REBELLION AND DEMOCRACY:

A Study o f Commoners i n the P o p u l a r R i g h t s Movement

of the Early M e i j i Period

by

ROGER WILSON BOWEN

B.A., Wabash C o l l e g e ( I n d i a n a ) , 1969

M.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n , 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Department

We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as conforming

to the r e q u i r e d standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December 1976

Roger W i l s o n Bowen, 1976

In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r

an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that

the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study.

I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s

f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head o f my Department or

by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g o r publication

of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed w i t h o u t my

written permission.

P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Department

The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia
2075 Wesbrook P l a c e
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5.

Date 1° Ou^AjiA,
Research. S u p e r v i s o r : Frank C. Langdon

ABSTRACT,

The t h e s i s i s concerned w i t h t h r e e s o - c a l l e d " i n c i d e n t s o f i n t e n s e

violence" (gekka jiken) t h a t o c c u r r e d between l a t e 1882 and l a t e 1884:

the Fukushima, Kabasan, and C h i c h i b u i n c i d e n t s . A l l three r e v o l t s oc-

c u r r e d simultaneous t o , and were connected w i t h , the r i s e and f a l l o f the

"freedom and p o p u l a r r i g h t s movement" (jiyu minken undo), e s p e c i a l l y w i t h

i t s p r i n c i p a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , the J i y u t o o r " L i b e r a l P a r t y . "

One o f the most important o f the c o n n e c t i o n s between the r e v o l t s and the

Jiyuto i s that of t h e i r overlapping leadership. For the most p a r t , local

J i y u t o l e a d e r s s e r v e d as the l e a d e r s o f these t h r e e r e v o l t s . Due to t h i s

f a c t , and the o t h e r e q u a l l y important one o f the c r i t i c a l e x t e n t t o which

the l o c a l J i y u t o l e a d e r s embraced the i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f the

n a t i o n a l J i y u t o — a s opposed t o the p r a g m a t i c , perhaps cynical, approach

toward these p r i n c i p l e s taken by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p — t h e " n a t u r a l

r i g h t " b a s i s o f the L i b e r a l ' s i d e o l o g y and i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g endorsement

o f the " r i g h t o f r e v o l u t i o n " f i l t e r e d down t o the farmers, h u n t e r s , day-

l a b o u r e r s and o t h e r s who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n these i n c i d e n t s . Notions o f

" n a t u r a l r i g h t " were used as g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s t o govern the aims o f

t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n s and as e x p l a n a t i o n s t o j u s t i f y their

attempts t o overthrow the government. P o p u l a r songs, poems, the c o u r t -

room testimony o f those p a r t i c i p a n t s a r r e s t e d , the content o f t h e i r revo-

l u t i o n a r y m a n i f e s t o s , t h e i r statements o f aims as p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i r

o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c h a r t e r s , the c o n t e n t o f l e c t u r e s g i v e n i n peasant villages,

by l o c a l J i y u t o o r g a n i s e r s , and the l i k e a t t e s t t o the b e g i n n i n g s o f a

s t r o n g l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c u n d e r c u r r e n t e x i s t i n g i n the e a r l y 1880's
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among Japan's common p e o p l e (heimin).

These f i n d i n g s c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n the c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the

e a r l y f a i l u r e o f democracy i n Japan reached by such noted Western

s c h o l a r s as E. H. Norman, Robert S c a l a p i n o , and Nobutaka Ike. This i s

due p a r t l y t o the f a c t t h a t each o f these s c h o l a r s a n a l y s e d Japan's

p o l i t i c s o f t h i s p e r i o d almost e x c l u s i v e l y a t the l e v e l o f n a t i o n a l ,

e l i t e f i g u r e s and t h e r e b y i g n o r e d the impact t h a t the p o p u l a r r i g h t s move-

ment had upon l o c a l p o l i t i c s and r u r a l f o l k . By n e g l e c t i n g l o c a l politics,

the above-mentioned s c h o l a r s p r e m a t u r e l y drew the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Japan's

common p e o p l e a c t e d as a c o l l e c t i v e A t l a s who p a t i e n t l y bore the burdens

o f m o d e r n i s a t i o n upon t h e i r peasant backs i n o b e d i e n t s i l e n c e .

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTION 1

I. THE INCIDENTS 11

The Fukushima I n c i d e n t 11

Governor Mishima and the A i z u J i y u t o 15

Governor Mishima and the Fukushima J i y u t o . . . . 23

M o b i l i z i n g the People o f A i z u 28

East-west A l l i a n c e 34

The K i t a k a t a I n c i d e n t 37

The Kabasan I n c i d e n t 42

Interpretations 46

Strategy and Recruitment 50

P l a n n i n g the R e v o l u t i o n 57

B e g i n n i n g o f the End 61

The C h i c h i b u Incident 68

Towards R e b e l l i o n . 70

"Headquarters o f the R e v o l u t i o n " 79

From V i c t o r y t o D e f e a t 83

II. BACKGROUND 103

T r a d i t i o n of Rebellion 104

Patterns of R e b e l l i o n 105

Tokugawa U p r i s i n g s : Economy, S o c i e t y , P o l i t y . . . 117

Meiji Uprisings 126

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 V

Chapter Page

The Economic B a s i s o f the Gekka Jiken 131

Depression i n the Countryside 131

Depression i n the Regions 137

The Movement f o r L i b e r t y and Popular Rights- . . . . 147

The Formative P e r i o d 148

The P e r i o d o f O r g a n i s a t i o n and Promotion

1878 t o 1881 152

III. THE PARTICIPANTS 169

The Samples • 177

Residence 182

Age . . 195

Status . 200

Occupation 205

F i n a n c i a l Status/Land Ownership 209

Conclusion: Leaders and F o l l o w e r s 230

IV. IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATION 247

Introduction 247

N a t u r a l R i g h t and L i t e r a c y 253

N a t u r a l R i g h t : Western and Japanese 253

L i t e r a c y i n the C o u n t r y s i d e 260

N a t u r a l R i g h t and P o l i t i c a l S o c i e t i e s 266

Sanshinsha 266

Aishinsha 274
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Chapter Page

Period of Activism 1881 to 1884 281

The J i y u t o i n Fukushima 281

The J i y u t o and the Kabasan Rebels 297

The Komminto and the J i y u t o 315

Conclusion 344

V. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 362

Consequences 363

Conclusions 384

WORKS CITED 402

Appendix

I. DECLARATION OF RESTORATION OF RIGHTS 416

II. FUKUSHIMA ACTIVISTS 417

III. CHICHIBU ACTIVISTS 426

IV. KABASAN ACTIVISTS 434

GLOSSARY 440
 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Uprisings by Region 107

2. Types of Tokugawa (1590-1867) Uprisings by

M e i j i Prefectures, and During F i r s t Ten

Years of M e i j i (1808-1912) 109

3. Market Value of One Roll of S i l k by Year 142

4. Comparison of Residence of Fukushima A c t i v i s t s ,

O r i g i n a l l y Listed for Crime of Treason with
Those Actually Tried 183
5. Residence of Komminto Army Leaders by Town
and V i l l a g e and Residence of those Charged
with "Massing to Riot" 191

6. Number of Participants i n Chichibu Incident

by V i l l a g e , Relative to V i l l a g e Population,
for V i l l a g e s Contributing more than F i f t y
"Direct" Participants 194

7. Age Structure of Sample Participants of

Fukushima, Chichibu and Kabasan Incidents
(abstracted from Appendices I I , I I I , IV) 196

8. Age Structure with Graph, of Seventy-Seven

Defendants Charged with Rioting 198

9. O f f i c i a l Status of Participants i n the Three

Incidents 201

10. Size of Land Holdings of Twenty-four Fukushima

Men Involved i n Fukushima Incident (abstracted
from Appendix II) 211

11. Average Area of Land Managed i n Fukushima

Prefecture, by Strata (1875) 212

12. Strata Structure by D i s t r i c t Using Land Tax

Payments (1883) 215

13. Farmer Strata According to Size of Land-

holdings, Fukuzawa V i l l a g e , Yama D i s t r i c t ,
Fukushima Prefecture (1872) . • 216

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Table Page

14. Percentage of Households and Land by Type

of C u l t i v a t i o n f o r the Sixteen D i s t r i c t s
of Fukushima (1883) 217

15. Percentage of Households by Type of Land-

holding f o r Chichibu D i s t r i c t and Saitama
Prefecture 220

16. Selected S t a t i s t i c s f o r Saitama Prefecture

and Chichibu D i s t r i c t (1885) 221

17. Landholding Relations, Makabe D i s t r i c t ,

Ibaraki Prefecture (1884) 226

18. Landholders by Strata According to Size of

Holding, Makabe D i s t r i c t (1879) 226

19. Landholding Relations i n Two V i l l a g e s of

Makabe D i s t r i c t : Number 1 Responded to
C a l l f o r Revolution; Number 2 Did Not 227
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map Page

1. The Kanto Region, and Fukushima and Nagano

Prefectures 9

2. Fukushima Prefecture 11

3. The Kabasan Area of Ibaraki and Tochigi

Prefectures 43
4. Chichibu D i s t r i c t and Surrounding Areas 67

Figure

1. Schema of Komminto Organisational Structure 332

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The lonely and oftentimes anxiety-ridden work of writing t h i s

thesis was made easier because of the help given to me by many i n d i v i d u a l s .

Professor Frank Langdon, my thesis supervisor and compassionate mentor i n

the ways and means of academia, provided me with advice and steady en-

couragement throughout the entire two years of my labours. Professor

Donald Burton, whom I must regard as a kindred s p i r i t inasmuch as we

share an interest i n the struggles of a l l peoples of a l l places against

the many and various forms of p o l i t i c a l oppression, helped me to organise

my ideas i n a coherent fashion and to structure my writing style into an

understandable form. My sincere thanks also go to Professor John Howes

who helped convince me and others i n the early stages of topic formulation

that the topic was indeed worthwhile studying. The author i s also i n -

debted to Professor Heath Chamberlain for reading the entire manuscript.

To the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I am pleased to express my

gratitude for the many years of f i n a n c i a l support I have received.

On the other side of the P a c i f i c , Professor Inoue K o j i guided my

search for materials relevent to the topic. At the National Diet Library,

Kato Rokuzo and Mitani Hiroshi lent considerable assistance i n locating

documentary material. Good friend, Professor Kage Tatsuo of Meijigakuin

University helped to arrange interviews with several Japanese scholars who

shared my i n t e r e s t i n the topic of popular r i g h t s .

I am indebted also to Professor Charles T i l l y of the University

of Michigan. During my f i r s t year of graduate school, he not only gave

x
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generously of his time and ideas, but also helped me to appreciate the

importance of studying incidents of c o l l e c t i v e violence. Dr. Robert Ward,

formerly at Michigan, helped to sustain my interest i n Japanese p o l i t i c s

at a time I was losing i t , and to procure f i n a n c i a l aid for my year at

the Inter-University Centre i n Tokyo. This i s an o l d debt, but one I

f e e l compelled to r e c a l l .

F i n a l l y , to Mrs. Agnes Lambe of Galiano Island I dedicate t h i s

thesis. She gave her home, her mind, and considerable typing a b i l i t i e s

to me and my work during the f i n a l stages of preparing the thesis. She

i s an i n s p i r i n g person, and one who causes young sceptics of the "modern

era" to understand that they do not have a monopoly on wisdom.

R.W.B.

Vancouver, B r i t i s h Columbia

October 1976
 REBELLION AND DEMOCRACY:

A Study of Commoners i n the Popular Rights Movement

of the Early M e i j i Period

xii
 INTRODUCTION

An a l l i a n c e f o r freedom,
taken with the idea of freedom:
i t a l l becomes clear
i n the small mirror of s i n c e r i t y .
Yet while we lament, asking
why our i n s i g n i f i c a n t selves
were oppressed,
the rain s t i l l f a l l s
heavily on the people-*-

The poem quoted above was written by Ohashi Genzaburo i n October

1892, shortly before he died i n his prison c e l l . He was a commoner

(heimin) and a farmer, and by his own admittance "barely l i t e r a t e . " He

was also a member of the o l d Jiyuto party (Freedom, or L i b e r a l party)

that dissolved i t s e l f i n late October 1884, barely a month after an at-

tempt to overthrow the government had taken place. This attempt i s known

to l a t e r historians as .the Kabasan Incident (Kabasan jiken), and Ohashi

Genzaburo had participated i n that attempt at revolution.

This study i s concerned with men such as Ohashi and with the po-

l i t i c a l party and movements i n which they were involved. I t i s a study

concerned not with the great statesmen or the i n s t i t u t i o n s they b u i l t ,

but instead i s concerned with the common people of Japan who were compel.-

led to suffer those great statesmen and t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s . It i s a

study of the popular opposition known as the jiyu minken undo (Movement

for Liberty and Popular Rights), a movement that began shortly after the

M e i j i Restoration (1868), coalesced i n 1881 to form the Jiyuto, and

nearly collapsed i n 1884 when the Jiyuto dissolved. Our special concern

i s with the movement as i t manifested i t s e l f i n popular r i g h t s ' societies

1
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i n the late seventies and early eighties and how these societies and simi-

l a r groups influenced the ideas of an entire generation of r u r a l folk.

Only those r u r a l folk who were involved i n the so-called gekka

jiken, or "incidents of i n t e n s i f i e d [violence]" are the subjects of our

study. Between 1881 and 1886 about ten of these occurred i n d i f f e r e n t

parts of the n a t i o n — A k i t a , Fukushima, Niigata, Gifu, Gumma, Kanagawa,

Ibaraki, Saitama, Nagano, A i c h i , and Shizuoka prefectures. Although the

goals, the class composition of the leaders and followers, and the t a c t i c s

employed by the membership i n each d i f f e r e d , they a l l had i n common at

least two elements: they a l l had connections with the popular rights

movement, and they a l l t r i e d using v i o l e n t methods to e f f e c t the kinds of

p o l i t i c a l reform that were advocated by the popular rights movement. In

general, the reforms could be regarded as democratic, for example, a

national assembly elected by the c i t i z e n r y on the basis of a constitution

that would guarantee the basic rights of free expression, free association,

and other c i v i l l i b e r t i e s then being denied most of Japan's population.

In many instances, the demands for p o l i t i c a l reform revolved around basic

economic issues such as excessive taxation; i n t h i s case the theme of "no

taxation without representation" was voiced repeatedly by the popular

rights advocates. And the loudest voicing demands for reform were the

p a r t i c i p a n t s of the gekka jiiken.

This i s one reason why we have chosen to study the gekka jiken.

Because they were "loud" and v i o l e n t , they captured the attention of not

only the authorities, but also the newspapers, the v i l l a g e historians,

and the p o l i t i c i a n s of the time. A l l of these observed and wrote about

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the p a r t i c i p a n t s and the incidents of which they were part. Hence, we

have today records and observations on how the popular rights movement

affected the l i v e s and ideas of the members of the lower classes who

rebelled.

Of course the question then arises, how representative are the

rebels of the s o c i a l classes from which they came? Is i t f a i r to assume

that the farmers involved i n the gekka jiken accurately r e f l e c t e d the

opinions of the farming class-as a whole toward the p o l i t i c a l reforms

being advocated by popular r i g h t s ' a c t i v i s t s ? For as we know, "More often,

historians have been i n c l i n e d to treat the rebellious or revolutionary

crowd as a m i l i t a n t minority to be sharply marked o f f from the f a r larger

number of c i t i z e n s of similar class and occupation who, . . . played no

active part i n the event." To t e s t the truth of this statement one need

only consult any of the large number of volumes dealing with Japan of

t h i s period. Robert Scalapino's Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-

war Japan devotes a bare four pages out of nearly 500 to the gekka jiken;

Nobutaka Ike allows nine pages; and E. H. Norman, whose sympathies f o r

the M e i j i peasants were c l e a r l y strong, discusses these incidents i n less

than four pages. Clearly, none of these scholars places much importance

on the topic we have chosen to study. Partly t h i s i s due to the nature

of t h e i r studies and the time when they were written: a l l three of these

works were sweeping i n scope, covering decades of p o l i t i c a l development

in Japan, and when they were written there existed very l i t t l e work i n

English that could be regarded as general h i s t o r i e s of t h i s period. There

c l e a r l y existed a need f o r the types of work they produced.

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Yet there appears to have been another reason for t h e i r having

ignored the gekka jiken, one which has to do more with the focus of h i s -

t o r i c a l analysis than with the absence of suitable material or with the

period i n which they were writing, although, c o n t r a d i c t o r i a l l y , a l l three

reasons are related. What I mean i s simply t h i s : a l l were aware of the

two attempts to establish a democratic form of government i n modern

Japanese history--the popular rights movement i n the eighties and the so-

c a l l e d Taisho democracy of the 1920's. Yet at the time they were writing,

Japan was entering a stage of u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l development,

or was just leaving i t , having l o s t the war and having been occupied by

Western m i l i t a r y forces whose purpose was to impose a democratic form of

government on Japan. Each believed that democracy had f a i l e d i n Japan,

and Scalapino even went as f a r as to say that i t s f a i l u r e was predeter-

mined by the l o g i c of Japan's past p o l i t i c a l development. The absence of

l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n s , the predominance of Confucian notions of hierarchy,

the anti-democratic bias of the e l i t e power structure, the close t i e s be-

tween "free enterprise" and the government, the i m p e r i a l i s t i c power struc-

ture of the World at the time Japan began her modernization, a t r a d i t i o n

of g l o r i f y i n g the m i l i t a r y and of despising the a g r i c u l t u r a l p o p u l a t i o n —

a l l these past elements of Japan's p o l i t i c s determined that the democratic

experiment i n Japan would f a i l . Likewise, they were less than sanguine

about the future of democracy once the A l l i e d Occupation had l e f t Japan.

The " f a i l u r e thesis" i s , then, a convincing one. I t i s attractive

because of i t s a b i l i t y to weave together a l l the various threads of

Japanese history, society, and p o l i t i c s into one neat explanatory piece

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of p o l i t i c a l f a b r i c . However, the fabric i s not without i t s loose threads

and i t s gaps i n the s t i t c h i n g . Probably the most unsightly of these gaps

i s the f a i l u r e of the " f a i l u r e thesis" to explain adequately the success

of democracy i n those two periods when i t was a p o l i t i c a l fact. Although

they acknowledge the fact, they attribute i t s origins primarily to exo-

genous factors or necessary external preconditions, and therefore f a i l to

consider seriously the p o s s i b i l i t y of indigenous p o l i t i c a l developments

that may have prepared the way for the r i s e of democracy. But an explana-

t i o n of the necessary preconditions for the r i s e of democracy i s one thing;

to explain why those conditions enabled democracy to burgeon i s e n t i r e l y

another. For example, to discuss the expansion of industry after the

F i r s t World War, the growth of international labour standards, the spread

of democratic and s o c i a l i s t ideas within Japan, and so on, does not i n

i t s e l f t e l l us how or why i n d u s t r i a l labourers and tenants organized them-

selves into unions, apparently democratic i n both p r i n c i p l e and practice,

and made them e f f e c t i v e means f o r getting demands met. Nor, f o r another

example, does a mere r e c i t a t i o n on the democratic programmes imposed by

the Occupation a f t e r the Second World War explain why the Japanese were

able to embrace democratic ideas and practices so quickly after such a

long period of f a s c i s t r u l e .

I think that the f a i l u r e of the " f a i l u r e thesis" l i e s i n i t s f a i l -

ing to account f o r the practice of p o l i t i c s at d i f f e r e n t levels of society.

The l e v e l at which t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l analyses have been aimed primarily

i s the e l i t e l e v e l of p o l i t i c s , the l e v e l occupied by national p o l i t i c i a n s ,

business leaders, and government o f f i c i a l s . There i s a reason f o r t h i s

 6

emphasis on the e l i t e l e v e l : Japan's modern history i s replete with

examples of great leaders i n a l l f i e l d s of s o c i a l l i f e . The imagery i s

one of a squadron of captains, each r u l i n g and d i r e c t i n g the course of

his own p a r t i c u l a r ship, yet i n co-ordination with one another, toward a

" r i c h country and a strong m i l i t a r y " (fukoku kyohei). But i n focusing

upon the "captains" of the ship of state, the l i v e s and work of the many

individual seamen c o l l e c t i v e l y serving as a "crew," upon whom the r e a l

fate of the ship r e s t s , have been ignored. More often than not, they

have been treated as an unthinking body of men whose i d e n t i t y i s a mere

extension of the captains', and t h e i r duty only what the captain orders.

To date, treatments of Japan's p o l i t i c a l history have been con-

fined to the study of "captains" and therefore i t has been assumed that

the many seamen existed, as i n any d i s c i p l i n e d m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , only

to do as t h e i r commanders ordered; the seamen constituted a "subject

p o l i t i c a l culture." But to carry this imagery one step further, what i f

the seamen decided to mutiny? What then? Since mutinies are studied by

h i s t o r i a n s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , and s o c i o l o g i s t s , we f i n d out what con-

d i t i o n s produced r e b e l l i o n ; we discover who the leaders were; whether they

i n fact represented a l l the crewmen or just a m i l i t a n t minority; we learn

what t h e i r demands were and which o f f i c e r s were the subject of t h e i r

attack; and we find out whether there was s u f f i c i e n t provocation and

whether the captain had been unjust.

This study w i l l focus on the seamen, as individuals and as members

of a crew, and w i l l do so by examining three "incidents of intense v i o -

lence": the Fukushima Incident of 1882 and the Kabasan and Chichibu
 7

incidents of 1884. We examine them for a l l the reasons s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s

study mutinies: to learn why they happened, what they t e l l about general

s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l conditions, and what consequences they

had for society and p o l i t i c s as a whole. We also wish to discover

whether the democratic ideals the participants espoused were shared by

others within t h e i r class, and whether they had some impact upon l a t e r

p o l i t i c a l developments i n Japan. A word of caution: as there was no

Gallup p o l l at the time these incidents occurred, i n the f i n a l analysis

i t w i l l not be possible to demonstrate with any degree of p r e c i s i o n to

what extent these early democrats represented others within t h e i r class;

we can only present the best case possible, and then suggest the l i k e l i -

hood of representativeness.

The thesis begins with case studies of each of the incidents.

The second chapter t r i e s to pinpoint the c o n d i t i o n s — h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l ,

economic, and p o l i t i c a l — t h a t helped to produce the three incidents. In

the t h i r d chapter, we perform an in-depth analysis of the participants

of the three incidents. Many of the rebels we w i l l be examining may be

regarded as l o c a l e l i t e s , i . e . , the p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l

leaders of l o c a l society. In terms of the earlier-used metaphor, these

l o c a l e l i t e s might be thought of as "chief petty o f f i c e r s . " Although i n

some respects t h e i r "rank" sets them apart from the many non-elites whom

they l e d i n the l o c a l popular rights movement and the related r e b e l l i o n s ,

in other respects they d i f f e r e d very l i t t l e . But despite whatever d i f -

ferences that may have separated l o c a l leaders from followers, i n the

pages that follow i t should become clear that both groups shared similar
 8

p o l i t i c a l goals, and that these shared goals set them f a r apart from the

national l i b e r a l leaders and governmental rulers.

The nature of these goals i s set forth i n the fourth chapter

where we further i d e n t i f y the participants by examining t h e i r p o l i t i c a l

b e l i e f s and the p o l i t i c a l societies and parties to which they belonged.

In the f i n a l chapter, we discuss the consequences the individual p a r t i -

cipants suffered because of t h e i r involvement i n the popular rights move-

ment and the effects t h e i r r e b e l l i o n had upon the Jiyuto. We conclude

by making some suggestions about the democratic experience i n modern

Japanese history.

One f i n a l word of introduction: the ultimate purpose of t h i s

thesis i s to address i t s e l f to three types of c r i t i c s , those whom S i r

Isaiah B e r l i n c i t e d i n h i s introduction to Franco Venturi's Roots of

Revolution, deleting where necessary the reference to Russia and i n -

serting a reference to Japan:

Those who look on a l l history through the eyes of the v i c t o r s , and

for whom accounts of movements that f a i l e d , of martyrs and minori-
t i e s , seem without interest as such; those who think that ideas play
l i t t l e or no part i n determining h i s t o r i c a l events; and f i n a l l y those
who are convinced that [democracy i n Japan] was simply the r e s u l t of
the [ A l l i e d Occupation], and possessed no s i g n i f i c a n t roots i n the
[Japanese] past.4
 9

Notes

±
Quoted i n Endo Shizuo, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1971), p. 264.
2
George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Distur-
bances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), p. 211.
3
Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement m Prewar
Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt (Berkeley, 1967; o r i g i n a l l y pub-
l i s h e d i n 1953), pp. 104-7; Nobutaka Ike, The Beginnings of Political
Democracy in Japan (New York, 1969; o r i g i n a l l y published i n 1950), pp.
160-68; E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and
Economic Problems of the Meiji Period (New York, 1940), pp. 180-84.
4
Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist
and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, trans. Francis
Haskell, Introd. Isaiah B e r l i n (New York, 1960; o r i g i n a l l y published i n
Italy i n 1952), p. v i i .
Map 1. The Kanto Region, and Fukushima and Nagano Prefectures

LZU •Fukushima Town

/FUKUSHIMA

LTOCHIG:

GUMMA
NAGANO
V S A I - ^ p • Kabaaan
Chichibu-
.TAMA A IBARAK]
KANA-
• Osaka
3AWA
-TOKYO

0 200 km
 CHAPTER I

THE INCIDENTS

The purpose of this .chapter i s a simple one: to provide a de-

t a i l e d sketch of the Fukushima, Kabasan, and Chichibu incidents. Care

w i l l be taken to introduce the main characters involved i n each of the

jiken, to explain how and when they got involved, and what part they

played i n the development of the incidents. The question of why they i n -

volved themselves w i l l be discussed i n Chapters III and IV, where we will

look at the background of the participants i n the f i r s t instance, and

t h e i r ideas as translated into action and organisation i n the second.

THE FUKUSHIMA INCIDENT

One of the few scholars s p e c i a l i z i n g on the Fukushima Incident,

Shimoyama Saburo, t e l l s us that "The incident begins with the appointment

of Mishima [Michitsune or Tsuyo] as Governor [of Fukushima prefecture] i n

early 1882, and ends with the mass arrests of Jiyuto members i n late

November and early December." 1

Most of the other s p e c i a l i s t s — S h o j i

Kichinosuke, Takahashi Tetsuo, Oishi Kaichiro, and Goto Yasushi—agree

with Shimoyama's dates for the most part, although Takahashi, for i n -

stance, believes that the incident did not r e a l l y end u n t i l well a f t e r

the "treason t r i a l " of A p r i l 1883, u n t i l , that i s , several of those

acquitted of treason became participants i n the abortive Kabasan r e v o l t

of September 1884. But since i n Chapter V we w i l l deal e x p l i c i t l y with

the government's reaction to the Fukushima jiken, and with i t s

11
Map 2. Fukushima Prefecture
 13

consequences, here we w i l l accept Shimoyama's dates as representing the

incident proper.

Although the dates for the beginning and the end of the incident

are debatable, there exists almost no disagreement among the s p e c i a l i s t s

with regard to the more important events of 1882 which c o l l e c t i v e l y com-

p r i s e the Fukushima j i k e n . After having compared t h e i r treatment of the

important events with those cited by the newspapers of that period, we

can, after noting one caveat, conclude that t h e i r accounts appear to be

h i s t o r i c a l l y accurate. The caveat i s t h i s : while a l l these scholare are

careful to d i s t i n g u i s h between the incident as i t developed i n eastern

Fukushima from i t s development i n western Fukushima, the fact that the

leadership of the incident in' both areas was largely drawn from the Jiyuto

of each area often causes obfuscation i n t h e i r work with regard to the

important differences i n the nature of each regional Jiyuto party branch.

This i s due i n part, I believe, to an ideologically-based tendency of

these scholars to see anti-government s o l i d a r i t y among the party f a i t h f u l

as a more important point to stress than the geographical, l o c a l s e l f -

interest that i n fact motivated the actions of each branch, independently

of one another. Minimizing the extent to which regional s e l f - i n t e r e s t

separated the eastern from the western branches of the Jiyuto i n Fukushima,

and conversely, maximizing the party t i e , leads, for instance, to the com-

mission of an error i n interpretation by Shimoyama: that i s , to transform

an admittedly highly p o l i t i c a l event into a revolutionary one. As we

s h a l l see i n Chapter IV, even though there i s c e r t a i n l y reason enough to

regard several of the eastern Fukushima Jiyuto members as being motivated

 14

by revolutionary aims, and even though both eastern and western members

had adopted a p o t e n t i a l l y revolutionary ideology p r i o r to the incident,

there i s at the same time l i t t l e evidence to support the argument that

most of the Jiyuto followers i n western Fukushima were intent upon bring-

ing down the government by force. Force, as we s h a l l see, did indeed

play an important role i n t h i s incident, but i t was applied one-sidedly.

If measured upon the scales of coercion, the a u t h o r i t i e s ' use of force

t i p s the scales heavily to t h e i r side. This said, i t i s now necessary to

examine the incident i t s e l f .

2

The appointment of Mishima Michitsune (1835-88), an ex-samurai

from Satsuma who began his government service i n 1871 with the Tokyo muni-

c i p a l government, was the catalyst that set into motion the subsequent

clash between prefectural authorities on the one side, and the prefectural

assembly and, e s p e c i a l l y , i t s Jiyuto membership on the other. Already

serving as governor of Yamagata prefecture, a post he continued to hold

u n t i l July, i n February 1882 the "Devil Governor" (oni kenri) was assigned
3

the Fukushima governorship. Upon t h i s occasion Mishima reportedly con-

fided to a friend, Sata J i r o ( D i s t r i c t Chief of Yama), what his orders

were from the central government: "I was given three secret orders along

with my appointment. The f i r s t i s to destroy the Jiyuto, the second i s

to b u i l d up the T e i s e i t o [the government's ' p o l i t i c a l party'], and the

4

t h i r d i s to construct several important roads." Events subsequent to

his appointment prove that Mishima acted f a i t h f u l l y to obey these three

orders, even though, i n terms of the sequence of events, the execution of

the orders was reversed, and for good reason.

