Memorial

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 I
TEAM CODE: ALS-01
XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW, 2019
BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
PIL UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

PIL NO: ___/ 2019
THE INDIANA YOUNG LAWYER ASSOCIATION & ORS.

………PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIANA & ORS. ……...RESPONDENTS
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS- - - - - - - - IV
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 BOOKS REFERRED - - - - - - - VI
 ARTICLES & JOURNALS - - - - - - X
 TABLE OF CASES - - - - - - - XII
 STATUTES - - - - - - - - XVII
 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS - - - - - XVIII
 REPORTS - - - - - - - - - XVIII
 DICTIONARIES - - - - - - - - XVIII
 OTHER PUBLICATIONS - - - - - - XIX
 ONLINE SOURCES - - - - - - - XIX
 STATEMENT OF FACTS - - - - - - - XXI
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION - - - - - - XXII
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES - - - - - - - XXIII
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS - - - - - - - XXV
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED - - - - - - - 1
I. THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT HAVE THE LOCUS
TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION- - - - - - 1
1.1 The Petitioners have the Locus standi but it is flouted- - - 1

1.2 The Present Petition is not driven by the noble cause of public interest. 2
1.3 The Petition cannot be filed against the Tenji board as it is not an
instrumentality of State.- - - - - - - 3
II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS LIMITED JURISDICTION IN DEFINING BOUNDARIES OF

RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES- - - - - - - 4
2.1 The rationality of religious practices is outside the ken of the Courts - 4
2.2 Hindu Temples are regulated by Agama Shastras - - - 6

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 III
2.3 Religion falls under custom and usage in Article 13 - - - 7

2.4 Separation of Powers and Judicial Overreach - - - 8
III. THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF CERTAIN
AGE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN LIGHT
OF RULE 3(b) OF TENJIKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION
OF ENTRY) RULES. - - - - - - - - 9
3.1 The restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age does not
amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution - - 9
3.1.1. The twin test principle is satisfied in the present case - 10
3.1.2. Test of of arbitrariness - - - - - 12
3.2 Article 15 of the Constitution has not been violated - - 12
3.3 The said restriction does not violate Article 17 of the Constitution.- 14
3.4 Article 21 of the Constitution has not been violated.- - - 16
IV. THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTE AN ‘ESSENTIAL

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE’ UNDER ARTICLE 25 AND A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION CAN
ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE
ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION. - - - 18
4.1 The practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential religious

practice’ protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. - - 18
4.1.1 Test of essential religious practices – what can be classified as
essential or not. - - - - - - 18
4.1.2 Power or authority to decide what is an essential religious
practice- - - - - - - 20
4.2 The right of a religious institution to manage its affairs in the matters of
religion will prevail in the instant case.- - - - - 22
4.2.1 Characteristics of a religious denomination can be witnessed 22
4.2.2 The said practice is not against ‘public morality’. - 23
 PRAYER - - - - - - - - XXVII

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 IV
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SL. ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION

NO.
1. & And
2. @ At
3. A.I.R. All India Reporter

4. A.P. Andhra Pradesh
5. All. L.J. Allahabad Law Journal
6. Anr. Another
7. Art. Article
8. Bom. Bombay
9. C.H.N. Calcutta High Court Notes
10. Cal. Calcutta
11. CEDAW Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
12. Cl. Clause
13. Co. Company
14. Commr. Commissioner
15. Corpn. Corporation
16. Dr. Doctor
17. Edn. / ed. Edition
18. F.C.R. Federal Court Records
19. H.P. Himachal Pradesh
20. Hon’ble Honorable
21. http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
22. I.L.R. Indian Law Reports
23. J&K Jammu and Kashmir

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 V
24. J.L.J. Jabalpur Law Journal

25. K.L.T. Kerala Law Times
26. M.L.J. Madras Law Journal
27. M.P. Madhya Pradesh
28. Mad. Madras
29. Ors. Others
30. P.L.R. Punjab Law Reports
31. Pg. Page
32. Punj. Punjab
33. Pvt. Private
34. R.L.W. Rajasthan Law Weekly
35. S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
36. S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
37. S/§ Section
38. SC Supreme Court
39. U.P. Uttar Pradesh
40. U.S. United States
41. URL Universal Resource Locator
42. v. Versus
43. Vol. Volume

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 VI
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
(A.) Books Referred
SL No: Page
BOOKS
No:
1. ARVIND P.DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 1

INDIA (2nd ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 2007)
2. CHAUDHARY, LAW OF WRITS (1st ed., Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2

1956)
3. D.D. BASU COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8th 5,17
ed., Lexis Nexis, 2014)
4. D.L. KEIR &AMP, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4thed., 17

Oxford University Press, 1979)
5. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (2nd ed., 20

6. H. M. SHEERVAI, CONCEPT OF INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18

(3rd ed., Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2010)
7. J. N PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (53rd ed., 2

Central Law Agency, 2016)
8. KAILASH RAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (11th ed., 3,15

Central Law Publications, 2015)
9. M. C. JAIN KAGZI, KAGZI’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (7th ed., 15

Universal Law Publishing, 2014)

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 VII
10. M. LAXMIKANTH, INDIAN POLITY, (4th ed., MC Graw Hill, 18

2016)
11. M. P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed., Lexis Nexis, 17

2016)
12. MADHAV KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1st ed., Oxford 19

University Press, 2012)
13. B. RAMASWAMYHUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1st ed., Anmol 16
Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2002)
14. P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14th ed., Universal 21
Law Publishing, 2017)
15. S.A. PALEKAR, INDIAN CONSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT AND 22
POLITICS (7thed. ABD Publishers 2003)
16. SUBHASH.C. KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN 23
INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S CONSTITUTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (22nd ed.,National Book Trust, 2011)
17. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION. (1st 3
18. N. SHUKLA CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (4th ed., Lexis Nexis, 1

2008)
19. V.KRISHNA ANANTH, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL 9
REVOLUTION (16th ed., Sage India, 1900)
20. ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS AND THEIR JUDGEMENTS (2nd ed., 8
Rupa and Co., 2002)
21. DR. ABHISHEK ATREY, LAW OF WRITS PRACTICE AND 1
PROCEDURE (1st ed., Kamal Publishers, 2016 Eastern Book
Company, 2004)
22. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2nded Oxford University 4
Press,2007)

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 VIII
23. JUSTICE B. P. BANERJEE, WRIT REMEDIES (6th ed. Lexis 6

Nexis2013)
24. MONA SHUKLA, INDIAN JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 8
(1st ed., Regal Publications, 2011)
25. P. ISHWARA BHATT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - A STUDY OF 21

THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIP (2nd, Eastern Law House, 2004)
26. V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS (1st ed. Eastern Book 1

Company, 2007)
4
27. T.K.VISWANATHAN, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING- SHAPING THE
LAW FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1st ed., Indian Law Institute
New Delhi, 2007)
2
28. KARLE PEREZ PORTILLA, REDRESSING EVERYDAY
DISCRIMINATION- THE WEAKNESS AND POTENTIAL OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW (1st ed., CPI Group Ltd, Croydon, 2016)
14
29. SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2nd, Clarendon Law
Series Book House,2012)
15
30. TARUNABH KHAITAN, THE THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW
(1st ed., Replika Press Pvt. Ltd., 2015)
7
31. RAJEEV BHARGAVA, SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS (2nd ed.,

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 IX
5
32. BS MURTHY, SECULARISM , RELIGION AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1ST ed., Andhra University, 1997)
17
33. RONJOY SEN, ARTICLES OF FAITH RELIGION, SECULARISM AND
THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT (4th ed., Oxford India Publishing
House, 2014)
5
34. IQBAL NARAIN , SECULARISM IN INDIA (1st ed., Classic
Publishing Book House, 1995)
6
35. B.S. CHAUHAN, MAYNE’S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW & USAGE,
834 (17th ed., Bharat Law House, 2017)
6
36. B.M.GANDHI, HINDU LAW 64 (4th ed., Eastern Book Co., 2016)
7
37. MULLA, HINDU LAW 224 (9th ed., Lexis Nexis ,1999)
9
38. N.S.BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 65 (10th ed., Lexis
Nexis, 2008)
9
39. C.K.TAKWANI, LECTURES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1st ed.
Lexis Nexis 2008)
KHWAJA.A.MUNTAQIM, EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN & 17

40.
GENDER JUSTICE IN INDIA 415 (3rd ed., Law Publishers, 2011)

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 X
(B.) Articles and Journals
SL No : ARTICLES AND JOURNALS Page No:
1. Pankaj Kakde, Indian Women: Law and Policy In India, 17

JOURNAL OF CENTRE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE Issue 1, 59-76
(2014)
2. Dipak Mishra J., Women Empowerment and Gender Justice, 17
J6 – J26 (2014)
3. N Dharmadan, Will ‘Sabarimala’ Become a ‘Balikeramala’ 22
For Women? KHC J52-J56 (2018)
4. Prof. (Dr) N.R. Madhava Menon, Why Sabarimala Judgment 22
Warrant Review? J7-J10 (2018)
5. Jaclyn L.Neo, Definitional Imbroglios: A Critique Of The 21
Definition Of Religion And Essential Practice Tests In
Religious Freedom Adjudication, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 574-595 (2018)
6. A.B. Princeton, Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium in 21
The Indian Constitution, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 32-98
(2013)
7. Deepa Das, Secularism in The Indian Context, JOURNAL OF 21
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 138-167 (2016)
8. Deepa Das Acevedo, God’s Homes, Men’s Courts, Women’s 20
Right, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AND NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 52-128 (2018)
9. Marc Galanter, Hinduism, Secularism, And The Indian 20
Judiciary, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS 467-487 (2019)
10. Vindhya Gupta, Cultural and Social Challenges Confronting 17
Women: Their Marginalization and Realities, JOURNAL OF
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE Issue 1, (2014) pp.01-08

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XI
(C.) Table of Cases
SI CASES CITATION PAGE NO.

