PART NINE

JUDGMENT

I. Definition and form

-Rule 120, sec 1

Section 1. Judgment definition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is
guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil
liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law
upon which it is based. (1a)

-People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, 24 January 2003

People of the Philippines vs. Lizada
G.R. No. 143468-71 (January 24, 2003)

Callejo, Sr., J.

Basic requisites in promulgating judgment

FACTS: On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each
count. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and
those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said
decision. The trial court even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on him.

ISSUE/s: WON there was an irregularity with the promulgation of judgment;

HELD: YES. The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the
1987 Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” This requirement is
reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which reads:

“SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.—The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused
and the law upon which the judgment is based.” xxx

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act
to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.” (Italicization Supreme Court)

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 The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision
on how it was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the
relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The
parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were
accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. More substantial
reasons for the requirement are:

“For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the
decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for
review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned,
may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in
good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that
decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially
those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that
can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future
controversies.” Xxx

The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts, which had been proved, and its
conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for
its resolution. Trial courts should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of
both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion.

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to
the documentary evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on
each count.

The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on
their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well
as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The
trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant with the curt declaration in the decretal
portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court
swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision
why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision
of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence of accused-
appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial
court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of
the trial court is a good example of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.

The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the
decision of the trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert
further delay in the disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits
considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to
the Court. The parties filed their respective briefs articulating their respective stances on the factual
and legal issues.

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Final Ruling: the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE.
Another judgment is hereby rendered.1

-People v. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289 (1980)

G.R. No. L-37271 June 25, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ROMIE V. BRAGA, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAGNO B. PABLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third
Judicial District, Branch XIII, ROGELIO CARACE, GODOFREDO CARACE, GIL
CASTRENCE, ROGELIO CARANZA and DAMIAN SENIT, respondents.

De Castro J.:

Facts:

Rogelio Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio Caranzaand Damian Senit were charged
with Homicide for the killing of Benjamin Atcha. The accused pleaded not guilty. Several
postponements were made upon motion by the prosecutors and without objection on the part of
the defense. On July 17, 1973, for failure of its last witness, Dr. Francisco Q. Duque, to arrive, the
prosecution moved for postponement on the ground that Dr. Duque is a vital and indispensable
witness who would testify on the cause of death of the victim. The presiding judge, Hon. Magno B.
Pablo, denied the motion for postponement and ordered the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of its evidence. The prosecuting fiscal asked for reconsideration of the order denying
the motion for postponement, but the judge denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the
prosecution to file a second motion for reconsideration in writing, signed by both the fiscal and the
private prosecutor, stating inter alia:

4. That this is the first time that the prosecution is moving for a postponement of this case
or. the ground of the absence of the last witness Dr. Francisco Q. Duque and it appears on
the records that the subpoena sent to Dr. Duque was received by his secretary who may not
have conveyed the same to Dr. Duque and the second time on the part of the prosecution
since the beginning of the hearing on this case;
5. That to serve the better ends of justice the prosecution should be given another
opportunity at least to secure and resort to other processes to enable it to present Dr.
Francisco Q. Duque at the next scheduled hearing.

Still the judge denied the motion. Prosecution asked for 10 days within which to elevate the question
of the propriety of denial to the appellate court. Judge allowed, but still granted the Motion to
Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and Motion to Dismiss filed by the defense that afternoon.
Accused were also acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the prosecution’s motion to
postpone and granting defense’s motion to consider the prosecution’s case rested and to dismiss the
case.

HELD: Yes.

1 Appellant was still convicted

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RATIO:

The motion for postponement is justified because Dr. Duque is a vital witness as he can testify with
regard to the causal relation between the wounds inflicted by the accused and the victim’s death. The
alleged denial of the right to speedy trial as constitutionally granted to the accused was a flimsy
ground for the court to deny the postponement as requested by the prosecution, much less to
dismiss the case, without even a recital of the facts as established by the evidence already presented,
which appears to have at least proved the commission of a crime by the accused against the victim,
although perhaps a lesser one than the offense charged. He should have first given warning that
there will definitely be no further postponement after that which he reasonably thought should be
the last. He should also have ascertained whether Dr. Duque had personally known of the subpoena,
so that if despite his personal knowledge thereof, he failed to come to court, his arrest may be
ordered, as is the precise procedure enjoined upon the court to follow under Section 11, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court.

The records also disclose that trial was never postponed due to the non-appearance of Dr. Duque.
The first and only postponement sought on that ground was denied. The respondent aggravated his
indiscretion by not only denying the motion for postponement, but also in immediately granting the
defense written motion to consider the prosecution's case rested, without giving the prosecution a
chance to oppose the same, and without reviewing the evidence already presented fora proper
assessment as to what crime has been committed by the accused of which they may properly be
convicted thereunder, acquitted the said accused, although, realizing later the improvidence in his
action, he amended his order of acquittal of the accused to that of dismissal of the case. The order
of dismissal, under the circumstances pointed out above, would amount to an acquittal because
evidence had already been presented by the prosecution. An evaluation of said evidence is thus
indispensably required, where, as in this case, the evidence presented even if the prosecution's case is
considered submitted at a stage short of the presentation of its complete evidence, obviously suffices
to prove a crime, even if a lesser one than the offense charged. The order to dismiss was sought to
be justified upon an invocation of the right to speedy trial. Precisely, the respondent judge, allegedly,
to avoid a violation thereof, denied further postponement. It is therefore, a palpable error to base
the dismissal of the case, as the respondent judge did, on the ground of the violation of accused's
right to speedy trial. If at all, the dismissal may be decreed by reason of the failure of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused of any crime under the information, even on the basis of the
evidence presented when its case was deemed submitted on motion of the defense. The respondent
court, however, failed utterly to show this to be what actually obtained after the hearings held on at
least six days, as the order of the respondent judge acquitting the accused, or dismissing the case, as
he later amended his order, made no mention whatsoever of the evidence presented by the
prosecution during the six times the case was set, for hearing merely stating, by way of an obviously
baseless conclusion, that the guilt of the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
basis of the dismissal of the case is, therefore, both legally and factually incorrect. Aside from this
series of missteps and legal error committed by the respondent judge, which in their totality clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion, the records also show that the court, after denying the second
motion for postponement filed in writing by the prosecution, granted on request, the latter ten (10)
days within which to elevate the matter of the denial of the aforesaid second motion for
reconsideration. The respondent denies this fact, but We find the records demonstrably showing
respondent's denial totally devoid of truth. His alleging that to grant said request would be to defeat
his act of denying the motion for postponement seems only to show the erratic turn of his mind.
There is nothing inconsistent between denying the motion for postponement and allowing the
denial to be tested by a higher court where it is alleged that the respondent judge in denying
postponement, committed a grave abuse of discretion. A judge who refuses to have his judicial acts

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tested in a higher court would be acting with tyranny, a judicial norm hardly proper of one exercising
judicial function in the lower echelon of the judicial hierarchy.
-People v.Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Facts:
 Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. were found by the trial court guilty of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
 Vicente went to his office with his two kids. On their way, they saw Escober at his post. In the office,
Vicente took a bath. Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and went to the
office. Abuyen knocked at the gate. Escober opened and talked to Abuyen. Abuyen then told
Punzalan to wait outside.
 Mrs. Chua arrived. She noticed that the gate was open and saw Punzalan standing there. She shouted
to ask why and then she heard a gunshot coming from the garage. When she looked, she saw
Abuyen and Escober walking towards the gate. Escober volunteered the information that her
husband was not hit.
 When Vicente went out of the bathroom, he saw his kids mortally wounded.
 He also noticed that the drawers were open. The kids were rushed to the hospital but were declared
dead on arrival. They were found guilty and the penalty of death was imposed.

ISSUE:
WON the decision was null and void as it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the
proceedings had been transcribed.
HELD:

 A court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
 The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge’s tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced.
 Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without
specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony
of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing
out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a
credible witness.
 As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization
of the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is
practically impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were
sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.
 Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-
judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner.
 He obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of
stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings
personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did.
 The records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the witnesses on which he
apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at
the time of the rendition of the judgment.
 After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

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-People v Toling, 91 SCRA 382 (1979), G.R. No. L-28548 13 July
1979
SUBJECT: Judgement: Definition and Form

FACTS:

The Supreme Court automatic reviewed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur, dated December 1, 1967, in Criminal Case No. 3141, in view of the capital
punishment imposed on accused Rolando Cometa, Rogelio Cometa and Candelario Bolando. CFI
found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide, and
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of in band, nocturnity, dwelling, and treachery regarding
the killing of victim Isabelo Caseres with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same. All
defendants were imposed with Death penalty.

According to the Information filed against the accused, On 5 February 5 1966, at Barrio
Bagong Gutlang, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, the defendants conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, armed with a home-made shot gun, bolos, with intent of gain, by
means of force and violence against persons and with intent to kill with the use of said firearms, shot
the victim Caseres thereby hitting and inflicting gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body,
which caused his death. The defendants then entered the dwelling of one Francisco Lumpayao, a
neighbor of the deceased Isabelo Caseres and once inside, took his personal household belongings
without his knowledge and consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in convicting the accuses of Robbery in a Band
with Homicide

HELD: No. The appellants should not have been convicted of Robbery in Band with Homicide.

Rogelio Cometa positively declared that for a price of P50.00, he joined Francisco Toling in
the latter's plan to kill Isabelo Caseres of Barrio Bagong Gutlang in consideration of a reward of
P250.00 promised by Magno Sejuela who wanted Isabelo Caseres to be killed. Relating this
declaration with the shooting and killing of Isabelo Caseres by Francisco Toling, We cannot escape
the conclusion that indeed the purpose of the group was to kill Caseres. In this connection, We
hasten to state that while Candelario Bolando stated that he was told along the way that their
purpose was to rob Francisco Lumpayao, said statement cannot prevail over the positive declaration
of Rogelio Cometa as to their purpose, it appearing that Francisco Toling, who did the killing, and
his brother-in-law, Rogelio Cometa, were the ones who organized and led the group in the criminal
enterprise. It is not improbable that they did not immediately reveal to Bolando their criminal
purpose in order to induce the latter to go with them. They were the leaders, while Candelario was
merely a minor follower. Indeed, the actuations of the appellants indicated that the robbery was an
afterthought which arose only when they saw that Lumpayao and his family have, because of fear,
abandoned their house.
RATIO:
The rules is that where the original design comprehends robbery in a dwelling, and homicide
is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, the crime committed is the complex
offense of robbery with homicide even though homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable
time. If the original design was not to commit robbery but robbery was committed after the
homicide as an afterthought as a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should
be viewed as constitutive of two distinct offenses and not as a single complex offense.

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 The rule is that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support
the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the other.
Where the defendant is charged with robbery with homicide, he may be convicted of one of
them.
Likewise, when a person is charged with a crime and the evidence does not show that he is
guilty of the crime charged, but does show that he is guilty of some lesser offense, the court may
sentence him for the lesser offense provided the lesser offense is a cognate offense and is included
in the complaint filed with the court.

In the instant case, it should be noted that the crime charged was Robbery with Homicide,
which being a special complex crime is definitely higher than the single crimes of homicide and
robbery. If there is no express or implied conspiracy among two or more persons taking part in the
commission of the crime, then their liability is regarded as individual or separate. Here, conspiracy
has not been sufficiently proven. It does not appear that the appellants had a common plan or
common criminal design.

II. Types of judgments and remedies against such judgment

A. Acquittal

-Rule 120, sec. 2 [par.2]

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 21

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

-Rule 117, secs 2 (i) & 7

Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:

Xxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

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 However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a
plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor
and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver
offense. (7a)

-Galman v Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986) G.R. No. 72670

(September 12, 1986)
Teehankee, C.J.

No Double Jeopardy subsequent to a void judgment of acquittal promulgated after an invalid

proceeding

FACTS: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are
unconvinced on the participation of Rolando Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and
branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and
Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused
as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos
who insists on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder
charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo
Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other
petitioners filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people
when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and
documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased,
prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts
the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination."

