Argumentation and Advocacy

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A General Theory of the Counterplan

Allan J. Lichtman & Daniel M. Rohrer

To cite this article: Allan J. Lichtman & Daniel M. Rohrer (1975) A General Theory of the
Counterplan, Argumentation and Advocacy, 12:2, 70-79, DOI: 10.1080/00028533.1975.11951070

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.1975.11951070

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 A GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer
INTRODUCTION
NCREASINGLY, the practice of aca-
I demic debate is being integrated
wiLh modern methods of policy analy-
sis.1 Debaters and coaches now employ
such sophisticated behavioral concepts
as systems models, statistical inference,
and cost-benefit analysis. 2 Unfortunately,
formal debate theory tends to lag be-
hind the actual practice of competitive
debate. More effort is required to synthe-
size traditional argumentation theory
and the techniques developed by con-
temporary scholarship for the analysis
of public policy.
The present study uses concepts drawn
from decision theory to establish criteria
for identifying competitive policy pro-
posals-that is, policy suggestions which
rival each other to the extent that ac-
*We wish to thank James J. Unger of
Georgetown University for his invaluable criti-
cisms of earlier drafts of this paper.
Allan J. Lichtman is an Assistant Professor
of Historv at The American University, and
Daniel M. Rohrer is the Director of Forensics
at Boston College.
1 Bernard Brock, James F- Klumpp, James
W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, Public
Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and
Comparative Advantages Debate. (New York:
Harper & Row, 1973), p. 3; "Implications of a
Systems Model of Analysis on Argumentation
Theory," ]AFA, ll (1974); Klumpp, "Debate
as a Paradigm for Comparing Alternative
Policy Options," Paper Tead at Speech Com-
munication Association of America Convention,
Chicago, Ill., Dec. 30, 1974.
2 Allan f. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer,
"Presumption and Burden of Proof: A Reevalu-
ation," Issues, 7 (1974); "Beyond Presumption
and Burden of Proof: New Rules for Policy
Decisions," Issues, 8 (1974); these articles are
reprinted in an anthology edited by David
Thomas and published by National Textbook
Company in the summer of 1975; similar ver-
sions appear in: Robert Branham, ed., The
New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate
Theory (Wash., D.C.: Information Research
Associates, 1975).
ceptance of one is tantamount to rejec-
tion of the other. This formulation has
obvious relevance to formal debate
where an affirmative advocate is charged
with upholding a particular policy posi-
tion and a negative advocate may defend
the present system or propose a "counter-
proposal" or "counterplan." But the rel-
evance of this study extends beyond the
boundaries of formal debate to all vari-
ants of policy dispute_3
Traditional theory approaches the
problem of recognizing competitive poli-
cy suggestions through its analysis of
the counterplan response to proposals
for changing the status quo_ Paradoxi-
cally, standards set forth by theorists
wedded to traditional concepts of argu-
mentation may serve both to confuse the
conscientious advocate and to restrict
unreasonably the scope of argumenta-
tion_ This article sets forth new criteria
for competitive policy proposals that
derive from a model of academic debate
based upon contemporary techniques of
policy analysis rather than from the tra-
ditional "problem-solution" approach.
These criteria assist in clarifying coun-
terplan theory, serve to reconcile debate
practice and theory, and help reveal the
full scope and power of the counterplan
as a tactic of argumentation_
TRADITIONAL THEORY
The traditional theory of the counter-
plan is based upon the old "problem-
3 Formal debate is distinguished by the fact
that competing advocates are charged with
the responsibility to affirm or negate a particu-
lar debate resolution. In this type of argumenta-
tion, negative counterplans must, of course, lie
outside the boundaries of the debate resolution.
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
solution" approach to policy analysis.
According to Brock, Klumpp, et al., the
"problem-solution" approach entails a
five-stage process of analysis: " (1) (Dis-
covery of) a felt difficulty, (2) location
and definition of the difficulty, (3) sug-
gestion of possible solution, (4) develop-
ment by reasoning of the bearings of the
suggestion, (5) further observation and
experiment leading to its acceptance or
rejection. " 4
In this view an advocate advancing a
counterplan assumes the validity of the
problems cited by the affirmative presen-
tation. But rather than admit that the
affirmative plan offers an optimal solu-
tion to these problems, the negative de-
bater argues for the adoption of a
counter-proposal which differs from both
the present system and the debate reso-
lution. To sustain this strategy the nega-
tive must contend that its counterplan
provides a better solution to the prob-
lems under indictment than does the
affirmative proposal. In fact, the negative
is virtually required to admit the affirma-
tive "need" or "problem" and to restrict
its argumentation to other areas of the
affirmative case. Consider the presenta-
tion of Douglas Ehninger and Wayne
Brockriede, two of the nation's most re-
spected authorities on debate theory:
. . . the negative may present a counterplan.