NO:
1. A S Naryana Deekshitulu v. State of 1996 (9) S.C.C. 548 6
A.P
2. A.L. Kalra v. P & E Corporation of A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1361 10
India Ltd
3. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta A.I.R. 1984 S.C.R. (1) 20
v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta 447
4. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nata (2016) 2 S.C.C 725 4,5,11
Sangam v. Government of Tamil
Nadu and Anr.
5. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487 3
6. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1539 1
Controller of Imports.
7. Andhra Pradesh Public Service (2009) 5 S.C.C. 1 10
Commission v. BalojiBadhavath
8. Anuj Garg and Ors. v. Hotel (2008) 3 S.C.C. 1 17
Association of India and Ors.
9. Asha Sharma v. Chandigarh Admin A.I.R. 2011 S.C.W. 10
5636
10. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. U.O.I (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1 16
11. Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1124 1
12. Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 S.C.C. 625 12
13. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 748 5,22
14. Bishan Das v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1570 15
15. Budhan Chowdary v. State of Bihar 1955 (1) S.C.R. 1045 10
16. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. A.I.R. 2016 S.C. 1777 3
U.O.I

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XII
17. Champakam Dorairajan and Ors. v. A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120 16

The State of Madras
18. Charu Khurana and Ors. v. U.O.I and (2015) 1 S.C.C. 192 17
Ors.
19. Commissioner, Hindu Religious A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 5,19,20,22
Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt
20. Confederation of Ex- Servicemen A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 2945 15
Associations v. U.O.I.
21. Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 2191 12
and Ors. v. The Election Commission
of India
22. Devarajiah v. Padmanna A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 35 14
23. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of (2014) 5 S.C.C. 75 23
T.N. & Ors
24. Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402 5,23
Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.
25. Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1642 12
of Trustees, Bombay Port
26. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 S.C.C. 3 11
27. EV Chinnaiah v. State of A.P A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 162 11
28. Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 S.C.C 733 4
29. Food Corporation of India v. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1601 10
Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries
30. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746 15
Territory Delhi, Administrator
31. Gopal Das Mohata v U.O.I A.I.R 1955 S.C. 1 1
32. Government of Andra Pradesh v. P.B. A.I.R 1995 S.C. 1648 18
Vijay Kumar

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XIII
33. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi v. (2016) 232 D.L.T. 196 24

U.O.I and Ors.
34. Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 11,19
LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri
Shirur Matt
35. In re Thomas A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 21 17
36. Independent Thought v. U.O.I & Ors. A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 4904 11
37. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) A.I.R. 1986 S.C 515 1
Private Ltd. v. U.O.I
38. Indian Young Lawyers Association 2018 (4) K.L.T. 373 23, 24, 25
and Ors. v. The State of Kerala and
Ors.
39. Indra Sawhney v. U.O.I A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 11,10
40. J.K.S.Puttuswamy v. U.O.I (2017) 1 S.C.C. 10 15
41. J.K.S.Puttuswamy v. U.O.I MANU/SC/1054/2018 15
42. Jai Singh v. U.O.I A.I.R 1993 Raj. 177 13,14
43. Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdari (1992) 4 S.C.C. 305 2
44. Javed v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 5
45. Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470 16
Cochin
46. Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra (1952) S.C.R. 435 16
47. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 404 11
Bengal
48. Kerala v.NM Thomas A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490 11
49. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 8
Kerala
50. L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1811 12
and Research Centre
51. L.I.C. v. Escorts A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370 12
52. Lachhmans v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 222 10

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XIV
53. M. Nagaraj v. U.O.I A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 71 10

54. M.S. Bhut Education Trust v. State of A.I.R. 2000 Guj. 160 12
Gujarat
55. M/s. Narinder Chand Hem Raj and A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2399 8
Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Administrator,
Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh
and Ors.
56. Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. [1954] S.C.R. 1046 5,11
The State of Orissa
57. Maneka Gandhi v. U.O.I A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 14
58. Mohd. Usman v. State of A.P (1971) 2 S.C.C. 188 12
59. Motor General Traders v. State of A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 222 10
Andhra Pradesh
60. N. Adithayan v. Travancore (2002) 8 S.C.C. 106 13
Devaswom Board and Ors
61. Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. U.O.I A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 432 24
and Ors
62. New Okhla Industrial Development A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1983 12
v.Arvind Sonekar
63. Northern Corporation v. U.O.I A.I.R. 1991 S.C 764 1
64. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Corporation A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 15
65. Parimal Chakraborty v. State of 2000 (3) G.L.T. 441 10
Meghalaya and Ors
66. Perarula Ramnya Swami v. State of A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586 5
Tamil Nadu
67. Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 251 10
68. Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 72 10
69. Raja BiraKishore v. The State of A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1501 23,24
Orissa

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XV
70. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. A.I.R 1979 S.C. 131 3

Mohanlal
71. Rajpal Sharma v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1623 12
72. Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1999 S.C.W. 6
1878
73. Ram Narayan Agarwal v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1213 16
74. Ram Prasad v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1607 10
75. Rana Muneswar v. State A.I.R. 1976 Pat. 198 22
76. Roop Chand Adlakha v. D.D.A A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 307 10
77. S. Mahendran v. Secretary, A.I.R. 1993 Ker. 42 5,20
Travancore Devaswom Board
78. S.P Gupta and Ors. v. President of A.I.R 1982 S.C. 149 2
India and Ors.
79. S.P Mittal v. U.O.I A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1 19
80. Sandeep Biswas v. State of West (2010) 2 Cal.W.N. 3
Bengal (Cal) 399
81. Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853 5,7,20
v. The State of Bombay
82. Sastri Yagnapureesh v. Muldas A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119 7
Bhudardas Vaishya
83. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 S.C.C. 11 6,19
84. Shantabai v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 531 2
85. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri (1959) S.C.R. 279 11
Justice SR Tendolkar
86. Shri. Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. (1987) 2 S.C.C. 707 13
Shanmukhan Chetti and Ors.
87. Smt. Anjali Roy v. State of West A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 825 16
Bengal
88. Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. A.I.R 1958 S.C 255 4,5,6,22
State of Mysore

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XVI
89. State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952) 1 S.C.R. 889 23

90. State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu 1995 Supp. (4) S.C.C. 14,17
Ingale 469
91. State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for (2009) 8 S.C.C. 46 10
Civil Liberties, Kerala State Unit
92. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Purachand A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 352 13
93. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1198 13
Krishna Bolathia
94. State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 212 10
95. State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10 10
96. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jeet S Bisht MANU/SC/7702/2007 9
97. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 12,10
Sarkar
98. State v. Gulab Singh A.I.R. 1953 All 483 13
99. Subramanian Swamy v. U.O.I and MANU/SC/0621/2016 15
Ors.
100. Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331 1
Ors
101. Supreme Court Employees' Welfare (1989) 4 S.C.C. 187 2
Association v. U.O.I and Anr
102. The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402 11
Syed Hussain Ali
103. Tilkayat Shri Govinda/ji Maharaj v. (1964) 1 S.C.R. 561 5,20,22
State of Rajasthan
104. U.O.I and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 96 8
Aggarwal
105. U.O.I v. Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 S.C.C. 195 7
106. U.O.I v. S.B Vohra A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1402 4
107. Uttam Kumar Samanta v. KIIT 118 (2014) C.L.T. 997 10
University

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XVII
108. V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, U.O.I (2012) 2 S.C.C. 542 9

& Ors
109. Vasant Abaji Mandke v. The State of 1979 (81) BomL.R. 542 12
Maharashtra
110. VinodChaturvedi v. State of Madhya A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 814 4
Pradesh
111. Yusuf v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 321 11
Foreign Cases
SL CASE CITATION Page

No: No:
1. Dash v. Van Kleeck (1811) 7 Johns 498 7
2 Bilston Corp. v. Wolverhampton Corp. (1942) 2 All E.R. 447 8
3. Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Clark and 15

Finnelly 85
4. Hinds v. R. (1976) 1 All E.R. 353 8
5. Ogden v. Blackledge 2 Cr 276; 7
(D.) Statutes
1. Constitution of India, 1949.
2. Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987.
3. The Civil Rights Act, 1955.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XVIII
(E.) International Conventions
1. CEDAW- Convention on Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against

Women
(F.) Reports
4. All India Reporter (A.I.R.)
5. Supreme Court Cases (S.C.C.)
6. Kerala Law Times (K.L.T.)
7. Indian Law Reports (I.L.R.)
8. Supreme Court Journal (S.C.J.)
9. Judgement Today (J.T.)
10. Criminal Law Journal (Cr.L.J.)
11. Supreme Court Record (S.C.R.)
(G.) Dictionaries
1. Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan .A. Garner, 8th Edition. 2004, West, Thompson
2. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition, 2002, Oxford University Press