ISSUE/s: 1. WON the judgment of acquittal was valid;

2. WON the rule of Double Jeopardy arose.

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HELD:
1. The Planned Acquittal. NO. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law
and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories
of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who
seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear
or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where
the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian
he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for
due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is
constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial, the non-trial of the century, and that the
pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. (Boldfacing Daryl)

2. Double Jeopardy. NO. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed
in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,

“Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and

prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue, which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process
is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation
may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head.”
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.”

More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as
we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent

9
 of an the respondents-accused. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses
and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan
maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the
proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. Manifestly,
the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and
biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted
verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no
judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To
paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he
breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.

Final Ruling: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. Judgment is hereby
rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of
acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen.
Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted
with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that
the truth may be finally known and justice done. This resolution is immediately executory.

-Rule 65, sec. 1, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

Manantan VS. CA 350 SCRA 387 (2001)

FACTS:

In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully
and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and
damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of
Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of
homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil
aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him
to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused
intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.

ISSUE:
WON the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.

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HELD:
Decision affirmed. While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly
imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is
not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of
Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding
indemnity and damages.

This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages
is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment
in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is
that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29
applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless
imprudence.

B. Conviction

-Rule 120, sec. 2 [par1]

Section 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

-Rule 121, 122-125

Check the provisions under the Rules of Criminal Procedure

-Rule 119, sec 24

Section 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a
miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
grating it. (n)

C. Judgment in particular instances

1. Judgment for two or more offenses

-Rule 120, sec 3

Section 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him
of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense,
setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense. (3a)

11
 2. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof

-Rule 120, sec 4

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved. (4a)

-People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 (1989), G.R. No. L- 65017

(November 13, 1989)
Sarmiento J.

FACTS:
On November 29, 1980, Joselito de los Reyes together with Teofilo Martinez attended a
dance sponsored by the San Agustin Barangay High School. Teofilo saw Eduardo Romero (still at
large) and appellant Stalin Guevarra together at the dance hall. The affair was interrupted abruptly
when someone stoned the school. At about midnight, Joselito and Teofilo went home. Together
with them were Rosabel Magno and Babylyn Martinez who were students. Along the way, Teofilo
held a flashlight to illuminate the rocky path whereon Joselito, Rosabel, and Babylyn walked.
Suddenly, they were waylaid by Stalin and Eduardo. Appellant Stalin went immediately behind
Joselito, and embraced him with both hands. Joselito struggled from the clutches of Stalin
but in vain; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both arms of Joselito. Facing the
hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket, opened it, and thrust the shiny and
pointed end of the weapon at the right side of Joselito's body just below his navel. "May tama
ako," were the words uttered by Joselito just before he fell to the ground. Teofilo, Babylyn, and
Rosabel froze where they stood. The abruptness of the incident petrified them. But after the
stabbing the assailants fled in the direction of San Agustin and disappeared in the dark. The beam of
light from the flashlight Teofilo carried, however, was sufficient to enable him and his two female
companions to witness clearly the stabbing of Joselito and to recognize the appellant and Eduardo
Romero, both known to them (Teofilo, Babylyn, and Rosabel), as the perpetrators of the crime.
Joselito de los Reyes died because of the stabbing incident.

Information was filed against the appellant and he was charged with the crime of murder
because the killing is qualified by premeditation. The appellant was found guilty by lower
courts of the charged crime in the information. In his attempt to absolve himself of guilt, the
appellant contends that there is an absolute variance between the allegations in the
information and the proofs presented by the prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE: WON there is an absolute variance between the allegations in the information and the
proofs presented;

HELD: NO. The appellant cooperated with Romero in the commission of the offense
by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Therefore, the appellant is guilty
as a principal by indispensable cooperation.

However, the SC do not agree with the findings of the CA that the crime committed by the
appellant is "murder as the killing is qualified by evident premeditation.". Not one of the
three basic elements of evident premeditation was proven, to wit: First, the time when the

12
offender determined to commit the crime itself, second, an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had tenaciously clung to his obsession to commit the crime; and third, a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his
act. On the other hand, what the evidence on record shows is that both the appellant and Romero,
assaulted the victim spontaneously and cooperated fully. This circumstance, we rule, precludes
evident premidatation.

Be that as it may, the crime committed is still murder, the killing being qualified by
treachery. The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that the attack by Romero, with
the indispensable The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that the attack by Romero,
with the indispensable cooperation of the appellant, was so sudden and unexpected as to
deprive the victim of any opportunity to defend himself or to inflict retaliation.

Final ruling: The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the civil
indemnity which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.

-Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680 (1988)

J. Cortez

FACTS:
An information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed
against the herein petitioner, Ramon SAYSON before the CFI of Manila.
A blank US dollar check of Bank of America came into the possession of SAYSON. With intent to
defraud one Ernesto Rufino and/or the Bank of America, SAYSON allegedly filled out said blank
check and made it appear as though said check was issued to one Atty. Norberto Perez (as payee) in
the amount of US$ 2,250 by the Bank. By means of similar deceits, SAYSON allegedly induced
Rufino to change the check at the prevailing exchange rate, the total sum amounting to P14, 850.
SAYSON was friends with the private secretary of Rufino (owner of theatres in need of dollars). His
friend, however, knew him not as SAYSON but as Fiscal/Atty. Norberto Perez. When he learned
that his friend’s boss (Rufino) needed dollars, he offered his perjured check for exchange. Rufino
issued him checks in peso. When SAYSON went to the bank to encash Rufino’s check in his name
(posing as Atty. Perez), the bank teller, being the diligent employee that she is, inquired and verified
all the documents he has presented to her for encashing purposes. She called the phone number he
provided, sent a messenger to the home address SAYSON provided, etc. When she found out all of
them were lies, she called and notified Rufino and the police.
SAYSON was duly arraigned where he pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. Despite several
postponements, the prosecution rested its case. On the scheduled day of the hearing, only SAYSON
appeared in court. He said that his counsel had another case in a different court. Contrary to such
statement, on the morning of the said day, his counsel has sent a telegram to the court requesting
cancellation of the hearing because he was sick. TC denied the motion for postponement and the
case was considered submitted for decision without petitioner's evidence.
TC ultimately found accused SAYSON guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed but modified the penalty by imposing six months of arresto mayor
and eliminating the fine.
Unsatisfied, SAYSON comes now with this petition for review on certiorari raising the following:

13
ISSUE:
WON SAYSON was denied due process when he was unable to present his evidence and convicted
thereupon.

HELD: NO. The instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in toto.

RATIO:
The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the accused. But
while the accused has such a right, the same is not exempt from the rule on WAIVER as long as the
waiver is not controverted to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made.
SAYSON, however, avers that he was not inclined to waive his right to present evidence and his
actuations during trial only suggests that he was vehemently asserting such a right by way of his
verbal motion of postponement due to absence of counsel de parte.
Unfortunately for SAYSON, it is a well established a rule that the grant or refusal of an application
for continuance or postponement of the trial lies within the sound discretion of the court. And the
ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonable degree of judicial acumen and
fairness, it is one which the higher court is loath to review or disturb. The trial judge must be to a
certain extent free to secure speedy and expeditious trials when such speed and expedition are not
inconsistent with fairness. As such, the TC is afforded the favorable presumption of regularity in
ruling on continuances or postponements.
Trial judges are in the best position to form the correct opinion upon the cases before them due to
their peculiar (personal) knowledge of all relevant circumstances presented.
It would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the action of the trial court a denial of
due process
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the information was filed on March 1972, but the arraignment was held
December of the following year. The prosecution started presenting its evidence March 1973 and
after 1 year, 10 months and 1 day, only then did it rest its case. During this whole time, SAYSON
had already secured 7postponements.
This is a notoriously postponed case. Hence, the judge was right to declare that "the defense had
abused the rules." No grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement
can be imputed to the trial court.
In any case, the denial of SAYSON’s motion to postpone is not without other basis.
For starters, it was filed out of time; there was no 3-day notice as required by the rules (Rule 15, Sec.
4, ROC); motion was also not accompanied by an affidavit nor a medical certificate to support the
alleged illness of counsel as required under Rule 22, Sec 5; lastly, there was a conflict between
SAYSON’s excuse for his counsel’s absence and his counsel’s own sorry excuse with the court he
sent via telegram.
His motion for postponement was properly denied.

The last issue dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between the prosecution's allegation and
proof.
SAYSON firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him because the charge in the information is so much
different from the acts proved in court.
This is UNTENABLE.
SAYSON maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the information charging him of
“attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America” because the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution show very clearly that the he allegedly attempted to defraud
Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr.

14
The rule in this jurisdiction is: "variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence
offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal.
Also, it has been repeatedly held that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint
with sufficient certainties to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the defendant.
The above ruling finds support in the Rules of Criminal Procedure where despite the requirement
that the complaint/information should state the name and surname of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Sec 12, ROC), the designation of the name of the offended party
is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.
IN THE INSTANT CASE FOR Estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal
Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.

-Vino v People, 178 SCRA 626 (1989) G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

About 7:00 PM of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house to go to the house of
Isidro Salazar to watch television. At 11:00 PM of the same date, Ernesto, the father of Roberto,
heard two gunshots. He heard his son cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot.

Ernesto, upon switching on the lights and seeing his son wounded, called out for help from
their neighbors. Subsequently, Ernesto saw appellant herein Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a
bicycle coming from the south towards their direction. Vino was driving while Salazar was carrying
an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto’s house, the two assailants stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar
pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

Roberto was brought to the hospital. He was still conscious and alive such that PC/Col.
Bernardo Cacananta was still able to take his ante-mortem statement. Roberto identified Jessie
Salazar as his assailant. He signed his statement with his own blood. Soon after, Roberto died.

On account of the victim’s statement and the testimonies of other witnesses, Vino and Sgt.
Salazar were charged with murder before the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. The
MTC Judge however referred the case against Salazar to the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO) as he was a member of the military. Meanwhile, the case against Vino was given due course
by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Vino was charged with the crime of murder in the
Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.

During the arraignment, Vino entered a plea of not guilty. The trial commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence on his own behalf,
Vino filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence.

15
 The RTC rendered a decision finding accused GUILTY as an accessory to the crime of
murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as minimum to
prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

Accused Vino appealed said conviction with the Court of Appeals (CA) but the same was
denied, TC’s decision was affirmed in toto; hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the appeal, JAGO has remanded Sgt. Salazar’s case to the civil
courts as he was already discharged from military service. Sgt. Salazar was tried and prosecuted in
the RTC for the crime committed but he was acquitted.

Accused (herein petitioner) Vino, through his counsel, filed a supplemental pleading
informing the SC of the acquittal of Sgt. Salazar.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON Vino’s conviction as an accessory can be sustained even when the information charged him
as a principal.

2. WON a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the
alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

HELD: The petition was DISMISSED by the Court. The Motion for Reconsideration was also
DENIED with FINALITY.

RATIONALE:

1. YES. This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved
or established by the evidence.

Section 4, Rule 120 states that:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. —

When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved. (4a)

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission
of the said crime was established by the evidence; thus, there is no variance as to the offense
committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of petitioner. While petitioner was
being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence however showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory.

Petitioner Vino was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the
commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the
crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was
the assailant. That the petitioner Vino was present during its commission or must have known its

16
commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen
driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly
thereafter. Thus, petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an
accessory.

2. YES. The trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal.

The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct
from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of
the principal.

Thus, it follows that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal, the accessory may
nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established. The acquittal of the principal will only
work as an acquittal for the accessory if such acquittal was based of the finding that no crime was
committed in as much as the same has happened by accident.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of Vino as
an accessory was established. As to Sgt. Salazar’s acquittal, it must be noted that he was acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt. In Salazar’s trial, prosecution was not able to present
convincing evidence such that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established.

The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the prosecution of the
accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be identified, the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is
indubitable.

3. Guidelines for judging Juveniles in Conflict with the Law

-RJCL, sec 30

Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the social worker assigned
to the child shall immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the child and the child's family, the
child's environment and such other matters relevant to aid the court in the proper disposition of the
case. The report shall be submitted to the court preferably before arraignment. If not available at
that time, the Report must be submitted to the court as soon as possible.

III. Promulgation

A. Promulgation

-Rule 120, sec 6

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of

the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the clerk of court.

17
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated
by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by
the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused
tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at
his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice,
the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)

-RJCL, sec 31

Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a Diversion Committee
composed of its Branch Clerk of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public
Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the social worker assigned by the court to the child, as
members.

