THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM

Volume XXX, No. 4, December 1999

A PROPER ARBITER OF PLEASURE:

ROUSSEAU ON THE CONTROL OF SEXUAL DESIRE

GLEN BAIER

It would be very dangerous if instinct taught your pupil to trick his senses and to find a substitute
for the opportunity of satisfying them. Once he knows this dangerous supplement, he is lost.1

Masturbation that is not habitual, not prompted by impulsive and passionate desires, and is, all
things considered, motivated only by need is not in any way harmful and, therefore, in no way
wrong.2

The first voice is heard in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile. It is a warning of

the threat posed by masturbation. The second voice is from the 1765 edition of
the Encyclopedie. It tells of the potential for masturbation as a harmless pursuit.
The disagreement between the two voices is obvious. For Rousseau, masturba-
tion is a danger at all times. There cannot be benign masturbation. The minute a
young man discovers it, he is doomed. “From then on he will always have an
enervated body and heart. He will suffer until his death the sad effects of this
habit, the most fatal to which a man can be subjected.”3 The Encyclopedie errs,
from Rousseau’s perspective, because of the suggestion that masturbation can be
a safe outlet for the satisfaction of a genuine need. While acknowledging that
masturbation may be harmful, if done strictly from habit or if motivated by
strong impulses or passions, there is still the supposition that masturbation does
not always have to be detrimental to human well-being. Rousseau denies this
possibility. There is something so powerful about the hold masturbation has that
it will be a threat no matter what.
In what follows, I consider various ways of interpreting the dangers Rousseau
sees as inherent in masturbation. The position I develop reduces the weight nor-
mally placed on the psychological and moral dangers Rousseau lists in favour of
a more pronounced emphasis on the physical disorders that he associates with
masturbation. I conclude that Rousseau uses reference to such health problems
in order to generate a form of anxiety regarding sexuality that has power within

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his educational and political programs. In particular, I contend that his diatribe
against masturbation makes available avenues for social control not justified by
his assumptions regarding the nature of autonomous, self-sufficient individuals.
Finding different dimensions to Rousseau’s condemnation of masturbation is
not surprising, given that his works invite speculation on many levels. Curiosity
over the matter is increased by Rousseau’s confession that he engages in
the very habit that he fears so much. His first-person account tells of the events
leading up to the moment that he “learned that dangerous means of cheating
Nature” and how it leads young men of his “temperament to various kinds of
excesses that eventually imperil their health, their strength, and sometimes their
lives.”4 The evils of masturbation are obvious for Rousseau in the failings of his
health and the destruction of his once hearty constitution. On one reading of this
confession, Rousseau is using himself as a model for instruction.5 By high-
lighting his own depravity, he shows us what is to be avoided. In following the
model of moral instruction outlined in the Emile, we avoid the pitfalls of sexual
awakening that trapped the poorly educated Rousseau. In simple terms, Rous-
seau’s loss will be our pupil’s gain.
Other interpretations of Rousseau take his preoccupation with masturbation to
be symptomatic of his philosophical disposition. Derrida, in this respect, con-
nects the notion of masturbation as a “dangerous supplement” to Rousseau’s
overall position on nature and language. On Derrida’s reading, a supplement cor-
rects for a lack or deficiency in nature, but correction is dangerous because at the
same time that the supplement provides a remedy, it destroys or corrupts what
it corrects. Masturbation is such a supplement because it aids natural desire
by providing a means of satisfying sexual appetites when no object of desire is
directly present. It is something added to nature to make up for a lack. However,
by compensating for a deficiency in this manner, masturbation disrupts nature by
changing desire.

The dangerous supplement, which Rousseau also calls a “fatal advantage,” is properly seductive;
it leads desire away from the good path, makes it err far from natural ways, guides it toward its
loss or fall and therefore it is a sort of lapse or scandal. It thus destroys nature. But the scandal of
Reason is that nothing seems more natural than this destruction of Nature.6

Masturbation departs from the natural expression of sexual desire, but it can
only do so because it is consistent with nature. The ease with which sexual
desire alters indicates that desire is not limited to what is deemed natural. It is
natural for desire to become unnatural.
Derrida takes the dual relationship with nature evident in the account of
masturbation as typical of everything that Rousseau labels a supplement and
concludes that it is key to seeing Rousseau as a paradigm of a philosopher who

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denigrates writing.7 Writing has, from Derrida’s perspective, been dismissed as

non-essential to language because writing lacks the “absolute proximity of voice
and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of mean-
ing.”8 Less opaquely, writing is criticized by Rousseau and others because it is
said not to stand in direct connection with thought. Thought, idealized to be a
function of subjective mental processes, is taken to be more readily expressed in
speech. Speech is viewed as having a direct relationship with thought because
speech is seen as the mere voicing of thought. On the other hand, writing as the
recording or inscribing of speech is said already to be at a distance from thought.
Writing is removed from thought because writing is secondary. It is a represen-
tation of what has already been put into words. For Derrida, this prejudice
against writing fails to realize that writing, as a supplement added to spoken lan-
guage, can only be a supplement because it shares something with the nature
that is supposedly supplemented. Speech requires the same kind of structural
differentiation evident in written inscription. All language is writing because all
language is predicated on relationships of difference among the basic elements
that compose the system of language. The supplement that is said to change the
nature of language actually demonstrates the features responsible for the nature
of language. Writing is thus analogous to masturbation because both are
dismissed by Rousseau as disruptions even though they are consistent with the
very nature they are accused of disrupting. Both writing and masturbation are
said to distort what is natural, yet both arise from and with the nature they alter.
There is truth in Derrida’s position. Rousseau’s thoughts on writing and mas-
turbation do have much in common. Both writing and masturbation are described
as supplements that distort nature. However, what is missing from Derrida’s
account is a realization of the difference between masturbation and writing.
Rousseau is not asserting that masturbation is one of many fatal habits and that
any number of activities can lead to the same problems it creates. Rather, his
position is that the dangers inherent in masturbation are unique and that is why it
requires drastic preventive measures. Dangers may be associated with writing,
dangers that may even be connected with the metaphysical assumptions that
Derrida outlines, but writing never invites the same attention as a physical dis-
order. Although Rousseau does think it necessary to delay Emile’s exposure to
reading and writing, he does not prohibit their teaching in the same way that he
attempts to protect the young pupil from masturbation. Writing does not elicit the
same demands for control that are prescribed for preventing masturbation.
Realizing that the supposed dangers of masturbation are used by Rousseau to
introduce methods of control makes relevant to my analysis the work of Michel
Foucault. For Foucault, modern critical discussions of sexual activity are a
means for forcing sexual behaviour to fit social and political agendas. Foucault
intends his claim to stand in opposition to the view that current discourses on