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XIX
3.
The Chambers Dictionary, Deluxe Edition 1993, 15th Edition
Reprint,2011,Allied Chambers (India) Pvt Ltd.
4 The Law Lexicon (Ed. Justice Y.Y. Chandrachud), P. Ramanatha Iyer, 2nd
Edition, 2002
5 Wharton’s Law Lexicon, Dr. A. R. Lakshmana J, 15TH Edition 2011,
Universal Law Publishing Co.
(H.) Other Publications
1. CNN IBN
2. Frontline
3. Hindustan Times
4. India Today
5. The Hindu
6. The Wire
7. Times of India
(I.) Online Sources
1. Constitution Society www.Constitution.org
2. Hein Online https://home.heinonline.org/
3. India Kanoon http://indiankanoon.org
4. Jstor https://www.jstor.org/

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XX
5. Lawyers Club India http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/
6. Legal Services India http://www.legalserviceindia.com
7. Lexis Nexis Academia http://www.lexisnexis.com/academica
8. Lex Warrier http://lex warrier.in/
9. Manupatra Online http://www.manupatrafast.in
10. Oxford Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com
11. SCC Online http://www.scconline.co.in.
12. Westlaw https://www.westlaw.com/

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXI
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. BRIEF SKETCH OF HISTORY
The Himaya Temple located in Tenjiku, a city in the Union of Indiana, is one of the few temples
in Tenjiku where devotees of every caste can enter. As per the religious text Tenji was born to
both Shiva and Vishnu. When Tenji fulfils his destiny by killing the demon, a beautiful woman
emerges from the body. Now free, she asks Tenji to marry her. He refuses, explaining to her
that his mission is to go to Tenjiku where he would answer the prayers of his devotees.
However, he assures her, he will marry her when kanni-swamis stop coming. She now sits and
waits for him at a neighbouring shrine near the main temple and is also worshipped as Masma.
II. ISSUE INVOLVED
The temple is prominent for a unique reason — the selective ban imposed on women preventing
them from entering it. Women aged between 10 and 50, that is those who are in menstruating
age, are barred from entering the temple. Although there are numerous Tenji Temple in Indiana,
the Himaya Temple depicts Lord Tenji as a ‘Naistika Brahmcharya’. It is believed that Lord
Tenji’s powers derives from his ascetism, in particular from his being celibate. Celibacy is a
practice adopted by the pilgrims before and during the pilgrimage. The pilgrims have to follow
a strict vow over a period of forty one days, which lays down a set of practice. The custom has
evolved in line with this belief.
III. LEGAL SCENARIO
The Indiana Young Lawyers Association, five women lawyers and a group of women, part of
the "Happy Mensuration" campaign approached the Supreme Court’s seeking a direction to
allow entry of women into the temple without age restrictions and sought the Court's direction
on “menstrual discrimination." The same issue was adjudicated upon by the Tenjiku High
Court in 1991 wherein it was held that the restriction was in accordance with a usage and
custom and hence, not discriminatory. The case is now pending before the seven judge Bench
of this Honourable Court.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONERS HAVE FILED THIS PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR THE VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
ENUMERATED IN PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE RESPONDENT
MAINTAINS THAT NO VIOLATION OF RIGHTS HAS TAKEN PLACE. THEREFORE,
THIS HON’BLE COURT NEED NOT APPLY ITS JURISDICTION IN THIS PETITION.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXIII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION
I. THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT HAVE THE

LOCUS TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION
1.1 The Petitioners have the Locus standi but it is flouted

1.2 The Present Petition is not driven by the noble cause of public interest.
1.3 The Petition cannot be filed against the Tenji board as it is not an
instrumentality of State.

RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES
2.1 The rationality of religious practices is outside the ken of the Courts
2.2 Hindu Temples are regulated by Agama Shastras
2.3 Religion falls under custom and usage in Article 13
2.4 Separation of Powers and Judicial Overreach
OF ENTRY) RULES.
3.1 The restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age does not
amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
3.1.1. The twin test principle is satisfied in the present case
3.1.2. Test of of arbitrariness
3.2 Article 15 of the Constitution has not been violated
3.3 The said restriction does not violate Article 17 of the Constitution.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXIV
3.4 Article 21 of the Constitution has not been violated.

ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE
ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION.
4.1 The practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential religious

practice’ protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.
4.1.1 Test of essential religious practices – what can be classified as
essential or not.
4.1.2 Power or authority to decide what is an essential religious
practice
4.2 The right of a religious institution to manage its affairs in the matters of
religion will prevail in the instant case.
4.2.1 Characteristics of a religious denomination can be witnessed
4.2.2 The said practice is not against ‘public morality’.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION
I. THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT HAVE THE

LOCUS TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION
Public interest litigation has been filed by the Petitioners and subsequent interveners under
Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana. The locus standi of the Petitioners is flouted due to the
existence of personal gain. The Tenji Board cannot be considered an instrumentality of State
under Art. 12 of the Constitution as it is not an authority which performs public functions.

Traditions and beliefs underlying such religion/practice have to be analyzed. Though there
exists an inherent judicial power in the Court to determine essential religious practices, such
exercise must always be restricted and restrained. When judicial activism crosses its limits, it
results in ‘Judicial Overreach’.
AGE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
LIGHT OF RULE 3(b) OF TENJIKU HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP
(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES.
The differentia for classification by the impugned Rule is on a rational basis, has reasonable
nexus to the object sought and does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. Thus, it is not
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Article 15(2) is not violated as temples do not come
within the ambit of the term place of public resort. Also, no rule has been formulated
by the State for making special provisions for women and children, thus, rendering Article

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXVI
15(3) inapplicable.
There has been no violation of Article 17 as the rights of untouchables cannot be used in
reference with the right of entry of women. Such an analogy is misconceived and sustainable.
The State has neither enacted any law nor is there a legitimate State aim. The Tenji Board is
not a State entity and their rules cannot be violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO
MANAGE ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION.
The practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential practice’ protected under Art. 25
of the Constitution for it is a part of religion. Moreover, devotees of Lord Tenji can be said to
constitute a separate religious denomination under Art. 26 and have a right to manage their
own affairs. The given custom which prohibits women is in no sense against public morality.

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUION OF INDIANA
I. THE PETITIONER AND THE SUBSEQUENT INTERVENERS DO NOT HAVE THE LOCUS
TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION
“If I was asked to name any particular Article in the Constitution as most important…. An
Article without which the Constitution would be a nullity- I could not refer, to any other Article
except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it.”1
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petition is not maintainable under
Art.322 of the Constitution, as the Petitioners do not have locus standi and there is no violation
of fundamental rights. The sole object of Art. 32 is the enforcement of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution3 but whatever other remedies may be open to an aggrieved
person, he has no right to complain under Art. 32 if no fundamental right has been infringed.4
Furthermore, the Judiciary can neither enforce the violation of Part III against a non- state entity
nor can it issue writs/directions5 based on the same6. Hence, the petition will not be
maintainable.
1.1 The Petitioners have the Locus standi but it is flouted
A Public interest litigation can be filed against the State for the violation of fundamental rights7
under Art. 328. In Northern Corporation v. U.O.I9 and Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
Private Ltd. v. U.O.I10, it was held that for invoking Art.32, there must be a clear breach of
1
Constituent Assembly Debates Volume III Page 953.
2
Gopal Das Mohata v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 1 (India).
3
ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 53 (2 nd ed., Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa 2007).
4
Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1124 (India).
5
ABHISHEK ATREY, LAW OF WRITS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 71 (1st ed., Kamal Publishers, 2004).
6
V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS 253 (1st ed., Eastern Book Company 2007).
7
Sukhdev and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram and Ors., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331 (India).
8
Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of Imports, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1539 (India).
9
Northern Corporation v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 764 (India).
10
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 515 (India).

fundamental right11 along with the requisite locus standi.12 Nevertheless, the traditional rule of
locus standi in a Public interest litigation is that a Non-Governmental Organization can file it,13
but further needs to prove that the petition is being filed on behalf of a group of people who
are incapable of protecting themselves. In the Judges Transfer case14, J. Bhagwati stated that:
Where a legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a person or a determinate

class of people by a reason of violation of any constitutional or legal rights
and such person or determinate class of people is by reason of poverty,
helplessness of disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position
unable to approach the Court for relief.15
In the present case, the women community does not belong to any of the classes
aforementioned.16 This petition needs to be considered as an abuse of Public interest litigation
as it amounts to the misuse of liberal rule of locus standi.17 In the light of the aforementioned
reason, it is submitted that the non-governmental organization’s locus standi is flouted.
1.2 The Present Petition is not driven by the noble cause of public interest
The subsequent interveners do not have the locus standi due to the existence of personal gain.
The five women lawyers and women forming part of the ‘Happy Mensuration’ campaign have
filed the petition in pursuance of their right to enter the temple.18 This is an abuse of the concept
of Public interest litigation as reiterated by J. Bhagwati:
It should be carefully analysed who approaches the Court in case of a PIL is

acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political or other
oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused by
any.19
The present petition is to be considered as an act to garner sufficient publicity. According to

the reports published by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation, a strong rise has been noticed
11
V.N SUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 324 (12th ed., Eastern Book Company 2016).
12
Shantabai v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 531 (India).
13
Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. U.O.I. and Anr., (1989) 4 S.C.C. 187 (India).
14
Id. at 13.
15
S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdari, (1992)
4 S.C.C. 305 (India).
16
KARLE PEREZ PORTILLA, REDRESSING EVERYDAY DISCRIMINATION- THE WEAKNESS AND
POTENTIAL OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 67 (1st ed., CPI Group Ltd, Croydon 2016).
17
APPENDIX 1.
18
Moot Proposition ¶ 5.
19
J. N PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 408 (52 nd ed., Central Law Agency 2015).

in the number of petitions filed by NGOs in order to gain a fake reputation and name.20 The
Apex Court has vehemently held that all such petitions which are filed on the basis of publicity
or for personal gains shall be dismissed.21 Therefore, the present petition should stand
dismissed because of the nature of it being a publicity stunt.
1.3 The petition cannot be filed against the Tenji board as it is not an
instrumentality of State
The Tenji board in the instant matter cannot be considered as an instrumentality of State under
Art. 1222. The term ‘State’ occurring in Art. 13(2), or any other provision concerning
fundamental rights, has an expansive meaning23, i.e.:
(a) The Government and Parliament of India.