B. Modification

-Rule 120, sec 7

Section 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived
in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)

-Rule 119, sec 24

Section 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a
miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
grating it. (n)

Cf. Rule 121

18
 C. Finality of judgment

-Rule 120, sec. 8

Section 8. Entry of judgment. — After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance
with Rule 36.

-Rule 120, sec. 7 [second sentence] (in death penalty cases)

Section 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived
in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

SUMMARY:

Q: What is judgment?

A: It is an adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and
the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any (Sec. 1). It is a judicial act which settles
the issues, fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties, and is regarded as the sentence of the law
pronounced by the court on the action or question before it (Sec. 1, Rule 120).

Q: What are the requisites of judgment?

A: It must be: 1. Written in official language; 2. Personally and directly prepared by the judge; 3.
Signed by the judge; and 4. Contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon
which it is based (Sec. 1, Rule 120). Note: Decisions of the court shall contain the facts and the law
on which they are based (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The rationale is that the losing party
is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court.

Q: How is entry of judgment made?

A: The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its
entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment order and shall be signed by the
clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or order has become final and executory(Sec. 2, Rule 36).

Q: What is mittimus?

A: It is a process issued by the court after conviction to carry out the final judgment, such as
commanding a prison warden to hold the accused in accordance with the terms of judgment.

Q: What is reasonable doubt?

A: Reasonable doubt is defined as the state of the case which, after full consideration of all evidence,
leaves the mind of the judge in such a condition that he cannot say that he feels an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.

19
Q: What is acquittal?

A: An acquittal is a finding of not guilty based on the merits, that is, the accused is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that his guilt is beyond reasonable doubt, or a dismissal of the case after
the prosecution has rested its case upon motion of the accused on the ground that the evidence fails
to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.

Note: It is well settled that acquittal, in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in
double jeopardy (Barbers v. Laguio Jr., AM No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001).

Q: Is there a maximum duration for the court’s sentence?

A: YES. In the service of sentence, the maximum duration of the court’s sentence shall not be more
than three- fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
the accused, and such maximum shall in no case exceed forty years.

Q: What are the contents of judgment?

A: The judgment must state:

1. If of conviction
a. Legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending its commission;
b. Participation of the accused whether as principal, accomplice or accessory;
c. Penalty imposed upon the accused; and
d. Civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission unless a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived.

2. If of acquittal
a. Whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
b. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did exist (Sec. 2, Rule 120).

Q: What is the rule regarding a judgment for two or more offenses charged in the complaint
or information?

A: The court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense (Sec.
3)
Note: Failure of the accused to object to the duplicity of offense charged in the complaint or
information, is deemed a waiver thereof (Herrera, Vol. IV, p. 882, 2007 ed.).

Q: What is the rule regarding a judgment in case of variance between the offense charged
and proved?

A: GR: An accused can be convicted of an offense only when it is both charged and proved; if it is
not charged although proved, or if it is not proved although charged, the accused CANNOT be
convicted thereof.

20
Xception: Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved AND the offense as charged is included in or is necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (Sec. 4).

Note: An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information for
this will be in violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged against him (Herrera, Vol. IV, p. 882, 2007 ed.).

Q: What happens when an offense includes or is included in another?

A: GR: If what is proved by the prosecution evidence is an offense which is included in the offense
charged in the information, the accused may validly be convicted of the offense proved. An offense
charged NECESSARILY INCLUDES the offense proved when some of the essential ingredients or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. An offense
charged NECESSARILY INCLUDED in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Xception: Where the facts supervened after the filing of information which changed the nature of
the offense.(Sec. 5).
Note: An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the crime
charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already prescribed
(Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983).

Q: What is the effect of the judgment of conviction upon a minor?

A: The courts shall promulgate the sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may
have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to
P.D. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. In which case, the child shall have been committed
under the care of the DSWD or any other accredited government institution until he reaches the age
of twenty one (21) or until the court so determines (Sec. 40, R.A. 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006).

Q: What are the exceptions for suspension of sentence of youthful offenders?

A: Offender: 1. has enjoyed previous suspension of sentence; 2. is convicted of a crime punishable

by death or life imprisonment; 3. is convicted by a military tribunal; or 4. is already of age at the time
of sentencing even if he was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime (Declarador v.
Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, Aug. 18, 2006).

Q: What if the minor already reached the age of majority upon the promulgation of his
sentence?

A: He is no longer entitled to the suspension of sentence. However, the time he spent during the
period of his confinement shall be credited to his actual service of sentence. Furthermore, he shall
still be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (People v. Francisco, G.R. No.
102976, Oct. 25, 1995; R.A. 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006).

Q: What is probation?

A: A disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is subject to conditions
imposed by the court and under the supervision of a probation officer (Sec. 3, PD 968, Probation
Law).

21
Q: What is promulgation of judgment?

A: It is the official proclamation or announcement of judgment. It consists of reading the judgment

or sentence in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court rendering the judgment.

Q: How is judgment promulgated?

A: It is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court which
rendered it (Sec. 6).

Q: Is the accused required to be present during the promulgation of judgment?

A: GR: Yes.

Xceptions:
1. In case of acquittal;
2. Conviction of light offense wherein the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of the
accused’s counsel or representative; and
3. Promulgation of judgment when the accused was tried in absentia(Sec. 6).

Q: Who promulgates the judgment?

A: GR: The judge of the court who renders the judgment.

Xception: When: 1. The judge is absent or outside the province or city – judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court; and 2. Accused is confined or detained in another city – judgment
may be promulgated by the executive judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention (Sec. 6).

Q: Is the presence of the accused indispensable in the promulgation of judgment?

A: No. The promulgation shall still be made by recording such judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof in his last known address or through his counsel. If judgment is one of
conviction and the accused is absent without justifiable cause, the court shall order his arrest and he
shall lose the remedies available in the rules against judgment and his bail shall be forfeited.
However, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies
within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of judgment. If such motion is granted, he may avail
of these remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice of such order granting the motion (Sec. 6).

Note: He must however, state the reasons for his absence at the promulgation and prove that his
absence was for a justifiable cause.

Q: What are the instances when judgment may be promulgated even if the accused is not
present?

A: 1. Judgment is for a light offense, in which case judgment may be promulgated in the presence of
the counsel for the accused or a representative. 2. Accused fails to attend the promulgation despite
due notice or if he jumped bail or escaped from prison. Notice must be given to the bondsmen,
warden, accused’s bailor and counsel (Sec. 6).

Q: How is promulgation in absentia conducted?

A: Promulgation shall be made by: 1. Recording the judgment in the criminal docket; and 2. Serving
the accused a copy thereof at his last known address or through his counsel.

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Q: What is the remedy if the judgment fails to award civil liability?

A: 1. Appeal; 2. Certiorari; or 3. Mandamus

Q: When does judgment becomes final?

A: Judgment becomes final: 1. After the lapse of time for perfecting an appeal 2. When the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied 3. When the accused has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal 4. When the accused has applied for probation

Q: When may the trial court lose jurisdiction even before the lapse of the 15 day period?

A: The trial court loses jurisdiction even before the lapse of the 15 day period when: 1. The
defendant voluntarily submits to the execution of the judgment; 2. When the defendant perfects an
appeal; 3. Defendant withdraws his appeal; 4. Accused expressly waives in writing his right to appeal;
5. Accused files for probation.

PART TEN
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

I. Remedies from a Judgment of Acquittal

-Rule 65, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

RULE 65

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

23
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46. (2a)

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)

Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed relates to the acts or
omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the
petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded
in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not
against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
impleaded as public respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.
If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included
therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall
not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (5a)

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Section 6. Order to comment. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the
respondents in such manner as the court may direct together with a copy of the petition and any
annexes thereto.

In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of
section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the
respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court
may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other pleadings as it may deem
necessary and proper. (6a)

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in which the petition is filed may issue
orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case. (7a)

Section 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. — After the comment or other pleadings required by the
court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require
the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or submission of memoranda or the
expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of the petition are
true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.

The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit,
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. (8a)

Section 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy of the judgment rendered in
accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct,
and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or
costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39. (9a)

-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 21

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Dimatulac v Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998) G.R. No. 127107 (October
12, 1998)
Davide, Jr., J.:

LESSON: Acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case, in cases where the State was deprived
due process, is considered void. Same is true with arraignments.

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FACTS: On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the MCTC of Macabebe-
Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against
Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti
David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito
Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain “Danny,” and a
certain “Koyang/Arding.” After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Serafin B. David of the MCTC issued
warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.

Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were
arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.

On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution in

Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions
were as follows:
“xxx The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses presented, [is] satisfied
that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and
confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be
remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga.” (Underscoring Supreme Court)

Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a

reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu
proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut
(hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the
MCTC, except accused “Danny” and “Koyang/Arding,” submitted their counter-affidavits to
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.

In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores

found that the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in
conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder.

On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein
petitioners, appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).

In a letter addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent
Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary
Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
Pampanga “to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder,” and to
include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information.

The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already been arraigned and they
would be put under double jeopardy. Thus, Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the
appeal was held moot and academic due to the previous arraignment of the accused for homicide.
(Underscoring mine)

Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus

26
ISSUE/S: WON the Yabuts can interpose the defense of double jeopardy.

HELD: NO, they cannot for the arraignment made should be considered void.

RATIO: [F]or justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be
equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it
could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.

In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura
and Villon was gross, grave and palpable, denying the State and the offended parties their day in
court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying
as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the
denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not
guilty.

We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere
ministerial task to process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our
democratic society under a rule of law.

Furthermore, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996
resolution, holding that murder was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to
accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had
already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over
the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly
surrendered to the latter’s inappropriate conduct or even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect
of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of
Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or
commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime
committed was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and
the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking
bolder steps to rectify the shocking “mistakes” so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent
further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined
cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers
over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service in not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in
view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case,
and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further
participating in the case. (Underscoring mine)
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to
determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as
early as 23 February 1996.

We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio “reconsideration” of the 7 June 1996
resolution of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

27
 It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those
cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above
discussed. (Underscoring mine)

- Saturnina Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 72670

(September 12, 1986)
Teehankee, C.J.
Attachment of Legal Jeopardy

FACTS: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of the late Sen. Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed
that they are unconvinced on the participation of Rolando Galman as the assassin of Aquino and
branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and
Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President
Marcos who insists on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of
murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked
later on. As planned, all accused were later acquitted in the judgment promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan.
The Supreme Court resolved the case by declaring the trial in the Sandiganbayan as a sham, hence
void ab initio.

ISSUE/s: WON the Double Jeopardy can be invoked by the individuals acquitted by
the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: NO. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court
stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
“Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue, which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head.”
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.

28
 In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.” (Citations omitted.
Italicization Supreme Court, boldfacing Yanga)

Final Ruling: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. Judgment is hereby
rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of
acquittal.

II. Remedies from a Judgment of Conviction

A. Before finality of Judgment

1. Motion for New Trial

-Rule 121, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6

Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final,
the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused,
grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)

Section 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;

(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)

Section 3. Ground for reconsideration. — The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors
of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (3a)

Section 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. — The motion for a new trial or reconsideration
shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on a newly-discovered
evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is
expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are proposed to be
introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the
prosecutor. (4a)

Section 5. Hearing on motion. — Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any question
of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise. (5a)

Section 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken
anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

29
 (b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment
shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)

-Rule 124, secs. 14 & 15

Section 14. Motion for new trial. — At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the appellant becomes final,
the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material to his
defense. The motion shall conform with the provisions of section 4, Rule 121. (14a)

Section 15. Where new trial conducted. — When a new trial is granted, the Court of Appeals may
conduct the hearing and receive evidence as provided in section 12 of this Rule or refer the trial to
the court of origin. (15a)

-People v Almendras, 401 SCRA 555, G.R. No. 145915, April 24, 2003
QUISUMBING, J:

Unreasonable delay caused by Counsel – remand to trial court was granted

Facts: Appellants were arrested by operatives of the PNP NARCOM as a result of a "buy-bust"
operation held in Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol, Calamba, Laguna against herein
appellants for selling and possessing 1kilo of Shabu. Interrogation by the PNP NARCOM
operatives revealed that "Apple" was Vilma Almendras y Zapata while "Scout" was her husband,
Arsenio Almendras y Locsin. The defense counsel moved for leave to file a Motion for Demurrer to
Evidence and the admission of said Demurrer with Alternative Prayer for Bail. The defense
submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the element of lack of authority to sell and deliver
the alleged shabu. It further alleged that the prosecution failed to present any concrete evidence
establishing that the substance tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory was the same substance seized
from appellants. The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.

