IO Project 2

LAW RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
National Law Institute University
PROJECT WORK
ON
Resolution of UNSC on Rwanda Civil War- A Critique
Submitted to: Submitted by:

Prof. V. RajyaLakshmi Rohit Singh Meena
2015BALLB50
RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 1

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 4
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................................................... 4
RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................................................................ 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 5
CHAPTERIZATION ................................................................................................................................... 5
I. THE GENOCIDE...................................................................................................................................... 6
Rwanda Civil War................................................................................................................................................ 9
Peacekeeping Efforts/ Arusha Accords ................................................................................................... 10
II. UNSC RESOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 12
United Nation Assistance Mission Rwanda (UNAMIR) ....................................................................... 12
MISSION TURQUOISE ...................................................................................................................................... 14
III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE ........................................................................... 17
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ........................................................................................ 17
National courts ................................................................................................................................................. 18
Gacaca Courts .................................................................................................................................................... 19
IV. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY .......................................................................... 20
V. AFTERSHOCKS ON RWANDA......................................................................................................... 21
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 24
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 25

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to The National Law Institute
University (NLIU) for providing me with this excellent opportunity to make this project.
I extend my sincere thanks to everybody who helped with the completion of this project. I am
greatly obliged to our teacher Prof. V. Rajyalakshmi for her exemplary guidance, monitoring and
constant encouragement throughout the course of this project. The blessing, help and guidance
given by her from time to time shall carry us a long way in the journey of life on which we are
about to embark. I am also thankful to the Library Administration for the provision of necessary
books and texts needed for the completion of this project.

INTRODUCTION
Rwanda Genocide was a mass slaughter of tutsi and hutu which took place between 7th April and
15th july 1994 during the Rwanda Civil War. This genocide was organised by the hutu political
elite members against the minority tutsi ethnic group. Rwanda civil war was a war in rwanda
fought between rwanda armed forces representing the government of rwanda and the Rebel
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from 1990 to 1994. United Nations Security Council passed some
resolutions to end this civil war like United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
The immediate trigger for the genocide was the death of the Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana, which was also used as a pretext to begin the slaughter campaign against the
Tutsis, somehow holding them responsible for his death as his plane had been shot down by a
missile of unknown origin.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1. The main aim of the project is to highlight how this violence is perpetrated against
helpless minority groups, how genocide is basically justified by the State and its institutions and
how propaganda is used.
2. This project will aim to understand the effect such violence can have and for how long the
aftershocks can also be felt.
3. This project seeks to Analyse resolutions passed by the UNSC to end the Rwanda Civil
War and some drawbacks of such resolutions.
4. This project also intends to underscore the role played by the world community in this
civil war.

RESEARCH QUESTION
Can the Rwandan Genocide be termed as a directed pre meditated attempt to eliminate an entire
ethnic group And whether UNSC played its role of keeping peace and security in Rwanda
effectively.
This question will be answered by the author in the course of the case study, after careful perusal
and analysis of the situation in Rwanda and if the global community could have done anything to
prevent it, had the Tutsi rebels not succeeded in suppressing the mass killings.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this project researcher has mainly relied upon the descriptive source of method based on the
secondary method especially Websites, Books and articles.
CHAPTERIZATION
This project work will be divided into six chapters namely

 The genocide
 UNSC Resoltuions
 Legal consequences of genocide
 Failure of international community
 Aftermath of genocide
 Conclusion

I. THE GENOCIDE
Background and Immediate Cause

Rwanda population comprised of three groups, one of which is Twa, which is so small as to play
no political role. Of the other two, the Hutu was the larger group. Hutu and Tutsi shared a common
culture and language. They also occasionally intermarried. Neither group had moved into what is now
Rwanda in a single mass and at an identifiable moment in time. Rather, small clusters of people
drifted in over centuries and coalesced. As the Rwandan state developed, an elite took shape and its
members were called Tutsi; the masses became known as Hutu.
The colonial administrations, first German, then Belgian, used and were used by the Tutsi in a
process that extended and intensified the control by the Tutsi-dominated central state over areas
both Hutu and Tutsi that had previously maintained considerable autonomy. During these years of
colonial rule the categories of Hutu and Tutsi became increasingly clearly defined and opposed to
each other, with the Tutsi elite seeing itself as superior and having the right to rule, and the Hutu
seeing themselves as an oppressed people.
Influenced by European ideas about race and the peopling of Africa, Rwandans came to accept a
distorted version of history. It held that Tutsi, a conquering group from northeast Africa, had
swept into Rwanda centuries before and had established the Rwandan state through military
prowess, through self-serving marriage alliances, and through an exploitative clientage system
based on the grant of cattle. It depicted Hutu as the consistent losers in major battles as well as in the
ordinary power struggles of daily life.
In the mid-twentieth century, as the colonialists were preparing to leave, Hutu overthrew the Tutsi
elite and established a Hutu-led republic. In the process they killed some twenty thousand Tutsi
and drove another three-hundred thousand into exile. This event, known as the 1959 revolution, was
remembered by Tutsi as a tragic and criminal event, while for Hutu it was seen as a heroic battle for
liberation, to be celebrated with pride.
Just before and during the 1994 genocide, Hutu political leaders insisted on the importance of
protecting the “gains of the revolution,” which meant not just control of political power but also the