If he employs this kind of case, he can admit
that serious problems inherent in the present
policy demand a change of some sort, but argue
that his counterplan would be superior . . .
When a counterplan is advanced, the "need"
issue drops out of the controversy and issues
are raised in the other two stock issues. Which
of the two proposals is more practicable? Which
of the proposals en tails the fewest serious dis-
advantages?
. . • the affirmative selects the ground of
argumentation in the stock issues of "need"
and "remedy", and the negative adapts his
arguments to those the affirmative has initiated.
Only in the "disadvantages" stock issue may
4 Brock, et. al., 3.
71
the negative select the terrain by initiating the
arguments . . .5
This exegesis of the counterplan was
useful so long as policy analysis was dom-
inated by the "problem solution" ap-
proach and argumentation by the cor-
responding "stock issues" of need, prac-
ticality, and disadvantages. But it pro-
vides little assistance for the practicing
debater or the real-world- advocate in an
era when policy analysis is increasingly
based upon the new insights of decision
theory and when debaters increasingly
confront formats, such as the compara-
tive advantages or criteria case, in which
there is no clear dividing line between
the traditional stock issues. 6 Moreover,
5 Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede,
Decision by Debate N.Y.: Dodd, Meade, (1963),
243-44; see also: Roger E. Nebergall, "The
Negative Counterplan, ST, 6 (1957), 217-20;
Wayne N. Thompson, "The Effect of a Counter·
plan Upon the Burden of Proof," CSS], 13
(1962), 247-50; Glen E. Mills, Reason in Con-
t:roversy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1964), 69, 178;
Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate
(Belmont, C.A.: Wadsworth, 1971), 236-239;
Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate (Skokie, Ill.:
National Textbook Company, 1958), 28-30, 121-
24; C. William Colburn, Strategies for Educa-
tional Debate (Boston: Holbrook, 1972), 157-
59; Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate (N.Y.:
McGraw-Hill, 1950), 38-40, 55-56, 140, 365.
6 For examples of such formate see: L. Dean
Fadely, "The Validity of the Comparative Ad-
vantages Case," ]AFA, 4 (1967), 28-35; Bernard
L. Brock, "The Comparative Advantages Case,"
ST, 15 (1967),118-123; James W. Chesebro, "The
Comparative Advantages Case," ]AFA, 4 (1958),
57-63; David Zarefsky, "The Traditional Case-
'Comparative Advantage Case' Dichotomy: An-
other Look," ]AFA, 4 (1969), 12-20; John F.
Cragan and Donald C. Shields, "The 'Compara-
tive Advantage Negative,'" ]AFA, 5 (1970), 85-
91; David A. Thomas, "Response to Cragan
and Shields; Alternative Formats for Negative
Approaches to Comparative Advantage Cases,"
]AFA, 7 (1972), 201-206; Allan J. Lichtman and
Daniel M. Rohrer, "Role of the Criteria Case
in the Conceptual Framework of Academic
Debate," Parts I-V, Issues, 3 (1970), reprinted
in: Donald R. Terry, ed., Modern Debate Case
Techniques, (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook
Company, 1970), 20-61; Clark D. Kimball, "Is
There a Rationale Criteria Case?" Issues, 4
(1970), 11-16, reprinted in: Terry ed., Modern
Debate Case Techniques, 62-78; James W. Chese-
bro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case,"
]AFA, 7 (1971), 298-315; David A. Thomas, "The
Criteria Case," Issues, 4 (1971), 1-]; .John D.
Lewinski, Bruce R. Metzler and Peter L. Settle,
"The Goal Case Affirmative," ]AFA, 9 (1973),
72 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
conventional theory needlessly restricts
the set of permissible counterplans to
those which provide superior solutions
to the problems set forth in the affirma-
tive case. A clearer and more cogent
theory of the counterplan can be devel-
oped through a model of argumentation
that incorporates both modern methods
of policy evaluation and the contempo-
rary practice of academic debate.
