct i n saying
that Christianity was not mysterious, since it was meant for
the plainest men in the world; but he insisted that this asser
tion does not mean that there are no mysteries in Christianity.
He agreed that there is nothing contrary to reason in the
Gospels and nothing above reason, i n the sense of being
beyond our comprehension. 'But if by not being above reason,
be meant that there is nothing spoke of in it, but what we have
as compleat and perfect knowledge of, as we have of any
object of our Senses, it is absolutely false; . . (p. 8). Toland's
doctrine of evidence as the only ground of persuasion is
criticized as overlooking the basis of authority i n religious
knowledge: 'all natural Truths which do not necessarily
require Revelation, need no other ground of perswasion, but
Evidence and Authority' (p. 19). Browne agrees that 'Clear
and distinct Idea's are the foundation of all our knowledge and
assent', but insists t h a t i t is false to say 'we can believe nothing
1
First published in The Occasional Papcr, as no. 3 (1697).
sECT.i I D E A S I N R E L I G I O U S K N O W L E D G E 123
but what we have a clear and distinct Idea of' (pp. 27-28).
His point is that we believe some things of which we do not
have clear and distinct ideas, on the strength of some clear
and distinct ideas which we do have. He insists that, though
we do not have any clear and distinct idea of the things of the
other world, we are bound to believe i n these things on the
authority of the Scriptures, which provide the base of clear
and distinct ideas. I t w as typical of Browne that while object
T
be said to have Ideas of God and Divine things, yet they are
not immediate or proper ones, but a sort of composition we
make up from, our Idea's of Worldly Objects; which at the
utmost amounts to no more than a Type or Figure, by which
something in another world is signified'. 2
1
A Letter in Answer to . . . Christianity not Mysterious, p. 32.
2
Ibid., p. 41.
i24 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
Locke admitted that the clearer and more distinct the ideas
involved are, the more clear and distinct would be our reason
ing about them, but he readily pointed out that he recognized
that we may have certainty about obscure ideas:
b y the clear ideas of t h i n k i n g i n m e , I find the agreement of the clear i d e a
of existence, a n d the o b s c u r e idea of a substance i n m e , because I p e r
ceive the necessary idea of t h i n k i n g , a n d the relative idea of a s u p p o r t ;
w h i c h support, w i t h o u t h a v i n g a n y clear a n d d i s t i n c t idea o f w h a t it i s ,
b e y o n d t h i s relative one of a support, I call s u b s t a n c e . 3
way of ideas from that used by such men as Toland. But three
major factors led Locke's contemporaries to find justice i n
Stillingfleet's insistence that, even though some men used his
ideas to bad purposes, Locke should feel a duty and com
pulsion to explain his system and to show how it did not
undermine the fundamental articles of the Christian religion:
( i ) the newness of the application of the way of ideas i n the
Essay, a factor which we have already examined; (2) the
doctrine of substance and essence which was not distorted by
Toland and which occupied the minds of so many men in the
century; and (3) the many rephrasings of various parts of the
Essay in the deistical tracts of the period, a factor which I shall
examine at length in the next chapter. I t is the second factor
which we must now examine, bearing i n mind that although
Stillingfleet and others may have falsely supposed that Locke
placed the criterion of certainty in clear and distinct ideas,
their reaction against the doctrines of the Essay was motivated
by the disbelief which they all shared in the fruitfulness of
the way of ideas in religious knowledge. I f the way of ideas
placed its emphasis upon an empirical, naturalistic foundation
for all knowledge, if the radical new sects i n religion could
draw support so easily from the Essay, and i f the way of ideas
pursued by Locke discounted (if not discarded) the doctrine
of real substances, that book was open to suspicion from all
the tradition-directed members of society.
1
Boyle, R. The Origine of Formes and Qualities, pp. 59, 61-62; More, H .
The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 11, 51.
SECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 127
1
A Vindication of the Doctrine ofthe . . . Trinity (1690), p. 4.
2
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 129
sought to give each of the three figures in the traditional doctrine a separate and
unique reality.
i o
3 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
of his replies to South, he cites Locke as an authority for the doctrine of personal
identity, another doctrine which Sherlock borrowed and adapted from Locke.
(Cf. his A Defence ofDr. Sherlock's Notion (1694), p. 6.) So far as I know, Locke
was never mentioned by Sherlock in relation to the doctrine of substance.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 131
But Locke was not merely saying that w e know some things r
and Person be abstract, and complex Ideas, as you say, and such
are only Acts of the M i n d , I do not see how it is possible for
you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity
and Incarnation'* Even i f Locke does admit a belief in real
substance, his principles will not allow us to gain knowledge
of its nature. Arbitrary classification is substituted for natural
or real sorting by God. Stillingfleet's description of our idea
of substance is, of course, identical with Locke's except that
he prefers to call it a necessary or rational idea, 'because it is
a Repugnance to our first conception of Things that Modes or
1
I n Works, vol. iv, p. 5. Cf. p. 18. Ibid., p. 7.
2
3
Mathew T i n d a l had in 1695 invoked both Locke's doctrine of substance and
his doctrine of identity in his interpretation of the Trinity. Cf. his Reflexions on
the XXVIII Propositions touching the Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 22-24.
4
Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter (1698), p. 55.
i34 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
was simply that he had found no one as yet who could show
how such knowledge of natural kinds was derived. But one
of the main merits of Stillingfleet's criticism was toshow that
Locke could not derive even the obscure idea of substance,
which he claimed, from his own principles. On Locke's
avowed principle of deriving all knowledge from ideas of
sensation and reflection, we can have no idea of substance
except as a complication or collection of simple qualities.
Locke admitted to Stillingfleet that the idea of substance was
never meant to arise out of sensation or reflection alone, but
was a manufactured idea constructed by the mind from the
general notion of substance abstracted from each particular
idea of substance, and from the relative idea of a support.
But Locke nowhere explains i n terms ofhis general empirical
scheme for all ideas, merely from a consideration of the sensible
ideas of qualities collected into wholes, how the mind can
derive the non-empirical concept of a real ontological sub
stance supporting these qualities. The transcendence of his
own empirical phenomenalism was made possible only by a
bold rationalism grafted on to his earlier attempts at con
structing an empirical epistemology. Locke's idea of sub
stance as an addition to the sensible qualities, as the locus of
the real essence, is not derivable from simple ideas of sense
but is an hypothesis of reason. That the impetus for form
ing the concept arose i n part from experience is, as Aaron
has suggested, very probable; for sensible qualities are
experienced in unity, not as isolated factors. 'There is an
awareness of ideas as going together. The mind has not ideas
of isolated qualities, but of qualities together i n one unity.
Now here, surely, is the empirical basis of the concept of
1
Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter (1697), Ρ· 4·Γ
2
A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 258.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 135
1
Letter to the . . . Bishop of Worcester, in Works, vol. iv, p. 7.
2
Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial (1704-7), t. iv, p. 219.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 137
though man can never know all of these accidents and hence
can never know the actual substance in its entirety, Sergeant's
position entails an entirely different definition of substance
from that employed by Locke. Substance is the most essential
part of objects for Locke, but by no means that object in its
completeness. Existence and substance are practically identical
1
SolidPhilosophy Asserted, p. 238. 2
Ibid., p. 240.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 141
aligned more and more with the members of the radical non
conformist religious sects. One of the more vehement of such
attacks against Locke's doctrine of substance appeared after
his death, in the writings of William Carroll. I n a series of
tracts Carroll strove to show that Locke's doctrine of sub
stance was an expansion of Spinoza's pantheism, of the
doctrine that there is only one substance in the world and that
this is material. Writing in 1705 against Samuel Clarke's
Boyle lectures, Carroll calls attention to Clarke's acceptance
2
1
An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (1733), p. 144, note r.