lands and jobs once held by Tutsi and distributed to Hutu after 1959.
During the 1960s some of the Tutsi in exile led incursions into Rwanda, seeking to unseat the new
Hutu leadership. Within Rwanda officials incited and, in some cases, led attacks against Tutsi still
resident in the country, accusing them of supporting the incursions. Most of the twenty-thousand
Tutsi counted as victims of the revolution actually died in these reprisal attacks and not in early
combat surrounding the change in power.
Hutu leaders from central and southern Rwanda and from the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri
led the 1959 revolution and established the first republic. Within a decade leaders from the center
and south had taken control of the most important government jobs and associated benefits. In 1973
military officers led by Juvenal Habyarimana and representing the interests of the northwestern
prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri overthrew leaders of the first republic and established the
second republic. Over time, Habyarimana and his group executed or caused the deaths through
starvation and ill- treatment of the first president and some fifty others. Hutu of central and
southern Rwanda resented their loss of power and saw the killing of the first generation of Hutu
leaders as a betrayal of these leaders of the revolution.
All genocides usually start when people of one race or religion want to dispose of people of
another race or religion. Two tribes that made most of the Rwandan population are the Hutu and
the Tutsi tribes. In 1978, a Hutu leader was elected, Juvenal Habyarimana, as president of
Rwanda. After 12 years of peace, Habyarimana was assassinated while he was traveling on a
plane. Although they haven't found out who launched the surface-to-air missile, government
forces suspect rebels from other minor tribes planned the assassination. About an hour after the
president was killed, the Presidential Guard and government army started to kill Tutsi and Hutu
people from nearby villages and communities. This campaign of government forces that started to
kill Rwandan people was the spark of the genocide.
While the killing was starting to spread in Rwanda, a new rebel force, Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF), was formed. It was mostly made up of refugees that fled Rwanda after the president was
killed. By taking advantage of the chaos that was happening, the RPF invaded Rwanda and
created a civil war. The government forces and Presidential Guard were fighting refugees that

fled Rwanda, while the citizens of Rwanda were trying to flee. The death toll for this genocide
ranged from about 500,000 people to a 1,000,000. About 70% of the Rwandan population was
killed after the RPF ended the civil war that was against government forces. As for the tribes,
500,000 Tutsi people were killed and villages across Rwanda were totally demolished.

Rwanda Civil War

The Rwandan Civil War was a civil war in Rwanda fought between the Rwandan Armed
Forces, representing the government of Rwanda, and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
from 1 October 1990 to 18 July 1994. The war, which lasted from 1990 to 1994, arose from
the long-running dispute between the Hutu and Tutsi groups within the Rwandan population.
A 1959–1962 revolution had replaced the Tutsi monarchy with a Hutu-led republic, forcing
more than 336,000 Tutsi to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. A group of these refugees
in Uganda founded the RPF which, under the leadership of Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame,
became a battle-ready army by the late 1980s.
The war began on 1 October 1990 when the RPF invaded north-eastern Rwanda, advancing
60 km (37 mi) into the country. They suffered a major setback when Rwigyema was killed in
action on the second day. The Rwandan Army, assisted by troops from France, gained the
upper hand and the RPF were largely defeated by the end of October. Kagame, who had been
in the United States during the invasion, returned to take command. He withdrew troops to
the Virunga mountains for several months before attacking again. The RPF began a guerrilla
war, which continued until mid-1992 with neither side able to gain the upper hand. A series of
protests forced Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana to begin peace negotiations with the
RPF and domestic opposition parties. Despite disruption and killings by Hutu Power, a group
of extremists opposed to any deal, and a fresh RPF offensive in early 1993, the negotiations
were successfully concluded with the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993.
An uneasy peace followed, during which the terms of the accords were gradually
implemented. RPF troops were deployed to a compound in Kigali and the peace-
keeping United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent to the country.
But the Hutu Power movement was steadily gaining influence and planned a "final solution"
to exterminate the Tutsi. This plan was put into action following the assassination of President
Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Over the course of about 100 days, between 500,000 and
1,000,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in the Rwandan genocide. The RPF quickly
resumed the civil war. They captured territory steadily, encircling cities and cutting off supply
routes. By mid-June they had surrounded the capital, Kigali, and on 4 July they seized it. The
war ended later that month when the RPF captured the last territory held by the interim
government, forcing the government and genocidaires into Zaire.
The victorious RPF assumed control of the country, with Paul Kagame as de facto leader.
Kagame served as vice president from 1994 and as president from 2000, winning elections

