Partition of India - Wikipedia

12/4/2019 Partition of India - Wikipedia
Partition of India
The partition of India in 1947 was the division of British India[b] into
Partition of India
two independent dominion states, the Union of India and the Dominion
of Pakistan.[3] The Union of India is today the Republic of India; the
Dominion of Pakistan is today the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the
People's Republic of Bangladesh. The partition involved the division of
two provinces, Bengal and the Punjab, based on district-wise Hindu or
Muslim majorities. Also divided between the two new dominions were
the British Indian Army, the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian Civil Service,
the railways, and the central treasury. The partition was set forth in the
Indian Independence Act 1947 and resulted in the dissolution of the
British Raj, or Crown rule in India. The two self-governing countries of
India and Pakistan legally came into existence at midnight on 14–15 British Indian Empire in The Imperial
August 1947. Gazetteer of India, 1909. British India
is shaded pink, the princely states
The partition displaced between 10–12 million people along religious
yellow
lines, creating overwhelming refugee crises in the newly constituted
dominions; there was large-scale violence, with estimates of loss of life Date August 1947
accompanying or preceding the partition disputed and varying between Location British Raj
several hundred thousand and two million.[1][c] The violent nature of the Outcome Partition of British Indian
partition created an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion between India Empire into independent
and Pakistan that plagues their relationship to the present. dominions the Union of
India and the Dominion of
The term partition of India does not cover the secession of Bangladesh
Pakistan and refugee
from Pakistan in 1971, nor the earlier separations of Burma (now
crises
Myanmar) and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) from the administration of
British India.[d] The term also does not cover the political integration of Deaths 200,000 to 2 million,[1][a]
princely states into the two new dominions, nor the disputes of 14 million displaced[2]
annexation or division arising in the princely states of Hyderabad,
Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir, though violence along
religious lines did break out in some princely states at the time of
the partition. It does not cover the incorporation of the enclaves of
French India into India during the period 1947–1954, nor the
annexation of Goa and other districts of Portuguese India by India
in 1961. Other contemporaneous political entities in the region in
1947, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives were unaffected by
the partition.[e]
Contents The prevailing religions of the British Indian

Empire based on the Census of India, 1901
Background
Partition of Bengal (1905)
World War I, Lucknow Pact: 1914–1918
Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms: 1919
Two-nation theory
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India 1/38
Muslim homeland, provincial elections, World War II,

Lahore Resolution: 1930–1945
1946 Election, Cabinet Mission, Direct Action Day, Plan for
Partition, Independence: 1946–1947
Geographic partition, 1947
Mountbatten Plan
Radcliffe Line
Independence, population transfer, and violence
Punjab
Bengal
Sindh
Gujarat
Delhi
Alwar and Bharatpur
Jammu and Kashmir
Resettlement of refugees in India: 1947–1951
Resettlement of refugees in Pakistan: 1947–1951
Missing people
Rehabilitation of women
Post-Partition migration
Pakistan
India
Perspectives
Artistic depictions of the Partition
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
External links
Background
Partition of Bengal (1905)
1909 Percentage of Hindu, 1909 Percentage of 1909 Percentage of Sikhs,

samprathek and arya Muslims. Buddhists and Jains.
In 1905, the viceroy, Lord Curzon, in his second term, divided the largest administrative subdivision in British India,
the Bengal Presidency, into the Muslim-majority province of East Bengal and Assam and the Hindu-majority
province of Bengal (present-day Indian states of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha).[7] Curzon's act, the
Partition of Bengal—which some considered administratively felicitous, and, which had been contemplated by various
colonial administrations since the time of Lord William Bentinck, but never acted upon—was to transform nationalist
politics as nothing else before it.[7] The Hindu elite of Bengal, among them many who owned land in East Bengal that
was leased out to Muslim peasants, protested fervidly. The large Bengali Hindu middle-class (the Bhadralok), upset at
the prospect of Bengalis being outnumbered in the new Bengal province by Biharis and Oriyas, felt that Curzon's act
was punishment for their political assertiveness.[7] The pervasive protests against Curzon's decision took the form
predominantly of the Swadeshi ("buy Indian") campaign and involved a boycott of British goods. Sporadically—but
flagrantly—the protesters also took to political violence that involved attacks on civilians.[8] The violence, however,
was not effective, as most planned attacks were either preempted by the British or failed.[9] The rallying cry for both
types of protest was the slogan Bande Mataram (Bengali, lit: "Hail to the Mother"), the title of a song by Bankim
Chandra Chatterjee, which invoked a mother goddess, who stood variously for Bengal, India, and the Hindu goddess
Kali.[10] The unrest spread from Calcutta to the surrounding regions of Bengal when Calcutta's English-educated
students returned home to their villages and towns.[11] The religious stirrings of the slogan and the political outrage
over the partition were combined as young men, in groups such as Jugantar, took to bombing public buildings, staging
armed robberies,[9] and assassinating British officials.[10] Since Calcutta was the imperial capital, both the outrage and
the slogan soon became nationally known.[10]
The overwhelming, but predominantly Hindu, protest against the partition of Bengal and the fear, in its wake, of
reforms favouring the Hindu majority, now led the Muslim elite in India, in 1906, to meet with the new viceroy, Lord
Minto, and to ask for separate electorates for Muslims. In conjunction, they demanded proportional legislative
representation reflecting both their status as former rulers and their record of cooperating with the British. This led, in
December 1906, to the founding of the All-India Muslim League in Dacca. Although Curzon, by now, had resigned his
position over a dispute with his military chief Lord Kitchener and returned to England, the League was in favour of his
partition plan. The Muslim elite's position, which was reflected in the League's position, had crystallized gradually
over the previous three decades, beginning with the 1871 Census of British India, which had first estimated the
populations in regions of Muslim majority.[12] (For his part, Curzon's desire to court the Muslims of East Bengal had
arisen from British anxieties ever since the 1871 census, the first comprehensive census there—and in light of the
history of Muslims fighting them in the 1857 Mutiny and the Second Anglo-Afghan War—about Indian Muslims
rebelling against the Crown.[12]) In the three decades since that census, Muslim leaders across northern India, had
intermittently experienced public animosity from some of the new Hindu political and social groups.[12] The Arya
Samaj, for example, had not only supported Cow Protection Societies in their agitation,[13] but also—distraught at the
1871 Census's Muslim numbers—organized "reconversion" events for the purpose of welcoming Muslims back to the
Hindu fold.[12] In the United Provinces, Muslims became anxious when, in the late 19th century, political
representation increased, giving more power to Hindus, and Hindus were politically mobilized in the Hindi-Urdu
controversy and the anti-cow-killing riots of 1893.[14] In 1905, when Tilak and Lajpat Rai attempted to rise to
leadership positions in the Congress, and the Congress itself rallied around symbolism of Kali, Muslim fears
increased.[12] It was not lost on many Muslims, for example, that the rallying cry, "Bande Mataram", had first
appeared in the novel Anandmath in which Hindus had battled their Muslim oppressors.[15] Lastly, the Muslim elite,
and among it Dacca Nawab, Khwaja Salimullah, who hosted the League's first meeting in his mansion in Shahbag, was
aware that a new province with a Muslim majority would directly benefit Muslims aspiring to political power.[15]
World War I, Lucknow Pact: 1914–1918

World War I would prove to be a watershed in the imperial relationship between Britain and India. 1.4 million Indian
and British soldiers of the British Indian Army would take part in the war and their participation would have a wider
cultural fallout: news of Indian soldiers fighting and dying with British soldiers, as well as soldiers from dominions
like Canada and Australia, would travel to distant corners of the world both in newsprint and by the new medium of
the radio.[16] India's international profile would thereby rise and would continue to rise during the 1920s.[16] It was to
lead, among other things, to India, under its own name, becoming a founding member of the League of Nations in
1920 and participating, under the name, "Les Indes Anglaises" (British
India), in the 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp.[17] Back in India,
especially among the leaders of the Indian National Congress, it would lead
to calls for greater self-government for Indians.[16]
The 1916 Lucknow Session of the Congress was also the venue of an
unanticipated mutual effort by the Congress and the Muslim League, the
occasion for which was provided by the wartime partnership between
Germany and Turkey. Since the Turkish Sultan, or Khalifah, had also Indian medical orderlies attending to
sporadically claimed guardianship of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, wounded soldiers with the
Medina, and Jerusalem, and since the British and their allies were now in Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force
conflict with Turkey, doubts began to increase among some Indian in Mesopotamia during World War I
Muslims about the "religious neutrality" of the British, doubts that had
already surfaced as a result of the reunification of Bengal in 1911, a decision
that was seen as ill-disposed to Muslims.[18] In the Lucknow Pact, the
League joined the Congress in the proposal for greater self-government
that was campaigned for by Tilak and his supporters; in return, the
Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims in the provincial
legislatures as well as the Imperial Legislative Council. In 1916, the Muslim
League had anywhere between 500 and 800 members and did not yet have
its wider following among Indian Muslims of later years; in the League
itself, the pact did not have unanimous backing, having largely been
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
negotiated by a group of "Young Party" Muslims from the United Provinces
(seated in carriage, on the right,
(UP), most prominently, two brothers Mohammad and Shaukat Ali, who
eyes downcast, with black flat-top
had embraced the Pan-Islamic cause;[18] however, it did have the support hat) receives a big welcome in
of a young lawyer from Bombay, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was later to Karachi in 1916 after his return to
rise to leadership roles in both the League and the Indian independence India from South Africa
movement. In later years, as the full ramifications of the pact unfolded, it
was seen as benefiting the Muslim minority élites of provinces like UP and
Bihar more than the Muslim majorities of Punjab and Bengal; nonetheless,
at the time, the "Lucknow Pact", was an important milestone in
nationalistic agitation and was seen so by the British.[18]
Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms: 1919

