Previous Conduct as Evidence
Similar acts as evidence or res inter alios acta II (Sec. 34)
Unaccepted offer (Sec. 35)
Testimonial Knowledge
Testimony confined to personal knowledge (Section 36)
Independently relevant statement
Bayani v. People, G.R. No. 155619, August 14, 2007
- Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of BP
22 in an Information to wit:
That on or about 20th day of August 1992 in the
Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, he did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously issued
Check No. 054924 dated Aug 26, 1992 drawn against PS
Bank, Candelaria Quezon Branch payable to Cash in the
amount of P10,000. It was presented to complaining
witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by Alicia
Rubia. He knew for a fact that he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with PS Bank. He failed to deposit the
necessary amount to cover said check.
- Petitioner has a check booklet issued by Philippine Savings bank
with the said Check No. 054924 as one of those included in said
booklet of checks. The said drawn check was made to apply to the
account of Bayani. Check was subsequently dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. At the time the checking account was closed
on September 1, 1992, the remaining deposit is only in the amount
of Php 2,414.96. Witness Evangelista testified that she was
approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that she was requested by
petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash, as he needed money
badly.
- Evangelista had a confrontation with Bayani and Rubia but both
pointed to each other for the settlement of the amount involved in
the check in question. After two confrontations and up tot he filing
of the instant case in MTC of Candelaria, Bayani’s acts were mere
flat denials of having talked with or otherwise met Evangelista but
admitted that the check indeed came from the check booklet.
- RTC convicted Petitioner.
- CA affirmed in toto.
Argument of respondent: OSG representing respondent, argued that:
1. petitioner’s denial of his liability for Check No. 05492 cannot
overcome the primordial fact that his signature appears on the face
of such check
2. want of consideration is a personal defense and is not available
against a holder in due course; and
3. the constitutional presumption of innocence was overcome by the
requisite quantum of proof.
Counter-argument of Bayani: Denies having issued the check subject of this
case. He argues that the evidence pinpointing him as signatory on the check
is merely hearsay.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in refusing to acquit the Accused (Petitioner)
despite the conviction of the trial court is utterly based on hearsay evidence
HELD
- No. Testimony of witness Evangelista is hearsay. Testimony is an
Independently Relevant Statement. However, petitioner is barred
from questioning the admission of said testimony. Hence, Bayani is
still guilty.
- (Relevant section here is Section 26, Rule 130)
- Evangelista testified that she was approached by Rubia who told her
that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for
cash, as he needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelista’s
testimony is hearsay since she had no personal knowledge of the
fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when
petitioner supposedly made this request. What she testified to,
 therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own perception
but from Rubia’s.
- However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of
Evangelista’s testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section
35 of the same Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a
witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is asked to
testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness shall be made as soon as the ground therefore becomes
reasonably apparent.
- Thus, it has been held that “in failing to object to the testimony on
the ground that it was hearsay, the evidence offered may be
admitted.” Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made— from the time her
testimony was offered and up to the time her direct examination
was conducted—then petitioner has effectively waived any
objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to
have her testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to
stand on.
- Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless w/o
probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence
falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule.
- Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently
relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose
of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or
the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.
When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner
who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista
was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does
not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia’s statement since it
is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest
to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of
such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary,
because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (b)
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista’s statement is
relevant to the issues of petitioner’s falsehood, his authorship of
the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the
offense charged. In any event, petitioner’s conviction did not rest
solely on Evangelista’s testimony. There are other pieces of
evidence on record that established his guilt: the subject check was
included in the booklet of checks issued by the PSBank to petitioner;
the subject check was made to apply to the account of petitioner
whose name appears on the upper portion of the said check; and
most telling is that petitioner never categorically denied that the
signature appearing on the check was his.
Security Bank v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
- Eric Gan opened an account with Security Bank at its Soler Branch
in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
- Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with Gan that he would
deposit an initial amount in his current account and he could draw
checks on the said account provided there were sufficient funds to
cover them.