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sex are attempts to liberate it from the repressive regime implemented by Victo-
rian sensibilities. He sees the modern mania for discussing sex, therapeutic or
otherwise, as part of a program designed to take command of sex. By forcing
sex into discourse, it becomes something tangible to be inspected and directed.9
What is intriguing about Foucault’s analysis is that it offers an approach condu-
cive to examining Rousseau. The preoccupation Rousseau has with masturbation
constantly forces him to speak of aspects of sex in ways that call for its control.
He is initiating a discourse intended to make the mastery of sex possible.
The relevance Rousseau has to Foucault’s work is even more visible when we
examine the reasons given for the connection of sexual discourse to social
control. Foucault thinks that the concern over sexual practice and the fear of
deviance accompany the rise to dominance of the bourgeoisie. With the transfer-
ence of power to this emerging elite came the need to exercise new control over
the realm of the human body. The bourgeoisie, unable to base its supremacy on
claims of heredity, required some other justification for its privileged position.
Something had to mark the bourgeoisie as special in a physical sense in the same
way that the aristocracy maintained its status by appeals to the quality of its
bloodline. As Foucault notes,

for the aristocracy had also asserted the special character of its body, but this was in the form of
blood, that is, in the form of antiquity of its ancestry and of the value of its alliances; the bour-
geoisie on the contrary looked to its progeny and the health of its organism when it laid claim to
a specific body. The bourgeoisie’s “blood” was its sex.10

The bourgeoisie’s search for control of the body made the need for physical
well-being paramount. The bourgeoisie sought a way “to ensure the strength,
endurance and secular proliferation” of the body.11 Such reference to strength
and health is not far from Rousseau’s own insistence that enervation caused by
masturbation undermines natural physical well-being. Indulgence in sexual plea-
sures, in particular those associated with masturbation, is bought at “the expense
of one’s constitution.”12 Rousseau’s discourse on masturbation names the reason
for its control to be physical health.13
One way in which Foucault sees the bourgeoisie instituting its particular claim
to control the body for the sake of physical health is through a concerted effort
to prevent children from discovering masturbation. In reference to this matter, he
observes that in the eighteenth century the sexual activities of children became
the focus of innovative forms of surveillance and observation.

Parents, families, educators, doctors and eventually psychologists would have to take charge, in a
continuous way, of this precious and perilous, dangerous and endangered sexual potential: this
pedagogization was especially evident in the war against onanism, which in the West lasted
nearly two centuries.14

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The justification of this “pedagogization” was the need to protect the child from
himself so that he did not suffer because of a premature exploration of sex. In
this regard, we find ourselves returning to Rousseau’s Emile, where the call for
surveillance and intervention are made explicit. As a tutor, you must be vigilant.
You must “watch the young man carefully. He can protect himself from every-
thing else, but it is up to you to protect him from himself. Do not leave him
alone, day or night. At the very least, sleep in his room.”15 Rousseau’s tutor must
follow this advice in order to preserve the health of his pupil.
The concern, however, is not only for the pupil but also for the betterment of
society. The healthy student, guided by the wise teacher, stands as a noticeable
contrast to those young libertines raised by ignorant instructors. Whereas they
“have only small souls because their worn-out bodies were corrupted early,” a
properly educated man would “preserve his heart, his blood and his morals from
the contagion of their example.”16 Emile will fulfill what Foucault identifies as
the bourgeoisie dream because Emile will take command of his life and behave
morally with purity of heart, blood, and body.
The claim that an ideal of physical health inspires Rousseau’s views on mastur-
bation highlights an aspect of his position often neglected by other interpretations.
On one dominant view, the crucial aspect of the analysis of masturbation is the
role played by imagination. This concern originates with Rousseau’s overall mis-
trust of imagination and the capacity it has for creating new desires. Imagination,
as a faculty that expands the scope of human cognition, disrupts nature and limits
the control reason has over behaviour. As well, imagination multiplies the number
of desires human beings have and increases frustration because not all of these de-
sires can be fulfilled. We find such an interpretation of Rousseau in the work of
Christopher Kelly. Kelly thinks that Rousseau condemns masturbation because it
“entails an extreme degree of dependence on or enslavement to the imagination.”
An individual who masturbates puts himself under the control of his imagination.
Dependence of this sort is problematic because imagination “creates virtually lim-
itless desires.”17 Thus Rousseau’s disdain for masturbation reflects his general
concern about the dangers of non-natural desires. Increasing desires beyond those
supplied by nature is a source of distress, because human beings lack the power to
satisfy every possible desire. Unhappiness results because desires remain unful-
filled. Preventing masturbation is therefore part of preventing the unhappiness
generated by the imagination creating a surplus of unsatisfiable desires.
It is difficult to dispute Kelly’s interpretation directly. Rousseau explicitly con-
nects the ability to masturbate to the exercise of imagination. It is the capacity to
fantasize about sexual situations when no one else is around that enables the indi-
vidual to masturbate. As he notes of himself in the Confessions, “This vice, which
shame and timidity find so convenient, has a particular attraction for lively imagi-
nations.”18 Vice of this sort is not apparent in sexual activities governed by nature.