The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction before the CA alleging that the trial court gravely abused its judicial discretion in denying
their Demurrer to Evidence and in denying their prayer for bail. Also, defense counsel moved to
suspend proceedings in Criminal Case pending the final disposition by the CA of their petition for
Certiorari. The trial court cancelled the scheduled hearing and reset new hearing dates however,
defense counsel failed to appear on these dates several times making the Trial Court to appoint
counsel de officio. When trial continued, appellants refused to testify in court and reset the hearing
with warning that in the event the defense failed to adduce its evidence on said date, the defense
would be considered as having waived its right to present evidence and Criminal Case would be
deemed submitted for decision.

30
Appellants filed a Motion for an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial Courtesy in their pending
petition at the CA. They prayed that the appellate court issue an order enjoining the trial court to
observe judicial courtesy by suspending proceedings in Criminal Case so as not to preempt the
decision of the appellate court in their pending petition for certiorari at the CA. Appellants
contended that the order of the trial court compelling them to present their evidence with assistance
of a counsel de oficio was violative of their right to due process. Appellants moved that the trial court
judge voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing Criminal Case. This motion was denied by the Trial
Court. Meanwhile, after due consultation, Atty. Carambas manifested that the Almendras spouses
told him that they would not testify in court unless assisted by Atty. Jimenez. When questioned by the
lower court, appellants affirmed the manifestation of Atty. Carambas. The prosecution then moved
that the defense be deemed to have waived its right to present its evidence and the case be
considered submitted for decision. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion and set
promulgation of judgment. Appellants then filed in CA a Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
TRO.

The then trial court promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty sentencing both appellants to
death. Hence, the need for this automatic review of the appellants’ conviction and sentence by this
Court. Meanwhile, Atty. Jimenez moved for leave to enter his appearance as counsel for appellant
Arsenio Almendras and admit his constancia. We directed Atty. Jimenez to file a brief for appellants.
In appellant’s brief he filed before this Court, he now prays for the alternative relief of remanding the
instant case to the lower court for the reception of evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the case shall be remanded to the trial court?

Held: YES, court considers "interest of justice and in view of the death penalty imposed on
appellants,

The postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a matter
which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be exercised wisely,
considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view to doing substantial
justice. Here, appellants lost their chance to present evidence due to the delaying strategy of their
original counsel of record. Recall that after the prosecution has rested its case, he filed a Demurrer
to Evidence that was denied by the trial court. Having expressed his intention to seek relief from
this Court, the trial court gave the defense 3 months before resuming with the reception of defense
evidence. Although there was no order from the CA enjoining the court a quo from resuming its
proceedings, the trial court postponed the resumption of hearing for 6 months so as not to pre-empt
the action of the CA on appellant’s prayer for TRO. Despite the 6-month leeway given by the trial
court to defense counsel, he failed to appear in several hearings. Due to the persistent absences of
their counsel, in the subsequent settings, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for appellants with
a warning that failure of the defense to present evidence would be considered waiver of their right to
present their evidence. Still undaunted by said warning, defense counsel filed a Motion for an Order
Enjoining Observance of Judicial Courtesy with the CA. He moved for the voluntary inhibition of
the hearing judge. Defense counsel Jimenez caused no less than 15 continuances in a span of two
years. Delay is obviously the name of his game.

The case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, which was filed by
defense counsel with the CA to assail the trial court’s denial of their demurrer to evidence, did not
interrupt the course of the principal action in the Criminal Case nor the running of the reglementary

31
periods involved in the proceedings. Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal
action during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. There was none in the
instant case. The rule is settled as far back as People v. Mercado that the judicial action on the motion
for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself is left to the exercise of the
court’s sound judicial discretion. Section 23 of Rule 119, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." As may be gleaned from
the records, defense counsel apparently lost sight of the above-mentioned cardinal rules of
procedure. In filing motions of various denominations, namely: Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
Motion for an Order Enjoining Observance of Judicial Courtesy, Urgent Motion for Further
Continuance, and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, all anchored on the certiorari case pending with
the CA, counsel regrettably exposed his disregard of quite elementary legal principles, in the false
hope of gaining tempo in the pursuit of dilatory tactics.

-People v Datu, G.R. No. 136796, 19 February 2003

FACTS:
The Datu family sold a dump truck to the victim, Antonio Chan. Out of the 4 postdated checks
issued, only three were honored. Romeo Datu, who was the manager of their family business
confronted the victim about the dishonored check but the former refused to entertain the victim’s
explanation. Romeo Datu devised and executed a plan to kill Antonio Chan together with Madayag,
Batuelo and four others. Bothered by his conscience, Madayag disclosed to his wife that he had
participated in the killing of Antonio Chan. They decided to refer his problem to his wife’s second
cousin, an Army intelligence operative, Sgt. Flordelito Sabuyas. Madayag met with the victim’s wife
and the latter agreed to forgive him if he would tell the truth. Madayag executed a statement
implicating Datu and Batuelo in the killing of Antonio Chan. Datu, Batuelo and several Does were
charged with murder. Datu and Batuelo were arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. The Trial Court directed the prosecution to amend the information to include
Madayag as an accused, in view of his extrajudicial confession admitting participation in the crime.
During trial, Madayag moved for discharge as a state witness. The Trial Court granted Madayag’s
motion for discharge as a state witness. The Trial Court rendered a judgement finding Datu guilty as
principal by induction and Batuelo by direct and indispensable participation and sentenced them to
suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection. Appellants filed a motion for new
trial/mistrial on the ground that the prosecution witness, Sgt. Flordelito Sabuyas, executed an
affidavit retracting his previous statements and instead declared that the wife of the victim and
Madayag framed up Datu and Batuelo. The prosecution opposed the motion. The Trial Court
denied the motion for new trial/mistrial for being “pro forma”. Appellants filed a supplemental
motion for new trial, to which was attached an affidavit executed by one Roosevelt Salvador, who
alleged that Madayag lied under oath and was physically manhandled to testify for the prosecution.
The Trial Court denied the supplemental motion on the ground that since the case records had been
elevated to Supreme Court for automatic review, the motion had become moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
RULING: Yes, because under Section 2 (b) Rule 121 of the Rules of Court an accused may move
for new trial on the ground of newly discovered material evidence.

32
 RATIO DECIDENDI:
For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requirements must be
met:
1. the evidence is discovered after trial;
2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and
3. The evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight
that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
In this case, the alleged newly discovered evidence consists of the affidavit of Roosevelt Salvador
declaring that he and several military men, including Sgt. Sabuyas, abducted, then manhandled and
physically abused Domingo Madayag to admit complicity in the killing of Antonio Chan and, as state
witness, implicate appellant Datu. Salvador further declared that Madayag only agreed to cooperate
after the victim’s wife offered him a more than reasonable financial package in exchange for his
testimony in court pinning down appellants herein. The statement made by Salvador after the trial a
quo was finished, is evidence which appellants could not have secured during the trial, such that it
must be considered as newly discovered evidence that may be presented in a new trial. More so, as
his statement as evidence, while mainly of an impeaching character, is material enough that could
change the results. Sabuyas’ testimony in court has been described as “worthy of note” and “the key
to the solution of the case.” But with his recantation, it is as if that “key” no longer fits to unlock
completely the truth in the case. A trial is primarily a quest for truth, where the parties are given full
opportunity to adduce evidence to ferret out the truth. Given the gravity of the offense charged and
the severity of the sentence imposed, even a mere shadow of doubt in this case might vitiate the
result reached below. Hence, the Supreme Court disposed to make sure that every piece of
pertinent material evidence be adduced before the trial court. It was held in the case of People vs.
Ebias that the Supreme Court cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and impose
upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him may be presented
by him in a new trial.
CONCLUSION: The assailed decision by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela is VACATED and the case is
hereby REMANDED for further proceedings. Both the accused Datu and Batuelo should be
allowed to present newly discovered evidence in their defense and such other evidence as the court
may allow to be introduced and taken for consideration together with the evidence already in the
records.

-People v Ebias, G.R. No. 127130, 12 October 2000 G.R. No. 127130,
October 12, 2000
Mendoza, J

New trial based on written confession was granted since no less than life was at stake

FACTS:
On July 7, 1994 at around 12 noon, Ronaldo Narez and his cousin, Tirso Narez, went to get some
jackfruit in Barangay Dambo, Pangil, Laguna. On their way, they saw two men sitting by the
roadside. As they were nearing the place where the two men were, the latter waved at them. Ronaldo
and Tirso Narez ignored the summon and continued walking. When they were about 15 meters
from the men, they heard one of the men, who was brandishing a bolo, say “Boy, tirahin mo na.” The
other man then drew his sulpak and shot them. Ronaldo and Tirso Narez ran towards the kaingin.
Ronaldo Narez realized that his right leg was bleeding. Nonetheless, he managed to reach his house
and told his father what had happened. Ronaldo was taken to the Pakil Hospital for treatment.
Tirso, who had also been taken to the same hospital, suffered a gunshot wound on his stomach. He
died from his injuries the next day, on July 9, 1994.

33
On July 11, 1994, Ronaldo Narez executed an affidavit identifying his assailant as a certain Boy
Marantal.About a month later, on August 16, 1994, Ronaldo executed another affidavit in which he
said that accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias was the same Boy Marantal who shot him and his cousin
on July 8.

Accused-appellant’s defense consisted of denial and alibi. A defense witness, Isagani Maray, claimed
that accused-appellant Ebias, together with several laborers, was working in a citrus plantation in
Pangil, Laguna on the day in question. Maray admitted, however, that the plantation where accused-
appellant was allegedly working was only around 10 meters from the place of the incident. Accused-
appellant claimed that he was at the Vista Villamayor Citrus Plantation at the time of the
commission of the crime. At around 12 noon of that day, when the shooting took place, he ate
lunch at his house with Isagani Maray and other members of his family.

On May 15, 1996, the court rendered a decision, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with frustrated murder and sentenced him to a
maximum penalty of death.

On November 20, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion seeking the appointment of a counsel de
oficio for Leonardo Eliseo, a death convict at the National Bilibid Prison, who wrote a letter
confessing to the commission of the crime for which accused-appellant was held liable. In a
resolution, dated April 27, 1999, the Court denied accused-appellant’s motion for lack of merit. On
February 3, 2000, accused-appellant moved for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence. Accused-appellant averred that new and material evidence had been discovered
by the defense, consisting of a confession made by Leonardo Eliseo, also a death row
convict, that he committed the crime for which accused-appellant was convicted and
sentenced to death. Accused-appellant further alleged that such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced during his trial because it was only after his conviction and
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison that he came to know of Eliseo’s responsibility for
the crime and his willingness to confess. Accused-appellant asserted that Eliseo’s
confession would probably change the judgment if it was introduced in evidence.
ISSUE/s:WONa motion for new trial should be granted on the basis of newly discovered
material evidence, the written confession of Leonardo Eliseo.

HELD:YES.

For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c)
the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such
weight that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.

The Solicitor General does not dispute these allegations. He opposes accused-appellant’s motion for
new trial, however, on the ground that Eliseo’s confession “cannot change the outcome of the
judgment against accused-appellant because it cannot overturn Ronaldo Narez’s positive and
unerring identification of accused-appellant as the person responsible for the crime.”

There is thus a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narez’s positive
identification vis-à-vis the alleged confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at
stake. We recognize that “court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal

34
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is
the best way to ferret out such truth.” Hence, a liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion
for new trial is called for. We cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and
impose upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly exonerate him
may be presented by him in a new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground that
another person confessed to having committed the crime.

On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that the confession by Leonardo Eliseo is a
last-ditch effort by accused-appellant to avoid the death penalty. For this reason, this case should
be reopened only for the purpose of allowing the defense to present the testimony of
Leonardo Eliseo and for the prosecution to present any rebutting evidence which it may
desire to present.