Secretary of State for India, Montagu and Viceroy Lord Chelmsford
presented a report in July 1918 after a long fact-finding trip through India
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, seated, third
the previous winter.[19] After more discussion by the government and from the left, was a supporter of the
parliament in Britain, and another tour by the Franchise and Functions Lucknow Pact, which, in 1916,
Committee for the purpose of identifying who among the Indian ended the three-way rift between
population could vote in future elections, the Government of India Act of the Extremists, the Moderates and
1919 (also known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms) was passed in the League
December 1919.[19] The new Act enlarged both the provincial and Imperial
legislative councils and repealed the Government of India's recourse to the
"official majority" in unfavorable votes.[19] Although departments like defence, foreign affairs, criminal law,
communications, and income-tax were retained by the Viceroy and the central government in New Delhi, other
departments like public health, education, land-revenue, local self-government were transferred to the provinces.[19]
The provinces themselves were now to be administered under a new dyarchical system, whereby some areas like
education, agriculture, infrastructure development, and local self-government became the preserve of Indian ministers
and legislatures, and ultimately the Indian electorates, while others like irrigation, land-revenue, police, prisons, and
control of media remained within the purview of the British governor and his executive council.[19] The new Act also
made it easier for Indians to be admitted into the civil service and the army officer corps.
A greater number of Indians were now enfranchised, although, for voting at the national level, they constituted only
10% of the total adult male population, many of whom were still illiterate.[19] In the provincial legislatures, the British
continued to exercise some control by setting aside seats for special interests they considered cooperative or useful. In
particular, rural candidates, generally sympathetic to British rule and less confrontational, were assigned more seats
than their urban counterparts.[19] Seats were also reserved for non-Brahmins, landowners, businessmen, and college
graduates. The principle of "communal representation", an integral part of the Minto-Morley Reforms, and more
recently of the Congress-Muslim League Lucknow Pact, was reaffirmed, with seats being reserved for Muslims, Sikhs,
Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and domiciled Europeans, in both provincial and Imperial legislative councils.[19]
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms offered Indians the most significant opportunity yet for exercising legislative
power, especially at the provincial level; however, that opportunity was also restricted by the still limited number of
eligible voters, by the small budgets available to provincial legislatures, and by the presence of rural and special
interest seats that were seen as instruments of British control.[19]
Two-nation theory
The two-nation theory is the ideology that the primary identity and unifying denominator of Muslims in the Indian
subcontinent is their religion, rather than their language or ethnicity, and therefore Indian Hindus and Muslims are
two distinct nations regardless of such commonalities.[20][21] The two-nation theory was a founding principle of the
Pakistan Movement (i.e., the ideology of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state in South Asia), and the partition of India in
1947.[22]
The ideology that religion is the determining factor in defining the nationality of Indian Muslims was undertaken by
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who termed it as the awakening of Muslims for the creation of Pakistan.[23] It is also a source
of inspiration to several Hindu nationalist organizations, with causes as varied as the redefinition of Indian Muslims
as non-Indian foreigners and second-class citizens in India, the expulsion of all Muslims from India, establishment of
a legally Hindu state in India, prohibition of conversions to Islam, and the promotion of conversions or reconversions
of Indian Muslims to Hinduism.[24][25][26][27]
The Hindu Mahasabha leader Lala Lajpat Rai was one of the first persons to demand to bifurcate India by Muslim and
non-Muslim population. He wrote in The Tribune of 14 December 1924:
Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim States: (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West
Frontier; (2) Western Punjab (3) Sindh and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim
communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly
constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear
partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.[28]
There are varying interpretations of the two-nation theory, based on whether the two postulated nationalities can
coexist in one territory or not, with radically different implications. One interpretation argued for sovereign autonomy,
including the right to secede, for Muslim-majority areas of the Indian subcontinent, but without any transfer of
populations (i.e., Hindus and Muslims would continue to live together). A different interpretation contends that
Hindus and Muslims constitute "two distinct, and frequently antagonistic ways of life, and that therefore they cannot
coexist in one nation."[29] In this version, a transfer of populations (i.e., the total removal of Hindus from Muslim-
majority areas and the total removal of Muslims from Hindu-majority areas) is a desirable step towards a complete
separation of two incompatible nations that "cannot coexist in a harmonious relationship".[30][31]
Opposition to the theory has come from two sources. The first is the concept of a single Indian nation, of which Hindus
and Muslims are two intertwined communities.[32] This is a founding principle of the modern, officially secular,
Republic of India. Even after the formation of Pakistan, debates on whether Muslims and Hindus are distinct
nationalities or not continued in that country as well.[33] The second source of opposition is the concept that while
Indians are not one nation, neither are the Muslims or Hindus of the subcontinent, and it is instead the relatively
homogeneous provincial units of the subcontinent which are true nations and deserving of sovereignty; this view has
been presented by the Baloch,[34] Sindhi,[35] and Pashtun[36] sub-nationalities of Pakistan and the Assamese[37] and
Punjabi[38] sub-nationalities of India.
Muslim homeland, provincial elections, World War II, Lahore Resolution: 1930–1945
Although Choudhry Rahmat Ali had in 1933 produced a pamphlet, Now or
never, in which the term "Pakistan", "the land of the pure", comprising the
Punjab, North West Frontier Province (Afghania), Kashmir, Sindh, and
Balochistan, was coined for the first time, the pamphlet did not attract
political attention.[39] A little later, a Muslim delegation to the
Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms gave short
shrift to the Pakistan idea, calling it "chimerical and impracticable".[39] In Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu,
1932, the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald accepted Dr. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and
Ambedkar's demand for the “Depressed Classes” to have separate Maulana Azad at the 1940 Ramgarh
session of the Congress in which
representation in the central and provincial legislatures. The Muslim
Azad was elected president for the
League favoured the award as it had the potential to weaken the caste
second time
Hindu leadership. However, Mahatma Gandhi, who was seen as a leading
advocate for Dalit rights, went on a fast unto death to persuade the British
to repeal the award. Ambedkar had to back down when it seemed Gandhi's
life was threatened.[40]
Two years later, the Government of India Act 1935 introduced provincial
autonomy, increasing the number of voters in India to 35 million.[41] More
significantly, law and order issues were for the first time devolved from
British authority to provincial governments headed by Indians.[41] This
increased Muslim anxieties about eventual Hindu domination.[41] In the
1937 Indian provincial elections, the Muslim League turned out its best
performance in Muslim-minority provinces such as the United Provinces, Chaudhari Khaliquzzaman (left)
where it won 29 of the 64 reserved Muslim seats.[41] However, in the seconding the 1940 Lahore
Resolution of the All-India Muslim
Muslim-majority regions of the Punjab and Bengal regional parties
League with Jinnah (right) presiding,
outperformed the League.[41] In the Punjab, the Unionist Party of Sikandar and Liaquat Ali Khan centre
Hayat Khan, won the elections and formed a government, with the support
of the Indian National Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal, which lasted
five years.[41] In Bengal, the League had to share power in a coalition headed by A. K. Fazlul Huq, the leader of the
Krishak Praja Party.[41]
The Congress, on the other hand, with 716 wins in the total of 1585 provincial assemblies seats, was able to form
governments in 7 out of the 11 provinces of British India.[41] In its manifesto, the Congress maintained that religious
issues were of lesser importance to the masses than economic and social issues, however, the election revealed that the
Congress had contested just 58 out of the total 482 Muslim seats, and of these, it won in only 26.[41] In UP, where the
Congress won, it offered to share power with the League on condition that the League stop functioning as a
representative only of Muslims, which the League refused.[41] This proved to be a mistake as it alienated the Congress
further from the Muslim masses. In addition, the new UP provincial administration promulgated cow protection and
the use of Hindi.[41] The Muslim elite in UP was further alienated, when they saw chaotic scenes of the new Congress
Raj, in which rural people who sometimes turned up in large numbers in Government buildings, were
indistinguishable from the administrators and the law enforcement personnel.[42]
The Muslim League conducted its own investigation into the conditions of Muslims under Congress-governed
provinces.[43] The findings of such investigations increased fear among the Muslim masses of future Hindu
domination.[43] The view that Muslims would be unfairly treated in an independent India dominated by the Congress
was now a part of the public discourse of Muslims.[43] With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the viceroy, Lord
Linlithgow, declared war on India's behalf without consulting Indian leaders, leading the Congress provincial
ministries to resign in protest.[43] The Muslim League, which functioned under state patronage,[44] in contrast,
organized "Deliverance Day", celebrations (from Congress dominance) and supported Britain in the war effort.[43]
When Linlithgow met with nationalist leaders, he gave the same status to Jinnah as he did to Gandhi, and a month
later described the Congress as a "Hindu organization."[44]
In March 1940, in the League's annual three-day session in Lahore, Jinnah gave a two-hour speech in English, in
which were laid out the arguments of the Two-nation theory, stating, in the words of historians Talbot and Singh, that
"Muslims and Hindus ... were irreconcilably opposed monolithic religious communities and as such no settlement
could be imposed that did not satisfy the aspirations of the former."[43] On the last day of its session, the League
passed, what came to be known as the Lahore Resolution, sometimes also "Pakistan Resolution",[43] demanding that
"the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India
should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and
sovereign." Though it had been founded more than three decades earlier, the League would gather support among
South Asian Muslims only during the Second World War.[45]
Viceroy Linlithgow proposed in August 1940 that India be granted a Dominion status at the conclusion of the war.
Having not taken the Pakistan idea seriously, Linlithgow supposed that what Jinnah actually wanted was a non-
federal arrangement without Hindu domination. To allay Muslim fears of Hindu domination the 'August offer' was
accompanied with the promise that a future constitution would take the views of minorities into consideration.[46]
Neither the Congress nor Muslim League were satisfied with the offer and both rejected it in September. The Congress
once again started a program of civil disobedience.[47]
In March 1942, with the Japanese fast moving up the Malayan Peninsula after the Fall of Singapore,[44] and with the
Americans supporting independence for India,[48] Winston Churchill, the wartime Prime Minister of Britain, sent Sir
Stafford Cripps, the leader of the House of Commons, with an offer of dominion status to India at the end of the war in
return for the Congress's support for the war effort.[49] Not wishing to lose the support of the allies they had already
secured—the Muslim League, Unionists of the Punjab, and the Princes—the Cripps offer included a clause stating that
no part of the British Indian Empire would be forced to join the post-war Dominion. The League rejected the Cripps
offer, seeing this clause as insufficient in meeting the principle of Pakistan.[50] As a result of that proviso, the
proposals were also rejected by the Congress, which, since its founding as a polite group of lawyers in 1885,[51] saw
itself as the representative of all Indians of all faiths.[49] After the arrival in 1920 of Gandhi, the preeminent strategist
of Indian nationalism,[52] the Congress had been transformed into a mass nationalist movement of millions.[51] In
August 1942, the Congress launched the Quit India Resolution which asked for drastic constitutional changes, which
the British saw as the most serious threat to their rule since the Indian rebellion of 1857.[49] With their resources and
attention already spread thin by a global war, the nervous British immediately jailed the Congress leaders and kept
them in jail until August 1945,[53] whereas the Muslim League was now free for the next three years to spread its
message.[44] Consequently, the Muslim League's ranks surged during the war, with Jinnah himself admitting, "The
war which nobody welcomed proved to be a blessing in disguise."[54] Although there were other important national
Muslim politicians such as Congress leader Abul Kalam Azad, and influential regional Muslim politicians such as A. K.
Fazlul Huq of the leftist Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, Sikander Hyat Khan of the landlord-dominated Punjab
Unionist Party, and Abd al-Ghaffar Khan of the pro-Congress Khudai Khidmatgar (popularly, "red shirts") in the
North West Frontier Province, the British were to increasingly see the League as the main representative of Muslim
India.[55] The Muslim League's demand for Pakistan pitted it against the British and Congress.[56]
1946 Election, Cabinet Mission, Direct Action Day, Plan for Partition, Independence:
1946–1947
Members of the 1946 Cabinet An aged and abandoned Muslim An old Sikh man carrying his wife.
Mission to India meeting couple and their grand children Over 10 million people were
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. On the sitting by the roadside on this uprooted from their homeland and
extreme left is Lord Pethick arduous journey. "The old man is travelled on foot, bullock carts and
Lawrence; on the extreme right, dying of exhaustion. The caravan trains to their promised new home.
Sir Stafford Cripps. has gone on," wrote Bourke-White.
Gandhi in Bela, Bihar, after attacks