in 2003, 2010 and 2017. The RPF began a programme of rebuilding the infrastructure and
economy of the country, bringing genocide perpetrators to trial, and promoting reconciliation
between Hutu and Tutsi. In 1996 the RPF-led Rwandan Government launched an offensive
against refugee camps in Zaire, home to exiled leaders of the former regime and millions of
Hutu refugees. This action started the First Congo War, which removed long-time dictator
President Mobutu Sese Seko from power. As of 2019, Kagame and the RPF remain the
dominant political force in Rwanda.
Peacekeeping Efforts/ Arusha Accords

In July 1993, after a year of negotiations, agreement, disavowal, and then renewed
negotiations, Habyarimana was still looking for ways to avoid signing the final peace treaty.
He was finding it increasingly difficult to delay because even France was pushing him to
accept the Accords. Habyarimana’s most ardent supporters in the French military may have
flinched little at the successful RPF thrust in February. But others, particularly those at the
Foreign Ministry who had believed for some time that Habyarimana could not win the war,
used the RPF military success to support their argument for a negotiated settlement. At the
same time, a change of ambassador in Kigali in April 1993 removed one of Habyarimana’s
strong supporters and in Paris the installation of Edouard Balladur as prime minister brought
to power someone who cared less for African adventures than did his predecessor.
By late July, the donor nations—including France—had lost patience and used the ultimate
threat. In combination with the World Bank, they informed Habyarimana that international
funds for his government would be halted if he didnot sign the treaty by August 9. With no
other source of funds available, Habyarimana was obliged to sign along with the other parties,
on August 4, 1993.
The international actors celebrated this hard-won success, particularly important as the first
peace negotiated with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tanzania
had served as the chief facilitator. France, Belgium, the U.S., Germany, Burundi, Senegal,
Uganda, and Zaire had been represented throughout and the U.N. had sent observers for the
final sessions. The international community so present in forging the treaty promised also to
help implement it by providing a U.N. peacekeeping force.
The Accords appeared to have dealt with all the major issues in a detailed series of
agreements that covered the establishment of the rule of law, the transitional institutions to

govern until elections could be held, the repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of displaced
persons, and the integration of the two opposing armies. They laid out a clear schedule for
implementation of the Accords. In the broad-based transitional government, power was to be
shared among three forces: Habyarimana and his group, the RPF, and the block of MDR,
PSD, and PL, with the addition of the Democratic Christian Party (PDC). Habyarimana would
remain as president, but would lose most of his power to a Council of Ministers, and in that
body the MRND was to have only five of nineteen places, instead of the nine held previously.
The RPF also was to hold five seats, but received in addition the newly-created post of vice
prime minister. The MDR, PL, PSD, and PDC were to have nine ministries plus the post of
prime minister, which remained in the hands of the MDR. The parties that composed the
broad-based transitional government were also to dominate the transitional legislative
assembly with a small number of additional seats allocated, one each for less important
parties.
In the integrated army, the Rwandan government was to provide 60 percent of the troops, but
would have to share command posts fifty-fifty down to the level of battalion with the RPF.
The new army was to count no more than 19,000 soldiers and 6,000 national police, so both
forces, the Rwandan army with more than 30,000 soldiers and national police and the RPF
with some 20,000 troops, would have to demobilize at least half their military personnel.
The carefully calibrated three-part division of power in the government made it unlikely that
any one group could dominate and thus be able to disrupt the movement toward elections and
real peace. But the hope of progress depended on each of the groups remaining coherent and
able to act as a counterweight to the others. As the negotiators all knew, that was a doubtful
premise given the division of the MDR just three weeks before the signature of the treaty. The
Accords actually named Faustin Twagiramungu, head of the smaller of the two MDR
factions, as the prime minister to take office when the broad-based transitional government
was installed. This designation, approved by Habyarimana, permitted the signature of the
Accords, but did not resolve the dispute within the MDR. The division in its ranks and the
possibility that similar splits could take place—or could be caused—in other parties offered
opponents of the settlement the chance to upset the whole peace process.

