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Case3 Northlands Ledger (B) Management Style, Strategy, and Performance
Case3 Northlands Ledger (B) Management Style, Strategy, and Performance
ROBERT DEWAR
After his first day on the job in January 2008, Potter never again used his reserved parking
place. Three weeks after becoming the Northlands Ledger’s publisher, he visited Paulus Press
headquarters—owners of the Ledger and the Star—and spoke with the executive vice president in
charge of newspapers about the newspaper’s problems. The executive vice president was
supportive of virtually any change Potter wanted to make, with one condition. The numbers could
slip for only two more years (Potter’s first counted as one) and after that they had better turn
around and do so dramatically. Cash flow had to be positive and the top line had to show real
improvement in all revenue categories.
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NORTHLANDS LEDGER (B) KEL537
now going to be “First Choice.” He wanted the Ledger to be readers’ first choice for news and
information, local advertisers’ first choice for placing their ads, and media professionals’ first
choice for employment. Potter would accept nothing less. Up to this point several of the old
managers thought they were hearing a new version of Allison, who had frequently stated a
mandate (disguised as a mission) and then given orders as to how they were going to carry it out.
Instead Potter appointed a number of task forces headed by members of what he now called his
executive committee—his direct reports. The task forces would work on learning more about
what readers wanted to read, how value could be added to advertisers, customer service for
subscribers and vendors selling the paper, and managing turnover. What surprised the people in
the room was the composition of each task force.
A number of these surveys asked about aspects such as the quality of customer service, new
service initiatives and reader reactions to features, the new emphasis on local content, the
website’s design and ease of use, and changes in the paper’s layout. Potter thought the first
surveys were, quite frankly, awful. They were poorly constructed, elicited less than a 5 percent
response, and were not well analyzed (simple means and percentages were all that was reported).
They also did not generate concrete recommendations. Potter kept encouraging these two task
forces to try something else and after a year, response rates started to increase and useful
information was generated. The task force learned it was a justifiable expense to contract with a
professional survey researcher, that a small sample with a high response rate (over 40 percent)
was worth far more than a large sample that generated an equal number of responses but only a
fifth of the response rate, and that the response rate improved when readers were given
summaries of the results and a report of what action the paper intended to take. This task force
also worked on empowering the customer service reps in the complaint department. At first this
effort was a good feelings program, but as new information became available to those in customer
contact positions, motivation increased and service enhancement and recovery efforts were better
targeted to “gold” customers. These improvements were linked to the “information services
revolution” task force below.
The newsroom added two reader advocate positions. These people took calls and wrote a
report on readers’ reactions to that day’s paper. People drawn from all departments in the paper
staffed these positions on a one-week rotating basis. After three months of a pilot, these new
positions were made permanent. The newsroom also started to focus some reporters on topics
found to be of interest to readers, including local government, national and international disasters,
local lifestyles, local entertainment, and local and national weather.
Advertising sales piloted a key account manager position in which two people were assigned
four large advertising accounts each. This pilot generated several other pilots, the most significant
of which was the “Value Ad” pilot (see below for a description of this task force). The account
manager pilot caused considerable conflict in the paper. These managers attempted to improve
service by telling their peers to shape up, which prompted predictable reactions. Potter halted the
pilot and sent a number of his top sales reps to a training program in relationship selling (for
advertising customers) and relationship building (for peers). Next Potter conducted meetings with
people from other departments and these new account reps so that managers could hammer out
who had responsibility for which decisions that affected an account. A year later the account
manager initiative was still a work in progress.
This was an effort to make the Ledger more valuable to advertisers. Visits were made to the
Star for ideas and many of the Star’s practices were adopted. Essentially the Ledger attempted to
shift from selling space and lines to consultative, relationship-building selling. This pilot was
delayed until Potter’s overhaul of the information services department. But, by the end of the first
year, Ledger sales representatives were able to supply advertisers with national market research
data and data from local consumer surveys done by the Ledger.
This pilot, so named by the task force members and backed by a substantial budget increase
from Potter, started with interviews of other department heads on what support they wanted from
information services. Potter and the task force reviewed and prioritized these. They deemed
acquiring and analyzing data for the use of advertisers the top priority, because of its profit
potential. Second priority was the creation of a reader database that tracked length of
subscription, history of complaints, starts, stops, cancellations, and classified ad placements.
Third priority was the building of capabilities to launch new electronic products and services. The
task force began experimenting in website creation for advertisers and used the Paulus chain’s
resources to start a real estate guide. This guide surpassed guides supplied by national real estate
broker chains because it contained far more local information with each listing, such as average
SAT scores for local high schools. An auto finder was not considered because others already
dominated this area.
Shortly after this the controller took a renewed interest in the information services revolution
task force. He spearheaded its work on account profitability and built systems to communicate
this to all people working with the account. He also spearheaded the development of a subscriber
database so that subscription history, complaints, and any other business the person did with the
paper appeared on the same screen. From this database the controller was able to show the cost of
subscriber acquisition, the cost of retention, and the potential long-term profitability. Customer
service representatives in the complaint department were surprised when they were able to call up
this data while resolving complaints. The screens were color-coded red, green, and gold for both
advertisers and subscribers. Essentially the rule was, “Be nice to everyone, but for a gold screen,
do anything you can.”
The head of human resources first tackled hiring. He involved advertisers in the interviews of
new sales people. He insisted on generating a pool of candidates for each position, on peers being
involved in the hiring interviews, and worked with Potter to make part of each manager’s
incentive compensation contingent on retention and development of good talent.
The new employee orientation program was expanded. New recruits visited all departments
of the paper and then had to make a report on these departments other than the one they were
joining.
As part of his effort to change the culture at the Ledger, Potter began an internal newsletter,
the Sunny North Ledger. The usual announcements of birthdays, anniversaries, and promotions
were in the back. The first three to four pages were filled with reports of the progress of the task
forces and their pilots, increases or decreases in circulation and ad revenues, and stories of reader
and advertiser customer service heroics.
Potter initiated a monthly pizza party during which he awarded the publisher’s prize for
significant customer focused achievements. These prizes were in the form of “Ledger” money.
This currency could be spent at any of the Ledger’s major advertisers. Each prize was worth
$100. Because the paper was a twenty-four hour operation, Potter himself ran a second party at
4:00 a.m. for the late shift of the press, the mailroom, and the circulation district managers.
Besides publisher’s prizes, this party featured doughnuts and coffee instead of pizza.