on Muslims, 28 March 1947.
Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee had been deeply interested in Indian independence since the 1920s, and for
years had supported independence. He now took charge of the government position and gave the issue highest
priority. In January 1946, a number of mutinies broke out in the armed services, starting with that of RAF servicemen
frustrated with their slow repatriation to Britain.[57] The mutinies came to a head with mutiny of the Royal Indian
Navy in Bombay in February 1946, followed by others in Calcutta, Madras, and Karachi. Although the mutinies were
rapidly suppressed, they had the effect of spurring the Attlee government to action. A Cabinet Mission was sent to
India led by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, which also included Sir Stafford Cripps, who had
visited India four years before. The objective of the mission was to arrange for an orderly transfer to independence.[57]
In early 1946, new elections were held in India. With the announcement of the elections the line had been drawn for
Muslim voters to choose between a united Indian state or Partition.[58] Earlier, at the end of the war in 1945, the
colonial government had announced the public trial of three senior officers of Subhas Chandra Bose's defeated Indian
National Army who stood accused of treason. Now as the trials began, the Congress leadership, although it never
supported the INA, chose to defend the accused officers.[59] The subsequent convictions of the officers, the public
outcry against the convictions, and the eventual remission of the sentences created positive propaganda for the
Congress, which enabled it to win the party's subsequent electoral victories in eight of the eleven provinces.[60] The
negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League, however, stumbled over the issue of the partition.
British rule had lost its legitimacy for most Hindus and conclusive proof of this came in the form of the 1946 elections
with the Congress winning 91 percent of the vote among non-Muslim constituencies, thereby gaining a majority in the
Central Legislature and forming governments in eight provinces, and becoming the legitimate successor to the British
government for most Hindus. If the British intended to stay in India the acquiescence of politically active Indians to
British rule would have been in doubt after these election results, although the views of many rural Indians were
uncertain even at that point.[61] The Muslim League won the majority of the Muslim vote as well as most reserved
Muslim seats in the provincial assemblies and it also secured all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly. Recovering
from its performance in the 1937 elections, the Muslim League was finally able to make good on the claim that it and
Jinnah alone represented India's Muslims[62] and Jinnah quickly interpreted this vote as a popular demand for a
separate homeland.[63] However, tensions heightened while the Muslim League was unable to form ministries outside
the two provinces of Sind and Bengal, with the Congress forming a ministry in the NWFP and the key Punjab province
coming under a coalition ministry of the Congress, Sikhs and Unionists.[64]
The British, while not approving of a separate Muslim homeland, appreciated the simplicity of a single voice to speak
on behalf of India's Muslims.[65] Britain had wanted India and its army to remain united for the purpose of keeping
India in its system of 'imperial defence'.[66][67] With India's two political parties unable to come to an agreement,
Britain devised the Cabinet Mission Plan. Through this mission, Britain hoped to preserve the united India which they
and the Congress desired, while concurrently securing the essence of Jinnah's demand for a Pakistan through
'groupings'.[68] The Cabinet mission scheme encapsulated a federal arrangement consisting of three groups of
provinces. Two of these groupings would consist of predominantly Muslim provinces, while the third grouping would
be made up of the predominantly Hindu regions. The provinces would be autonomous but the center would retain
control over defence, foreign affairs and communications. Though the proposals did not offer independent Pakistan,
the Muslim League accepted the proposals. Even though the unity of India would have been preserved, the Congress
leaders, especially Nehru, believed it would leave the Center weak. On 10 July 1946 Nehru gave a "provocative speech",
rejected the idea of grouping the provinces and "effectively torpedoed" both the Cabinet mission plan and the prospect
of a United India.[69]
After the Cabinet Mission broke down, Jinnah proclaimed 16 August 1946 Direct Action Day, with the stated goal of
peacefully highlighting the demand for a Muslim homeland in British India. However, on the morning of the 16th,
armed Muslim gangs gathered at the Ochterlony Monument in Calcutta to hear Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the
League's Chief Minister of Bengal, who, in the words of historian Yasmin Khan, "if he did not explicitly incite violence
certainly gave the crowd the impression that they could act with impunity, that neither the police nor the military
would be called out and that the ministry would turn a blind eye to any action they unleashed in the city."[70] That very
evening, in Calcutta, Hindus were attacked by returning Muslim celebrants, who carried pamphlets distributed earlier
which showed a clear connection between violence and the demand for Pakistan, and directly implicated the
celebration of Direct Action Day with the outbreak of the cycle of violence that would later be called the "Great
Calcutta Killing of August 1946".[71] The next day, Hindus struck back and the violence continued for three days in
which approximately 4,000 people died (according to official accounts), Hindus and Muslims in equal numbers.
Although India had had outbreaks of religious violence between Hindus and Muslims before, the Calcutta killings were
the first to display elements of "ethnic cleansing", in modern parlance.[72] Violence was not confined to the public
sphere, but homes were entered and destroyed and women and children were attacked.[73] Although the Government
of India and the Congress were both shaken by the course of events, in September, a Congress-led interim government
was installed, with Jawaharlal Nehru as united India's prime minister.
The communal violence spread to Bihar (where Muslims were attacked by Hindus), to Noakhali in Bengal (where
Hindus were targeted by Muslims), to Garhmukteshwar in the United Provinces (where Muslims were attacked by
Hindus), and on to Rawalpindi in March 1947 in which Hindus were attacked or driven out by Muslims.[74]
The British Prime Minister Attlee appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten as India's last viceroy, who was given the task to
oversee British India's independence by June 1948, with the instruction to avoid partition and preserve a United
India, but with adaptational authority to ensure a British withdrawal with minimal setbacks. Mountbatten hoped to
revive the Cabinet Mission scheme for a federal arrangement for India. But despite his initial keenness for preserving
the center the tense communal situation caused him to conclude that partition had become necessary for a quicker
transfer of power.[75][76][77][78]
Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the first Congress leaders to accept the partition of India as a solution to the rising
Muslim separatist movement led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He had been outraged by Jinnah's Direct Action
campaign, which had provoked communal violence across India and by the viceroy's vetoes of his home department's
plans to stop the violence on the grounds of constitutionality. Patel severely criticised the viceroy's induction of League
ministers into the government and the revalidation of the grouping scheme by the British without Congress approval.
Although further outraged at the League's boycott of the assembly and non-acceptance of the plan of 16 May despite
entering government, he was also aware that Jinnah did enjoy popular support amongst Muslims, and that an open
conflict between him and the nationalists could degenerate into a Hindu-Muslim civil war of disastrous consequences.
The continuation of a divided and weak central government would in Patel's mind, result in the wider fragmentation of
India by encouraging more than 600 princely states towards independence.[79] Between the months of December 1946
and January 1947, Patel worked with civil servant V. P. Menon on the latter's suggestion for a separate dominion of
Pakistan created out of Muslim-majority provinces. Communal violence in Bengal and Punjab in January and March
1947 further convinced Patel of the soundness of partition. Patel, a fierce critic of Jinnah's demand that the Hindu-
majority areas of Punjab and Bengal be included in a Muslim state, obtained the partition of those provinces, thus
blocking any possibility of their inclusion in Pakistan. Patel's decisiveness on the partition of Punjab and Bengal had
won him many supporters and admirers amongst the Indian public, which had been tired of the League's tactics, but
he was criticised by Gandhi, Nehru, secular Muslims and socialists for a perceived eagerness to do so. When Lord
Louis Mountbatten formally proposed the plan on 3 June 1947, Patel gave his approval and lobbied Nehru and other
Congress leaders to accept the proposal. Knowing Gandhi's deep anguish regarding proposals of partition, Patel
engaged him in frank discussion in private meetings over the perceived practical unworkability of any Congress-
League coalition, the rising violence and the threat of civil war. At the All India Congress Committee meeting called to
vote on the proposal, Patel said:
I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas]. Nobody likes the division
of India and my heart is heavy. But the choice is between one division and many divisions. We must face
facts. We cannot give way to emotionalism and sentimentality. The Working Committee has not acted
out of fear. But I am afraid of one thing, that all our toil and hard work of these many years might go
waste or prove unfruitful. My nine months in office has completely disillusioned me regarding the
supposed merits of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Except for a few honorable exceptions, Muslim officials
from the top down to the chaprasis (peons or servants) are working for the League. The communal veto
given to the League in the Mission Plan would have blocked India's progress at every stage. Whether we
like it or not, de facto Pakistan already exists in the Punjab and Bengal. Under the circumstances I would
prefer a de jure Pakistan, which may make the League more responsible. Freedom is coming. We have 75
to 80 percent of India, which we can make strong with our own genius. The League can develop the rest
of the country.[80]
Following Gandhi's denial[81] but Congress' approval of the plan, Patel represented India on the Partition Council,
where he oversaw the division of public assets, and selected the Indian council of ministers with Nehru. However,
neither he nor any other Indian leader had foreseen the intense violence and population transfer that would take place
with partition.
Late in 1946, the Labour government in Britain, its exchequer exhausted by the recently concluded World War II,
decided to end British rule of India, and in early 1947 Britain announced its intention of transferring power no later
than June 1948. However, with the British army unprepared for the potential for increased violence, the new viceroy,
Louis Mountbatten, advanced the date for the transfer of power, allowing less than six months for a mutually agreed
plan for independence. In June 1947, the nationalist leaders, including Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad on behalf of the
Congress, Jinnah representing the Muslim League, B. R. Ambedkar representing the Untouchable community, and
Master Tara Singh representing the Sikhs, agreed to a partition of the country along religious lines in stark opposition
to Gandhi's views. The predominantly Hindu and Sikh areas were assigned to the new India and predominantly
Muslim areas to the new nation of Pakistan; the plan included a partition of the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab
and Bengal. The communal violence that accompanied the announcement of the Radcliffe Line, the line of partition,
was even more horrific.
Describing the violence that accompanied the Partition of India, historians Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh write:
There are numerous eyewitness accounts of the maiming and mutilation of victims. The catalogue of
horrors includes the disembowelling of pregnant women, the slamming of babies' heads against brick
walls, the cutting off of victims limbs and genitalia and the displaying of heads and corpses. While
previous communal riots had been deadly, the scale and level of brutality during the Partition massacres
was unprecedented. Although some scholars question the use of the term 'genocide' with respect to the
Partition massacres, much of the violence was manifested with genocidal tendencies. It was designed to
cleanse an existing generation and prevent its future reproduction."[82]
On 14 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan came into being, with Muhammad Ali Jinnah sworn in as its first
Governor General in Karachi. The following day, 15 August 1947, India, now a smaller Union of India, became an
independent country with official ceremonies taking place in New Delhi, and with Jawaharlal Nehru assuming the
office of prime minister, and the viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, staying on as its first Governor General; Gandhi,
however, remained in Bengal, preferring instead to work with the new refugees from the partitioned subcontinent.
Geographic partition, 1947
Mountbatten Plan
The actual division of British India between the two new dominions was accomplished according to what has come to
be known as the "3 June Plan" or "Mountbatten Plan". It was announced at a press conference by Mountbatten on 3
June 1947, when the date of independence–15 August 1947–was also announced. The plan's main points were:
Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in Punjab and Bengal legislative assemblies would meet and vote for partition. If a
simple majority of either group wanted partition, then these provinces would be divided.
Sind and Baluchistan were to make their own decision.[83]
The fate of North West Frontier Province and Sylhet district of Assam was to be decided by a referendum.
India would be independent by 15 August 1947.
The separate independence of Bengal was ruled out.
A boundary commission to be set up in case of partition.
The Indian political leaders accepted the Plan on 2 June. It did not deal with the
question of the princely states, but on 3 June, Mountbatten advised them against
remaining independent and urged them to join one of the two new dominions.[84]
The Muslim League's demands for a separate state were thus conceded. The
Congress' position on unity was also taken into account while making Pakistan as
small as possible. Mountbatten's formula was to divide India and at the same time
retain maximum possible unity.
Abul Kalam Azad expressed concern over the likelihood of violent riots, to which
Mountbatten replied:
Mountbatten with a
countdown calendar to the
At least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall Transfer of Power in the
see to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier and not a background
civilian. Once the partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue
orders to see that there are no communal disturbances anywhere in
the country. If there should be the slightest agitation, I shall adopt the
sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud.[85]
Jagmohan has stated that this and what followed shows the "glaring" "failure of the government machinery".[85]
On 3 June 1947, the partition plan was accepted by the Congress Working Committee.[86] Boloji states that in Punjab
there were no riots but there was communal tension, while Gandhi was reportedly isolated by Nehru and Patel and
observed maun vrat (day of silence). Mountbatten visited Gandhi and said he hoped that he would not oppose the
partition, to which Gandhi wrote the reply: "Have I ever opposed you?"[87]
Within British India, the border between India and Pakistan (the Radcliffe Line) was determined by a British
Government-commissioned report prepared under the chairmanship of a London barrister, Sir Cyril Radcliffe.
Pakistan came into being with two non-contiguous enclaves, East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) and West Pakistan,
separated geographically by India. India was formed out of the majority Hindu regions of British India, and Pakistan
from the majority Muslim areas.
On 18 July 1947, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act that finalized the arrangements for
partition and abandoned British suzerainty over the princely states, of which there were several hundred, leaving them
free to choose whether to accede to one of the new dominions. The Government of India Act 1935 was adapted to
provide a legal framework for the new dominions.
Following its creation as a new country in August 1947, Pakistan applied for membership of the United Nations and
was accepted by the General Assembly on 30 September 1947. The Dominion of India continued to have the existing
seat as India had been a founding member of the United Nations since 1945.[88]
Radcliffe Line
The Punjab—the region of the five rivers east of Indus: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—consists of interfluvial
doabs, or tracts of land lying between two confluent rivers. These are the Sind-Sagar doab (between Indus and
Jhelum), the Jech doab (Jhelum/Chenab), the Rechna doab (Chenab/Ravi), the Bari doab (Ravi/Beas), and the Bist
doab (Beas/Sutlej) (see map on the right). In early 1947, in the months leading up to the deliberations of the Punjab
Boundary Commission, the main disputed areas appeared to be in the Bari and Bist doabs, although some areas in the
Rechna doab were claimed by the Congress and Sikhs. In the Bari doab, the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore,
and Montgomery were all disputed.[89] All districts (other than Amritsar, which was 46.5% Muslim) had Muslim
majorities; albeit, in Gurdaspur, the Muslim majority, at 51.1%, was slender. At a smaller area-scale, only three tehsils
(sub-units of a district) in the Bari doab had non-Muslim

majorities. These were: Pathankot (in the extreme north of
Gurdaspur, which was not in dispute), and Amritsar and Tarn
Taran in Amritsar district. In addition, there were four
Muslim-majority tehsils east of Beas-Sutlej (with two where
Muslims outnumbered Hindus and Sikhs together).[89]
Before the Boundary Commission began formal hearings,

governments were set up for the East and the West Punjab
regions. Their territories were provisionally divided by
"notional division" based on simple district majorities. In both
the Punjab and Bengal, the Boundary Commission consisted of A map of the Punjab region c. 1947.
two Muslim and two non-Muslim judges with Sir Cyril
Radcliffe as a common chairman.[89] The mission of the
Punjab commission was worded generally as: "To demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab, on the
basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will take into account
other factors." Each side (the Muslims and the Congress/Sikhs) presented its claim through counsel with no liberty to
bargain. The judges too had no mandate to compromise and on all major issues they "divided two and two, leaving Sir
Cyril Radcliffe the invidious task of making the actual decisions."[89]
Independence, population transfer, and violence
Train to Pakistan being given an Rural Sikhs in a long oxcart train Two Muslim men (in a rural
honor-guard send-off. New Delhi headed towards India. 1947. refugee train headed towards
railway station, 1947 Pakistan) carrying an old woman
in a makeshift doli or palanquin of
1947.
A refugee train on its way to