DEBATE AS A COMPARISON OF
PoLICY SYSTEMS
Counterplan theory exemplifies the
most fundamental defect of the tradi-
tional approach to argumentation. The
conventional wisdom focuses our atten-
tion upon particular problems and their
solution. It neither enables us to en-
vision the full range of alternative policy
actions nor provides criteria for choosing
among them.
Both the logic of comparative advan-
tages and of contemporary decision
theory indicate that policy argument is
an attempt to select the best policy from
the range of available options. The com-
parative advantages format, routinely
'employed by practicing debaters, focuses
argument upon a balance between the
benefits and costs generated by all as-
pects of the affirmative plan and of the
policies defended by the negative. Com-
parison may focus, for example, on the
extent to which alternative policies
achieve desired objectives, the time span
required for their operation, the re-
sources they expend, and their probable
side-effects. Affirmative teams must ad-
vance policies whose acceptance entails
affirmation of the debate resolution,
whereas negative teams are free to sup-
port any non-resolutional alternative.
Assuming, of course, that an affirmative
proposal is indeed a reasonable inter-
458-63; Allan J. Lichtman, Charles Garvin and
Jerome Corsi, "The Alternative-Justification
Affirmative," ]AFA, 10 1973), 59-69.
pretation of the debate resolution, the
outcome of a debate hinges upon wheth-
er or not a rational decision-maker
would support adoption of the affirma-
tive plan and hence adoption of the
proposition as well.7 A negative victory
is warranted only if the affirmative plan
is rejected.
The process of policy argument in-
herently requires a comparison of policy
systems to determine their relative mer-
its.8 Decision theory posits that a policy
proposal (which unlike proposals of fact
or value requires action to be taken) can
be tested only by comparison with al-
ternative policies. A course of action is
affirmed because it is better than all
other possibilities and rejected because it
is not as good as at least one other pos-
sibility. Inevitably, the rejection of one
policy or course of action means the
adoption of another policy or course of
action. Even doing nothing or suspend-
ing judgment is a form of action and
thus a policy. A negative team cannot
merely adopt the position sometimes
known as "straight refutation"-a simple
denial of arguments raised by the affirm-
ative team. In order for comparison to
take place it must defend one or more
alternatives to the policy system advo-
cated by the affirmative. A judge cannot
decide whether or not to adopt a given
policy system without knowledge of
other options.
The insight that actions or policies
must be evaluated on a comparative
basis is formalized by Riker and Orde-
shook in their standard treatise on de-
ductive theories of politics:
7 For clarity, we assume throughout that
the affirmative plan is topical and that the
counterplan is not.
8 A discussion of the controversial question
of whether a negative team may, in a single
debate, de~end multiple alternatives is beyond
the scope of this article. The criteria we pro-
pose for identifying competitive counterplans
do not depend upon the response to this ques·
tion.
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
A person adopts one alternative rather than
another if he believes that the net benefits of
the chosen activity exceed the net benefits of
any alternative activity. Thus, if we let B denote
the benefits of an activity and C its costs, and if
we identify alternatives by subscripts, then al-
ternative i is preferred to alternative k if
Bi-Ci> Bk-Ck and alternative i is chosen if
this inequality is satisfied for all perceived
alternatives to i . . . This condition is fre-
quently simplified incorrectly by asserting that
an activity is chosen if the chooser believes
that the benefits of the activity exceed its
costs . . . Bi> Ci. Observe, however, that there
may be other activities for which the discrep-
ancy between costs and benefits is greater, in
which case these alternative activities are pre-
ferred and i is not chosen.9
Debate propositions generally propose
alterations in the status quo or present
system that can be concretized in vari-
ous ways. 10 The combination of the al-
tered and unaltered features of the pres-
ent system constitute the new affirmative
policy system. Affirmative teams seek to
demonstrate that the future operation
of their policy system promises greater
net benefits (benefits minus costs) than
the future operation of negative alterna-
tives: the status quo, the status quo with
repairs, or counterproposals that do not
fulfill the debate resolution. 11
9 William H. Rinker and Peter C. Orde-
shook, An Introduction to Positive Political
Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1973), 46-47.