II. UNSC RESOLUTIONS
United Nation Assistance Mission Rwanda (UNAMIR)

UNAMIR was established by Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 to
help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August
1993. UNAMIR's mandate was: to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali;
monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone
and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the
transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and
assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief
operations.
After renewed fighting in April 1994, the mandate of UNAMIR was adjusted by Security
Council resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, so that it could act as an intermediary
between the warring Rwandese parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;
assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor
developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge
with UNAMIR.
After the situation in Rwanda deteriorated further, UNAMIR's mandate was expanded by
Security Council resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, to enable it to contribute to the
security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the
establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for
relief operations to the degree possible.
Following the ceasefire and the installation of the new Government, the tasks of UNAMIR
were further adjusted by the Security Council to ensure stability and security in the north-
western and south-western regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and monitor the situation in all
regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; to provide security
and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through
mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.
The UN agreed to reinforcement, that would deliver nearly 5,500 troops and much needed
personnel carriers and other equipment to UNAMIR, which would be henceforth known as
UNAMIR II. The new soldiers did not start arriving until June,and following the end of the
genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR II was largely confined to maintaining security and

stability. UNAMIR withdrew from Rwanda in 1996, following the withdrawal of support by
the RPF-led government.
UNAMIR II and subsequent resolutions were still unclear on the right to use force in stopping
the genocide. In one of Dallaire's parting cables, he said that "the [UN] force has been
prevented from having a modicum of self-respect and effectiveness on the
ground". Unfortunately, in the face of the mayhem in Rwanda and this diplomatic watering
down of UNAMIR's mandate, many UN member states delayed contributing personnel for
some time, until the main wave of killings ceased.
By resolution 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR was specifically asked to

contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
and of human rights officers, and to assist in the establishment and training of a new,
integrated, national police force.
By resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, the Council decided to further adjust the mandate of
UNAMIR so that it would exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation;
assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and
their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of
Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the
performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;
support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering,
logistics, medical care and demining; assist in the training of a national police force;
contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's
Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of
humanitarian agencies in case of need.
On 12 December 1995, the Security Council, by its resolution 1029 (1995) , further adjusted
UNAMIR's mandate to focus primarily on facilitating the safe and voluntary return of
refugees, and, as an interim measure, contributing, with the agreement of the Government of
Rwanda, to the protection of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
The mandate of UNAMIR officially came to an end on 8 March 1996. The withdrawal of the
Mission was completed in April 1996.

MISSION TURQUOISE
After the assassination of President Habyarimana in April 1994, it quickly became clear that
the violence engulfing Rwanda was of an unspeakable magnitude; a genocide was
unfolding. Despite this, France declined to act, not wishing to aid the RPF in the fight against
their erstwhile ally, the Rwandan regime. As it became clear that the Rwandan government
was failing in its fight against the RPF, France chose to intervene under the guise of a much-
needed humanitarian mission. The UN had little choice, given the dearth of alternatives, and
accepted the French offer of assistance.
The French-led Opération Turquoise, mobilized by the United Nations (UN) Security Council
through Resolution 929, was controversial from its genesis. The debate leading up to the final
vote on the resolution was riddled with arguments about France’s true intentions. Having
been the main sponsors of the Hutu regime that was now organizing and perpetrating
genocide against the Tutsi minority, an abrupt change in France’s policy was viewed with
suspicion. Publicly, France argued that violence in Rwanda had escalated to the point that it
necessitated international intervention on humanitarian grounds. The wording of the
resolution seemed to confirm this, stating that the mission was “aimed at contributing, in an
impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at
risk in Rwanda.” However, due to concerns over France’s intentions, and the proposed
departure from the Chapter VI mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) and UNAMIR II, five countries abstained from the final vote. Rather than
supplying and funding the existing UNAMIR mission, France wanted a Chapter VII mandate
over which they had near complete jurisdiction. When the mission was eventually condoned
by the Security Council, France mobilized their force and, as some countries had feared, used
it to promote their interests. Rather than protecting Tutsis from the genocidal regime,
Opération Turquoise was co-opted to allow the perpetrators to continue their campaign of
violence and eventually escape the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) advance by fleeing into
neighboring Zaire. The results of this would prove disastrous.
The origins of Opération Turquoise were rooted in the close ties between then French
President François Mitterrand and his Rwandan counterpart Juvénal Habyarimana. The
Technical Military Assistance Agreement signed between the two countries after
Habyarimana came to power in the 1970s solidified this relationship by formally
incorporating Rwanda into the linguistic and cultural sphere of la francophonie and promising
economic aid and military protection. Following this agreement, military aid was passed for
decades to the Rwandan army and its militias directly through the Quai D’Orsay, the French