(b) The Government and the Legislature of a State.
(c) All local authorities; and
(d) Other authorities within the territory of India, or under the control of the
Central Government.24
To determine the ambit of the institutions falling under ‘other authorities’, a six-point test has
been laid down. Whether a body is an instrumentality of the Government or not will depend on
the types of functions performed by it, among other factors25:
(e) The functions performed by the corporation is also an indication of the

corporation being an instrumentality of the state, that is if the corporation
performs public functions or closely related to government functions, it
would be considered an instrumentality of the state.26
In the present case, the board is not an authority which performs public functions. A Public
function can be defined as any function/ activity carried on with respect to public places.27 It is
contended that though the Tenji Board maintains the temple, as long as the temple is not a
public place,28 any function performed in this aspect cannot be considered as a public function.
It is to be noted that ‘temples’ were consciously deleted from draft Indian Constitution since
20
APPENDIX 2.
21
Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 2016 S.C. 1777 (India).
22
INDIAN CONST. art.12.
23
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohanlal A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 131 (India).
24
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION 68 (1st Oxford University Press 2016).
25
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487, Sandeep v. State of W.B, (2010) 2 Cal W.N. 399 (India).
26
KAILASH RAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 177(11 th ed., Central Law Publications 2015).
27
Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 S.C.C. 733 (India).
28
Id. at 27.

the Constituent Assembly did not consider it fit to include temples along with places of public
worship29. Disregard of this legislative intent will result in an apparent error.30 Therefore, it
can be safely concluded that the Tenji Board is not a State entity under Art. 12.31
Under Art. 32, fundamental rights violation can be invoked only against a State or State entity32
and as long as Tenji Board is not incorporated under Art. 12, no writ can be enforced against
it.33
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Public interest litigation is not maintainable.

It is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction in defining the
boundaries of religion in public spaces. The arguments presented are three-fold in nature:
2.1 The rationality of religious practices is outside the ken of the Courts
Art. 25 of the Constitution34 declares the right of the individual to freedom of religion 35 while
Art. 2636 protects the exercise thereof. There exists no rigid, fixed or mechanical definition of
the word religion.37 Persons are given the fullest freedom to hold genuine beliefs.38
Furthermore, freedom of religion is not only confined to conscientious beliefs but also extends
to outward acts such as religious practices.39
A practice is deemed religious if it is regarded as an essential part of the religion.40 The

jurisdiction in applying the ‘essential and integral practice test’ in religious matters is vested in
29
Vol. No. VII, Constituent Assembly Debates, Amendment No. 301 p. 650-664.
30
T.K.VISWANATHAN, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING- SHAPING THE LAW FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
(1st ed., Indian Law Institute New Delhi 2007).
31
ARTICLE 12, supra note 21.
32
Vinod Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 814 (India).
33
U.O.I v. S.B. Vohra, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1402(India).
34
INDIAN CONST. art. 25.
35
Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255 (India).
36
37
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nata Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2016) 2 S.C.C. 725 (India).
38
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 45 (2nded., Oxford University Press 2007).
39
Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 1046; Sri Venkataramanav Devaru v.
State of Mysore, [1958] S.C.R. 895; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, [1962] 1 S.C.R., 383 (India).
40
Javed v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India).

Court.41 If beliefs are sincerely held and responsibly professed, they are bound to be protected
by the Courts.42 The object of the test is to limit the scope of State’s interference with
religion.4344
Though there exists an inherent judicial power in the Court to determine essential religious
practices, such exercise must always be restricted and restrained as laid down in Adi Saiva
Sivachariyargal Nata Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr.45 When there arises a
necessity to determine the essential religious practice, then the Supreme Court has to
dispassionately examine the origins and basis of the religious practice46 by examining the
relevant scriptures, historical considerations47 and seek inputs from the Chief priest of the
Temple48 as has been laid down in Sardar Syadna TaherSaifuddin Saheb v. The State of
Bombay.49
Thus, the tradition and the beliefs underlying such religion/practice have to be analyzed.50 It is
not for the Courts to determine which of these practices of faith are to be struck down except
if they are pernicious, oppressive or a social evil. The Courts cannot straight away apply the
‘impact theory’ in religious matters. It would only lead to homogenization of religious places
of worship and killing their very identities in the process. The theory is indifferent to the rights
of stakeholders such as the Deity, the Temple and devotees. It is also precisely for this reason
that the legislature has not been given the power to alter religious practices under Art. 25(2),
since it only speaks of social reform or welfare. 51
The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction in defining the boundaries of religion in public
spaces. The belief/ practice should be upheld at most times and judicial restraint should be
exercised in interfering in religious matters. Judicial review of religious practices ought not to
be undertaken as it imposes morality, or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a
41
DD BASU COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 680 (9 thedn., LEXIS NEXIS 2016)
42
Bijoi Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 748 (India).
43
Perarula Ramnya Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586(India).
44
IQBAL NARAIN , SECULARISM IN INDIA (1st ed., Classic Publishing Book House 1995).
45
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal, supra note 37.
46
Commr., H.R.E, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 S.C.R. 1005 (India).
47
Tilkayat Shri Govinda/ji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1964) 1 S.C.R. 561(India).
48
BS MURTHY, SECULARISM , RELIGION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1 st ed., Andhra Univ. 1997).
49
Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853(India).
50
S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, A.I.R. 1993 Ker 42 (India).
51
RONJOY SEN, ARTICLES OF FAITH RELIGION,SECULARISM AND THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT
43(4th ed., Oxford India Publishing House, 2014).

deity. If any practice can be traced to antiquity and is integral, then it must be taken as to be an
essential religious practice of that temple and courts should not interfere in it. The rationality
of the Courts is thus, outside the ken of the Courts.
2.2. Hindu Temples are regulated by Agama Shastras
The right recognized by Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitution52 necessarily becomes subject to some
limitations or regulations and these limitations arise in the process of harmonizing the rights
conferred by Art. 25(2)(b) with that protected by Art. 26(b).53
In this regard, in the instant case, the judgement of the Tenjiku High Court in 1991 assumes
relevance where ‘The Himaya Thantri’ asserted that these customs and usages had to be
followed for the welfare of the temple. Only followers of penance and custom are eligible to
enter the temple.54 Thus, the sole reason for the restriction placed on the entry of women with
reproductive capabilities in the Tenji Temple is directly traceable to the custom.
The worship in Hindu temples is regulated in strict accordance with the rules laid down in the
Agama Sastras. The primacy of the Agama Shastras was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu.55 The Apex Court had discussed in detail the
significance of Agama Shastras which apply to the religious aspects of a Temple.
The institution of temple worship has an ancient history. With the construction of temples, the
institution of Archakas also came into existence, the Archakas being professional men who
made their livelihood by attending on the images.56 Treatises on rituals were compiled and they
are known as Agamas. 57
The authority of these Agamas is recognized in Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of
Mysore.58 Agamas are described as treatises of ceremonial law dealing with the construction of
temples, installation of idols therein and conduct of the worship of the deity. Rules with regard
to daily and periodical worship have been laid down for securing the continuance of the Divine
Spirit. According to the Agamas, a Deity becomes defiled if there is any departure or violation
52
53
Sastri Yagnapureesh v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1119 (India).
54
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
55
Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586 (India).
56
B.M. GANDHI, HINDU LAW 64 (4th ed., Eastern Book Co., 2016).
57
B.S. CHAUHAN, TREATISE ON HINDU LAW & USAGE, 834 (17th ed., Bharat Law House 2017)
58
Devaru, supra note 34.

of any of the rules relating to worship.59
In A S Naryana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P.60, held that:
The institution of the temple should be in conformity with the Agamas co-
existing with the institution of temple worship. Construction of the temple
and the institution of Archakas simultaneously came into existence. The
temples are constructed according to the Agama Shastra.61
Furthermore, in Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay62, this Court
held that the reformative levers provided in the Constitution cannot be used to reform a
religious or a religious institution out of its identity and the State must be careful in applying
its notions of equality and modernity to religious institutions. Therefore, the ancient history of
the Himaya Temple in the case at hand should be preserved.
2.3 Religion falls under custom and usage in Article 13
Religious practices and traditions which apply to public places of worship, as distinguished
from personal laws based on religion, fall under custom and usage as used in Art.1363 of the
Constitution.64 Parliament exercises sovereign power to enact laws65 and Courts have to
interpret these laws. To declare what the law is or has been is judicial power; to declare what
law shall be is legislative.66
In M/s. Narinder Chand Hem Raj and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory,
Himachal Pradesh and Ors.,67 it was held that legislative power can be exercised only by the
legislature and its delegate and none else. In U.O.I and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal,68 the
Court observed that the power to legislate has not been conferred on the Court.
The Legislature has to regulate any activity related to customs and usages by formulating laws.
For instance, Sati, an obsolete and evil funeral custom, was banned by way of legislation i.e.
59
Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar 1999 A.I.R. S.C.W. 1878 (India).
60
A S Naryana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P., 1996 (9) S.C.C. 548 (India).
61
MULLA, HINDU LAW 224 (9th ed., Lexis Nexis, 1999).
62
Sardar Syadna , supra note 49.
63
INDIAN CONST. art.13 cl 1.
64
RAJEEV BHARGAVA, SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 191 (2 nd ed., Oxford University Press 2007).
65
U.O.I. v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 S.C.C. 195 (India).
66
Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cr 276; Dash v. Van Kleeck, (1811) 7 Johns 498 (Foreign).
67
M/s. Narinder Chand and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Administrator, H.P and Ors., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2399 (India).
68
U.O.I. and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 96 (India).

Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987. In the present matter, the Judiciary cannot play a role in deciding
on the custom as it has a force of law under Art.13 and only the Legislature can enact or amend
the law. 69
If the instant issue pending before a seven-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indiana,70 decides on the custom, it shall be binding on all the lower Courts/Benches of the
Supreme Court under Art. 141 of the Constitution. It will be quite an arduous task to constitute
a larger bench in the future to decide on similar religious matters. The subsequent decisions by
other lower or co-ordinate Benches will render the decision of the seven-judge Bench as per
incuriam, and will be liable to be ignored by other subsequent Benches.71
2.4 Separation of Powers and Judicial Overreach
When judicial activism crosses its limits, it results in ‘Judicial Overreach’. When the judiciary
oversteps the powers given to it, it may interfere with the proper functioning of the legislative
or executive organs of government. This is contrary to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
which is a constituent of the basic structure of Indian Constitution.72
In the case at hand, the petition fails to distinguish between diversity in religious traditions and
discrimination.73 The aspect of discrimination in the petition has the potential of causing
irreparable harm to the religious rights protected under Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In
Arguendo, even if the practice is not an essential and integral part of the belief concerned, the
Court can neither legislate nor issue a direction to the Legislature to enact in a particular
manner.74It is for the democratically elected Legislature to determine what would be for the
benefit of the society and the well-being of its members and, public policy.75
Moreover, if a Court were to dictate what is or is not in public interest, it would be usurping
the functions of the Legislature.76 In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jeet S Bisht77, Markandey Katju
J. observed that:
69
MONA SHUKLA, INDIAN JUDICIARY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 67 (1st ed., Regal Publications 2011).
70
71
ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS AND THEIR JUDGEMENTS 72 (2 nd ed., Rupa and Co. 2002).
72
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India).
73
74
V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, U.O.I & Ors. (2012) 2 S.C.C. 542 (India).
75
Bilston Corp. v. Wolverhampton Corp., (1942) 2 All E.R. 447 (451) (Foreign).
76
Hinds v. R., (1976) 1 All E.R. 353 (370) (PC) (Foreign).
77
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jeet S Bisht, MANU/SC/7702/2007 (India).

After all, it is only these two organs78 of the state that is responsible for
framing and implementing policies for the public good and the judiciary’s
role is to prevent any transgression in respect of Constitutional breach and
fundamental rights. The judiciary must exercise self-restraint and eschew the
temptation to encroach into the domain of the legislature.79
In this backdrop, it is worth emphasizing that according to the theory of separation of powers,
the judiciary cannot exercise its powers in domain of the executive and the legislature.80
Therefore, the Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction in defining boundaries of religion in
public spaces.
OF ENTRY) RULES?
It is humbly submitted that the said restriction imposed on the women and children of a certain
age does not amount to violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 17 and 21
in light of Rule 3(b) of Tenjiku Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry)
Rules.81
3.1 The restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age does not amount
to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
Art. 14 of the Constitution guarantees the right to equality to every person of India82 and
prohibits discrimination.83 It confers on all people equality before law and equal protection of
law.84 The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law 85 which
pervades the Indian Constitution.86 If a law is arbitrary or irrational, it would fall foul of Art.14
which prohibits class legislation and not reasonable classification for the purpose of
78
V.KRISHNA ANANTH, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION 63 (16 th ed., Sage
India1900).
79
N.S.BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 65 (10 th ed., Lexis Nexis 2008).
80
C.K.TAKWANI, LECTURES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1 st ed., Lexis Nexis 2008).
81
The Tenjiku Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, Rule 3: (b) Women at such time
during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.
82
Thommen,J., in IndraSwahney v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (India).
83
DR.J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 237 (51 st, Central Law Agency 2018).
84
M.Nagaraj v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 71 (India).
85
Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1601; Asha Sharma v.
Chandigarh Admin., 2011 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5636.
86
Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India).

legislation.87 The principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 is a basic feature of the Constitution
and88to consider that Art.14 is not violated it is necessary to check arbitrariness along with the
twin test principles.89
3.1.1. The twin test principle is satisfied in the present case
This principle propounds that any classification should satisfy the test of reasonable
classification by fulfilling the following two conditions90-
(1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which

distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left
out from the group91and,
(2) Secondly, there should be some rational nexus relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the Act.92
A classification may properly be made on geographical93 or territorial basis or on historical

considerations94 if that is germane to the purposes.95 The classification in the present case finds
its basis in the location of the said Tenji temple as distinct from the temples of Lord Tenji in
other parts of the state. Moreover, the historical background has been illustrated through the
depiction of the Lord as a ‘Naishtika Brahmachari’ or an eternal celibate. It is to preserve this
characteristic that the customs regarding the exclusion of women in procreative age group have
been established.96 Most importantly, a classification need not be scientifically perfect or
logically complete.97
87
Budhan Chowdary v. State of Bihar, 1955 (1) S.C.R. 1045 (India).
88
State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kerala State Unit, (2009) 8 S.C.C. 46 (India).
89
A.L. Kalra v. P & E Corporation of India Ltd., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1361 (India).
90
Parimal Chakraborty v. State of Meghalaya and Ors., 2000 (3) G.L.T. 441;Uttam Kumar Samanta v. KIIT
University, 118 (2014) C.L.T. 997 (India).
91
State of W.B v. Anwar Ali, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75, Motor Traders v. State of A.P , A.I.R.1984 S.C. 222.
92
Roop Chand Adlakha v. D.D.A., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 307(India).
93
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10 (India).
94
Lachhmans v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.222; Ram Prasad v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1607
(India).
95
State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 212 (India).
96
97
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 404 (India).

Equal protection is not violated if the exception made is required by some other provision of
the Constitution.98 The protection under Articles 25 and 26 extends a guarantee for rituals and
observances, ceremonies and modes of worship99 which are integral parts of a religion.100 Thus,
both the fundamental rights need to be harmonized. The given custom in the instant case is
protected under the Constitution within the ambit of right to religion and there is nothing in the
custom which demands a social reform or contravenes with public order, morality or health.101
The Rule has rightly considered this scenario, and the classification envisaged is reasonable
and founded on rational reasons.
Furthermore, there is no constitutional or legal bar to reasonably differentiate between two sets
of groups/classes.102 Sub-classification, which is rational, relevant, based on intelligible
differentia, and with a nexus between the differentia and the object to be achieved is allowed.103
Thus, Art.14 does not forbid reasonable sub-classification. In the instant matter, there is no
restriction between two sections or between two classes amongst Hindus in the matter of entry
to a temple whereas the restriction is only in respect of women of a particular age group and
not women as a class.
Secondly, a rational nexus exists in the present case as the classification is solely for the
purpose of safeguarding the custom of exclusion of women within the age group of 10 to 50
years to preserve the belief that Lord Tenji exists in a celibate form.
The validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its overall effect and not by picking up
exceptional cases.104 All aspects need to be taken into consideration while making a
classification. Taking all the factors into consideration in the present scenario, the historical
report, religious texts, beliefs, biological factors and other relevant matters, it can be asserted
that there has been no violation of Art.14 by the Tenji Board.
98
Independent Thought v. U.O.I and Ors., A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 4904; Yusuf v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C.
321 (India).
99
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal, supra note 37.
100
H.R.E v. Sri Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282; Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The
State of Orissa 1954 S.C.R. 1046; Durgah Commi., Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402 (India).
101
P. ISHWARA BHATT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - A STUDY OF THEIR INTER-RELATIONSHIP 603
(2nd ed., Eastern Law House 2004).
102
EV Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 162; Indra Sawhney v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477; Kerala v.
NM Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490 (India).
103
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice SR Tendolkar, (1959) S.C.R. 279; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu, (1974) 4 S.C.C. 3 (India).
104
Mohd. Usman v. State of A.P., (1971) 2 S.C.C. 188 (India).