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The consideration of mating practices provided in the Discourse on Inequality

makes it clear that sex in accordance with nature would only be a function of
need. An individual living according to nature has desires, but they result only in a
search for the nearest available and cooperative member of the opposite sex. The
state of nature, prior to the existence of society, is a place where “males and
females united fortuitously, depending on encounter, occasion and desire. . . .”19 If
one’s advances met with rejection, one merely had to seek out a more compatible
companion. Masturbation is not an option in the state of nature, because sexual
needs when they arise are more easily fulfilled than they are in society.20
The natural restrictions on sexual activity imply that there is a limit to need.
Given that one only seeks a physically appropriate and cooperative mate, one
only requires a basic form of sexual satisfaction. It is the fulfillment of a natural
appetite. The situation is radically altered when imagination becomes a factor.
Rousseau contrasts the benign call of natural need with the disruptions caused
by imagination.

Imagination, which causes so much havoc among us, does not speak to savage hearts. Everyone
peaceably waits for the impulsion of nature, yields to it without choice with more pleasure than
frenzy; and the need satisfied, all desire is extinguished.21

Sexual activity becomes problematic when imagination decides the shape of de-
sire. In contaminating sexual desire in this way, imagination demonstrates the
same broad influence that Rousseau observes elsewhere. Hence his declaration
that it is “the errors of imagination which transform into vices the passions of all
limited beings.”22 Without imagination we would not fall prey to the intense and
dangerous passions that are unknown to human beings in their natural state.
The validity of Kelly’s basic position is further established by Rousseau’s re-
marks on the need to avoid excess desires. We are told by Rousseau that a
“being endowed with senses whose faculties equalled his desire would be an ab-
solutely happy being.”23 Happiness is a function of perceiving as desirable only
those things that are naturally desirable. In other words, if our wants and needs
were limited to what we actually need, then we would be happy at all times. On
these grounds, it is clear that masturbation is incompatible with the ideal Rous-
seau presents. The ability to use sexual fantasies as a means to pleasure entails
that the individual desires what cannot be had, namely sex with any partner he
wants. By substituting self-gratification for actual sexual relations with someone
else, the individual admits to desiring what is not available. Moreover, this form
of desiring allows for excess. There is, in terms of the generation of desire, no
limit to the ability to fantasize. It is not subject to the limits of the “real world.”24
To this end, Rousseau’s condemnation of masturbation is consistent with his
overall distrust of habits. He thinks that all habits are hindrances to living proper,

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because habits involve needs that are not present in the individual by nature. If I
find myself wanting something because I have grown used to having it, then my
need is not necessarily a function of what I actually require. I merely have the
desire in question because of the habit I have acquired. It is a situation where
“desire no longer comes from need but from habit, or, rather, habit adds a new
need to that of nature.”25 With the ascendancy of habit over nature comes regret-
table restrictions on the individual’s ability to govern action. Given that habitual
needs are not necessarily natural, it follows that their satisfaction may not be
within the scope of our natural capacities. The desire to have things that are not
readily provided by nature increases the potential for disappointment. We may
find ourselves struggling to satisfy our desires and failing miserably. If we, how-
ever, are fortunate enough not to fall victim to habit, then we not only may have
more success satisfying our natural desires, but we will feel more control of our
lives. Rousseau counsels, in this regard, that “your freedom and your power
extend only as far as your natural strength and not beyond. All the rest is only
slavery, illusion and deception.”26 Thus habit is synonymous with slavery. We
literally become slaves to our desires when we are governed by habit.
If imagination were eliminated, then masturbation would not be a cause for
concern. However, when we examine the condition of human beings in social
situations, removed from the idealized abstraction of the state of nature, we must
acknowledge that they are similar to Rousseau and have “lively imaginations.”
In the case of Emile, he lives in a world where it is possible to search for sexual
satisfaction independent of the need to copulate and reproduce. Rousseau clearly
notes that Emile can fantasize and discover new outlets for sexual pleasure. As
Rousseau puts it, “the memory of objects that have made an impression upon us,
the ideas that we have acquired follow us in our retreat and people it in spite of
ourselves with images more seductive than the objects themselves. . . .”27 The
potential to think of others in their absence and to embellish the images we have
of them, through the power of the imagination, makes us vulnerable to the
threats Rousseau has already mentioned. Because we share a world with individ-
uals whom we can imagine in their absence, we are to fear masturbation. Those
with active imaginations can “make any beauty who tempts them serve their
pleasure without the need of first obtaining their consent.”28 Rousseau asserts
that if we remained alone we would not have these problems, because “a solitary
man raised in a desert, without books, without instruction, and without women,
would die there a virgin at whatever age he reached.”29 Without the imaginative
capacity to envision objects of sexual desire in absentia, there would be no temp-
tation to masturbate.
If we concentrate solely on the ills engendered by imagination and its contri-
bution to the formation of desires and habits, we overlook the special treatment
Rousseau gives masturbation. While it is true that this vice is a symptom of the

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disorders of imagination and desire, it is singled out for its devastating powers.
Not everything Rousseau labels a vice is so feared. Although habits should be
avoided, not every habit is deemed to be fatal in its consequences. Therefore,
even if we accept that the evils of masturbation are linked to imagination and
habit, something has been left unsaid. There is need for an interpretation that
explains why masturbation is taken to be so deadly. Moreover, looking at mas-
turbation as solely a product of imagination and desire gone astray obscures the
obvious point that it can be a source of physical pleasure. In this respect, what
must be added to Kelly’s basic position is the recognition of the seductive
appeal Rousseau thinks masturbation has for young men.30 We need to note that
being enervated by the constant effort to achieve sexual satisfaction through
masturbation is not entirely the same as suffering because one’s desires remain
unsatisfied. Indeed, the dangers inherent in masturbation are related to the fact
that it does provide satisfaction. The gratification resulting from masturbation is
what drives individuals to continue. It is not because they are merely seeking
something that they cannot find, but that they enjoy something they have easily
found. The habit, although made possible by the imagination, is ultimately sus-
tained because of its ability to supply satisfaction on a physical level.
The pleasurable aspect of masturbation is what accounts for Rousseau’s dread
of its physically weakening effects. Individuals, it is claimed, compulsively seek
satisfaction to the point of physical exhaustion. This situation is evident in Rous-
seau’s own interpretation of his personal history. He falls victim to masturbation
because of his infatuation with Mme de Warens. When he succumbs to tempta-
tion and masturbates, he makes it obvious that he is finding enjoyment. Even
though he recognizes that by masturbating, instead of pursuing her directly, he
preserved their relationship as friends, he still speaks of being “stimulated” and
“intoxicated”31 by the situation. He enjoys masturbation even though it is only
a substitute for the situation he truly desires. If masturbation only entailed
the frustration of desire, Rousseau’s recollection of his discovery would not be
colored by descriptions of pleasure. He obviously found satisfaction in the sup-
plement as a way of fulfilling the desires that he could not satisfy elsewhere.
By not acknowledging that masturbation involves pleasure, Derrida fails ade-
quately to characterize Rousseau’s position. Derrida, like Kelly, is quick to note
the role that imagination plays in masturbation. He observes that the object of
thought, the imagined other that is the subject of fantasy, “that is thus delivered
to us in the present is a chimera.” Masturbation, as a supplement to natural de-
sire, is contingent on imagined objects. “The sign, the image, the representation
which come to supplement the absent presence are the illusions that sidetrack
us.” And with the recourse to the imagined for satisfaction supposedly comes in-
evitable disappointment. Because the one imagined is never directly present, the
individual never really acquires what he wants. He must be satisfied with the