 15

Governor Mishima and the Aizu Jiyuto

The destruction of the Fukushima Jiyuto was not an easy task.

Two branches, one i n Aizu and the other i n the east, had been established

i n December 1881, just two months after the founding of the national

party. Of a l l the party branches l a t e r established across the nation,

the Fukushima branches were popularly regarded as among the strongest.

At the time of Mishima's appointment, prefectural assembly members a f f i l -

iated to the Jiyuto outnumbered those of the other p a r t i e s . The break-

down i n the sixty-two-member assembly (with one seat vacant) was: Jiyuto,
6

twenty-four; Texseito, f i f t e e n ; Kaishinto, twelve; unattached, ten.

Besides holding a numerical s u p e r i o r i t y , the Fukushima Jiyuto assembly

members also shared a history of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the jiyu minken

movement that began i n the mid-seventies (see Chapter IV). More than the

members of the other p a r t i e s , they were a readily i d e n t i f i a b l e and cohe-

sive group. Moreover, outside the prefectural assembly, both i n the Aizu

and eastern Fukushima regions, Jiyuto members held many positions of

authority at the l o c a l l e v e l of government, e.g., v i l l a g e head (kocho),

s u b - d i s t r i c t head (kucho), or as elected members of the v i l l a g e or ku
1

assemblies. A number of Jiyuto members had also held positions of respon-

s i b i l i t y during the tenure of the previous administration, but once Mishima

took o f f i c e they were summarily dismissed and replaced by o f f i c i a l s per-

sonally l o y a l to him. In a l l , more than ninety known Jiyuto o f f i c i a l s or

school teachers (who were employees of the government at t h i s time) were

g

said to have been sacked by Mishima. These dismissals can be regarded

as the f i r s t instance of Mishima acting upon his objective to "destroy

 16

the Jiyuto." This instance, however, i s of minor importance compared to

subsequent attacks upon the Jiyuto, and with regard to the development

of the Fukushima Incident. This becomes clear when we look at two other

actions taken by Mishima during his f i r s t few months i n o f f i c e .

The f i r s t was the action the governor took i n order to implement

the central government's order to b u i l d new roads i n the Aizu region,

which consists of the s i x d i s t r i c t s located i n the western part of the

prefecture: Yama, Kawanuma, Onuma, Minami-Aizu, Kita-Aizu, and Higashi-

9

Kabahara. The project, one he had already begun during his tenure as

governor of Yamagata prefecture, was known as the "Three Roads" (sampo

doro) project, so c a l l e d because i t was to l i n k Wakamatsu, the former

castle town of Aizu han, with Yamagata prefecture to the north, Tokyo to

the south v i a Tochigi and Ibaraki prefectures, and Niigata prefecture to

the west. The t o t a l cost of construction i n Aizu, 620,000 yen, was to be

shared by the c e n t r a l government and the s i x d i s t r i c t s of Aizu. The Aizu

share, however, at 360,000 yen was s u b s t a n t i a l l y larger, and further repre-

sented a considerable extra economic burden for the 129,000 residents of

the region.

Mishima r e a l i z e d that this extra, unsought f i n a n c i a l burden,

announced within weeks of his taking o f f i c e succeeding a popular governor,

would not be e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y received by Aizu residents, and that i t

would be necessary to gain the co-operation of the area's residents. To

t h i s end, on 28 February, Mishima sent from the f a r - o f f c a p i t a l (Fukushima

Town)' his construction chief Nakayama and his personal deputy Ebina, a

former samurai of Aizu han, to Aizu for the purpose of assembling the s i x
 17

d i s t r i c t chiefs (guncho). They were ordered by Mishima to hold an elec-

t i o n among v i l l a g e and town councilmen, with only councilmen serving as

electors, to choose one man from each d i s t r i c t to serve as members of a

committee that would be responsible for establishing the rules to govern

the e l e c t i o n of residents who would compose a standing committee c a l l e d

the Aizu rokugun rengokai ("Six Aizu d i s t r i c t s ' j o i n t committee," here-

after c i t e d as Rengokai). The Rengokai, representing the "people," i n

turn was intended to serve to legitimize and rubber-stamp Mishima's p o l i c y ,

as yet unannounced, of carrying out the road construction. Mishima's own

notion of the composition of the Rengokai was a thirty-man committee, con-

s i s t i n g of f i v e people from each d i s t r i c t and elected by v i l l a g e and town

councilmen. Moreover, as communicated to Ebina, Mishima made i t clear

that a l l t h i s b u s i n e s s — t h e election of the rule-making committee, the

determination of the rules for electing the Rengokai members, and the

e l e c t i o n i t s e l f — s h o u l d be concluded i n several days t i m e ! 11

The e l e c t i o n of the rules committee went as quickly as Mishima

12

had wanted, and the s i x members f i r s t ..met: on 5 March. In one day the

rules f o r e l e c t i n g Rengokai members were s e t t l e d . But despite the alac-

r i t y , and because four of the s i x were Jiyuto members, the rules f i n a l l y

settled upon for the Rengokai e l e c t i o n were much more democratic than

Mishima had wanted. Instead of an i n d i r e c t election by v i l l a g e and town

councilmen serving as electors, the rules committee endorsed proportional

representation, i . e . , the number of Rengokai members from each d i s t r i c t

would depend upon the d i s t r i c t ' s population, and a d i r e c t e l e c t i o n of

members by a l l male taxpayers twenty years or older. This scheme was

 18

accepted by Mishima for the sake of expediency, and two days l a t e r , on

7 and 8 March, the e l e c t i o n of t h i r t y - f o u r Rengokai members was held.

(This number was l a t e r increased to f o r t y - s i x once Onuma and Minami-Aizu

d i s t r i c t s , whose chiefs favoured i n d i r e c t elections i n i t i a l l y , complied

13

with the rules committee e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a . )

Although the procedure, the speed of s e l e c t i o n and even the idea

of the existence of such a committee as the Rengokai was questioned, or

rather, protested against by Jiyuto members of the p r e f e c t u r a l assembly

who regarded t h i s as a v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t to advise the administra-

t i o n on important issues, t h e i r protests were muted by the aggressiveness

and quick i n i t i a t i v e that Mishima had taken on t h i s matter. The only

r e a l l y serious protest was lodged by the administrative head of Yama d i s -

t r i c t , Igarashi Chikarasuke, a l e f t - o v e r from the previous administration

whom Mishima quickly replaced with his own appointee, Sato J i r o , who, in

d i s p o s i t i o n and attitude toward the Jiyuto, remarkably resembled his boss

On 14 to 16 March, just two weeks a f t e r Mishima i n i t i a t e d t h i s

entire process, the Rengokai met for the f i r s t time at Wakamatsu to

"deliberate" on the government's road construction plans. Most present

14

were "large landlords or l o c a l notables (meiboka)," and several were

members of the p r e f e c t u r a l assembly, such as Jiyuto members Nakajima

Yuhachi and Watanabe I c h i r o . Nakajima, a thirty-one-year-old small land-

lord of Kawanuma prefecture, was elected chairman of the Rengokai.

Their deliberations e s s e n t i a l l y revolved around a proposal

e a r l i e r outlined by the s i x d i s t r i c t heads i n collaboration with Mishima'

deputies. Pressured to "deliberate" quickly, debate over the government'

 19

proposals was sharply c u r t a i l e d , and on 16 March the Rengokai approved

two resolutions. The f i r s t required (a) one day of corvee labour each

month for a period of two years from a l l Aizu residents between the ages

of f i f t e e n and s i x t y , excluding the disabled and widowed; and (b) a sub-

s t i t u t e labour tax to be paid by those d i s i n c l i n e d to work, at the rate

of f i f t e e n sen per day for male labour, and ten sen per day for female

labour. The second resolution provided for v i l l a g e and town councils to

take appropriate measures to ensure p a r t i c i p a t i o n , or for the c o l l e c t i o n

of taxes for substitute labour based upon land value and the population

of the v i l l a g e . The acceptance of both resolutions, however, was condi-

t i o n a l on (1) the grant of supplementary funding from the central govern-

ment and on (2) a l l work done by corvee labourers being r e s t r i c t e d to

l e v e l ground, only professionals doing the mountain and bridge construc-

15

tion. I t i s important to note that nothing was mentioned about what

course the road should take, who would oversee the workers, the precise

amount of supplementary funds to come from the central government, or

about the d e t a i l s of tax assessment. In this regard, almost a l l students

of the incident agree that these mistakes or oversights by the Rengokai

were important factors i n the growth of the incident."^

Since actual construction work on the roads was not due to begin

u n t i l August, during the intervening months Aizu residents i n general and

Rengokai members i n p a r t i c u l a r had time to consider the d e t a i l s of the

Rengokai resolutions and to discover the oversights or omissions not

covered by them. By June, i n fact, several events had transpired that

caused many Aizu residents to question the road plan seriously. First,
 20

i n June i t was learned that instead of the 260,000 yen i n government funds
17

i n i t i a l l y promised, only 98,000 yen was granted. This, of course, meant

a correspondingly heavier f i n a n c i a l burden f o r Aizu residents. Second,

Mishima e f f e c t i v e l y suspended the Rengokai, taking complete charge of the

planning and supervision of road construction. As Takahashi evaluated

t h i s development, "The Rengokai was nothing but a t o o l whose resolutions

merely served to round up people to work on the roads. I t s actual work

was three days of debate, and then i t had to close up shop. Or rather,

from the standpoint of the governor and the d i s t r i c t head, i t had out-
18

l i v e d i t s usefulness." And t h i r d l y , the governor ordered corvee labour

dues to be made retroactive to March, when the resolutions were passed,

and further ordered through the s i x d i s t r i c t heads the speedy c o l l e c t i o n

of these dues. ^ 1

In reaction to these developments, a good number of Aizu residents

adopted defensive measures. Some, such as Rengokai member Igarashi

Takehiko of Yama d i s t r i c t , began c a l l i n g on other members to f i g h t the

government, s p e c i f i c a l l y by demanding that a special session of the Ren-

gokai be c a l l e d i n order to oppose these recent developments. By 28 July,

the e f f o r t s of Igarashi and other Jiyuto-Rengokai members had succeeded

i n gaining a majority (by one) of Rengokai members to sign a p e t i t i o n

c a l l i n g for the special session. But on 14 August the p e t i t i o n was r e -

jected, as were two other such p e t i t i o n s presented to the government be-

20

fore the end of the month. Other l o c a l Jiyuto members were preaching

c i v i l disobedience against the l e v i e s saying, as S a j i Kobei of Takada vil-

lage i n Onuma d i s t r i c t d i d , " I t i s not the duty of our c i t i z e n s to obey

 21

t h i s resolution" because of "the i l l e g a l and unfair election of the

21

[Rengokai] members." (He was r e f e r r i n g to his d i s t r i c t ' s f a i l u r e to

comply early on with the rules committee election c r i t e r i a . )

Such attempts at i n i t i a t i n g c i v i l disobedience, moreover, spread

throughout the region, although they were mainly concentrated i n Yama,

Kawanuma, and Onuma d i s t r i c t s . Reports sent to Mishima by Yama d i s t r i c t

head Sato further attest to such a c t i v i t y . "The Jiyuto i s agitating,"

wrote Sato, "by lecturing at v i l l a g e assemblies, involving often more

22
than a hundred people, throughout the entire region." Uda S e i i c h i , f o r
example, t o l d the farmers of Atsushio v i l l a g e i n Yama, "We ought to ex-
23

pand t h i s [movement] into an extraordinary incident." Proof that t h e i r

"agitating" had some e f f e c t i s seen i n the growing numbers of v i l l a g e

councilmen who were refusing to levy road construction taxes on t h e i r

fellow v i l l a g e r s . Further evidence i s the government's i n i t i a t i o n of

intimidation and bribery as means to dissuade Rengokai members from

organising an opposition movement. The most blatant example of intimida-

t i o n occurred on 18 August, the day a f t e r the government s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y

held a ceremony to mark the o f f i c i a l beginning of road construction, when

Jiyuto members Uda S e i i c h i , Kojima Yuhachi, and Tamano Hideaki were

b r u t a l l y attacked while sleeping at the Shimizu ryokan (hotel) i n K i t a -

kata by seven or eight T e i s e i t o party members. Kojima was able to f l e e

24

and escape injury, but the other two suffered a bad beating.

This attack, known to l a t e r historians as the "Shimizuya jiken,"

i s p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t not only for showing the extent to which the

government would go i n order to suppress the Jiyuto, but also f o r

 22

demonstrating how successful Mishima had been i n accomplishing the second

of his secret goals as governor, that of building a l o y a l and unquestion-

ing T e i s e i t o . In going about this Mishima had concentrated h i s e f f o r t s

in Wakamatsu, the centre of han (feudal domain) resistance during the

Tohoku region's primarily samurai-led counter-revolutionary movement

a f t e r the Restoration i n 1868 and 1869 (known as the Boshin War). After

t h e i r defeat by the new government, and the loss of t h e i r status as

samurai and the stipends that went•with that status, many ex-samurai of

this region suffered unemployment and poverty. Many depended upon the

goodwill of the new government i n finding them employment, such as i n the

Asaka land reclamation project or i n the l o c a l constabulary, but i n any

event, there existed a large f r e e - f l o a t i n g population of ex-samurai i n

the Aizu region ready and able to be mobilized f o r one cause or another.

Some joined the Jiyuto, and others joined the T e i s e i t o .

On 30 June 1882, the Fukushima branch of the T e i s e i t o was organ-

ised, and under Mishima's d i r e c t i o n founded i t s e l f on the p r i n c i p l e s of

"love of Emperor and country, the defense of the righteous road of the

fatherland, and the measured reform of society based upon the above two
25

ideas." In September i t received through Mishima an interest-free

loan of 196,000 yen from the central government, which served to finance

the expenses of the party and i t s largely ex-samurai (shizoku) membership,

and to establish a party headquarters and academy at Wakamatsu, c a l l e d

the Nisshinkan ("New Day Academy"). Shortly after i t s founding, i t

26

claimed the support of more than 4,500 members, although the r e a l figure
27
was probably only one-half that number. I t received additional support
 23

from l o c a l businessmen and merchants who were eager to have a new road

for the expansion of commerce. The chief, self-defined duty of the Fuku-

shima T e i s e i t o , and that which had the greatest impact on the Jiyuto, was

"to protect and enforce the Law Regulating Public Meetings (shukai jorei).'

During the day of the evening when the "Shimizuya jiken" took

place, Jiyuto members of the Rengokai secretly gathered i n Wakamatsu

where they resolved that henceforth the Aizu Jiyuto would take f u l l respon

s i b i l i t y for organising a more wide-scale and structured protest against

the government. Lawsuits and a tax boycott (of the substitute corvee

labour fee), they decided, would constitute the core of their protest move

ment.

For the residents of the Aizu region, t h i s Jiyuto meeting, and

the T e i s e i t o attack of the same day, marks the end of one phase i n the

jiken and the beginning of the next.

Governor Mishima and the Fukushima Jiyuto

While these events were happening i n Aizu, on the other side of

the prefecture, i n the east, around Fukushima machi (town), equally s i g n i f

icant developments had also been taking place. For d i f f e r e n t but nonethe-

less related reasons, the Fukushima branch of the Jiyuto was assuming a

posture of opposition to Mishima. During A p r i l when the p r e f e c t u r a l

assembly was i n session, Governor Mishima, contrary to custom, f a i l e d to

attend even one s i t t i n g , even though the assembly had requested his atten-

dance on three separate occasions. On 1 May, the assembly chairman, Kono

Hironaka, a long-time Jiyuto and minken leader, sent a personal messenger

to ask the governor one l a s t time to appear before the assembly, but
 24

again Mishima did not respond. Infuriated at Mishima's open contempt,

on 4 May, during a debate on a b i l l r e l a t i n g to annual government expen-

ditures, Kono accepted a motion from the f l o o r , made by Jiyuto member and

vice-chairman of the assembly Yamaguchi Chiyosaku, to suspend a l l busi-

ness u n t i l the governor consented to appear. The motion was not approved,

but the idea behind the motion began to gain currency nevertheless. From

5 to 7 May, the Jiyuto caucus met and put together nineteen a r t i c l e s

accusing Mishima of misgovernment, and further resolved to t r y again to

garner s u f f i c i e n t support to suspend business i n the assembly. The

29

author of t h i s measure was Uda S e i i c h i of Aizu's Yama d i s t r i c t . Uda's

resolution was subsequently presented i n the assembly three d i f f e r e n t

times, on 7, 8, and 10 May. Each time i t was approved by a bare majority,

and the f i n a l vote was twenty-three to twenty-one (eighteen members were

30

absent, and i n mid-May, fearing Mishima's temper, they resigned). Sup-

porting Uda were nineteen other Jiyuto members and three Kaishinto members.

The f i n a l resolution, dated 12 May 1882, read i n part:

For acting contrary to public opinion, for not responding to the
wishes of the public of t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n regard to deliberating
on p o l i c y , and i n s e t t l i n g the matter of t h i s year's taxes, t h i s
assembly withholds the disbursements of those funds. Also, we w i l l
vote down a l l such b i l l s i n the future.31
This action was without precedent i n the few years since the July

1878 law permitting the establishment of prefectural assemblies had come

32

into e f f e c t throughout Japan. But because that law r e a l l y accorded

very l i t t l e power to the assemblies—they had the "right to deliberate on

bills" (gian shingi ken)—vis-a-vis the governor, who had the exclusive

r i g h t to i n i t i a t e l e g i s l a t i o n , the power to request the Home Minister to

 25

dissolve the assembly, and the further right to ignore the assembly's

deliberation, the Fukushima prefectural assembly's action to refuse to

accept a l l future b i l l s from the administration i n e f f e c t merely amounted

to a strong vote of censure against Mishima. I t also provided Mishima

with s u f f i c i e n t reason, under the law, to seek the a i d of the Home Min-

i s t r y , i.e., to involve the central government d i r e c t l y i n prefectural

a f f a i r s , which i s exactly what he did on 22 May. Upon doing t h i s , he re-

ceived permission from the Home and Finance ministries to enforce the

annual appropriations b i l l and to invoke A r t i c l e 34 of the Fu-ken-kai

kisoku (Rules governing Prefectural Assemblies), impowering him to suspend

the right of election for a fixed period of time, and to dissolve the
33
assembly.
Although t h i s was not the least s i g n i f i c a n t of Mishima's responses

to the contentious assembly, i t s t i l l represented only h i s pro forma

34

reaction. Equally as s i g n i f i c a n t was h i s campaign to suppress the

Jiyuto, which, as the following excerpt from a l e t t e r written by Uda to

Miura Nobuyuki on 13 May shows, was intensive even before the vote of

censure:
Since t h i s assembly convened, d a i l y the r i s k of speaking freely i n
the assembly h a l l grows greater. . . . Ever since the present governor
assumed o f f i c e , the p o l i c y of government toward free speech i n the
assembly has changed f o r the worse. His actions are manifestly author-
i t a r i a n , r e s t r a i n i n g the freedoms of the people . . . and he shows no
regard for the opinions of the assembly.35
Earlier s t i l l , on 4 May, during the morning session, assembly chairman

Kono Hironaka took the f l o o r and addressed i t s members:

This assembly i s founded on the premise that we ought to represent

public opinion, that we ought to consider t h i s and then enact public
 26

p o l i c y . . . . Since his a r r i v a l , Governor Mishima has removed himself

many r i and has neglected the assembly and has acted without regard
to public opinion. . . . Without regard f o r the wishes of the people
of today for freedom of speech, he has for one thing employed the
p o l i c e against assemblymen involved i n p o l i t i c s , and for another,
against those who p u b l i c l y gather, using the Law Governing Assembly
(shukai jorei) with the utmost severity . . . . J D

The proof of the pudding, moreover, that Mishima reacted oppres-

s i v e l y against the assemblymen who voted to censure him, came l a t e r with

the arrest of a l l twenty-three men for the crime of "slandering a public

official" (kanri bujoku zai); conviction of t h i s crime carried a prison

37

term of seven months to a year, and a fine of ten to twenty yen. The

topping to the pudding (to be examined more f u l l y i n Chapter V) was first

his personal involvement i n obtaining financing from the central govern-

ment for the establishment of a Fukushima branch of the T e i s e i t o , created,

as we have seen, to "protect and enforce the Law Governing Assemblies

38

against the Jiyuto"; and secondly, Mishima's order i n December for the

arrest of most of the twenty-three assemblymen for the crime of treason.

After the motion of censure was passed, Mishima enjoyed no respite

from the Jiyuto attack. During the next several months Jiyuto members i n

eastern Fukushima r e l e n t l e s s l y continued to contest the l e g a l i t y of

Mishima's administration. Shortly a f t e r Mishima dissolved the assembly,

Jiyuto members sent memorial after memorial to the central government

accusing Mishima of misgovernment. These memorials c i t e d his summary d i s -

missal of former o f f i c i a l s , his contempt for the assembly, his handling

of the Aizu road project, his suppression of freedom of speech, and so
39 40
alleged Oni l l5e July,
on. g a l practices i n his
another such taxation
memorial wasp o sent,
l i c y . t h i s time concerning
 27

The e f f e c t s of t h e i r f a i l u r e to e l i c i t a s a t i s f a c t o r y response

from the c e n t r a l government to these memorials, and the more general prob-

lem of the repression they were suffering, are r e f l e c t e d i n the growing

tribute paid to more r a d i c a l ideas by Jiyuto leaders attached to the

Mumeikan ("Hall of No Name"), the meeting place of the Fukushima branch

of the Jiyuto i n the eastern part of the prefecture. Within this branch

a f a c t i o n c a l l i n g i t s e l f the Kyushinto or "Radical Party" under Hanaka,

and l a t e r under Kono Hironaka as well,.was d a i l y gaining influence i n the

41
party. Hanaka, i t s chief promoter, characterized i t i n t h i s way: "Our
ideology concerns how to obtain freedom quickly and to give vent to a
42

r a d i c a l philosophy, under the aegis of the Jiyuto. . . . " (See Chapter

IV for a f u l l e r treatment.) After his arrest i n late November, Hanaka

made clear i n his courtroom testimony why a more r a d i c a l orientation was

necessary for the Jiyuto:

The governor took on the dual job of f i r i n g [former] o f f i c i a l s and
crushing the Jiyuto. On the one hand, he replaced [the former o f f i -
c i a l s ] with his own; on the other, he worked to organise the T e i s e i t o
in order to suppress the Jiyuto. . . .43

Clearly, Hanaka at l e a s t believed that radicalism was necessary at t h i s

juncture i n order to preserve the l i f e of the Jiyuto. In any event, t h i s

development coincides with the emergence within the national party of

others holding s i m i l a r r a d i c a l b e l i e f s , such as Oi Kentaro and Miyabe

Noboru who were elected to leadership positions i n June 1882.

In Fukushima t h i s growing tendency toward radicalism did not go

unobserved by the a u t h o r i t i e s . The p o l i c e chief of Miharu reported as

early as late May, "People i n the area are saying that by July of t h i s

year a new Jiyuto government w i l l be established and w i l l rule the entire

M 44
country. ..."
 28

Having observed the important developments i n eastern Fushima

that took place before September, the narrative now returns to examine

what was happening i n Aizu a f t e r the important 18 August meeting of Jiyuto

members there, i n preparation for showing how these two d i f f e r e n t a n t i -

Mishima movements coalesced.

Mobilizing the People of Aizu

During late August and early September a number of secret meetings

between Aizu Jiyuto leaders were held, concerning the problem of how to

involve large numbers of Aizu residents i n the anti-road campaign. Up to

t h i s point, the l o c a l Jiyuto leaders r e a l i z e d that the movement was what

present-day scholars would c a l l joryu minken or an "upper-class peoples'

rights movement," consisting mainly of landlords, ex-samurai (shizoku),

i n t e l l e c t u a l s and v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s . Though l o c a l l y powerful, such men

alone, they reasoned, would not be able to carry out a tax boycott nor a

l i t i g a t i o n campaign. To be e f f e c t i v e , such action required mass p a r t i c i -

pation i n the f i r s t instance, and i n the second instance, at least the

written endorsement (power of attorney) of a substantial number of c i t i z e n s

i n order to receive recognition by the courts. But i n either case, t h e i r

intent was to involve as many as possible i n a campaign of popular pro-

test, and thereby to create a climate for the government that some of them

termed "cloudy and foggy" (unmu), that they alone, upon government capitu-

l a t i o n to t h e i r demands, would have the power to dissipate. As one of the

Aizu Jiyuto leaders, Nakajima, put i t , "Through l i t i g a t i o n on the road

a f f a i r , we believe that we can r e a l i s e our [immediate] objective of caus-

45
ing the government to be upset." Pressure p o l i t i c s , employed through
 29

legal means on the one hand, coupled with a massive c i v i l disobedience

campaign on the other ( i . e . , the tax boycott), could drive the government

to recognize the right of Aizu residents to hold greater authority over

local affairs.

Of the two-pronged attack against Mishima's actions concerning

the road construction project, however, at t h i s point l i t i g a t i o n was most

heavily r e l i e d upon. Since none of the Aizu Jiyuto leaders were lawyers

by profession, they naturally looked outside for a i d . Interestingly

enough, instead of turning to the Fukushima branch i n the east, which was

staffed by many competent lawyers, they sought aid from the Tokyo head-

quarters of the Party, mainly because even by this time the Fukushima

branch had shown only nominal interest i n , and concern f o r , the road

issue.

Some time i n September, Hara Heizo, a moderately wealthy farmer

and minken a c t i v i s t since 1880 when he was twenty-one, and "the biggest
46

hope of the Aizu Jiyuto," went to Tokyo to seek the legal counsel of

two of the national party's more r a d i c a l lawyers, Oi Kentaro and Hoshi

Toru. While Hara was i n Tokyo, Jiyuto a c t i v i s t s i n Aizu had begun organ-

i z i n g an e f f e c t i v e l i t i g a t i o n movement. Five men—Uda S e i i c h i , Akajiro

Heiroku, Igarashi Takehiko, Yamaguchi and Nakajima—were present at the

f i r s t such meeting i n early September. A second organisational meeting

was held soon a f t e r i n Yamaguchi's v i l l a g e of Onomoto, but this time

t h i r t y Jiyuto members were i n attendance, including the important addi-

tions of Miura Bunji, S a j i Kobei, and Kaneko Tsunejiro. At the t h i r d

organisational meeting, held at Komeoka v i l l a g e i n Yama d i s t r i c t on 28

 30

September, over seventy were present, holding the power of attorney of

47

3,400 to 4,000 supporters. At t h i s meeting the "Declaration of the

Restoration of Rights" was formulated and approved (see Appendix I ) , and

the movement was given added structure by selecting a three-man l i t i g a t i o n

committee (Uda, Nakajima, and Yamaguchi), a President (Akajiro), and a

vice-President (Miura Bunji). Also at t h i s gathering, Hara Heizo, back

from Tokyo, reported on the l e g a l advice given by Oi and Hoshi. Briefly,

they advised that success i n the l i t i g a t i o n movement could only be assured

by acquiring the formal support of at least one-half of the region's

48

40,000 voting c i t i z e n s . The a c t i v i s t s i n attendance resolved to t r y to

get the extra support of the 16,000 needed.

By the fourth organisational meeting, held on 8 October, again at

Onomoto v i l l a g e i n Kawanuma d i s t r i c t , over 100 leaders were present, repre-

senting and holding the power of attorney of 5,792 Aizu voting residents,

a gain of almost 1,800 i n a l i t t l e more than a week's time. Again i t was

resolved to continue the drive to r e c r u i t others to the movement, but i n

the meantime they decided that immediate action was necessary. First,

Miura Bunji and Yamaguchi were to leave on 12 October f o r Tokyo to get

further legal advice from Oi Kentaro. Secondly, using what support they

had already mustered, they would i n i t i a t e a special type of lawsuit, a

gankai, which would request of the Wakamatsu magistrate a r u l i n g of a r b i -

t r a t i o n on four points: (1) that the rule-making body f o r the Rengokai

and the election of i t s members was unfair; (2) that the course of the road

was a r b i t r a r i l y surveyed i n disregard of centres of population; (3) that

Mishima's r e f u s a l to reconvene the Rengokai was improper; and (4)' that

 31

action thus far taken by the authorities contravened the o r i g i n a l resolu-

49

tions adopted by the Rengokai.

This s u i t , soon a f t e r rejected on the grounds that the court was

not competent to rule on the matter, was prompted by the increasingly

repressive action taken by the authorities to break up the opposition

movement—threats of expropriation of homes and property, public auctions

of the protesters' household a r t i f a c t s , summons to appear before the

50

l o c a l authorities for questioning, etc. — a n d was therefore intended to

serve as a "stop-gap" measure against the government, and to demonstrate

to the movement's supporters that action was being taken on t h e i r behalf.

It was also hoped that t h i s s u i t would serve to lessen the chances of

c a p i t u l a t i o n by harassed farmers while the l i t i g a t i o n committee continued

to t r y to r e c r u i t the necessary number of signatures.