3.1.2. Test of arbitrariness
Every State action must be informed by reason and guided by public interest.105 It follows that
an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary.106The classification for achieving specific ends
should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible differentia,
some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped together
in the class from others left out of it.107
In the case at hand, the practices, traditions and customs of the Tenji Temple in Tenjiku are
based on the celibate nature of the deity. There exist temples of similar nature where restrictions
exist on men with respect to their entry and participation in festivals celebrating Female
Deities.108 The instant differentiation of women in the age of 10 to 50 years is in relation to the
aforesaid reason. The sub-classification is not arbitrary and has a rational nexus with respect to
the object sought to be achieved.109
The law laid down under this Article is an anti-discriminative110law that prevents any
discrimination on the part of the State on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them.111 The judgment in Kathi Raning Rawat,112 gives a clear picture in extrapolating
the real sense of discrimination in which it was observed that ‘Discrimination thus involves an
element of unfavorable bias in any public place and it is in that sense that the expression has to
be understood in this context.’113
Any discrimination which is based solely on the grounds that a person belongs to a particular
race or caste or professes a particular religion or was born at a particular place or is of a
105
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, Bombay Port, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1642; L.I.C. v. Escorts,
A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370; L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1811; M.S.
Bhut Education Trust v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 2000 Guj. 160 (India).
106
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 625 (India).  
107
Vasant Abaji Mandke v. The State of Maharashtra,1979 (81) BomLR 542 (India).
108
APPENDIX 3.
109
Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam and Ors. v. The Election Commission of India, A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 2191;
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C.; New Okhla Industrial Development v. Arvind
Sonekar, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1983; Rajpal Sharma v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1623 (India).
110
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. U.O.I, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1 (India).
111
INDIAN CONST. art. 15 , cl.1.
112
KathiRaningRawatv.Saurashtra (1952) S.C.R. 435 (India).
113
B.RAMASWAMYHUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 85 (1st ed., Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd. 2002).

particular sex and on no other ground is a violation of Art. 15 unless it is based on one or more
of these grounds and also on other grounds is not hit by the Article. 114 The significance of the
word ‘only’ in Art.15 is that, other qualifications being equal the race, religion etc. of a citizen
shall not be a ground of preference of disability.115 Additionally, in Anuj Garg and Ors. v.
Hotel Association of India and Ors.116 and Charu Khurana and Ors. v. U.O.I and Ors.,117 the
Court held that gender bias alone in any form is opposed to the constitutional norms.
Art. 15 (2) prohibit subjection of a citizen to any disability, liability, restriction or condition on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth with regards to-
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public

entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing Ghats, roads and places of public resort
maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of
the general public.118
And, Article 15(3) does not prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children respectively.119
A challenge to a law on the ground that it violated Art.15 or any other Article must be pleaded
and proved to succeed, if a person fails to establish a right he will fail to establish a violation
of fundamental right.120 Without the infringement of a right, there cannot be a violation of Art.
15.121
Temples were consciously deleted from draft Art. 9 (Art.15 of Indian Constitution) since the
Constituent Assembly did not consider it fit to include temples along with places of public
resort where no citizens are subject to discrimination on the basis of the prohibited grounds122.
114
Smt. Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 825 (India). INDIAN WOMEN: LAW AND
POLICY IN INDIA, Pankaj Kakde, Journal of Centre For Social Justice, Issue 1, (2014) pp.59-76
115
ChampakamDorairajanand Ors. v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120 (India).
116
Anuj Garg and Ors. v. Hotel Association of India and Ors, (2008) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India).
117
CharuKhurana and Ors v. U.O.I and Ors, (2015) 1 S.C.C. 192 (India).
118
WOMEN EMPOWERMENT AND GENDER JUSTICE, Dipak Mishra J.,(2014) 6 SCC (J) pp. J6 – J26
119
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES CONFRONTING WOMEN:THEIR MARGINALIZATION
AND REALITIES, Vindhya Gupta, Journal Of Centre For Social Justice, Issue 1, (2014) pp.01-08
120
D.D BASU’S, COMMENTARY ON ‘THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA’ 680 (8 th ed., Lexis Nexus 2008)
121
In re Thomas, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 21 (India).
122
Vol. No. VII, Constituent Assembly Debates, Amendment No. 301 p. 650-664.

Furthermore, the fact that the expression ‘and public place of public resort’ is added to a
specific enumeration of ‘wells, tanks, bathing Ghats, roads’123 indicates that the expression is
to be interpreted by the rule of ejusdem generis.124 Hence, for the same reason religious
institutions and places of public worship appear to be excluded from the purview of Art.15 (2)
and that is why separate provision in Articles 25 (2) (b) at 26 (b) were needed.125 Thus
petitioners cannot claim the right under 15(2) in case of religious institutions and places of
public worship, and hence they cannot plead a violation of the right guaranteed under Art.15.
Moreover, there is no infringement of Art. 15(3) as ‘special provisions’126 for women and
children can be made only by the State acc. to Art.15.127 So, the petitioners’ argument on
violation of Art.15(3) cannot be entertained by this Court as the rules were framed by the Tenji
board, which is neither State nor a State entity under Art.12128.129 Therefore, it is humbly
submitted that there is no breach of Art.15(2) or 15(3) as temples are not considered a public
place and it is not the state who has formulated the rules on special provisions for women and
children respectively.
3.3. The said restriction does not violate Article 17 of the Constitution
‘Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any
disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with
law.’130Art. 17 of the Constitution131gives expression to equality in abolishing untouchability:
a practice fundamentally at odds to the notion of an equal society.132In the light of the facts and
circumstances of the present case, it becomes imperative to analyse the scope of ‘any form ’.
According to the Black's Law Dictionary133 the word 'any' is defined as: ‘Any, some; one out
of many; an indefinite number; one indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity; one or some
(indefinitely).”The word ‘any’134 indicates “all” or “every” as well as “some” or “one”
123
KHWAJA.A.MUNTAQIM, EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN & GENDER JUSTICE IN INDIA 415 (3 rd ed.,
Law Publishers 2011).
124
State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1126 (India).
125
D.D. BASU’S, COMMENTARY ON ‘THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA’,2735 (8 th ed., Lexis Nexus 2008).
126
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijay Kumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648 (India).
127
M. P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 937 (7 th ed., Lexis Nexis 2016).
128
INDIAN CONST. art.12.
129
D.L. KEIR & AMP, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (4th ed., Oxford University Press 1979).
130
DR.J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 237 (51 sted., Central Law Agency 2018).
131
State v. Gulab Singh, A.I.R. 1953 All 483 (India).
132
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors., (2002) 8 S.C.C. 106 (India).
133
Black's Law Dictionary 64 (6th ed.).
134
LAW LEXICON, P. RAMANATHA AIYAR 116 (2 nd ed.).

depending on the context and the subject matter of the statute as laid down in Shri. Balaganesan
Metals v. M. N. Shanmukhan Chetti and Ors.135 Relying on the Principles of Statutory
Interpretation136,
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to

dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in
common parlance. However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of
a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule
that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their
colour from the context in which they appear.137
The intent with which the Article is embedded in the Constitution needs to be analysed. The
Constitutional Assembly Debates138 elucidate that the practice of “untouchability” 139
is a
symptom of the caste system.140 The subject-matter of Art.17141 is not untouchability in its
literal or grammatical sense142 but “as it had developed historically143 in this country”.144
Interpreting the same on the present facts and circumstances will fall foul under the literal rule
of interpretation.145 Moreover, in Devarajiah v. Padmanna146, the Court held that exclusion of
few individuals from worship, religious services etc., is not within the contemplation of
Art.17147:
Comprehensive as the word ‘ untouchables148’ in the Act is intended to be, it

can only refer to those regarded as untouchables in the course of historical
development. A literal construction of the term would include persons who
are treated as untouchables either temporarily or otherwise for various
reasons, such as their suffering from an epidemic or contagious diseases or
on account of social observances such as are associated with birth or death or
on account of social boycott resulting from caste or other such disputes.149
135
Shri. Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. Shanmukhan Chetti and Ors., (1987) 2 S.C.C. 707 (India).
136
G.P. SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 302 (9 th ed., Lexis Nexis 2004).
137
E.A. DRIEDGER, “A NEW APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION”, 31 Canadian Bar
Review, at 838, (1951).
138
ANNEXURE 1.
139
Jai Singh v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1993 Raj. 177; State of M.P v. Ram Krishna Bolathia, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1198 (India).
140
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Government of Maharashtra, Vol. 1 (2014), at pages 5-6.
141
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Purachand, A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 352 (India).
142
H. M. SEERVAI, CONCEPT OF INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 320 (3 rd ed., Universal Law Publishing
Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2010).
143
Dr. Ambedkar’s Paper “Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development”, 1916.
144
M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1008 (7 th ed., Lexis Nexis 2014).
145
Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Clark and Finnelly 85 (Foreign).
146
Devarajiah v. Padmanna, A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 35, 39 (India).
147
I.L.I., MINORITIES AND THE LAW, 143-170 (1972).
148
SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2nded. Clarendon Law Series Book House, 2012).
149
Jai Singh v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1993 Raj. 177 (India).

In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale150, the origin of untouchability was traced. It was
sought to establish a new ideal for society by bestowing equality to the Dalits, and ensuring
absence of disabilities, restrictions or prohibitions on grounds of caste or religion, availability
of opportunities and a sense of being a participant in the mainstream of national life.151
It should be duly noted that such kind of gender untouchability152 is not practised in the light
of Rule 3(b). Women of a notified age group are not allowed to enter the temple and such
restriction was based on the unique characteristics of the deity, instead of any social exclusion.
The analogy sought to be drawn by comparing the rights of Dalits with reference to the entry
of women is wholly misconceived and unsustainable. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that
there is no violation of Art.17 of the Constitution.
Art. 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law.153 The expression ‘procedure established by law’ means
procedure laid down by statute or procedure prescribed by the law of the state. 154 Right to life
includes the right to live with human dignity.155 The right to life guaranteed under Art.21 of
the Constitution embraces within its sweep not only the physical existence but the quality of
life156.157
Concededly, fundamental rights are not absolute158.159 The Constitution itself permits the State
to impose reasonable restrictions on these rights under certain circumstances. Nariman J. has
observed that ‘When it comes to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which
the right relates must be scrupulously followed’. In the recent seven bench judgement of K.S.
150
State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale 1995 Supp. (4) S.C.C. 469 (India).
151
TARUNABH KHAITAN, THE THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 35 (1 st ed., Replika Pvt. Ltd, 2015).
152
MARC GALANTER, Caste Disabilities and Indian Federalism, 3 JILI, 205 (1961).
153
Bhagavathi J., Maneka Gandhi v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597(India).
154
Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1570(India).
155
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory Delhi, Administrator, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746 (India); Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Corporation, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 (India).
156
Confederation of Ex- Servicemen Associations v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 2945 (India).
157
M. C. JAIN KAGZI, KAGZI’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 94 (7 th ed., Universal Law Publishing 2014).
158
Subramanian Swamy v. U.O.I and Ors., MANU/SC/0621/2016 (India).
159
KAILASH RAI, INDIAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 130 (5th ed., Allahabad Law Agency
2016).