10 If an affirmative actually supported an
existing program, the negative would obviously
be required to advance a counterplan; the
criteria we su~~;gest for identifying competitive
counterplans would remain the same. Even if
the wording of certain propositions technically
permits an affirmative team to defend aspects
of the status quo, it may be wise for academic
debate to consider a "fairness rule" restricting
this practice.
11 A critic might suggest that if we view
the resolution as a normative statement simply
to be affirmed or denied, it might be possible
to reject the resolution on its merits without
the comparison of policy alternatives. Yet, as
Riker and Ordeshook's formal model clearly
demonstrates, the problem with this contention
is that so long as the normative statement is,
in effect, a call for action (as every policy propo-
sition must be) the decision to accept or re-
73
Decision theory stipulates that the net
benefits of any policy system are a func-
tion of both the probability that the sys-
tem will achieve results and the value
placed upon those results. A rational de-
cision-maker seeks a policy which pro-
vides the greatest chance of obtaining
the most desirable consequences. This
precept is succinctly stated by Victor A.
Thompson of the University of Illinois:
It is generally accepted that in the empirical
world we never have certainty .•• we either
have probabilities or no knowledge at all. Thus,
between an alternative and each consequence
is a number expressing the probability (P) of
the consequence occurring . . . Our utility
yardstick comes next and includes our goal.
With this vardstick comes next and includes
our goal. With this yardstick we choose the
alternative that, considering the probabilities,
gives us the best ratio of plus values to minus
values, or of accomplishment to cost, which
means the same thing.l2
Thus, policy disputes pivot upon the
two issues of prediction and evaluation.
The best policy is chosen on the basis of
attempts both to determine the proba-
bilities of possible policy outcomes and
to assess the value of those results. Once
the focus of analysis is shifted from the
comparison of "problem-solutions" to
the comparison of alternative policy sys-
tems it is possible to understand the
substantive deficiencies of traditional
theory and to formulate sound criteria
for the identification of competitive and
non-competitive counterplans.
ject the statement can only be based upon a
wmparison of the net benefits of the proro-
sition with the net benefits of possible alterna-
tives. It is not adequate to examine in isolation
the net benefits of the affirmative plan itself.
12 Victor A. Thompson, "Decision Theory,
Pure and Applied," General Learning Press
(1971); see also, Kurt W. Back, "Decisions under
Uncertainty," The American Behavioral Sci-
entist, 4 (1961); Howard Raiffa, Decision Anal-
ysis (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968); R.
Duncan Luce and Heward Raiffa, Games and
Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957).
74 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
CoMPETITIVE AND NoN-CoMPETITIVE
CouNTERPLANs
Legitimate counterplans must not ful-
fill the affirmative resolution, but they
must be genuinely competitive with the
affirmative plan. Adoption of a counter-
plan must be tantamount to rejecting the
policy system offered by the affirmative
team and hence rejecting the debate res-
olution as well. A counterplan may yield
greater net benefits than an affirmative
plan without providing reasons for re-
jecting the affirmative plan. It may be
possible to adopt both plans and achieve
greater net benefits than would derive
from adoption of the counterplan alone.
Using more familiar debate terms, this
statement expresses the argument that
adoption of the affirmative plan gener-
ates an "additive advantage'' over adop-
tion of the counterplan alone. Under
such circumstances a rational decision-
maker would opt for both the affirmative
plan and the counterplan. An affirmative
victory would then be mandatory since
the negative team would not have ful-
filled its responsibility of opposing the
debate proposition; it would have justi-
fied only adoption of a non-competitive
counterplan in addition to the policy
system fulfiling the proposition.Is
Assume, for example, that a negative
team responds to an affirmative case pro-
13 It is assumed, of course, that decisionmakers
being addressed have the power to put a
counterplan into effect. An individual or gov-
ernmental unit can reasonably be asked to
reject a particular policy if an alternative
promises greater net benefits. If, however, a
counterplan must be adopted by another in-
dividual or unit of government, the initial
decisionmaker must consider the probability
that the counterplan will be accepted. Debate
propositions often affirm that a particular policy
should be adopted by the federal government.
Even if adoption of this policy by the indi-
vidual state governments would be more bene-
ficial, a reasonable critic would still affirm the
r~solution if state adoption were highly un-
likely. The federal government should refrain
from acting only when the net benefits of
state and local action, discounted by the proba-
bility that such action will occur, are greater
than the net benefits of federal action.
posing the elimination of criminal pen-
alties for possession of marijuana with a
counter-proposal of comprehensive
health insurance. Even if the program of
health insurance has greater net bene-
fits than the decriminalization of mari-
juana use, the affirmative could argue
that adoption of the counterplan does
not preclude adoption of the affirmative
plan or render it undesirable. The af-
firmative could then claim that it has ful-
filled its responsibility of upholding a
policy system whose affirmation entails
affirmation of the debate resolution.