While t h i s was the purpose of the s u i t f o r a r b i t r a t i o n , the sub-

stance of the s u i t consisted of the central points made e a r l i e r i n the

t h i r d organisational meeting, and incorporated i n t h e i r "Declaration of

the Restoration of Rights." Besides the above-mentioned four points, the

s u i t c a l l e d f o r investing the Rengokai with the necessary authority to

oversee the road construction. I t was, therefore, not against the road

as such, but only opposed to "outside" control over i t , i . e . , against

the prefectural government's handling of i t . For t h i s reason the Fukushima

Incident i s commonly regarded as one of the more dramatic episodes of

the early r u r a l peoples' f i g h t f o r "the r i g h t of self-government" (chiji

kenri). ^ Seen i n t h i s way, the "restoration of rights movement that

developed i n this region was connected with the f i g h t f o r an autonomous

 33

those v i l l a g e s where the more active of the regional Jiyuto leaders

resided.

Those v i l l a g e s where strong Jiyuto leaders resided and often

served as v i l l a g e heads (kimoiri or kocho), e.g., Shinai and Atsushio,

were the same v i l l a g e s which sustained the tax boycott, despite threats

and intimidation by the a u t h o r i t i e s , u n t i l the very end of the a f f a i r ,

u n t i l , that i s , the mass arrests of late November and early December.

Most such v i l l a g e s , i t i s important to add, were located i n Yama d i s t r i c t ,

which by October had become the centre of opposition within the s i x d i s -

t r i c t s of Aizu. By 20 October, i n Yama d i s t r i c t alone forty-two v i l l a g e s

and 2,662 of t h e i r residents had handed over t h e i r power of attorney to

the l i t i g a t i o n movement. One week l a t e r an additional 1,287 people of

56

sixteen other v i l l a g e s i n Yama had also signed up. By mid-November

when many Yama residents were losing t h e i r property to government-

enforced public auctions, only 132 of the several thousand involved had
57

given i n to governmental oppression. In some v i l l a g e s , such as Miura

Bunji's Atsushio, where 273 people were summoned to appear at government

o f f i c e s f o r "questioning," and where numerous others were losing t h e i r

58

property to forced sales, none at a l l capitulated.

Many others did, however. In mid-November, when property confis-

cation and p o l i c e repression against boycotters was stepped up, many

broke from the movement and either promised to comply to corvee labour
59

duty or to pay the substitute labour tax. Among those who quit the move-

ment were l o c a l Jiyuto leaders Endo Naoyuki, Miura Shinroku, and Endo

Shozo, but only a f t e r they unsuccessfully t r i e d to reach a compromise with

Mishima. Moreover, since many of the defectors' were l o c a l v i l l a g e heads

 32

52

governing body led by the Aizu branch of the Jiyuto." Local autonomy
versus central c o n t r o l — i t was a b a t t l e c l a s s i c to most developing nations.

The import of the c o n f l i c t as regards the Japanese experience i s neatly

summarized by Kurt Steiner:

A l o c a l government system that has grown up from below may emphasize

the idea that the c i t i z e n s of a community should be given the oppor-
tunity to r e a l i s e t h e i r own interests within that community and that
the state should exercise s e l f - r e s t r a i n t for t h i s purpose. A l o c a l
government system imposed from above w i l l put the interests of the
state f i r s t , and w i l l stress the duties, not the r i g h t s , of c i t i z e n -
ship.^

This, c e r t a i n l y , i s the fundamental issue raised by the "Declara-

t i o n of the Restoration of Rights," seen equally as c l e a r l y i n the pre-

face to the rules governing the l i t i g a t i o n movement: "We who say we want

to guarantee happiness and to regain rights for our members seek to

achieve t h i s goal, based on legal a c t i v i t i e s , of reforming government by

54

simply moving to stop the road construction." On a more p r a c t i c a l

l e v e l , i n order to achieve t h e i r goals they implemented resolutions that

would fund the movement. Members were asked to contribute ten sen apiece

(Resolution 5) to cover the costs of t r a v e l expenses for the l i t i g a t i o n

committee members (Resolution 6), and t h e i r lodging expenses (Resolution

6a). The organisational structure was also enlarged and made more e f f i -

cient. Local v i l l a g e organs composed of one person per household and

apportioned into ten-to twenty-man units, who i n turn selected a leader,

were established as more e f f i c i e n t means to communicate information, to

assign r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and to pressure c o l l e c t i v e l y the l o c a l o f f i c i a l

55

in charge of road construction. Through such organs they were also able

to organise t h e i r tax boycott, which u n t i l then was largely limited to

 34

and therefore l o c a l men of influence, they were able to withdraw entire

v i l l a g e s from the movement.

Such defections did not dampen the s p i r i t of most a c t i v i s t s .

Several lawsuits against Mishima, and even against the Home Ministry,

were carried on, meetings were c a l l e d and speeches given i n many v i l l a g e s ,

and most, as a r e s u l t , remained l o y a l to the Restoration of Rights move-

ment. Also, an outside force entered the f i g h t to give .added staying

power to the movement: belatedly, Jiyuto members from the Fukushima

branch of the Jiyuto were coming to the rescue of Aizu people.

East-West A l l i a n c e

Despite the common party t i e between the east and west branches,

i t i s not surprising that the Fukushima branch stayed out of the Aizu con-

f l i c t for so long. In the mid-to-late seventies the predominant eastern

popular r i g h t societies served as patrons to the slower-organising western

society (the Aishinsha; see Chapter IV), but when i n late 1881 the subject

of consolidating into one p r e f e c t u r a l branch party came up, Aizu residents

opted to remain separate from t h e i r eastern brethren. Thereafter, each

branch was regional i n scope and i n i n t e r e s t . This i s e a s i l y seen i n the

fact that for the eastern branch the Aizu road struggle was only one

among several of the charges c i t e d against Mishima for misgovernment dur-

ing the censure vote i n May. In fact, that i t was c i t e d at a l l was largely

due to the influence and insistence of Westerners i n the largely eastern-

dominated p r e f e c t u r a l assembly, and to t h e i r friendship with Kono Hironaka,

rather than to the interest Easterners had i n the a f f a i r s and problems of

the Aizu party and the residents of the area. Most western assemblymen
 35

were not Jiyuto members; only Uda, Nakajima, and Yamaguchi and a few

others stood as the proverbial lone voices of protest to represent t h e i r

region's interest i n a p o l i t i c a l wilderness dominated by eastern and

prefecture-wide interests.

The estrangement of the west from the east stemmed i n part from

the e a r l i e r administrative d i v i s i o n of the two regions. Less than a

decade before, Aizu had been a separate prefecture with separate interests,

and fought against amalgamation. Moreover, the Aizu Jiyuto branch was

organisationally autonomous from the Fukushima one, and i t s members d i f -

fered s u b s t a n t i a l l y from the eastern members i n terms of socio-economic

background. (See Chapter III.)

In any event, with regard to the separate nature of the two branches

v i s - a - v i s one another, the important points to make are these: f i r s t , "The

disobedience campaign i n Aizu was organised under the aegis of the Aizu

Jiyuto i t s e l f . " ^ 0
Secondly, the Fukushima branch did not lend a hand

u n t i l less than a month before the Aizu movement was suppressed, and even

during that l a s t month, very few party men from Fukushima a c t u a l l y set

foot i n Aizu to lend aid. T h i r d l y , the separate q u a l i t y of the r e l a t i o n -

ship between the two branches i s further attested by the e a r l i e r -

mentioned instance of Aizu members going to Tokyo, and not to Fukushima,

for l e g a l counsel. F i n a l l y , of a l l the well-known eastern Jiyuto leaders,

only one, Tamano Hideaki, involved himself i n the Aizu struggle before

November, and then only by happenstance. 61

P r i o r to November, the

eastern branch mainly directed i t s energies and attention toward Tokyo:

i t was too embroiled i n the controversy surrounding Jiyuto President

 36

Itagaki Taisuke's planned t r i p abroad to give the Aizu road problem much

attention. In large part, t h i s stemmed from the fact that Kono Hironaka

qua national party leader involved his branch i n the junket controversy,

and himself spent most of October i n Tokyo at the national party head-

quarters. When the Aizu problem was broached, Kono was quoted as having

responded on more than one occasion, i t "ought not to be the main busi-

ness of our party." He gave as further reason not to involve himself,

or his branch, the 1874 precedent of how Eto Shimpei, an early minken/

n a t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i s t , and his followers i n Saga were manipulated by simi-

l a r circumstances into leading the i l l - f a t e d Saga Rebellion. Not u n t i l

late October did Kono and the Mumeikan of eastern Fukushima succumb to

chance involvement.

On 17 October, Yamaguchi and Miura, who had been sent to Tokyo

63

to seek additional legal advice from Oi Kentaro, met there with Kono.

The two Aizu men requested of Kono that he send eastern party a c t i v i s t s

to Aizu to lend a hand i n the anti-road campaign. On 23 October, Kono

dispatched two of the more r a d i c a l Mumeikan members, Sato Sumasu and

Kamada Naozo, not because of the e a r l i e r request f o r help, but instead

to investigate a rumour of Jiyuto-provoked violence that supposedly took

64

place on the twenty-first i n Kitakata. Kono's two envoys reported back:

"At this time, the people [of Aizu] have not yet reached the b o i l i n g

point." 6 5
I t was t h i s seemingly i n s i g n i f i c a n t non-event that served to

open the doors f o r future involvement by the Fukushima branch into the

Aizu c o n f l i c t , for from this moment u n t i l the Kitakata incident on 28

November, the eastern branch became increasingly committed and receptive

 37

to pleas made by Aizu Jiyuto leaders to a s s i s t them i n the f i g h t against

the hastened tempo of governmental repression against the party. More-

over, the eastern commitment was strengthened once i t s own members f e l l

prey to repression.

On 25 October, a meeting i n Aizu between eastern and western

Jiyuto members was v i o l e n t l y broken up by f i f t y or so T e i s e i t o members.

On the evening of the same day, i n Shinai v i l l a g e , Akajiro's v i l l a g e and

the headquarters of the Restoration of Rights Movement, several tens of .

policemen under Ebina's command threatened eastern members Sato and Monna

Mojiro (Shigejiro), who were acting as representatives for the v i l l a g e r s

i n a p e t i t i o n campaign. The same sort of incident occurred the next day

as well, t h i s time with another eastern Jiyuto member, Kamada, also pre-

sent. These confrontations, says Shimoyama Saburo, mark "the f i r s t time

Mumeikan leaders d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the l i t i g a t i o n movement.

In terms of consequences, Kamada was arrested, and Sato barely escaped,

only to return to the Mumeikan to report what had happened, and to request

that aid be given, prophetically remarking, "For our party, v i c t o r y or

6 7

defeat [in Aizu] w i l l have great consequences." Kono's response to

Sato's recommendation, however, cabled from Tokyo where he remained u n t i l

11 November, said the Aizu a f f a i r was not the business of the Fukushima
68

branch, adding, " I t might destroy our party." In contrast, the Fuku-

shima Jiyu Shimbun e d i t o r i a l i z e d on 5 November, "The troubles i n the Aizu

69
region are not unimportant with regard to our Party's future growth."
The Kitakata Incident

In Kono's absence, opinion among Mumeikan members seemed to be

 38

siding with the "help Aizu" proponents.^ On 9 November, Sugiyama

Masagi, lawyer and l a t e r a Waseda University professor, and r a d i c a l

Sawada Kiyonosuke, signatory to a manifesto c a l l i n g f o r the overthrow of

71

the government, were dispatched by Mumeikan leaders to Aizu. They

were present when during the next few weeks the p o l i c e began confiscating

the property of the tax boycotters. They were also there when Jiyuto

a c t i v i s t s Hara Heizo and Miura Bunji were arrested f o r "slander" on 19

November for having denounced the Yama d i s t r i c t chief as a "criminal"

for ordering the confiscation ("robbery") of the protesters' property.

Reportedly, Sugiyama and Sawada were at l e a s t p a r t l y responsible f o r i n -

c i t i n g a crowd of two thousand farmers, coming from v i l l a g e s recently

raided by the p o l i c e , to assemble on 23 November at the p o l i c e station

i n Kitakata where Miura and Hara were being held. The reason f o r t h i s

i l l e g a l assembly was a rumour that the two Jiyuto captives were going to

be sent outside the d i s t r i c t to Wakamatsu to be t r i e d ; only a f t e r the

crowd received assurances from the Kitakata p o l i c e that Miura and Hara
72

would be t r i e d i n l o c a l court d i d i t disperse.

The arrest of these two men, and e s p e c i a l l y of Hara, became a

cause celebre among l o c a l a c t i v i s t s and supporters. Leaders of the

movement since the beginning and "defenders of the f a i t h , " t h e i r arrest

aroused the anger of thousands of Aizu residents. I t became even more

intense the next day when i t was learned that yet another Aizu Jiyuto

leader, Uda S e i i c h i , was arrested. One of the early organisers of the

anti-road movement, Uda was seized by twenty 73 policemen while on a r e -
cruitment drive i n nearby Toyama prefecture.
 39

Uda's recruitment drive was not l i m i t e d merely to Toyama. Before

a r r i v i n g there, Uda had toured much of the nation, giving speeches and

meeting with Jiyuto leaders i n an e f f o r t to secure outside a i d . I t

appears that his e f f o r t s were f r u i t f u l . In Gumma and Sendai he received

assurances that Jiyuto members from those areas would send delegations

to Aizu (several of whom were arrested; see Appendix I I : Fukushima

Activists). Around 18 November, a f t e r Kono had returned to Fukushima

from Tokyo, he and Uda engaged i n several days of conversation, and as a

r e s u l t , Uda received a promise from Kono that the eastern branch would
74
commit i t s e l f to the Aizu struggle.

Before any of these outside Jiyuto groups could mobilize, however,

certain events overtook them, as well as the Aizu protesters. The p o l i c e

took pre-emptory action, b e l i e v i n g a r e b e l l i o n o f sorts was i n the o f f i n g ,

and began arresting other Jiyuto leaders. Between Uda's arrest and the

Kitakata incident on 28 November, another eleven Aizu Jiyuto "ringleaders"

were arrested for "assembling crowds for the purpose of r i o t i n g " (kyoto
75

shushukyosa), presumably for t h e i r alleged p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 23

November disturbance i n Kitakata. Ten other l o c a l Jiyuto leaders, fear-

ing arrest, f l e d . The s i t u a t i o n , for both sides, was one of confusion

and fear.

Against t h i s backdrop of a largely leaderless Jiyuto and a very

apprehensive government, the Kitakata incident occurred. The incident be-

gan to take shape on 26 November, two days before the event i t s e l f , at a

meeting of Jiyuto leaders and supporters held at the famous Chuzenji

temple, which i s located i n Tanaka hamlet of Shibage v i l l a g e , residence

 40

of Uda S e i i c h i . The purpose of the meeting was to consider what action

should be taken i n response to the arrest of Uda and the other Jiyuto

leaders. The p r i n c i p a l speakers at.the. meeting were Uda's father,

Sugiyama Masagi and Sato Samasu of eastern Fukushima, and Uryu Naoshi,

a twenty-two-year-old Jiyuto speech-maker and son of a headman of a Yama

district village. The upshot of the opinion expressed by these men was

that Uda was unjustly victimized for h i s e f f o r t s to contest the road

project l e g a l l y and was arrested on trumped-up charges. As most present

shared t h i s opinion, i t was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y decided to gather as many

supporters as possible and to march to the Kitakata p o l i c e station where

Uda was being held. According to an eye-witness account of the Chuzenji

meeting, nothing was said or proposed about making the march a v i o l e n t

one; the purpose was reportedly to inquire about Uda's condition, to make

sure that he would not be transferred to.another j a i l outside the d i s -

t r i c t , and, i f possible, to demonstrate peacefully for his immediate r e -

77

lease, and that of Hara and Mxura who were also being held there.

Independently, another group, t h i s one from Onuma d i s t r i c t , had

arrived at a similar plan, and on 28 November, the two bodies of farmers

met on the f i e l d s of Danseigehara, located about f i v e kilometres south

of Kitakata. Estimates of the crowd's size vary from just over a thous-

and to 10,000, but the actual figure, the experts maintain, was probably
78

closer to the former than to the l a t t e r . °

By the time a l l were assembled at Danseigehara, i t had been

learnt that Uda had already been transferred to Wakamatsu; the knowledge

of t h i s undoubtedly served to kindle the anger of the crowd. Sugiyama

 41

and Uryu addressed the crowd and, according to a p o l i c e report, used

inflammatory language: "Mishima's despotism i s trampling over the rights

79

of man." The p o l i c e also reported that Uryu urged the crowd to attack

the p o l i c e station i n Kitakata and to free the Jiyuto leaders being held.

From a l l accounts (other than p o l i c e reports, although even these

d i f f e r ) , i t i s unlikely that even i f Uryu said such things, he r e a l l y

intended that the crowd attack the p o l i c e station. For one thing, the

crowd was not armed with weaponry of any sort; i t was unlikely that they

could or would r i s k t h e i r l i v e s against well-armed policemen.80 For

another, even when the crowd did assemble i n front of the police station,

no one made any move to i n c i t e the crowd to storm the s t a t i o n . Even

though they were unarmed, however, they probably could have overcome the

f i f t e e n or so police occupying and defending the station, but as mentioned,

only at the r i s k of suffering many casualties. The most offensive action

the crowd took during the twenty minutes they were assembled there was

to shout words of abuse at the p o l i c e , u n t i l , that i s , someone threw

several stones and broke several stationhouse windows, although even here
i t has been alleged by several that a police spy (agent provocateur) was
81

responsible. When t h i s happened, three sword-swinging policemen

charged the crowd, k i l l i n g one, seriously i n j u r i n g three, and arresting

four. No p o l i c e were injured. The crowd then immediately dispersed i n

f l i g h t and the "revolutionary r i o t and attack" (kakumeiteki na kyoto

shugeki), as the Kitakata incident was l a t e r termed by the p o l i c e , came

abruptly to an end.

If the Kitakata incident can properly be regarded as the denouement

 42

of the movement, then the wholesale arrests which followed i n i t s wake

can be regarded as the climax of the Fukushima Incident. U n t i l late

December, the p o l i c e embarked upon a massive arrest campaign against

Jiyuto members, supporters, and leaders, and many innocent farmers whose

only crime was to give support to the l i t i g a t i o n movement. Throughout

the entire prefecture, close to two thousand were arrested; many were

l a t e r victims of torture while awaiting t r i a l ; and f i f t y - s e v e n were

sent to Tokyo to stand t r i a l for the crime of s e d i t i o n .

Since these post-Kitakata events were c l e a r l y an instance of

government using a minor disturbance as a pretext for major repression,

they w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l i n the l a s t chapter where the conse-

quences of the gekka jiken and the government's reactions to them are

treated.

THE KABASAN INCIDENT

Around eleven o'clock on the rainy Tuesday morning of 23 September

1884, a s o l i t a r y mountain p r i e s t of Mount Kaba, Makabe d i s t r i c t , Ibaraki

prefecture, discovered that he was no longer alone, that his mountain had

been occupied by an armed force. He sent this message to the p o l i c e sub-

station at Machiya, situated at the northern base of Mount Kaba:

F i f t e e n or sixteen men c a l l i n g themselves Jiyuto members, armed with

various weapons, and bombs too, I believe, have assembled atop Mount
Kaba, near Nagoaka v i l l a g e , Makabe d i s t r i c t . ^ 2

Of a l l reports, newspaper and government, subsequently issued

about the Kabasan rebels, t h i s one by the p r i e s t , despite i t s brevity,

was most accurate. The rebels i n fact numbered sixteen; they were heavily
 Map 3 . The Kabasan Area of Ibaraki and Tochigi Prefectures

To Nikko

Utsunomiya
TOCHIGI PREF. IBARAKI PREF.
To
Sendai
•Inaba
/
•Mibu •Kobayashi

•Tochigi Town
Kokuri •Mi to
To •Ota
Takasaki
Shimodate
(Gumma) A Mt. Kaba

/
Nagaoka
•Makabe Town
,A Mt. Tsukuba

•Nakada
 44

armed with swords, a few guns and about 150 home-made bombs; and i f the

several banners they raised atop Mount Kaba were a f a i r i n d i c a t i o n , then

indeed they were Jiyuto members. The banners read: "Charge Ahead for

Freedom," "Overthrow the Oppressive Government," "Die for Patriotism,"

83

and "Friends of Freedom and Liberalism." The next day, as i f to make

t h e i r intentions and i d e n t i t y of t h e i r group c l e a r l y known, the rebels

hoisted yet another banner reading "Headquarters of the Kabasan Revolu-

tionary Party." They could also be heard singing the "Song of American
84

Independence" (Beikoku dokuritsu no uta).

The plan of the rebels was to remain at Mount Kaba u n t i l they re-

ceived word about when an already twice-postponed o f f i c i a l ceremony to

celebrate the opening of new government buildings at nearby Utsunomiya

(Tochigi prefecture) was to be held. On the day of the ceremony they

intended to assassinate the many highly-placed Ministers of State who

were scheduled to be i n attendance, to attack the prison there and re-

lease i t s inmates, and to lead these men and other l o c a l residents on a

march against the c e n t r a l government i n Tokyo. However, as they r e a l i z e d

that the authorities were already aware of t h e i r existence and possibly

of t h e i r plans as well, a f t e r reaching the summit of Mount Kaba they de-

cided to a l t e r t h e i r o r i g i n a l plans and to take immediate action. They

decided to r a i s e an army from the residents of the area. To t h i s end, on

23 September, they raised t h e i r several banners c a l l i n g for revolution,

wrote and d i s t r i b u t e d revolutionary manifestos to Kabasan area residents,

and launched an attack upon the nearby Machiya p o l i c e sub-station, a l l

done i n order to demonstrate to the l o c a l populace the seriousness of

 45

t h e i r intentions. The rebels also attacked and robbed the wealthier

residents of the area (to whom "receipts" were given f o r the money and

merchandise taken) i n order to secure arms, food and money to meet t h e i r

own needs, and the needs of the embryo army of l o c a l s they expected to

attract.

But since several scores of policemen had thwarted the attempt of

some l o c a l residents, perhaps 100 to 200, to j o i n the rebels, the Kabasan

men were e f f e c t i v e l y isolated atop the mountain, and were further plagued

with a rapidly diminishing water supply. Hence, early on 24 September,

they decided to t r y to go ahead and attack Utsunomiya, despite there

being no ceremony scheduled f o r that day. En route to Utsunomiya, by

n i g h t f a l l they had reached the r i c e f i e l d s of Nagaoka v i l l a g e . There they

were forced to engage i n a b a t t l e with about twenty p o l i c e . Using t h e i r

bombs, they k i l l e d one, injured four, and l o s t one of t h e i r own men.

Also, during the confusion of the f i g h t they had to abandon almost 100

bombs. Confronted with death and the loss of much of t h e i r weaponry, and

fearing more p o l i c e ahead, they backtracked towards Kabasan.

On 25 September, as they headed northwest from Kabasan toward Ota

v i l l a g e , they were being pursued not only by the combined p o l i c e units

from four v i l l a g e s i n the Makabe d i s t r i c t , but also by a squad of Imperial

troops and ten metropolitan p o l i c e e a r l i e r sent from Tokyo. Despite

t h e i r fear of being overtaken by the authorities, on the twenty-sixth,

around 1:00 a.m., they attacked two homes of wealthy c i t i z e n s of Kokuri

v i l l a g e (Makabe d i s t r i c t ) . From there the rebels crossed into the moun-

tainous d i s t r i c t of Haga i n Tochigi, where after d i v i d i n g t h e i r money and

 46

weapons equally, they made camp at Kobayashi v i l l a g e and discussed their

uncertain future. F i n a l l y , a f t e r protestations by several, and sugges-

tions of mass suicide by others, they agreed to disband, but also to

regroup i n one month's time i n Tokyo. However, before the month was over,

a l l but two of them had been captured and placed under arrest. By Feb-

ruary 1885, the other two had also been caught.

Thus ended the Kabasan Incident, the f i r s t instance i n the M e i j i

85

period i n which bombs had been used, and for .revolutionary purposes.

Interpretations

It w i l l be remembered that several s p e c i a l i s t s on the Fukushima

Incident believe that the Kabasan Incident of September 1884 marks the

true ending of the Fukushima Incident. . Their reasons for adopting such

a view are not d i f f i c u l t to understand. F i r s t , of the p r i n c i p a l Kabasan

rebels (including several who did not climb the mountain, but who joined

i n the planning), eight of the twenty or so had been arrested for t h e i r

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Fukushima Incident, and another four Kabasan rebels

were residents of Fukushima. Secondly, one of t h e i r p r i n c i p a l targets

of assassination was none other than the "Devil Governor" himself,

Mishima Michitsune, who since 30 October 1883, had been serving simultane-

ously as Governor of Fukushima and of Tochigi, and therefore was to serve

86
as host to the gathering of Tokyo o f f i c i a l s at Utsunomiya. As several
have pointed out, " . . . had there been no Mishima, there probably would
87

never have been a Kabasan Incident." In other words, for the Fukushima

participants i n the Kabasan Incident at least, the attack on Utsunomiya

was a means to avenge the e a r l i e r repression they and the Fukushima

 47

Jiyuto had suffered under Mishima during 1882. In this view, Mishima

was a c a t a l y t i c agent personified. F i n a l l y , during t h e i r t r i a l s several

of the Kabasan rebels coming from Fukushima stated unequivocally that

t h e i r involvement stemmed from a hatred of Mishima.

Although there i s good reason to accord credence to t h i s view, at

the same time there also exists reason enough not to accept t h i s i n t e r -

pretation of revenge i n i t s entirety. This view by i t s e l f does not, f o r

instance, explain why those rebels coming from Ibaraki, Ishikawa, A i c h i

and perhaps even Tochigi decided to j o i n . Nor does i t explain why

several of the Fukushima participants during t h e i r court t r i a l s failed

to c i t e revenge against Mishima as an important reason for p a r t i c i p a t i n g .

The revenge thesis also f a i l s to take into account i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s

as motivating forces which, as we s h a l l see i n Chapter IV, were much too

strongly f e l t to ignore. F i n a l l y , the single-factor interpretation of

revenge does not even begin to explain the substantially d i f f e r e n t nature

of the Kabasan r e b e l l i o n i n terms of the t a c t i c s , targets and goals of

participants. The Fukushima Incident may, then, be regarded as a s t a r t -

ing point i n the development of the Kabasan, but nonetheless must not

obscure the fact that the Kabasan Incident was h i s t o r i c a l l y an event i n

itself. One f i n a l observation: revenge against Mishima might have very

well provoked the Kabasan rebels to act i n i t i a l l y , but i n the process of

planning the assassination of Mishima they broadened t h e i r objective to

include high-ranking government o f f i c i a l s of the central government.

Planning lasted over a year, and i n the process the i n i t i a l reason f o r

involvement came to be less important to the conspirators than t h e i r

 48

ultimate goal, revolution. In t h e p r o c e s s , t h e Kabasan r e b e l s appear t o

have e x p e r i e n c e d some change i n p o l i t i c a l consciousness; t h i s generaliza-

t i o n a p p l i e s t o those coming from Fukushima p r e f e c t u r e as w e l l as o t h e r

areas.

B e f o r e l o o k i n g a t t h e development o f t h e i n c i d e n t , i t i s n e c e s s a r y

t o f i r s t e x p l a i n what i s meant by development. In a s m a l l s c a l e , conspir-

a t o r i a l p l o t such as the Kabasan I n c i d e n t , development r e f e r s t o r e c r u i t -

ment, the p r o c e s s by which i n d i v i d u a l s and s m a l l groups come t o know one

another s u f f i c i e n t l y t o exchange c o n f i d e n c e s about i d e a s and p l a n s that

would c o n v e n t i o n a l l y be r e g a r d e d as t r e a s o n a b l e . As we s h a l l see, from

e a r l y 1883 u n t i l 23 September 1884, almost a l l o f t h e twenty o r so r e b e l s

l i v e d i s o l a t e d and l o n e l y l i v e s o f i n t r i g u e , p l o t t i n g , and c o n s p i r a c y .

Each, i t seems, determined f o r h i m s e l f t h a t r e v o l u t i o n was e s s e n t i a l .

But each o f them a l s o knew t h a t alone he was unable t o e f f e c t r e v o l u t i o n .

Hence, each r e a l i z e d t h e importance o f f i n d i n g o t h e r s who shared this

b e l i e f , and more i m p o r t a n t l y , who were w i l l i n g t o a c t upon i t . T h i s p r o -

cess whereby each found " l i k e - m i n d e d " men (doshi) c o n s t i t u t e s the develop-

ment o f t h e i n c i d e n t . More than i n e i t h e r o f t h e o t h e r two i n c i d e n t s ,

men r a t h e r than events form t h e c o r e o f t h e Kabasan I n c i d e n t . The

Kabasan r e b e l s sought t o make events, r a t h e r than t o r e a c t t o them.

Recruitment was o f a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d . F i r s t , s i n c e most o f t h e

r e b e l s were committed t o a s s a s s i n a t i o n , r e c r u i t m e n t was n e c e s s a r i l y

h i g h l y e x c l u s i v e , as t h i s type o f adventure appealed o n l y t o v e r y few.

Status o r s o c i a l s t a n d i n g was n o t a c r i t e r i a i n c h o o s i n g comrades. As

one o f t h e r e b e l s phrased i t , "From t h e o u t s e t , we d i d n o t p l a c e any

 49

importance on r e c r u i t i n g important personages (meiboka) to j o i n our

88

i l l e g a l rebellion." Secondly, the nature of recruitment was very i n -

formal and secretive. A constant fear of p o l i c e spies i n f i l t r a t i n g t h e i r

group, which as we s h a l l see probably did happen, caused the rebels to

exercise extreme caution i n discussing t h e i r plans. Only those people

known to hold strong anti-government views, and who attended i l l e g a l

party meetings, were privy to the conspiracy. Monna Shigejiro, for

example, t e s t i f i e d on 10 November to the question:

Q: What methods were used to bring the comrades together?
A: Mine and other's was to speak only with those [interested in]
t h i s t o p i c , and also to keep our ears open to b i t s and pieces [of
information] coming from a wide variety of people at meetings of
comrades. But as far as s p e c i a l methods, I say there were none.^9

F i n a l l y , i f we can believe the rebels' testimony i n court and

p o l i c e interrogations, then for each rebel there i s a somewhat d i f f e r e n t

version of how they became involved. Moreover, i n reconstructing the

chain of events, the few secondary sources—contemporary to the incident

as well as present-day—are of l i t t l e help i n sorting things out. In

these works, too much emphasis i s placed on p e r s o n a l i t i e s , ideology or

90

"terrorist" tactics, and too l i t t l e on the i n t r i c a c i e s of involvement.