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image rather than the genuine article and therefore must contend with an “expe-
rience of frustration.”32 The point Derrida misses is that in some way the indi-
vidual must find relief from frustration. Otherwise, there is no reason for the
person to continue to the point of making masturbation an unbreakable habit.
While there may be grounds for disappointment on some emotional or existen-
tial level, there is no reason to deny that masturbation is a source of physical
pleasure.
Further response to Derrida is made available by recourse to one of his own
preferred topics, that of writing. As we have seen, Rousseau includes books
among the things that upset the natural order and threaten the “virginity” that we
would otherwise enjoy if not for social influences. Books are obviously sources
of enticement because they can contain seductive descriptions that fuel the imag-
ination. But despite the danger presented by the erotic potential of literature,
Rousseau does not refrain from associating his own novel writing with sexual
fantasy. His account of the genesis of La Nouvelle Heloise shows it to be born of
unrequited love. His obsession with Mme Houdetot, who does not return his
affections, forces him to concoct fantasies, and he eventually records his “erotic
transports” in the form of a book.33
The relevance of Rousseau’s novel to my position is conspicuous if we take
into account the physical dimension of his “erotic transports.” At one point,
Rousseau describes the overwhelming anticipation of seeing the object of his
affections and imagines what it would be like to have his desires fulfilled. He
writes,

as I walked I dreamt of her I was about to see, of the affectionate welcome she would give me,
and of the kiss, that fatal kiss, even before I received it. It so fired my blood that my head was
dizzy, my eyes were dazzled and blind, and my trembling knees could no longer support me. I
had to stop and sit down; my whole bodily mechanism was in utter disorder. . . .34

Rousseau’s reactions to his fantasy manifest themselves physically. Not only

does he begin to feel the pleasures that he seeks, but he also experiences the
exhaustion associated with rigorous sexual activity. When he reaches his destina-
tion he is “weak, exhausted, worn out and scarcely able to hold himself up.”35
This choice of words recalls his prior statement of the evils of masturbation. It
suggests that Rousseau’s fantasizing reaches a frenzy comparable to the kind he
attributes to his youthful discovery of masturbation. The pleasures of the imagi-
nation translate into physical sensations and inspire reactions similar to those
felt during sexual activity. The enjoyment of imagining sexual satisfaction
excites the body, and with this pleasure comes the same physical strain attributed
to masturbation. Therefore even if fantasy is associated with the defects of a
“lively imagination,” its powers are felt through their capacity to change one’s

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physical state. The power of erotica is felt in the flesh, and whatever negative
function it has is not strictly a product of defects of the imagination. Rousseau’s
surrender to his fantasies is ultimately described in terms symptomatic of his
general dismay over the power he thinks sex has to weaken the body.
Another common limitation to interpretations that stress the imaginative di-
mension of masturbation is that they confine the analysis of prevention to ques-
tions of controlling imagination. Kelly makes such a move when he considers
Rousseau’s suggested method for preventing masturbation. On his reading, the
ultimate restraint of sexual desire is achieved in the Emile by supplying the pupil
with an image of his perfect spouse. Emile’s tutor, therefore, appeals to the
pupil’s imagination and makes him fall in love with an ideal woman as a way of
ensuring that his desires will be properly directed. As Rousseau puts it, “this
model, if well made will nonetheless attach him to everything resembling it and
will estrange him from everything not resembling it, just as if his passions had a
real object.”36 Emile will not be unfaithful to this image, and thus will not be
aroused by dissimilar images and objects. The image of Emile’s true love is also
unlike other images of women in that she is envisioned to be so pure that he
could not place her in the context of a sexual fantasy.37 Kelly concludes that “the
success of the plan to keep Emile from promiscuous enslavement to his imagina-
tion and senses depends on the restriction of his imagination to a single object
and prompts the introduction of a real woman.”38 Masturbation is not a factor
because Emile is confined to loving an ideal that becomes actual and prevents
the imagination from wandering.
On a certain level, this result is undeniably ironic. The imagination, by pro-
viding the right image, prevents its powers from being truly felt. The imagina-
tion emerges as the source of its own enslavement. Such a conclusion does not
seem out of place for the professed champion of paradox.39 However, there is
another problem. Rousseau does not consider the use of imaginative devices as
the only feasible solution. He considers a more straightforward approach that
does not depend on governing the powers of imagination. This solution, rather,
lessens the appeal to the very faculty that is the source of the difficulty. Such an
approach has merit because, as it stands, the use of the ideal image as a way of
quelling desire and preventing masturbation is suspect. Although the tutor may
feel that he has cast the image of Sophie in the purest of terms, there is no guar-
antee that the thought of her will not provoke Emile to masturbate. The idea of
her beauty may overwhelm Emile’s respect for her purity. In other words, there
is nothing in what Rousseau has said that prevents Sophie from becoming the
subject of impure and inappropriate fantasies. Even if Rousseau endorses the
appeal to imagination as the route to be pursued, its effectiveness may be lim-
ited. Moreover, Rousseau does not indicate that providing Emile with the image
of Sophie means that the tutor’s presence is no longer required in his student’s