Traditional theory suggests that a legiti-
mate counterplan is one which proposes
an alternative solution to the particular
problems cited by an affirmative case. If
the negative solution proves more prac-
tical and entails less serious disadvan-
tages, both the affirmative plan and the
debate proposition should be rejected.
Not only may this criterion generate con-
fusion, but it also fails to rule out all
non-competitive counterplans and ex-
cludes important categories of genuinely
competitive counterproposals.
It is logically possible that a negative
policy system can prove to be a superior
means of achieving affirmative goals
without warranting the rejection of the
affirmative policy system. The best way
to secure common goals may be the
simultaneous adoption of both the af-
firmative plan and the negative counter-
plan. Assume, for example, that an af-
firmative team proposes a program of
public work in order to combat long
term unemployment. The negative team
demonstrates that because significant
numbers of unemployed Americans will
reject public employment, a counterplan
of job creation subsidies to business is
a better way of handling the problem.
Further analysis might reveal, however,
that unemployment is dealt with most
effectively through the adoption of both
the affirmative public work program and
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
the negative program of business subsi-
dies. Again, in this instance, the negative
will have failed to warrant rejection of
the affirmative proposal.
The key to a new theory of the coun-
terplan is the demonstration that a
counterplan is not competitive with an
affirmative plan if simultaneous adop-
tion of the plan and counterplan yields
greater net benefits than adoption of
the counterplan alone. To identify com-
petitiYe counterplans it is necessary only
to specify the conditions under which
adoption of both the plan and counter-
plan does not yield greater net benefits
than singular adoption of the counter-
plan. Fortunately these conditions can be
stated precisely.
A counterplan is competitive with an
affirmative plan if it satisfies either of
two criteria. The first criterion is that
the plan and counterplan are mutually
exclusive. The second criterion is that
simultaneous adoption of the plan and
counterplan, though possible, is less de-
sirable than adoption of the counter-
plan alone. These criteria shift the de-
fining characteristics of compeuuve
counterplans to the negative policy sys-
tem itself and away from the problem
it seeks to resolve. This shift in the defi-
nition of a legitimate counterplan means
that an advocate may claim advantages
in any problem area he chooses, as long
as his counterplan is a genuine rival of
the affirmative proposal. Moreover, in at-
tempting to demonstrate the greater net
benefits of his proposal, the negative is
free to criticize any aspect of affirmative
case development including its indict-
ments of the status quo. By supporting
a counterplan the negative argues in ef-
fect that the present system plus the al-
terations it suggests are superior to the
present system plus the alternations sug-
gested by the affirmative. Any aspect of
the comparison between the counterplan
75
and the affirmative plan is subject to
argumentation in the debate.
First, a counterplan is competitive
with an affirmative plan if the two pro-
posals are mutually exclusive. Clearly if
it is impossible for the counterplan and
the affirmative plan to exist simultane-
ously, adoption of the counterplan
means rejection of the affirmative plan.
If two policy systems cannot coexist, a
decision-maker must choose between
them. In the debate context, an affirma-
tive team cannot claim that simultane-
ous adoption of the plan and counter-
plan is superior to adoption of the coun-
terplan alone if the option of simultane-
ous adoption is unavailable.
A counterplan can fulfill this criterion
of mutual exclusivity without tacitly
conceding affirmative criticisms of the ex-
isting order, and without even dealing
with the problem areas of the affirmative
case. Assume, for instance, that an af-
firmative advocate proposes that all
American troops be withdrawn from
Europe in order to reduce our balance of
payments deficit. The opposition might
offer a counterplan which proposes that
America's European forces be supplied
with chemical and biological weapons in
order to provide a genuinely credible de-
terrent against Soviet aggression. This
counterproposal is not designed to cope
with the balance of payments problem
that concerns the affirmative. But it still
competes with the affirmative plan be-
cause the affirmative and negative pro-
posals cannot coexist. The U. S. cannot
simultaneously strengthen and eliminate
her European troops. Thus the decision-
maker is forced to choose between the
affirmative proposal and the negative
counterproposal. The negative would
support its counterplan by arguing that
the advantages of establishing a credible
deterrent outweigh the advantages
achieved by the affirmative attempt to
reduce the balance of payments deficit.