However, a f t e r c a r e f u l readings of each of the rebels' s t o r i e s as t o l d to

the p o l i c e and prosecutors, I think that t h i s problem can be handled be-

91

cause the s t o r i e s t o l d by each of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , except for one,

are characterized by forthrightness and apparent honesty, even to the ex-

tent that i t earned seven of them the death penalty. This w i l l be d i s -

cussed further i n the l a s t chapter.

This said, we now move on to look at the development of the i n c i -

dent.
 50

Strategy and Recruitment

It w i l l be remembered that during October 1882, as the leaders

of the Fukushima Incident were turning greater attention to l i t i g a t i o n

as a means to f i g h t Mishima, Monna Shigejiro, ex-policeman, Wakamatsu

shizoku, and member of the l i t i g a t i o n committee, was sent to Tokyo to

seek further legal counsel from Oi Kentaro. After the Kitakata incident

of 28 November, Monna was arrested and i n A p r i l 1883 was sent to Tokyo

to stand t r i a l for the crime of sedition. Acquitted of t h i s crime, he

sought to make Mishima pay for h i s arrest and imprisonment (and probably

torture; see Chapter V). Hence, i n July, along with Jiyuto a c t i v i s t s

Hara Heizo and S a j i Kyomatsu, Monna went to Sendai, obtained a lawyer

named Maezawa, and "called on a member of the appeals court (koso sai-

banjo) i n order to bring l e g a l action against the unfair treatment suf-

92

fered because of the Fukushima governor." Unsuccessful there, he and

his companions went to the Wakamatsu courts for the same purpose, but

t h i s time not only did he not have a chance to pursue his lawsuit, but

as a r e s u l t of t r y i n g was sought for the crime of "slandering a public

official" (namely, Mishima). To escape arrest, Monna f l e d to Tokyo and

went into hiding for three months. While there he met a number of Jiyuto

r a d i c a l s , two of whom, Kono Hiromi (or H i r o s h i ) , nephew of Kono Hironaka

and also recently acquitted of treason, and Yokoyama Nobuyuki, ex-

policeman and son of a low-ranking samurai of old Aizu han, were to j o i n

him l a t e r i n the Kabasan Incident.

The content of the discussions held i n Tokyo between Monna, Kono,

and Yokoyama during the winter of 1883 to 1884 are of great importance i n
 51

understanding subsequent events. By t h i s time a l l three of these young

Fukushima men, aged twenty-three, nineteen, and twenty-one respectively,

had abandoned any notion of bringing about p o l i t i c a l reform by peaceful

means and had concluded that only violence offered any hope of e f f e c t i n g

democratic changes i n the Japanese government. This common understanding

gave them, and the others who were to j o i n them l a t e r , the necessary basis

to a r r i v e at a plan for revolution. But at the same time, they disagreed

on what type of v i o l e n t strategy to employ. This disagreement proved to

be an ongoing one, l a s t i n g u n t i l shortly before the r e b e l l i o n i t s e l f , and

determined to some extent exactly who would be among the sixteen men who

climbed Mount Kaba on 23 September.

The disagreement revolved around the d i s t i n c t i o n made by the

rebels between ko-undo or "small movement" and dai-undo or "large move-

ment." "Small movement," otherwise c a l l e d "assassination-ism" (ansatsu-

shugi) by the rebels, and supported by Kono and Yokoyama, implied that

" f i v e men, perhaps ten men, having the same b e l i e f s and aiding one

another, could carry out assassination, i n other words, a small movement."

By "large movement," again quoting Kono Hiromi's courtroom testimony, i t s

advocate, Monna meant "getting a large number of l i k e - t h i n k i n g men from

a l l over the country to meet i n Tokyo and overthrow the government; i n

93

other words, a large movement." To the rebels, t h i s was also known as

"raising-an-army-ism" (kyoheishugi). How many men were needed to comprise

a large movement was suggested by one of the early p l o t t e r s who withdrew

from the r e b e l l i o n because of disagreement over t h i s issue of strategy.

Ohashi Genzaburo said during p o l i c e questioning:

 52

To carry out the revolution (kakumei), 300 comrades would be suf-

f i c i e n t to go to Tokyo and e f f e c t the overthrow. Using dynamite,
probably 100 men would be enough to assassinate o f f i c i a l s . But the
proper time to carry this out has not yet arrived.(Emphasis
mine.)

According to Kono, those advocating a "large movement" wanted "to

95

wait three years to s t a r t the revolution." Kono, Yokoyama and most of

the others argued that i t was not necessary to wait for the "proper time,"

that i t was i n t h e i r power to create the "proper time" by large-scale

assassination of high-ranking government o f f i c i a l s :

To discuss [this issue of t a c t i c s ] i s senseless. To e s t a b l i s h a con-
s t i t u t i o n a l system based on the rights of the people, i t i s necessary
to overthrow the despotic government. To overthrow a despotic govern-
ment, we cannot count on the remote p o s s i b i l i t y of such things as
r a i s i n g a prefecture-wide army. I t i s a far-fetched idea because we
lack s u f f i c i e n t funds. Hence, instead we s t r i k e one blow aimed at
the genro ["senior statesmen"] of the government. This done, having
l o s t i t s leaders ["head"], the government ["body"] w i l l naturally
fall. 9 6

This problem of the best strategy to employ to overthrow the

government resurfaced continually, even up u n t i l the day of the r e b e l l i o n

itself. Although more about the implications of t h i s debate w i l l be d i s -

cussed i n Chapter IV, for the present l e t i t s u f f i c e to make three points:

(1) a strong majority of the Kabasan rebels favoured "assassination-ism"

more or less consistently; (2) "more than h a l f of the assassination fac-

97

t i o n had been connected with the Fukushima incident"; and (3) even

those against a "small movement" usually believed that once the assassina-

tions were accomplished, either by design or by chance, an anti-government

army would r i s e up. In any event, the important point to make i s that

regardless of which strategy a Kabasan conspirator advocated, he shared

with the others the goal of overthrowing the government, and i t was this
 53

fact that allowed him to co-operate with the others.

Through Yokoyama, Kono and Monna became better acquainted with

Yokoyama's patron, Koinuma Kuhachiro (Tadayaro), the "fatherly master of

98
the assassination f a c t i o n , " or as another contemporary c a l l e d him,
99

"friend to the commoners (heimin)." Although less famous p o l i t i c a l l y

than the man whom the government mistakenly assumed was' the r e a l leader

of the Kabasan rebels, Tomatsu Shoan (Masao), Koinuma was i n fact the

prime mover and organiser of the rebels u n t i l less than two weeks before

the incident, when an accidental explosion of a bomb he was making cost

him his l e f t arm. Koinuma was thirty-two years old i n 1884, was himself

a commoner from Tochigi prefecture, and was the unsuccessful t h i r d son

of a wealthy merchant/farmer family who allowed Koinuma freedom enough to

100

pursue his c h i l d - l i k e f a s c i n a t i o n f o r mechanical devices. In f a c t ,

Koinuma's a b i l i t y to make bombs, an art that he l a t e r taught to several

of the other rebels, made him the l i k e l y leader of those who had opted

for assassination-ism.

Koinuma's r a d i c a l tendencies are f i r s t known to have been ex-

pressed i n January 1883, during a meeting of around 300 Kanto Jiyuto mem-

bers held i n Tochigi Town. During the meeting, the purpose of which was

to discuss what consequences the Fukushima Incident had on the growth and

s o l i d a r i t y of the Party, Koinuma met p r i v a t e l y with f i v e other members

who were well known for t h e i r r a d i c a l ideas: Arai Shogo, v i l l a g e head,

secretary of the Tochigi party branch, and magazine publisher cum intel-

lectual; ^"'" Shiota Okuzo, a Jiyuto p r e f e c t u r a l assemblyman; Sakagihara

1

Keibu, lawyer and brother-in-law to Monna; Koinuma's " c l i e n t " (kobun),

 54

Yokoyama; and Fukao J u n n o s e i p a r t y member who was l a t e r accused of being

102

a p o l i c e spy. A l l except Fukao were l a t e r arrested for complicity i n

the Kabasan Incident.

What these men discussed with Koinuma remains unknown today, but

at another such secret meeting, held t h i s time i n Tokyo on 23 November

1883 at an Asuka-yama ryokan (hotel), i t i s known that about 100 young

103
Jiyuto members met "to discuss what shishi ['patriots'] should be doing."
One source claims that i t was here that Koinuma met Ibaraki Jiyuto leader
104
Tomatsu Masao, Kono Hiromi and others l a t e r involved i n the incident.
Another source claims that at t h i s meeting Koinuma f i r s t discussed with
. . 105

these men his intention to assassinate high government o f f i c i a l s .

Koinuma himself said that at this meeting he met Kono and Miura Bunji

through Kotoda Iwamatsu, another Kabasan rebel, and that they then began

p l o t t i n g the a s s a s s i n a t i o n . ^
1
But whatever the s p e c i f i c content of the

discussion, i t i s l i k e l y that some t a l k of assassination did take place

for immediately a f t e r t h i s meeting Koinuma began making bombs at his home

in Inaba v i l l a g e .

Also at this meeting i n Tokyo, Koinuma probably was introduced

to Amano Ichitaro, nineteen-year-old shizoku who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the

Fukushima Incident, and Yamaguchi Moritaro (Sanetaro), eighteen years old

and also a shizoku from Fukushima. Less than a month a f t e r the Tokyo

meeting these two youth went with Koinuma to Tochigi Town to spy upon,

and to investigate the routine of, the newly-appointed governor Mishima

Michitsune, whom they had chosen as a target for assassination. One

source states that t h e i r journey was more than a mere scouting p a t r o l ,

 55

that they actually intended to assassinate Mishima then, but that they

deferred because of respect for the Emperor who was v i s i t i n g Tochigi at

^ ^. 107
the time.

Probably independently of t h i s attempt, around January 1884, Kono

and Fukushima a l l i e s Kotoda Iwamatsu and Kusano Sakuma pledged to k i l l

108
Mishima. Kono himself claimed during his courtroom testimony that " i t
was late l a s t year [1883] or early t h i s year that we f i r s t discussed
109

[using bombs to assassinate government o f f i c i a l s ] . " But the "we" i n

Kono's testimony refers not to Kusano and Kotoda, as the authors of the

Jiyuto-shi claim, but to "Yokoyama, Sugiura and Saeki." Quite possibly

both sources are correct to the extent that each refers to a d i f f e r e n t

episode involving Kono, for c l e a r l y several plots were i n the making by

this time. For instance, Kusano had already been recruited by fellow

Fukushima a c t i v i s t Miura Bunji i n mid-1883 for involvement i n a plan to

assassinate Mishima,"*" ^ along with Amano, Yamaguchi, and Kokugi.

1
And, as

we have already seen, Yamaguchi and Amano by this time were a s s i s t i n g

Koinuma i n his own p l o t to k i l l Mishima. Hence, besides Kono's scheming,

at least two separate plots to assassinate Mishima, one by Koinuma and

another by Miura, with overlapping membership, had been hatched i n late

1883. The s i m i l a r i t i e s i n timing and i n membership of the two plots

leads us to believe that the two groups were probably i n contact with

each other by then. Moreover, Tomatsu Masao, who was to assume leader-

ship of the incident a f t e r Koinuma's accident, had by 23 November 1883

been alerted at least to Koinuma's p l o t , and probably was therefore not

at a l l surprised when he was approached i n mid-September for assistance.

 56

The i n t r i c a c i e s of recruitment thus far mentioned can be s i m p l i -

fied. On the one hand there was Koinuma's group: Amano, Yamaguchi, Kono,

and Yokoyama by late 1883; by late 1884 Saeki Shomon (Masakado), Sugiura

Kippuku, Kobayashi Tokutaro, and Isokawa Motoyoshi had learned through

Kusano of Koinuma's intentions and had joined him. "'' A l l nine of these
11

men, l i k e t h e i r leader, Koinuma, were committed to "assassinationism."

They stand i n contrast to another group of Jiyuto members, mainly from

Tochigi, with whom Koinuma entered into discussions a f t e r May 1884:

Ohashi Genzaburo, Iwamoto Shinkichi, Tateno Yoshinosuke and several

others, some of whom Koinuma had spoken with i n the January 1883 Tochigi

Town meeting (e.g., Arai Shogo, Shida Okuzo, and Sakagihara Keibu). This

l a t t e r group of Koinuma's associates generally supported the "large move-

ment" strategy, and although l a t e r implicated, remained for the most part

on the periphery of the conspiracy, and were not among those who raised

the f l a g of revolution atop Mount Kaba.

More or less simultaneously to Koinuma's recruitment of t h i s

group, Miura Bunji, one of the p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i s t s i n the Fukushima I n c i -

dent, was assembling his own group, also committed to "assassinationism."

Kokugi, Kusano, and Hara Rihachi, farmer and commoner from Fukushima,

were i t s main "members"; Yamaguchi and Amano, whom Miura shared with

Koinuma, made up the rest of Miura's group.

Besides the twelve thus far mentioned, four others eventually

112

climbed Mount Kaba on 23 September. From Ibaraki came Tomatsu Masao,

former school teacher and head of an Academy f o r young Jiyuto r a d i c a l s

located i n Shimodate; his bodyguard and fencing instructor at the academy,

 57

Tamamatsu Kaichi; and one of the academy's students, Hota Komakichi. The

fourth was Koinuma's fellow Tochigi resident and Jiyuto ideologue, Hirao

Yasokichi, the only one of a l l sixteen to be k i l l e d i n b a t t l e . The

involvement of these men stemmed from either t h e i r personal contact with

Tomatsu, or from the contact they made with members of Koinuma's or

Miuras's group at a Tokyo Jiyuto youth academy. (See Chapter IV.) As we

s h a l l soon see, the beginnings of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the planning of

the incident are dated around mid- to late-August.

Planning the Revolution

Not u n t i l about that time did the Kabasan rebels s e t t l e upon a

concrete plan of action. I t could hardly have been otherwise. U n t i l then

"recruitment" consisted mainly of individuals and small groups discovering

the i d e n t i t y of others who shared a more-or-less vaguely expressed intent

to reform the government and a more-or-less p r e c i s e l y expressed b e l i e f i n

eliminating the more obtrusive of the government's leaders as the most

e f f i c i e n t means to e f f e c t reform. But as Koinuma became the hub of this

underground movement, the focus of the rebels' enmity became, contradic-

t o r i l y , both sharper and d u l l e r . From the i n i t i a l plans to assassinate

only Mishima, they changed to include a l l high government o f f i c i a l s . And

since i t was the c a p i t a l where a l l the important o f f i c i a l s resided, the

rebels moved from Koinuma's home i n Tochigi, where most of the bomb-

making and discussions between his group and Miura's had taken place since

January, to Tokyo. From early summer u n t i l shortly before the jiken it-

s e l f most of the action takes place i n Tokyo.

The centre of a c t i v i t y i n Tokyo was Kono Hiromi's apartment

 58

located on the t h i r d f l o o r of a boarding house (geshuku) i n the Nihonbashi

113
d i s t r i c t , and owned by Jiyuto sympathizer Iizuka Denjiro. According
to Koinuma, at Kono's apartment i n early July, he, Kono, Yokoyama, Saeki,

and Sugiura planned t h e i r f i r s t attempt to assassinate government

114

officials. The occasion was to be the 19 July ceremony welcoming the

new n o b i l i t y into the Peers (Kazoku), to be held at the Enryokan, and to

be attended, according to a newspaper report from which the f i v e rebels

took t h e i r information, by over 100 high government o f f i c i a l s , including

such notables as Ito Hirobumi and the recently appointed (12 December

1883) Home Minister, Yamagata A r i t o m o . 115

As Koinuma lectured his co-

conspirators, t h i s was t h e i r chance to emulate the Russian n i h i l i s t s , to

"bring about the revolution by assassinating ministers of state." "'" 1 6

But as i n the September incident, bad planning and bad luck prevented

them from carrying out their plan. In the matter of bad planning,

although Koinuma had been making bombs at l e a s t since January, he had not

yet tested any, nor perhaps had he yet obtained a l l the necessary ingred-

ients to make them e f f e c t i v e . This i s indicated by a number of large

purchases made just before the day the ceremony was scheduled—2,500

pieces of iron shot bought i n Tokyo on 19 July, and 120 t i n tea containers

(chazutsu) on 18 July, also i n Tokyo—and by the bomb-testing sessions

carried out by Koinuma and Kono i n Ishikawa d i s t r i c t (Fukushima) on 29

July, and i n Kamitsuga d i s t r i c t (Tochigi) as late as 21 August. In the

second instance, "bad luck" apparently hurt t h e i r plans since the govern-

ment postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y (as they

117 did with the Utsunomiya ceremony i n
September) the Enryokan ceremony.
 59

The decision to carry out the Enryokan assassination attempt was

not made u n t i l 13 July, a bare three days a f t e r a meeting of Jiyuto

r a d i c a l s — i n c l u d i n g Koinuma, Sugiura, Kono and a number of Tomatsu Masao

followers as well—was held at an inn on Mount Tsukuba, Ibaraki prefec-

ture, from 9 to 11 July. The meeting was supposed to be attended by

r a d i c a l s from Ibaraki, Tochigi, Fukushima, Saitama, and Gumma i n order to,

according to one account contemporary to t h i s period, "together select

118
the vanguard of the revolution." How many attended i s not known, but
i t i s known that Saitama and Gumma Jiyuto branches f a i l e d to send dele-
119

gates. The meeting discussed the implications the Gumma Incident (May

1884) had for the p o s s i b i l i t y of s t a r t i n g the revolution. Koinuma and

his supporters argued that the f a i l u r e of the Gumma Jiyuto r a d i c a l s to

transform the incident's p a r t i c i p a n t s into an "army" proved the p r a c t i c a l

emptiness of the "large movement" strategy, and that accordingly "assas-

120

smationism" must be t r i e d . The other f a c t i o n , however, p r i m a r i l y

followers of Oi Kentaro (who was l e c t u r i n g i n the Kansai region at the

time), proposed organising an advance guard composed of Tohoku (North-

eastern) p a t r i o t s so that "when the moment of imminence comes, we w i l l be

ready to r a l l y groups of Tohoku shishi, who w i l l come [to Kanto] as the

121

pioneers of the revolutionary army (kakumei gun no semben)." This

f a c t i o n also argued that t h e i r immediate concern, as a preparatory step

to r a i s i n g the army, should be party reform, centred around the creation

of a new r a d i c a l leadership. They maintained, "Reform of the Jiyuto head-

122

quarters [leadership] and p o l i t i c a l revolution are complementary."

This group's p o s i t i o n , though hurt because of Oi's absence, appears to

 60

have carried the meeting, because Koinuma and his followers l e f t i t com-

p l a i n i n g that the meeting had f a i l e d to arrive at any concrete plan of

123

action. Given t h i s , i t seems f a i r to assume that Koinuma's plans to

assassinate government o f f i c i a l s at the 19 July Enryokan meeting stemmed

from the f r u s t r a t i o n and impatience he suffered because of the Tsukuba

meeting.

Despite the Enryokan disappointment, Koinuma's hopes rose momen-

t a r i l y when i n mid-August he learned of a wide-scale disturbance at

Hachioji, beginning on 10 August and organised by Jiyuto and Komminto

(Poor Peoples' Party) leaders. Perhaps t h i s indicates that Koinuma was

coming around to the "large movement" strategy, or perhaps he was just

looking to r e c r u i t other comrades for a "small movement," but i n any event

he sent Hirao, Isokawa, and Kobayashi to speak with the leaders of the

Hachioji r i s i n g . Several days l a t e r Koinuma's emmisaries returned to

report, "They are unable to understand our purposes at a l l . They are lack-

ing i n p r i n c i p l e s , i n s p i r i t , and i n w i l l , and were unwilling to discuss

124

the matter seriously." Again disappointed, he bided his time by

t e s t i n g his bombs.

F i n a l l y , good news arrived. On 20 August, the newspapers reported

that on 15 September, a ceremony to inaugurate the relocation of the

Tochigi c a p i t a l to Utsunomiya would be attended by many high-ranking

government o f f i c i a l s from Tokyo; the host of the event, the papers also

noted, would be Mishima Michitsune. The Kabasan rebels regarded t h i s as

125
"one chance i n a thousand."
 61

The Beginning of the End

Koinuma immediately arranged for a l l the bomb materials they had

been buying, c o l l e c t i n g , and hiding i n Tokyo to be sent to his home i n

Tochigi. He also sent Sugiura, t r a v e l i n g under a false i d e n t i t y , to

Utsunomiya to v e r i f y whether the newspaper reports were accurate,' and

further c a l l e d for his comrades to meet at Kono's Tokyo apartment on 1

September. Assembling there to plan the attack on Utsunomiya were

Koinuma, Kono, Sugiura, Kotoda, Yamaguchi, Amano, Hirao, and Isokawa.

As the o f f i c i a l Party history has i t , "There they united i n a revolution-

ary a l l i a n c e (kakumei domei). " 1 2 6

But, as i t w i l l be noticed, only one-

half of the sixteen men who ascended Mount Kaba were at t h i s time part of

the "revolutionary a l l i a n c e . " In fact, as Kobayashi l a t e r points out i n

his court testimony, "The assembling of a l l seventeen [sic] and the

mutual decision on our plan by a l l seventeen [sic] was not completed

u n t i l 21 or 22 September. Before then the plan had only been discussed

127

i n small groups of f i v e or ten." At any rate, a f t e r the eight men

vowed i n Tokyo to begin preparing for the 15 September assassination p l o t ,

Koinuma l e f t for his home i n Tochigi to begin his own planning.

Now confronted with what almost c e r t a i n l y was the perfect oppor-

tunity to overthrow the government, Koinuma began to come around to the

idea of r a i s i n g an army. When he returned to Tochigi he entered into

discussions with a number of Jiyuto radicals known for t h e i r support of

the "large movement" strategy. In his own words, on 3 or 4 September he

spoke with Ohashi Genzaburo about "how the Jiyuto could aid the ordinary

people (ippan jimmin), . . . and together concluded that we must summon

 62

our energies for a revolution decided only by our deaths (kesshi kakumei).

. . . I t o l d him of the p l o t to assassinate government Ministers. . . .

128

We subsequently made a compact to seek death together." As a r e s u l t

of t h i s compact, Ohashi opened his home to bomb-makers Kusano and Isokawa.

Secondly, Koinuma approached the l o c a l "strong man" (kyokaku or "Robin

Hood") Kumakutsu Torashi about gaining help from him and his many f o l -

lowers who were miners at the Ashio copper mine, hoping to raise an army
129

once the assassination was carried out. F i n a l l y , Koinuma chose four

men—Kono, Yokoyama, Sugiura, and Miura--to draw up a plan of attack that

included freeing the inmates from Tochigi prisons and j a i l s as a prelude

130
to inducting them into the revolutionary army. S i m i l a r l y , he also
131

hoped to r e c r u i t the l o c a l poor into the army. Koinuma's plan, then,

was " i f the attack on Utsunomiya i s successful, then we w i l l raise an

army" that would i n turn march on Tokyo where an appeal would be made to
132

the Emperor to change the government. Given this plan, i t i s not sur-

p r i s i n g that during his t r i a l Koinuma expressed admiration for Oliver

Cromwell, who i n the beginning of the English Revolution did not want to
133

dispose of the monarchy.

Around the same time, and most probably with Koinuma's approval,

Kono, Yokoyama and Kobayashi, who had remained i n Tokyo a f t e r Koinuma

and the others departed for Tochigi, met with Monna Shigejiro at the

Jiyuto youth centre where they unsuccessfully t r i e d to s o l i c i t party

134

funds for the revolution. They needed the money i n order to buy addi-

t i o n a l bomb materials, e.g., f i f t y pounds of potassium chlorate and 200

pounds of red phosphorous. In l i e u of a party contribution, they proposed

 63

to Monna that the four of them should rob a Kanda area pawnshop, whose
135

owner was known not only to have 300 to 400 yen on hand usually, but

also to be a generous money-lender to the n o b i l i t y (kazoku). As a pure

"raise-an-army-ism" proponent, Monna was reluctant to j o i n these three

"assassinationism" advocates, but d i d so on the understanding that h i s

13(

portion of the money stolen would be used "to raise funds for the army."

Thus i t came about that around 7:30 p.m. on 10 September, these

four men, each armed with a bomb, broke into the Kanda pawnshop, surpris-

ing i t s owner who screamed and brought a nearby policeman running to the

scene, simultaneously whistling for other policemen to respond. Kono

137

alone, said Yokoyama l a t e r , threw h i s bomb, causing serious injury to

one passer-by and s l i g h t injury to another passer-by as well as to one

policeman. Monna too was s l i g h t l y injured by the b l a s t , and was captured.

The other three—although the pawnshop owner said he saw only two others

—escaped and hid that night i n Tokyo. The next morning they l e f t for

Koinuma's.

The "costs" of the robbery f a r exceeded the "benefits" the rebels

derived. F i r s t , they managed to steal only four yen. Secondly, although

Monna managed to conceal his i d e n t i t y from the p o l i c e for several days

after the robbery, once i t was discovered they further learned who h i s

comrades were that night (except f o r Kobayashi) and began a Kanto-wide

manhunt. F i n a l l y , as the "Kogawa jiken" (Kogawa i s a section of the Kanda

d i s t r i c t ) was the f i r s t time i n Japan's history that anyone had been

injured by a bomb, the authorities were a l l the more persevering i n t h e i r

attempt to capture the rebels. Also, i t i s l i k e l y that the apprehension

 64

the robbery provoked i n the authorities was responsible for the post-

ponement of the Utsunomiya ceremony, scheduled for a mere f i v e days

a f t e r the robbery.

The rebels did not hear of the postponement u n t i l four days l a t e r ,

on 14 September. By that time they had suffered yet another, perhaps

more serious reverse to t h e i r cause. On 12 September, with eight other

rebels present, Koinuma seriously injured himself at his home i n Inaba

when a bomb he was making exploded. Koinuma l o s t his l e f t arm, suffered

a serious concussion, and had to be hospitalized at Mibu .Town:; The next

day he was v i s i t e d by the l o c a l p o l i c e . Despite his serious condition,

Koinuma did not break under Police questioning and refused to say anything.
138

Not u n t i l October did Koinuma confess h i s r o l e i n the incident.

For the rebels, the immediate consequence of the loss of t h e i r

leader was, of course, fear of being discovered and arrested. They there-

fore f l e d to Ibaraki, to the Literary and Martial Arts H a l l (Bunbukan) of

Nakada v i l l a g e , where they stayed one night. The next day (fourteenth)

they went to Tomatsu Masao's Yuikan i n Shimodate. There they remained

u n t i l the Kabasan jiken on 23 September. By 18 September, Kono, Yokoyama,

and Kobayashi had arrived there as well, after f i r s t stopping at Koinuma's

on 13 September, only to hear of h i s accident. (Incredibly, though not

yet known to the p o l i c e as a "Kogawa jiken" p a r t i c i p a n t , Kono v i s i t e d

Koinuma i n the hospital on the thirteenth.) By 18 September, then, a l l

sixteen rebels who were to climb Mount Kaba were assembled for the f i r s t

time since the 1883 beginning of the recruitment process.

Having l o s t t h e i r former leader, by going to Tomatsu they gained,

 65

a l b e i t r e l u c t a n t l y , a new one. I say "reluctantly" because Tomatsu was

dedicated to Oi Kentaro's f a c t i o n of Jiyuto r a d i c a l s who believed i n

waiting and q u i e t l y preparing for some future revolution. How Tomatsu

139
got involved i n what he c a l l e d "this r i s k y revolutionary undertaking"
he explained during his t r i a l on 19 January 1885:

On September 14, 1884, Hirao Yasokichi and Kotoda Iwamatsu came to

see me. They expressed t h e i r approval of my work [at the Yuikan] and
said that they agreed with i t . . . . They then informed me repeatedly
that they were making bombs and that they planned to use them against
important people at the Utsunomiya ceremony i n the hope of reforming
the government. After that they asked i f f i v e or six others could
come and t a l k with me, to which 1 said, " c e r t a i n l y . " That afternoon
I spoke with Hara and four or f i v e other Jiyuto members who had come
and who agreed with the p l o t . . . . On September 18, Kono and several
others arrived, bringing our company to sixteen.140

On the same day that Tomatsu i n v i t e d the rebels to his school,

the rebels learned that the Utsunomiya ceremony had been postponed. This

i n part explains why Tomatsu, who i n the past had consistently opposed

the "small movement" strategy of revolution, agreed to involve himself,

i.e., since there was no immediate danger that the rebels would take any

action, he may have seen t h i s as an opportunity to convert f i f t e e n very

dedicated and p o l i t i c i z e d men to his way of thinking. Certainly, i t was

not simply because his ego was f l a t t e r e d by t h e i r praise of his work that

he joined them, because he r e a l i z e d , "I was made t h e i r leader (shukai)

. . . because I am well known i n t h i s region and could therefore persuade

141

people to give us men and provisions. . . ." S t i l l , the most l i k e l y

reason for Tomatsu s p a r t i c i p a t i o n was, as the author of the contemporary

1

work Tosui minken shi argued, that Tomatsu believed, as Koinuma had come

to believe, "assassinationism" could serve as the f i r s t step to r a i s i n g

142
an army of revolution. Hence, he had convinced the others by 22
 66

September t h a t , "Our aim i s d e f i n e d : t o go t o Kabasan u n t i l the ceremony

a t Uysunomiya i s h e l d ; then t o go t h e r e and r a i s e an army; then [to

overthrow the government] and e f f e c t r e f o r m (kairyo) o f the central

government.
4. ..143

The events t h a t f o r c e d the s i x t e e n r e b e l s t o l e a v e the Yuikan

and go t o Kabasan were s e v e r a l . F i r s t , on 21 September, s e v e r a l o f the

r e b e l s a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n o f neighbours by s t u p i d l y t e s t i n g some

bombs near the Yuikan. Secondly, a warrant had been i s s u e d f o r the

a r r e s t o f Kono and Yokoyama on the e i g h t e e n t h ; they l e a r n e d o f the warrant

on the t w e n t y - f i r s t . T h i r d l y , Hota had been sent t o Utsunomiya t o l e a r n

when the ceremony would be scheduled; he found out t h a t i t had been

moved from the t w e n t y - f o u r t h (the second s c h e d u l i n g ) t o the twenty-

seventh. ( I t f i n a l l y took p l a c e on 22 October.) F i n a l l y , on the evening

o f the twenty-second, a " f r i e n d , " o r a p o l i c e spy a c c o r d i n g t o one con-

144
temporary source, v i s i t e d the Yuikan t o r e p o r t and warn t h a t , "Tonight
145

policemen are coming here. I t e l l you t h i s f o r your p a s t k i n d n e s s e s . "

Supposedly s u r p r i s e d a t t h i s news, Tomatsu o r d e r e d the f i f t e e n t o c o l l e c t

t h e i r bombs, g a t h e r p r o v i s i o n s , and head f o r Mount Kaba.