- Under special arrangement with Security Bank’s Branch Manager,
Mr. Qui, Gan was allowed to transfer funds from his account to
another person’s account within the same branch. Gan availed of
this arrangement several times by depositing checks in his account,
and withdrew them and transferred them even before they were
cleared.
- Such transactions were covered by “debit memos” since Gan has
no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
- Gan incurred a negative balance. The overdraft balance ballooned
to 297,060.02 at the end of September 15, 1990.
 - Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against Gan.
Respondent denied liability and alleged that the overdraft resulted
from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.
- TC: dismissed case. Held: Security bank was not able to prove that
respondent owed it the amount it claimed considering that the ledger
cards it presented were mere hearsay evidence. CA affirmed this.
ISSUE: WON the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr. Patricio
Mercado (bookkeeper) constituted the best evidence of the transactions
made by the respondent relative to his account?
HELD: NO, The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not
competent evidence to prove that respondent consented to the transfers of
funds. These entries merely showed that the transfers were indeed made and
that Qui approved them. Petitioner's claim that respondent availed of a special
arrangement to transfer funds from his account to another person's account
was a bare allegation that was never substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado had
no personal knowledge of this arrangement. In fact, when asked about the
details of the alleged consent given by respondent to the transfers, he stated
that he could not remember because respondent talked to Qui and not to him.
Petitioner could have presented Qui whom they alleged allowed the special
arrangement with respondent. But it did not.|||
- Neither can we accept petitioner's argument that the entries made by
Mercado in the ledger were competent evidence to prove how and
when the negative balance was incurred. Petitioner invokes Section
43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. EaHIDC
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of
entries in corporate books required the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to
testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
- Mercado, petitioner's bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was
presented to testify on the transactions pertaining to the account of
respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the ledger
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification
nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who
made them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting
the entries, particularly those entries which resulted in the negative
balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries.
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
1. Dying Declaration (Sec. 37)
People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012
- Past midnight on July 31, 1993, Johnny Bolanon was stabbed near
the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk
to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help.
 - Estao rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that
on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca
who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the
stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at
the time.
- Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder
for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. On appeal, his conviction
was affirmed by the CA. The basis of the conviction is the testimony
of the victim’s uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño that on their way to the
hospital Bolanon told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed
him.
ISSUE
- Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of
murder before he died is admissible as evidence
- - January 5, 1991 Jose Rabago went to Enoc Theater to view some
HELD
- Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide,
or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the
Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a
dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
- A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death - There is ample authority for the view that the
declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by
the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his
presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is a victim.
- All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person
who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in
the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in
which Bolanon was the victim.
2. Declaration against interest (Section 38)
3. Act or declaration about pedigree (Section 39)
4. Family reputation or tradition re pedigree (Section 40)
5. Common reputation (Section 41)
6. Part of the res gestae (Section 42)
People v. Noel Navarro, G.R. No. 129566, October 7, 1998
stationary pictures exhibited outside the theater. When he was about to
go home on board his motorcycle, he was invited by Ferdinand Rabadon,
who was drinking beer inside Adela's Restaurant, to join him. Rabago
obliged.
- "Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he used in going
to the bus terminal to check if his wife had already arrived from
Zamboanga. Upon his return, Rabadon invited Rabago to Five Doors
Disco but the latter opted to go home. Rabadon, who was still on the
motorcycle holding its handle bars, offered to drive Rabago home
- "When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was pushed by
one Ming Basila, causing him to fall, after which Basila shot Rabadon
twice at the back. While Rabadon was already lying down with his leg
pinned by the motorcycle, appellant shot him three times
- "Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila had left
the scene, he returned and saw Rabadon dying and gasping for breath
- "Rabago saw Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, a policeman(SPO2 Rabadon), to
whom he reported Ferdinand Rabadon's killing. (immediately reported,
after the crime was committed)
- January 6, 1991 Rabago was investigated by policeman Rolando
Rabadon but he said that he did not see anything. (a day after the
incident.)
- "During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not divulge
the identities of the assailants for fear of his life. He claimed that some
policemen in Alaminos, Pangasinan were members of the Aguila Gang
which killed people. The gang was allegedly led by one Ramon Navarro,
appellant's brother.