76 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
The negative would not be obliged to
concede the significance of the inflation
problem cited by the affirmative. On the
contrary, it would be in the negative's
best interest to minimize this problem in
order to create a more favorable com-
parison between the counterplan and
the plan. 14
A counterplan is also competitive with
an affirmative plan if simultaneous adop-
tion of both the counterplan and the af-
firmative plan, though possible, is less de-
sirable than adoption of the counterplan
alone. In this instance the outcome of
a debate pivots on a one-to-one compari-
son of the net benefits achieved by the
plan and counterplan. If the counter-
plan proves superior to the affirmative
plan then only the counterplan should
be adopted. The affirmative plan should
be discarded because the adoption of the
counterplan alone is preferable either
to adoption of the affirmative plan alone
or to simultaneous adoption of the plan
and counterplan.
Again, to fulfill this second criterion,
a counterplan need not concede any as-
pect of the affirmative analysis or even
deal with the problem areas identified by
the affirmative. Assume in this case that
the affirmative proposes a program of
national health insurance costing ap-
proximately $20 billion. The negative
responds with a counterplan calling for
the procurement of a new weapons sys-
tem involving similar costs. The affirma-
tive might reasonably argue that since
adoption of the weapons procurement
program does not preclude adoption of
national health insurance, it is not a
competitive counterplan. The negative
14 In a debate where the negative does not
advocate a counterplan, traditional theory
would permit the negative to argue as a dis·
advantage that withdrawal of our European
forces would undermine our deterrent against
Soviet aggression. The crucial difference, of
course, is that the disadvantage would be
argued with respect to the status quo rather
than with respect to the situation prevailing
after adoption of the counterplan.
could respond, however, that the simul-
taneous adoption of both programs is less
desirable than the adoption of just the
weapons procurement program. It might
argue that whereas the economy could
withstand the expenditures entailed by
either program, the expenditures result-
ing from the adoption of both programs
would lead to runaway inflation and
economic collapse. Thus if the negative
could prove that its weapons procure-
ment program has greater net benefits
than the affirmative program of health
insurance, it would warrant rejection of
the affirmative plan. Again, in seeking to
minimize the advantages flowing from
the affirmative plan, the negative could
attack the affirmative rationale as well as
question the practicality of the affirma-
tive plan and propose plan disadvan-
tages15
Some may fear that this second cri-
terion will unduly tempt negative teams
to concoct counterplans that permit
them to ignore the affirmative case. Yet
the negative has the difficult task of prov-
ing that the counterplan alone is more
desirable than the counterplan and the
affirmative plan taken together. Even
when both proposals entail substantial
expenditures, it does not necessarily fol-
15 One might argue that by permitting op-
possing teams to offer policy proposals in dif-
ferent problem areas we risk the creation of
situations in which there are, in essence, two
affirmative teams and no negative team. Yet re-
gardless of a counterplan's substance, affirma-
tive and negative teams have distinct respon-
sibilities. The gol of the negative team is not
to justify adoption of its conterplan, but to
justify rejection of the affirmative plan. If the
affirmative plan were not rejected, an affirma-
tive victory would be mandatory, irrespective
of the disposition of the counterplan. Given the
three options in a counterplan situation, adop-
tion of the counterplan only, adoption of the
affirmative plan only, and adoption of both the
countcrplan and the affirmative plan. a neg-
ative victory would result only from selec-
tion of the first option. As we have already
indicated, the negative must be prepared to
demonstrate that its counterplan is superior
not only to the affirmative plan, but also to
a combination of the counterplan and the
affirmative plan. (See note 15 for discussion of
a possible fourth option).
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
low that, if highly desirable, they should
not both be adopted. After all, cuts
could be made in less desirable programs.
Thus the negative has a strong incentive
to clash with the affirmative proposal in
order to minimize the benefits and maxi-
mize the costs of the proposal. The af-
firmative has a similar incentive to clash
with the negative counterplan. In cases
where the affirmative spends large sums
for a relatively small net advantage, it is
legitimate for the negative to use the
counterplan strategy to propose alterna-
tive expenditures. Indeed, the formula-
tion of both criteria serves as a check on
the irresponsible use of a counterplan
strategy; they identify for judges and ad-
vocates illegitimate counterplans that
are not genuinely competitive with af-
firmative proposals.