2
Ibid., pp. 152-3.
sECT. i n C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 149
summarize and epitomize this issue, for, like his many pre
decessors, Bentley directed his attack against the Epicureans
and sought to demonstrate the existence of an immaterial,
thinking soul. I t is, he declared, the Opinion of every
Atheist, and counterfeit Deist of these times, that believes
there is no Substance but Matter.' Thus, atheism was directly 2
1
p. 315. Molyneux left numerous marginal summaries of Locke's arguments
but only one or two critical observations of his own in these notes. H i s copy of
the Essay is in the Bodleian Library.
2
Anti-Scepticism, p. 246.
i54 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
stance it self; or, all of the Substance that falls under our
Knowledge and Apprehension' (p. 2).
Once having given these definitions, he proceeds to argue
as if he ignored them, using in his argument the usual defini
tion of substance as that which can exist by itself, and the
definition of mode or attribute as that which cannot so exist.
Like Stillingfleet, he urges that, for one who seeks to make all
knowledge come from sensation and reflection, the idea of
substance will turn out to be, as it was for Locke, an absurd
sECT.iii C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 155
an eternal knowing Being was proved necessary to exist; wou'd argue all to
be Matter, and so deny a God; T h e D a n g e r of granting these M e n w h a t ,
over a n d above, it is a b s u r d to grant to a n y M a n , is to m e a good W a r r a n t
why I s h o u ' d . . . d e n y the general Possibility of Matter's Thinking
(p. 56).
1
A Discourse Concerning the Resurrection of the Same Body (1705).
2
Collins to Locke, 30 June, 1703. M S . Locke, C . 7, f. 2.
3
Locke to Collins, 9 July 1703, in Works, vol. x, p. 266.
4
Cf. Locke to Collins, 21 February 1703/4 and 24 February 1703/4, in
Works, vol. χ, pp. 276, 278.
sECT.iii C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 157
Bold, however, were not the only figures i n the period who
were defending the position which Broughton had attacked.
Broughton, in fact, was writing not only to refute Locke's
suggestion of matter being given a power of thought; he wrote
as well against William Coward's Second Thoughts Concerning
Human Soul (1702), in which Coward not only took up the
suggestion made by Locke, but actually maintained that the
human soul is just such a power of life and movement super
added to the physical body. Whether or not Coward was
actually directly influenced in this belief by Locke cannot be
determined; but it is curious that a few years after Locke's
suggestion had caught the attention of the critics, a serious
writer should champion the precise view suggested i n the
Essay. I t is, however, indicative of Locke's own views that
neither he nor his friend Collins found the arguments of
Coward's later work, The Grand Essay (1704), convincing.
Thus it is clear that Locke did not mean to accept the view-
as actual fact which he had suggested i n his digression as a
possibility. 1
1
Second Thoughts,p. 163. 2
Ibid.,p. 165.
3
p. 189 ofhis ' A Brief Answer to M r . Broughton' (included at the end of The
Grand Essay as pp. 177-248). Ibid., p. 194. 4
sECT.iii C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 159
God must act in accord with natural law. Even his infinite
power cannot transgress the order of nature. For Hampton,
Locke was less culpable than Coward, since the latter openly
declared that man isjust the same as a beast, in that both man
and animals think and reason.
M r . Locke i n h i s E s s a y of h u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g confest, that t h o '
w e don't k n o w b u t that it w a s i n the P o w e r of G o d to have given U n d e r
s t a n d i n g to M a t t e r , yet h e w a s most i n c l i n a b l e t o b e l i e v e , that h u m a n
S o u l is a s p i r i t u a l i m m o r t a l S u b s t a n c e ; a n d yet w h i l e it is clog'd w i t h
the B o d y , does not always think. . . . N o w D r . Coward c o n c l u d e s , that
sECT. πι C O N T R O V E R S Y ON T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 163
for matter to think, and that the immortality of the soul did
not depend upon its immateriality. Locke's name appears
2
1
L e C l e r c gave a long review of Ditton's book, in which he devoted several
pages to Ditton's views on thinking matter. Cf. Bibliotheque Choisie, t. xxv, pt.
ii, pp. 450-2 (art. v i ; 1712).
2
Cf. esp., Collins's An Answer to Mr. Clark's Third Defence of his Letter to
Mr. Dodwell (1708), and Clarke's A Second Defense ofan Argument Made use ofin
a Letter to Mr Dodwel (1707).
sECT.iii C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 165
1
See Browne's Procedure, pp. 362-70.
2
L i k e many other of Locke's doctrines, this entire controversy was reflected
by L e C l e r c in various reviews in his Bibliotheque Choisie. Cf. t. ii, pp. 352ff.,
art. xiii; t. viii, pp. 58 ff., art. i i ; t. xxi, p. 217, art. v i i ; t. xxiv, pp. 191 ff.; and t.
xxvi, pp. 280 ff., art. iii.
i66 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
form was, we have seen, forced upon the Essay by Carroll, but
many another writer credited the doctrine of thinking matter
to the deists and to other radical thinkers of the day. I n the list
of principles underlying deism, a list which was more than
once drawn up at the turn of the century, this doctrine takes
a prominent place. M y concern, however, is more with the
epistemological doctrines proper of the Essay, their reception,
rejection, and absorption by Locke's contemporaries, than i t
is with the various subsidiary problems engendered by these
principles. W i t h the close of the seventeenth century and the
beginning of the eighteenth, these epistemological principles
—the resting of all knowledge upon ideas, the representative
theory of perception, the pretended reduction of knowledge
to an empirical basis and the consequent rejection of all innate
sources of knowledge, the confusing, semi-phenomenalistic
doctrine of substance—found more and more favour among
the new deistical sects. No evaluation of Locke's influence
upon his countrymen can be complete which does not recog
nize the role which his epistemology played i n the service
of these new religious movements. The very fact that many of
these principles were absorbed by the orthodox defenders of
tradition enabled the new naturalistic movement, in great
measure, to catch and spread even while it was being most
bitterly attacked.
V
T
H E Cartesian development of the logic of ideas together
with its English adaptations early i n the seventeenth
century provided the context from which Locke's episte
mology emerged. His epistemology was also rooted i n the
1
that the Essay appeared and continued into the middle of the
eighteenth ceritury. Both the members of the new religious
sects (Deists, Unitarians, Free-Thinkers) and the adherents
to the older tradition found ample use for these doctrines.
But the epistemology of the Essay found its most ready
application within the ranks of the Deists and other naturalistic
theologians. Where it is adopted by the traditional theologians
it is usually for the purpose of combating some criticism by the
new sects which had invoked Lockean doctrines, or as a means
of modifying tradition less radically than the Deists demanded.
The absorption within tradition of these principles led to the
general dissemination of the new epistemology of Locke,
making it easier for these doctrines to be accepted finally even
by those most opposed to the growing naturalism i n religion.
The epistemology of the Essay became so familiar through this
double application, that the theoretical framework of Deism
was given a most favourable impetus and support.
1
History ofEnglish Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i , pp. 82-85.
i7o E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
Wollaston or Collins.
Although the various non-orthodox sects which appeared
in England between 1690 and 1704 (the period from the Essay
to Locke's death) differed from one another in virtue of
certain minor doctrinal points, i n studying any one of them
we are in effect learning most of the characteristics of all the
others. I t depends on where one enters the period to decide
1
Abbey and Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i ,
p. 181.
2
T h e name of Stephen Nye is most often associated with this movement. Cf.
his A BriefHistory ofthe Unitarians (1687).