- Accused Noel denied any participation in the killing of Rabadon
- RTC: appellant guilty of murder based on Rabago’s testimony as a
prosecution witness
- silent as to the identity of the assailant. Such omission, as has been
- Issue: Which of the statements between SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and
Patrolman Rolando Rabadon is part of res gestae?
- not render their testimonies false or incredible, for the delay may be
- Held: At the outset, it must be stated that res gestae pertains to the
admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight and sufficiency, as
the Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence,
while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade.
- Res gestae is defined as follows:
"Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae."
- Rabago's statement to SPO2 Rabadon that someone had killed his
companion can be considered part of the res gestae, and is thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. It was a
spontaneous statement that was made right after a startling
occurrence and that refers to such occurrence.
- However, the same cannot be said of his statement to Patrolman
Rabadon, as it lacked the requisite spontaneity, having been given
in answer to questions propounded in an investigation, a day after
the incident in question.
- The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported the
incident to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence regarding the identity
of the killers created doubt as to the appellant's culpability for such
killing and, thus, should have been likewise considered by the lower
court in appellant's favor as part of the res gestae. This proposition
deserves scant consideration. Such omission cannot be taken to
mean that appellant was not the culprit. The witness was simply
discussed, can be attributed to Rabago's fear of the Navarros.
- Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a crime does
explained by the natural reticence of most people and their
abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. But more than this,
there is always the inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite
understandable, especially if the accused is a man of power and
influence in the community.
- Wherefore, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED.
People v. Villarico, et.al., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011
- On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court in Misamis Occidental (RTC) against all the
accused, “That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in
the morning at Barangay Bolinsong, Municipality of Bonifacio,
Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
 intent to kill, armed with a short firearms (sic), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot
HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which
cause(d) the instant death of said victim and that he had no chance
to avoid or defend himself from the attack. All the accused pleaded
not guilty at their December 15, 1999 arraignment.
- After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide
aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to the positive
identification of the accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses, and
disbelieved their denial and alibis due to their failure to show the
physical improbability for them to be at the crime scene.
- On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC’s decision,
holding instead that murder was established beyond reasonable
doubt because the killing was attended by treachery.
ISSUE: WON the Prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify the
accused as the persons who had actually shot Haide
HELD
- The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim
as well as their familiarity with the accused who were their
neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haide’s
assailants. Hi
- The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to
prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the commission of the
crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof
of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. In that
regard, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. The
intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in
the identification simply means that the accused’s constitutional
right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, even if doubt may cloud
his innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence
constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is forever of primary
importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the strength
of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.
Security Bank v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
(Refer to Case#2)
Entries in the course of business (Section 43)
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
● Patula was sued for estafa in RTC Dumaguete and pleaded not
guilty.
● At pre trial, no stipulation of facts was made and Patula did not avail
the plea bargaining. Trial ensued.
● RTC found Patula guilty for the defense did not refute the evidence
of the Prosecution.
● Insisting that the RTC's judgment "grossly violated [her]
Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge against
her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of RPC, the evidence
presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was
falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the Information
under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty," and that said
judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and manifestly... disregarded
the rules on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence
admitted by the trial court were all private documents, the due
execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,"...
petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review
on certiorari
ISSUE
- Whether Patula is guilty or not? Not guilty.
HELD
- Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by
 the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had
previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent
admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the
summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis,
and King’s testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.
- Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by tersely stating that the ledgers
"were prepared in the regular course of business." Seemingly,
the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
- Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
- This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping
mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was
unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of the
several requisites before entries in the course of business could
be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
- (a) The person who made the entry must be dead or
unable to testify;
- (b) The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
- (c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries;
- (d) The entries were made in his professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
- (e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-101292, June 8, 1993
- Ricardo Encarnacion was a telephone service subscriber of private
respondent Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL). Under the
terms and conditions governing the account, Encarnacion was to pay
monthly rentals (local service charges) and other bills for long
distance calls (toll charges).