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room at night. Emile cannot be trusted, even if he is enthralled by the thoughts

of his love. The image of Sophie may work as a deterrent, but it is obviously not
the last word on the subject.
The other way in which Emile can be directed away from masturbation is by
being given a lover. However, it is not a case of supplying him with the woman
that corresponds to his ideal. Rather, it is a matter of turning him over to some-
one who can satisfy his awakening sexual desires. Thus as well as providing
Emile with the image of the truly adorable Sophie, Rousseau considers giving
the young pupil to a prostitute or allowing him to have a mistress. If he appears
to be on his way to discovering masturbation, then it is a practical solution to
allow him a lover. Rousseau exclaims: “If a tyranny must subjugate you, I prefer
to yield you to one from whom I can deliver you. Whatever happens, I shall tear
you away more easily from women than from yourself.”40 The issue raised by
this proposal is that Rousseau obviously considers a physical solution to the
problem of masturbation. If worse comes to worst, the trick is to give the pupil
an actual physical outlet for his desire. This form of “tyranny” has the benefit of
being easily replaced. In other words, Emile can engage in sexual activity with
such a woman on a fairly regular basis without it becoming a hindrance to his
future status as a husband. He can be given over to Sophie without there being
any question of him suffering from the physical side-effects of masturbation.
A physical relationship with a woman is deemed better than a fantasy that could
result in masturbation.
The Confessions, once again, aids our understanding of the Emile in this con-
text. As Starobinski has noted, Rousseau uses the same term to describe his
relationship with his lover, Therese, that he uses to describe masturbation. Both
are supplements. In fact, it is finding the supplement of Therese that allows
Rousseau, at least temporarily, to forget about the supplement of masturbation.
In commenting on the substitution of a woman for masturbation, Starobinski
also observes that Therese was for Rousseau “someone he could easily identify
with his own flesh and who never raised the problem of the other. Therese is not
a partner in a dialogue but an auxiliary to Rousseau’s physical existence.”41
Leaving aside Starobinski’s emphasis on Rousseau’s psychological condition,
we can concentrate on the claim that Therese is assigned the role of “auxiliary
to Rousseau’s physical existence.” Therese provides Rousseau with a way of
achieving physical pleasure. She is an outlet in the very same sense that Emile’s
mistress would be. A woman is to prevent the discovery or, in Rousseau’s case,
the continuation of the destructive habit of masturbation.
Showing that the desire to masturbate can be uprooted by a physical relation-
ship with a woman does not fully explain why a woman is to be preferred. How
can a young man be more easily torn away from the object of his sexual desire
than from himself? The answer is quite simple. A woman, as a sexual partner,

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must consent. She must cooperate.42 This is true even in the state of nature,
where sexual coupling only takes place if both parties are willing. A similar de-
gree of cooperation is not required if the object of sexual desire is only present
in a fantasy. Recall that masturbation enables individuals to “make any beauty
who tempts them serve their pleasure without the need of first obtaining her con-
sent.”43 Masturbation, because it only involves one person, does not require the
agreement of another party. It can be done any time the individual feels the
desire. But sex with another person requires that the other person be present and,
to some extent, willing. Therefore, as a solution to the problem of masturbation,
the advantage of using a female supplement is simply one of controlling access
to the supply of pleasure. With a reduction in opportunity comes a reduction in
the likelihood that all energy and strength will be expended on sexual activity.
The body is protected from itself by the use of a less damaging supplement. A
woman cannot be a habit because she might not always be available. Emile,
however, is a constant and present danger to himself. He is, in Rousseau’s terms,
the only enemy that “cannot be put out of the way.”44
We can make this result even clearer if we consider Rousseau’s views on the
moral dimension of love. In describing how couples in romantic relationships
should have shared feelings for each other, Rousseau declares: “He who said ‘I
possess Lais without her possessing me’ uttered a witless phrase. Possession
which is not reciprocal is nothing. It is at most possession of the sexual organ,
not of the individual.”45 People, if they are truly in love, should be mutually
devoted. They must truly possess each other. However, if these feelings are
absent and one engages in sexual activity without reciprocal feeling, then it is
equivalent to masturbation in that it is only “possession of the sexual organ.”46
But there is one visible difference. Sexual activity with an other, even if it is not
predicated on mutual affection, is still limited by the willing presence of the
other. A relationship with a mistress is less likely to lead to the same kind of
physical strain as masturbation because it is less likely that the mistress will
always be available or willing. Possessing the organ of an other is not as easy as
possessing one’s own.
The comparison between a mistress and masturbation raises various issues
that fall outside of the topic I have introduced. Rousseau’s views on women are
controversial and we could, among other things, ask about the appropriateness of
using a woman solely as an instrument for sexual satisfaction. But the more
pressing concern for my position is whether the fear Rousseau expresses is gen-
uine. Until now I have not stopped to question the vehemence with which Rous-
seau holds his opinion. Is it correct to suppose that adolescent males, if left to
their own devices, would masturbate until they destroy themselves? Moreover,
even if we think this could happen, do we have any reason to suppose that this
would be more than an isolated incident? Rousseau may honestly have believed