3
Stephen, vol. i , p. 111.
sECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 171
are complex. On the one hand there can be little doubt that
he never seriously considered himself as an opponent of
revealed religion. I n the preface to his Second Vindication of
his Reasonableness of Christianity, he wrote:
But, w h e n I h a d gone t h r o u g h the w h o l e , a n d s a w w h a t a p l a i n ,
s i m p l e , reasonable t h i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s , s u i t e d to a l l c o n d i t i o n s a n d
c a p a c i t i e s ; a n d i n the m o r a l i t y o f it n o w , w i t h d i v i n e a u t h o r i t y , e s t a b
l i s h e d into a legible law, so far s u r p a s s i n g a l l that p h i l o s o p h y a n d h u m a n
reason h a d attained to, or c o u l d p o s s i b l y m a k e effectual to a l l degrees o f
m a n k i n d , I w a s flattered to t h i n k it m i g h t be of s o m e u s e i n the w o r l d ;
especially to those, w h o t h o u g h t either that there w a s no n e e d of r e v e l a
t i o n at a l l , or that t h e revelation o f o u r S a v i o u r r e q u i r e d the belief o f
1
'Some Reflections on a Book, Entituled, A Letter to the Deists\ no. 1 of The
Occasional Paper (1697), p. 10.
2
See his A Letter to the Deists (1697). 3
Op. cit., vol. i , p, 37.
824331 N
i74 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
1
Treface to the Reader', in Works, vol. vii, p. 188.
2
Op. cit., vol. i , pp. 223-4.
3
Procedure, Extent, andLimits of Human Understanding, p. 40.
sECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 175
1
A Free Discourse concerning Truth and Error (1701), p. 87.
2
Ibid., p. 423. 3
Ibid., pp. 423-4.
176 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
Not only did Witty consider the basing of all knowledge upon
the way of ideas essential to Deism, but the doctrine of the
unknowability of substance is evidenced as an example of the
type of vague inferences from ideas allowed by the Deists.
A n d t h u s h a v i n g I d e a s of the i n h e r e n t A t t r i b u t e s o f Matter, and
thinking Substances, a n d of t h e i r necessary d e p e n d e n c e o n something as
a s u p p o r t of their E x i s t e n c e , w e infer a n d assent to the E x i s t e n c e of the
Substances w h i c h s u p p o r t t h e m ; t h o u g h w h a t those Substances are i n
t h e i r i n t r i n s i c N a t u r e s w e are entirely ignorant. ( I b i d . )
1
A Dissertation upon the Tenth Chapter ofthe Fourth Book ofMr. Locke's Essay
1706), p. 276. 2
Ibid., p. 277.
sECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 179
1
See T i n d a l to Locke, io January 1696/7, M S . Locke, C . 20, f. 207.
i8o E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N c H . v
1
Bibliotheque Choisie, t. xxi, pt. i , art. i i , pp. 38-39.
2
Berkeley's Works, vol. iii, Editor's introduction to Alciphron, p. 6.
3
Op. cit., p. 39.
sECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 181
1
Cf. Hickes's Preliminary Discourse to Carroll's Spinoza Reviv'd. 1
i88 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N
I n other words,
F r o m E x t e n s i o n , Solidity, F i g u r e , C o l o u r , &c. u n i t e d i n one S u b j e c t ,
w e infer the Subject i n w h i c h they are u n i t e d ; a n d that unexceptionably,
w i t h o u t a n y necessity of h a v i n g a n I d e a of M a t t e r as it is i n it self, or of
the i n m o s t N a t u r e of the Substance of Corporeal Being (p. 27).
Not only does everything refrain from doing what is not in its
power, but everything does all that is i n its power. T o the
objection that objects appear to be different under different
conditions, and that therefore we have no basis from which
to infer the nature of object's in themselves, Witty replies that,
though the specific extension may vary, the fact of extension
itself never varies. This invariance shows the constancy of the
basic qualities of objects (pp. 131-2). To the objection that
secondary qualities show that bodies do not always reveal
their true natures, Witty argues that bodies reveal themselves
through qualities in so far as they can, thus reverting once
more to the presupposition of the first argument noted above.
He was determined to adhere to the representative theory,
while avoiding the scepticism which Locke's earlier critics
had disclosed as implicit in that position.
I grant that Light a n d other secondary Q u a l i t y s have n o t h i n g i n B o d y s
i n any M e a s u r e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to o u r Sensations of ' e m ; a n d it m u s t be
granted b y all, that the Specific P o w e r s a n d P r o p e r t y s of B o d y s are,
generally speaking, infinitely too subtile a n d fine to represent themselves
as they are in themselves to u s b y the Mediation o f o u r gross O r g a n s : B u t
t h e n does it hence follow that, because they can't represent themselves to
u s at all, therefore they don't necessarily represent themselves, as far as
they c a n c o m e w i t h i n the V e r g e of the finest S e n s e s , a c c o r d i n g to their
N a t u r e s , to s u c h C r e a t u r e s w h o s e organs are fine e n o u g h to be affected
w i t h their O p e r a t i o n s ? N 0 s u c h M a t t e r ( p . 141).
Witty did not agree with those who held what he called the
'inherent quality' doctrine, which is in reality the position of
na'ive realism. He may have had men like Sergeant in mind at
this point.
A n d a s for those w h o h o l d the inherent-quality Doctrin, and accord
ingly m a i n t a i n that there is heat i n the F i r e , light i n the S u n , &c.
adaequately the same as i n o u r S e n s a t i o n s ; these M e n can't m a k e the O b
j e c t i o n I have n o w a n s w e r ' d , n o r a n y at a l l : I n a s m u c h as they a s s u m e
not o n l y w h a t I c o n t e n d for, but m u c h m o r e ; not o n l y that the Primary
b u t the Specific P r o p e r t y s of T h i n g s are i n B o d y s w h a t they appear i n
o u r Sensations a n d Ideas; m e a n i n g b y those Specific P r o p e r t y s those
v e r y Sensations, or s o m e t h i n g of the like N a t u r e w i t h ' e m , w h i c h i n d e e d
the secondary A t t r i b u t e s of B o d y s are only the occasional C a u s e s of
(p. 147).
sECT.ii L O C K E ' S E P I S T E M O L O G Y A P P L I E D 193
(P-4)-
(p. 65). Not only are the actions of the mind separate from the
conceptions we form of them, but they are not able to be the
subject of 'ideas' proper, since these are interpreted in sensual
ist terms. Much i n the fashion of Malebranche, he argues that
we can have ideas only of objects external to us, preferring
to call our knowledge of the operations of our minds 'con
ceptions' or, in the fashion of Berkeley, 'notions'. The use of
the term 'idea' as applied to self-knowledge constitutes for
Browne the first step along the erroneous and misleading
road of useless distinctions: those of compound ideas, ideas
of simple modes, of power, of cause, &c.
Referring indirectly (as was his practice) to Locke as 'the
Standard and Oracle of Ideas in our Age' (p. 73), Browne
proceeds to argue (1) that the idea of a thinking matter is
absurd and shameful; (2) that we have more knowledge of
body than we have of spirit; (3) that we have no direct know
ledge of spirits at all and especially of God; and (4) that we
do know something of the essential nature of such things as
man and stones. He makes a threefold distinction between
the ideas of sense, the necessary material for all thought,
which enter the mind at first without any intellectual activity;
i 8
9 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
innate ideas, which he rejects because they are absurd and not
necessary; and the so-called ideas of reflection. The only way
we come to self-knowledge is by 'an immediate Consciousness
of the several different ways of its [the mind's] own working
upon those Ideas of Sensation lodged in the Imagination'
(p. 97). Knowledge of self is thus indirect. 'We have not even
the least Direct Idea or Perception of the purely spiritual part
of us; nor do we discern any more of its Real Substance than
we do that of an Angel'. (Ibid.) But the necessity of avoiding
the second use of the representative theory of perception, that
of self-knowledge, in order to be able to maintain his doctrine
of an indirect but valid knowledge of divine and non-empirical
objects, leads him into a doctrine of the knowledge of the
nature of the self strikingly akin to Locke's phenomenalistic
doctrine of substance. 'We have no Knowledge of our own
Spirit, or of any of its Faculties, but from a conscious Ex
perience of its several Ways of acting upon the Ideas of
Sensation' (p. 109). Moreover, when he starts elaborating the
details of his doctrine of. indirect or non-imaginal knowledge
of self and spiritual substances, he finds it necessary to modify
the indirectness i n a fashion which comes close to destroying
his fundamental distinction.