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These same weapons were later put to use exterminating the
Tutsi minority.
The French originally conceived the mission as a means to halt the advance of the RPF
militarily and assist the government of Rwanda in retaking the capital, Kigali. However, it
soon became evident that this position was untenable as the evidence of genocide
mounted. The goal of Opération Turquoise was thus altered to aid the Rwandan government
forces in fleeing the country to Zaire, with the intention to preserve the government and its
hierarchy intact to pursue future power-sharing agreements. It was a final, frantic attempt to
avoid losing influence in the region, and one that would have devastating consequences.
In the process of assisting the genocidal regime, France often neglected to protect the Tutsi
whom they were charged with safeguarding. There is irrefutable evidence that the French
demonstrated gross negligence of their mandate by abandoning thousands to die in various
locations around the country, most notably at Bisesero. Indeed, numerous reports cite French
soldiers trading sexual favors for food and medical supplies, raping, and even killing
Rwandan citizens. The French further neglected to disarm Rwandan troops and militias
whom they escorted to Zaire, and in some cases supplied them with food, weapons, and
vehicles. These same Rwandan forces would later profiteer in the Zairean refugee camps,
syphoning humanitarian aid intended for victims of genocide. As the refugee camps were
often not the internationally required 50 miles from the border of Rwanda, the ex-Rwandan
Armed Forces and militias were able to use the camps as bases and launch a devastating and
deadly insurgency back into Rwanda, killing thousands. In response to the insurgency, and
renewed killings of Tutsi in Zaire, the new RPF-led Rwandan government invaded Zaire,
setting in motion the Congo Wars, the most deadly series of conflicts worldwide since the two
World Wars. Years of suffering, disease, and death can be traced back to the decision made
by the French to escort the génocidaires to Zaire and continue to supply and support them in a
vain attempt to cling to their influence in the region.
The French were in Rwanda before the Genocide to help support Rwanda's President. Frances
goal was to come into Rwanda and to set up humanitarian zone. They sent 2,500 troops into
Rwanda, but they were limited to the southwest due to the quick advance of the RPF. There
were over 1.5 million people in there humanitarian zone but they were also holding Hutu
killers. Because they couldn't single out any of them they so there was violence and it let
some of the Hutu's escape. They couldn't bring justice and eventually the French left. The
french lost no troops but they also didn't help prevent anything. They set up a Humanitarian

zone for a brief period of time. Many people to this day still question if France really helped
with the terrible genocide.
Ultimately, Opération Turquoise failed on two fronts: It failed to maintain the integrity and
legitimacy of the former Rwandan regime and also failed to uphold its mandate to protect
victims of genocide. Although it is impossible to establish a direct causal relationship
between violence in the Great Lakes Region following Opération Turquoise and the 1994
Genocide against the Tutsis, there is ample evidence that Opération Turquoise exacerbated the
humanitarian situation. Opération Turquoise, conceived as a humanitarian mission, thus
paradoxically contributed to one of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern history in the
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
In November 1994 the UN responded to charges of genocide in Rwanda by creating the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR; formally known as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994).
The ICTR was international in composition and was located in Arusha, Tanzania. The tribunal
was not empowered to impose capital punishment; it could impose only terms of
imprisonment. The governing statute of the ICTR defined war crimes broadly. Murder,
torture, deportation, and enslavement were subject to prosecution, but the ICTR also stated
that genocide included “subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum
requirement.” In addition, it ruled that “rape and sexual violence constitute genocide as long
as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular
group, targeted as such”—as was the case in the Rwandan conflict, where the Hutu
dominated interim government organized the mass rape of Tutsi women by HIV infected
men. The tribunal thus was among the first international bodies to formally recognize sexual
violence as a war crime.
The statute of the ICTR limited the jurisdiction of the tribunal to Rwandan leaders, while
lower-level defendants were to be tried in domestic courts. The ICTR statute did not consider
the official position of an individual, including his position as head of state, to be a sufficient
basis for avoiding or evading criminal culpability. Military and civilian leaders who had
known or should have known that their subordinates were committing war crimes were
subject to prosecution under the doctrine of command or superior responsibility. Individuals
who had committed war crimes pursuant to government or military orders were not thereby
relieved of criminal liability, though the existence of the orders could be used as
a mitigating factor.
After extensive administrative and logistic delays, the ICTR completed its first cases in 1998.
In May former Rwandan prime minister Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to six charges of

