Topic: Absolute Pardon

People of the Philippines, appellee

vs,
Leopoldo Bacang, appellant

G.R. No. 116512

July 30, 1996

Facts:

The RTC of Negros Occidental rendered a Decision finding the accused and co-accused Palacios
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and pay, severally, Php 200,000 and Php 25,000 as actual damages and for the
funeral expenses, and costs. The accused Casido and Alcorin appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a notice of appeal on December 8, 1993. Such appeal was accepted on December 7, 1994.

On January 11, 1996, the court received an undated urgent motion to withdraw appeal from the
accused-appellants which did not state any reason therefor. On March 22, 1996, court received a
1st indorsement informing the Court that the accused-appellants were released on conditional
pardon on January 25, 1996.

On May 20, 1996, the Court directed Superintendent Tesoro to submit certified true copies of the
Conditional Pardon and the release/discharge order. Tesoro submitted the copies both signed by
the President on January 19, 1996 and certificates of discharge from prison showing they were
released on January 25, 1996. Pardons were granted by virtue of the authority conferred upon the
President by the Constitution and upon recommendation of the Presidential Committee for the
Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon.

Issue:
Whether or not conditional pardons can be extended to the accused-appellants during the pendency
of their instant appeal.

Ruling:
No. Conditional Pardons if granted during the pendency of an appeal is considered void.

In People v. Hinlo, the Court categorically declared the "practice of processing applications for
pardon or parole despite pending appeals" to be in clear violation of law." In People v. Salle, the
Court declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor,
if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grand should not be begun unless
the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or
that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the
trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate
as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31
January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee’s appeal. It follows then that the conditional
pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void
for having been extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.