F o r o u r Conceptions a n d N o t i o n s m a y be Direct or Indirect, as w e l l as
o u r Ideas. W h e n they stand i n the M i n d for their p r o p e r a n d Original
O b j e c t s , a n d w h e n the W o r d s that express t h e m are taken Literally for
s u c h Objects, t h e y are Direct.. . . B u t w h e n t h e y are Substituted to c o n
ceive, a n d do Standfor D i v i n e Immaterial T h i n g s , then they become
Indirect a n d Analogical (pp. 110-11).
Browne never moves very far from this core of sensation, for
knowledge of divine things is acquired or constructed only
by finding analogies within experience. Such constructions
are valid sources of knowledge; but Browne wishes his readers
to recognize the nature of this knowledge, that it involves
close dependence upon experience. I n general, he was con
vinced of the limitations of man's knowledge, limitations
which both Glanville and Locke had voiced before him. A l l
three men were convinced, however, that though knowledge
is severely restricted it is sufficient for our needs. Browne's
expression of this conviction parallels closely that of Locke.
T h u s short a n d imperfect is all o u r boasted K n o w l e d g e of N a t u r e ;
w e are i n t i r e l y i n the dark as to the i n w a r d S t r u c t u r e a n d C o m p o s i t i o n of
the m i n u t e Particles of all B o d i e s ; a n d c a n w i t h no degree of C e r t a i n t y
j u d g e or determine a n y t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e m , b u t f r o m their o u t w a r d
A p p e a r a n c e s a n d sensible Effects; w h e n w e attempt a n y t h i n g b e y o n d
this, all our R e a s o n i n g s are full of C o n f u s i o n a n d U n c e r t a i n t y . A n d yet
e v e n this p u r e l y Experimental K n o w l e d g e of N a t u r e is h o w e v e r a D e g r e e
o f it aptly suited to o u r present State a n d C o n d i t i o n i n this L i f e ; it
a n s w e r s all the Reasonable E n d s of o u r W e l l - b e i n g a n d P r e s e r v a t i o n
(p. 2 0 9 ) .
§ 3—General Conclimon
Once more the study of the reception which Locke's episte
mological doctrines received from his contemporaries has
carried us into the middle of the eighteenth century. Not only
1
Cf. above, p. 70.
sECT.iii G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N 203
The same can be said of his religious views, for here too he
was foremost i n the ranks of those considered radical and
revolutionary. What has not always been appreciated, and
never to its fullest extent, is the intimate relation which
existed in the minds of Locke's contemporaries between his
epistemology and the new movements within religion. I t is
not very difficult to discern the pervasive influence of Locke's
epistemology upon subsequent English and Scottish philo
sophers, for the very structure and orientation of the writings
of men like Berkeley, Reid, or Hume duplicate those of the
Essay. I t is less obvious that the way of ideas was effective i n
bringing to fruition those radical movements in religion which
culminated i n the eighteenth century under the single name
of 'Deist'. The general tendency i n religion throughout
Locke's lifetime was towards the natural religion of Collins
and Wollaston. I n the hands of those who openly pro
fessed themselves antithetical to revealed religion and to
the many complex mysteries required by traditional re
ligious beliefs, Locke's clear-cut jettisoning of much of the
traditional verbiage and the strong direction towards em
pirical, phenomenalist analysis exemplified i n the Essay
became tools to be exploited. But the religious scene in this
period of criticism and growth is complicated by three
1
John Locke, pp. 307-8.
204 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
tion of moral rules and precepts; from the belief that, in order
to understand the Trinity and human personal identity, an
intimate knowledge of substance was required, to the realiza
tion that the required beliefs could be retained while relin
quishing the confused and difficult notions which they
formerly seemed to entail. A major shift i n the intellectual
temper of the country was under way. The new science, the
new emphasis upon observation in medicine, the rationalism
within religion, the empiricism within philosophy, all served
to propel this reorientation of thought. The seventeenth
century introduces the forces which lead to a movement away
from metaphysics towards empiricism; from scholastic
reliance upon definitions and predetermined schemes of
thought, to an impartial phenomenological analysis of know
ledge; from a simple, direct form of realism to a complex,
representative position embodied in the generally accepted
way of ideas; from making theory of knowledge harmonize
with the requirements of religious beliefs and theological
dogma, to the reverse: to making theology keep in step with
the demands of the phenomenological analysis of knowledge.
The emphasis on clarity and distinctness raised to promi
nence by Toland's and Locke's writings served to lead men to
revise their conceptions, to discard many obscure notions.
Some of the intricacies of the new epistemology formulated
by Locke could not be absorbed even by the more pliable
traditionalists, such as his suggestion that matter might be
able to acquire a power of thought. The necessity of i m
materiality for immortality was a belief not easily shaken,
although there were men ready to champion this suggestion
and to develop it to lengths not conceived of nor tolerated
by Locke (e.g. Coward, Layton). Likewise, the denial of
innate sources of knowledge proved difficult for more than
one otherwise resilient follower of tradition to accept. There
were undoubtedly many among these receptive men of tradi
tion who perceived the dangers of these radical rejections and
innovations, who trusted more to a tradition which did
not conform to the current standards than they did to the
824331 P
2o6 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
C O N T E M P O R A R Y S O U R C E S |
A. Manuscript Material
L o v e l a c e Collection of L o c k e manuscript material i n the Bodleian L i b r a r y ,
Oxford.
The c o l l e c t i o n c o m p r i s e s a l a r g e n u m b e r o f l e t t e r s to a n d f r o m L o c k e , together
w i t h important philosophical a n d religious papers, a n d most of his journals. T h e
collection has been arranged a n d catalogued by Prof. W . v o n L e y d e n , of D u r h a m
U n i v e r s i t y . I t i s to h i s p a i n s t a k i n g c a r e t h a t a l l s u b s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h e r s o n L o c k e o w e
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ANONYMOUS. A Dissertation on D e i s t i c a l a n d A r i a n C o r r u p t i o n : O r ,
P l a i n Proof, that the Principles and Practices of A r i a n s and Deists are
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Narrative of the L i f e a n d Deplorable E n d of M r . J o h n C h i l d . . . A l s o
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of the n a t u r e a n d role of ideas i n k n o w l e d g e at the t u r n of the c e n t u r y . I t is clearly
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d e d u c t i v e m a n n e r o f e x p o s i t i o n w o r k i n g f r o m a x i o m s a n d d e f i n i t i o n s to c o n c l u s i o n s .
T h e t r a c t s e r v e s as a n a t u r a l b r i d g e b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n t h - a n d eighteenth-century
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be valuable to l e a r n w h o the author was. I h a v e b e e n a b l e to u n c o v e r nothing
definitive i n this respect, b u t two possible candidates m a y be cited. I n the auction
catalogue m a d e for the sale of A n t h o n y Collins's library by T h o m a s Ballard for
18 J a n u a r y 1 7 3 0 / 1 , t h i s t r a c t i s c r e d i t e d t o ' T h o . B u r n e t ' . T h i s m a y have been
T h o m a s B u r n e t , D . D . , s o m e t i m e p r e b e n d a r y of S a l i s b u r y a n d B o y l e l e c t u r e r for
1726. I n h i s An Essay upon Government ( 1 7 1 6 ) a n d i n h i s The Argument Setforth
in a late Book, Entitled Christianity as old as the Creation (1730-2), he employs
and praises the deductive m a n n e r of w r i t i n g from definitions, axioms, corollaries,
& c . H o w e v e r , t h i s B u r n e t d o e s n o t s e e m to h a v e w r i t t e n a n y t h i n g p r i o r to 1716,
and I h a v e f o u n d n o o t h e r a u t h o r i t y for a s c r i b i n g t h e a b o v e t r a c t to h i m . A n o t h e r
possibility is that it w a s w r i t t e n b y R o b e r t S o u t h , b u t m y o n l y basis for this sugges
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S o u t h tells L o c k e that he has d r a w n u p s o m e r e m a r k s u p o n S h e r l o c k ' s ' D i g r e s s i o n ' .