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his dire predictions and felt that they were true in his case, but we can look to
see what Rousseau leaves unsaid. One possible interpretation is that, regardless
of how seriously Rousseau believes in the evils of masturbation, his imaginary
tutor’s approach has the pronounced effect of generating fear and anxiety. The
young Emile is swayed by his persuasive instructor to believe that masturbation
is a serious danger. The anxiety that surrounds masturbation enables Rousseau
to introduce forms of control that cannot be advocated within his educational
system as a whole. Anxiety enables Rousseau to make Emile submissive, a
result not in keeping with the professed intention of the work.
The idea that Emile is to be commanded through his anxiety returns us to the
theme of social control introduced at the beginning of my discussion. Before
advancing, it is important to note how the kind of control I outline differs from
more conventional accounts of Rousseau’s position. Joel Schwartz, for example,
remarks that Emile is “denied any opportunity to masturbate, because Emile
must be a social being.”47 However, although Emile is being prepared for life
in society, prohibiting masturbation is not merely a means of ensuring that he
acknowledges social responsibility. The intent behind Emile’s revolutionary
education is not just the creation of a human being who is prepared for life in
society. Indeed, Emile is given the chance of living a life very different from that
of the average “social being.” To make this point clear, it is necessary to start
with an analysis of Rousseau’s pedagogical aspirations.
Rousseau’s educational project, as revealed in the Emile, is founded on a
choice between mutually exclusive options. We are told that we “must choose
between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same
time.”48 If we are interested in “making a man,” we must follow an educational
path that corresponds to the one followed by natural development. To be truly
a man, a man must be as nature intended him. Primarily, he must live a life of
psychological and physical independence. In his natural state, man exists only
for himself, without being distracted or corrupted by the influences Rousseau
attributes to society. If our system of education creates a man who lives accord-
ing to nature, he will be a “numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative
only to itself or its kind.”49 He is complete and self-sufficient. In opposition to
this idea of natural completeness, we learn that a man educated to be a citizen is
fractional. The citizen is brought up to belong to a group and “his value is deter-
mined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body.”50 Therefore, if we
have chosen the second option, we must educate the individual to become part of
a social unit that provides what he lacks.
In the light of the distinction between what is social and what is natural, it is
clear that Rousseau intends his treatise to provide the foundations for a natural
education. His story of the life and development of Emile is preoccupied with
keeping the pupil close to nature. For example, remarking on methods for

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maintaining physical health, Rousseau observes that “I will be told that animals,
living in a way that conforms to nature, ought to be subject to fewer ills than we
are. Well, their way of life is precisely the one I want to give my pupil.”51 This
invocation of the wisdom of nature is a definite contrast to the negative view
offered of human culture. “All our wisdom consists in servile prejudices. All our
practices are only subjection, impediment and constraint. Civil man is born,
lives and dies in slavery.”52 Therefore, even though Rousseau offers a choice
regarding the form education takes, his preferred option is to follow nature.
To limit the scope of the Emile to the issue of how to raise a man capable of
existing independent of all social influence, however, would limit its practical
appeal. Very few people would be moved to follow an education manual that
told them how to raise their children or pupils to be completely isolated and in-
dependent agents. Moreover, the task of embarking on a pedagogical mission,
such as the one outlined in the Emile, involves introducing the pupil to the world
of social interaction. Although Rousseau instructs the aspiring educator to con-
ceal much of his work from the pupil,53 the pupil is still involved in a very
active, very social relationship with his instructor. We therefore should be cogni-
zant of Rousseau’s confessed purpose for writing the Emile. Rousseau, after out-
lining the various obstacles to natural education, raises this question: “what will
a man raised uniquely for himself become for others?”54 In other words, the
challenge Rousseau sets himself is to answer the question of what happens when
an individual raised to be complete and self-sufficient is made to be part of a
social unit. Emile will be a man educated according to nature but capable of
living with others. In this respect, Emile is not intended, as Schwartz claims, to
be a social being. Instead, he is to be a natural man capable of living with social
beings. He occupies society because he must, but he is not made into a social
being.
The dangers Rousseau’s project faces are exactly the traps he sees in traditional
educational practices. If Rousseau fails to live up to the challenge that he has
raised, his pupil might become as flawed as everyone else. Emile may fluctuate
between nature and society and be like the rest of us, unable “to put ourselves in
harmony with ourselves and without having been good for either ourselves or for
others.”55 But Rousseau may also fail on grounds that are unique to his project.
Part of the program for educating according to nature involves ensuring that the
pupil, upon reaching maturity, is capable of exercising his individual freedom.
The pupil must be prepared so that he is able to take command of his life. In so
doing, the pupil is taught to control his appetites and desires and to live a life that
maintains the natural health of the body. “Prepare from afar the reign of his free-
dom and the use of his forces by leaving natural habit to his body, by putting him
in the condition always to be master of himself and in all things to do his will, as
soon as he has one.”56 The emphasis here is on the ability to exercise self-control.

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Masturbation, as a graphic example of habit-forming activity, entails the constant

surrender of control to passion. If the project Rousseau envisions is to succeed,
then the pupil must be prevented from adopting such habits. The individual must
be free to control his life.
Before the pupil is ready to have authority over himself, he is educated to
make proper use of his freedom. To this extent, he is directed or controlled by
his tutor until he is able to be left on his own. But in order to succeed, the tutor
must not reveal his power. He must conceal what he does so that the pupil does
not think himself a servant. Rousseau counsels that as a tutor you must not let
your pupil “imagine that you might pretend to have any authority over him.”57
Revealing to the pupil that he is not free may make him resentful and rebellious.
The aim is to have the pupil remain cooperative through the hidden exercise of
power. “There is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of
freedom.”58 In order to make the pupil ready for freedom, he must be subject to
secret command.
There is, however, a point in the process where it becomes necessary for the
tutor to expose his methods. When the young man reaches the age of sexual
awakening and is vulnerable to the dangers of sexuality, especially those of mas-
turbation, he is told about the nature and function of his education. In order for
the pupil to be prepared to face the myriad dangers of sexuality, the tutor must
reveal all that he did for the sake of the pupil. The pupil must feel that succumb-
ing to sexual passion is an act of self-destruction that undermines all that has
been undertaken on his behalf. This lesson is imparted during a candid conversa-
tion in which the pupil is described as the valued possession of his tutor. “You
are my property, my child, my work. It is from your happiness that I expect my
own. If you frustrate my hopes, you are robbing me of twenty years of my life,
and you are causing the unhappiness of my old age.”59 The curious outcome of
this exchange is that entrusting of the pupil to himself is a source of increased
anxiety. Not only does the pupil have to worry about himself, but he is made
anxious about the negative influence his actions may have on his beloved
mentor.
It is not surprising that Emile’s first moments of freedom result in a renuncia-
tion of freedom. The anxiety surrounding sexuality makes him fearful of taking
the command for which he has been prepared. After being instructed about the
dangers of sexual intemperance, Emile pleads with his tutor to remain as his pro-
tector. Emile passionately declares:

Defend me from all the enemies who besiege me, and especially from those I carry within myself
and who betray me. Watch over your work in order that it remain worthy of you. I want to obey
your laws; I want to do so always. This is my steadfast will. If ever I disobey you, it will be in
spite of myself. Make me free by protecting me against those passions which do violence to
me.60

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Emile’s motivation is to be free of the rule of unruly passions and be a master

of his own life. He wishes to be guided by reason rather than by a passion for
sexual pleasures that will enslave him to corrupt habits. But he is so over-
whelmed by what awaits that he enters into an agreement with his tutor. This
agreement is intended to serve Emile’s self-interest by not allowing him to fall
victim to his weakness. He looks to someone else for protection.
Emile’s earnest desire to avoid the pitfalls of his emerging sexuality leaves
him at the mercy of his tutor, but he does not perceive his situation to be that of
a slave. His plea for protection is made in the name of freedom. By being
defended by his tutor from the potential excesses of his own passions, Emile be-
lieves that he is in the position necessary to command his own actions. But there
are grounds to doubt that Emile retains his freedom. He states that he only
wishes to obey the laws established by his tutor. In this respect, he forfeits the
right to contribute to formulation of the laws he must follow. He is, in principle,
no longer entitled “to consult his reason before heeding his inclinations.”61 His
ability to make decisions regarding his desires and inclinations has been surren-
dered. In fact, the tutor can now exercise complete control over his pupil as long
as the rules the tutor establishes are presented as necessary for preventing sexual
intemperance. Emile has expressed his willingness to follow such commands,
and the tutor is in a position to exploit this compliance.
Emile’s apparent lapse into slavery is deemed necessary to preserve the
strength and health his tutor has provided. Emile gladly accepts what his tutor
prescribes. The pupil will do what his instructor commands, but force is not a
factor in Emile’s submission. The tutor’s ability to make Emile docile and accept
his command negates the need for direct and explicit control. Emile is not
“forced to be free”62 because he has given himself freely. He has accepted
authority willingly because he fears his freedom. With the fear of sexual intem-
perance comes the acceptance of authority necessary for communal stability.
Emile is an ideal contrast to a world of non-cooperative individuals. He puts
aside his own individual will and accepts rules. He is submissive in ways that
others are not, because he is riddled with anxiety about where his freedom may
lead.
Emile’s tutor does not exploit the authority given to him by his pupil. In fact,
at one point, the tutor liberates Emile from his bondage. The tutor says to Emile:
“Up to now you were only apparently free. You had only the precarious freedom
of a slave to whom nothing has been commanded. Now be really free. Learn to
become your own master.”63 The tutor has not had to act on the powers granted
to him by Emile. Emile did not behave in a fashion that indicated that he was
about to be consumed by his own passions, and his tutor did not have to inter-
vene. However, despite the absence of direct interference by the tutor, it would
be hasty to conclude that Emile is now in a position to be “really free.” The fears

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that the tutor has instilled in Emile spill over into his married life. He is prepared
to let his wife Sophie take the lead in sexual matters so that he will not become a
victim of passion. He realizes that intemperance may still be the source of his
downfall. Emile may be protected from the vice of masturbation, but his carnal
appetites may resurface in marriage. Hence he accepts his wife’s dominion in
this area and says to her: “be the arbiter of my pleasures as you are of my life
and my destiny.”64 Sophie is to take Emile’s reins from the tutor and control him
in a similar way. The motivation for Emile’s submission to both his tutor and his
wife is identical. They are entrusted to protect him from the potential destruc-
tiveness of his passions.65
Without the threat of the dangers inherent in masturbation, Rousseau is with-
out the leverage necessary to control an individual such as Emile. Emile, as a
self-sufficient person, has no need for society. He is a “numerical unity” and is
not “fractional.” He can live in society, but he really has no need for it. It is only
after he learns to fear himself that it becomes likely he will remain in society. He
could live the life of a virgin on a desert island if he did not dread the vices to
which he has been exposed. Masturbation is the one aspect of living a solitary
life that he has been told makes it undesirable. His belief that his sexual passions
endanger his health makes him submit to the will of other people. Emile’s accep-
tance of the dominion of his tutor, and later of his wife, indicate that he will for-
feit autonomy to avoid the pitfalls of his own sexuality. Emile is an individual
who can be commanded. His anxiety over sexual intemperance leads him to be
ruled. He seeks to protect his body by handing it over to others. However, it is
not that he is made social. He is submissive because he fears solitude. He cannot
be alone even though he is educated to be self-sufficient and independent.

University College of the Fraser Valley, Canada

NOTES

1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. A. Bloom (New York: Basic Books,
1979), 334.
2 Quoted by Theodore Tarczylo in “Moral Values in ‘La Suite de L’Entretien,’” trans. James Coke
and Michael Murphy, in ’Tis Nature’s Fault: Unauthorized Sexuality during the Enlightenment,
ed. Robert Purks Maccubbin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43.
3 Rousseau, Emile, 334.
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. J. M. Cohen (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1953),
108–09.
5 This is the general position endorsed by Christopher Kelly in Rousseau’s Exemplary Life: The
Confessions as Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
6 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 151 (Derrida’s emphasis).

