REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B.
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
TAMPUS, Respondent. G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts: Respondent was married to Dante L. Del Mundo
on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage
ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went
to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no
children. Since then, respondent heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the
RTC a petition8 to declare Dante as presumptively dead
for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the
lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is
already dead. Due to the absence of any oppositor,
respondent was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte. She testified on the allegations in her petition,
affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by
inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who,
unfortunately, were also not aware of his whereabouts.
She averred that she intends to remarry and move on
with her life.10
The RTC granted the petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without
prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's
findings that respondent had exerted efforts to find her
husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who likewise had no knowledge of his
whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years,
coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to respondent's
well-founded belief that her husband is already dead.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
RULING: YES
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can
be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death:
(a) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391
of the Civil Code;
(b) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(c) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
(d) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the
Family Code exist.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires
the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates
exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the
mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such absentee
spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of
complying with the stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief which can only be discharged upon a
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is
still alive or is already dead.
In this case, respondent testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to
his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, she made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the
AFP headquarters to request information about her
husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the
help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was
sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the
time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from
the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the
Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for
her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts
to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and
friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his
death. Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family,
relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have
corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly
looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even
named.
Finally, other than respondent's bare testimony, no other
corroborative evidence had been offered to support her
allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was
unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as
established in this case was that respondnet simply
allowed the passage of time without actively and
diligently searching for her husband, which the Court
cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief
that her husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and
after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present
spouse.26
Having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree
of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support her
claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante
is already dead, the instant petition must be granted.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent. G.R. No.
165545 March 24, 2006
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and
Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage.6 More than 15
years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a
petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead. CFI
granted the petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice
was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983,
Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque
(respondent). On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a
member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits
and was granted.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a
daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of
the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with
Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with
her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral
expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious.
Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma),
who claimed to be daughters of Bailon and one Elisa
Jayona (Elisa), contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits and
submitted an Affidavit averring that they are two of nine
children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband
and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their
right to file the necessary court action to contest the
marriage between Bailon and respondent as they
personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."
Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death
benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, he further
attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who
defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed
claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before
the SSS.20
SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with
Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s
marriage with Alice was still subsisting. Respondent
protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits. The SSS, however, maintained the denial
of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of
monthly pension. Respondent thus filed a such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the
restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
Respondent informed the SSS that she was returning,
under protest.
SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was
void and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife."
The CA reversed and set aside Resolution and Order of
the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all
the pension benefits due her. It held that nowhere does
the law contemplates the possibility that respondent SSS
may validly declare the second marriage null and void
on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare
that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be
presumptively dead is without basis. Respondent SSS
cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the
decision of the regular courts
ISSUE: 1. WON SSC has jurisdiction to make a finding with
respect to the validity of the marriage of Bailon and
respondent. NO
2. WON the 2nd marriage is valid. YES
3. WON the reappearance of the 1st wife (ALICE) is
sufficient to terminate the 2nd marriage. NO
RULING: 1.) NO
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with
respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions,
there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however,
it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered
by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it
declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was
obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded
the same, making its own findings with respect to the
validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage
on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the
SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does
not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders
of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to
determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
2.) The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a
subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted
under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It
bears noting that the marriage under any of these
exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null
and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus
probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been
absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought
the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for
purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased)
commented: Where a person has entered into two
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the
party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is
not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be
shown that it had not ended when the second marriage
was contracted. The presumption in favor of the
innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse
or of the continuance of the marital relation with such
first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
3.) Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent
marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul
a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42
thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage
at the instance of any interested person, with due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family
Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court
to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain
a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance,
even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by
registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial
declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case
at bar, Tolentino submits: x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent
marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the
effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The
good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages,
the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent
is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA
FERNANDEZ, Respondent. G.R. No.
166357 September 19, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported
by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to
convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and
respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) were married
and they had four children. Shortly after the birth of their
youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who bore him three more
children. Malyn left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone.
Tyrone went to the USA with Jocelyn and their children.
He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a
rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and
a driver. Also, in accordance with their custody
agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.9
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He
alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during
their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s following acts:
she left the children without proper care and attention
as she played mahjong all day and all night; she left the
house to party with male friends and returned in the early
hours of the following day; and she committed adultery
on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in
flagrante delicto.13
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr.
Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her
sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter
disregard of her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is
manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19
Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder
"may have been evident even prior to her marriage"
because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be
materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.20
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by
her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-
in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript
of Tyrone’s court testimony.21 Fr. Healy corroborated Dr.
Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity
is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her
needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s
needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed
that she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs. Fr.
Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time
with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only
constitute psychological incapacity whenever
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities
to the detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr. Healy
characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as
grave and incurable.24 He based his opinion on his
interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the
report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s
expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the
truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s
"habits" because he believed it is the court’s duty to do
so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption
that the factual allegations are indeed true.
The RTC concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code. The trial court then
declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.55
The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling. Both parties’
allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for
a legal separation.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has sufficiently proved that
respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
RULIING: NO.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations.72 The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff
must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or
her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations
of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s
experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in
mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as
a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and
always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their
mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s
home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so
frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when
these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s
alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared
to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance
of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental
duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they
narrated that she took care of them, was around when
they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts to see and take care
of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic
shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and,

perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other
and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.