Punjab, Pakistan
Massive population exchanges occurred between the two newly formed states in the months immediately following the
Partition. "The population of undivided India in 1947 was approx 390 million. After partition, there were 330 million
people in India, 30 million in West Pakistan, and 30 million people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)."[90] Once the
lines were established, about 14.5 million people crossed the borders to what they hoped was the relative safety of
religious majority. The 1951 Census of Pakistan identified the number of displaced persons in Pakistan at 7,226,600,
presumably all Muslims who had entered Pakistan from India. Similarly, the 1951 Census of India enumerated
7,295,870 displaced persons, apparently all Hindus and Sikhs who had moved to India from Pakistan immediately
after the Partition.[2] The two numbers add up to 14.5 million. Since both censuses were held about 3.6 years after the
Partition, the enumeration included net population increase after the mass migration.[91]
About 11.2 million (77.4% of the displaced persons) were in the west, with the Punjab accounting for most of it: 6.5
million Muslims moved from India to West Pakistan, and 4.7 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from West Pakistan to
India; thus the net migration in the west from India to West Pakistan (now Pakistan) was 1.8 million.
The remaining 3.3 million (22.6% of the displaced persons) were in the east: 2.6 million moved from East Pakistan to
India and 0.7 million moved from India to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); thus net migration in the east was 1.9
million into India.
There was no conception that population transfers would be necessary because of the partitioning. Religious
minorities were expected to stay put in the states they found themselves residing in. However, an exception was made
for Punjab where transfer of populations were organised because of the communal violence affecting the province.
This did not apply to other provinces.[92][93]
Punjab
The Partition of British India split the former British province of Punjab
between the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The mostly
Muslim western part of the province became Pakistan's Punjab province;
the mostly Hindu and Sikh eastern part became India's East Punjab state
(later divided into the new states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh). Many Hindus and Sikhs lived in the west, and many Muslims
lived in the east, and the fears of all such minorities were so great that the
Partition saw many people displaced and much intercommunal violence.
A refugee special train at Ambala
Some have described the violence in Punjab as a retributive genocide.[94] Station during partition of India
The newly formed governments had not anticipated, and were completely unequipped for, a two-way migration of
such staggering magnitude, and massive violence and slaughter occurred on both sides of the new India-Pakistan
border. Estimates of the number of deaths vary, with low estimates at 200,000 and high estimates at 2,000,000. The
worst case of violence among all regions is concluded to have taken place in Punjab.[95][96][97][98] Virtually no Muslim
survived in East Punjab (except in Malerkotla) and virtually no Hindu or Sikh survived in West Punjab.[99]
Lawrence James observed that 'Sir Francis Mudie, the governor of West Punjab, estimated that 500,000 Muslims
died trying to enter his province, while the British high commissioner in Karachi put the full total at 800,000...This
makes nonsense of the claim by Mountbatten and his partisans that only 200,000 were killed: [James 1998:
636]".[100]
During this period, many alleged that Tara Singh was endorsing the killing of Muslims. On 3 March 1947, at Lahore,
Singh along with about 500 Sikhs declared from a dais "Death to Pakistan".[101] According to political scientist Ishtiaq
Ahmed, "On March 3, radical Sikh leader Master Tara Singh famously flashed his kirpan (sword) outside the Punjab
Assembly, calling for the destruction of the Pakistan idea prompting violent response by the Muslims mainly against
Sikhs but also against Hindus, in the Muslim-majority districts of northern Punjab. Yet at the end of that year, more
Muslims had been killed in East Punjab than Hindus and Sikhs together in West Punjab."[102][103][104][105] Nehru
wrote to Gandhi on 22 August that up to that point, twice as many Muslims had been killed in East Punjab than
Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab.[106]
Bengal
The province of Bengal was divided into the two separate entities of West Bengal, awarded to the Dominion of India,
and East Bengal, awarded to the Dominion of Pakistan. East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan in 1955, and later
became the independent nation of Bangladesh after the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.
While the Muslim majority districts of Murshidabad and Malda were given to India, the Hindu majority district of
Khulna and the Buddhist majority, but sparsely populated, Chittagong Hill Tracts were given to Pakistan by the
Radcliffe award.[107]
Thousands of Hindus, located in the districts of East Bengal which were awarded to Pakistan, found themselves being
attacked and this religious persecution forced hundreds of thousands of Hindus from East Bengal to seek refuge in
India. The huge influx of Hindu refugees into Calcutta affected the demographics of the city. Many Muslims left the
city for East Pakistan and some of their homes and properties were occupied by the refugee families.
Sindh
Most of Sindh's prosperous middle class at the time of Partition was Hindu. At the time of Partition there were
1,400,000 Hindu Sindhis, though most were concentrated in cities such as Hyderabad, Karachi, Shikarpur, and
Sukkur. Hundreds of Hindus residing in Sindh were forced to migrate. Some anti-Hindu violence in Sindh was
precipitated by the arrival of Muslim refugees from India with minimal local Muslim support for the rioters. Sindhi
Hindus faced low scale rioting unlike the Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs who had to migrate from West Punjab.[108]
On 6 December 1947, communal violence broke out in Ajmer in India, precipitated by an argument between Sindhi
Hindu refugees and local Muslims in the Dargah Bazaar. Violence in Ajmer again broke out in the middle of December
with stabbings, looting and arson resulting in mostly Muslim casualties.[109] Many Muslims fled across the Thar
Desert to Sindh in Pakistan.[109] This sparked further anti-Hindu riots in Hyderabad, Sindh. On 6 January anti-Hindu
riots broke out in Karachi, leading to an estimate of 1100 casualties.[109] 776,000 Sindhi Hindus fled to India.[110] The
arrival of Sindhi Hindu refugees in North Gujarat's town of Godhra sparked the March 1948 riots there which led to an
emigration of Muslims from Godhra to Pakistan.[109]
Despite the migration, a significant Sindhi Hindu population still resides in Pakistan's Sindh province where they
number at around 2.3 million as per Pakistan's 1998 census; the Sindhi Hindus in India were at 2.6 million as per
India's 2001 Census. Some bordering districts in Sindh had a Hindu majority like Tharparkar District, Umerkot,
Mirpurkhas, Sanghar and Badin, but their population is decreasing and they consider themselves a minority in
decline. In fact, only Umerkot still has a majority of Hindus in the district.[111] The Sindhi community did not face
large scale violence, but felt deprivation of homeland and culture.[109]
Gujarat
During the partition, there was no mass violence in Gujarat as there was in Punjab and Bengal.[112] Only about 2.2% of
the migrants to Pakistan were from Gujarat and Bombay city, and of them about 75% went to Karachi due to business
interests.[112]
Delhi
For centuries Delhi had been the capital of the Mughal Empire from Babur
to successors of Aurangzeb and of previous Turkic Muslim rulers of North
India. The series of Islamic rulers keeping Delhi as a stronghold of their
empires left a vast array of Islamic architecture in Delhi and a strong
Islamic culture permeated the city. The 1941 Census listed Delhi's
population as being 33.2% Muslim.
However thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Punjab poured into
the city. This created an atmosphere of upheavals as anti-Muslim pogroms
rocked the historical stronghold of Indo-Islamic culture and politics.
Pakistani diplomat in Delhi, Hussain, alleged that the Indian government
was intent on eliminating Delhi's Muslim population or was indifferent to
their fate. He reported that Army troops openly gunned down innocent
Muslims.[113] Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru estimated 1000
casualties in the city. However other sources claimed that the casualty rate
had been 20 times higher. Gyanendra Pandey's more recent account of the A crowd of Muslims at the Old Fort
Delhi violence puts the figure of Muslim casualties in Delhi as being (Purana Qila) in Delhi, which had
between 20,000–25,000.[114] been converted into a vast camp for
Muslim refugees waiting to be
Tens of thousands of Muslims were driven to refugee camps regardless of transported to Pakistan. Manchester
Guardian, 27 September 1947.
their political affiliations and numerous historic sites in Delhi such as the
Purana Qila, Idgah and Nizamuddin were transformed into refugee camps.
At the culmination of the tensions in Delhi 330,000 Muslims were forced
to flee the city to Pakistan. The 1951 Census registered a drop of the Muslim population in the city from 33.2% in 1941
to 5.3% in 1951.[115]
Alwar and Bharatpur

Alwar and Bharatpur were two princely states of Rajputana (modern day Rajasthan) which were the scene of a bloody
confrontation between the dominant, land-holding community of Hindu Jats and the cultivating community of
Muslim Meos from May 1947 onwards.[116] Well-organised bands of Hindu Jats, Ahirs and Gujars started attacking
Muslim Meos in April 1947. By June more than fifty Muslim villages had been destroyed after attacks by all sides. The
Muslim League was outraged and demanded that the Viceroy provide Muslim troops. Accusations emerged in June of
the involvement of Indian State Forces from Alwar and Bharatpur in the destruction of Muslim villages both inside
their states and in British India.[117]
In the wake of unprecedented violent attacks unleashed against them in 1947, 100,000 Muslim Meos from Alwar and
Bharatpur was forced to flee their homes and an estimated 30,000 Meos are said to have been massacred.[118] On 17
November, a column of 80,000 Meo refugees went on their way to Pakistan. However, 10,000 stopped travelling due
to the risk of trying to reach and settle in Pakistan.[116]
Jammu and Kashmir

In September–November 1947 in the Jammu region of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, a large number of
Muslims were massacred and others driven away to West Punjab. The impetus for this violence was partly provided by
the influx of a large number of Hindu and Sikh refugees since March 1947, who brought with them "harrowing stories
of Muslim atrocities", to Jammu from West Punjab. The killings were carried out by extremist Hindus and Sikhs,
aided and abetted by the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Hari Singh.
Observers state that Hari Singh's aim was to alter the demographics of the region by eliminating the Muslim
population, in order to ensure a Hindu majority in the region.[119][120]
Resettlement of refugees in India: 1947–1951

According to the 1951 Census of India, 2% of India's population were refugees (1.3% from West Pakistan and 0.7%
from East Pakistan). Delhi received the largest number of refugees for a single city – the population of Delhi grew
rapidly in 1947 from under 1 million (917,939) to a little less than 2 million (1,744,072) during the period 1941–
1951.[121] The refugees were housed in various historical and military locations such as the Purana Qila, Red Fort, and
military barracks in Kingsway Camp (around the present Delhi University). The latter became the site of one of the
largest refugee camps in northern India with more than 35,000 refugees at any given time besides Kurukshetra camp
near Panipat. The camp sites were later converted into permanent housing through extensive building projects
undertaken by the Government of India from 1948 onwards. A number of housing colonies in Delhi came up around
this period like Lajpat Nagar, Rajinder Nagar, Nizamuddin East, Punjabi Bagh, Rehgar Pura, Jangpura and Kingsway
Camp. A number of schemes such as the provision of education, employment opportunities, and easy loans to start
businesses were provided for the refugees at the all-India level.[122]
Many Sikhs and Hindu Punjabis came from West Punjab and settled in East Punjab (which then also included
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh) and Delhi. Hindus fleeing from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) settled across
Eastern India and Northeastern India, many ending up in neighbouring Indian states such as West Bengal, Assam,
and Tripura. Some migrants were sent to the Andaman islands where Bengalis today form the largest linguistic group.
Sindhi Hindus settled predominantly in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Some, however, settled further afield in
Madhya Pradesh. A new township was established for Sindhi Hindu refugees in Maharashtra. The Governor-General
of India, Sir Rajagopalachari, laid the foundation for this township and named it Ulhasnagar (namely 'city of joy').
A settlement consisting largely of Sikhs and Punjabi Hindus was also founded in Central Mumbai's Sion Koliwada
region, and named Guru Tegh Bahadur Nagar.[123]
Resettlement of refugees in Pakistan: 1947–1951