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7 “What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the ‘dangerous supplement’ is that
in what one calls the real life existences ‘of flesh and bone,’ beyond and behind what one
believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, there has never been anything but writing;
there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could come
forth in a chain of differential significations, the ‘real’ supervening and being added only while
taking on a meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc.” Derrida, Of
Grammatology, 158–59.
8 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12.
9 Taylor Stoehr has described the animosity that Victorian medical authorities had toward Rous-
seau in terms that evoke the modern preoccupation with sexual discourse: “The universal hatred
of Rousseau among our authorities was no accident. Not only did he masturbate and tell about
it (if not shamelessly, at least brazenly), but he also thought about it.” Stoehr, “Pornography,
Masturbation and the Novel,” in Words and Deeds: Essays on the Realistic Imagination (New
York: AMS Press, 1986), 130 (Stoehr’s emphasis). Rousseau, by thinking and talking about
masturbation, makes it into a topic of discourse, which, ironically, suits the purposes of the very
authorities that condemn him.
10 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 124.
11 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 125.
12 Rousseau, Emile, 334.
13 Tracy Strong, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Oaks, Ca.:
Sage Publications, 1994), has observed another way in which masturbation can be linked to a
desire for control. He claims that what worries Rousseau is that young men will masturbate in
order to make orgasm something that can be commanded. Anxiety over having orgasm appear to
be “involuntary” initiates a search for control. Strong writes that masturbation is “a means of
controlling an original fear, the fear of not being your own person, of being controlled” (14).
Strong’s analysis is not incompatible with what I am proposing. What I add to Strong’s view is
the idea that the anxiety over orgasm he describes is a social creation. It is not “original,” but is,
rather, implemented for social purposes.
14 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 104.
15 Rousseau, Emile, 333.
16 Rousseau, Emile, 335.
17 Kelly, Rousseau’s Exemplary Life, 128.
18 Rousseau, Confessions, 109.
19 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality, in The First and
Second Discourses, ed. R. Masters, trans. R. Masters and J. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1964), 121.
20 This view marks another difference between Rousseau’s position and the one presented in the
Encyclopedie. According to Rousseau, there cannot be masturbation that is prompted only by
need, because there is no real need to masturbate. Masturbation is a product of unnatural desire
and not of need. Moreover, this point would be invoked as a response to the claim that masturba-
tion as a supplement to nature is natural. Despite Derrida’s insistence, Rousseau seeks to bar
masturbation from nature.
21 Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, 121.
22 Rousseau, Emile, 219.
23 Rousseau, Emile, 80.
24 “The real world has its limits; the imaginary world is infinite.” Rousseau, Emile, 81.
25 Rousseau, Emile, 63.
26 Rousseau, Emile, 83.

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27 Rousseau, Emile, 333.

28 Rousseau, Confessions, 109.
29 Rousseau, Emile, 333.
30 Kelly does mention the pleasure of masturbation, but he thinks it is solely a product of the imagi-
nation. Thus in describing Rousseau’s revulsion when he is “approached by a man who suggests
that they ‘amuse [themselves] together,’” Kelly argues that “the presence of the other man would
focus attention on the physical act rather than on the imaginary object of desire. By removing the
imaginative dimension of the act, this amusement would fail to amuse” (Rousseau’s Exemplary
Life, 128–29). What is odd about Kelly’s view is that it almost seems to forget that masturbation
is “a physical act” and that the pleasure achieved, while aided by imagination, still requires phys-
ical stimulation. It is more likely that Rousseau is sickened by the suggestion because the act is
for him one that “shame and timidity find so convenient” and is not something that should be
done in public.
31 Rousseau, Confessions, 109.
32 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 154.
33 Rousseau, Confessions, 408.
34 Rousseau, Confessions, 414.
35 Rousseau, Confessions, 415.
36 Rousseau, Emile, 329.
37 Sophie’s modesty and purity distance her from women who would lead Emile astray. See Emile,
329.
38 Kelly, Rousseau’s Exemplary Life, 141.
39 “Common readers, pardon my paradoxes. When one reflects, they are necessary and whatever
you may say, I prefer to be a paradoxical man than a prejudiced one” (Emile, 93). For more on
Rousseau’s dedication to paradox, see Stephen Salkever “Interpreting Rousseau’s Paradoxes,”
Eighteenth Century Studies 9 (1977–78): 204–26.
40 Rousseau, Emile, 334.
41 Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. A. Goldhammer
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 179 (Starobinski’s emphasis).
42 This view seems to exclude the possibility of forcing oneself on another, but in the context of the
Emile, the consent of the partner is guaranteed because she is either enlisted as a willing mistress
or paid for her cooperation. Moreover, Anthony Skillen has observed that it is essential to Rous-
seau’s view of human psychology that women who are desired are seen as reciprocating desire. It
is this element that makes them truly desirable. As Skillen writes, “the beloved, as a subject has
her own needs, desires and values and is therefore a centre of consciousness, evaluation and
motivation.” Skillen, “Rousseau and the Fall of Social Man,” Philosophy 60 (1985): 112. In this
light, force as a sexual weapon is discounted because it undermines feelings of reciprocity.
43 Rousseau, Confessions, 109.
44 Rousseau, Emile, 333.
45 Rousseau, Emile, 349.
46 This description approximates Rousseau’s relationship with Therese. He thus seems to “possess
Lais” without being possessed.
47 Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984), 105.
48 Rousseau, Emile, 39.
49 Rousseau, Emile, 39.
50 Rousseau, Emile, 39–40.
51 Rousseau, Emile, 55.
52 Rousseau, Emile, 42.

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53 See Emile, 91.

54 Rousseau, Emile, 41.
55 Rousseau, Emile, 41.
56 Rousseau, Emile, 63.
57 Rousseau, Emile, 91.
58 Rousseau, Emile, 120.
59 Rousseau, Emile, 323.
60 Rousseau, Emile, 325.
61 On the Social Contract, in On the Social Contract with Genevan Manuscript and Political Econ-
omy, ed. R. Masters, trans. R. Masters and J. Masters (New York: St. Martins Press, 1978),
55–56.
62 Rousseau, Social Contract, 55.
63 Rousseau, Emile, 445.
64 Rousseau, Emile, 477.
65 Mary Nichols makes a similar observation, although she does not focus on sexual anxiety or
masturbation. For Nichols, Rousseau is seen as sacrificing Emile’s independence by binding him
to others through love. With reference to Rousseau’s incomplete sequel to the Emile, Nichols
writes: “Rousseau is finally unable to reconcile the radical individualism he seeks for Emile with
the connection to others he tries to give him through his family.” Nichols, “Rousseau’s Novel
Education in the Emile,” Political Theory 13 (1985), 553. I choose, rather, to describe these
bonds in a less emotional way and more in terms of personal misgivings about oneself, which
may make them more compatible with the individualism Nichols describes.

268