The two criteria proposed in this
study define only the acceptability or
legitimacy of a counterplan. They are
not necessarily dispositive of the out-
come of a debate. If the affirmative team
can show that simultaneous adoption of
its plan and a counterplan is possible
and more desirable than adoption of the
counterplan alone, it has established suf-
ficient reason for not rejecting its pro-
posal regardless of the net benefits of the
counterplan. If, however, the negative
demonstrates that simultaneous adop-
tion of the two plans is either impossible
or less desirable than adoption of the
counterplan alone, it has simply restored
the normal comparative process. The
debate then pivots upon a comparison of
each individual proposal. Only if adop-
tion of the counterplan alone proves
superior to adoption of the affirmative
plan alone is the negative team assured
of victory.
Traditional paradigms of argumenta-
tion, however, do not encompass the
type of advocacy that may result from
the presentation of a competitive coun-
terplan that does not address the a£-
77
firmative problem area. The conven-
tional wisdom essentially recognizes two
forms of argumentation. First, there is
the situation in which one advocate ad-
vances a new policy system and the op-
position defends the status quo. Second,
there is the situation in which both
teams recognize problems in the status
quo and offer alternative means of cop-
ing with these problems. If, however,
competitive policy proposals deal with
distinct areas of concern, then advocates
would be simultaneously arguing for
new policy and defending the present
system.
In this instance, the debate would
pivot on a comparison of the present sys-
tem plus affirmative alterations and the
present system plus the alterations sug-
gested by the counterplan. The operative
comparison would be first, affirmative
plan vs. aspects of the present system un-
altered by the counterplan, and, second,
counterplan vs. aspects of the present sys-
tem unaltered by the affirmative plan.
In developing these comparisons, of
course, advocates would have to consider
the ways in which the affirmative plan
and counterplan interact with ostensibly
unaltered features of the status quo.
Adoption of the counterplan may under-
mine the ability of the existing order to
achieve the goals sought by the affirma-
tive plan, whereas adoption of the affirm-
ative plan may undermine the ability of
the existing order to achieve the goals
sought by the counterplan. Moreover,
adoption of these plans may undermine
the ability of the status quo to achieve
goals not explicitly considered by either
the affirmative or negative case. This
latter type of interaction would be ex-
pressed as plan disadvantages, which may
be directed against both affirmative and
negative proposals.
Assume, once again, that an affirmative
proposal of national health insurance is
opposed by a competitive counterplan
78 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
(criterion #2) advocating adoption of a
new weapons system. In seeking to mini-
mize net benefits of the affirmative plan,
the negative advocate would assume the
traditional role of the negative arguing
that the status quo could achieve affirma-
tive goals, that the affirmative plan could
not achieve these goals, and that the
plan would produce significant disadvan-
tages. In maximizing the net benefits of
its counterplan the negative would then
assume the role of the traditional affirm-
ative, arguing that adoption of the new
weapons system would yield significant
advantages which cannot be realized un-
der the status quo. The affirmative would
now assume the role of the traditional
negative, arguing that the advantages of
the counterplan can be obtained without
the new weapons system, that the weap-
ons system would not even achieve these
advantages, and that it would generate
serious disadvantages. A reasonable de-
cision-maker would opt for whichever
plan proved to have greater net benefits
vis-a-vis the present system.16
Debate becomes even more complex
when a counterplan partly overlaps the
affirmative problem area. In this in-
stance the operative comparisons are a£-
16 Although unlikely in practices, an inter-
esting theoretical problem would arise if ad-
vocacy in a debate demonstrated that the re-
tention of existing policy were superior to
adoption of the affirmative plan, adoption of
the counterplan, or adoption of both plan
and counterplan. If both affirmative and neg-
ative proposals were rejected in favor of main-
taining the status quo, the affirmative would
not have fulfilled its burden of warranting
affirmation of the debate resolution. Yet one
might argue that, in academic debate, a negative
team forfeits its option to defend the status quo
whenever it advances a counterplan. Thus a
negative victory would be justified only if
advocacy demonstrated that the counterplan
should be chosen in preference either to the
affirmative plan or to the affirmative plan and
counterplan combined. In contrast, one might
claim that it would be perfectly legitimate for
the negative (as long- as it avoids substantive
contradictions) to defend in either/or fashion
both the present system and a counterplan.