The 1951 Census of Pakistan recorded that the largest number of Muslim refugees came from the East Punjab and
nearby Rajputana states (Alwar and Bharatpur). They were a number of 5,783,100 and constituted 80.1% of Pakistan's
total refugee population.[124] This was the effect of the retributive ethnic cleansing on both sides of the Punjab where
the Muslim population of East Punjab was forcibly expelled like the Hindu/Sikh population in West Punjab.
Migration from other regions of India were as follows: Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa, 700,300 or 9.8%; UP and Delhi
464,200 or 6.4%; Gujarat and Bombay, 160,400 or 2.2%; Bhopal and Hyderabad 95,200 or 1.2%; and Madras and
Mysore 18,000 or 0.2%.[124]
So far as their settlement in Pakistan is concerned, 97.4% of the refugees from East Punjab and its contiguous areas
went to West Punjab; 95.9% from Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa to the erstwhile East Pakistan; 95.5% from UP and
Delhi to West Pakistan, mainly in karachi division of Sindh; 97.2% from Bhopal and Hyderabad to West Pakistan,
mainly Karachi; and 98.9% from Bombay and Gujarat to West Pakistan, largely to Karachi; and 98.9% from Madras
and Mysore went to West Pakistan, mainly Karachi.[124]
West Punjab received the largest number of refugees (73.1%), mainly from East Punjab and its contiguous areas. Sindh
received the second largest number of refugees 16.1% of the total migrants while Karachi division of sindh received
8.5% of the total migrant population. East Bengal received the third largest number of refugees, 699,100, who
constituted 9.7% of the total Muslim refugee population in Pakistan. 66.7% of the refugees in East Bengal originated
from West Bengal, 14.5% from Bihar and 11.8% from Assam.[125]
NWFP and Baluchistan received the lowest number of migrants. NWFP received 51,100 migrants (0.7% of the migrant
population) while Baluchistan received 28,000 (0.4% of the migrant population).
The Government undertook a census of refugees in West Punjab in 1948, which displayed their place of origin in India.
Data on the Number of Muslim refugees in West Punjab from the Districts of East Punjab and
Neighbouring Regions[126]
Places Number
Amritsar (East Punjab) 741,444
Jalandhar (East Punjab) 520,189
Gurdaspur (East Punjab) 499,793
Hoshiarpur (East Punjab) 384,448
Karnal (East Punjab) 306,509
Hissar (East Punjab) 287,479
Ludhiana (East Punjab) 255,864
Ambala (East Punjab) 222,939
Gurgaon (East Punjab) 80,537
Rohtak (East Punjab) 172,640
Delhi 91,185
Kangra (East Punjab) 33,826
United Provinces 28,363
Shimla (East Punjab) 11,300
Data on the Number of Muslim refugees in West Punjab from the Princely states in East Punjab and
Rajputana[126]
Name Number
Patiala (East Punjab) 308,948
Alwar (Rajputana) 191,567
Kapurthala (East Punjab) 172,079
Faridkot (East Punjab) 66,596
Bharatpur (Rajputana) 43,614
Nabha (East Punjab) 43,538
Jind (East Punjab) 41,696
Together other small states 39,322
Missing people
A study of the total population inflows and outflows in the districts of the Punjab, using the data provided by the 1931
and 1951 Census has led to an estimate of 1.3 million missing Muslims who left western India but did not reach
Pakistan.[100] The corresponding number of missing Hindus/Sikhs along the western border is estimated to be
approximately 0.8 million.[127] This puts the total of missing people, due to Partition-related migration along the
Punjab border, to around 2.2 million.[127] Another study of the demographic consequences of partition in the Punjab
region using the 1931, 1941 and 1951 censuses concluded that between 2.3 and 3.2 million people went missing in the
Punjab.[128]
Rehabilitation of women
Both sides promised each other that they would try to restore women abducted and raped during the riots. The Indian
government claimed that 33,000 Hindu and Sikh women were abducted, and the Pakistani government claimed that
50,000 Muslim women were abducted during riots. By 1949, there were governmental claims that 12,000 women had
been recovered in India and 6,000 in Pakistan.[129] By 1954, there were 20,728 Muslim women recovered from India
and 9,032 Hindu and Sikh women recovered from Pakistan.[130] Most of the Hindu and Sikh women refused to go
back to India, fearing that they would never be accepted by their family, a fear mirrored by Muslim women.[131]
Post-Partition migration
Pakistan
Even after the 1951 Census many Muslim families from India continued migrating to Pakistan throughout the 1950s
and the early 1960s. According to historian Omar Khalidi the Indian Muslim migration to West Pakistan between
December 1947 and December 1971 was from U.P., Delhi, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh,
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The next stage of migration, which lasted between 1973 and the
1990s, was when the migration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan was reduced to its lowest levels since 1947. The primary
destination for these migrants was Karachi and other urban centers in Sindh.[132]
In 1959, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) published a report stating that from 1951 to 1956, a total of
650,000 Muslims from India relocated to West Pakistan.[132] However, Visaria (1969) raised doubts about the
authenticity of the claims about Indian Muslim migration to Pakistan, since the 1961 Census of Pakistan did not
corroborate these figures. However, the 1961 Census of Pakistan did incorporate a statement suggesting that there had
been a migration of 800,000 people from India to Pakistan throughout the previous decade.[133] Of those who had left
for Pakistan, most never came back.
Indian Muslim migration to Pakistan declined drastically in the 1970s, a trend noticed by the Pakistani authorities. In
June 1995, Pakistan's interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, informed the National Assembly that between the period
of 1973–1994, as many as 800,000 visitors came from India on valid travel documents. Of these only 3,393
stayed.[132] In a related trend, intermarriages between Indian and Pakistani Muslims have declined sharply. According
to a November 1995 statement of Riaz Khokhar, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, the number of cross-
border marriages has declined from 40,000 a year in the 1950s and 1960s to barely 300 annually.[132]
In the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, 3,500 Muslim families migrated from the Indian part of the Thar
Desert to the Pakistani section of the Thar Desert.[134] 400 families were settled in Nagar after the 1965 war and an
additional 3000 settled in the Chachro taluka in Sind province of West Pakistan.[135] The government of Pakistan
provided each family with 12 acres of land. According to government records this land totalled 42,000 acres.[135]
The 1951 census in Pakistan recorded 671,000 refugees in East Pakistan, the majority of which came from West
Bengal. The rest were from Bihar.[136] According to the ILO in the period 1951–1956, half a million Indian Muslims
migrated to East Pakistan.[132] By 1961 the numbers reached 850,000. In the aftermath of the riots in Ranchi and
Jamshedpur, Biharis continued to migrate to East Pakistan well into the late sixties and added up to around a
million.[137] Crude estimates suggest that about 1.5 million Muslims migrated from West Bengal and Bihar to East
Bengal in the two decades after partition.[138]
India
Due to religious persecution in Pakistan, Hindus continue to flee to India. Most of them tend to settle in the state of
Rajasthan in India.[139] According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan data, just around 1,000 Hindu
families fled to India in 2013.[139] In May 2014, a member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Dr
Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, revealed in the National Assembly of Pakistan that around 5,000 Hindus are migrating
from Pakistan to India every year.[140] Since India is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention it
refuses to recognise Pakistani Hindu migrants as refugees.[139]
The population in the Tharparkar district in the Sind province of West Pakistan was 80% Hindu and 20% Muslim at
the time of independence in 1947. During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the Hindu upper castes and their
retainers fled to India. This led to a massive demographic shift in the district.[134] In 1978 India gave citizenship to
55,000 Pakistanis.[139] By the time of the 1998 census of Pakistan, Muslims made up 64.4% of the population and
Hindus 35.6% of the population in Tharparkar.
The migration of Hindus from East Pakistan to India continued unabated after partition. The 1951 census in India
recorded that 2.5 million refugees arrived from East Pakistan, of which 2.1 million migrated to West Bengal while the
rest migrated to Assam, Tripura and other states.[136] These refugees arrived in waves and did not come solely at
partition. By 1973 their number reached over 6 million. The following data displays the major waves of refugees from
East Pakistan and the incidents which precipitated the migrations.[141][142]
Year Reason Number

1947 Partition 344,000
1948 Hyderabad annexation by India 786,000
1950 1950 Barisal Riots 1,575,000
1956 Pakistan becomes Islamic Republic 320,000
1964 Riots over Hazratbal incident 693,000
1971 Bangladesh liberation war 1,500,000
Perspectives
The Partition was a highly controversial arrangement, and remains a cause

of much tension on the Indian subcontinent today. According to American
scholar[143] Allen McGrath, many British leaders including the British
Viceroy, Mountbatten, were unhappy over the partition of India.[144] Lord
Mountbatten of Burma had not only been accused of rushing the process
through, but also is alleged to have influenced the Radcliffe Line in India's
favour.[145][146][147] The commission took longer to decide on a final
boundary than on the partition itself. Thus the two nations were granted
their independence even before there was a defined boundary between
Refugees on train roof during
them.
Partition
Some critics allege that British haste led to increased cruelties during the
Partition.[148] Because independence was declared prior to the actual
Partition, it was up to the new governments of India and Pakistan to keep public order. No large population
movements were contemplated; the plan called for safeguards for minorities on both sides of the new border. It was a
task at which both states failed. There was a complete breakdown of law and order; many died in riots, massacre, or
just from the hardships of their flight to safety. What ensued was one of the largest population movements in recorded
history. According to Richard Symonds, at the lowest estimate, half a million people perished and twelve million
became homeless.[149]
However, many argue that the British were forced to expedite the Partition by events on the ground.[150] Once in
office, Mountbatten quickly became aware that if Britain were to avoid involvement in a civil war, which seemed
increasingly likely, there was no alternative to partition and a hasty exit from India.[150] Law and order had broken
down many times before Partition, with much bloodshed on both sides. A massive civil war was looming by the time
Mountbatten became Viceroy. After the Second World War, Britain had limited resources,[151] perhaps insufficient to
the task of keeping order. Another viewpoint is that while Mountbatten may have been too hasty he had no real
options left and achieved the best he could under difficult circumstances.[152] The historian Lawrence James concurs
that in 1947 Mountbatten was left with no option but to cut and run. The alternative seemed to be involvement in a
potentially bloody civil war from which it would be difficult to get out.[153]
Conservative elements in England consider the partition of India to be the moment that the British Empire ceased to
be a world power, following Curzon's dictum: "the loss of India would mean that Britain drop straight away to a third
rate power."[154]
Venkat Dhulipala rejects the idea that the British divide and rule policy was
responsible for partition and elaborates on the perspective that Pakistan
was popularly imagined as a sovereign Islamic state or a 'New Medina', as a
potential successor to the defunct Turkish caliphate[155][156] and as a leader
and protector of the entire Islamic world. Islamic scholars debated over
creating Pakistan and its potential to become a true Islamic state.[155][156]
The majority of Barelvis supported the creation of Pakistan[157][158] and
believed that any co-operation with Hindus would be counter
productive.[159] Most Deobandis, who were led by Maulana Husain Ahmad
Madani, were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and the two-nation
theory. According to them Muslims and Hindus could be one Four nations (India, Pakistan,
nation.[160][161][162] Dominion of Ceylon, and Union of
Burma) that gained independence in
In their authoritative study of the partition, Ian Talbot and Gurharpal 1947 and 1948
Singh have shown that the partition was not the inevitable end of the so-
called British 'divide and rule policy' nor was it the inevitable end of
Hindu-Muslim differences.[163]
A cross-border student initiative, The History Project, was launched in 2014 to explore the differences in perception of
the events during the British era which led to the partition. The project resulted in a book that explains both
interpretations of the shared history in Pakistan and India.[164][165]
Berkeley, California based non-profit organization The 1947 Partition Archive collects oral histories from people who
lived through the Partition and consolidates the interviews into an archive.
In October 2016, The Arts and Cultural Heritage Trust (TAACHT) of India set up what they describe as "the world’s
first Partition Museum" at Town Hall in Amritsar (in Punjab state). The Museum, which is open from Tuesday to
Sunday, offers multi-media exhibits and documents that describe both the political process that led to partition and
carried it forward, and video and written narratives offered by survivors of the events.[166]
Artistic depictions of the Partition