RULING:WHEREFORE,without vacating the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 33, at Siniloan, Laguna, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 276, of Muntinlupa City for the purpose of allowing the presentation of the
testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and any evidence which the prosecution may wish to present
to rebut such testimony. In accordance with Rule 121, §6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
evidence already in the record shall stand and the new evidence shall be taken into account
by the trial court and considered with evidence already in the record and, thereafter,
judgment should be rendered accordingly.SO ORDERED.

-People v Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)

Puno, J.

Facts:
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the
PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty. After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court
ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the
appellant, if he so desired. Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary
evidence to prove that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation. On
July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death.
Issue:
WON the decision of the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to death.
Held:
YES, arraignment and plea of guilt are null and void; some of the evidence of the prosecution were
inadmissible (Uncounseled Confession).
Ratio:
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. These
are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit
of counsel. In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all

35
 important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that
appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the
blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled
confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. It is not only the
uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom.
The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled
confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. But even assuming arguendo that the
pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court erred in holding that they
"strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped."
For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt
were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that
they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains were
caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that
the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must also be
noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by
occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant
"because he used to accompany me during butchering of animals."
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural
irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In
BINABAY VS. PEOPLE, ET AL., ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held
that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the
arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to
the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for
further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill
without any semblance of fairness and justice.

-People v Del Mundo, 262 SCRFA 266 (1996)

Facts:
 That sometime in October, 1993, at 8:00 a.m. or thereabout, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
motivated by lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of MARIVIC DEL MUNDO, a ten (10) year old
child who is her (sic) natural child, against the latter's will and consent and to her damage and
prejudice.
 Accused-appellant Victorino del Mundo was charged with six counts of rape filed by his ten-year
old daughter, Marivic del Mundo, before Branch 27, RTC-Cabanatuan City.[1]
 The records of the case show that the incidents of rape in five Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978,
5980, 5981 and 5982 were committed on different days in October 1993 while that in Criminal Case
No. 5983 took place on July 22, 1994. Hence, the court a quo took cognizance of the fact that only
Criminal Case No. 5983 is covered by Republic Act No. 7659[2] which took effect December 31,
1993.
 Finding that the complainant, the accused, the witnesses and the evidence in these six (6) cases are
common to all the cases, the court a quo tried them jointly.
 Among those who testified for the prosecution was Dr. Jun Concepcion, City Health Officer
of Cabanatuan City who conducted Marivic's medico-legal examination.
 Dr. Concepcion testified that the contents of and entries in the medico-legal report he prepared are
true and correct, that is, there were abrasions, injury and lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and
that the hymen was ruptured indicating a penetration of the vagina.

36
 Thereafter, all documentary and testimonial evidence were offered by the prosecution and admitted
by the Court. When the time came for the defense to present its evidence, complainant Marivic del
Mundo was called as witness. She identified an affidavit of desistance executed by her
dated November 17, 1994.
 Notwithstanding complainant's affidavit of desistance, the court a quo sentenced accused-appellant
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Cases Nos. 5977, 5978, 5980, 5981 and 5982,
and death in Criminal Case No. 5983. Hence, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic
review.
 On October 6, 1995, Atty. Procopio Beltran of the IBP Free Legal Aid Program filed a Formal
Entry of Appearance for accused-appellant, which we resolved to note in our resolution of
November 14, 1995.
 Under date of January 24, 1996, accused-appellant, thru his counsel, filed a verified motion
for new trial on the following grounds:
1. New and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced in the trial which, when introduced and admitted, would
probably change the judgment.
2. Irregularities have been committed during the trial pre-judicial to the substantial rights of the
defendant.
3. The principal witness and alleged victim has recanted her testimony which, if not considered, will
result in a miscarriage of justice.
 Aside from Marivic's affidavit recanting her testimony, accused-appellant, thru his counsel, submits
to this Court annexes to afford him the opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged
and to warrant a new trial, the most important of which is the Medical Report of the examination
conducted on Marivic del Mundo by the NBI Medico Legal Division, re: determination of her
physical virginity.
 The Solicitor General interposed no objection to the motion for new trial in the interest of
substantial justice.

ISSUE:
WON the Motion for New Trial should be granted.
HELD: [YES]

 After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court notes that aside from the recantation
by complainant Marivic del Mundo, the medical report submitted and issued by the Medico Legal
Division of the NBI is diametrically opposed to the medico legal report of Dr. Jun Concepcion,
City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City, which was relied upon by the court a quo in rendering the
judgment of conviction inasmuch as it was submitted four weeks after the last act of rape
committed by accused-appellant in 1994.
 Although the NBI report executed a year later stated that Marivic's physical virginity was preserved,
the earlier report by the Cabanatuan City Health Officer stated that there were abrasions, injury and
lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and that the hymen was ruptured, indicating a penetration of
the vagina.
 While the NBI-Medico Legal report cannot be considered new and material evidence which accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, we grant the motion
for new trial on the broader ground of substantial justice, taking into account the variance
in the two aforesaid reports.
 It is the sense of this Court that such serious discrepancy raised substantial doubt as to the guilt of
the accused-appellant. Furthermore, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is death. Here is a
situation where a rigid application of the rules must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice
to render justice to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a
crime of which he is charged.

37
 The rule for granting a motion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights.
 Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by
which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out
such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.
 Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the purposes of
justice or, in a proper case, disregard them.
 In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases
on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or
incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de
oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a
stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.
 Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice."
WHEREFORE, we hereby SET ASIDE the judgment of conviction of accused-appellant
Victorino del Mundo and REMAND the cases to the court a quo for a new trial only for the
purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial court shall
inform this Court the final outcome of the cases within a reasonable time.

-Agulto v CA, 181 SCRA 80 (1990)

Grino-Aquino, J.

Reopening of a case rests entirely in the sound discretion of a trial court.

FACTS: On April 23, 1970, an information for bigamy was filed against the petitioner, Avelino C.
Agulto alleging as follows:

That on or about December 30, 1968, in he City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with one Maria Pilar Gaspar, which marriage is still in force and
subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Andrea Suico. (p. 11, Rollo.)

After the trial was finished and the parties had rested, but before judgment was promulgated, the
accused filed on November 12, 1975 a motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, i.e., a copy of a marriage contract between Andrea Suico and one Romeo Vergeire
supposedly contracted on July 19, 1960, or before Andrea's marriage to the petitioner.

On March 23, 1976, the court denied the motion on the ground that it was filed too late because the
accused, with due diligence, could have discovered the so-called newly-discovered evidence sooner
and could have presented it during the trial, it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged
marriage of Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17, 1972 yet.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the court's order was also denied. He then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in refusing to allow him to adduce the newly discovered evidence which would have shown that his
second marriage on December 30, 1968 to Andrea Suico was null and void because the latter was
previously married on July 19, 1960 to a certain Romeo Vergeire; that said evidence was not
available to petitioner at the time of the presentation of his evidence but only after the parties had
rested their case.

38
The respondents opposed the petition contending among others, that the alleged newly discovered
evidence (the marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire) does not bear the seal
of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. The Court notes, moreover, that the
document does not indicate the municipality and the province where the municipal court is located.
The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not properly certified and authenticated, and, on
its face it appears that the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license (p.21 Rollo).

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE/s: WON the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in refusing
to reopen the trial.
HELD: No.
A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Reopen Trial.

A Motion for New Trial may be filed after judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal
(Sec. 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
A Motion to Reopen Trial may be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered
and closed their evidence, but before judgment. There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court
for motions to reopen trial. It is albeit a recognized procedural recourse or devise, deriving validity
and acceptance from long established usage. The reopening of a case for the reception of further
evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial (Alegre vs. Reyes, 161 SCRA 226).

A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions may be applied for and granted only upon
specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1) and 121 (Section
2). On the other hand, the reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after
a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered is, it has
been said, controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice, resting
entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession, or denial, by
said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal unless a clear
abuse thereof is shown. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of a previous
marriage between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire, assuming the marriage was valid, was not
supported by evidence that said marriage was still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner.
On the other hand, the fact that the fiscal did not charge her with bigamy is significant. Unlike
Agulto, she was found by the fiscal to be under no impediment to contract a second marriage.

Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which the accused Agulto claims to be his
"newly-discovered evidence," the trial court's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was
properly sustained by the Court of Appeals. His motion bears the earmarks of a merely dilatory
pleading. Still, it has succeeded in delaying this case for fourteen (14) years.

RULING: The petition for review is denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against the petitioner.

-Alegre v Reyes, 161 SCRA 226 (1988)

39
FACTS:
Petitioner Alegre was charged of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. On arraignment, Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. Trial commenced and lasted for
about two and a half years. The prosecution presented twenty-nine witnesses, voluminous exhibits
and thirty-three affidavits. Alegre's evidence, on the other hand, consisted only of his sole testimony,
and a few exhibits. Before rendition of judgment , Alegre filed a "Motion to Reopen Trial for
Presentation of Additional Evidence" to prove "that the funds in question are not public funds and
are not impressed with a public character," and "that he is not a public officer." The motion was
opposed by the prosecution, it being argued in substance that the additional evidence would not
affect the essential question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the latter had been
accorded adequate time and opportunity to put on all his proofs but he had failed to do so. The
motion was denied by the Trial Court. It said that the points raised would only be unnecessarily
cumulative and a superfluity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Alegre's petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Alegre then filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting Alegre’s
motion to re-open trial

RULING: Yes, because the reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after a case
has been submitted for decision but before judgment is controlled by the paramount interests of
justice

RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Trial Court had acted unreasonably, capriciously, whimsically, and oppressively in spurning
Alegre's plea for reopening the trial so that he might present additional evidence. The record shows
that it took the prosecution no less than two and a half years to adduce its proofs; the accused
presented evidence within a span of five (5) days and only on two (2) hearing dates. The prosecution
called to the stand twenty-nine (29) witnesses and introduced more than sixty (60) exhibits; the
accused offered naught but his sole testimony and a few documents. There was withal no undue
delay in Alegre's presentation of his motion to reopen. Of significance, too, is the absence of
showing of any substantial prejudice to the State which would have been occasioned by the
reception of Alegre's proffered additional evidence. There was moreover a frank avowal of error
and oversight on Alegre's part; he had quite apparently underestimated the State's evidence and
overrated his own meager proofs. It was moreover unreasonable for the Trial Court to justify denial
of the application for reopening by simply adverting to the fact that "the accused had been given all
the opportunity to present his evidence" which the accused does not at all deny, but as to which he
pleads that serious error on his part prevented him from fully availing of that opportunity. It is also
an error on the part of the Trial Court to stress that "the record has been extensively saturated with
evidence on the points raised in the motion such that further evidence on said points would only be
unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity". Since the "saturating evidence" did not proceed from
the appellant, in the first place, and hence his additional evidence would not be cumulative thereto
but in refutation thereof, and could not, in any event, be characterized as "a superfluity."

A motion to reopen the trial is quite distinct from a motion for new trial. A motion to reopen may
properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered, and closed their
evidence, but before judgment. Unlike a motion for new trial, is not specifically mentioned and
prescribed as a remedy by the Rules of Court. There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court
governing motions to reopen. It is albeit a recognized procedural recourse or device, deriving

40
validity and acceptance from long, established usage. The reopening of a case for the reception of
additional evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually
rendered is, it has been said, controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of
justice, resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession, or denial,
by said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal unless a clear abuse
thereof is shown. On the other hand, a motion for new trial is proper only after rendition or
promulgation of judgment. A motion for new trial in civil or criminal actions may be applied for and
granted only upon specific, well-defined grounds, set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1 ) and
121 (Section 2).

CONCLUSION: The Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Order of the Trial Court thereby
affirmed, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is hereby ORDERED
to reopen the case for reception of the petitioner Alegre's proffered evidence in accordance with the
rules of evidence, and under the control of said Judge.

-Valdez v Aguilizan, 133 SCRA 150 (1984), G.R. No. L-67422-24

October 31, 1984
ABAD SANTOS, J.