Puttuswamy v. U.O.I.160, J. DY Chandrachud observed that there should be a law enacted by

the State to right to privacy. He also stated that:
1. No person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The existence of law is an essential requirement.
2. There is a requirement of a legitimate state aim, for any law to impose restrictions.
Hence, there should be a law enacted by the State in order to violate any fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution. In the instant case, the State has neither enacted any law nor is
there a legitimate State aim. The Tenji Board is not a State entity and their rules cannot be
violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Interpreting these principles of Aadhar161 judgement in the present case, it can be observed that
(i) there is no law to justify an encroachment on physiological factors under Art.21; (ii) there
is no question of legitimate State aim.162 Thus, the State has not caused any violation of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 21.
Moreover, there has been no violation of other inter-related fundamental rights under Articles
14, 15 and 17 of the Constitution of Indiana in the present case. There is no harm to petitioner’s
dignity163 or personal liberty164 under Art. 21 of the Constitution in the case at hand.
Therefore, the said restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age does not
amount to violation of Articles 14, 15(3) and 17 in light of Rule 3(b) of Tenjiku Hindu
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules.
160
J.K.S. Puttuswamy v. U.O.I, (2017) 1 SCC 10 (India).
161
Aadhar case: J.K.S. Puttuswamy v. U.O.I, MANU/SC/1054/2018 (India).
162
Id at 141.
163
Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470 (India); Ram Narayan Agarwal v. State of
U.P., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1213 at p. 367(India).
164
M.P Singh “The Constitutional Principles of Reasonableness” (1987); P.K. Tripathi: “The Fiasco of Overruling
A.K. Gopalan” (1990).

IV. THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUSION OF WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN ‘ESSENTIAL

ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE RIGHT TO
MANAGE ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION.
It is humbly submitted that the practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential

practice’ protected under Art. 25 of the Constitution for it is a part of religion. Moreover,
devotees of Lord Tenji can be said to constitute a separate religious denomination under Art.
26 and have a right to manage their own affairs. The submission for the same is two-fold in
nature:
4.1. The practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential religious practice’

protected under Article 25 of the Constitution
Art. 25 of the Constitution165 guarantees the right to freedom of religion.166 Though the term
religion is not defined in the Constitution,167 the Judiciary in various judgments has interpreted
it as:
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it
might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are
regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observations might extend
even to matters of food and dress168.
4.1.1 Test of essential religious practices – what can be classified as essential or not
Certain practices which can be said to be integral or essential to a particular religion cannot be
interfered with. The doctrine of determining such practices was first articulated in the Shirur
Mutt case169 wherein the Court was asked to resolve the competing claims of a leader of a
165
INDIAN CONST. art.25 cl.1.
166
M. LAXMIKANTH, INDIAN POLITY 52 (4th ed., MC Graw Hill 2016).
167
H. M. SEERVAI, CONCEPT OF INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed., Universal Law Publishing Co.
Pvt. Ltd. 2010).
168
Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282;
Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 S.C.C. 11; S.P Mittal v. U.O.I, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1 (India).
169
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,
A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).

religious order and a state actor authorized to participate in the regulation of religious
institutions.170 The Court clearly propounded that:
What constitutes the essential part of a religion—and what was thus beyond
the purview of the state—is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the
doctrines of that religion itself.171
It is, thus, clear that the ‘essential’ aspects of religion include rituals and practices as well as
beliefs172, and that the views of believers are inherently relevant to this analysis.173 In the
present case as well, a watertight distinction does not exist with regard to what may be essential
or not. It has to be understood in light of the tenets of Hinduism as well as the belief of the
followers and believers of Lord Tenji.
The Court in Ananda Margi II case extended this concept to more than the very real possibility
of textual arbitrage and said that ‘alterable parts or practices are definitely not the core of
religion.’174 Only the foundational core of a religious tradition could be considered essential.175
Consequently, the protection of the doctrine can be claimed if it is shown to be so fundamental
to the religious belief without which the religion will not survive.176
In the instant case, the whole belief and value of the existence and continuance of the temple
rests on the cornerstone of Lord Tenji being a Naishtika Brahmachari. If this is altered, the
core of the religious belief of the Himaya temple will crumble, resulting in danger to the very
survival of the temple.
The 1991 decision, Mahendran v. TDB,177 of the Kerala High Court has defined the scope of a
selective ban on women worshippers by its ruling that the ban was an essential practice keeping
in mind the customs or usages of the temple and that it did not violate Articles 25, or 26 of the
170
Jaclyn L. Neo, Definitional Imbroglios: A Critique of The Definition Of Religion And Essential Practice Tests
In Religious Freedom Adjudication, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW 574-595 (2018).
171
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
172
RONJOY SEN, ARTICLES OF FAITH RELIGION, SECULARISM AND THE INDIAN SUPREME
COURT 73 (4th ed., Oxford India Publishing House 2014).
173
MADHAV KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 435 (1 st ed., Oxford University Press 2012).
174
Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda (Ananda Margi II), C.A. No. 6230 of 1990 (India).
175
Deepa Das Acevedo, God’s Homes, Men’s Courts, Women’s Right, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AND
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 52-128 (2018).
176
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, A.I.R. 1984 S.C.R. (1) 447 (India).
177

Constitution, hence, giving it a protected status.178 This can be very well applied in the present
case, due to the similarity of the factual matrix.
Additionally, the impugned practise cannot be held to be exclusionary in as much as the females
are not excluded from worship. Females before the age of 10 and after the age of 50 are eligible
to worship Him. Hence, the delay or wait of 40 years to worship cannot be considered as
exclusionary but merely regulatory.179
4.1.2. Power or authority to decide what is an essential religious practice
With respect of the determination of such practice to be essential or not, the law laid down till
date by this very Court180 also requires the Court to rigorously and dispassionately examine the
origin and basis of an impugned religious practice by examining the background of the temple
and the evidence by the Thanthri of the Temple.181
Idol worship is an essential religious practice
It is submitted that idol being the essential feature of Hinduism182, the welfare of the idol and
the maintenance of the same also becomes an integral essential feature of Hinduism.183
Additionally, an Idol is recognized, legally as a minor.184
The welfare of the idol could only be determined by its ‘parents/ guardian’ and the belief of
the worshippers of the idol.185 As per the religious texts and the judicial interpretations,
Thanthri happens to be the father of the idol. Thus, the welfare of the idol is determined by the
decision of the Thanthri. The 1991 Tenjiku judgment gave due consideration to the evidence
given by the Himaya Thanthri who observed that the impugned custom and usage is supposed
178
Marc Galanter, Hinduism, Secularism, And The Indian Judiciary, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS, Vol.21
No.4 467-487 (2019).
179
Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006.
180
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, 1954 A.I.R. 282; Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State ofBombay,1962 A.I.R. 853; and
Tilkayat Shri Govinda/jiMaharajv. State of Rajasthan, (1964) 1 S.C.R. 561 (India).
181
182
Deepa Das Acevedo, Secularism In The Indian Context, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
Vol 38, Issue 1 pp-138-167
183
Definitional Imbroglios, supra note 171.
184
A.B. Princeton, Temples, Courts, And Dynamic Equilibrium In The Indian Constitution, UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO 32-98 (2013).
185
Indian Young Lawyers Association, supra note 180

to be adhered to for the welfare of the temple.186 The same has been blatantly ignored in the
present case.
In the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore &Ors., it was observed
by the Court as follows:
The Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and their worship at home
and in temples is ordained as a certain means of attaining salvation.187
The deity at the Himaya temple is in the form of Naishtika Brahmachari (eternal celibate),
distinct from the idols installed in thousands of other Tenji temples in different parts of the
country.188
With respect to Art.25(1), it is submitted that the worshippers of Lord Tenji are entitled to the
freedom of conscience, and the right to profess, practise and propagate their religion. The right
to profess their faith by worshipping at the Tenji Temple, can be guaranteed only if the
character of the deity as a ‘Naishtika Brahmachari’ is preserved. If women between the age of
10 to 50 years are permitted entry, it would result in changing the very character/nature of the
deity, which would directly impinge on the right of the devotees to practise their religion
guaranteed by Art. 25(1) of the Constitution.
The ceremonial laws pertaining to temples as to who is entitled to enter into them for worship
and where they are entitled to stand and worship and how the worship is to be conducted are
all matters of religion.189 It is the custom among all Hindus that women during menstrual
periods do not go to temples or participate in religious activity,190 thus the custom comes under
the umbrella of matters of religion. Hindu Scriptures specifically state that menstruating
women should not engage in holy or sacred activities since during menstruation they are in a
temporary state of Asucha191 which itself is a practice that has been followed since centuries.
186
187
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 1999).
188
189
Devaru, supra note 34
190
N.R. Madhava Menon, Thanthra Samuchayam, Why Sabarimala Judgment Warrant Review? KHC (J) pp. J7-
J10 (5) (2018).
191
Angirasa Smriti (Verse 37), WILL ‘SABARIMALA’ BECOME A ‘BALIKERAMALA’ FOR WOMEN? N
Dharmadan, 2018 (5) KHC (J) pp.J52-J56.