The partition of India and the associated bloody riots inspired many in India and Pakistan to create literary/cinematic
depictions of this event.[167] While some creations depicted the massacres during the refugee migration, others
concentrated on the aftermath of the partition in terms of difficulties faced by the refugees in both side of the border.
Even now, more than 70 years after the partition, works of fiction and films are made that relate to the events of
partition. The early members of the Progressive Artist's Group of Bombay cite "The Partition" of India and Pakistan as
a key reason for its founding in December 1947. They included FN Souza, MF Husain, SH Raza, SK Bakre, HA Gade
and KH Ara, who went on to become some of the most important and influential Indian artists of the 20th
Century.[168]
Literature describing the human cost of independence and partition comprises Bal K. Gupta's memoirs Forgotten
Atrocities (2012), Khushwant Singh's Train to Pakistan (1956), several short stories such as Toba Tek Singh (1955) by
Saadat Hassan Manto, Urdu poems such as Subh-e-Azadi (Freedom's Dawn, 1947) by Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Bhisham
Sahni's Tamas (1974), Manohar Malgonkar's A Bend in the Ganges (1965), Chaman Nahal's AZADI (1975) originally
written in English and winner of the Sahitya Akedemi Award in India (1977), and Bapsi Sidhwa's Ice-Candy Man
(1988), among others.[169][170] Salman Rushdie's novel Midnight's Children (1980), which won the Booker Prize and
The Best of the Booker, wove its narrative based on the children born with magical abilities on midnight of 14 August
1947.[170] Freedom at Midnight (1975) is a non-fiction work by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre that chronicled
the events surrounding the first Independence Day celebrations in 1947.
There is a paucity of films related to the independence and partition.[171][172][173] Early films relating to the
circumstances of the independence, partition and the aftermath include Nemai Ghosh's Chinnamul (Bengali)
(1950),[171] Dharmputra (1961)[174] Lahore (1948), Chhalia (1960), Nastik (1953). George Cukor's Bhowani Junction
(1956), Ritwik Ghatak's trilogy of Meghe Dhaka Tara (Bengali) (1960) / Komal Gandhar (Bengali) (1961) /
Subarnarekha (Bengali) (1962);[171][175] later films include Garm Hava (1973) and Tamas (1987).[174] From the late
1990s onwards, more films on this theme were made, including several mainstream ones, such as Earth (1998), Train
to Pakistan (1998) (based on the aforementined book), Hey Ram (2000), Gadar: Ek Prem Katha (2001), Khamosh
Pani (2003), Pinjar (2003), Partition (2007), Madrasapattinam (2010)[174] and Viceroy's House (2017). The
biographical films Gandhi (1982), Jinnah (1998) and Sardar (1993) also feature independence and partition as
significant events in their screenplay. A Pakistani drama Daastan, based on the novel Bano, highlights the plight of
Muslim girls who were abducted and raped during partition.
The novel Lost Generations (2013) by Manjit Sachdeva describes the March 1947 massacre in rural areas of
Rawalpindi by the Muslim League, followed by massacres on both sides of the new border in August 1947 seen
through the eyes of an escaping Sikh family, their settlement and partial rehabilitation in Delhi, and ending in ruin
(including death), for the second time in 1984, at the hands of mobs after a Sikh assassinated the prime minister.
The 2013 Google India advertisement Reunion (about the Partition of India) has had a strong impact in India and
Pakistan, leading to hope for the easing of travel restrictions between the two countries.[176][177][178] It went
viral[179][180] and was viewed more than 1.6 million times before officially debuting on television on 15 November
2013.[181]
See also
List of princely states of India
Princely states of Pakistan
Indian independence movement
Pakistan Movement
History of Bangladesh
History of India
History of Pakistan
History of the Republic of India
Indian annexation of Goa
The 1947 Partition Archive
Notes
a. "The death toll remains disputed with figures ranging from 200,000 to 2 million."[1]
b. British India consisted of those regions of the British Raj, or the British Indian Empire, which were directly
administered by Britain; other regions, of nominal sovereignty, which were indirectly ruled by Britain, were called
princely states.
c. "The death toll remains disputed to this day with figures ranging from 200,000 to 2 million."[1]
d. Coastal Ceylon, part of the Madras Presidency of British India from 1796, became the separate crown colony of
British Ceylon in 1802. Burma, gradually annexed by the British during 1826–86 and governed as a part of the
British Indian administration until 1937, was directly administered thereafter.[4] Burma was granted independence
on 4 January 1948 and Ceylon on 4 February 1948. (See History of Sri Lanka and History of Burma.)
e. The Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim was established as a princely state after the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1861,
however, the issue of sovereignty was left undefined.[5] In 1947, Sikkim became an independent kingdom under
the suzerainty of India and remained so until 1975 when it was absorbed into India as the 22nd state. Other
Himalayan kingdoms, Nepal and Bhutan, having signed treaties with the British designating them as independent
states, were not a part of British India.[6] The Indian Ocean island of The Maldives, became a protectorate of the
British crown in 1887 and gained its independence in 1965.
References
1. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 2.
2. Population Redistribution and Development in South Asia (https://books.google.com/books?id=tGiSBAAAQBAJ&
pg=PA6#v=onepage&q&f=false). Springer Science & Business Media. 2012. p. 6. ISBN 978-9400953093.
3. Partition (n), 7. b (3rd ed.). Oxford English Dictionary. 2005. "The division of British India into India and Pakistan,
achieved in 1947."
4. Sword For Pen (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,788006,00.html), Time, 12 April 1937
5. "Sikkim" (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-46212). Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008.
6. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. "Nepal." (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-23632), Encyclopædia Britannica.
2008. "Bhutan." (http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-25008)
7. Spear 1990, p. 176
8. Spear 1990, p. 176, Stein & Arnold 2010, p. 291, Ludden 2002, p. 193, Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 156
9. Bandyopādhyāẏa 2004, p. 260
10. Ludden 2002, p. 193
11. Ludden 2002, p. 199

12. Ludden 2002, p. 200
13. Stein & Arnold 2010, p. 286
14. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 20.
15. Ludden 2002, p. 201
16. Brown 1994, pp. 197–198
17. Olympic Games Antwerp 1920: Official Report
(http://www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1920/1920.pdf), Nombre de bations representees, p. 168.
Quote: "31 Nations avaient accepté l'invitation du Comité Olympique Belge: ... la Grèce – la Hollande Les Indes
Anglaises – l'Italie – le Japon ..."
18. Brown 1994, pp. 200–201
19. Brown 1994, pp. 205–207
20. Talbot, Ian (1999), "Pakistan's Emergence" (https://books.google.com/books?id=eEd7tQEACAAJ), in Alaine M.
Low; Robin W. Winks (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography, Oxford University Press,
pp. 253–263, ISBN 978-0-19-820566-1
21. Liaquat Ali Khan (1940), Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (https://books.google.com/books?id=swIYjzJOx5wC),
Thacker & Co. Ltd., ISBN 978-1443726672, "... There is much in the Musalmans which, if they wish, can roll them
into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both Hindus and Muslims, which if developed, is capable of
molding them into one people? Nobody can deny that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which
are common to both. Nobody can deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do divide
Hindus and Muslmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized ..."
22. "Two-Nation Theory Exists" (https://web.archive.org/web/20071111023629/http://www.pakistantimes.net/2007/04/
03/oped2.htm). Pakistan Times. Archived from the original (http://www.pakistantimes.net/2007/04/03/oped2.htm)
on 11 November 2007.
23. Conor Cruise O'Brien (August 1988). "Holy War Against India" (https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/88au
g/obrien.htm). The Atlantic Monthly. pp. 54–64. Retrieved 2 April 2017.
24. Economic and political weekly, Volume 14, Part 3 (https://books.google.com/books?id=dN4nAAAAMAAJ),
Sameeksha Trust, 1979, "... the Muslims are not Indians but foreigners or temporary guests—without any loyalty
to the country or its cultural heritage—and should be driven out of the country ..."
25. M. M. Sankhdher, K. K. Wadhwa (1991), National unity and religious minorities (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=bwGKAAAAMAAJ), Gitanjali Publishing House, ISBN 978-81-85060-36-1, "... In their heart of hearts, the Indian
Muslims are not Indian citizens, are not Indians: they are citizens of the universal Islamic ummah, of Islamdom ..."
26. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Sudhakar Raje (1989), Savarkar commemoration volume (https://books.google.com/
books?id=ByFuAAAAMAAJ), Savarkar Darshan Pratishthan, "... His historic warning against conversion and call
for Shuddhi was condensed in the dictum 'Dharmantar is Rashtrantar' (to change one's religion is to change one's
nationality) ..."
27. N. Chakravarty (1990), "Mainstream" (https://books.google.com/books?id=DDLQAAAAMAAJ), Mainstream, 28
(32–52), "... 'Dharmantar is Rashtrantar' is one of the old slogans of the VHP ..."
28. "The Partition of India" (http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1826/18260810.htm).
29. Carlo Caldarola (1982), Religions and societies, Asia and the Middle East (https://books.google.com/books?id=R
1ME01zxL98C), Walter de Gruyter, ISBN 978-90-279-3259-4, "... Hindu and Muslim cultures constitute two
distinct, and frequently antagonistic, ways of life, and that therefore they cannot coexist in one nation ..."
30. S. Harman (1977), Plight of Muslims in India (https://books.google.com/books?id=0x1uAAAAMAAJ), DL
Publications, ISBN 978-0-9502818-2-7, "... strongly and repeatedly pressed for the transfer of population between
India and Pakistan. At the time of partition some of the two-nation theory protagonists proposed that the entire
Hindu population should migrate to India and all Muslims should move over to Pakistan, leaving no Hindus in
Pakistan and no Muslims in India ..."
31. M. M. Sankhdher (1992), Secularism in India, dilemmas and challenges (https://books.google.com/books?id=h8wf
AAAAIAAJ), Deep & Deep Publication, "... The partition of the country did not take the two-nation theory to its
logical conclusion, i.e., complete transfer of populations ..."
32. Rafiq Zakaria (2004), Indian Muslims: where have they gone wrong? (https://books.google.com/books?id=-aMlKS
mWRQ8cC), Popular Prakashan, ISBN 978-81-7991-201-0, "... As a Muslim ... Hindus and Muslims are one
nation and not two ... two nations has no basis in history ... they shall continue to live together for another
thousand years in united India ..."
33. Pakistan Constituent Assembly (1953), Debates: Official report, Volume 1; Volume 16 (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=-AmIKAAAAIAAJ), Government of Pakistan Press, "... say that Hindus and Muslims are one, single
nation. It is a very peculiar attitude on the part of the leader of the opposition. In fact, if his point of view was
accepted, then the very justification for the existence of Pakistan would disappear ..."
34. Janmahmad (1989), Essays on Baloch national struggle in Pakistan: emergence, dimensions, repercussions (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=mRErAAAAMAAJ), Gosha-e-Adab, "... would be completely extinct as a people
without any identity. This proposition is the crux of the matter, shaping the Baloch attitude towards Pakistani
politics. For Baloch to accept the British-conceived two-nation theory for the Indian Muslims ... would mean losing
their Baloch identity in the process ..."
35. Stephen P. Cohen (2004), The idea of Pakistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=-78yjVybQfkC), Brookings
Institution Press, p. 212, ISBN 978-0-8157-1502-3, "[In the view of G. M. Sayed,] the two-nation theory became a
trap for Sindhis—instead of liberating Sindh, it fell under Punjabi-Mohajir domination, and until his death in 1995
he called for a separate Sindhi 'nation', implying a separate Sindhi country."
36. Ahmad Salim (1991), Pashtun and Baloch history: Punjabi view (https://books.google.com/books?id=-yvxtAAAAM
AAJ), Fiction House, "... Attacking the 'two nation theory' in Lower House on December 14, 1947, Ghaus Bux
Bizenjo said: "We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslim
requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan
..."
37. Principal Lecturer in Economics Pritam Singh; Pritam Singh (2008). Federalism, Nationalism and Development:
India and the Punjab Economy (https://books.google.com/books?id=lQpswqcdDLIC&pg=PA137). Routledge.
pp. 137–. ISBN 978-1-134-04946-2.
38. Pritam Singh (2008). Federalism, Nationalism and Development: India and the Punjab Economy (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=PzZ8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PT173). Routledge. pp. 173–. ISBN 978-1-134-04945-5.
39. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 31.
40. "The turning point in 1932: on Dalit representation" (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-turning-point-in-19
32/article23752117.ece). The Hindu. 3 May 2018. Retrieved 28 May 2018.
41. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 32.
42. Talbot & Singh 2009, pp. 32–33.
43. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 33.
44. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 34.
45. Yasmin Khan (2017). The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, New Edition (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=_PEpDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA18). Yale University Press. pp. 18–. ISBN 978-0-300-23364-3. "Although it
was founded in 1909 the League had only caught on among South Asian Muslims during the Second World War.
The party had expanded astonishingly rapidly and was claiming over two million members by the early 1940s, an
unimaginable result for what had been previously thought of as just one of numerous pressure groups and small
but insignificant parties."
46. William Roger Louis; Wm. Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and
Decolonization (https://books.google.com/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&pg=PA397). I.B. Tauris. pp. 397–.
ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. "He made a serious misjudgement in underestimating Muslim sentiment before the
outbreak of the war. He did not take the idea of 'Pakistan' seriously. After the adoption of the March 1940 Lahore
resolution, calling for the creation of a separate state or states of Pakistan, he wrote: 'My first reaction is, I
confess, that silly as the Muslim scheme for partition is, it would be a pity to throw too much cold water on it at the
moment.' Linlithgow surmised that what Jinnah feared was a federal India dominated by Hindus. Part of the
purpose of the famous British 'August offer' of 1940 was to assure the Muslims that they would be protected
against a 'Hindu Raj' as well as to hold over the discussion of the 1935 Act and a 'new constitution' until after the
war."
47. L. J. Butler (2002). Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (https://books.google.com/books?id=Fci
qvzTfAuEC&pg=PA41). I.B. Tauris. pp. 41–. ISBN 978-1-86064-448-1. "Viceroy Linlithgow's 'August Offer', made
in 1940, proposed Dominion status for India after the war, and the inclusion of Indians in a larger Executive
Council and a new War Advisory Council, and promised that minority views would be taken into account in future
constitutional revision. This was not enough to satisfy either the Congress or the Muslim League, who both
rejected the offer in September, and shortly afterwards Congress launched a fresh campaign of civil
disobedience."
48. Talbot & Singh 2009, pp. 34–35.
49. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 35.
50. Ayesha Jalal (1994). The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (https://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=1_0LBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT81). Cambridge University Press. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-139-
93570-8. "Provincial option, he argued, was clearly an insufficient security. An explicit acceptance of the principle
of Pakistan offered the only safeguard for Muslim interests throughout India and had to be the precondition for
any advance at the centre. So he exhorted all Indian Muslims to unite under his leadership to force the British and
the Congress to concede 'Pakistan'. If the real reasons for Jinnah's rejection of the offer were rather different, it
was not Jinnah but his rivals who had failed to make the point publicly."
51. Khan 2007, p. 18.
52. Stein & Arnold 2010, p. 289: Quote: "Gandhi was the leading genius of the later, and ultimately successful,
campaign for India's independence"
53. Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 209.
54. Khan 2007, p. 43.
55. Robb 2002, p. 190
56. Gilmartin, David (2009). "Muslim League Appeals to the Voters of Punjab for Support of Pakistan" (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=pR0LzVCpfw8C&pg=PA410). In D. Metcalf, Barbara (ed.). Islam in South Asia in Practice.
Princeton University Press. pp. 410–. ISBN 978-1-4008-3138-8. "At the all-India level, the demand for Pakistan
pitted the League against the Congress and the British."
57. Judd 2004, pp. 172–173
58. Barbara Metcalf (2012). Husain Ahmad Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India's Freedom (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=TQjrAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT107). Oneworld Publications. pp. 107–. ISBN 978-1-78074-210-6.
59. Judd 2004, pp. 170–171
60. Judd 2004, p. 172
61. Brown, Judith Margaret (1994). Modern India: the origins of an Asian democracy (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=Eq7tAAAAMAAJ). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-873112-2. "Yet these final years of the raj
showed conclusively that British rule had lost legitimacy and that among the vast majority of Hindus Congress had
become the raj's legitimate successor. Tangible proof came in the 1945–6 elections to the central and provincial
legislatures. In the former Congress won 91 percent of the votes cast in non-Muslim constituencies, and in the
latter gained an absolute majority and became the provincial raj in eight provinces. The acquiescence of the
politically aware (though possibly not of many villagers even at this point) would have been seriously in doubt if
the British had displayed any intention of staying in India. (pp. 328–329)"
62. Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2012). A Concise History of Modern India (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=c7UgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA212). Cambridge University Press. pp. 212–. ISBN 978-1-139-53705-6.
63. Burton Stein (2010). A History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=QY4zdTDwMAQC&pg=PA347). John
Wiley & Sons. pp. 347–. ISBN 978-1-4443-2351-1.
64. Sugata Bose; Ayesha Jalal (2004). Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (https://books.google.c
om/books?id=PaKdsF8WzbcC) (2nd ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 148–149. ISBN 978-0-415-30787-1.
65. Burton Stein (2010). A History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=QY4zdTDwMAQC&pg=PA347). John
Wiley & Sons. p. 347. ISBN 978-1-4443-2351-1. "His standing with the British remained high, however, for even
though they no more agreed with the idea of a separate Muslim state than the Congress did, government officials
appreciated the simplicity of a single negotiating voice for all of India's Muslims."
66. Jeffery J. Roberts (2003). The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=Pj8DIT_bva