What happened t h e r e , as we saw a t the b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s narrative,

c o n s t i t u t e s the c l i m a x o f the Kabasan I n c i d e n t . I f the r e b e l s ever had

a chance t o r e a l i z e t h e i r p l a n , i t was l o s t the next day when the governor

o f I b a r a k i c a b l e d the Home M i n i s t r y : "3,000 r i o t e r s on Mt. Kaba. Send

aid immediately."
 Map 4. Chichibu D i s t r i c t and Surrounding Areas
0 10 20 km
KODAMA
DISTRICT
NAKA
GUMMA PREF. •KaneyA DISTRICT
/
/
/

MINAMI-KANRA , • •Homirioyama ^-, Yb'rii* HANZAWA

„ , , Manaba* *Oda
DISTRICT Sakahara • -- ' DISTRICT
•Kanesaki
Yono* -otabu
•Honnogami
•Kpkahara '.Kami • Fuppu*
•OJz6mo hinozawa \ OBUSUMA
Shimo-•
Fuj ikura , ?l- 1 £E a . Isama* Sakamoto• DISTRICT
hinozawa
Narahara• •Hio •. Akuma *Minano
i
NAGANO Usuda
1
Shirai- Sanyama• Kami- I >
•Kawarasawa yoshida • Onohara
PREF. / To Kuma=
• Chinas : Iida ' gaya
Takanomachi- •Ogano
Susuki* Shimo- -Omiya
'Kaize HIKI
ogano ?Nagaru
DISTRICT
• Higashi-managashi •Komori *'Yokose
•Kita-aiki •Shiroku

CHICHIBU DISTRICT
•Minami-aiki \To Hanho >
Noheyamahara •
MINAMI-SAKU
DISTRICT
y IRUMA
DISTRICT

YAMANASHI PREF.

TOKYO (URBAN) PREF.

 68

THE CHICHIBU INCIDENT

At 5:00 p.m. on 1 November 1884, as the l a s t of the government

troops were a r r i v i n g i n Tokyo from Ibaraki, where they had been sent f i v e
147

weeks e a r l i e r to suppress the Kabasan rebels, about 3,000 farmers,

hunters, small tradesmen, Jiyuto party members, and l o c a l school teachers

were meeting at the Muku temple, situated on a high tree-covered h i l l i n

the v i l l a g e of Shimo-yoshida, Chichibu D i s t r i c t , Saitama Prefecture. The

people present were armed with r i f l e s , swords and bamboo spears. Most

were wearing white head bands (shiro-hachimaki), straw sandals (waraji),

short coats (hanten) with t h e i r sleeves girded up and held by white cords,

and t i g h t - f i t t i n g trousers that were pulled up at the groin. Before them

stood Tashiro Eisuke, s e r i c u l t u r i s t , once-convicted gambler, s e l f -

proclaimed lawyer (daigsnnin), the son of a low-ranking samurai, and a

man of patronage who was able to count several hundred people as " c l i e n t s "

(kobun). But at t h i s moment, he faced the crowd that was assembled within

the outer compound of the temple as t h e i r "supreme commander" (soshireikan),

as leader of the Poor Peoples' Army (Komminto).

To one side of Tashiro stood his "chief of s t a f f " (sambocho),

Kikuchi Kanbei, another "lawyer," who had come from Saku d i s t r i c t of

neighbouring Nagano prefecture to j o i n the Komminto only four days e a r l i e r .

The other o f f i c e r s of the Komminto, standing on the temple steps with

Tashiro and Kikuchi, were i n d i v i d u a l l y introduced. "Vice-commander" of

the Army was Kato Orihei, a gambler and philanthropic pawnshop owner of

Isama v i l l a g e . The two "treasurers" were Shinto p r i e s t and long-time

friend of Tashiro, Miyakawa Tsuari, and Jiyuto member and farmer of

 69

Shimo-yoshida v i l l a g e , Inoue Denzo. Those introduced as "battalion com-

manders" were Shibaoka Kumakichi, Arai Shuzaburo, and Iizuka Seizo, also

residents of the Chichibu region. Under them were several assistant com-

manders of the three battalions; below them squadron leaders, p r i v i s i o n s

o f f i c e r s , and so on. In a l l , over sixty men were introduced to the crowd

as o f f i c e r s of t h e i r army.

When the crowd was s i l e n t , Kikuchi read the "army code," or

" a r t i c l e s of war," that would henceforth serve to guide the behaviour of

the army. I t prohibited drinking, the v i o l a t i o n of women, arson without

permission, and the withholding of appropriated goods and money from the
148

army command. When this was done, one of the leaders, perhaps Kikuchi

again, read the "Rules of Conduct" (kodo mokuhyo) that would serve to

give d e f i n i t i o n to the aims of the army. Its f i r s t rule was to "aid the

poor people"; the others served to pinpoint the targets of the rebels:

c r e d i t o r s ' homes, p o l i c e stations, government buildings, and the o f f i c i a l

149

documents found i n these places.

With these formalities disposed of, the l a s t order of business

was to assign a l l those present who were not already members of one of

the v i l l a g e squads to units of t h e i r own. By 8:00 p.m. t h i s work was

done and two b a t t a l ions were assembled. The " F i r s t Battalion" (ko—tai) ,

numbering 2,000 men, was led by Kato Orihei, A r a i Shuzaburo, and Ono

Naekichi. I t began marching southwest toward the market town of Ogano.

The "Second Battalion" (otsu-tai), under the leadership of Tashiro,

Iizuka, and Ochiai T o i s h i , took a d i f f e r e n t route to Ogano, enabling the

Komminto army to surround the town eventually. E a r l i e r , before the two

 70

battalions began marching, Takagishi Zenkichi had taken a squad of men

to Shimo-ogano i n order to scout ahead of the main force. By eleven

o'clock that evening the Komminto army had begun invading Ogano and be-

fore the day was over had placed the town under Komminto rule.

These events of 1 November mark the formal beginning of the Chi-

chibu Incident. The "formal" end of the r e b e l l i o n was ten days l a t e r ,

when the government announced that the l a s t remnants of the Komminto army

had been routed. In fact, however, these dates represent only the begin-

ning and end of open, large-scale h o s t i l i t i e s between the government

and the rebels. Here we w i l l examine the actual origins of the c o n f l i c t ,

and i n Chapter V w i l l show that the incident produced effects that mani-

fested themselves p o l i t i c a l l y well after 10 November.

Towards Rebellion

The f i r s t known instance i n which individuals, l a t e r to become

instrumental i n organising the Komminto and the r e b e l l i o n , took concerted

action to aid the poor people of Chichibu was i n December 1883. At that

time Takagishi Zenkichi, Sakamoto Sosaku, and Ochiai T o i s h i presented a

" p e t i t i o n admonishing usurers" (koriga setsuya seigan) to the administra-

t i v e head of Chichibu d i s t r i c t (guncho), requesting that the government

intervene on behalf of the indebted, order creditors to permit interest

payments on loans to be deferred, and also to i n i t i a t e a scheme whereby

repayment of a l l outstanding debts could be made annually over a f o r t y -

year period. The d i s t r i c t head, however, argued that he did not have the
150
authority to accept such a p e t i t i o n and sent the three men away.
The next instance of importance with regard to the l a t e r r e b e l l i o n
 71

took place i n the spring of 1884. In March, following a February speak-

ing tour throughout Chichibu by the well-known Jiyuto r a d i c a l , Oi Kentaro,

the same three men, who i n December had petitioned the government, joined

the Jiyuto and then attended i t s national conference i n Tokyo. With Oi

Kentaro, who by then was Jiyuto d i r e c t o r of the Kanto region (Kanto

chiho jobi-in), they secretly pledged to overthrow the government. They

also agreed to serve as the Chichibu representatives for the Jiyuto

151

headquarters. Also during March, and on into A p r i l , these same three,

along with other l a t e r Komminto leaders, Inoue Denzo (Jiyuto member),

Inoue Zensaku, Miyada Seitaro, and Arai Shigejiro, again petitioned the

d i s t r i c t head with the same demands that were made i n December. Again,

however, they were refused, t h i s time on the grounds that a recent

edict governing the presentation of p e t i t i o n s d i d not allow the p e t i -

tioning of d i s t r i c t or prefectural o f f i c e r s without f i r s t receiving

formal permission from the v i l l a g e heads (kocho) of the p e t i t i o n e r s

concerned. Ignoring t h i s , they subsequently once again petitioned, but

failed.

For most of these early a c t i v i s t s , who were farmers, the next

two months was the "busy season" (nohanki) when s e r i c u l t u r i s t s were

forced to give the utmost care and attention to t h e i r spring silkworms.

Not u n t i l July did organisational a c t i v i t y resume i n Chichibu. To the

north, however, i n Gumma prefecture, which borders Chichibu, several

thousand impoverished farmers followed l o c a l Jiyuto members and others

into a r e b e l l i o n that May;

t h i s was known as the Gumma Incident and was
153
one of the several gekka jiken of 1884. I t i s noteworthy because i n
 72

October and November several prominent Jiyuto members from the region i n

Gumma where the incident took place came to Chichibu to o f f e r t h e i r ser-

vices to the Chichibu rebels.

In July, according to the M e i j i government, organisational

a c t i v i t y that l a t e r led to the building of the Komminto began anew. When

the government t r i e d Arai Shigejiro, a forty-four-year-ole impoverished

s e r i c u l t u r i s t from Isama v i l l a g e i n Chichibu, for his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n

the r e b e l l i o n , he was accused and found g u i l t y of "helping to organise

the Komminto between July 12 and September 1, 1884, along with Ochiai
154

T o i s h i and Takagishi Zenkichi " The government's contention

that organisational a c t i v i t y was taking place since July i s supported

not only by Arai's testimony i t s e l f , but also by records that show f a r -

mers gathering during July to protest against high i n t e r e s t loans. On

16 July, for example, farmers from the v i l l a g e s of Minano, Shimo-yoshida,

155

and Ogano met near Ogano for t h i s purpose.

Although some organisational a c t i v i t y occurred during July, i t

i s the month of August that r e a l l y marks the beginnings of serious and

consequential organisational a c t i v i t y by the farmers of Chichibu. The

mechanism that brought farmers together i n August and that allowed them

the opportunity to begin organising was the s i l k market. In early August

s e r i c u l t u r a l i s t s took t h e i r worms, cocoons, and s i l k to market for sale.

And the market, as Inoue observes, "was where l o c a l farmers communicated

156
to one another t h e i r thoughts about l o c a l conditions." In early
August, t h e i r thoughts centred around the fact that the value of t h e i r
157
products was only about one-half t h e i r 1882 value.
 73

Such was the case on 10 August, when a t l e a s t a dozen farmers

who were d o i n g b u s i n e s s a t the Ogano market d e c i d e d , on whose s u g g e s t i o n

it i s not known, t o meet s e c r e t l y i n the f o r e s t s o f nearby Mount Azawada

i n o r d e r t o o r g a n i s e some k i n d o f response t o the d e t e r i o r a t i n g economic

conditions. On t h a t day the Poor P e o p l e s ' P a r t y was born. According to

the l a t e r courtroom testimony o f T a k a g i s h i , the n u c l e u s o f the Komminto

was formed and the o r i g i n s o f a p l a t f o r m were e s t a b l i s h e d :

I i s u k a M o r i z o , O c h i a i T o i s h i , Inoue Zensaku and e l e v e n o r twelve

o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g m y s e l f , d i s c u s s e d how we ought t o o b t a i n an e i g h t -
y e a r , annual debt repayment scheme.158

Although no e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e i s made t o the term Komminto i n t h i s pas-

sage, t h e r e i s n o n e t h e l e s s r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t by t h i s time (10 August)

the term was b e i n g used f r e q u e n t l y by C h i c h i b u farmers.

For one r e a s o n , s i n c e A p r i l the Komminto o f H a c h i o j i , located

about f o r t y k i l o m e t r e s s o u t h e a s t o f Omiya, had been a c t i v e l y — s o m e t i m e s

p e a c e f u l l y , sometimes v i o l e n t l y — e n g a g e d i n a f i g h t a g a i n s t the u s u r e r s

of t h e i r r e g i o n f o r the r e d u c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t on l o a n s . In f a c t , on 10

August itself, the v e r y day the C h i c h i b u o r g a n i s e r s were meeting on Mount

Azawada, the H a c h i o j i Komminto l e d a r e b e l l i o n o f s e v e r a l thousand

farmers from s e v e r a l v i l l a g e s a g a i n s t l o c a l l o a n companies and government

159
officials. I t i s a l s o important t o note t h a t t h e i r r e b e l l i o n met

w i t h p a r t i a l s u c c e s s , e s p e c i a l l y i n r e g a r d t o the r e s c h e d u l i n g o f l o a n

^ 160
repayments.

Elsewhere i n the c o u n t r y , o r g a n i s a t i o n s o f i n d e b t e d farmers,

b e a r i n g d i f f e r e n t names but making the same type o f demands, had been

s p r i n g i n g up s i n c e 1882. In August o f t h a t y e a r farmers o f Shimane

 74

prefecture had formed the Yohaka shakuchito, or "Yohaka Leased Land

Party." ""Debtors' Party" or Shakkinto, was another t i t l e that indebted

farmers took for t h e i r organisations i n Shiga and Fukuoka prefectures

during 1883, and i n Shizuoka and Iwaki prefectures i n early 1884.

In Chichibu i t s e l f , there i s evidence that the t i t l e "Komminto"

was already gaining currency by early August. A farmer from Akuma v i l -

lage, from which many l a t e r joined the November r e b e l l i o n , was quoted as

saying, "In mid-August I went to a meeting of the Komminto." In another

instance, a young carpenter of Tochiya v i l l a g e (near Omiya) said, "On

August 18, we gathered at a temple i n our mountain v i l l a g e . I t was said

that a large crowd from Ogano was coming to wreck the house (uchikowashi) of'
16 2

a l o c a l usurer. We decided that we ought to j o i n them." "We" here

meant the v i l l a g e Komminto organ.

While t h i s was going on, the i n i t i a l organisers of Mount Azawada

were also busy. Several of the Jiyuto members among them, such as Ochiai

and Takagishi, had begun making l i s t s of the names of indebted farmers,

then approached t h e i r creditors requesting r e l i e f , and traveled throughout

the many mountain communities giving lectures, holding meetings, and

X63
organising l o c a l Komminto organs. Arai E i t a r o of Isama v i l l a g e and
Takeuchi Kishigoro of Kamihinozawa were two such v i l l a g e leaders who were
164
prompted by the early Komminto organisers to b u i l d v i l l a g e p a r t i e s .
In some cases, i t appears that joining the l o c a l Komminto was a prelimi-
165

nary move to joining the Jiyuto i t s e l f . Moreover, during August and

early September, organisational a c t i v i t i e s by Komminto leaders reached

beyond the boundaries of Chichibu d i s t r i c t and spread into neighbouring

 75

Kodama, Hanzawa, and Ofusama d i s t r i c t s . Even the neighbourhood prefec-

tures of Gumma and Nagano were not immune to the organisational a c t i v i -

t i e s of the early Komminto o r g a n i s e r s . 1 6 6

Hence, "Around t h i s time the
16V

name 'Komminto' came to be widely used."

By late August and early September the organisational process was

proceeding well i n the eyes of i t s i n i t i a t o r s , but they also had reached

the conclusion that the leadership of the Komminto was as yet d i f f u s e ,

that i t needed a well-known and strong figure to unite and cement the

bonds of membership. The one whom they were able to agree upon, the per-

son who was l a t e r t o become "Supreme Commander of the Army of the Poor

Peoples' Party," was Tashiro Eisuke. According to the posthumous l e t t e r s

of Ochiai, i t was Kato Orihei who f i r s t suggested Tashiro Eisuke as the
168

ideal candidate. Tashiro was known to be sympathetic to the Jiyuto,

i f not a c t u a l l y a member himself; he was a l o c a l meiboka ("famous person-

age") , a patron (oyabun) who had several hundred c l i e n t s (kobun) under

obligation to him; a known gambler, once convicted, who was obviously not

averse to opposing authority; and f i n a l l y Tashiro was a self-declared

Kyokaku, or "Robin Hood," who believed he should "help the weak and crush

the strong." In a l l , Tashiro seemed to be the ideal person to head the

Komminto. Thus, beginning 21 August, Tashiro was approached at least

three times by the early Komminto organisers (Inoue Denzo, Horiguchi

Kosuke of Gumma and one of Tashiro's kobun, Iizuka Seizo, Jiyuto member

Kokashiwa Tsunejiro, also of Gumma, and Takagishi Zenkichi). Not u n t i l

8 September, however, d i d Tashiro consent to serve as leader. I t appears

that Tashiro's reluctance to j o i n was due to a fear that the Komminto

 76

would ultimately resort to r e b e l l i o n and that i n the process l i v e s would

169

be l o s t . However, with the addition of Tashiro, the s e t t l i n g of the

leadership problem was accomplished, and the Komminto leaders henceforth

proceeded to devote a l l t h e i r energies to further organisational e f f o r t s .

For the next month organisational a c t i v i t i e s took the form of

Komminto a i d to indebted farmers who were having d i f f i c u l t y with c r e d i t o r s .

Komminto members would either confront creditors d i r e c t l y on the question

of deferring repayment of loans, or they would encourage l o c a l farmers

to organise themselves into l o c a l Komminto branches f o r the same purpose.

They were aided i n their attempts to capture new Komminto members by

both the recalcitrance of creditors to comply with such demands, and by

the effects that suppression of v i l l a g e meetings by the p o l i c e had i n

alienating poor farmers from the authorities. Nearly a l l the e f f o r t s

by the Komminto during t h i s month met without success i n reducing or

deferring debt repayment. This fact prompted the Komminto leadership to

c a l l a meeting at the home of Inoue Denzo on 12 October, to discuss how

the Komminto was going to respond to i t s lack of success i n helping the

indebted farmers.

According to the Nichi Nichi Shimbun account, nine leaders were

present at t h i s meeting: Tashiro, Kato, Inoue Denzo, Arai Shusaburo, a

school teacher; Takagishi, Sakamoto Sosaku, Kokashiwa of Gumma, and

170
Kikuchi Kanbei of Nagano. They discussed the f a i l u r e s thus f a r of
Komminto members to make any gains with creditors over the terms of loans,
and the d i s t r i c t government!s r e f u s a l to intervene on behalf of Chichibu's
171
poor farmers. To date, they noted, the Komminto had worked within
 77

the confines of the law, r e l y i n g upon the means of organisation, per-

suasion and negotiation to t r y to get demands met. This, they decided,

had proved i n e f f e c t i v e . Unanimously, they decided that r e b e l l i o n was

the only alternative.

Having reached t h i s conclusion on 12 October, they closed the

meeting u n t i l the next day when they decided they would meet at the home

of Kato Orihei. There they would tackle the problem of how to implement

the decision to rebel. Two immediate problems arose: f i r s t , the problem

of how to communicate t h i s decision to Komminto supporters throughout

Chichibu and, likewise, how to convince them of the wisdom of t h i s

decision; and secondly, the problem of how a group of indebted farmers

could acquire s u f f i c i e n t money and provisions to e f f e c t a r e b e l l i o n suc-

cessfully.

The solution to the l a t t e r problem, i t was decided, perhaps on

172

Tashiro's suggestion, was to " l i b e r a t e " funds from the wealthy r e s i -

dents of the region. On 14 October, the next day, Miyakawa, Sosaku,

Horiguchi and several others broke into the home of a wealthy merchant of

Yokose v i l l a g e and stole four swords, a spear, and 100 yen. Arai

Shusaburo followed s u i t on the f i f t e e n t h , but was only able to steal

173

f i f t y sen from a reputedly wealthy farmer. But once the actual f i g h t -

ing began i n November, the Komminto increasingly turned, with greater

success, to robbery, confiscation of goods, weapons and food, and to

impressment i n order to meet t h e i r needs of money, supplies and men for

the r e b e l l i o n .
In response to the f i r s t problem of how to mobilize t h e i r
 78

sympathizers throughout the d i s t r i c t , the Komminto leaders apportioned

Chichibu d i s t r i c t into a number of t e n - v i l l a g e units and assigned to

each of themselves the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for mobilizing one of these units.

Tashiro, for instance, who was responsible for the villages e n c i r c l i n g

his own home town of Omiya, began on 15 October to v i s i t each of these

v i l l a g e s on a rekiho ("round of c a l l s " ) , advocating to the v i l l a g e r s that

they should be prepared to r i s e i n "house-wreckings" against t h e i r

174

creditors. (Ultimately, once the r e b e l l i o n began, only three of his

v i l l a g e s responded.) Not a l l of the Komminto leaders, however, employed

t h i s method of "round of c a l l s " to mobilize followers, usually because

i t was not necessary. Since many v i l l a g e s had begun organising themselves

since late August, mobilization i n these cases amounted merely to the

conveyance of a message from Tashiro, or one of the other leaders, to a

v i l l a g e Komminto leader. Such, for instance, was the case with Fuppu

village. But whatever the means employed to mobilize the v i l l a g e r s ,

p o l i c e reports on the condition of the region c l e a r l y show that Chichibu

residents were b u s i l y engaged i n organising a f t e r mid-October. Yet even

though the p o l i c e were aware of t h i s , they maintained as late as 21

October, that, "The s i t u a t i o n i s not such that [we expect] a r e b e l l i o n

soon." They argued t h i s on the basis of knowledge of t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i -

c u l t u r a l patterns, saying that early November was an u n l i k e l y time for

r e b e l l i o n because this was when the Chichibu farmers began planting

wheat (mugimaki)

Just f i v e days l a t e r , however, on 26 October, at Shimo-yoshida's

Mount Ano, near where the Yoshida and Isama r i v e r s converge and where
 7.9

160 Komminto members had met for an organisational meeting on 6 September,

the Komminto leadership gathered to decide upon the date to begin the
176

rebellion. Kokashiwa, who two months e a r l i e r had come from h i s native

Gumma to help the Chichibu farmers organise the Komminto, argued on t h i s

occasion for a 28 October r i s i n g . Tashiro, supported by Inoue Denzo,

recommended a l a t e r November beginning, mainly on the grounds that i t

would take at least a month to mobilize and co-ordinate other groups and

areas i n the Kanto region. Only by involving the poor people of Gumma,

Nagano, Yamanashi, and Kanagawa prefectures, Tashiro maintained, would

the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n have a chance of success. Kokashiwa, l i k e most

of the others present at t h i s 26 October meeting, believed that the

peoples of these other prefectures would r i s e spontaneously once the

Chichibu Komminto led the way. Kokashiwa's views won the day, and as

the meeting ended a l l present agreed upon 1 November as the date the

r e b e l l i o n was to begin.

"Headquarters of the Revolution"

Kokashiwa and his supporters at the Mount Ano meeting were not

the only ones i n Chichibu impatient to begin f i g h t i n g . On 31 October,

while most Komminto leaders were meeting at Kami-hinozawa i n the morning,

and at Kato's home i n Isama i n the afternoon, i n order to make f i n a l

preparations for the r e b e l l i o n , the Komminto branch of Fuppu v i l l a g e

located i n the far northeast of Chichibu d i s t r i c t , numbering 130 to 140

men, began marching southeasterly i n order to meet up with the main body

of the Komminto then beginning to c o l l e c t at Shimo-yoshida. En route,

the advance squad of the Fuppu organ met and fought with f o r t y - f i v e
 80

policemen who had been sent from Y o r i i (Hanzawa d i s t r i c t ) to investigate

rumours of r e b e l l i o n . According to newspaper reports, which t o l d of a

177

"poor peoples' r e b e l l i o n i n Fuppu," twelve of the rebels were captured

before they managed to rout the p o l i c e and continue t h e i r march, attack-

ing the homes of usurers along the way.

The same evening, before the r e b e l l i o n was scheduled to begin,

Arai Shusaburo, Shibaoka Kumakichi, and Kadodaira Sohei led forty men

against a loan company i n Kami-hinozawa and destroyed 10,000 yen worth of

178

mortgaged land deeds. They also reportedly set f i r e to the homes of

the president of the loan company, of the v i l l a g e head (kocho), and of

a l o c a l pawnbroker, and took the l a t t e r ' s brother as hostage.

The next day, p r i o r to the large gathering of the Komminto army

(mentioned at the beginning of t h i s section), yet another b a t t l e took

place, t h i s time at Shimo-yoshida. Though reinforced by p o l i c e sent from

Ogano, l o c a l p o l i c e were nonetheless outnumbered by the rebels and were

forced to f l e e after two of t h e i r members and one Komminto member were

k i l l e d , the f i r s t of the very few recorded deaths i n the Chichibu rebel-

lion. While t h i s f i g h t was going one, other Komminto men were storming

the o f f i c e of the kocho. After capturing i t , they proceeded to burn a l l

o f f i c i a l records stored t h e r e — l a n d r e g i s t r i e s , tax assessments, family

r e g i s t r i e s , etc. This practice of the destruction of o f f i c i a l records

was repeated throughout the remaining days of the r e b e l l i o n .

Another instance of t h i s practice, again occurring on 1 November,

i s exemplified by the a c t i v i t i e s of Sakamoto Sosaku and his " g u e r r i l l a "

179
unit of 150 men, one of three such units active during the r e b e l l i o n .
 81

On the f i r s t day of open r e b e l l i o n his unit was active i n and around

Shimo-yoshida. They entered the d i f f e r e n t hamlets, attacked the homes of

usurers and the o f f i c e s of o f f i c i a l s , burnt documents, stole weapons and

money, and invited or enjoined v i l l a g e r s to serve i n t h e i r unit. In some

v i l l a g e s the people w i l l i n g l y joined, but i n others where the population

was generally apathetic or unsympathetic to the r e b e l l i o n , men were

impressed into service. One person per household was the customary

demand made by the rebels. In t h i s way, by 2 November, Sosaku had i n -

creased his force to 300, doubling i t s o r i g i n a l number. This p r a c t i c e of

r e c r u i t i n g or of impressing Chichibu residents also occurred throughout

the remainder of the r e b e l l i o n .

By the end of 1 November, as e a r l i e r seen, the Komminto army had

captured the market town of Ogano. There the l o c a l government o f f i c e was

set a f i r e , destroying a l l public documents; the p o l i c e station was

attacked and i t s defenders sent running; the homes of six usurers were

destroyed, and food and arms were appropriated from the residents of the

town. From Omiya, the d i s t r i c t c a p i t a l (present-day Chichibu C i t y ) , the

f i r e s i n Ogano could e a s i l y be seen. Reacting quickly, the merchants

and the wealthy of Omiya began to scurry into hiding, or to send o f f

t h e i r families and t h e i r valuables i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the impending

attack upon the town by the rebels.

In Ogano on 2 November at 6:00 a.m., over 3,000 men and women

divided into squads of riflemen, takeyori ("bamboo spears") and battotai

("drawn-sword squad") formed into two long columns, boasting squad and

b a t t a l i o n flags, and departed from Ogano to head southeast toward Omiya.

 82

As they encountered no resistance along the way, they reached Omiya by

noon and e a s i l y overpowered a squad of policemen who were defending the

town. They then proceeded to the d i s t r i c t government o f f i c e (gunyakusho)

— e a r l i e r vacated by the d i s t r i c t head, known l o c a l l y as "Daruma" because

of h i s corpulence—where they placed a sign on the building that read

180

"Headquarters of the Revolution" (kakumei hombu). The Komminto army

also immediately captured the town j a i l , which they p a r t l y destroyed, and

the courthouse from which o f f i c i a l documents were seized and burnt.

Between the evening of 2 November and the morning of 3 November,

the Komminto leadership issued three orders to i t s army. F i r s t , the

homes and contents of Omiya's more notorious usurers were to be wrecked.