The petitioner is accused of rape in three cases filed in the court presided by the respondent judge.
The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the respondent judge and to
disqualify him from the case. Because the verified petition imputed serious irregularities to the
respondent judge, being not impartial and asking not only clarificatory questions, the Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining him from further
proceeding. In his comment, the respondent judge claims that he had already decided the three
cases. The decision is dated April 2, 1984, but the petitioner claims that it was promulgated on May
3, 1984, without the presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal; that no notice was issued in
respect of the promulgation; and that no copy of the decision was given to the defense counsel of
record.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner must be given new trial

Held:

Yes. It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest the requisite cold
impartiality which the petitioner deserved.

The petition which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and seeks his disqualification
was received by him on March 29, 1984. Prudence dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or
at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court.
But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the
cases on April 2, 1984, and promulgating his decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of
the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction
which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

41
-People v Amparado, 156 SCRA 712 (1987) G.R. No. L-48656
December 21, 1987
FERNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Norman Amparado was found guilty of murder for the death of Manuel
Maghanoy. Amparado was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim the sum of 12,000 php plus the cost of suit.

The accused-appellant sought a new trial of his case citing the following grounds: (1) the
discovery of new and material evidence, (2) errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial
prejudicial to his substantive rights as an accused, and (3) interest of substantial justice and
avoidance of failure of justice. Plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, thru the Solicitor General,
opposed the motion.

The newly-discovered evidence relied upon by accused-appellant consists of the testimonies

of Antonio Cachin Jr., Manuel Henry Auza and Violeta Amparado. While, as contended by the
Solicitor, the testimony of Violeta Amparado could not be considered as newly-discovered nor could
it materially affect the judgment, said testimony being merely cumulative in character, We find the
proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr., and Manuel Henry Auza to be newly-discovered and of
sufficient weight and character as to alter the outcome of the case.

Part of the affidavit:

Q Why, please state the reason when according to you, you exerted
earnest effort and reasonable diligence to produce evidence and
witnesses for your defense during the trial?

A Because I did not know then of any person or persons who were in
the road and able to render assistance to late Manuel Maghanoy after
he was stabbed, considering that after the stabbing in self-defense, I
was just inside the house; when I went with the Policemen that same
evening, Manuel Maghanoy was no longer there and during the trial
and the pendency of the appeal, I did not go back to the scene,
premises and environment of the incident of Estaka, Dipolog City, to
gather information as to the possibility of any person or persons who
might have rendered assistance to Manuel Maghanoy after he was
stabbed in the house or who could be present in the road when the
incident happened, for fear of retaliation from his relatives and
friends, especially that I received information that they were hunting
me.

xxx
Q When, for the first time did you discover that Antonio Cachin Jr.
and Manuel Henry Auza were present in the road in front of the
home of Deling Velasco when the incident between Manuel
Maghanoy and you happened in the house where you were boarding
and that they were the first persons who rendered assistance to
Manuel Maghanoy after he was wounded by you in self-defense or to
repel his unlawful aggression?

42
 A Only after I received a copy of the decision of the Honorable
Supreme Court on October 15, 1985.

Q How did you discover it?

A After I received the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, I

went to Dipolog City to look for a lawyer for an advice or
consultation. Coincidentally, I met Roseller Ladera who was one of
the prosecution witnesses and I regretably told him that I was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment principally due to the
testimony of Rogelio Patangan, and Roseller Ladera told me that it
was surprising for the reason that Rogelio Patangan was not present
during the incident, it was a certain Antonio Cachin Jr. and his
companion who were present based on what he knew.

ISSUE:

WON the motion for new trial may be granted

HELD: YES. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court dated October 3, 1985 was
reconsidered and set aside.

RATIONALE:

Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the evidence sought to be presented are
newly-discovered as defined by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the proposed testimonies of
Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza, who aver to be the first persons to render assistance to
the victim immediately after the stabbing incident, if admitted, would tend to show that the alleged
eyewitness Rogelio Patangan, whose version of the crime was given full faith and credence by the
trial court and sustained by this Court, was not present at the scene of the crime. If this is true, then,
the version of the prosecution might perforce fail and that of the defense prevail. Consequently, the
judgment of conviction could be reversed, or at the very least, modified.

Finding that the evidence sought to be presented by accused-appellant conforms to

the requisites laid down by Section 2[b] of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the Court
Resolved to GRANT accused-appellant's motion for new trial.

2. Motion for Reconsideration

-Rule 121, sec 1, 3, 4, 5, 6

Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final,
the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused,
grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)

Section 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;

43
 (b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)

Section 3. Ground for reconsideration. — The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors
of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (3a)

Section 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. — The motion for a new trial or reconsideration
shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based on a newly-discovered
evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is
expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are proposed to be
introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the
prosecutor. (4a)

Section 5. Hearing on motion. — Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any question
of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise. (5a)

Section 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken
anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly.

-Rule 124, sec 16

Section 16. Reconsideration. — A motion for reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
after from notice of the decision or final order of the Court of Appeals, with copies served upon the
adverse party, setting forth the grounds in support thereof. The mittimus shall be stayed during the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration. No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order. (16a)

-People v Enriquez, 90 Phil. 423 (1951), G.R. No. L-4934 (November

28, 1951)
Feria, J.

FACTS:
On April 17, 1951, the respondent, Judge Juan Enriquez promulgated its decision
sentencing the defendant in criminal case No. 158 of said court to an indeterminate sentence of six
(6) years and one (1) of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

44
 The defendant filed on May 2, 1951, a motion for reconsideration based on the ground
that the court erred "in appreciating the age between seventeen and eighteen of the defendant as
ordinary mitigating circumstance which lower the penalty by one degree, and in not appreciating the
surrender of the defendant, admitted by the fiscal, as another mitigating circumstance, on the ground
that the mere previous issuance of an order for his arrest precludes the appreciation of his surrender
as mitigating circumstance."
The respondent judge, on June 18, 1951, granted the motion and amended its original
decision promulgated on April 17, 1951, by considering the attendance of the above-mentioned
mitigating circumstances in the commission of the offense, and sentencing the defendant to an
indeterminate sentence of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as a minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. A motion for reconsideration of the second
judgment was held by the prosecution and denied by the court.

ISSUE:
WON the motion for reconsideration was timely filed and if such filing of motion
interrupted the finality of the order;

HELD:

YES. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Rule 124 Sec. 16 provides:

Sec. 16. Reconsideration. – A motion for reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the Court of Appeals with copies thereof
served upon the adverse party, setting forth the grounds in support thereof. The mittimus shall be
stayed during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. No party shall be allowed a
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.

The assailed judgment was promulgated on April 17, 1951 and the defendant filed a
motion for reconsideration on the 15th day from the promulgation of the judgment on May 2,
1951 which is still within the 15-day filing period and such filing of a motion for reconsideration has
the effect of interrupting the finality of the judgment until the resolution of the motion.

Final ruling: The respondent judge did not act in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
amending its former judgment, and therefore the present petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack
of merits.

3. Reopening

-Rule 119, sec 24

Section 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge
may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a
miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
grating it.

4. Appeal

a. Generally

-Rule 122, secs. 1, 2, 3, 6 & 9

45
Appeal

Section 1. Who may appeal. — Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy. (2a)

Section 2. Where to appeal. — The appeal may be taken as follows:

(a) To the Regional Trial Court, in cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and

(c) To the Supreme Court, in cases decided by the Court of Appeals. (1a)

Section 3. How appeal taken. —

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided in section 10 of this Rule.

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules 45. (3a)

-Rule 123, 124 & 125

RULE 123

Procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts

Section 1. Uniform Procedure. — The procedure to be observed in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial
Courts, except where a particular provision applies only to either of said courts and in criminal cases
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. (1a)

46
RULE 124

Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Section 1. Title of the case. — In all criminal cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, the party
appealing the case shall be called the "appellant" and the adverse party the "appellee," but the title of
the case shall remain as it was in the court of origin. (1a)

Section 2. Appointment of counsel de oficio for the accused. — If it appears from the record of the case as
transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in prison, (b) is without counsel de parte on appeal, or (c)
has signed the notice of appeal himself, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall designate a
counsel de oficio.

An appellant who is not confined in prison may, upon request, be assigned a counsel de oficio within
ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to file brief and he establishes his right thereto. (2a)

Section 3. When brief for appellant to be filed. — Within thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant or
his counsel of the notice from the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals that the evidence, oral and
documentary, is already attached to the record, the appellant shall file seven (7) copies of his brief
with the clerk of court which shall be accompanied by proof of service of two (2) copies thereof
upon the appellee. (3a)

Section 4. When brief for appellee to be filed; reply brief of the appellant. — Within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the brief of the appellant, the appellee shall file seven (7) copies of the brief of the
appellee with the clerk of court which shall be accompanied by proof of service of two (2) copies
thereof upon the appellant.

Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the brief of the appellee, the appellant may file a reply brief
traversing matters raised in the former but not covered in the brief of the appellant. (4a)

Section 5. Extension of time for filing briefs. — Extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be
allowed except for good and sufficient cause and only if the motion for extension is filed before the
expiration of the time sought to be extended. (5a)

Section 6. Form of briefs. — Briefs shall either be printed, encoded or typewritten in double space on
the legal size good quality unglazed paper, 330 mm. in length by 216 mm. in width. (6a)

Section 7. Contents of brief. — The briefs in criminal cases shall have the same contents as provided
in sections 13 and 14 of Rule 44. A certified true copy of the decision or final order appealed from
shall be appended to the brief of appellant. (7a)

Section 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. — The Court of Appeals may, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. (8a)

47
Section 9. Prompt disposition of appeals. — Appeals of accused who are under detention shall be given
precedence in their disposition over other appeals. The Court of Appeals shall hear and decide the
appeal at the earliest practicable time with due regard to the rights of the parties. The accused need
not be present in court during the hearing of the appeal. (9a)

Section 10. Judgment not to be reversed or modified except for substantial error. — No judgment shall be
reversed or modified unless the Court of Appeals, after an examination of the record and of the
evidence adduced by the parties, is of the opinion that error was committed which injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant. (10a)

Section 11. Scope of judgment. — The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment
and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial
Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (11a)

Section 12. Power to receive evidence — The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases (a) falling within its original jurisdiction, (b) involving claims for damages arising from
provisional remedies, or (c) where the court grants a new trial based only on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence. (12a)

Section 13. Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. — Three (3) Justices of the
Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division. The unanimous vote of the
three (3) Justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or final
resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by a member of
the division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding
Justice shall direct the raffle committee of the Court to designate two (2) additional Justices to sit
temporarily with them, forming a special division of five (5) members and the concurrence of a
majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or final
resolution. The designation of such additional Justices shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation
among all other Justices of the Court of Appeals.