- Sometime, he claims that the service was not operational during 10
July to 30 September 1982.
- Thus he refused to pay the local service charges for said months but
admits paying toll charges (long distance calls) during the same
period.
- The telephone service was restored on 1 October 1982.
- There were conflict as to the payment of the months when the
service were having issues, PILTEL claims that there were only
interruptions in the service, Encarnacion refuses to pay despite grace
period given.
- Of course, PILTEL disconnected the service.
- PILTEL, averred that:
- The telephone service was operational during the months
of July, August, and September 1982 except from July 19
to 22, September 22 to October 2 and October 29 to
November 4, 1982, as shown by the trouble card of Tel.
No. 442-4822 but for which interruptions in, service,
periodic rebates were granted.
- RTC ruled in favor of Encarnacion; ordered PILTEL to restore
Encarnacion’s telephone service and to pay moral and exemplary
damages.
 - CA, based on the trouble card, reversed RTC; dismissed the award
of damages.
- Before the SC, Encarnacion claims that CA committed a serious
misapprehension of fact when it considered the trouble record (the
very piece of evidence on which the CA anchored its decision).
ISSUE: Whether the trouble card is competent evidence.
HELD: An entry in the course of business “may be received as prima facie
evidence” — if the person who made the entry cannot testify. [Sec. 37, Rule
130]
- -
- YES; the CA, therefore, did not commit any serious
misapprehension of fact when it considered the trouble card.
- Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
“Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or
near the time of the transaction to which they refer, by a
person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.”
- The entry “may be received as prima facie evidence” — if the person
who made the entry cannot testify. The rule establishes a disputable
presumption regarding admissibility of a document.
- Discrediting or giving credence to a piece of evidence pertains to its
materiality or relevance (the tendency in reason to establish the
probability or improbability of a fact in issue). The trouble record in
question formed part of the records. The RTC decision evaluated its
materiality and did not give credence. The CA believed otherwise.
Unless there is a clearly grave or whimsical abuse on its part,
findings of fact of the CA will not be disturbed. The Supreme Court
will only exercise its power of review in known exceptions such as
gross misappreciation of evidence or total void of evidence.
- In the case at bar, there no reversible error in the CA decision after
considering certain statements of the trial court itself which,
ironically, ruled in favor of Encarnacion
- As to the award of damages
- Assuming arguendo that the trouble record is incompetent evidence,
Encarnacion’s arguments on the total absence of phone service for
July, August, and September 1982 is belied by the RTC's recitation
of facts, thus: “The plaintiff, however, paid ‘the toll charges’
covering long distance calls during said period of July 1982, August
1982 and September 1982.
Why, it may be asked, was Encarnacion able to use his telephone for
long distance calls but not for local calls for the same given period?
He does not explain. It appears that the telephone line was not really
dead for the whole 3 months of July, August and September 1982,
but only for intermittent periods. We do not condone the constant
disruption of PILTEL’s telephone service, but Encarnacion must be
accurate in his claim if he expects to be awarded damages.
- We find no reason for the award of moral and exemplary damages
as the disconnection was done after due notices to petitioner.
Encarnacion was further given a rebate for the period of interrupted
service. His account balance was condoned by means of a credit
memo and the telephone line was restored on 14 December 1983.
These are no badges of wanton, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
actuation on the part of PILTEL.
Security Bank v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464 June 27, 2006
Refer to 2nd Case
Entries in official records (Section 44)
Miro v. Vda. De Erederos, et.al., G.R. Nos. 172532, 172544-45, November
20, 2013
- Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land
Transportation Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu) and 7 others
(Alingasa included), were administratively charged with Grave
 Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private
complainants.
- They were likewise charged with criminal complaints for violation
of Section 3 (e) of the "Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
- The administrative and criminal charges arose from the alleged
anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of confirmation
certificates, an indispensable requirement in the processing of
documents for the registration of motor vehicle with the LTO.