Secondly, Ide Tamekichi, "the c o l l e c t o r of funds for the army" (gunyokin-

shukata), Nagano resident and Jiyuto member, was to take charge of c o l -

l e c t i n g money from the town's wealthiest c i t i z e n s . O f f i c i a l records show

that almost 3,000 yen was acquired from the wealthy, and over 250 yen

from the d i s t r i c t government o f f i c e . To at least f i v e of the ten who

"donated" money to the Komminto, " o f f i c i a l " receipts were given, showing

the amount donated, the purpose for which the money would be used ("mili-

tary expenses"), the date, and a stamp reading "Headquarters of the Revo-
181

l u t i o n " addressed, Omiya. Tashiro personally signed four of them.

The t h i r d order issued by the command concerned an appeal for

aid and manpower from the nearby v i l l a g e s . To t h i s end, small forces of

Komminto were dispatched to the nearby v i l l a g e s of the Buko Mountain

area. Appeals f o r aid were usually made d i r e c t l y to the v i l l a g e head,

who was asked to send to Omiya one person from each household. As a
 83

consequence of these appeals, during the next two days people from the

region poured into Omiya, bringing the t o t a l force to at l e a s t seven or

eight thousand by 3 November. Some newspapers and the Komminto i t s e l f ,

and l a t e r the a u t h o r i t i e s , said that by this date the t o t a l Komminto

force had reached 10,000. But i n any event, as several newspapers ex-

pressed i t , the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n had become "the largest and most

v i o l e n t movement since the peasant uprisings (ikki) of 1876 i n Gifu, Mie,

182
and A i c h i prefectures."

From Victory to Defeat

An equally important fact pointed out by the newspapers at the

time was that up u n t i l t h i s point " a l l of the Chichibu region had been a
183

c l e a r b a t t l e - f i e l d for the Komminto." I t had thus f a r only experienced

v i c t o r i e s , a l b e i t minor ones, i n i t s battles against the a u t h o r i t i e s .

Communications being what they were, the very remoteness of Chichibu,

the very mountainous and therefore l a r g e l y inaccessible t e r r a i n , as well

as the impressive size of the Komminto army, not to forget,the unpre-

paredness on the a u t h o r i t i e s ' part, were a l l factors ensuring these early

victories. There were, however, attempts made by l o c a l authorities early

on to nip the r e b e l l i o n i n the bud. As early as 1 November, the prefec-

t u r a l governor had requested the Home Ministry, headed by the notorious

M e i j i o l i g a r c h Yamagata Aritomo, to dispatch Imperial troops to q u e l l

the r e b e l l i o n . But no response was made by the Home Minister u n t i l the

following day. On 2 November, the secretary to Yamagata relayed to him

the cables that had been a r r i v i n g from the Chichibu a u t h o r i t i e s . He also

probably reported to Yamagata that the nation's major newspapers were

 84

beginning to send special correspondents to Chichibu, i n d i c a t i n g that the

r e b e l l i o n was coming to be regarded p u b l i c l y as an event of some impor-

tance. At 6:00 a.m. November 3, an assistant to Yamagata telegraphed

Urawa, the c a p i t a l of Saitama:

The Home Minister has become very anxious about conditions there.
But [ i t seems] there i s l i t t l e danger at t h i s time and he urges cau-
t i o n . He says that by now the [Tokyo garrison] troops should have
been dispatched.184

By 9:30 a.m. a company of the Imperial Army, l e d by Major Harada and

Second Lieutenant Kummamoto, arrived i n Urawa, and t h e i r a r r i v a l was soon

followed by that of two other companies i n the late afternoon. A l l of

these troops proceeded- to head f o r Kumagaya, and then on to Y o r i i (by

r a i l ) where a base of operations was set up. On 4 November, the next day,

the Third Company of the Third Battalion of the Tokyo garrison had

arrived at Kodama Town. Chichibu was sealed o f f at "the north and at

the northeast.

Perhaps because they had not anticipated that the Imperial army

would be mobilized so quickly, or perhaps because of rumours c i r c u l a t i n g

around Omiya, on 3 November, the Komminto leadership panicked. The panic

was accentuated by t h e i r own " i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s " — n e v e r very r e l i a b l e

throughout the entire time of r e b e l l i o n — w h i c h mistakenly reported the

Imperial army was marching on Omiya that very morning.

To minimize the disorder a r i s i n g among the rank-and-file because

of these reports, the Komminto leadership devised a strategy to replace

t h e i r e a r l i e r one of shutsugeki ("sortie") into surrounding hamlets f o r

men, weapons, and provisions. Since by then i t was obvious that a show

of strength alone would not compel the authorities to consider t h e i r

 85

demands, they concluded t h a t they must u t i l i z e and t e s t the s t r e n g t h o f

t h e i r army f o r the f i r s t time. A c c o r d i n g l y , they d e c i d e d t o employ their

three b a t t a l i o n s . Kato O r i h e i and A r a i Shusaburo were t o take the First

B a t t a l i o n and head toward the Ogano-yoshida d i s t r i c t and repulse the

advance supposedly b e i n g made by the I m p e r i a l t r o o p s toward t h a t area.

The Second B a t t a l i o n , under the command o f K i k u c h i and I i z u k a , was to

head n o r t h t o defend Onohara. The T h i r d B a t t a l i o n , commanded by Tashiro

and O c h i a i , was t o remain i n Omiya and p r e p a r e t o defend the city.

Almost n o t h i n g went as p l a n n e d . The Second B a t t a l i o n disobeyed

i t s o r d e r s and went beyond Onohara as f a r as Y o r i i where they were r o u t e d

and f o r c e d t o r e t r e a t back t o Onohara. The F i r s t B a t t a l i o n , numbering

o n l y 1,000 men, found no I m p e r i a l t r o o p s a t Yoshida; they remained there,

r a t h e r than s e a r c h i n g out government t r o o p s , and c a r r i e d out s o r t i e s i n

the r e g i o n . T a s h i r o , too, was g u i l t y of disobeying ( h i s own) orders.

F e a r i n g t h a t an a t t a c k on Omiya was i n e v i t a b l e , he took most o f the T h i r d

B a t t a l i o n and went t o Minano, which, he f i g u r e d , was a less likely object

o f government a t t a c k . While t h e r e T a s h i r o s u f f e r e d severe chest pains

(he was f i f t y - o n e - y e a r s o l d ) , and, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, by the

morning o f 4 November had withdrawn from the r e v o l t . H i s abandonment o f

h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the r e b e l s , i t appears, was p r e c i p i t a t e d by the

a r r i v a l of h i s son Yasa, w i t h whom he subsequently disappeared i n t o the

185

mountains, o n l y t o be found and a r r e s t e d two weeks l a t e r . On the

same day, Komminto l e a d e r Inoue Denzo a l s o d i s a p p e a r e d . N o t h i n g more was

heard about him u n t i l t h i r t y - f i v e y e a r s l a t e r when on h i s deathbed i n a

s m a l l v i l l a g e i n Hokkaido he r e v e a l e d h i s t r u e i d e n t i t y as a " l e a d e r o f
186
the C h i c h i b u I n c i d e n t . "
 86

Following the disappearance of Tashiro.. and Inoue on 4 November,

the leadership of the Komminto deteriorated quickly. In quick succession

other leaders also f l e d : Kato Orihei, Arai Shusaburo (who had e a r l i e r

been seriously wounded by a t r a i t o r i n his b a t t a l i o n ) , Arai E i t a r o ,

Takagishi Zenkichi, Kokashiwa Tsunejiro, Ide Tamekichi, and Akihara

Shojiro a l l dispersed i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . Kato Orihei, second i n

command under Tashiro, probably t y p i f i e d the sentiments of the other

leaders who f l e d when, upon hearing of the disappearance of Tashiro and

187

Inoue, he said, "I thought to myself, there i s nothing to do but f l e e . "

Regardless of t h e i r reason for breaking ranks, they did so none

too soon. Even more troops had been mobilized on the afternoon of 4

November, and had begun to augment t h e i r force by r e c r u i t i n g (conscripting,

i n some cases) l o c a l hunters and ex-samurai, and making them the core of

"self-defense" forces. By late i n the day an estimated 1,000 police,

army and l o c a l r e c r u i t s had formed a semi-circle from the northeast to

the southeast around Chichibu, and were slowly closing i n , c o n s t r i c t i n g

the movements of the Komminto. By the early morning of 5 November, the

authorities had retaken Omiya, "Headquarters of the Revolutionary Army."

At t h i s point, the only e f f e c t i v e resistance by the rebels that

remained was centred at Minano. From there Ochiai ordered a unit of

eighty to a hundred men to hold the Kainida pass, the most l i k e l y point

of entry for the government's troops coming over the mountains that sep-

arated Minano from Sakamoto v i l l a g e . Near Sakamoto late on 4 November,

the two sides clashed i n armed combat, and although the Komminto troops

were successful i n repulsing the government's advance that evening, they

 87

were forced to retreat the next morning a f t e r a squad of garrison troops,

armed with the new Murata r i f l e s , arrived as reinforcements. During the

retreat Ochiai vanished, only to re-emerge two years l a t e r as a p a r t i c i -

pant i n the Osaka Incident led by Oi Kentaro.

Defeat followed defeat. At almost the same time that the Komminto

leaders remaining i n Minano were learning of Ochiai's retreat, they also

learned that one of i t s best organised units, the Fuppu v i l l a g e Komminto,

had met disaster l a t e on 3 November. Led by Ono Naekichi, the 300-man

Fuppu unit had headed northward into neighbouring Kodama d i s t r i c t the day

before i n order to provoke r e b e l l i o n i n that region. Although they had

managed to r e c r u i t or conscript about 300 v i l l a g e r s during t h e i r march,

they were nonetheless d e c i s i v e l y defeated by a smaller force of army

troops a short distance to the south of Kodama Town.

Learning t h i s news, the Komminto leaders remaining at Minano—

Kikuchi Kanbei, Sakamoto Sosaku, and Kadohira Sohei—concluded that

Minano too would soon be l o s t . They therefore assembled about 100 men,

l e f t Minano, and went to Yoshida where they joined the fifty-man force

of A r a i Torakichi of Gumma prefecture. After discussing the desperate-

ness of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n , they elected Kikuchi to serve as t h e i r commander,

and resolved to take the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n to Nagano prefecture,

Kikuchi's home, by way o f a western march through Gumma, Minami-kanra d i s -

t r i c t , along the Sanchuyatsu Kannagawa basin. They selected t h i s route

for i t s easy access from Chichibu and because i t was known to be a highly.

p o l i t i c i z e d region, dominated by Jiyuto a c t i v i s t s who since 1881 had been

188
busy organising the l o c a l farmers. Their choice of routes proved to
 88

be a good one for "when the Chichibu Komminto rose up, the farmers of
189

Sanchuyatsu also rose up." Indeed, before Kikuchi had even crossed

the border into Gumma, a large group of v i l l a g e r s from the Hominoyama

region were already on the march to j o i n the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n and soon

the two groups united. But not only f o r t h i s reason was t h e i r choice of

routes a good one. Since most of the government's troops and the l o c a l

p o l i c e were concentrated around Omiya, the Sanchuyatsu road was r e l a -

t i v e l y open to Kikuchi's company.

Along the way toward Nagano, Kikuchi was able to r e c r u i t or

impress about 125 men and was able to s t e a l arms and food enough to

insure that the march continued. Not u n t i l the morning of 7 November,

just before they were beginning to cross the mountains that separated

Gumma from Nagano, were they attacked from the rear by government troops.

They l o s t as a r e s u l t twelve men captured and an unknown number of others

through desertion, mainly Gumma residents who d i d not want to leave t h e i r

own prefecture. Despite these reverses, before they departed from the

border town of S h i r a i they had managed to build up t h e i r number to 250 to

300 men, t h i s time with residents from the Minami-saku d i s t r i c t of Nagano,

a strong centre of Jiyuto a c t i v i t y , who had crossed the border into

Gumma to j o i n them. Despite t h i s welcome aid, Kikuchi's company was

thereafter forced to d i v e r t t h e i r attention and manpower to keep a close

watch on the Sanchuyatsu farmers who made repeated attempts to escape

once i n Nagano.

By the evening of 7 November, the Komminto force had reached the

v i l l a g e of Ohinata where they camped f o r the night. That evening they

 89

were joined by a number of farmers from the area who had heard of t h e i r

a r r i v a l , and who hoped that by j o i n i n g they would free themselves from

indebtedness. Perhaps i n response to t h e i r hopes, the next morning (8

November) witnessed uchikowashi campaigns against l o c a l creditors by

the Komminto. More than 1,000 yen worth of weapons, a r t i f a c t s , and

money were taken and then d i s t r i b u t e d to l o c a l residents. Through such

philanthropic action the Komminto attracted a large number of new

r e c r u i t s , bringing t h e i r t o t a l force to about 430. With t h i s new-found

strength they marched toward Kaize, attacking usurers, a bank, and a dry-

goods store along the way. By then one squad of t h e i r army had been

designated to serve as the "house-wrecking corps" (uchikowashi-so), which

in turn c a l l e d i t s e l f the "Freedom Corps" (Jiyu-tai). A special "swords-

man squad" of twenty men was also organised; i t was led by a haiku poet

from Omiya. I t was separated from the main body and ordered to go north

to Usuda; along the way i t was to attack government o f f i c e s , to r e c r u i t

(or impress) v i l l a g e r s , and to learn whatever possible about the move-

ments of the authorities. This squad only got as f a r as Takanomachi

where i t was met and routed by l o c a l p o l i c e .

Meanwhile, the main force under Kikuchi advanced as f a r as

Higashi-managashi where they camped the evening of 8 November. From

there squads were sent out to the surrounding v i l l a g e s to attack banks

and usurers, and also to secure r e c r u i t s .

Unknown to the rebels at t h i s time, however, was the fact that

more than 100 troops of the Takasaki garrison (from Gumma) were encamped

near Usuda, where another 100 l o c a l p o l i c e were mobilized i n order to

 90

march south to battle the rebels. As these troops moved south, near

Kaize they were spotted by a Komminto recruitment p a t r o l . Four or f i v e

of the rebels, riflemen, remained there to f i r e upon the government

troops and delay t h e i r advance while t h e i r comrades hastened to inform

Kikuchi of the bad news. At f i r s t Kikuchi hesitated to withdraw,

remaining to meet the government troops. A short b a t t l e cost the Kom-

minto the l i v e s of thirteen men (only one policeman was k i l l e d ) and the

aid of many more as a good number turned and f l e d . At this Kikuchi

assembled h i s remaining force of about 200 and retreated south from Mana-

gashi. By 2:00 p.m. on 10 November, the Komminto force had gone as f a r

as the f o o t h i l l s of the Hachigaoka mountain range near the v i l l a g e of

Noheyamabara, when unexpectedly they were attacked again, t h i s time by a

squad of s o l d i e r s who had come to meet them from Azusayama. The rebel

force was thoroughly routed. I t s members f l e d i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , and i n

a short time the Komminto army no longer existed. Only isolated i n d i -

viduals and small groups, most of whom went into hiding, remained to

await capture by the a u t h o r i t i e s . The Chichibu r e b e l l i o n was over.

 91

Notes

I
Shimoyama Saburo, "Fukushima jiken koron," ed. Sakane Yoshihisa,
Jiyu minken 10, Nihon Rekishi Ser. (Tokyo, 1973):162.
2
Takahashi Tetsuo, Fukushima jiken (Tokyo, 1970), p. 68.
3
Ibid.; the appointment was made on 25 J a n u a r y , but Mishima d i d
not take up the post u n t i l 17 February.
4
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 70; and Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 162.
5
Ibid.
6
Takahashi, Fukushima jxken, p. 67. The breakdown by status
was nine shizoku and fifty-two heimin. Economically, however, i t was a
f a i r l y homogeneous group as most were wealthy farmers, merchants, or
v i l l a g e headmen.
7
A ku was an intermediate l e v e l of l o c a l government, located be-
tween the v i l l a g e or town and the d i s t r i c t (gun). This l e v e l of govern-
ment was eliminated i n the l a t e e i g h t i e s .
Q
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 70-71.
9
In 1886, Higashi-Kabahara became part of Nngata prefecture.
The other f i v e d i s t r i c t s s t i l l comprise the Aizu region yet today.
1 0
Shoji Kichinosuke, ed., Nihon seisha seito hattatsu shi (Tokyo,
1959) , p. 305.
I I
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 108.

12
The names of the s i x members were: Nakajima Yuhachi (Kawanuma),
Maeda Sosaku (Yama), Chiba Toya (Onuma), Watanabe Yuhachi (Minami-Aizu),
Shinya Shuji (Kita-Aizu), and Yamaguchi Uramatsu (Higashi-Kabahara).
Ibid., p. 109.
13
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 163.
14
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 110.
15
The resolution i s quoted i n i b i d . , p. 163, and i n Shoji Kichino-
suke 's c o l l e c t i o n of documents, Nihon seisha, pp. 305-6.
1
Ibid., p. 306; Takahashi, Fukushima jiken,
6
p. 110; Shimoyama,
"Koron," p. 163.
17
Ibid., p. 165. In 1880 the central government began s c a l i n g
 92

down i t s grants to the prefectures for regional construction projects;

thereafter, funds for such projects came from l o c a l taxes for the most
part.
18
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 125.
19
Theoretically, the rate of assessment was l e f t to the v i l l a g e s
to determine i n accordance with that part of the Rengokai resolution that
read, "ought to be suitable for each v i l l a g e . " In fact, the Onuma guncho
i n i t i a l l y assembled a l l v i l l a g e heads and instructed them to levy taxes
at the rate of 60 per cent by population and 40 per cent by land value.
Rich peasants i n many v i l l a g e s protested against t h i s scheme, and i n many
cases were able to a l t e r the tax rate to 10 to 20 per cent by land value
and 80 to 90 per cent by population, thereby s h i f t i n g the tax burden onto
the poorer peasants. Some v i l l a g e s , moreover, rejected at the outset any
levy at a l l . See Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 115-17.
20
Ibid., pp. 123, 125.
21
Ibid., p. 116.
22
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 170.
23
Ibid.
24
See Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 133-37 for d e t a i l s of t h i s
incident.
25
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 132.
2 6
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 179.
27
See Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 133,- for an evaluation of
the d i f f e r e n t estimates made by historians on T e i s e i t o membership.
28
Ibid., p. 132.
29
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 163.
30
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 72.
31
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 73. Also see Kurt Steiner, Local Govern-
ment in Japan (Stanford, 1965), pp. 30-37, esp. p. 31.
32
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 254-75; also Steiner, Local Govern-
ment, p. 31.
33
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 80-81; S h o j i , Nihon seisha, p.
275; Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 164.
 93

34 Barely a week i n o f f i c e , on 6 March 1882, Mishima signed Order

No. 43; i t required p r i o r approval from the police before groups be
allowed to "discuss p o l i t i c a l matters" or be allowed to assemble. Quoted
i n Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 94.

35
This l e t t e r appears i n Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 409-10.
Quoted i n Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 76-77; a r i is. a
measurement of distance equalling 2.44 miles.

3 7
Ibid., p. 81.
38
Ibid., pp. 132-36.
39
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 164.
40
Ibid., p. 169.
41
Ibid., p. 171.
42
Ibid.
43
Quoted i n i b i d . , pp. 171-72.
44
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 165.
45
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 310-11.
46
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 125.
47
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 312. The organisers themselves claimed
the figure was 4,083. Takahashi says i t was about 3,400. Fukushima
jiken, p. 126.
48
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 306. Takahashi, Fukushima jxken, p.
126; Takahashi Tetsuo, Fukushima j'iyu minken undo shi (Tokyo, 1954) , pp.
108-9.
49
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 127; Shimoyama, "Koron," p.
180; Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 311.
50
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 126. Nakajima's v i l l a g e , f o r
instance, which was u n t i l then among the most active i n opposing the road
construction, capitulated to government threats, and broke from the boy-
cott.
The strongest proponent of t h i s view i s Shoji; see h i s commen-
5 1

tary i n Nihon seisha, pp. 306-9.

52
Ibid., p. 309.
 94

53
Steiner, Local Government, p. 35.

54
Quoted i n Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 310.
55
See Appendix I I .
56
Kobayashi S e i j i and Yamada Akira, Fukushima ken no rekishi
(Tokyo, 1973), p. 202.
57
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 142.

58
Ibid.
59
Takahashi, Fukushima jiyu minken, p. 109; and h i s Fukushima
jiken, pp. 143-45. The f i r s t instance of the confiscation of the boycot-
ter's property was recorded on 12 November. Akajiro Heiroku of Shinai
v i l l a g e (Yama d i s t r i c t ) had his 'household belongings seized and sold at
public auction. Ninety-five others from the same v i l l a g e suffered a
similar fate. The t o t a l number of households so affected was 578 i n Yama
d i s t r i c t alone. Moreover, the prices these household effects brought at
public auctions was abysmally low. For example, a tatami mat sold for
only three or four sen; a rain shutter f o r the same; a cupboard for f i v e
to s i x sen. The t o t a l sale price of a l l goods sold f o r a l l ninety-five
households of Shinai was 799 sen, less than eight yen!. In some cases,
however, r i c h sympathizers were known to have purchased these confiscated
goods and to have returned them to t h e i r former owners at sale p r i c e .

^ Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 171-72.

61
Tamano had gone to Aizu i n August i n order to s o l i c i t funds
for the recently established Fukushima Jiyu Shimbun, the prefectural
party organ. Ibid., p. 172; i n h i s 1954 work, Fukushima jiyu minken,
Takahashi c i t e s a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t reason (p. 101).
62 Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 173.

63 Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, p. 202.

64 Ibid.; Shimoyama, "Koron," pp. 181-82.

65
Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 183; Monna was from Wakamatsu.

67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., p. 184.
69
Ibid.
 95

70
Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, p. 205.
71
See Chapter IV.
72
Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, pp. 204-6; Takahashi,
Fukushima jiyu minken, p. 112; Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 164-65;
Shimoyama, "Koron," p. 184.
73
Uda was accused of "fraud and extortion" (sagi shuzai), sup-
posedly committed i n the process of c o l l e c t i n g contributions from sup-
porters of the Restoration of Rights movement. He was l a t e r t r i e d for
sedition. Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 164-65, 197-98.
74
Ibid., pp. 164-65; Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, p.
206.
75
Fukushima kenshi, 11 (Aizu, 1964):482-83; Takahashi, Fukushima
jiken, p. 165.
76
Chuzenji i s a designated national treasure, dating from the
Kamakura period of the thirteenth century, and v i s i t e d by the author i n
1971.
77
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 166-70, 177.
78
The o f f i c i a l Party history says "a thousand several hundred";
p o l i c e figures varied from a thousand to 10,000. See Takahashi, Fuku-
shima jiken, p. 177.
79
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 178.
80
Ibid., pp. 179-83.
81
Ibid., p. 180.
- 82
Quoted i n Endo Shizuo, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1970), p. 200.
Another account has the p r i e s t sending this message at 5:00 p.m. See
Inaba Seitaro, comp., Kabasan jiken kankei shiryo shu, with an introd. by
Toyama Shigeki and an afterword by Endo Shizuo (Tokyo, 1970) , p. 766.
(Hereafter c i t e d as KJKS.)
83
Taoka Reiun (pseud.), Meiji hanshin den (Tokyo, 1954; o r i g i -
n a l l y published i n 1909), p. 72; Wagatsuma E i et a l . , comp., Nihon seiji
saiban shi roku II (Tokyo, 1968):48; Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 201.
84
Itagaki Taisuke, Jiyuto shi (Tokyo, 1973; o r i g i n a l l y published
i n 1913), 111:54.
85
For example, Takahashi, Fukushima jiken. Also see KJKS, p.
 96

773, for a review by Endo on how various s p e c i a l i s t s treat the dates for
the beginning and end of the incident.
86
His dual appointment was intended to ensure that the Three
Roads project, begun e a r l i e r i n Fukushima arid Yamagata, would be success-
f u l l y extended, into Tochigi prefecture. For the adverse reaction of the
Tochigi prefectural assembly to Mishima's high-handed t a c t i c s i n that
prefecture, see Kenneth Strong, "Tanaka Shozo: M e i j i Hero and Pioneer
against P o l l u t i o n , " Japan Society of London Bulletin I I , No. 14 (June
1972):6-11, esp. p. 8; and a more detailed report, Akagi Etsuko, "Tochigi
no jiyuminken undo: chiho j i j i no yoso wo megutte," Tochigi shi ron, 2
(1969):1-15.
87
For example, see Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 15.
88
Testimony given on 8 November 1884; KJKS, p. 25. (Hereafter,
unless stated otherwise i n the text or i n the footnote, a l l references to
KJKS should be understood as o f f i c i a l p o l i c e interrogation, court t e s t i -
mony, or o f f i c i a l documents of one sort or the other.)
89
KJKS, p. 19.
90
Endo i s one who has attached the term " t e r r o r i s t " and "ter-
rorism" to the rebels and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . For an i d e o l o g i c a l treatment
of the rebels' ideology, see Hayashi Motoi, "Kabasan jiken nanaju shunen,"
Rekishi Hyoron 59 (Anniversary v o l . , 1954):54-61.
91
At the end of each defendent's testimony, he was given a
chance to amend e a r l i e r statements. Most took advantage of t h i s , pos-
s i b l y to avoid perjury; Tomatsu r a r e l y d i d . But besides t h i s , he l i e d
about knowing several close acquaintances.
92
KJKS, p. 15.

93
Ibid., p. 244.
94
Ibid., p. 120.
95
Ibid., p. 345.
96 Quoted i n Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 59. The l a s t sentence of
t h i s quote also appears i n Hirano Yoshitaro, Oi Kenataro (Tokyo, 1965),
p. 84.
97
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 60.
98
ization. Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 29, r e f e r r i n g to Taoka's character-

99
No jima Kitaro, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1890), p. 23.
 97

1<
" )0
Nojima Kitaro, Kabasan jiken, pp. 33-36.

Arai's wife was the daughter of Eto Shimpei, the leader of

1 0 1

the Saga Rebellion of February 1874, who was beheaded for his crime. See
Wayne C. McWilliams, "Eto Shimpei and the' Saga Rebellion, 1874," paper
delivered at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, Toronto, 21
March 1976.
102
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 36; Nojima, Kabasan jiken, pp. 42-46
for a discussion about the contents of t h i s meeting.
103
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 54.
104
Wagatsuma et a l . , Meiji saiban shi 11:45.
1 0 5
KJKS, p. 764 (Afterword by Endo Shizuo).
106
KJKS, p. 102.
107
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 45.
108
Itagaki, Jiyuto shi 111:44.
109
KJKS, p. 235.
1 1 0
Miura's testimony, KJKS, p. 29; Miura, you w i l l r e c a l l , was
a leader of the Restoration of Rights movement i n Fukushima and l a t e r
t r i e d for treason.

1 1 1
KJKS, p. 46.

112
Actually t h i r t e e n names have.been mentioned, but Saeki, who
was involved from the beginning, withdrew several days before the i n c i -
dent.
113
KJKS, p. 102; during a l a t e r testimony, Koinuma stressed that
Iizuka was not involved i n the planning sessions: KJKS, p. 108. Also see
the 2 October 1884 interrogation of Sugiura, KJKS, p. 191, where he i m p l i -
cates Iizuka as "an intimate f r i e n d of Koinuma."
114
KJKS, p. 112.
The peerage system had just been s e t t l e d by law on 7 July
1884. See Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 158.

KJKS, pp. 112 (Koinuma), 191 (Sugiura), 235-36, 243 (Kono),

1 1 6

22 (Yokoyama), 258 (Saeki).

117
Further d e t a i l s can be found i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, pp.
 98

153-56; Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 61; Wagatsuma et a l . , Meiji saiban shi I I :

47; Nojima, Kabasan jiken, pp. 156-59; Itagaki, Jiyuto shi 111:45.
118
Sekido Kanzo, Tosui minken shi, Shimodate (1903) quoted i n
Wagatsuma et a l . , Meiji saiban shi 11:46.
119
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 149.
120
This faction has been c a l l e d the "cautious f a c t i o n " (shm-
choha) as opposed to Koinuma's "decisive action f a c t i o n " (kekkoha);
Wagatsuma et a l . , Meiji saiban shi, pp. 46-47.
121
Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 151.
122
Ibid.
123
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 153.
124
Endo, Kabasan jiken, pp. 157-58.
125
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 62.
Itagaki, Jiyuto shi 111:45; the Meiji saiban shi claims they
met at Koinuma's home on 1 September; the compilers of the KJKS say Tokyo.
127
KJKS, p. 455.
1 2 8
Ibid., p. 103.
129
Endo, Kabasan jiken, pp. 164-65.
130
Ibid., p. 172; also see Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nihon nomin undo shi
II (Tokyo, 1958):359.
131
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 173.
1 3 2
Ibid., pp. 173-74.
133
KJKS, p. 107. I t i s not surprising that Koinuma should be
acquainted with the English Revolution and Cromwell. See a reference to
t h i s experience i n English history i n a J i y u Shimbun e d i t o r i a l of 19
October 1884 that also includes a reference to the Kabasan rebels. Be-
sides the newspaper i t s e l f , the a r t i c l e can be found i n Shimoyana Saburo,
ed., J i y u minken shiso II (Tokyo, 1961):181-84, esp. p. 182.
134
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 62.
135
The amount i s mentioned by Kono i n h i s testimony of 29 Sep-
tember 1884: KJKS, p. 234.
 99

1 3 6
KJKS./ p. 15.
137
See Itagaki, Jiyuto shi 111:46-47; also Endo, Kabasan jiken,
pp. 167-70; and 6 November 1884 testimony of Yokoyama, KJKS, p. 21.
138
Almost simultaneous to t h i s accident, Tateno Yoshinosuke,
Jiyuto member and friend of Koinuma, l o s t h i s right arm when a bomb he
was making for Koinuma exploded accidentally. Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 176.
139
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 186.
140
KJKS, p. 447.
1 4 1
Ibid., p. 448.
142
Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 188.
143
KJKS, p. 448.
144
Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 192; Itagaki, Jiyuto shi
111:50.
145
Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 191; also Taoka, Hanshin
den, p. 69.
146 Quoted i n Isikawa Naoki, Tonegawa minken kiko (Tokyo, 1972),
p. 53.
147
Japan Weekly Mail, 1 November 1884. Other primary sources of
aid i n r e l a t i n g the d e t a i l s of t h i s f i r s t day include Tanaka Senya's 1884
eyewitness account e n t i t l e d "Chichibu bodo zatsuroku," found i n v o l . I I ,
Chichibu jiken shiryo, ed. the Saitama Shimbun sha (Urawa, 1970) :555-77
(hereafter abbreviated CJSR I or I I ) ; an account written by a shop owner
of Omiya at the time of the r e b e l l i o n e n t i t l e d "Chichibu bodo jiken
gairyaku," CJSR 11:589-607; and contemporary newspaper accounts by the
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Choya Shimbun, Yubin Hochi
Shimbun, Jiyu Shimbun, Jiji shimpo, and the Japan Weekly Mail and i t s
translations of a r t i c l e s appearing i n the vernacular newspapers. A l l
dates were checked against the d e t a i l s of the incidents as related by
Ebukuro Fumio, Chichibu bodo (Tokyo, 1952); and Inoue K o j i , Chichibu
jiken (Tokyo, 1968).
148
Testimony of Tashiro Eisuke, 16 November 1884; CJSR 1:106-7.
(Hereafter, a l l references made to o f f i c i a l documents appearing i n either
volume of CJSR w i l l simply be c i t e d with page number unless the date of
the testimony or document i s relevant to the text.)
149

Tanaka Senya papers, CJSR 11:555.