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law
involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith
certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review. (13a)

Section 14. Motion for new trial. — At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the appellant becomes final,
the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material to his
defense. The motion shall conform with the provisions of section 4, Rule 121. (14a)

Section 15. Where new trial conducted. — When a new trial is granted, the Court of Appeals may
conduct the hearing and receive evidence as provided in section 12 of this Rule or refer the trial to
the court of origin. (15a)

Section 16. Reconsideration. — A motion for reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
after from notice of the decision or final order of the Court of Appeals, with copies served upon the
adverse party, setting forth the grounds in support thereof. The mittimus shall be stayed during the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration. No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final order. (16a)

48
Section 17. Judgment transmitted and filed in trial court. — When the entry of judgment of the Court of
Appeals is issued, a certified true copy of the judgment shall be attached to the original record which
shall be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. (17a)

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil to criminal cases. — The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46
and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. (18a)

RULE 125

Procedure in the Supreme Court

Section 1. Uniform procedure. — Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court
of Appeals. (1a)

Section 2. Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. — The procedure for the review by the Supreme
Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil
cases. (2a)

Section 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. — When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in
opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall
again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of
conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted. (3a)

-People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 141129-33, 14 December 2001

Bellosillo, J.:

LESSON: If conviction does not fall under Sec. 17, par. (1), RA 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948) as
amended; Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals is Necessary

FACTS: Roland Molina, was charged with attempted rape and four (4) counts of incestuous rape
committed against his very own 16-year old daughter Brenda. He was found guilty by the trial court
in these five (5) crimes for which he was meted an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum for the attempted rape, and four (4) death sentences for the four (4)
counts of incestuous rape. He was also ordered to pay his victim indemnity and moral damages each
worth P75,000.00.
Roland was arraigned on the four (4) indictments for incestuous rape on 18 May 1999. He
pleaded not guilty to each of the four (4) charges. On 30 August 1999 the hearing was cut short
when the prosecution "asked for a deferment to determine whether the proposal of the accused to
withdraw his plea of not guilty and change same (sic) to guilty could have the effect of lowering the
penalty attached to the offense charged to reclusion perpetua." Trial was thus reset to 2 September 1999
on which date the defense counsel manifested the desire of Roland to change his plea to guilty as
regards all the five (5) crimes since he "was being bothered by his conscience and by way of
contrition would like to make amends." Thus he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a plea of

49
 guilty "after," as the trial court noted, "the consequences of the change of plea had been duly
explained to him by his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eugenio Manaois, the public
prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution.” Despite this observation of the trial court,
there is nothing on record to determine what this explanation consisted of. By way of
concession, after Roland was arraigned, the defense counsel prayed for liberality from the trial
court "even only by recommending the accused for executive clemency." (Emphasis mine)

The prosecution then proceeded to present its evidence on 16 September 1999 to ascertain
with precision the real culpability of Roland. While the defense counsel cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses, he did not introduce any evidence in behalf of Roland. On 10 November
1999 the trial court rendered judgment finding Roland guilty of the five (5) crimes charged on the
basis of "the change of plea by the accused from not guilty to guilty, and the testimony of the
offended party Brenda and the corroborating evidence presented by the prosecution, both oral and
written." The trial court however strongly recommended executive clemency in light of his plea of
guilt and his alleged letter that ambiguously expressed his remorse for some unidentified acts. No
notice of appeal was filed from the conviction in the criminal case for attempted rape.
(Emphasis and underscoring mine)

ISSUE/s: WON the failure to file a Notice of Appeal for the conviction of Roland in the criminal
case for attempted rape fatal to this case.

HELD: YES.

RATIO: [T]his Court notes the conspicuous absence of a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
for proper review. It was necessary to file such notice since the conviction does not fall under Sec.
17, par. (1), RA 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948) as amended which outlines our jurisdiction over "[a]ll
criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and
those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence
or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the
more serious offense x x x x" In the instant case, it cannot be said that the attempted rape "arose
out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion" as the more severe
crimes of incestuous rape. The two (2) sets of cases involved distinct offenses committed allegedly
at an interval of three (3) months. The prosecution evidence reveals that the last incident of
incestuous rape was committed on Christmas eve of 1998 while the attempted rape was perpetrated
on 1 March 1999. As can be deduced further from the same evidence, the circumstances in both
cases are diverse that clearly accused-appellant was animated by separate circumstances and criminal
intent although both crimes were directed against the same victim. The prosecution evidence for
the attempted rape shows that he merely commenced the foreplay by mimicking the sexual act while
he and his daughter had their clothes on; while in contrast, the four (4) criminal cases of rape
involved consummated lust.

This omission is fatal since ordinarily the conviction for attempted rape would by now be
already final and executory. No doubt this omission was caused by accused-appellant's improvident
plea of guilty that led the public defender to simply shorten the proceedings. Given that the plea
of guilty has been set aside, effective counseling would have nonetheless dictated the
institution of at least a precautionary appeal to the appellate court if only to assure
protection of his client's rights. (Emphasis and underscoring mine).

b. Specific Procedures on Appeal

50
 (1) Death penalty cases

-Rule 122, sec 3,10 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03 [ October 15,
2004];
Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases
[** Subject to the new law abolishing the death penalty in the Philippines]

Sec. 3. How appeal taken.—(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided .by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by
notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeals to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court isreclusion perpetua,
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reciusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reciusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this
Rule..

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty.’ The Court of
Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)

xxx

Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. — In all cases where the death penalty is imposed
by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and
judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (10a)

-Rule 124, sec 12,13 (as amended by SC A.M. No. 00-5-03 [October 15, 2004]
Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases

Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence.—The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings,, receive evidence and perform a!i acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Triais or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. 12(a)
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds
that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from
making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the
Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses’ committed on the same occasion or which arose out of
the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused
appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to. the Supreme Court.

(c) Incases where the Court of Appeals imposes reciusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals.

51
 -Rule 125

(2) Appeal by any of several accused

-Rule 122, sec 11

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter;

(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect
of the judgment or order appealed from.

(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final
order appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party.

(3) Withdrawal of appeal

-Rule 122, sec. 12

Section 12. Withdrawal of appeal. — Notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal before the
record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper appellate court as provided in section
8, in which case the judgment shall become final. The Regional Trial Court may also, in its
discretion, allow the appellant from the judgment of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court to withdraw his appeal,
provided a motion to that effect is filed before rendition of the judgment in the case on appeal, in
which case the judgment of the court of origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to
the latter court for execution of the judgment. (12a)

-PD 968 (as amended), sec. 4

Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

52
 (4) “Even split” or no majority in Supreme Court

-Rule 125, sec. 3

Section 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. — When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in
opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall
again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of
conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.

-People v Saliling, 249 SCRA 185 (1995), G.R. No. 117732, 10 October
1995
J. MELO

FACTS:
Jesus Saliling was charged with murder. After trial following a plea of not guilty, the trial court still
found the accused guilty and sentenced him to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to pay actual
damages, and to indemnify the victim’s heirs.
The accused-appellant filed for an appeal maintaining that neither premeditation nor treachery was
proved by the prosecution.

ISSUE:
W/N such a notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the penalty imposed is death

HELD &RATIO:
No, such notice of appeal is not necessary in cases where the penalty imposed is death. The
Supreme Court held that, “automatic as the review of said decision is as mandated by law” which
meant that no notice of appeal was necessary.

Rule 122, Sec. 3 (d) states that:

“No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial
Court. T he same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in
Section 10 of this Rule.”

(5) Effects of death of accused pending appeal

-Villegas v CA 271 SCRA 148 (1997), G.R. No. 82562, April 11, 1997
ROMERO, J:
Death of accused – no civil liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation libel
deemed a quasi-delict
Facts:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then
Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Committee, however, observed that all the
allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro
U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly questionable. Villegas also failed to submit
the original copies of his documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation, Raquiza was
cleared of all charges by the Committee. All these acts of political grandstanding received extensive
media coverage.

53
An information then for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then CFI
Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the
United States where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded
on absentia by the time of his death the in 1984, the prosecution had already rested its case 2 months
after notice of his death, the court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but
reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect. No memorandum was ever filed in his behalf.

Judge Marcelo R. Obien rendered judgment dismissing the criminal case against Antonio J.
Vlllegas, on account of his death on November 16, 1984 and Ordering the estate of Antonio J. Villegas,
represented herein by his legal heirs, to pay plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza 200M Pesos as moral,
actual & exemplary damages. On appeal to CA by the heirs of Villegas, it affirmed the CFI. Both
parties elevated said decision to this Court for review

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused before the case was decided extinguish criminal and
civil liability?

Held: Yes, death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his criminal
but also his civil liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the
act or omission complained of,

Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the case of People
v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on September 2, 1994, viz.:

It is thus evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for
civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

In recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based
on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused (under Sec. 1, Rule 87) and not against
the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission.

Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

54
The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly
committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 in
relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an accused
during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his criminal but also his civil
liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or
omission complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused
died shortly after the prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to submit his
memorandum and all this before any decision could even be reached by the trial court.

Final Ruling: decisions of the CA and of the Manila RTC are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, without prejudice to the right of the private offended party Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil
action for damages against the executor or administrator of the estate or the heirs of the late Antonto J. Villegas in
accordance with the foregoing procedure.

B. After finality of Judgment

-Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, Resolutions

dated 4 and 19 January 1999
Facts:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. Echegaray was earlier found guilty of the crime of raping his 3-week old
daughter. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power
of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court belied public respondents claim that their grant of the temporary
restraining order at the motion of Echegaray amounted to an encroachment of executive power.

Analysis:

Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.

55
It does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. (Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 26 Phil.
267[1915])

Conclusion:

The Court granted the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifted the Temporary Restraining Order issued
in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also ordered respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner.

-People v Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999

Purisima, J.
Facts:
On May 14, 1997, this Court handed down a Decision, affirming with modification subject Joint
Decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija. On May 29, 1997, appellant
interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the
Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would
warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction. On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved to
grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in abeyance consideration of his motion for
reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for
reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by
a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, or on January 19, 1999, to precise, appellant was
allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical Center, with appropriate escorts, to undergo the
necessary neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation and work-up. In compliance with the said
resolution of the Court, Dr. Rosa Mendoza, Senior Chief Staff Officer of the Supreme Court Clinic
Services, submitted two (2) Memorandum Reports, dated July 29, 1998 and March 5, 1999,
respectively, on the mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation of appellant.
Issue:

WON the Joint Decision rendered by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija in
Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168 must be set aside.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert.
The fact that he was "helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983", as
noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page of the transcript of stenographic notes for
February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a
competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of
appellant.

56
-People v Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, September 29, 1999

Per Curiam

SENTENCED TO DEATH MODIFIED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA BECAUSE OF

r.a. 7659
FACTS:
The penalty of death was imposed on Romeo Gallo for the offense of qualified rape
promulgated by this Court in its decision promulgated on January 22, 1998.

On August 24, 1999, accused appellant filed a “Motion to Re-Open the Cased (with leave of
court)” seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua based on the new court
ruling in line with section 11 of RA 7659 which introduced seven (7) attendant circumstances which
partake of a qualifying circumstance that must be pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the
imposition of the penalty. If they were not pleaded as such, they could only be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstance.

The information filed against accused-appellant reads:

That on or sometime the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, with lewd designs and by means of force or intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl, Marites
Gallo y Segovia. 3

The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim's father;
accordingly, accused-appellant's relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial, cannot
be considered to be a qualifying circumstance. 4

ISSUE:

WON the sentence of Gallo should be modified since the accused was not alleged as father
of the victim therefore such relationship cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance but just a
generic aggravating circumstance per section 11 of RA 7659.

HELD: YES. The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal
retains control over a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to
cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it. 5

The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration in People vs. Ramos, 6 People
vs. Ilao, 7 and People vs.Medina, 8 came only after almost a year from the promulgation of the instant
case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24th
August 1999 motion of accused-appellant, had this to state:

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and
effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable
to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already
been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).

57
 Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application
of Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellant's prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees
merit in its stand to join accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death
to reclusion perpetua.

Final Ruling: WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the
decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by imposing accused-appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P50,000.
Considering that the records of all cases where the death penalty is imposed are
forwarded to the Office of the President in accordance with Section 25 of RA 7659, the
Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of the President with a copy of this
resolution for appropriate guidance.

C. Effect of failure to appeal a patently wrong judgment

-People v Barro Sr., 338 SCRA 312 (2000)

FACTS:
 On October 31, 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur filed an Information,
which accuses Arnulfo Barro, Sr., Arnulfo Barro, Jr., Benigno Barro, Juan Barro, Joel Barro,
Wilfredo Arroyo, Joel Florin and Cristobal Arte with the crime of Murder defined and
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
 It was alleged in the said information that accused Joel Barro, who is a minor, together
with the seven (7) remaining accused who were still at large, with intent to kill, conspired to
assault, attack and stab one after the other one Virgilio Saba y Libang thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
 For their part, Benigno Barro and Joel Florin interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that
they were in the house of Arnulfo Barro, Sr. in Catduce, Turague, Sangay, Camarines Sur,
when the incident happened.
 Joel Barro failed to testify because he escaped from his confinement at the Tinangis Penal
Farm, in a jailbreak.
 On April 11, 1994, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision finding
Benigno Barro, Joel Florin and Joel Barro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.
 As Joel Barro escaped from his confinement during the trial, a notice of appeal was filed
only by Benigno Barro and Joel Florin through their counsel Atty. Briones.
 In a Resolution dated October 14, 1996, this Court granted appellant Joel Florin’s motion to
withdraw appeal.
 The sole appellant in the case at bar is Benigno Barro. In his appeal, he contended that the
trial court erred in convicting the three (3) accused of the offense charged on the basis of
the contradictory and irreconcilable testimonies of the two (2) prosecution witnesses Danilo
Libang and Nimfa Saba, who are blood relatives of the victim, and on the basis of the
wounds sustained by the latter.