- They observed that:
(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the amount of P2,500.00
per pad without official receipt;
(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to Erederos who
would, in turn, remit all the collections to Mendoza;
(3) The official receipt for the processing of the confirmation
certificates issued to the private complainants acknowledged only
the amount of P40.00 which they paid for each engine, chassis or
new vehicle, as MR (Miscellaneous Receipt-LTO Form 67);
(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from the P2,500.00
required to be paid for each pad
(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for the individual
stock/sales reports evaluation of Erederos; and
(6) The confirmation certificates processed during the previous
administration were no longer honored; thus, the private
complainants were constrained to reprocess the same by purchasing
new ones.
- During preliminary conference, the respondents, through their
counsels, manifested their intention to submit the case for decision
on the basis of the evidence on record after the submission of their
memoranda/position papers.
- Additional administrative and criminal complaints for the same
charges were filed by 3 liaison officers against respondents. new
complainants commonly alleged that they had to pay P2,500.00 per
pad to Alingasa before they could be issued confirmation certificates
by the LTO Cebu. Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos
and to Mendoza. When they protested, Erederos and Alingasa
pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They were also
told that the confirmation certificates processed during the previous
administration would no longer be honored under Mendoza's
administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation
certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles with
the LTO.|||
- Mendiza denied this and alleged that the confirmation certificates'
actual distribution and processing were assigned to Alingasa; the
processing entails the payment of P40.00 per confirmation
certificate, as administrative fee; payment is only made when the
confirmation certificates are filled up and submitted for processing
with the LTO, not upon issuance; and he did not give any
instructions to impose additional fees for their distribution.|||
- Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa guilty
of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Peque, on the other hand, was only found guilty of simple
misconduct and was meted the penalty of reprimand.|||
- CA: Deputy Ombudsman's finding of grave misconduct was not
supported by substantial evidence because the affidavits, on which
the decision was mainly anchored, were not corroborated by any
other documentary evidence.|||
ISSUE :WON CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the
administrative charge against the respondents. – NO.
HELD: There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.|||
- Maria Gomez-Samson, Jesus Gomez and Ariston Gomez, Jr. are the
- Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in
the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire
were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation.
- The reports in question do not constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired
by the reporting officers through official information, not
having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty
to do so.
- The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in
the performance of their duties not on the basis of their own personal
observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the
complainants' affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman
cannot rely on it.
- Thus, In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. Since the
Deputy Ombudsman's findings were found wanting by the CA of
substantial evidence, the same shall not bind this Court.|||
Commercial lists and the like (Section 45)
Learned treatises (Section 46)
Testimony/deposition at former proceeding (Section 47)
Opinion Rule
General rule (Section 48)
Opinion of Expert witness (Section 49)
Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007
- Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is
impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted down before the
bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Consuelo, Ariston, Sr. and
Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively.
children of Ariston, Sr. while Augusto Gomez is the child of Angel.
When Consuelo died, Augusto alleged that Rita and Jesus prepared
a simulated deed of donation inter-vivos over the 3 parcels of lot in
latter’s favor and another deed of donation in favor of Ariston Sr.
And Jr.. Consequently the request of Augusto to declare false, null
and void ab initio, and/or be nullified the deed of donation
intervivos. Respondents countered copy of the deed of donation
were valid notarized and registered.
RTC: Ruled in favor or respondents.
CA: Affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was able to prove that the Deeds of
Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by
Consuelo Gomez - NO
HELD:
Established exceptions to Petition for Review on Certiorari:
1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.
3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence of
record.
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the
testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner of the NBI. Respondents,
on the other hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief
of Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct
evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating
that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form
in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of
Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the respondents including
Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of
Donation.
Zenaida Torres testimony signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo.
However, she opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed or
prepared in one continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some
variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did
not show any variance. Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized
studies on the matter of Questioned Documents, except on one or two
seminars on Questioned Documents. The testimony of Torres was completely
discredited.
Positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than negative
evidence. However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who
testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while
it is impossible to remember what never existed.