However, he confesses that he thinks his remarks unworthy of publication (a
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P r i n c i p a l B r a n c h e s of it, i n Opposition to the Prevailing Notions of the
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O r i g i n and F r a m e of the W o r l d : I n E i g h t S e r m o n s P r e a c h e d at
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All e i g h t s e r m o n s w e r e first i s s u e d s e p a r a t e l y w i t h s e p a r a t e t i t l e - p a g e s ; t h e second
s e r m o n g o i n g i n t o s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s . I n o t e h e r e o n l y t h e first t w o , a n d m o s t impor
tant sermons of this series.
T h e F o l l y of A t h e i s m , A n d (what is n o w called) D e i s m ; E v e n w i t h
Respect to the Present L i f e . . . Preached, B e i n g the F i r s t of the
L e c t u r e . . . M a r c h the V I I 1691/92. L o n d o n , for T . Parkhurst, 1692.
4°. 4 o p p .
Matter and M o t i o n cannot T h i n k : O r , A Confutation of A t h e i s m
from the Faculties of the S o u l . A S e r m o n P r e a c h e d A p r i l 4, 1692.
B e i n g the S e c o n d of the L e c t u r e . . . L o n d o n , for T . Parkhurst, 1692.
4°· 39 PP·
T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . L o n d o n , for T h o . Parkhurst, 1692. 4 . 40 pp. 0
33 PP- I
S o m e m i n o r textual changes occur i n this edition.
[ B E V E R L E Y , T H O M A s ] . C h r i s t i a n i t y T h e G r e a t M y s t e r y . I n A n s w e r to a
late T r e a t i s e , C h r i s t i a n i t y not M y s t e r i o u s [by J o h n T o l a n d ] : T h a t is
N o t A b o v e , N o t C o n t r a r y to R e a s o n . I n Opposition to w h i c h is
A s s e r t e d C h r i s t i a n i t y is above C r e a t e d R e a s o n , i n its pure Estate. A n d
contrary to H u m a n e R e a s o n , as F a l l e n and c o r r u p t e d : and, therefore
in proper senses, M y s t e r y . T o g e t h e r w i t h a Postscript L e t t e r to the
A u t h o r , on his S e c o n d E d i t i o n E n l a r g ' d . B y T . B . L o n d o n , for W .
M a r s h a l , 1696. 4 . 2 p . l . , 13-44, 4 5 ^ pp.
0 I _
212 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
226 pp.
T h e sixth article is O f I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l ' a n d the fifteenth is entitled 'That
the S o u l is Matter'.
[ B o L D , S A M U E L ] . A D i s c o u r s e C o n c e r n i n g the R e s u r r e c t i o n of the S a m e
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of C r e a t e d T h i n k i n g Substance. L o n d o n , S . H o l t f o r A . a n d J . C h u r c h i l l ,
1705. 8°. 6 p . l . , 206 pp.
D a t e d at e n d 10 S e p t . 1703.
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addicted to Experimental Philosophy, a M a n is rather Assisted, than
Indisposed, to be a Good C h r i s t i a n . T h e F i r s t Part. B y T . H . R . B .
F e l l o w of the R o y a l Society. I n the Savoy, E d w . Jones, 1690. 8°. 9 p.l.,
120 pp.
- E x p e r i m e n t s , Notes, &c. about the M e c h a n i c a l Origine or P r o d u c
tion of D i v e r s particular Qualities. L o n d o n , E . F l e s h e r , 1675. 8°. 3 p . l . ,
21 pp.
'Advertisements R e l a t i n g to t h e f o l l o w i n g Treatises', followed by 12 separately
paged treatises.
B R O W N E , P E T E R , Senior F e l l o w of T r i n i t y College, D u b l i n . A L e t t e r i n
A n s w e r to a Book E n t i t u l e d , Christianity not Mysterious [by T o l a n d ] A s
also T o all T h o s e w h o Set u p for R e a s o n and E v i d e n c e I n opposition
to Revelation and Mysteries. L o n d o n , for R o b e r t C l a v e l l , 1697. 8°.
ι p . l . , 180 pp.
[ ] T h e Procedure, E x t e n t , and L i m i t s of H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
L o n d o n , for W . I n n y s , 1728. 8°. 4 p . l . , 477 pp.
[ B u L L O K A R , J o H N ] lexicographer. A n E n g l i s h E x p o s i t o r : T e a c h i n g the
Interpretation of the hardest words used in our Language. W i t h S u n d r y
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 213
B u R N E T , G i L B E R T , B i s h o p of Salisbury. A n E x p o s i t i o n of the T h i r t y - n i n e
Articles of the Church ofEngland. W r i t t e n by G i l b e r t , B i s h o p of S a r u m .
L o n d o n , b y R . Roberts for R i . C h i s w e l l , 1699. folio. 4 p . l . , xxiv, 396 pp.
[ B u R N E T , T H O M A S ] M a s t e r of the Charterhouse. R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y
concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g : I n a L e t t e r A d d r e s s ' d to the
A u t h o r . L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1697. 4 . 15 pp. 0
Second R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
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R e m a r k s , Against the A n s w e r of M r . L o c k , A t the E n d of H i s R e p l y to
the L o r d Bishop ofWorcester. L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1697. 4 . 30 pp. 0
T h i r d R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g :
I n a L e t t e r A d d r e s s ' d to the Author. L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1699. 4 . 0
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Burthogge. E d i t e d w i t h introduction a n d notes by Margaret W .
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Reason ( a s h o r t e n e d v e r s i o n ) a n d Of the Soul of the World, i n full.
[ 7 8 4 H 7 9 1 ] PP-
C A R P E N T E R , R i C H A R D , D . D . , & Pastor of S h e r w e l l i n D e v o n . T h e C o n -
scionable C h r i s t i a n : O r , T h e I n d e v o u r of Saint P a u l , to have and
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the A u t h o r ' s E n d e a v o u r s to E s t a b l i s h Spinoza's Atheistical Hypothesis,
more especially i n that T e r i t h C h a p t e r , are D i s c o v e r ' d a n d Confuted.
L o n d o n , J . Matthews, 1706. 8°. 4 p . l . , xv, 292 p p .
A L e t t e r to the R e v e r e n d D r . B e n j a m i n P r a t . W h e r e i n T h e D a n
gerous E r r o r s i n a late Book, Intituled, A n E s s a y concerning the U s e of
R e a s o n i n Propositions [by A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] are D e t e c t ' d , Confuted,
and gradually D e d u c ' d from the very Basis of all Atheism, u p o n w h i c h
alone they are Bottom'd. B y W i l l i a m C a r o l l . L o n d o n , for R i c h a r d Sare,
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[ ] T h e I m m o r t a l i t y o f the H u m a n S o u l , Demonstrated b y t h e L i g h t of
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0
Physiologia E p i c u r o - G a s s e n d o - C h a r l e t o n i a n a : or, A F a b r i c k of
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T r v t h , O r , C h a r i t y m a i n t a i n ' d b y Catholiques, W h i c h pretends to
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y 2iS
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to M r . Hobbs, Spinoza, A n d their F o l l o w e r s : W h e r e i n the N o t i o n of
Liberty is Stated, a n d the Possibility a n d Certainty of it Proved, i n
Opposition to Necessity a n d Fate, 2 d ed., corrected. B e i n g the S u b
stance of E i g h t S e r m o n s P r e a c h ' d i n the Y e a r 1704, the Boyle L e c t u r e s .
L o n d o n , W i l l B o t h a m , 1706. 8°. 8 p.l., 206 pp.
A S e c o n d Defense of an A r g u m e n t M a d e use of i n a L e t t e r to M r .