genocide and was sentenced to life imprisonment on September 4. In October 2000

Kambanda tried to revoke his guilty plea, but his motion was rejected by the ICTR.
Another roadblock occurred in 1999, when Rwanda severed its relationship with the ICTR
after the tribunal ordered the release, on procedural grounds, of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a
prominent genocide suspect. He had been charged with orchestrating a media campaign that
urged the Hutu to kill their Tutsi neighbours. The order to release him was suspended, though,
and in February 2000 the Rwandan government announced that it would resume cooperation
with the UN court. Barayagwiza stood trial later that year and was found guilty in 2003.
In April 2002 four senior military officers—including former colonel Bagosora, who was
considered the main architect of the genocide—were brought to trial at the ICTR. The
ICTR alleged that Bagosora had begun planning the genocide as early as 1992, and it charged
that all four had trained the militias that killed Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The four were also
considered responsible for the murders of 10 UN peacekeepers from Belgium and the murder
of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana in 1994. The other three defendants were former military
commanders Anatole Nsengiyumva and Aloys Ntabukuze and the former chief of military
operations, Gratien Kabiligi. On Dec. 18, 2008, Bagosora was sentenced to life imprisonment
for having masterminded the killings, and Nsengiyumva and Ntabukuze also received life
sentences. Those were the first convictions for the organization of the genocide that were
issued by the ICTR.
Several key perpetrators were sentenced to life imprisonment in 2009, including
former justice minister Agnes Ntamabyariro, former Kigali prefect Tharcisse Renzaho, and
former speaker of the parliament Alfred Mukezamfura (in exile in Belgium and sentenced in
absentia).
National courts
National courts were charged with trying lower-level genocide suspects. Unlike the ICTR,
Rwandan courts were initially able to sentence those found guilty to capital punishment. The
first death sentences were carried out on April 24, 1998, when 22 people convicted of
genocide were publicly executed by police firing squads, despite serious procedural
inadequacies in the hearings: war crimes trials often suffered from procedural deficiencies
indicative of ethnic biases.

In 2007 Rwanda’s parliament abolished the death penalty, an important step in the country’s
efforts to extradite genocide suspects from European countries that had hitherto refused such
requests because they objected to capital punishment.
Gacaca Courts
The number of suspects to be tried in connection with the genocide was immense, and cases
moved slowly through the ICTR and national courts. In 2001, in an attempt to clear the
backlog of some 115,000 genocide cases awaiting trial, the Rwandan government announced
plans to establish gacaca (grass) courts according to the traditional justice system. In
precolonial days gacaca courts were used to resolve conflicts between families. The courts
were held outside, and the heads of households served as judges. The government’s decision
to employ that method of justice would create thousands of local courts to handle some
genocide suspects accused of minor crimes, such as arson, as well as capital crimes, though
suspects accused of more serious crimes would continue to be tried in higher courts. In
addition to clearing the backlog of cases, it was hoped that the gacaca courts would bring to
light some of the unknown details of the genocide, provide a sense of closure, and foster
reconciliation between Rwandans.
The courts were convened in January 2002 and began operating in several phases over the
next several years, with the first trials beginning in March 2005. The success of the courts,
often a matter of opinion, varied from trial to trial. Although some courts were found to be
fair and objective, others were accused of having followed a political agenda and of having
delivered harsh sentences that were not commensurate with the evidence provided.
The gacaca courts were intended to operate for a limited amount of time, but closure of the
courts was repeatedly postponed. By 2010 the gacaca courts had prosecuted some 1.5 million
cases.

IV. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The slaughter, which took place over about 100 days and did not even spare those who sought
sanctuary in churches and missions, will forever be remembered as one of the most abhorrent
events of the 20th century. The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did
it stop the killing once it had begun.
There is equally harsh criticism of the UN Security Council for failing to deploy a sufficient
peace-keeping force to the region at the end of 1993 when attempts were made to implement a
peace agreement. Among those countries which consistently resisted the formation of a major
force was the United States, which had support from Britain. Those who did not even care,
who said that Rwanda was a distant African country and that it is not about us, they must also
bear some of the responsibility.
Britain eventually contributed logistical support to the peace-keepers, but four months after
the slaughter occurred.
The failure of the Secretariat, and Mr Annan, to respond to a cable sent on 11 January by the
Canadian commander of the peace-keeping mission, General Romeo Dallaire. In it, he said he
had intelligence from an informant about plans by Hutu forces for mass extermination of their
enemies. He said the plan foresaw Tutsis being killed at the rate of 1,000 every 20 minutes.
General Allaire requested permission to take immediate action to intervene and seek out a
cache of weapons. The general's proposals were dismissed by Mr Boutros Ghali's chief
adviser, Iqbal Riza, but signed by Mr Annan.
The “shadow of Somalia”, national interest and lack of internal pressure, or short “lack of
political will”, were the main factors that led to the international community’s failure to
prevent and stop the Rwandan genocide. The main actors Belgium, the US and France had
sufficient information on what was going on and the quick and effective evacuation of foreign
nationals as well as France’s intervention in July show that they also had the capacity to
intervene. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention of 1948 not only carries moral but also legal
responsibilities. Lack of political will led to the failure of the Security Council, which has
responsibility for international peace and security. Its malfunction meant that UNAMIR was
never able to protect or save Rwandan lives and became a bystander to genocide.