1 5 0
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 38; Wagatsuma et a l . , Nihon saiban
 100

shi, p. 72; Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 49; and Tanaka Soka, ed., Saitama Kenshi,
l a s t v o l . (Tokyo, 1926):584. According to the verdict passed on Kato
Orihei, he too was supposed to have taken part; CJSR 1:359.
151
Ide Magoroku, Chichibu Komminto gunzo (Tokyo, 1973), p. 43;
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 30-31; Gakushuin j o j i n k a i , shigakubu, comp.,
Chichibu jiken no ikkosatsu (Tokyo, 1968), p. 43.
152
Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 50; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 38.
153
For a short sketch of the Gumma jiken, see Maeda Hasuyama,
Jiyu minken jidai (Tokyo, 1961), p. 270. The only book-length treatment
of the disturbance i s Fukuda Kaoru, Temmin sojo roku: Meiji jushichinen
Gumma jiken (Tokyo, 1974). Discussion of how the Gumma jiken connects
with the Chichibu can be found i n Ide, Komminto, pp. 160-67; Inoue, Chi-
chibu jiken, pp. 34-36, 43-44; also see Gumma ken hyakunen shi I (Mae-
bashi, 1971):582-96.
154
CJSR 11:202; also Ide, Komminto, p. 17; and Inoue, Chichibu
jiken, p. 86.
155
Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 51.
156
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 39.
157
Wagatsuma et a l . , Nihon saiban shi 11:68; Ebukuro, Bodo, p.
51; and Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 39.
158
CJSR 1:47; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 39.
159
Irokawa Daikichi, Shimpen Meiji seishin shi (Tokyo, 1973),
pp. 298-99.
Irokawa Daikichi, "Komminto to Jiyuto," Rekishigaku kenkyu
247 (August 1961):l-30.

Hayashi, "Kabasan jiken," pp. 58-59; also see Ide, Komminto,

1 6 1

and Irokawa, "Komminto," for a development of the debtors' and poor

peoples' parties o f the 1880's.

Quoted i n Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 40.

163
Wagatsuma et a l . , Meiji saiban shi 11:73; Ebukuro, Bodo, p.
51.
164
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 40.
165

Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 52.

1 6 6
Ibid., pp. 53-54; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 40-41; and Wakasa
 101

Kuranosuke, "Chichibu jiken n i okeru Jiyuto Komminto no soshiki k a t e i , "

Rekishi Hyoron 260 (1972):30-50. The l a t t e r a r t i c l e stresses how impor-
tant family t i e s that crossed prefectural boundries ( i . e . , between Chi-
chibu and Gumma) were i n aiding organisation of the Komminto.
16V
Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 53.
168
CJSR I I ; also see the 14 November 1884 e d i t o r i a l i n the
Yomiuri Shimbun e n t i t l e d "The Origins of the Riot."
169
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 51-52; Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 53.
Ebukuro claims that Tashiro joined a day e a r l i e r , on 7 September, after
meeting with Shibaoka Kumakichi.
170
November 24, 1884. I t i s doubtful i f Kikuchi was present
since he was not supposed to have arrived i n Chichibu u n t i l 28 October.
Ide, Komminto, p. 21, claims that Inoue Zensaku and Kadodaira Sohei were
also present.
171
Other attempts were made during August and September. See
i b i d . , pp. 20-21.
172
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 54.
173
Ibid.; Ebukuro, Bodo, pp. 66-67.
174
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 71; Ebukuro, Bodo, pp. 63-64; also
see Tashiro's testimony of 15 November 1884 i n CJSR 11:101.
175
Quoted i n Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 60.
1V 6
Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 68.
177
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 3 November 1884; also see i t s
e d i t o r i a l of 12 November 1884: "Chichibu boto shimatsu."
1 7 8
TV,
Ibid.
179
"Guerrilla'.' (gerira-tai) i s Inoue Koji's term, Chichibu jiken,
pp. 103-7.
1 80
CJSR 11:215; Ide, Komminto, p. 119.
181
The names of the wealthy and the amount of money they "contrib-
uted" i s l i s t e d i n the Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 November 1884.
182
Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 November 1884; Yubin Hochi Shimbun, e d i -
t o r i a l , "Boto no dosei," 7 November 1884.
183
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 130.
184
Quoted i n Inoue, Chichibu j i k e n , p. 120.
185
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 17 November 1884.
1 8 6
July 18, 1918.

187

Quoted i n Inoue, Chichibu j i k e n , p. 134.

1 8 8
Ibid., pp. 145-46.
1 8 9
Ibid., p. 146.
 CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

In the course of r e l a t i n g the d e t a i l s of each of the three d i s t u r -

bances i n the l a s t chapter, what may be regarded as the p r e c i p i t a t i n g

causes were indicated. In the case of the Fukushima Incident, they were

the road scheme, Governor Mishima's use of high-handed t a c t i c s , the

onerous taxes and corvee labour dues imposed on the Aizu people, and so

on. The immediate causes of the Kabasan Incident appear to have been the

repression most of the participants suffered because of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n

the Fukushima Incident, the desire for revenge, and a more general wish

to effect d r a s t i c changes i n government. What set o f f the Chichibu I n c i -

dent can be inferred from the nature of the demands the rebels made: debt

deferrment, tax reductions and an end to high interest loans; i n other

words, the rebels wanted r e l i e f from the economic depression.

If t h i s adequately sums up the p r e c i p i t a t i n g causes of each of

the disturbances, then we must go beyond and investigate what the under-

lying causes were. That i s the purpose of t h i s chapter, to search for

the h i s t o r i c a l , s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l forces which, i n providing

a context for the revolts, help to explain why they occurred.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s chapter w i l l examine the following. First, we

w i l l look at the Tokugawa t r a d i t i o n of peasant r e b e l l i o n , a legacy uncon-

sciously bequeathed by Tokugawa period (1600-1867) peasants to M e i j i

farmers. We study t h i s t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n f o r what i t can t e l l us

not only about r e b e l l i o n as such, but also for what i t reveals about the

103
 104

changing socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l features of Tokugawa and early

Meiji. Secondly, t h i s chapter examines the nature of the Japanese economy

as i t was immediately before the disturbances of the 1880's and as i t was

at the time of t h e i r occasion. Here, special emphasis w i l l be given to

the Matsukata d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y , as i t affected the nation's farmers as a

whole and as i t affected the farmers of Yama (Fukushima), Chichibu

(Saitama) and Makabe (Ibaraki) s p e c i f i c a l l y . F i n a l l y , the l a s t section

w i l l look at the p o l i t i c a l climate of the 1870's and 1880's, and espe-

c i a l l y at the r i s e of the popular rights movement.

TRADITION OF REBELLION

In the experiences of most nations, i t seems that some regions

are more i n c l i n e d toward r e b e l l i o n than others. In China, for instance,

the south more than other regions has been "the hearth of r e b e l l i o n within

the Chinese State In Mexican history, the north i n general and

the State of Morelos i n the south stand out as rebellious areas. Like-

wise, one can c i t e Nghe An province i n Viet Nam; Kabylia i n Algeria;

Oriente i n Cuba; the Ukraine i n Russia; the south (Hampshire, Sussex, and

Kent) i n early i n d u s t r i a l England; and the provinces surrounding Paris i n

2

eighteenth-and nineteenth-century France. The reasons for some regions

to manifest rebelliousness and not others are both complex and varied:

peripheral location v i s - a - v i s the centre of State control;, close proximity

to urban centres of commerce; l i n g u i s t i c or ethnic differences separating

them from the majority of the population; differences with regard to pat-

terns of agriculture, economy and kinship; and perhaps even the existence
 105

of a folk "custom of r e b e l l i o n " that r e l i e s upon the c o l l e c t i v e memory of

3

a region's inhabitants.

Now, the existence of such a t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n i n a par-

t i c u l a r region cannot be regarded as a cause or r e b e l l i o n . I t must, how-

ever, be considered i n any explanation of the o r i g i n s of r e b e l l i o n , i f

only as a c r u c i a l intervening variable that helps to show a tendency or

p r o c l i v i t y of the residents of c e r t a i n areas to employ c o l l e c t i v e v i o -

lence as a means to redress wrongs, or even to attempt to reform society

itself. I f such i s the case, what, then, can be said about the case of

Japan?

Patterns of Rebellion

Despite the emphasis i n recent years by Western scholars on the

importance of the p a s s i v i t y of Japan's peasant population as a key to her

successful modernization, the truth i s otherwise—Japan modernized i n

spite o f peasant r e b e l l i o n . As i f to emphasize t h i s much under-emphasized

point, eminent Japanese s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n Irokawa Daikichi stressed, "Even

4
our country has a h i s t o r y of armed r e b e l l i o n . " During the Tokugawa
period no less than 6,889 peasant uprisings (ikki) were recorded; this
5

figure translates into nearly twenty-five disturbances per annum.

An annual average, of course, cloaks the equally important fact

of r i s e s and f a l l s within t h i s 267 year era. For instance, during the

Tempo period (1830-44), an average of over sixty-seven disturbances

occurred annually. This figure was second only to the Keio period

(1865-68) when the annual average was 114 incidents. The Temmei period

(1781-89) was another highpoint; i t had a yearly average of f i f t y - f i v e

 106

incidents. By way of contrast, the twenty-four-year Kyoho period (1716-

35) experienced only nineteen r i s i n g s each year; likewise, there were

only nine r i s i n g s a year during the Kambun period (1661-72).^

Just as certain periods witnessed more peasant rebellions than

others, so too did certain regions of Japan. I f we p a r t i t i o n Japan into

geographical regions as i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been done, and look to the

number of disturbances each region experienced during a l l of Tokugawa,

then we can see the results i n Table 1. The Chubu region or c e n t r a l por-

t i o n of the main i s l a n d of Honshu c l e a r l y leads with s l i g h t l y over 30

per cent of a l l disturbances, and i s followed i n order by Kinki (19.6),

Kanto (16.6), Tohoku (14.8), and so on. The same kind of figures are

likewise indicated for the f i r s t decade of the M e i j i period, only here we

see that the Kinki region drops from second to s i x t h i n rank, and the

Tohoku region advances to second.

Although t h i s breakdown i s revealing i n a very general way, i t

nonetheless obscures i n t e r n a l geographical d i s t i n c t i o n s within each

region, as p a r t i a l l y noted i n the table by the subdivisions of the Chubu

and Kanto regions. Also, we know that each region distinguishes i t s e l f

from the others by consisting of d i f f e r e n t numbers of provinces (kunl),

as well as varying numbers of feudal domains (han). To the extent that

many uprisings were generated by d i s t i n c t i v e p r o v i n c i a l or domain prob-

lems—and i t i s impossible to say here when and how often t h i s was the

case—then i t becomes necessary to go beyond the high l e v e l of general-

i z a t i o n concerning uprisings by regions, and t r y at least to distinguish

the uprisings by employing a lower l e v e l of geographical s p e c i f i c i t y .

 107

Table 1. Uprisings by Region

Intra
No. of Rural City % of
Region Village Total Rank
Provinces Uprisings Type Total
Rising

TOKUGAW7A, 1590-1867
Tohoku (8) 664 45 311 1,020 14.8 (4)
Kanto (8) 349 74 721 1,144 16.6 (3)
E. Kanto (6) (660) 9.6
W. Kanto (3) (484) 7.0
Chubu (16) 735 155 1,187 2,077 30.1 (1)
Chuo (2) (747) 10.8
Hokuriku (7) (609) 8.8
Tokai (6) (721) 10.5
Kinki (15) 519 127 706 1,352 19.6 (2)
Chugoku (12) 375 40 137 552 8.0 (5)
Shikoku (4) 260 9 75 344 4.9 (7)
Kyushu (11) 303 38 52 393 5.7 (6)
(Unclear) 7 7 0
Total (74) 3,212 488 3,189 6,889 99.7

MEIJI, 1868-1877
Tohoku 110 — 10 120 17.8 (2)
Kanto 58 4 41 103 15.3 (3)
E. Kanto (.54); 8.0
W. Kanto (49). 7.3
Chubu 98 11 46 155 23.0 (1)
Chuo (59) 8.7
Hokuriku (47) 6.9
Tokai (49) 7.3
Kinki 43 3 26 72 10.7 (6)
Chugoku 72 5 11 88 13.0 (5)
Shikoku 29 — 13 42 6.0 (7)
Kyushu 89 1 4 94 13.9 (4)
(Unclear) — — —
Total* 499 24 151 674 99.7

Source: Based on figures provided i n Aoki K o j i , Tokugawa hyakusho

ikki no sogo nempyo (Tokyo, 1971), Appendix.
 108

Since i t i s the t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n within certain M e i j i prefectures

that we are interested i n studying, then we do what the M e i j i government

did and amalgamate the seventy-four kuni into f o r t y - f i v e prefectures.

The results are shown i n Table 2, appearing on the next page.

For the present, the most important point to be taken from

Table 2 i s the rankings according to prefecture. We see that Fukushima

and Saitama prefectures, where the Fukushima and Chichibu Incidents

occurred, rank t h i r d and second respectively i n t h e i r number of incidents

for the Tokugawa period, and f i r s t and fourth for the f i r s t decade of

Meiji. Ibaraki prefecture, s i t e of the Kabasan Incident, does not rank

highly i n either period. I t should also be pointed out that even i f we

look at a higher l e v e l of s p e c i f i c i t y by separating Fukushima into

Iwashiro and Iwagi provinces (kuni) and look only at the figures for

Iwashiro (the larger part being the Aizu region), then we see that i t s

259 Tokugawa incidents and i t s fifty-two i n M e i j i would s t i l l place i t i n

the top ten i n both periods, and would even rank i t f i r s t for early M e i j i !

Unfortunately, the same cannot be done with Saitama prefecture,

since i t and Tokyo have h i s t o r i c a l l y been lumped together as Musashi

7

province. Nevertheless, i t i s known that within the Saitama portion of

Musashi province the northern zone, of which Chichibu occupies the l a r -

gest part, was where most of the peasant disturbances took place during

the Tokugawa period. During the eight-year Temmei period (1781-89), for

instance, a l l but two of i t s dusturbances took place outside of Tokyo,

9

and eighteen of them were based i n the northern part of Saitama.

Chichibu d i s t r i c t as such, with four disturbances, was second only to the

 Table 2. Types of Tokugawa (1590-1867) Uprisings by M e i j i Prefectures*
and During F i r s t Ten Years of M e i j i (1868-1912)

TOKUGAWA M E I J I

City Intra City Intra

Prefecture Uprisings Total Rank Uprisings Total Rank
Type Village Type Village

Tohoku Aomori 34 9 3 46 4 — — 4
Akita 91 12 28 131 9 — 1 10
Iwate 138 8 14 160 22 — — 22 (9)
Miyagi 25 8 5 38 4 — — 4
Yamagata 129 5 81 215 (10) 13 — 1 14
Fukushima 247 3 180 420 (3) 55 — 8 63 (1)
Kanto Ibaraki 52 3 45 100 6 — 3 9
Tochigi 33 21 66 120 12 1 — 13
Gumma 74 12 71 157 18 — 4 22 (9)
Saitama 16 3 15 34 (4)
94 28 310 432 (2)
Tokyo
Kanagawa 22 7 82 111 — — 10 10
Chiba 74 3 147 224 (9) 6 — 9 15
Chuba Niigata 138 40 128 306 (6) 23 3 2 28 (6)
Toyama 37 24 4 65 5 5 3 13
Ishikawa 54 19 17 90 3 — 1 4
Fukui 67 18 63 • 148 2 — — 2
Shizuoka 40 15 71 126 2 — 1 3
Yamanashi 21 3 156 180 7 1 4 12
Nagano 173 23 371 567 (1) 28 — 19 47 (2)
Aichi 74 5 78 157 12 2 3 17
Gifu 104 5 276 385 (5) 13 — 13 26 (7)

i—
1

Excluding Hokkaido and Okinawa. o

VD

Source: Aoki, Sogo nempyo, Appendix.

 Table 2 (continued)

TOKUGAWA M E I J I

City Intra City Intra

Region Prefecture Uprisings Total Rank Uprisings Total Rank
Type Village Type Village

Kinki Shiga 67 15 61 143 4 1 1 6

Kyoto 102 16 107 225 (8) 6 1 2 9
Osaka 64 8 200 272 (7) — — 12 12
Nara 55 16 21 92 1 — 1 2
Wakayama 27 12 26 65 3 — — 3
Mie 19 7 17 43 9 1 — 10
Hyogo 180 53 270 403 (4) 20 — 10 ' 30 (5)

Chugoku Okayama 96 3 54 153 21 — 4 25 (8)

Hiroshima 106 20 55 181 15 2 4 21 (10)
Yamaguchi 69 2 3 74 14 — — 14
Tottori 45 7 9 61 7 — 3 10
Shimane 59 8 16 83 15 3 — 18

Shikoku Kagawa 26 1 6 33 4 — 3 7
Ehime 145 4 30 179 19 — 7 26 (7)
Tokushima 53 0 4 57 2 — 2 4
Kochi 36 4 35 75 4 — 1 5
Kyushu Fukuoka 37 6 2 45 9 — — 9
Oita 55 3 4 62 12 — — 12
Miyazaki 71 1 4 76 19 — — 19
Saga 20 1 17 38 6 — — 6
Nagasaki 38 14 9 61 7 1 2 10
Kumamoto 68 13 12 91 33 — 2 35 (3)
Kagoshima 14 0 4 18 3 — 3
(Unclear) 7 0 0 7
Total 3,212 488 3,189 6,889 499 24 151 674 i
i
J
 Ill

Tama region (with six) which, i t may be r e c a l l e d , i s not only contiguous

to Chichibu but i s topographically i d e n t i c a l and had, since the s i x t h

10

century, been regarded as an adjunct of Chichibu.

Also from Table 2 we should notice that of the 432 Tokugawa

period disturbances, most probably took place i n the r u r a l regions of

Saitama since only twenty-eight of a l l disturbances were of the " c i t y

type." 11

In any case, Tables 1 and 2 show conclusively that Saitama and

Fukushima ranked among the highest of the disturbance-prone regions for

the Tokugawa and early M e i j i periods. S t i l l , there are a number of impor-

tant features about r e b e l l i o n that these two tables do not show: the f r e -

quency according to region; the intensity of the disturbances; the forms

they took; the number of participants; the duration of the r i s i n g s ; the

causes and consequences of them, and so on. For some of these questions,

owing to incomplete data, only tentative answers can be offered. For

others, the answers must be sought i n the remaining sections of t h i s

chapter. Right now, however, we w i l l only attempt to answer the f i r s t

few.

When t a l k i n g about a t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n existing i n certain

regions, the question of frequency i s important only insofar as i t serves

as an incomplete substitute f o r the c u l t u r a l and anthropological evidence

that can demonstrate the endurance among a c o l l e c t i v i t y of an o r a l or

written t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n . I f , for example, a c o l l e c t i v i t y r i s e s i n

r e b e l l i o n , say, once every couple of generations, then we may provision-

a l l y assume that a c o l l e c t i v e memory passes on the information of the

 112

facts of r e b e l l i o n to younger generations. For t h i s reason, the question

of frequency i s an important one. But we also know that as time elapses

between r e b e l l i o n s , a c o l l e c t i v i t y also commits i t s e l f to an apotheosis

of e a r l i e r rebels, that i s , l i k e any c o l l e c t i v i t y i t creates for i t s e l f

12

certain folk heroes. Also, since a c o l l e c t i v i t y may be defined i n

either very broad or narrow terms, a hero-rebel may at f i r s t only be

remembered by the l o c a l community from which he came, but l a t e r may be

revered by a regional or even the national community, and revered perhaps

for reasons t o t a l l y unrelated to the o r i g i n a l experience that catapulted

him into the ranks of heroism. In the Japanese experience, folk heroes

have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been rebels. Kanno Hachiro of Fukushima, Date d i s -

t r i c t , Kaneharada v i l l a g e , who led a r e v o l t against his domain government

i n 1866, i s one such example. His name was invoked as a l e g i t i m i z i n g

13

symbol a decade l a t e r by Tama region popular rights advocates. Much

e a r l i e r , Sakura Sogoro was i n i t i a t e d into the holy order of martyrdom

after he was c r u c i f i e d by the feudal government for i l l e g a l l y p e t i t i o n i n g

14

for economic r e l i e f for his v i l l a g e . Gimin (martyr), kyokaku ("Robin

Hood") , and daimyojin (."Divine R e c t i f i e r " ) were terms variously used by

peasants to refer to t h e i r rebel heroes who had led them to f i g h t the

authorities. Itagaki Taisuke, President of the L i b e r a l Party (Jiyuto),

was oftentimes referred to as a daimyojin for the imagined help he gave

to the poor and disenfranchised i n t h e i r quest for economic and p o l i t i c a l

autonomy.

But c u l t u r a l rebel-heroes aside, there exists enough evidence on

the frequency of r i s i n g s to lead us to suppose that at least the peasants

 1 113

of Fukushima and Chichibu possessed a c o l l e c t i v e memory of r e b e l l i o n .

In the Iwashiro region of Fukushima, or western Fukushima where the 1882

incident was centred, r i s i n g s of various types broke out f a i r l y regularly,

16

beginning i n 1654 and continuing u n t i l the Fukushima Incident i t s e l f .

After the mid-eighteenth century, r i s i n g s i n the Aizu region were rarely

separated from one another by more than a dozen years, and i n some

periods there was even some clustering, especially i n 1749 to 1752, the

1780's, and the 1860's. In these years i t appears that one revolt was

transposing i t s e l f into another. It should also be noted that the c l u s -

17

terings usually coincided with periods of poor harvests and famine.

Like Fukushima, the Musashi region also experienced r i s i n g s on a

f a i r l y regular basis, and demonstrated some c l u s t e r i n g , notably i n the

Tempo (1830-44), Temmei (1781-89), and Keio (1865-68) periods. The 130

uprisings i n these three periods alone accounted f o r 30 per cent of a l l

Musashi-based Tokugawa disturbances. Nearly a quarter of the 130 were

centred i n the Tama region, and nineteen or about 15 per cent took place
18
in and around the d i s t r i c t of Chichibu.

Compared to Fukushima and Chichibu, Hitachi province (Ibaraki)

did not experience any clustering u n t i l the Bakumatsu period (1853-68).

In that period, Ibaraki had twenty-two of i t s 100 Tokugawa r i s i n g s , four-

teen of which took place i n the Tsukuba or Makabe regions, both areas of
19
popular rights a c t i v i t y i n the 1880's.

Thus, i n a l l three regions, though somewhat less i n the case of

Ibaraki, a t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n seems to have been sustained throughout

the Tokugawa period, and was bolstered by a frequency of occurrence that

 114

probably made l a t e r generations of residents less hesitant to take c o l -

l e c t i v e action whenever an apparent need to do so arose. Equally as

important, i n a l l three regions the number of incidents of r e b e l l i o n

clustered during the l a t t e r years of Tokugawa, thereby increasing the

chances that a t r a d i t i o n of protest would survive the profound changes

that came with the founding of the new M e i j i order.

This c e r t a i n l y seems to have been the case with the Aizu region.

In the f i r s t ten years of M e i j i that area alone accounted for twenty-four

risings.' In the same period ten of the t h i r t y - f o u r Musashi r i s i n g s took

place i n and around Chichibu. Even Ibaraki, where only nine disturbances

were counted i n t h i s period, showed continuity with i t s past by hosting

20
three of them i n Makabe d i s t r i c t .

If quantity with special reference to frequency i s one index that

helps to demonstrate a t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n f o r certain regions, then

i t i s necessary to show the quality of the r e b e l l i o n as well. Form,

intensity, duration and p a r t i c i p a t i o n figures are aspects of r e b e l l i o n

that help to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the r i s i n g s which have thus f a r only been

counted and not explained.

In a large measure, the i n t e n s i t y and duration of, and the extent

of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , a peasant uprising was a function of the form the

r e b e l l i o n took. What i s meant by form here d i f f e r s minimally from the

21

typologies used by Hugh Borton, Kokusho Iwao, and Aoki K o j i . Each of

these s p e c i a l i s t s more or less subscribe to the same typology, but since

Aoki's i s the more recent and the more complete, i t i s the one related
 115

Chosan ("running away") refers to a form of protest used by peas-

ants since the early Muromachi period, whereby they would c o l l e c t i v e l y

23
abandon t h e i r farms and leave the area. I t perhaps rested on the idea
incorporated i n the o l d saying, "Agreement i n the v i l l a g e on nonpartici-
24

pation i s one way to coerce." In e f f e c t then, i t was a farmers' s t r i k e

and was therefore p o t e n t i a l l y harmful to the feudal r u l e r s whose wealth

and power was derived from a g r i c u l t u r a l production. For t h i s reason,

i t enjoyed considerable success as a way of getting demands met. But

with the gradual erosion of v i l l a g e s o l i d a r i t y , a sine qua non for t h i s

form, the chosan soon became impossible to e f f e c t ; seldom did i t occur

a f t e r the early eighteenth century.

The other forms, however, lasted well into the M e i j i period. (1)

The tonshu, choshu, and gunshu referred to the legal gathering of a crowd

intent upon demonstrating t h e i r discontent. When these gatherings were

unruly and broken up by l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , they were known as fuon ("un-

rest"). (2) When the crowd manifested enough organisation to make a c o l -

l e c t i v e appeal by l e g a l l y p e t i t i o n i n g the v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s , the form

was known as a shuso. (3) Sometimes the protesters would t r y to bypass

or leapfrog their l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and appeal d i r e c t l y to the domain lord

or even to the Bakufu. This form was i l l e g a l and was c a l l e d an osso.

It had a variant known as the daihyo osso and referred to an i l l e g a l

appeal made by a v i l l a g e representative(s), usually the v i l l a g e headman.

Sakura Sogoro and Kanno Hachiro, e a r l i e r mentioned as rebel heroes, are

two examples. (4) I f an osso was backed up by threat, intimidation or

violence, then i t became a goso. (5) That form e a s i l y and oftentimes was
 116

transformed into a Jbodo ("violent movement"), and i f i t was directed

against the homes, property or persons of o f f i c i a l s , wealthy merchants

and farmers, then i t became an uchikowashi ("house-wrecking"). (6) These

l a t t e r largely l o c a l a f f a i r s might sometimes go beyond v i l l a g e or domain

borders and then become a zenpan sodo ("all-domain r i s i n g " ) . To the

extent that i t was organised and had a strong goal orientation, then i t

was a hoki ("rebellion"). In some cases the large-scale rebellions were

characterized by a t a v i s t i c , r e l i g i o u s or primitive communistic undertones;

these were termed yonaoshi ikki ("world reform u p r i s i n g " ) .

As might be expected, usually the intensity heightened, the dura-

t i o n lengthened, and the number of participants increased as the form of

r e b e l l i o n progressed from the f i r s t type toward the l a s t . Rarely, i t

seems, i f ever, did a disturbance pass through a l l six "stages." Many

were probably uniform, i . e . , began, proceeded and ended at the same stage

or i n the same form, and probably just as many jumped from the legal

appeal stage d i r e c t l y to the "house-wrecking" stage.

While most of these forms could be found occurring at any time

during the Tokugawa period, at certain times one form seemed to predomi-
25

nate. Thus, f o r the f i r s t seventy years, u n t i l 1660, the predominant

form of s o c i a l protest was what i t had been for the past several hundred

years, the chosan, and secondarily, the bodo. The next f i f t y years wit-

nessed the ascendency of the osso, but p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s variant, the

daihyo osso. For the next half century, u n t i l the early 1760's, the

illegal and more v i o l e n t goso form was the major type of protest. During

the l a s t 100 years of Tokugawa and during early M e i j i , peasant uprisings

 117

were usually of the Jbodo and uchikowashi v a r i e t i e s , although t h i s i s when

the all-domain r i s i n g s and the yonaoshi ikki also began manifesting them-

selves .

Accordingly, as the more v i o l e n t forms of protest became more

frequent as the Tokugawa era approached the M e i j i , the i n t e n s i t y , duration

and peasant p a r t i c i p a t i o n also heightened. Even a cursory examination of

the figures shows that especially after the mid-eighteenth century, more
26

peasants were involved more often i n more v i o l e n t forms of protest.