Dodwel, T o Prove the Immateriality a n d Natural Immortality of the
S o u l . I n a L e t t e r to the A u t h o r of A Reply to Mr. C l a r k e ' s Defense,
&c. [i.e. A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] . L o n d o n , W . B . for James K n a p t o n , 1707.
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[CocKBURN, MRS. CATHARINE TROTTER] A Defence of the Essay of
H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g , W r i t t e n b y M r . Lock. W h e r e i n its Principles
w i t h reference to Morality, ReveaVd Religion, and the Immortality
of the Soul, are consider'd a n d J u s t i f y ' d : I n A n s w e r to S o m e R e m a r k s
on that E s s a y [by T . B u r n e t ] . L o n d o n , W i l l T u r n e r , 1702. 8°. 4 p . l . ,
70 pp.
[ C o L L i N S , A N T H O N Y ] A D i s c o u r s e of F r e e - T h i n k i n g , O c c a s i o n ' d by T h e
R i s e and G r o w t h of a Sect call'd F r e e - T h i n k e r s . L o n d o n [ J . , J . , & P .
K n a p t o n ] 1713. 8°. v i , 178 pp.
[ ] A n E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g the U s e of R e a s o n i n Propositions, T h e
E v i d e n c e whereof depends u p o n H u m a n T e s t i m o n y . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d
i n the Y e a r 1707. 8°. 56 pp.
[ ] A L e t t e r to the L e a r n e d M r . H e n r y D o d w e l l ; Containing S o m e
R e m a r k s on a (pretended) Demonstration of the Immateriality and
N a t u r a l I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l , I n M r . C l a r k ' s A n s w e r to his late
Epistolary Discourse, &c. L o n d o n , for A . B a l d w i n , 1707. 8°. 16 pp.
[ ] A R e p l y to M r . C l a r k ' s Defence O f his L e t t e r to M r . Dodwell.
W i t h a Postscript relating to M r . Milles's A n s w e r to M r . DodwelVs
Epistolary D i s c o u r s e . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r 1707. 8°. 48 pp.
[ ] Reflections on M r . C l a r k ' s S e c o n d Defence of his L e t t e r to M r .
Dodwell. L o n d o n , b y J . D a r b y , 1707. 8°. 61 pp.
[ ] A n A n s w e r to M r . C l a r k ' s T h i r d Defence O f his L e t t e r to M r .
D o d w e l l . L o n d o n , for A . B a l d w i n , 1708. 8°. 94 pp.
[ ] A Philosophical I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n L i b e r t y . L o n d o n , for
R . R o b i n s o n , 1717. 8°. v i , 115 pp.
[ C o w A R D , W i L L i A M ] M . D . T h e G r a n d E s s a y : O r , A V i n d i c a t i o n of
R e a s o n , and Religion, against Impostures of Philosophy. P r o v i n g
according to those Ideas and Conceptions of T h i n g s H u m a n U n d e r
standing is capable of forming to it self. 1. T h a t the E x i s t e n c e of any
Immaterial Substance is a Philosophic Imposture, and impossible to be
conceived. 2. T h a t all Matter has Originally created i n it, a principle
of I n t e r n a l , or S e l f - M o t i o n . 3. T h a t Matter & M o t i o n must be the
F o u n d a t i o n of Thought i n M e n and Brutes. T o w h i c h is A d d e d ,
A B r i e f A n s w e r to M r . Broughton's Psycholo. &c. B y W. C. м. D .
c . M . L . c . L o n d o n , for P . G . , 1704. 8°. v i , 197, 177-248 pp.
2l6 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
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C u L V E R W E L , N A T H A N A E L , M.A. A n E l e g a n t a n d L e a r n e d D i s c o u r s e of
the L i g h t of N a t u r e , W i t h severall other T r e a t i s e s . L o n d o n , T . R . and
E . M . , 1654 . 4 . 7 p . l . , 183, 207 pp.
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passages o m i t t e d ' . — D . N . B . , vol. vii, p. 1288.
S C I R ? t u u m n i h i l est: O r , T h e A u t h o r s Defence of T h e V a n i t y
of D o g m a t i z i n g ; Against the E x c e p t i o n s of T h e L e a r n e d T h o . A l b i u s
I n his L a t e S c i r i . L o n d o n , E . C . for H e n r y E v e r s d e n , 1665. 4 . 0
8 p . l . , 92 pp.
T h e V a n i t y of D o g m a t i z i n g : O r Confidence i n O p i n i o n s Manifested
i n a D i s c o u r s e of the Shortness a n d U n c e r t a i n t y of our K n o w l e d g e
A n d its C a u s e s ; W i t h some Reflexions o n P e r i p a t e t i c i s m ; a n d A n
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H A L E , S i R M A T T H E W , C h i e f Justice. T h e P r i m i t i v e Origination of M a n
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S o u l After D e a t h : P r o v e d from Scripture, Reason and Philosophy.
W h e r e i n M r . Lock's N o t i o n t h a t U n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y b e given to Matter,
M r . Hobb's Assertion that there is no s u c h t h i n g as an I m m a t e r i a l
Substance . . . a n d all s u c h other Books a n d O p i n i o n s , are briefly a n d
plainly confuted . . . L o n d o n , for S . Popping, 1711. 8°. 1 p . l . , i i , 44 p p .
H A R R i s , J o H N , M.A., F . R . s . L e x i c o n T e c h n i c u m : O r , A n Universal
E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y of A r t s a n d Sciences E x p l a i n i n g not only T h e Terms
of Art, B u t the A r t s T h e m s e l v e s . L o n d o n , D a n . B r o w n , 1704. folio.
V o l . i i . L o n d o n , D a n . B r o w n , 1710.
A n e w edition a n d revision of the 1704 v o l u m e .
H A R T C L i F F E , J o H N , B . D . , F e l l o w o f K i n g ' s C o l l e g e , Cambridge. A T r e a t i s e
of M o r a l a n d Intellectual V i r t u e s ; W h e r e i n their N a t u r e is fully e x
plained, a n d their Usefulness proved, as being T h e best R u l e s of
L i f e . . . . L o n d o n , C . H a r p e r , 1691. 8°. 23 p . l . , 414 pp.
' I m p r i m a t u r . N o v . 20. 1690.'
M . Brittaniae i n G a l l i a . E t V n i v e r s o H v m a n o G e n e r i D i c a v i t .
1624. 4°· Ρ·1·> 7 ΡΡ·
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2 2
H i C K E S , G E O R G E . T h r e e S h o r t T r e a t i s e s . . . F o r m e r l y P r i n t e d , A n d now
again P u b l i s h e d . . . I n Defense of the Priesthood, and True Rights of
the C h u r c h , against the Slanderous and R e p r o a c h f u l T r e a t m e n t of the
C l e r g y , i n a late Book of Pernicious and Blasphemous D o c t r i n e s ,
falsely Intituled, The Rights of the C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h [by M a t t h e w
T i n d a l ] . L o n d o n , f o r W . T a y l o r , 1709. 8°. 43 p . l . , 17 pp. and% separately
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T w o T r e a t i s e s , O n e of the C h r i s t i a n Priesthood, T h e O t h e r of the
D i g n i t y of T h e E p i s c o p a l O r d e r . F i r s t W r i t t e n , and Afterwards P u b
lished to obviate the E r r o n e o u s O p i n i o n s . . . i n a late Book E n t i t u l e d ,
T h e R i g h t s of the C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h . W i t h a large Prefatory D i s c o u r s e
I n A n s w e r to the said Book. 3d ed. enlarged. L o n d o n , W . B . for R i c h a r d
Sare, 1711. 8°. 2 vols.
H i L L , O L i V E R . A R o d for the B a c k of F o o l s : I n A n s w e r to M r . J o h n
T o l a n d ' s Book, W h i c h he calleth, Christianity not Mysterious. . . .