V. AFTERSHOCKS ON RWANDA
As the ICTR, national courts, and gacaca courts attempted to bring the most
serious genocide suspects to justice, the government, to alleviate prison congestion,
periodically granted mass amnesty to prisoners accused of lesser crimes. For example, in
March 2004, 30,000 accused prisoners were granted amnesty and freed after they confessed
to, and asked forgiveness for, having committed acts of genocide, and in February 2007 some
8,000 prisoners accused of war crimes—many of them sick or elderly—were released.
Amnesty was not wholly supported by survivors, who believed that those who confessed were
not genuinely sorry for what they had done but, rather, were using the amnesty to escape
justice. Many survivors were forced to live and work beside those whose violent acts they had
witnessed during the genocide.
Meanwhile, Rwanda’s military forces became embroiled in neighbouring Zaire’s civil war.
The troops had entered Zaire in late 1996 to expel Hutu extremists who had fled there after
the genocide and were using that country as a base for launching attacks on Rwanda. After
many attempts at resolution, a peace agreement was reached in 2002 that provided for the
withdrawal of Rwandan troops in exchange for the disarmament and repatriation of Hutu
extremist rebels there.
Although Hutu insurgencies continued to occupy Rwanda’s government, reconciliation efforts
were ongoing. The government announced plans to change several national symbols,
including the flag and national anthem, that were widely associated with extremist
Hutu nationalism. A new constitution, aimed at preventing further ethnic strife in the country,
was promulgated in 2003. Later that year the first multiparty democratic elections in Rwanda
since independence were held; Kagame, who had ascended to the presidency after Bizimungu
resigned in 2000, was victorious in securing another term. In 2006 the Rwandan
government implemented a significant administrative reorganization, replacing the previous
12 prefectures with 5 larger, multiethnic provinces intended to promote power sharing and
reduce ethnic conflict. Also, several genocide memorials were created throughout the country.
Rwanda’s economy, adversely affected by the conflict of the early 1990s, continued to
recover gradually; by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, substantial progress had
been made. Recovery efforts were aided in 2006, when significant debt relief was granted by
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in 2007, when Rwanda joined
the East African Community, a regional trade and development bloc.

In the early 21st century the events of 1994 still weighed heavily on Rwanda. In 2004
Kagame came under fire after a newspaper leaked the findings of a report, commissioned by
French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, that included allegations that Kagame and other FPR
leaders had ordered the rocket attack that caused the 1994 plane crash that killed
Habyarimana and triggered the genocide (echoing the claims of some Rwandan dissidents);
Kagame vehemently denied the allegations. Rwanda severed relations with France in 2006
when Bruguière—claiming jurisdiction because the flight crew members who perished in the
crash were French—signed international arrest warrants for several of Kagame’s close
associates for their alleged roles in the crash and requested that Kagame stand trial at the
ICTR. (Relations between the two countries were restored in November 2009.) As before,
Kagame denied having had anything to do with the crash and countered by alleging that the
French government had armed and advised the rebels responsible for the genocide. Later that
year Rwanda established a commission to investigate France’s role in the genocide; the
findings, released in 2008, implicated more than 30 French military and political officials. In
October 2007 the Rwandan government launched a formal investigation into the 1994 plane
crash. The results, released in January 2010, indicated that Hutu extremist soldiers were
responsible for shooting down the plane carrying Habyarimana, with the intent of derailing
his peace negotiations with Tutsi rebels, and for using the incident as an excuse to initiate the
genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
But the country has recovered economically, with President Kagame's policies encouraging
rapid growth and technological advancement. He won a third term in office in the most recent
election in 2017 with 98.63% of the vote. Growth remains good - 7.2% in 2018 according to
the African Development Bank. But Mr Kagame's critics say he is too authoritarian and does
not tolerate dissent.
At the end of 2001, Rwanda's Government unveiled a new flag and national anthem as part of
its drive to promote national unity and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide. The new
national anthem refers to the Rwandans as one people, rather than to Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.
In 2013 Rwandan Parliamentary elections ushered in a record-breaking 64% of seats won by
women candidates. The Government of Rwanda, with the UN as a key partner, has been
pursuing gender equality since 1994.
They are facing extreme poverty and starvation and with little education they are not
developing as a nation; the children are the leaders of the future, but with little education that
future looks depressing. Up to 2 million people fled the country, including many of the Hutu