0C&pg=PA85). Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 85–. ISBN 978-0-275-97878-5. "Virtually every Briton wanted to
keep India united. Many expressed moral or sentimental obligations to leave India intact, either for the inhabitants'
sake or simply as a lasting testament to the Empire. The Cabinet Defense Committee and the Chiefs of Staff,
however, stressed the maintenance of a united India as vital to the defense (and economy) of the region. A unified
India, an orderly transfer of power, and a bilateral alliance would, they argued, leave Britain's strategic position
undamaged. India's military assets, including its seemingly limitless manpower, naval and air bases, and
expanding production capabilities, would remain accessible to London. India would thus remain of crucial
importance as a base, training ground, and staging area for operations from Egypt to the Far East."
67. Darwin, John (3 March 2011). "Britain, the Commonwealth and the End of Empire" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/b
ritish/modern/endofempire_overview_01.shtml). BBC. Retrieved 10 April 2017. "But the British still hoped that a
self-governing India would remain part of their system of 'imperial defence'. For this reason, Britain was desperate
to keep India (and its army) united."
68. Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2002). A Concise History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=jG
CBNTDv7acC&pg=PA212). Cambridge University Press. pp. 212–. ISBN 978-0-521-63974-3. "By this scheme,
the British hoped they could at once preserve the united India desired by the Congress, and by themselves, and
at the same time, through the groups, secure the essence of Jinnah's demand for a 'Pakistan'."
69. Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2002). A Concise History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=jG
CBNTDv7acC&pg=PA213). Cambridge University Press. pp. 211–213. ISBN 978-0-521-63974-3. "Its proposal for
an independent India involved a complex, three-tiered federation, whose central feature was the creation of
groups of provinces. Two of these groups would comprise the Muslim majority provinces of east and west; a third
would include the Hindu majority regions of the centre and south. These groups, given responsibility for most of
the functions of government, would be subordinated to a Union government, would be subordinated to a Union
government controlling defence, foreign affairs and communications...Nevertheless, the Muslim League accepted
the Cabinet mission's proposals. The ball was now in the Congress's court. Although the grouping scheme
preserved a united India, the Congress leadership, above all Jawaharlal Nehru, now slated to be Gandhi's
successor, increasingly came to the conclusion that, under the Cabinet mission proposals the Center would be
too weak to achieve the goals of the Congress, which envisioned itself as successor to the Raj. Looking ahead to
the future, the Congress, especially its socialist wing headed by Nehru, wanted a central government that could
direct and plan for an India, free of colonialism, that might eradicate its people's poverty and grow into an
industrial power. India's business community also supported the idea of a strong central government...In a
provocative speech on 10 July 1946, Nehru repudiated the notion of compulsory grouping or provinces, the key to
Jinnah's Pakistan. Provinces, he said, must be free to join any group. With this speech Nehru effectively
torpedoed the Cabinet mission scheme, and with it, any hope for a united India."
70. Khan 2007, pp. 64–65.
71. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 69: Quote: "Despite the Muslim League's denials, the outbreak was clearly linked with the
celebration of Direction Action Day. Muslim procession that had gone to the staging ground of the 150-foot
Ochterlony Monument on the maidan to hear the Muslim League Prime Minister Suhrawardy, attacked Hindus on
their way back. They were heard shouting slogans as 'Larke Lenge Pakistan' (We shall win Pakistan by force).
Violence spread to North Calcutta when Muslim crowds tried to force Hindu shopkeepers to observe the day's
strike (hartal) call. The circulation of pamphlets in advance of Direct Action Day demonstrated a clear connection
between the use of violence and the demand for Pakistan."
72. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 67 Quote: "The signs of 'ethnic cleansing' are first evident in the Great Calcutta Killing of
16–19 August 1946."
73. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 68.
74. Talbot & Singh 2009, p. 67 Quote: "(Signs of 'ethnic cleansing') were also present in the wave of violence that
rippled out from Calcutta to Bihar, where there were high Muslim casualty figures, and to Noakhali deep in the
Ganges-Brahmaputra delta of Bengal. With respect to the Noakhali riots, one British officer spoke of a
'determined and organised' Muslim effort to drive out all the Hindus, who accounted for around a fifth of the total
population. Similarly, the Punjab counterparts to this transition of violence were the Rawalpindi massacres of
March 1947. The level of death and destruction in such West Punjab villages as Thoa Khalsa was such that it was
impossible for communities to live together in its wake."
75. Ziegler, Philip (1985). Mountbatten: The Official Biography. London: HarperCollins. p. 359. ISBN 978-
0002165433..
ks.google.com/books?id=D63KMRN1SJ8C&pg=PA251). Cambridge University Press. p. 250. ISBN 978-0-521-
45850-4. "These instructions were to avoid partition and obtain a unitary government for British India and the
Indian States and at the same time observe the pledges to the princes and the Muslims; to secure agreement to
the Cabinet Mission plan without coercing any of the parties; somehow to keep the Indian army undivided, and to
retain India within the Commonwealth. (Attlee to Mountbatten, 18 March 1947, ibid, 972–974)"
ks.google.com/books?id=D63KMRN1SJ8C&pg=PA251). Cambridge University Press. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-521-
45850-4. "When Mountbatten arrived, it was not wholly inconceivable that a settlement on the Cabinet Mission's
terms might still be secured...Limited bloodshed called for a united Indian army under effective control. But
keeping the army intact was now inextricably linked with keeping India united. This is why Mountbatten started off
by being vehemently opposed to 'abolishing the center'."
78. Talbot, Ian (2009). "Partition of India: The Human Dimension". Cultural and Social History. 6 (4): 403–410.
doi:10.2752/147800409X466254 (https://doi.org/10.2752%2F147800409X466254). "Mountbatten had intended to
resurrect the Cabinet Mission proposals for a federal India. British officials were unanimously pessimistic about a
Pakistan state’s future economic prospects. The agreement to an Indian Union contained in the Cabinet Mission
proposals had been initially accepted by the Muslim League as the grouping proposals gave considerable
autonomy in the Muslim majority areas. Moreover, there was the possibility of withdrawal and thus acquiring
Pakistan by the back-door after a ten-year interval. The worsening communal situation and extensive soundings
with Indian political figures convinced Mountbatten within a month of his arrival that partition was, however, the
only way to secure a speedy and smooth transfer of power."
79. Gandhi, Rajmohan. Patel: A Life. pp. 395–397.
80. Menon, V. P. Transfer of Power in India. p. 385.
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92. Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar (2010). The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees,
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Press. pp. 40–. ISBN 978-0-231-13847-5. "Second, it was feared that if an exchange of populations was agreed
to in principle in the Punjab, ' there was likelihood of trouble breaking out in other parts of the subcontinent with a
view to forcing Muslims in the Indian Dominion to move to Pakistan. If that happened we would find ourselves with
inadequate land and other resources to support the influx.' The Punjab could set a very dangerous precedent for
the rest of the subcontinent. Given that Muslims in the rest of India, some 42 million, formed a population larger
than the entire population of West Pakistan at the time, economic rationality eschewed such a forced migration.
However, in the divided Punjab millions of people were already on the move, and the two governments had to
respond to this mass movement. Thus, despite these important reservations, the establishment of the MEO led to
an acceptance of a 'transfer of populations' in divided Punjab to, 'to give a sense of security' to ravaged
communities on both sides. A statement of the Indian government's position of such a transfer across divided
Punjab was made in the legislature by Neogy on November 18, 1947. He stated that although the Indian
government's policy was 'to discourage mass migration from one province to another'. Punjab was to be an
exception. In the rest of the subcontinent migrations were not to be on a planned basis, but a matter of individual
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of preventing migration on a large scale, because the borders would be adjusted instead. Minorities need not to
be troubled by the new configuration. As Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, affirmed, 'the division of
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175. Raychaudhuri, Anindya (2009). "Resisting the Resistible: Re-writing Myths of Partition in the Works of Ritwik
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Further reading
Textbook histories
Bandyopādhyāẏa, Śekhara (2004), From Plassey to partition: a history of modern India (https://books.google.com/
books?id=0oVra0ulQ3QC), Delhi: Orient Blackswan, ISBN 978-81-250-2596-2
Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha (2004), Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political economy: second edition (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=WJ7BNOmQvwcC), Routledge, ISBN 978-1-134-39715-0
Brown, Judith Margaret (1994), Modern India: the origins of an Asian democracy (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=Eq7tAAAAMAAJ), Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-873112-2
Dyson, Tim (2018), A Population History of India: From the First Modern People to the Present Day (https://books.
google.com/books?id=3TRtDwAAQBAJ), Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-882905-8
Kulke, Hermann; Rothermund, Dietmar (2004), A history of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=V73N8js5Z
gAC), Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-32920-0
Ludden, David (2002), India and South Asia: a short history (https://books.google.com/books?id=wQJuAAAAMAA
J), Oneworld, ISBN 978-1-85168-237-9
Markovits, Claude (2004), A history of modern India, 1480–1950 (https://books.google.com/books?id=uzOmy2y0
Zh4C), Anthem Press, ISBN 978-1-84331-152-2
Metcalf, Barbara Daly; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2006), A concise history of modern India (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=iuESgYNYPl0C), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-86362-9
Peers, Douglas M. (2006), India under colonial rule: 1700–1885 (https://books.google.com/books?id=6iNuAAAAM
AAJ), Pearson Education, ISBN 978-0-582-31738-3
Robb, Peter (2002), A History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=GQ-2VH1LO_EC), Palgrave