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ISSUE:
WON the appeal is impressed with merit
HELD:
 No. After a careful study of the records of the case and the pleadings submitted by both
parties, the Court finds the appeal to be without merit.
 It has become a doctrinal rule for this Court to accord great respect to the factual
conclusions drawn by the trial court, particularly on the matter of credibility of witnesses,
since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the behavior and demeanor of witnesses
while testifying.
 We will not disturb the findings of trial courts with respect to the credibility of the witnesses
unless there are facts, or circumstances, of weight and influence appearing in the record
which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misapprehended or
misinterpreted by the trial courts.
 The alleged variance in the testimony of the prosecution’s two eyewitnesses relate to
inconsequential details. At any rate, herein appellant’s participation in the slaying of Virgilio
Saba is not being contested.
 Moreover, the existence of conspiracy was proven by the prosecution.
 Where conspiracy is adequately shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary, the applicable rule being that the act of one
conspirator is the act of all of them.
 What is important in this case is that the herein appellant Benigno Barro was positively
identified by the vital prosecution witnesses in a straight-forward, categorical and candid
manner to have participated in the overt act before and during the killing of Virgilio Saba.
 The alleged inconsistencies do not in any way refute the positive identification made by the
two eyewitnesses that it was Benigno Barro, Joel Barro and Joel Florin, among others, who
killed the victim.
AS TO THE EFFECT OF FAILURE OF ACCUSED JOEL TO APPEAL:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1[23] of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.[24] Two degrees
lower is prision correcional maximum to prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail, hence, he
is disqualified[25] from the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be
meted the straight penalty of eight years which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month and
11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in imposing the penalty of
imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records
show that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the co-
accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that
penalty imposed on the accused who did not appeal can be corrected to make it conform to
the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final
and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it
conformable with law.

SUMMARY

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Q: Distinguish new trial from reconsideration?

New Trial Reconsideration

Rehearing of a case already decided but before the May be filed in order to correct errors of law or fact
judgment of conviction therein rendered has become in the judgment. It does not require any further
final, whereby errors of law or irregularities are proceeding.
expunged from the record or new evidence is
introduced, or both steps are taken
Grounds: Grounds:
1. Errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the 1. Errors of law;
substantial rights of the accused have been 2. Errors of fact (Sec. 3). Note: The principle
committed during the trial. underlying this rule is to afford the trial court
2. 2. New and material evidence has been the opportunity to correct its own mistakes
discovered which the accused could not, with and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being
reasonable diligence, have discovered and taken. The grant by the court of
produced at the trial and which if introduced reconsideration should require no further
and admitted would probably change the proceedings, such as taking of additional
judgment (Sec. 2). proof.
3. 3.Other grounds which the court may consider
in the exercise of its jurisdiction : a. Negligence
or incompetency of counsel or mistake which
is so gross amounting to deprivation of the
substantial rights of the accused and due
process; (Aguilar v. Court of Appeals GR No.
114282, November 28, 1995) b. Recantation of
a witness where there is no evidence sustaining
the judgment of conviction other than the
testimony of such witness; (Tan Ang Bun v.
Court of Appeals GR No c. Improvident plea
of guilty which may be withdrawn; d.
Disqualification of attorney de officio to
represent accused in trial.

Q: When should a motion for new trial or consideration be filed?

A: It should be filed with the trial court within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment.

Note: Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.

Q: When should a motion for reconsideration of any final order or order be filed in cases
before the Sandiganbayan?

A: It may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of final order or
judgment (Sec. 5, R.A. 8249).

Note: Such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within 30 days from submission (Sec. 5,
R.A. 8249).

60
Q: When may a new trial granted?

A: It may be granted at any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final on motion of the
accused or the court with the consent of the accused (Sec. 1).
Note: The award of new trial or taking of additional evidence rests upon the sound discretion of the
court. Once the appeal is perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over it, except for the purpose
of correcting clerical errors. In such case, the appellate court steps in. When new material evidence
has been discovered, the accused may file a motion for new trial with the appellate court.

Q: What should be the form of a motion for new trial or reconsideration?

A: The motion must:

1. be in writing;
2. filed in court;
3. state the grounds on which it is based; and
4. if the motion for new trial is based on newly discovered evidence, it must be supported by the
affidavits of the witness by whom such evidence is expected to be given or duly authenticated copies
of documents which it is proposed to introduce in evidence (Sec. 4).

Note: While the rule requires that an affidavit of merits be attached to support a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, the rule also allows that the defect of lack of merit may be
cured by the testimony under oath of the defendant at the hearing of the motion (Paredes v. Borja,
G.R. No. L- 15559, Nov. 29, 1961).

Q: What is recantation? Is it a ground for new trial?

A: Recantation is the public and formal withdrawal of a witness of his prior statement (People v.
Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, Nov. 19, 1996). It is not a ground for new trial because it makes a
mockery of the court and would place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witness. Moreover, retractions are easy to extort out of witness. In contrast, their statements are
made under oath, in the presence of judge, and with the opportunity to cross-examine.

Q: Distinguish recantation from desistance.

Recantation Affidavit of Desistance

A witness who previously gave a testimony The complainant states that he did not really intend
subsequently declares that his statements are untrue to institute the case and he is no longer interested in
publicly (People v. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, Nov. testifying or prosecuting.
19, 1996).

GR: It is not a ground for granting a new trial and are
hardly given weight XPN: When there is no evidence
sustaining the judgment of conviction other than the
testimony of the recanting witness (Tan Ang Bun v.
CA, G.R. No. L-47747, Feb. 15, 1990).
It is not by itself a ground for dismissal of the action
(People v. Ramirez, G.R. Nos. 150079-80, June 10,
2004). It is merely an additional ground to buttress
the defense and not a sole consideration for acquittal
(People v. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, Nov. 19,
1996).

Q: What are the requisites before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence?

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A: That:
1. the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
3. it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
4. the evidence is of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted (Herrera,
Vol. IV, p. 935, 2007 ed.).

Q: May errors or ignorance of counsel be a ground for new trial or consideration?

A: GR: Mistakes or errors of counsel in the conduct of his case are not grounds for new trial. This
rule is the same whether the mistakes are the result of ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence.

Xception: If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error
committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another
chance to present his case (Abrajano v. CA, G.R. No. 120787, Oct. 13, 2000).

Q: What are the effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration?

A: In all cases, when the court grants a new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be
set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly.

In addition, when granted on the ground of:

1. Errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial

a. All proceedings and evidence not affected by such errors and irregularities shall stand;
b. Those affected shall be set aside and taken anew; and
c. In the interest of justice, the court may allow the introduction of additional evidence.

2. Newly discovered evidence

a. The evidence already taken shall stand;
b. Newly discovered and other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record (Sec. 6).

Note: The effect of granting a new trial is not to acquit the accused of the crime of which the
judgment finds him guilty but precisely to set aside said judgment so that the case may be tried de
novo as if no trial had been had before.

Q: What is the effect of filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration on the period of
perfecting an appeal?

A: A fresh period of fifteen (15) days to appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial (Neypes v. CA, G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005).

Note: Denial of a motion for reconsideration or new trial is not appealable nor subject of certiorari;
but it may be raised as an error on appeal.

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Q: Distinguish new trial from reopening of the case.

New Trial Re-opening of the Case

Filed after judgment is rendered but before the
finality thereof.
Made by the court on motion of the accused or at its
own instance but with the consent of the accused.
Made by the court before the judgment is rendered in
the exercise of sound discretion.
Does not require the consent of the accused; may be
at the instance of either party who can thereafter
present additional evidence.

Q: What is the “fresh period rule” as enunciated in Neypes?

A: In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within
which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for
reconsideration within which to appeal.

The "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution
(Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005).

Q: Does the “fresh period rule” apply to criminal cases?

A: Yes. The Court held in the case of Yu v. SamsonTatad (G.R. No. 170979, Feb. 9, 2011) that the
pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period
stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again
upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation
that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be
similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case,
it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to
the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by
certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section
3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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Q: What are the modes of review?

A: The Rules of Court recognize four modes by which the decision or final order of the court may
be reviewed by a higher tribunal:
1. Ordinary Appeal;
2. Petition for Review;
3. Petition for Review on Certiorari;
4. Automatic Appeal

Q: What is appeal?

A: It is a proceeding for review by which the whole case is transferred to the higher court for a final
determination. It is not an inherent right of a convicted person. The right of appeal is statutory.
Only final judgments and orders are appealable.

Q: Who may appeal?

A: Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy (Sec. 1).

Q: What is the effect of an appeal?

A: An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of
penalty, indemnity, and the damages involved. Consequently, on appeal, the appellate court may
increase the penalty and indemnity of damages awarded by the trial court although the offended
party had not appealed from said award, and the party who sought a review of the decision was the
accused.

Note: When an appeal has been perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction.

Q: What is the difference between the appeal of a judgment and the appeal of an order?

A: The appeal from a judgment must be perfected within 15 days from promulgation. The appeal
from an order should be perfected within 15 days from notice of the final order.

Q: When is appeal taken?

A: An appeal must be filed within fifteen (15) days counted from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from.

Q: Where is the appeal taken?

A: To the:
1. RTC, in cases decided by the MTC, MTCC, MeTC, or MCTC;
2. CA or to the SC in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the RTC;
3. SC, in cases decided by the CA (Sec. 2).

Q: May the prosecution appeal a judgment of acquittal?

A: GR: No, because the accused would be subjected to double jeopardy.

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Xceptions:

1. If the dismissal is made upon motion or with the express consent of the accused. However,
double jeopardy will still attach if the dismissal is based on:
a. Insufficiency of the prosecution evidence; or
b. Violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.
2. If the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence on the merits;
3. If the question is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; and
4. If there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari under Rule 65 may be available.

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Q: How is appeal taken?

Appeal to From decision of How taken

RTC MTC 1. File a notice of appeal with the MTC;

2. Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse
party.
RTC
CA Exercising its original jurisdiction for 1. File a notice of appeal with the RTC; 2.
offenses with imposable penalties less Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse
than reclusion perpetua or life party.
imprisonment
RTC
CA Exercising its appellate jurisdiction File a petition for review under Rule 42.
RTC
CA Where the imposable penalty is: a. life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; or 1. File a notice of appeal with the RTC; 2.
b. a lesser penalty for offenses Serve a copy of the notice to the adverse
committed on the same occasion or party.
which arose from the same occurrence
that gave rise to the offense punishable
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
CA RTC
Where the imposable penalty is death Automatic review to CA (Sec. 10)

All other appeals except: a. Decision of Petition for review on certiorari via Rule 45
SC RTC where the imposable penalty is
life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua
or a lesser penalty for offenses
committed on the same occasion or
which arose from the same occurrence
that gave rise to the offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; and b. Decisions of
RTC imposing the penalty of death.

CA
SC a. When it finds that death penalty Automatic review (Sec. 13, Rule 124)
should be imposed
b. Where it imposes reclusion Notice of appeal (Sec. 13, Rule 124)
perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty

a.

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SC Sandiganbayan
a. Exercising its appellate File a notice of appeal
jurisdiction for offenses
where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment
File a notice of appeal (Sec. 13, Rule 124;
b. Exercising its original
Sec. 5, PD 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249)
jurisdiction for offenses
where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua and life Automatic review (Sec. 13, Rule 124; Sec. 5,
imprisonment PD 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249)
c. Exercising its original or
appellate jurisdiction where it Petition for review on certiorari via Rule 45
finds that the penalty to be
imposed is death
d. Cases not falling in paragraphs a
and b above

Q: What are the effects of appeal by any of the several accused?

A:
1. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
2. The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect of the
judgment or order appealed from; and
3. Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from shall
be stayed as to the appealing party (Sec. 11).

Note: In People v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 80481, June 27, 1990), the SC applied the benefit of an
acquittal handed down in an appeal to an accused who jumped bail or escaped.

Q: What are the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal?

A: 1. Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken within the period
fixed by these Rules;
2. Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by these
Rules;
3. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40
and section 4 of Rule 41;
4. Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on appeal as provided in
section 4 of Rule 44;
5. Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief of
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
6. Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the
record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44;
7. Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or completion of the record
within the time limited by the court in its order;
8. Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule 48 or to comply with
orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable cause; and
9. The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable (Rule 50)

Thank you.

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