As noted above, the question of multiple nega-
tive options deserves far more extended discus-
sion than can be offered in this article.
firmative plan vs. present system plus
relevant aspects of the counterplan and
counterplan vs. present system plus rele-
vant aspects of the affirmative plan. In
addition to the roles described m the
previous paragraph, when plans do not
overlap, debaters would also assume the
roles of advocates in a conventional
counterplan debate. Each would attempt
to demonstrate that, in areas of over-
lap, his suggestions offer a superior
means of coping with existing problems.
CoNCLUSION
This new theory of the counterplan
generates criteria for legitimate counter-
plans that can clearly guide advocates
through every argumentative situation.
A negative team offering a counterplan
must be prepared to demonstrate either
that the affirmative and negative plans
are mutually exclusive or that adoption
of both plans is less desirable than adop-
tion of the counterplan alone. Similarly,
an affirmative seeking to argue that a
counterplan is not competitive must dem-
onstrate both that the affirmative plan
and the counterplan can co-exist and
that adoption of the affirmative plan
and counterplan is superior to adoption
of the counterplan alone. Of course, if
an affirmative debater believes that a
negative counterplan is not competitive,
he must explicitly discuss this issue and
not expect the judge to invent the argu-
ment for him.
The theory also enhances the strategic
value of the counterplan approach to
negative argumentation. Since negative
teams need no longer concede the affirma-
tive rationale or address the same prob-
lem areas as the affirmative case, they
can draw upon a much richer store-
house of potential counterplans. Freed
from the artificial constraints of tradi-
tional theory, debaters can far more cre-
atively design competitive alternatives to
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE COUNTERPLAN
affirmative policy systems. As long as
they are indeed competitive, the adop-
tion of negative counterplans can be
justified by any aspect of their compari-
son with the affirmative proposal. Thus
the new theory provides advocates far
greater latitude in the type of argumen-
tation they may employ in support of
a counterplan. They need not regard as
sacrosanct affirmative indictments of the
existing order, and can criticize the af-
firmative case at every level of analysis. 1 7
The types of policy comparisons rend-
ered possible by the present revision of
traditional counterplan theory brings
this theory into closer correspondence
with policy-making in the real world. Di-
verse varieties of decision-makers are
frequently obliged to choose between
competing policy systems designed to
achieve different objectives. In each in-
stance, the policies are competitive be-
cause they satisfy one of the two criteria
set forth above. Government officials
must continually choose between gearing
fiscal and monetary policy to the reduc-
tion of inflation or unemployment. Leg-
islators must regularly decide between
different types of programs (perhaps as
distinct as a program for the procure-
ment of a new missile system and a pro-
gram of comprehensive health insurance)
that cannot all be funded within reason-
17 This argument does not imply that we
advocate the presentation of trivial counter-
plans; under our theory negative teams would
still have to shoulder normal burdens of proof.
~Ioreover, the demonstration that a counter-
plan is competitive with an affirmative plan is
not itself a trivial matter.
79
able budget guidelines. And each day,
every one of us must choose between
spending our time on such ranges of ac-
tivities as attending a concert or social
gathering, reading, working, sleeping,
and eating.
The importance of defining the char-
acteristics of rival policy systems extends
to every forum in which policy alterna-
tives are evaluated. It is essential that
advocates and policy-makers be able to
distinguish between competitive and
non-competitive policy systems. First, if
advocates do not comprehend the proper
criteria for identifying competitive poli-
cy systems, they may mistakenly exclude
from consideration important policy al-
ternatives. Second, cognizance of these
criteria helps decision-makers to avoid
the adoption of contradictory or redun-
dant policy systems. Third, knowledge of
the criteria avoids useless argumenta-
tion over policy systems that are not
genuinely competitive.
This attempt to formulate a new
theory of the counterplan based upon a
systems model of policy dispute has im-
portant implications both for academic
debate and the actual formulation of
policy. It clarifies untapped potential of
the counterplan for competitive debate.
and provides a rational basis for assess-
ing the legitimacy of counterplam. It
thus helps decision-makers to discover
for each situation the full range of policy
alternatives, to avoid meaningless argu-
ments, and to ensure that the process of
argumentation produces the best possi-
ble policy choices.