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting
consideration, although not exclusive on questions of a professional
character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their
findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they
can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which
may have been adduced during the trial. The problem of the credibility of the
expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of
the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. The trial court is consequently given the discretion
in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness
credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the
demeanor of these witnesses. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of
paper for both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevitys sake. While
the ensuing litigation could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston,
Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevitys sake, there still
appears no indication that he did so maliciously. Time and again, this Court
has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower
court.
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer
her properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an
airplane. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof
that it had been impossible to perform those alleged acts within three hours.
As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud
without difficulty within five to ten minutes each. We can also take judicial
notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on Saturday mornings,
and was much less of a problem in 1979.
Circumstance that aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the names
of the donees only after the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation
were dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself indicate that the said documents
were antedated.
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for
the defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the defendants claim. Even if the
evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there
is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient
in itself to establish his cause of action.
Tamani v. Salvador, G.R. No. 171497, April 4, 2011
● Sps Salvador filed a Complaint for quieting of title against petitioners
Tamani et al. over a 431 sqm. parcel of land.
● Sps Tamani and Salvador are co-owners of the 776 sqm disputed
property – the Salvadors own 345 sqm, and the Tamanis own 431 sqm.
● The Tamanis allegedly sold the property to Cruz (under a Deed of
Absolute Sale) who thereafter sold the same to the Salvadors.
● Petitioners Heirs of Tamani filed an Answer arguing that they were the
lawful owners and were in actual possession of the disputed property
having inherited the same from their parents, contending that the
signature of their parents was forged and thus assail the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
● During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of Demetrio
Tamani appearing on the deed of sale and his standard signatures were
submitted for examination and comparison to the Questioned Documents
Division of the NBI
● NBI Document Examiner Albacea filed a report finding that “the
questioned and standard signatures “DEMETRIO TAMANI” are
WRITTEN by one and the same person.”
● Dissatisfied with the report, petitioners asked for another examination of
the signatures, this time submitting the same to PNP Crime Laboratory
Service.
● PNP Document Examiner Mely Sorra filed a PNP report finding that the
questioned signature of DEMETRIO TAMANI appearing on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated and the standard signatures of Demetrio Tamani
shown by the documents submitted WERE WRITTEN BY 2
DIFFERENT PERSONS.
● RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor. Confronted with conflicting testimonies
from handwriting experts, it gave more weight to the PNP report and
testimony of Sorra because of her educational, professional and work
background. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal.
● CA ruled in favor of respondents, stating that RTC erred when it relied
solely on Sorra’s educational, professional and work background when
it decided to give more credence to the PNP report. After examining the
questioned and standard signatures of Tamani, CA opined that “the
similarities of strokes are more prominent and pronounced than the
dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are overshadowed by the
striking similarities in the questioned and the standard signatures.”
ISSUE: WON the authenticity of the signature of Tamani where there
are conflicting expert testimonies was properly interpreted. - NO
HELD:
● The manner by which the RTC disposed of the issue was not proper
because while credentials of an expert witness play a factor in the
evidentiary and persuasive weight of his testimony, the same cannot
be the sole factor in determining its value. The CA was thus correct
when it declared that the judge must conduct his own independent
examination of the signatures under scrutiny.
● HOWEVER, after review of the testimonies of the expert witnesses and
the documentary evidence, the SC is more inclined to believe that the
signature of Tamani appearing on the August 17, 1959 Deed of Sale was
forged as can be gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the document
examiner from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
● The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon
his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice
or detection from an unpracticed observer. While SC was admittedly
unable to fully comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that
her testimony was fairly technical in nature and description, it still has
observed a good number of the differences noted by her.
● Lastly, while it was improper for the RTC to rely solely on Sorra’s
credentials, her superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give
added value to her testimony.
Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
- Jeanice and Jordan had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997. They
have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998.
After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February
1999.
- On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordan’s psychological incapacity
was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to
 become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were
not satisfied.
- Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his
whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great
deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family
business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play
Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts.
Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and
attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice
noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his
friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also
demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for
their son.
- Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to
hit her with a golf club.
- Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was
afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability."
ISSUE
- Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
HELD
- Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity
- HELD: An ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of
- Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by
the person alleging said disorder.
- mental stage below normal.
- Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
-
- In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates
on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her
interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of
Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Gates only diagnosed
Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and
evaluate Jordan.
Opinion or ordinary witness (Section 50)
Hernandez v. Santos G.R. Nos. 166470, 169217, August 7, 2009
- Lulu inherited an estimated value of 50 million worth of inheritance
from her mother who passed away due to complications in giving
birth to her
- Since Lulu did not finish elementary education, her father continued
to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties.
- When her father died, Hernandez (paternal aunt) assumed custody
over Lulu wherein she was asked to live in the basement with no
proper ventilation and her estate was not properly administered With
this, Santos filed for guardianship over Lulu
ISSUE: WON the testimony of an ordinary witness (attending physicians)
on the mental sanity of a person be admitted in evidence
a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted
- IN THIS CASE:Lulu’s attending physicians spoke and interacted
with her.
- Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior
and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her
THUS:Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
People v. Efren Castillo G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010
 - Castillo was charged by AAA, assited by her mother BBB, with the
crime of rape when Castillo knew that AAA was mentally retarded
but still committed sexual intercourse with her, against her will.
- When arraigned, Castillo pleaded not guilty.
- The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, Dr.
Antillon-Malimas, BBB, and delos Reyes-Villanueva.
- On the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution
established that AAA was 18 years old, the eldest of the four
children, she began attending school at at the age of 8, she was not
able to finish Grade 1 because of her epileptic seizures.
- The ordeal began when AAA approached Castillo in order to collect
his debt from the rice cake he bought from her mother. Instead of
settling his account, Castillo cuddled with AAA until they reached
the house of a certain Atok. Once inside, Castillo made her lie down
and removed her short pants and panty. The awful experience was
repeated. Thereafter, AAA told her mother was Castillo did to her.
- AAA was subjected to psychological tests to determine her mental
capacity. It showed that AAA has poor visual motor coordination
and low level mental functioning. Delos Reyes-Villanueva
concluded that AAA is suffering from mild to moderate mental
retardation.
- The trial court then rendered a decision finding Castillo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s mental retardedness was proven.
HELD
- YES. Under Sec. 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
the opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, bay be
received in evidence regarding the mental sanity of a person with
whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Accordingly, it is competent for
the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient
opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of
the person in question.
Character Evidence
Inadmissibility of character evidence; exceptions (Section 51)
People v. Felan G.R. No. 176631, February 2, 2011
c/o Lawrence
CSC v. Belagan,G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004
FACTS
- Magdalena Gapuz, founder and directress of Mother and Child
Learning center and Ligaya Anawi, a public school teacher at Fort
Del Pilar Elementary, filed a case against Dr. Allyson Belagan, the
Superintendent of DECS, for sexual indignities and harassment and
other malfeasances.
- When applying for a permit to operate a pre-school, Belagan, who
offered to conduct the inspection, suddenly plced his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Upon follow up of her
application, Belagan told her, “Magdate muna tayo.”
- When they reported the incident, Belagan merely denied
any personal relationship with Magdalena.
- On 4 occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind pulled her close to
him with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this, Ligaya
charged him with delaying teachers’ salaries, failing to release
differentials to substitutes, refusing to release teachers’ uniforms
and allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection and
Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations
- DECS Secretary found Belagan guilty and order the dismissal. CSC
affirmed
- Belagan filed a MR contending that he has never been charged of
any in his 37 years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged
with numerous offenses before MTC Baguio which casts a doubt on
her character, integrity, and credibility/
- 22 Criminal cases for light and grave oral defamation,
slight and serious physical injuries, grave threats,
malicious mischief, light threats, unjust vexation.
 - Also 23 complaints filed with the Brgy Chairman for unjust
vexation, grave threats, rumor mongering, oral defamation,
false accusation, harassment, habitual trouble maker in the
70s and 80s
- CSC denied MR

ISSUE: Is Magdalena a credible witness given the cases and complaints?

Yes

HELD
- Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a
time not too remote from the time in question.
- What is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not a period
remote from the commencement of the suit
- Character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.