L o n d o n , at E d . E v e t s , 1702. 8°. 34 pp.
j A C K S O N , J O H N , M . A . , R e c t o r of Rossington ( Y o r k s h i r e ) A Dissertation
on M a t t e r and S p i r i t : W i t h Some R e m a r k s on a Book, E n t i t l e d , An
Enquiry into the Nature of the humane Soul [of A n d r e w B a x t e r ] . L o n d o n ,
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K i N G , W i L L i A M , A r c h b i s h o p of D u b l i n . D e Origine m a l i . A u t h o r e
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large Notes; tending to explain and vindicate some of the A u t h o r ' s
Principles Against the Objections of Bayle, L e i b n i t z , the A u t h o r of a
Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty [i.e. A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] ;
and others. T o w h i c h is prefix'd A Dissertation concerning the F u n d a
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D e d i c a t e d to R o b e r t B o y l e .
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[ ] A S h o r t a n d E a s i e M e t h o d w i t h the D e i s t s . W h e r e i n , T h e C e r
tainty of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h is D e m o n s t r a t e d . . . I n a L e t t e r to a
F r i e n d . T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . T o w h i c h is A d d e d , a S e c o n d P a r t T o
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L o c K E , J o H N . T h e W o r k s of J o h n L o c k e . A new edition, corrected.
L o n d o n , T . T e g g , 1823. 10 vols.
E x t r a i t d'un L i v r e Anglois qui n'est pas encore publie, intitule
Essai Philosophique concernant UEntendement, ou l'on montre quelle
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L o n d o n , P r i n t e d for T h o m a s Basset, and sold b y E d w . M o r y , 1690.
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[ M A L E B R A N C H E , N i c o L A s ] D e la R e c h e r c h e de la V e r i t e . O u Γ ο η traitte
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T e n t a m i n a P h y s i c o - T h e o l o g i c a D e D e o : Sive T h e o l o g i a Scholastica
. . . D u o b u s L i b r i s comprehensa: Q u o r u m A l t e r o D e D e i E x i s t e n t i ä
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224 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
P A Y N E , W i L L i A M , D . D . T h e M y s t e r y of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h a n d of the
Blessed Trinity V i n d i c a t e d , a n d the Divinity of Christ Proved. I n T h r e e
S e r m o n s . . . I n the Press before his D e a t h , a n d b y h i m s e l f ordered to be
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of Preface], 460 p p . , 12 1.
Locke's copy of this book, w i t h his n u m e r o u s manuscript notes, is i n the library
of S t . J o h n ' s C o l l e g e , C a m b r i d g e .
[ ] T r a n s n a t u r a l Philosophy, or M e t a p h y s i c k s : D e m o n s t r a t i n g the
E s s e n c e s a n d Operations of all Beings whatever, w h i c h gives the
Principles to all other Sciences. A n d S h e w i n g the Perfect C o n f o r m i t y of
Christian Faith to Right Reason, a n d the Unreasonableness of Atheists,
Deists, A n t i - t r i n i t a r i a n s , a n d other Sectaries. W i t h an A p p e n d i x ,
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 225
'Imprimatur, J u n . 9. 1 6 9 0 /
A D e f e n c e of D r . Sherlock's N o t i o n of A T r i n i t y i n U n i t y » I n
A n s w e r to the A n i m a d v e r s i o n s u p o n his V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e
of the H o l y and E v e r Blessed T r i n i t y . W i t h a P o s t - S c r i p t R e l a t i n g t o
the C a l m D i s c o u r s e of a T r i n i t y i n the G o d h e a d . I n A L e t t e r to a
F r i e n d . L o n d o n , W . Rogers, 1694. 4 . 1 p . l . , 112 pp. 0
[ S o u T H , R o B E R T ] A n i m a d v e r s i o n s u p o n D r . Sherlock's Book, E n t i t u l e d
A V i n d i c a t i o n of the H o l y a n d E v e r - B l e s s e d T r i n i t y , &c. B y a D i v i n e
of the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d . T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n w i t h some A d d i t i o n s .
L o n d o n , for R a n d a l T a y l o r , 1693. 4 . 1 p . l . , xix, [3] 382 pp.
0
[ ] T r i t h e i s m charged u p o n D Sherlock's r
N e w N o t i o n of the T r i n i t y .
A n d the C h a r g e made good, i n an A n s w e r to the Defense of the said
N o t i o n against T h e Animadversions u p o n D r . Sherlock's Book, E n t i t u l e d ,
A V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e of the . . . T r i n i t y . B y a D i v i n e of t h e
C h u r c h o f E n g l a n d . L o n d o n , f o r J o h n W h i t l o c k , 1695.4 . 12p.l., 316pp. 0
• T w e l v e S e r m o n s P r e a c h e d u p o n Several Occasions. S i x of t h e m
never before P r i n t e d . L o n d o n , J . H . for T h o m a s Bennet, 1692. 8°.
4 P-1., 639 p p .
S p R A T , T H O M A S , D . D . , F . R . s . , B i s h o p of Rochester. T h e H i s t o r y o f T h e
R o y a l Society of L o n d o n , F o r the I m p r o v i n g of N a t u r a l K n o w l e d g e .
L o n d o n , T . R . f o r J . M a r t y n , 1667. 4 . 8 p . l . , 438 p p . 0
[ S T E P H E N S , W i L L i A M ] B . D . , R e c t o r of Sutton, S u r r e y . A n A c c o u n t of t h e
G r o w t h of D e i s m i n E n g l a n d . L o n d o n , f o r t h e A u t h o r , 1696. 4 . 32 p p . 0
S T i L L i N G F L E E T , E D W A R D , B i s h o p of Worcester. T h e W o r k s of T h a t M o s t
E m i n e n t and L e a r n e d Prelate, D r . E d w . Stillingfleet, L a t e L o r d B i s h o p
of Worcester. T o g e t h e r w i t h H i s L i f e a n d C h a r a c t e r . I n S i x V o l u m e s .
L o n d o n , J . H e p t i n s t a l l for H e n r y & George M o r t l o c k , 1710-13. folio.
6 vols.
Stillingfleet's biography c o n t a i n e d i n t h e first v o l u m e w a s also i s s u e d separately
u n d e r the title: T h e L i f e a n d C h a r a c t e r o f T h a t E m i n e n t a n d L e a r n e d Prelate,
T h e L a t e D r . E d w . Stillingfleet. . . . ( L o n d o n , J . H e p t i n s t a l l , 1 7 1 0 . 8°. 149 p p . )
According to T h o m a s H e a r n e ' s note i n his copy (now i n the Bodleian L i b r a r y )
its a u t h o r w a s T i m o t h y G o o d w i n , o r G o d w i n . T h i s e d i t i o n o f h i s W o r k s , h o w e v e r ,
w,as m a d e b y R i c h a r d B e n t l e y , S t i l l i n g f l e e t ' s chaplain.
226 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
[ S T i L L i N G F L E E T , EüWARö] A L e t t e r to a D e i s t , I n A n s w e r to several
Objections against the Truth and Authority of the Scriptures. L o n d o n ,
b y W . G . , 1677. 8°. 3 p . l . , 135 p p .
Origines Sacrae, O r A Rational A c c o u n t of the G r o u n d s of C h r i s t i a n
F a i t h , as to the T r u t h and D i v i n e A u t h o r i t y of the Scriptures, A n d
the matters therein c o n t a i n e d / L o n d o n , R . W . for H e n r y M o r t l o c k ,
1662. 4 . 18 p . l . , 619 p p .
0
A D i s c o u r s e i n V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e of the T r i n i t y : W i t h A n
A n s w e r to the L a t e Socinian Objections Against it f r o m Scripture,
Antiquity and Reason. A n d A Preface concerning the different Explica
tions of the Trinity, a n d the T e n d e n c y of the present S o c i n i a n C o n -
troversie. T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y M o r t l o c k ,
1697. 8°. ι p . l . , l x i i , [3] 292 p p .