Macmillan (published 2011), ISBN 978-0-230-34549-2
Spear, Percival (1990) [First published 1965], A History of India, 2, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-013836-8
Stein, Burton; Arnold, David (2010), A History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=0K3GZfqCabsC),
John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 978-1-4051-9509-6
Talbot, Ian (2016), A History of Modern South Asia: Politics, States, Diasporas (https://books.google.com/books?i
d=eNg_CwAAQBAJ), Yale University Press, ISBN 978-0-300-19694-8
Talbot, Ian (2015), Pakistan: A New History (https://books.google.com/books?id=fLf2ngEACAAJ), Hurst,
ISBN 978-1-84904-370-0
Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal (2009), The Partition of India (https://books.google.com/books?
id=utKmPQAACAAJ), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-85661-4
Wolpert, Stanley (2008), A new history of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=JT0wAQAAIAAJ), Oxford
University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-533756-3
Monographs
Ansari, Sarah. 2005. Life after Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh: 1947–1962. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press. 256 pages. ISBN 0-19-597834-X
Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to
Kargil, 1947–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN 978-0-8059-9594-7..
Butalia, Urvashi. 1998. The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press. 308 pages. ISBN 0-8223-2494-6
Bhavnani, Nandita. The Making of Exile: Sindhi Hindus and the Partition of India (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=n_8aBAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false). Westland, 2014.
Butler, Lawrence J. 2002. Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World. London: I.B.Tauris. 256 pages.
ISBN 1-86064-449-X
Chakrabarty; Bidyut. 2004. The Partition of Bengal and Assam: Contour of Freedom (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004)
online edition (https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108233199)
Chattha, Ilyas Ahmad (2009), Partition and Its Aftermath: Violence, Migration and the Role of Refugees in the
Socio-Economic Development of Gujranwala and Sialkot Cities, 1947–1961, University of Southampton, School
of Humanities, Centre for Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies
Chatterji, Joya. 2002. Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932—1947. Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press. 323 pages. ISBN 0-521-52328-1.
Chester, Lucy P. 2009. Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition
of Punjab. (https://web.archive.org/web/20110728100016/http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/catalogue/
book.asp?id=1204410) Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-7899-6.
Daiya, Kavita. 2008. Violent Belongings: Partition, Gender, and National Culture in Postcolonial India.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 274 pages. ISBN 978-1-59213-744-2.
Dhulipala, Venkat. 2015. Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial
North India (https://books.google.com/books?id=1Z6TBQAAQBAJ&pg=PR2#v=onepage&q&f=false). Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 1-10-705212-2
Gilmartin, David. 1988. Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California
Press. 258 pages. ISBN 0-520-06249-3.
Gossman, Partricia. 1999. Riots and Victims: Violence and the Construction of Communal Identity Among Bengali
Muslims, 1905–1947. Westview Press. 224 pages. ISBN 0-8133-3625-2
Hansen, Anders Bjørn. 2004. "Partition and Genocide: Manifestation of Violence in Punjab 1937–1947", India
Research Press. ISBN 978-81-87943-25-9.
Harris, Kenneth. Attlee (1982) pp 355–87
Hasan, Mushirul (2001), India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
ISBN 978-0-19-563504-1.
Herman, Arthur. Gandhi & Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age (2009)
Ikram, S. M. 1995. Indian Muslims and Partition of India. Delhi: Atlantic. ISBN 81-7156-374-0
Jain, Jasbir (2007), Reading Partition, Living Partition, Rawat, ISBN 978-81-316-0045-0
Jalal, Ayesha (1993), The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-45850-4
Judd, Denis (2004), The lion and the tiger: the rise and fall of the British Raj, 1600–1947 (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=hlf9u1asHTAC), Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-280579-9
Kaur, Ravinder. 2007. "Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi". Oxford University
Press. ISBN 978-0-19-568377-6.
Khan, Yasmin (2007), The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=
i9WdQp2pwOYC), Yale University Press, ISBN 978-0-300-12078-3
Khosla, G. D. Stern reckoning : a survey of the events leading up to and following the partition of India New Delhi:
Oxford University Press:358 pages Published: February 1990 ISBN 0-19-562417-3
Lamb, Alastair (1991), Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990, Roxford Books, ISBN 978-0-907129-06-6
Metcalf, Barbara; Metcalf, Thomas R. (2006), A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge Concise Histories),
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-68225-1
Mookerjea-Leonard, Debali. (2017). Literature, Gender, and the Trauma of Partition: The Paradox of
Independence London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1138183100.
Moon, Penderel. (1999). The British Conquest and Dominion of India (2 vol. 1256 pp)
Moore, R.J. (1983). Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem, the standard history of
the British position
Nair, Neeti. (2010) Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India
Page, David, Anita Inder Singh, Penderel Moon, G. D. Khosla, and Mushirul Hasan. 2001. The Partition Omnibus:
Prelude to Partition/the Origins of the Partition of India 1936–1947/Divide and Quit/Stern Reckoning. Oxford
University Press. ISBN 0-19-565850-7
Pal, Anadish Kumar. 2010. World Guide to the Partition of INDIA. Kindle Edition: Amazon Digital Services. 282
KB. ASIN B0036OSCAC (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0036OSCAC)
Pandey, Gyanendra. 2002. Remembering Partition:: Violence, Nationalism and History in India. Cambridge
University Press. 232 pages. ISBN 0-521-00250-8 online edition (https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10503
8993)
Panigrahi; D.N. 2004. India's Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat London: Routledge. online edition (http
s://www.questia.com/SM.qst?act=adv&contributors=D.%20N.%20Panigrahi&dcontributors=D.%20N.%20Panigrah
i)
Raja, Masood Ashraf. Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857–
1947, Oxford 2010, ISBN 978-0-19-547811-2
Raza, Hashim S. 1989. Mountbatten and the partition of India. New Delhi: Atlantic. ISBN 81-7156-059-8
Shaikh, Farzana. 1989. Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–
1947. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 272 pages. ISBN 0-521-36328-4.
Singh, Jaswant. (2011) Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence
Talib, Gurbachan Singh, & Shromaṇī Guraduārā Prabandhaka Kameṭī. (1950). Muslim League attack on Sikhs
and Hindus in the Punjab, 1947. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbankhak Committee.
Talbot, Ian. 1996. Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in
North-West India. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-577657-7.
Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh (eds). 1999. Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the
Subcontinent. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 420 pages. ISBN 0-19-579051-0.
Talbot, Ian. 2002. Khizr Tiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press. 216 pages. ISBN 0-19-579551-2.
Talbot, Ian. 2006. Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar. Oxford and Karachi: Oxford
University Press. 350 pages. ISBN 0-19-547226-8.
Wolpert, Stanley. 2006. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press. 272 pages. ISBN 0-19-515198-4.
Wolpert, Stanley. 1984. Jinnah of Pakistan
Articles
Brass, Paul. 2003. The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab,1946–47: means, methods, and
purposes (http://faculty.washington.edu/brass/Partition.pdf) Journal of Genocide Research (2003), 5#1, 71–101
Gilmartin, David (1998). "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative". The Journal of
Asian Studies. 57 (4): 1068–1095. doi:10.2307/2659304 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2659304). JSTOR 2659304
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Gupta, Bal K. "Death of Mahatma Gandhi and Alibeg Prisoners" www.dailyexcelsior.com
Gupta, Bal K. "Train from Pakistan" www.nripulse.com
Gupta, Bal K. "November 25, 1947, Pakisatni Invasion of Mirpur". www.dailyexcelsior.com
Jeffrey, Robin (1974), "The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947", Modern Asian
Studies, 8 (4): 491–520, doi:10.1017/s0026749x0000562x (https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0026749x0000562x),
JSTOR 311867 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/311867)
Ravinder Kaur (2014). "Bodies of Partition: Of Widows, Residue and Other Historical Waste" (https://www.academ
ia.edu/5044993). Histories of Victimhood, Ed., Henrik Rønsbo and Steffen Jensen, Pennsylvania University
Press.
Kaur, Ravinder. 2009. 'Distinctive Citizenship: Refugees, Subjects and Postcolonial State in India's Partition' (http
s://www.academia.edu/3195375/Distinctive_Citizenship_Refugees_Subjects_and_Post-colonial_State_in_Indias_
Partition), Cultural and Social History.
Kaur, Ravinder. 2008. 'Narrative Absence: An 'untouchable' account of India's Partition Migration (https://www.aca
demia.edu/3195344/Narrative_absence_An_Untouchableaccount_of_Partition_migration), Contributions to Indian
Sociology.
Kaur Ravinder. 2007. "India and Pakistan: Partition Lessons" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080724043212/htt
p://opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/india_pakistan/partition). Open Democracy.
Kaur, Ravinder. 2006. "The Last Journey: Social Class in the Partition of India" (https://www.academia.edu/31953
82/The_Last_Journey_Exploring_Social_Class_in_the_1947_Partition_Migration). Economic and Political
Weekly, June 2006. epw.org.in
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83) comprehensive collection of British official and private documents
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Narendra Singh Sarila, "The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition", Publisher: Carroll
& Graf
Popularizations
Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre: Freedom at Midnight. London: Collins, 1975. ISBN 0-00-638851-5
Seshadri, H. V. (2013). The tragic story of partition. Bangalore : Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 2013.
Zubrzycki, John. (2006) The Last Nizam: An Indian Prince in the Australian Outback. Pan Macmillan, Australia.
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Memoirs and oral history
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam (2003) [First published 1959], India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative,
New Delhi: Orient Longman, ISBN 978-81-250-0514-8
Bonney, Richard; Hyde, Colin; Martin, John. "Legacy of Partition, 1947–2009: Creating New Archives from the
Memories of Leicestershire People," Midland History, (Sept 2011), Vol. 36 Issue 2, pp 215–224
Mountbatten, Pamela. (2009) India Remembered: A Personal Account of the Mountbattens During the Transfer of
Power
Historical-Fiction
Mohammed, Javed: Walk to Freedom, Rumi Bookstore, 2006. ISBN 978-0-9701261-2-2
External links
1947 Partition Archive (http://www.1947partitionarchive.org)
Partition of Bengal (https://www.britannica.com/event/Partition-of-Bengal) – Encyclopædia Britannica
India Memory Project – 1947 India Pakistan Partition (http://www.indianmemoryproject.com/category/battle-and-c
onflict/1947-partition/)
The Road to Partition 1939–1947 – The National Archives (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resource
s/the-road-to-partition/)
Indian Independence Bill, 1947 (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1947/jul/16/indian-independence-bill)
India's Partition: The Forgotten Story British film-maker Gurinder Chadha, director of Bend It Like Beckham and
Viceroy's House, travels from Southall to Delhi and Shimla to find out about the Partition of India – one of the
most seismic events of the 20th century. Partition saw India divided into two new nations – Independent India and
Pakistan. The split led to violence, disruption and death. (http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x5ymvad)
Bibliographies
Select Research Bibliography on the Partition of India (https://web.archive.org/web/20130923121836/http://www.s

scnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/Independent/partition_bibliography.html), Compiled by Vinay Lal, Department of
History, UCLA; University of California at Los Angeles
South Asian History: Colonial India (http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/SSEAL/SouthAsia/india_colonial.html) –
University of California, Berkeley Collection of documents on colonial India, Independence, and Partition
Indian Nationalism (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/india/indiasbook.html#Indian%20Nationalism) – Fordham
University archive of relevant public-domain documents
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Contents The prevailing religions of the British Indian

Muslim homeland, provincial elections, World War II,

Partition of Bengal (1905)

1909 Percentage of Hindu, 1909 Percentage of 1909 Percentage of Sikhs,

World War I, Lucknow Pact: 1914–1918

Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms: 1919

Gandhi in Bela, Bihar, after attacks

Geographic partition, 1947

(sub-units of a district) in the Bari doab had non-Muslim

Before the Boundary Commission began formal hearings,

Independence, population transfer, and violence

A refugee train on its way to

Alwar and Bharatpur

Jammu and Kashmir

Resettlement of refugees in India: 1947–1951

Resettlement of refugees in Pakistan: 1947–1951

Year Reason Number

The Partition was a highly controversial arrangement, and remains a cause

Artistic depictions of the Partition

11. Ludden 2002, p. 199

66. Jeffery J. Roberts (2003). The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (https://books.google.com/books?id=Pj8DIT_bva

155. "Was Pakistan sufficiently imagined before independence?" (https://tribune.com.pk/story/943379/was-pakistan-suf

Robb, Peter (2002), A History of India (https://books.google.com/books?id=GQ-2VH1LO_EC), Palgrave

Mohammed, Javed: Walk to Freedom, Rumi Bookstore, 2006. ISBN 978-0-9701261-2-2

Select Research Bibliography on the Partition of India (https://web.archive.org/web/20130923121836/http://www.s

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Partition_of_India&oldid=929078808"

This page was last edited on 3 December 2019, at 14:52 (UTC).

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