ethnic group perpetrators. A million people were displaced within the country. Of the
survivors, 75,000 were children who lost one or both parents.
It is important to know about the Rwandan Genocide because a statistical assessment of the
risk of state led mass killing puts Rwanda in the top 15% countries most likely to witness a
mass killing. There’s no reason to stop worrying about Rwanda even after more than 25 years
of the genocide.
Rwanda went through a lot of hardships in the past twenty years but they have seemed to have
come through and are starting to make changes that will rebuild the country in a better way.
The schools are still not to the standard of what we have but they have a school with teachers
and books in tents. One out of every five children dies before their fifth birthday. The Tutsi
still think of themselves as superior to the Hutu clan but not to the extent of genocide. The
people of Rwanda live on two dollars a day, plus Rwanda is ranked 158 out of 177 countries
on a list of the best country for a mother to live in.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Rwanda genocide left many devastating consequences. Both children and adults faced
catastrophic psychological damage, those who saw atrocities, those who were forced to
commit them, and those who were victims of attack. As a result, many of these victims
remain disfigured and handicapped, which makes daily life a struggle not only physically but
psychologically as well. The economy and education system are extremely slow to recover.
Most children are not attending school. Rwandans are struggling to make a living and survive
despite the failing economy.
UNSC played an important role in Rwanda Civil War by passing several resoltuions to end
the war, several missions took place to help the people of rwanda and to assist the government
of rwanda. War ended after four years resulted in the death of million people.
It was evident from the reaction of the international community that they had the ability to
stop the genocide but they failed which resulted in the death of the million innocent people.
Specifically UNSC failed to perform its legal duty of peacekeeping. US and France were the
main nation who were at fault here because of their personal interest and lack of political will,
instead of stopping the man slaughter they somehow helped the armed forces.
Women who were raped by the soldiers are the main victim of the genocide because they
were raped by the men who were having HIV as a result they got affected and became
pregnant. Many media reports came in last few years in which woman were saying that how
difficult it is for them to survive in this society where people look at them as the rape victim
and the discrimination faced by their children. But still woman play an important role in the
developing economy and politics of Rwanda.
If the international community had followed their moral and legal duty under the treaty of
genocide 1948 this disaster could have been prevented and western countries should also
respect the black people because it is an African country. US and Britain refused to help and
they only rescued the white people present in Rwanda during that time.
Missions like UNAMIR and TURQUOISE were the main failure on the part of international
community because they knew what is going to happen but still they did nothing to prevent it.
ICTR, national courts and gacaca courts are still some good measure taken by international
community to prosecute the perprators of this genocide.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES
 https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/50189764.pdf
 https://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3ebf9bb60.pdf
 https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-
rwanda/39240.html

WEBSITES
 https://hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-11.htm#P830_317589
 https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml
 https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/1994-rwandan-genocide-
facts
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Assistance_Mission_for_Rwanda
 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirM.htm

BOOKS
 Genocide a comprehensive introduction ~ By Adam Jones

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LAW RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

National Law Institute University

LAW RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

Resolution of UNSC on Rwanda Civil War- A Critique

Submitted to: Submitted by:

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 1

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 2

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 3

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 4

This project work will be divided into six chapters namely

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 5

Background and Immediate Cause

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 6

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 7

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 8

Rwanda Civil War

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 9

Peacekeeping Efforts/ Arusha Accords

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 10

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 11

II. UNSC RESOLUTIONS

United Nation Assistance Mission Rwanda (UNAMIR)

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 12

By resolution 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR was specifically asked to

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 13

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 14

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 15

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 16

III. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

In November 1994 the UN responded to charges of genocide in Rwanda by creating the

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 17

genocide and was sentenced to life imprisonment on September 4. In October 2000

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 18

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 19

IV. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 20

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 21

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 22

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 23

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 24

RESOLUTION OF UNSC ON RWANDA CIVIL WAR- A CRITIQUE 25

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