Maintaining temples and its spiritual conditions is an integral practice of religion and is
protected under the rights guaranteed by Art.25(1) and Art.26(b).192
In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,193 it was observed that the question is not whether a
particular religious belief or practice appeals to our reason or sentiment, but whether the belief
is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of the profession or practice of religion. Personal
views and reactions are irrelevant. If the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held, it attracts
the protection of Art. 25. 194
Once it is proved or admitted that a particular activity is an essential part of a religion, the Court
cannot further insist that (i) it is being performed from time immemorial;195 or (ii) that the
doctrine involved is sound according to the Court’s opinion; or (iii) that it must be established
as a customary right.196
Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the practice of selective exclusion of women is an
‘essential practice’ protected under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
4.2. The right of a religious institution to manage its affairs in the matters of religion
will prevail in the instant case
The worshippers of Lord Tenji form a religious denomination under Art. 26 and hence can
manage their affairs in matters of religion. The characteristics of a religious denomination can
be witnessed and the said practise of rights is not against public morality.
4.2.1 Characteristics of a religious denomination can be witnessed
A group of devotees or a sect should possess certain characteristics in order to be catogorised

as a religious denomination. In Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa,197 it was held by this
Hon’ble Court that:
The identity of a religious denomination consists in the identity of its

doctrines, creeds and tenets and these are intended to ensure the unity of the
192
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.,1963 A.I.R. 1638, 1964 S.C.R. (1) 561 (India).
193
Bijoe Emmanuel, supra note 42
194
P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14 th ed., Universal Law Publishing 2017).
195
Rana Muneswar v. State, A.I.R. 1976 Pat. 198, ¶ 16, 17, 21 (India).
196
Commr., H.R.E. v. Lakshmindra, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
197
Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1501 (India).

faith which its adherents profess and the identity of the religious views are
the bonds of the union which binds them together as one community. 198
This decision was relied upon in Mahendran case to conclude that the devotees constitute a
denomination.199 It also held that:
A religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the

matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to
the tenets of the religion. No outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere
with the decision of such religious denomination.
Religious maths200, religious sects201, religious bodies, sub-sects or any section thereof202 have
been held to be religious denominations. Therefore, given the distinct identity of the Temple
in the present case, the traditions it subscribes to and the clear markers of identity which
devotees have to observe as Lord Tenji devotees during the period of observance of the vow
and the visit to the Temple, there can be no denying the fact that Tenji devotees do in fact
constitute a religious denomination for the purposes of Art. 26.
Moreover, the continuity of the denomination is possible only by maintaining the bond of
religious discipline which would secure the adherence of its members to certain essentials like
faith, doctrine, tenets and practices.203
4.2.2 The said practise of rights is not against ‘public morality’
The term ‘morality’ may be defined as that which cannot be considered abhorrent to civilized
society, given the mores of the time, by reason of harm caused by way, inter alia, of
exploitation, degradation.204 On skimming through the intentions of makers of the Constitution,
it is understood that right granted under Art. 25 is subject to public morality, public order and
public health. Further, it was stated that ‘morality’ is essentially morality of the public on a
particular period of time and includes growing social and moral conscience of the people.205
198
S.A. PALEKAR, INDIAN CONSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 54 (7 thed. ABD Publishers
2003).
199
Mahendran, supra note 50.
200
Shirur Mutt, supra note 46.
201
Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402 (India).
202
Dr. Subramanian Swamyv. State of T.N. &Ors., (2014) 5 S.C.C. 75 (India).
203
Raja BiraKishore v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1501 (India).
204
Sabrimala, supra note 186.
205
Vol. No. VII, Constituent Assembly Debates, Book No. 2, Pg. cited 831,834.

A similar interpretation is to be given by this Hon’ble Court while considering the case at hand
and constitutional morality may not be taken into consideration since, whenever two
constructions are possible, the Court should discard the interpretation which will stultify the
apparent intention of the makers of the Constitution and adopt the one through which the
intention can be implemented.206 Thus, morality has to be construed as public morality.
Constitutional morality in its strictest sense implies strict and complete adherence to the
Constitutional principles as enshrined in various segments of the document.207 Thus, the
conception of constitutional morality is different from that of public or societal morality.
Unlike constitutional morality, the regime of public morality is about the conduct of society
determined by popular perceptions existing in society.208 In the instant case, public morality is
to be elucidated with respect to the public will and their moral sense of the public.
Further, the morality as envisioned in Arts. 25 and 26 is never intended to cover constitutional
morality. It cannot be forgotten that doing so would bring in, through the back door, the other
provisions of Part III of the Constitution, which Art.26 is not subject to.209 If the term morality
was to be given such a wide definition like constitutional morality then there was no necessity
of adding a special provision that, the rights under Art. 25 are subject to other rights of Part III.
210
Thus, the given custom which temporarily prohibits women has been followed since time
immemorial and in no sense, is against public morality. The said proposition can also be said
to be in violation of the very preamble to the Constitution which guarantees to all citizens
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship.211
In light of all these arguments, it is humbly submitted that the position envisaged by the
Petitioners is absolutely untenable and irrational, if not perverse. The practice of selective
exclusion of women is an ‘essential practice’ protected under Art. 25 of the Constitution for it
206
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 S.C.R. 889 (India).
207
Government of N.C.T.of Delhi v. U.O.I and Ors, 232 (2016) D.L.T. 196(India).
208
Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. U.O.I and Ors, A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 432 (India).
209
Indian Young Lawyers Association, supra note 180.
210
SUBHASH.C. KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA’S CONSTITUTION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (22nd ed., National Book Trust 2011).
211
The Constituion of India, Preamble.

is a part of religion.212 Moreover, devotees of Lord Tenji can be said to constitute a separate
religious denomination under Art. 26 and have a right to manage their own affairs.
Therefore, the practice of excluding such women constitutes an ‘essential religious practice’
under Article 25 and the religious denomination can asserts a claim in that regard under the
umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.
***
212
Jaclyn L. Neo, Definitional Imbroglios: A Critique Of The Definition Of Religion And Essential Practice Tests
In Religious Freedom Adjudication, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW 574-595 (2018).

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 XXVII
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts used, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to adjudge and declare that:
I. The Petition filed before this Hon’ble Court needs to be dismissed.

II. The Apex Court has limited jurisdiction in defining the boundaries of religion in public
spaces.
III. Directions should not be given to take away the restriction imposed on the women and
children of a certain age as it does not amount to the violation of their fundamental
rights in light of Rule 3(b) of Tenjiku Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization
of Entry) Rules to enter the Himaya Temple.
IV. The practice of excluding such women constitutes an ‘essential religious practice’ under
Article 25 and the institution can assert a claim in that regard under the umbrella of the
right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion.
The Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which has been respectfully submitted,
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

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XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW 2019 I

TEAM CODE: ALS-01

XII AMITY ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, LUCKNOW, 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

PIL UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

THE INDIANA YOUNG LAWYER ASSOCIATION & ORS.

UNION OF INDIANA & ORS. ……...RESPONDENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

1.1 The Petitioners have the Locus standi but it is flouted- - - 1

II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS LIMITED JURISDICTION IN DEFINING BOUNDARIES OF

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

2.3 Religion falls under custom and usage in Article 13 - - - 7

IV. THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTE AN ‘ESSENTIAL

4.1 The practice of selective exclusion of women is an ‘essential religious

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

SL. ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSION

3. A.I.R. All India Reporter

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

24. J.L.J. Jabalpur Law Journal

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

(A.) Books Referred

1. ARVIND P.DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 1

2. CHAUDHARY, LAW OF WRITS (1st ed., Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 2

4. D.L. KEIR &AMP, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4thed., 17

5. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (2nd ed., 20

6. H. M. SHEERVAI, CONCEPT OF INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18

7. J. N PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (53rd ed., 2

8. KAILASH RAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (11th ed., 3,15

9. M. C. JAIN KAGZI, KAGZI’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (7th ed., 15

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

10. M. LAXMIKANTH, INDIAN POLITY, (4th ed., MC Graw Hill, 18

11. M. P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed., Lexis Nexis, 17

12. MADHAV KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1st ed., Oxford 19

18. N. SHUKLA CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (4th ed., Lexis Nexis, 1

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

23. JUSTICE B. P. BANERJEE, WRIT REMEDIES (6th ed. Lexis 6

25. P. ISHWARA BHATT, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS - A STUDY OF 21

26. V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS (1st ed. Eastern Book 1

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

KHWAJA.A.MUNTAQIM, EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN & 17

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

(B.) Articles and Journals

SL No : ARTICLES AND JOURNALS Page No:

1. Pankaj Kakde, Indian Women: Law and Policy In India, 17

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

(C.) Table of Cases

SI CASES CITATION PAGE NO.

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

17. Champakam Dorairajan and Ors. v. A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120 16

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

33. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi v. (2016) 232 D.L.T. 196 24

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

53. M. Nagaraj v. U.O.I A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 71 10

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

70. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. A.I.R 1979 S.C. 131 3

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

89. State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952) 1 S.C.R. 889 23

Written Submission on behalf of the Respondents

108. V.K. Naswa v. Home Secretary, U.O.I (2012) 2 S.C.C. 542 9

SL CASE CITATION Page

2 Bilston Corp. v. Wolverhampton Corp. (1942) 2 All E.R. 447 8