T h e B i s h o p ofWorcester's A n s w e r t o M r . L o c k e ' s L e t t e r concerning
Some Passages Relating to his E s s a y of H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
M e n t i o n ' d i n the L a t e D i s c o u r s e i n V i n d i c a t i o n of the T r i n i t y . W i t h
a Postscript i n answer to some Reflections made u p o n that T r e a t i s e i n
a late Socinian Pamphlet. L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y Mortlock, 1697.
8°. 154 pp.
T h e B i s h o p of Worcester's A n s w e r to M r . Locke's Second Letter;
W h e r e i n his N o t i o n of Ideas I s prov'd to be Inconsistent w i t h it setf,
A n d w i t h the Articles of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h . L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y
Mortlock, 1698. 8°. 178 p p .
[ S T R U T T , S A M U E L ] A Philosophical E n q u i r y into the P h y s i c a l S p r i n g of
H u m a n A c t i o n s , a n d the Immediate C a u s e of T h i n k i n g . L o n d o n , for
J . Peele, 1732. 8°. 1 p . l . , 53 p p .
[ T i N D A L or T i N D A L L , M A T T H E w ] T h e Reflexions on the X X V I I I P r o
positions touching the D o c t r i n e of the T r i n i t y , I n a L e t t e r to the
C l e r g y , &c, [n.p.] P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r M D C X C V . 4 . 36 p p . 0
[ W A R D , S E T H ] B i s h o p of S a l i s b u r y . A Philosophicall E s s a y T o w a r d s a n
Eviction
(B e i n g a n d Attributes of G o d .
I m m o r t a l i t y of the souls of m e n .
W o T T O N , W i L L i A M , B . D . , C h a p l a i n to the E a r l of N o t t i n g h a m . Reflec
tions u p o n Ancient a n d Modern L e a r n i n g . L o n d o n , b y J . L e a k e , for
Peter B u c k , 1694. 8°. [32] 359 p p .
228 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
C. Periodicals
R u n n i n g title: T h e A t h e n i a n Mercury.
G e n t l e m a n ' s J o u r n a l , or, T h e M o n t h l y M i s c e l l a n y . E d i t e d b y P . A .
Motteux. vols. 1-3. J a n . 1 6 9 2 - N o v . 1694. L o n d o n , 1692-4. s m a l l 4 . 0
S E C O N D A R Y SOURCES
2 vols.
A s P E L i N , G u N N A R . L o c k e and S y d e n h a m . (In Theoria> vol. xv, 1949.
L u n d [1949] pp. 2 9 - 3 7 . )
B A R N E S , A N N i E . Jean L e C l e r c (1657-1736) et la R 6 p u b l i q u e des L e t t r e s .
Paris, E . D r o z , 1938. 280 p p . , 2 1.
B A S T i D E , C H A R L E S . Anglais et F r a n c a i s au x v n siecle. Paris, F . A l c a n ,
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1936. 210 p p .
F 0 x - B 0 u R N E , H . R . T h e L i f e of J o h n L o c k e . L o n d o n , H e n r y S . K i n g ,
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G i B S O N , j A M E S . L o c k e ' s T h e o r y o f K n o w l e d g e and its H i s t o r i c a l Relations.
C a m b r i d g e , U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1931. xiv, 338 p p .
G R A H A M , W A L T E R j A M E S . T h e Beginnings of E n g l i s h L i t e r a r y Periodicals.
A S t u d y of Periodical L i t e r a t u r e 1665-1715. N e w Y o r k , O x f o r d
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1926. iv p p . , 2 1., 92 p p .
GRÜNBAUM, j A C O B . D i e Philosophie R i c h a r d Burthogges (1637-1698).
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H A L L A M , H E N R Y , F . R . A . s . Introduction to the L i t e r a t u r e of E u r o p e , i n
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y 231
A N e w E d i t i o n . W i t h Considerable Additions. L o n d o n , H e n r y
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Kant, 20.
K i n g , P., I I n., 13 n., 93. Occasionalists, 93, 95, 99·
K i n g , W . , 3, 5 - 7 , l b 19, 4 9 - 5 0 . Oldfield, J . , 1 9 3 - 5 , 202, 204, 206.
K n o r r von Rosenroth, C . , 1, 50¬ Overton, J . H . , 1 1 8 n . , 1 7 0 n . , 171,
52. 174, 2 0 4 n .
INDEX 235
pantheism, 144. Stephen, L . , 169-70.
Parker, S., 4 4 - 4 6 , 47"48, 53, 54, 7 Ь Stephens, W . , 173.
168. Stillingfleet, E . , 8, 10, 15 n . , 18-19,
Payne, W . , 1 8 3 - 4 , 187, 195. 23, 2 4 n . , 3 6 - 4 1 , 8 8 - 8 9 , !OQ, I i i ,
Pearson, J . , 44. 116-17, 1 2 4 - 8 , 1 3 2 - 4 0 , 143, 148,
phenomenalism, 20, 99, 113, 135, 142, 151-3, 163, 172-3, 187, 204.
146^7, 183, 186-7, 194, 198, 203, Stoics, 36-37.
207. Strutt, S., 164.
phenomenological analysis, 168, 205. substance, 13, 24-25, 9 1 - 9 2 , 96¬
Philosophick Essay concerning Ideas, 97, 1 1 3 , 117, 120, 124-5, 1 2 6 - 4 8 ,
6 7 - 6 8 , 9 5 - 9 7 , 100, 210. 149, 155, 164, 1 8 3 - 4 , 186, 194.
Plato, 32, 42, 44- syneidesis, 34.
Porter, N . , 19 n., 56 n. synteresis, 31-35·
Prat, B., 13 n.
Prideaux, H . , 173. Thomas Aquinas, 3 4 n . , 77, 103, 110.
Pringle-Pattison, A . S., 27. Thoynard, N . , 24.
prolepsis, 34 n., 3 ^ 3 7 , 43, 45- Tindal, M . , 12, 133 n., 171, 174, 178¬
80.
Ray, J . , 36 n. Toland, J . , 19, 25, 88, 116, 1 1 8 - 2 6 ,
Reid, T . , 203. 129-31, 136, 152, 170-1, 175, 178,
Rivaud, A . , 27, 36-37. 180, 183-5, 195, 198-9, 205.
Rosenroth, C . K n o r r von, 1, 50¬ Tri-Trinitarianism, 129 n., 184.
52. T y r r e l l , J . , 3 - 4 , 6, и , 13, 19n., 52, 54,
60 n.
scepticism, 18-19, 25, 65, 72-166
passim, 168. Unitarianism, 64, 169-70, 174, 187.
Sclater, W . , 33, 39.
Senault, J . F . , 43 n. Viret, P., 172.
Sergeant, J . , 4 n., 8 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 73, 7 6 - 8 7 , Voltaire, 28.
8 9 ^ 1 , 1 0 3 - 1 3 , 121, 1 4 0 - 3 , 148,
183, 187, 192, 201. Watts, I . , 25, 64, 70, 1 4 7 - 8 , 1 6 5 , 2©i-
Sherlock, W . , 8, 20, 6 0 ^ 1 , 65, 68, 2, 206.
1 2 8 - 3 0 , 160, 183-4, 187, 204. Whichcote, B., 63.
Sidney, Sir P., 35 n. Whiston, W . , 180-1.
socinianism, 10-11, 60, 62, 129, 136, Wilkins, J . , 38.
169-72, 174-6, 181-2, 187, 195. Windelband, W . , 27.
Socinus, 172, 174. Witty, J . , 25, 99, 1 6 0 - 1 , 163, i 7 5 - 8 ,
South, R., 19 n., 24 n., 3 8 - 3 9 , 60 n., 182, 1 8 9 - 9 3 , 195-6, 204.
62, 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 184. WoUaston, W . , 35 n., 69-70, 170, 203.
Spinoza, 51 n., 1 4 4 - 6 , 161, 179-80. Wotton, W . , 4.
Spinozism, 13, 70, 107, 160, 165. Wynne, J . , 4 n., 12.