Why t h i s happened has to do with certain socio-economic changes

that were taking place, changes which were themselves r e f l e c t e d by changes

i n the form of peasant uprisings. Before viewing these changes i n t h i s

way, a b r i e f outline of the main socio-economic changes occurring during
27
Tokugawa would be h e l p f u l .

Tokugawa Uprisings: Economy, Society and P o l i t y

During the seventeenth century the system of landholding changed

dramatically. Large landholdings which were based on the extended family

and servant labour—what Professor Aoki K o j i terms the "system of p a t r i -

28

a r c h i c a l slavery" (kafucho doreisei) —were breaking up and i n t h e i r

place many small landholdings appeared, some tenant operated and others

owned by s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r s . In some regions, such as the Kinai (Osaka

region) which was more urban and commercial than other parts of Japan,

t h i s phenomenon of the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of large holdings was already pro-

nounced. Even i n less commercialized regions, such as the Tohoku, a l -

29
though the same process was already discernible as''early as-1594, i t did
30
not become widespread u n t i l the eighteenth century.
 118

Although this process was recorded and made o f f i c i a l by govern-

ment surveys which recognized the de facto operator of a landholding, i t

was also commonly recorded by the v i l l a g e r s themselves i n the form of

v i l l a g e codes. These codes recognized landownership, established regu-

l a t i o n s regarding the appropriation of common lands, and set down penal-

ties for v i o l a t i o n s . 3 1
The codes were oftentimes the product of the

buraku (hamlet) association which would, after a natural disaster or a

poor harvest (and the consequent loss of land for some smaller c u l t i v a t o r s ) ,

rewrite the v i l l a g e code so as to r e f l e c t the new r e a l i t i e s of landowner-

ship. Those who l o s t t h e i r land would quite commonly s e l l t h e i r labour

for a term of service as a day labourer or servant; doing so, however,

meant a loss of whatever s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l rights the code granted land-

32

owners.

S t i l l , despite having l o s t t h e i r property and t h e i r rights as

landowners, they benefited from the close s o c i a l and f a m i l i a l t i e s opera-

t i v e i n early Tokugawa v i l l a g e s . Whether related by blood, marriage, or

indentured servitude, the a g r i c u l t u r a l labourer was treated as a " c h i l d "

by the large landowner he served. This relationship, known as oyakata-

kokata ("parent-child"), r e f l e c t e d a condition of s o c i a l and economic

33

interdependence between the two p a r t i e s .

Occasionally i n early Tokugawa, t h i s relationship took on a p o l i -

t i c a l aspect as well when:

. . . the successful farmer, having become a v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l repre-
senting the interests of the small farmer, represented the v i l l a g e
cooperative body i n opposition to the domain authority.34
In addition to representing his v i l l a g e , he oftentimes led i t i n r e b e l l i o n .
 119

T h i s t o o was a p o l i t i c a l a c t : "Resorts t o v i o l e n c e — p e a s a n t r e v o l t s and

j a c q u e r i e s — w a s t h e o n l y o t h e r method o f i n t e r m i t t e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n

35
the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process."

Only w i t h i n such a c l o s e , i n t e r d e p e n d e n t and c o - o p e r a t i v e village

context c o u l d t h e predominant form o f peasant p r o t e s t be t h e chosan, a

form which v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d a f t e r t h e mid-seventeenth century.

U n t i l then t h e v i l l a g e had r e t a i n e d mush o f i t s c o - o p e r a t i v e s p i r i t , but

t h e r e a f t e r began l o s i n g i t as t h e breakup o f t h e l a r g e l a n d h o l d i n g s left

i n i t s wake s e v e r a l r e m a i n i n g l a r g e landowners and a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f

small-scale subsistence farmers. The unequal r e l a t i o n s h i p r e s u l t i n g

u s u a l l y caused t h e l a r g e l a n d h o l d e r t o occupy a p o s i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y

equal t o h i s economic p o s i t i o n . Thus he became t h e headman (shoya,

nanushi, o r kimoiri, depending on t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e v i l l a g e ) , an o f f i c e

u s u a l l y i n h e r i t e d by h i s descendents, b u t a p o s i t i o n o f l e a d e r s h i p rather

than one o f o v e r l o r d s h i p . He d e r i v e d h i s p o l i t i c a l predominance from t h e

consent o f t h e o r g a n i c v i l l a g e u n i t and i n o r d e r t o keep i t , and t o be

true t o the co-operative s p i r i t o f t h e v i l l a g e , would on o c c a s i o n have t o

36

represent t h e demands o f t h e v i l l a g e r s t o t h e domain r u l e r s .

I t was n o t u n t i l t h e l a t e seventeenth and e a r l y e i g h t e e n t h cen-

tury that l o c a l o f f i c i a l s became a l i e n a t e d from t h e v i l l a g e u n i t . As

Thomas Smith and o t h e r s suggest, t h i s was due t o a number o f f a c t o r s : an

i n h e r i t a n c e system t h a t r e i n f o r c e d an economic h i e r a r c h y among l a n d -

holders; an expanding p o p u l a t i o n that put extra pressure on f i x e d l a n d

resources and which helped t o f o s t e r i n t u r n t h e c r e a t i o n o f s o c i o -

economic c l a s s e s ; t h e development o f sharper c l a s s l i n e s a f t e r n a t u r a l

 120

d i s a s t e r s , c a u s i n g many t o i n d e b t themselves t o the l a r g e landholders;

the r o u t i n i z a t i o n o f c e r t a i n s o c i a l customs such as d r e s s , ceremonial

s e a t i n g arrangements and the i n c r e a s i n g importance a t t a c h e d to family

h i s t o r i e s ; the i n c r e a s i n g i n t r u s i o n i n t o and the c o n t r o l over v i l l a g e

37
government by domain government; and f i n a l l y , the growth o f the market

economy which made l a n d , l a b o u r and w e a l t h i n t o commodities, t h a t i s ,

38

"goods produced not f o r use, but f o r s a l e . " Hence, i n c r e a s i n g l y the

socio-economic c o n t e x t was b e i n g d e f i n e d i n terms o f the unequal encounter

between the l a r g e l a n d h o l d e r qua v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l on the one hand, and

the r e s t o f the v i l l a g e s m a l l h o l d e r s on the o t h e r . Village solidarity

was s l o w l y e r o d i n g , g i v i n g way to a p o l a r i z a t i o n of c l a s s e s within the

v i l l a g e brought on by the impersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s imposed by the cash

nexus.

T h i s change was c l e a r l y m i r r o r e d by the changing form o f peasant

protest. Whereas d u r i n g e a r l y Tokugawa, "when the s o l i d a r i t y o f the vil-

lage had not been w i d e l y d i s t u r b e d by the i n f l u e n c e o f competitive

farming, many peasant u p r i s i n g s were l e d , not by o u t c a s t s and ne'er-do-

w e l l s , but by headmen," d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t s i d i n g "with the village

39

against h i s l o r d . . . meant almost c e r t a i n death," d u r i n g the latter

h a l f o f the Tokugawa p e r i o d many peasant u p r i s i n g s were l e d by the vil-

l a g e r s themselves and were f r e q u e n t l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the headman qua

40
landlord. Some o f t h e s e , known to l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s as murakata sodo
( i n t r a - v i l l a g e c o n f l i c t ) , would go beyond the v i l l a g e a f t e r d i s p o s i n g o f
41

the headman and go d i r e c t l y t o Bakufu o f f i c i a l s . These t y p e s , u s u a l l y

expressed i n the forms o f the more v i o l e n t goso o r uchikowashi, accounted

 121

for between 40 and 50 per cent of a l l uprisings of the mid-Tokugawa

period.

Even then however, i t was not uncommon i n the more economically

backward regions for some headmen to lead their v i l l a g e r s i n r e b e l l i o n ,

43

but this was becoming more and more rare. Since headmen were increas-

ingly also the major landlords and creditors of the v i l l a g e , especially

i n the Kinai and Kanto regions, they were not very sympathetic to demands

for debt deferrment, lower prices for commodities and, to the extent
44

they were t i e d to the domain government, requests for tax reduction.

Consequently, i n t h e i r place as leaders of v i l l a g e rebellions, the middle

income farmer—oftentimes a minor v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l or the head of an old

but f i n a n c i a l l y unstable family—who was more vulnerable to the v i c i s s i -

45

tudes of the market and of nature, rose to lead the poorer v i l l a g e r s .

Rebellions l e d by middle-income farmers i n the mid-eighteenth century

were as yet small-scale a f f a i r s ; the large-scale ones were led by the

headman. As Professor K o j i observes, the scale of violence "widened

considerably" whenever the poorer farmers "formed an a l l i a n c e with other

46
classes [ i . e . , headmen]."
47

An example of the l a t t e r case i s the Tenma Sodo of 1764. One

of the largest Tokugawa uprisings, i t involved an estimated 200,000

peasants, encompassed both Bakufu and private domains, and during i t s

more than three month existence spread throughout most of the northern
48

Kanto region (Chichibu i n Saitama, Gumma, Tochigi and Eastern Nagano).

The uprising takes i t s name from the issue which set i t o f f o r i g i n a l l y ,

the Bakufu's decision to increase the number of post stations (tenma) i n

 122

the sukego ( " a s s i s t i n g v i l l a g e , " r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g men, h o r s e s

49

and o t h e r o f f i c i a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e r v i c e s between p o s t s t a t i o n s ) on

the main road between Tokyo (Edo) and Nikko, s h r i n e o f t h e Tokugawa f a m i l y

which was about t o c e l e b r a t e t h e one hundred and f i f t i e t h anniversary o f

its founder's death. F o r t h a t r e a s o n , and t o improve t h e road f o r com-

mercial t r a f f i c , t h e Bakufu imposed an onerous tax. I t was supported by

the merchants who had b u s i n e s s i n the region, a n t i c i p a t i n g increased

revenue i n t h e f u t u r e , b u t i t met w i t h v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n by t h e many

farmers—including t h e v i l l a g e headmen—who would have t o f i n a n c e the

l a r g e s t p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e sukego system improvement p l a n . Most v i l l a g e s

along the road c o n t r i b u t e d manpower t o t h e r e b e l l i o n — v i l l a g e s t h a t were

r e l u c t a n t t o j o i n were t h r e a t e n e d with d e s t r u c t i o n — a n d together they

compelled t h e government t o abandon i t s p l a n s . However, t h e v i c t o r y was

not w i t h o u t i t s p r i c e . Some 600 v i l l a g e l e a d e r s — h e a d m e n , e l d e r s (toshi-

yori), "group heads" (gumigashira) and farmers' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s (hyaku-

shodai)—were punished; o n l y 113 peasants r e c e i v e d sentences, u s u a l l y

much l i g h t e r than those g i v e n t o t h e l e a d e r s . 5 0

The p r i n c i p a l l e a d e r o f

the r e b e l l i o n , a v i l l a g e headman from Kodama d i s t r i c t i n Saitama, was

51
executed, o n l y t o be r e s u r r e c t e d 100 y e a r s l a t e r as a gimin (martyr).
T h i s example o f r e b e l l i o n a l s o p o i n t s t o another index o f what
52

Smith terms "the d e c l i n e o f t h e c o o p e r a t i v e group," t h a t i s t h e emer-

gence o f a new p a t t e r n o f m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r u p r i s i n g s , whereby r e b e l

l e a d e r s would compel i n d i v i d u a l s t o p a r t i c i p a t e . One p e r s o n p e r house-

h o l d was the u s u a l e x a c t i o n , and those households which would n o t comply

53
were s u b j e c t e d t o "house-wreckings." I n the m i d - t o - l a t e e i g h t e e n t h
 123

century, when trans-domain uprisings took place (like the Tenma Sodo),
54

entire v i l l a g e s were forced to p a r t i c i p a t e .

During the l a s t 100 years of Tokugawa, peasant uprisings continued

to record changing socio-economic conditions. Most of the large-scale

disturbances of t h i s time r e f l e c t the increasing numbers of farmers who

were turning to s p e c i a l i z e d commercial production of crops"*"' but were

finding the consequences of t h i s hard to bear. They were troubled by:

v a r i a b i l i t y of farm income and an i n e l a s t i c cost structure; increased

production of cash crops hurt by the v a r i a b i l i t y of the market; fixed

taxes i n the face of such v a r i a b i l i t y ; the steady concentration of land-

holdings i n the hands of a few which made competition d i f f i c u l t ; the

r i s i n g merchant guilds that manipulated the market; time-consuming and

costly government projects for improved transportation systems that depen-

ded on the farmer's corvee labour; and so o n . 5 6

The Tenma Sodo, for instance, r e f l e c t e d the government's e f f o r t s

to e s t a b l i s h e f f i c i e n t means of transportation between production centres

and commercial centres. Seventeen years a f t e r that uprising, again the

same region experienced another, but t h i s time centred i n the s e r i -

culture region of later-day Gumma prefecture. This time i t was over the

government granting permission to merchant guilds and v i l l a g e headmen/

wealthy farmers to e s t a b l i s h quality controls on s i l k production, and to

57

issue transport licences and levies on s i l k . A few years a f t e r that

incident, an entire series of " r i c e r i o t s " (kome sodo) broke out i n

countryside areas which had no r i c e because they had to s e l l i t a l l , and

58
i n c i t i e s denied r i c e because of a general shortage. Rice shortages
 124

59

again produced r i c e r i o t s i n the Tempo period. Two decades l a t e r , i n

1865 to 1866, the demand for r i c e provoked more violence, especially i n

Edo and i n the predominantly cash crop areas of Chichibu and Aizu; both

areas were dependent on the importation of staples to meet basic needs;

they were also troubled by a new government stamp tax on s i l k and other

sericulture-related items. 60
Moreover, the staples that the people of

these areas required were priced almost out of reach, even i f they could

get them. Between 1859 and 1867, the p r i c e of r i c e increased 3.7 times;

soy sauce 4.0 times; sugar 3.2 times; cotton 4.3 times; and tea 1.3

times. "*"
6
According to one of the rebels involved i n the 1866 uprising:

Since the opening of the Yokohama port, commodities have become higher
priced, gradually causing hardships for v i l l a g e peoples, especially
t h i s year when silkworm production was poor. Popular discontent was
widespread, and after discussion i t was decided to do some house-
wrecking. In addition to grain stores, we wrecked f i v e houses.62

The Chichibu protesters "decided to destroy the homes of o f f i c i a l s

f i r s t " and especially the homes of the headmen. After disposing of them,

they attacked s i l k and tea merchants who were s e l l i n g t h e i r goods to

Yokohama merchants. F i n a l l y , they attacked " r i c e dealers, usurers, o f f i -

c i a l s , and others who have a u t h o r i t y . " 63

From Chichibu, t h i s uprising

spread south, almost to Yokohama i t s e l f , and l a t e r north as far as Fuku-

shima, but only after reaching a very v i o l e n t stage i n the Gumma area.

The r e b e l l i o n involved tens of thousands of farmers, and f i n a l l y had to

be put down by newly organised noheitai ("farmers' army"), armed with

r i f l e s supplied by the Tokugawa government. I t was "composed mainly of

64

the sons of middle and wealthy farmers." In contrast, the rebel forces

were mainly led by middle-income farmers and consisted of "poor p e o p l e —

 125

65
day labourers, servants, craftsmen, tenants and the l i k e . "

This r e b e l l i o n , e s p e c i a l l y as i t was manifested i n Fukushima,

developed into a yonaoshi ikki, and therefore exhibited a markedly a n t i -

feudal character. I t opposed merchant guild controls over production,

taxes and s p e c i a l levies on the production of cash crops, and c a l l e d

for free enterprise of commodity production and sale. Politically, i t

c a l l e d for the democratization of v i l l a g e government, i . e . , an end to

hereditary positions i n v i l l a g e government, and the use of open and free

elections; i t also demanded v i l l a g e autonomy from domain administration.

F i n a l l y , the p a r t i c i p a n t s wanted tenant rents decreased and wages for

day labourers increased. 66

Similar types of demands were again made i n October 1868 when

another yonaoshi involving several thousands of Aizu residents broke out.

In t h i s one, and i n others i n d i f f e r e n t parts of the country, demands

for a more equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of the land, as well as demands for

the elimination of c e r t i f i c a t e s of pawned land (shichichiken), have led

l a t e r historians to regard these yonaoshi ikki as precursors of the demo-

c r a t i c movement and/or the "farmers' r e v o l u t i o n . " ^ 6

Indeed, the " l e v e l -

ing" component of the yonaoshi were recognized by observers of t h e i r

time, who referred to such uprisings as yonarashi ikki (literally,

"equalize the world u p r i s i n g s " ) . As one of the few s p e c i a l i s t s on the

subject characterizes them:

Yonaoshi took as i t s objective the l e v e l i n g of economic l i f e and the

creation of a [new] universe. Concretely, as the movement expressed
i t s [aims] i n action, most sought to recover documents pertaining to
pawned land or loans; to d i s t r i b u t e food equally i n times of famine;
and appeared as destroyers of the private property of the wealthy
 126

farmers, whose economic status stemmed from holding positions of v i l -

lage authority, or from serving as domain functionaries. Moreover,
the participants were a l l poor farmers, therefore making the r i s i n g s
t o t a l l y class b a s e d . 68

Since most yonaoshi ikki were centred around the s e r i c u l t u r a l

regions of Chichibu, Fukushima, Gumma and eastern Nagano, where tenancy

was minimal and most farmers were small landholders who produced mainly

for the market, the "poor farmers" of the yonaoshi rebellions must be

understood i n t h i s l i g h t . Moreover, i t should also be made clear that

the leaders of the yonaoshi were usually the s l i g h t l y more wealthy of the
69

community of poor farmers.

Despite the fact that many of the yonaoshi rebellions invoked

Buddhist m i l l e n i a l notions and occasionally neo-Confucian standards of

r i g h t and wrong to j u s t i f y t h e i r anti-feudal economic and p o l i t i c a l
70

opinions, i t i s nonetheless necessary to pay heed to the l e v e l i n g

aspect they exhibited, especially since t h i s aspect l a t e r re-emerged i n

the r a d i c a l popular r i g h t thought of Oi Kentaro and others, as well as i n

the expressions and slogans used by M e i j i farmers belonging to the Jiyuto

and Komminto. C a l l s for p o l i t i c a l reform during the Chichibu Incident,

for example, were expressed by such slogans as "Itagaki no yonaoshi"

("World reform of [Jiyuto President] Itagaki"), and "aid the poor, equally
71

d i s t r i b u t e the wealth."

M e i j i Uprisings

If the various types of Tokugawa peasant uprisings were not an

important cause of the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the Tokugawa government and sys-

tem, then they c e r t a i n l y may be regarded as an index of the extent to

 127

which the feudal system was collapsing. A feudal system based t h e o r e t i -

c a l l y upon the wealth derived from the land the peasants worked was being

increasingly subjected to ever more v i o l e n t attacks by the farmers them-

selves. Even after t r a d i t i o n a l v i l l a g e leaders were co-opted by the

system, thereby taking from the peasants one of t h e i r more important

means to plug into the decision-making structure, the farmers continued

to employ the only other means l e f t open to them—rebellion. Moreover,

t h i s system which so denigrated the merchant by placing him l a s t i n the

feudal s o c i a l hierarchy was being undermined by the many farmers who

turned increasingly to commerce as a subsidiary or even as the main source

of t h e i r income. The peasant uprisings then, and the penetration of the

market economy down into the depths of peasant society, revealed c l e a r l y

the socio-economic contradictions besetting the feudal system.

But even when the o l d system f e l l and a new set of feudal e l i t e s

replaced the o l d , peasant uprisings continued to plague the new govern-

ment just as much as they did the o l d , and to make just as apparent the

contradictions inherent i n the new order. I t could hardly have been

otherwise. For the vast majority of farmers, conditions p r e v a i l i n g dur-

ing at least the f i r s t f i v e years of M e i j i , u n t i l the land tax reform,

72

were no d i f f e r e n t than those of l a t e Tokugawa. Neither should i t be

surprising, therefore, that the bulk of peasant violence i n early M e i j i

occurred during the f i r s t f i v e years.

In the f i r s t year of M e i j i at least eighty-five disturbances

73

occurred, eleven of them large yonaoshi ikki. During the f i r s t decade

(see Table 1, page 107), 674 incidents took place, a yearly average of
 128

67.4 (a mean of about f i f t y per annum), considerably higher than the rate

for almost any decade during the Tokugawa period. Most r e f l e c t e d economic

conditions not unlike those which existed i n late Tokugawa. For example,

due to a succession of poor harvests i n the f i r s t three years of M e i j i ,

nineteen " r i c e r i o t s " broke out. Likewise, even as government was making

appeals to merchants to stop speculating on commodities, violent "house-

wreckings" and bodo were occurring i n the name of cheaper food or tax

r e l i e f or debt exemption. Nearly 50 per cent of a l l disturbances during

74

the f i r s t ten years were of t h i s type.

Some disturbances of t h i s period, however, were d i f f e r e n t from

Tokugawa ones, but only i n terms of the immediate cause and not i n terms

of the form they assumed. For example, after the Restoration domain

borders formerly closed to outside commerce were now opened; t h i s cut

75

into p r o f i t s made on the l o c a l market, producing some r e b e l l i o n . Once

prefectures were established (1871), differences i n the tax rates between

prefectures, or rather the knowledge of t h i s , provoked some r e b e l l i o n . 7 6

Other early reforms enacted by the new government also produced discon-

tent. Conscription, the school system, the census, and telephone and
telegraph systems were a l l , to quote E. H. Norman, "sparks which ignited
77

the uprisings." But probably the most resented of a l l the new reforms

was the land tax reform of 1873. I t recognized private ownership, issued

land deeds, changed the form of tax payment from r i c e to cash., and fixed

the land tax at 3 per cent of the land's assessed value.

The new land tax regulations were regarded as excessive by many

farmers, especially those from regions where immediately after the

 129

Restoration the domain r u l e r s had reduced annual land taxes (nengu) by

78

half i n order to placate a rebellious peasantry. For most farmers,

however, several years were needed i n order for them to understand and

to be affected by t h i s reform. Its most immediate e f f e c t was "the estab-

79

lishment of the landlord system." Large numbers of small-and medium-

sized landholders began losing t h e i r land because they were unable to

pay the tax or the mortgage they took out the year before i n order to

meet that year's land tax payment. Hence, they f e l l into tenancy. In

1872, the amount of land under tenant c u l t i v a t i o n was an estimated 29 per

80

cent. By 1888, the figure was over 40 per cent. The records of subse-

quent protest also record the effects of the land tax reform. During

the decade 1877 to 1886, 29 per cent of a l l disturbances were tenant-

landlord c o n f l i c t s , up 23.3 per cent from the decade e a r l i e r ; 17 per cent

of a l l incidents f o r 1877 to 1886 were fights against creditors, a type

of disturbance v i r t u a l l y unknown i n the previous decade. In contrast to

these types of disturbances, between 1877 and 1886 the percentage of a n t i -

government c o n f l i c t s had dropped about 41 per cent, to a mere 9 per cent

81

of a l l incidents. I t seems that i n a very short time, the main enemy

of the farmer had changed from the government to the landlord and creditor.

In the next section where the r i s i n g rate of tenancy and dispos-

session of land i s discussed, i t w i l l become apparent why the number of

anti-landlord c o n f l i c t s jumped dramatically a f t e r the 1873 land tax law

had a chance to e f f e c t changes i n patterns of landownership. On the

other hand, why the number of anti-government c o n f l i c t s dramatically de-

creased requires explanation immediately. B r i e f l y , i t has to do with the

 130

growing power and authority of the M e i j i government. In an i n c r e d i b l y

short period, the leaders of the M e i j i Restoration embarked on a pro-

gramme of " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power by means of taxation and conscription

82
[that] rendered r e b e l l i o n well-nigh impossible." In the name of the
83

Emperor, the forces of " o l i g a r c h i c absolutism" organised a conscript

army capable of suppressing peasant and samurai uprisings. Nowhere was

t h i s capacity better demonstrated than i n 1877 when the conscript army

e a s i l y and quickly put down the largely samurai army of Saigo Takamori.

A year before i t had done the same i n the case of the huge Mie and Gifu

peasant uprising.

Up against a v e r i t a b l e brick wall of m i l i t a r y strength, the M e i j i

farmer learned quickly that he could not knock i t down. Instead, he

joined lawful struggles (goho toso)—"This i s one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that

84

separates the M e i j i period from the Tokugawa feudal period" — t o oppose

national p o l i c y . Chief among these lawful struggles was the j i y u minken

undo. In j o i n i n g i t , he changed from the e s s e n t i a l l y n o n p o l i t i c a l being

he was during the Tokugawa period, having no p o l i t i c a l rights outside

the v i l l a g e (providing, of course, that he owned land), to a p o l i t i c a l

being out to define what was meant by the 6 A p r i l 1868 Imperial Oath,

especially A r t i c l e One:
"An assembly s h a l l be widely convened and a l l
85
issues s h a l l be resolved by public opinion."

Strengthened by the legacy of protest bequeathed to him by h i s

Tokugawa forefathers, and given d i r e c t i o n by the Freedom and People s 1

Rights Movement, the M e i j i farmer sought to make government honour the

Imperial Oath. To t h i s experience we w i l l turn shortly, but before doing

 131

so we w i l l look f i r s t at the economic background to the "incidents of i n -

tense violence" of the 1880's.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE GEKKA JIKEN

The "incidents of intense violence" took place against an economic

backdrop of severe depression the acceptance of which was made a l l the

more d i f f i c u l t since the f i v e preceding years (1878-82) was a period of

unprecedented prosperity f o r most landowning farmers. What brought on

the depression was Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi's deflationary

policy. This p o l i c y was adopted i n late 1881 i n order to strengthen the

unstable Japanese economy, beset by a weak currency at home and a too

heavy reliance on imported goods. What exactly the p o l i c y entailed and

even i t s effects on the farming population i n general has been well-

86

documented elsewhere. Here l e t i t s u f f i c e to outline the consequences

of the d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y on the general farming population and then, more

s p e c i f i c a l l y , on the farming populations of the regions where the gekka

jiken occurred.
Depression i n the Countryside

Following the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, Japan's farming popula-

t i o n prospered. In that year the rate of taxation was lowered from 3

per cent to 2.5 per cent. This was done p a r t l y i n response to peasant

uprisings over the land tax, and p a r t l y i n response to pressure applied

by the popular rights movement on the government to keep i t s 1873 pledge

87

of lowering the land tax. At the same time, the commodity p r i c e index

rose appreciably, thereby increasing the incomes of farmers. Increased

 132

income encouraged increased consumer spending, as well as e f f o r t s to

expand production and commercial enterprise. This situation, however,

helped improve only the l o t of the landowner; i t hurt the tenant and

wage workers whose low and fixed incomes were i n s u f f i c i e n t to afford the
88

higher-priced commodities. S t i l l , for most farmers, the post-1877

period was one of prosperity.

We can see that t h i s was the case by looking at the s i t u a t i o n i n

more d e t a i l . One j o u r n a l i s t who toured the Chichibu region around t h i s

time wrote an account of the growing wealth of the region's farmers; i t

was e n t i t l e d "A Diary of Prosperity i n the Countryside" (Inaka janjoki).

He wrote, " . . . the people of Chichibu have s e r i c u l t u r e . They w i l l l i v e

89

in comfort for a hundred years." He also observed the trend of i n -

creased consumer spending, noting that even "young wives and young g i r l s
90

have enough money to buy fine dresses and s i l k s . " Another indication

of prosperity was the growth of producer s o c i e t i e s , i n Chichibu and else-

where, organised i n order to modernize and expand production. But i n

order to do t h i s , most farmers were forced to borrow from either the

government or p r i v a t e loan dealers.

The government, however, recognized that much of the increased

wealth the countryside was enjoying was i n fact i l l u s o r y , that i t was

the product of i n f l a t i o n , and that i t was b e n e f i c i a l to the farming popu-

l a t i o n i n the short run, but detrimental i n the long run for the e s t a b l i s h -

ment of a s o l i d i n d u s t r i a l , modernizing economy; for t h i s reason the

government embarked on a stringent p o l i c y of d e f l a t i o n . Immediately, i t

attacked one of the major causes of i n f l a t i o n , cheap money, by withdrawing

 133

from c i r c u l a t i o n nearly 35 per cent of the depreciated paper currency

then i n c i r c u l a t i o n . Consequently, the paper money l e f t i n c i r c u l a t i o n

appreciated considerably, causing commodity prices to decline d r a s t i c a l l y ,

and causing the r e a l value of taxes to increase substantially. "To ex-

press t h i s increase more concretely, the peasant was obliged to s e l l 42

c

percent more of his crop to pay his land tax i n 1885 than i n 1881 . . . ."'

Not only d i d the r e a l cost of land taxes increase the f i n a n c i a l burden of

the c u l t i v a t o r , but many who had converted production to cash crops during

the i n f l a t i o n a r y period were now a f f l i c t e d with new duties on such items

as sake, lacquer, tobacco, and soy sauce. These duties, coupled with

more expensive money, priced h i s cash crops out of the range of the buying

power of most consumers. Local tax rates were also increased i n many

areas, mainly because as part of i t s retrenchment p o l i c y the central

government ceased to provide i n whole or i n part subsidies for such l o c a l

93

needs as hospitals, roads, schools, prisons, and government o f f i c e s .

F i n a l l y , the d e f l a t i o n programme c a l l e d for the stopping of l i b e r a l grant-

ing of funds f o r l o c a l a g r i c u l t u r a l improvement and expansion schemes,

thereby preventing many farmers from pursuing a p o s i t i v e means to break

free from t h e i r f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s .

Since they lacked p o s i t i v e means, large numbers of farmers were

compelled to adopt negative ones to free themselves from indebtedness—

heavy borrowing at usurious rates, mortgaging t h e i r land, and non-payment

of taxes. Bankruptcy and tenancy soon followed, or, even worse, "having

l o s t t h e i r land, many farmers would desert t h e i r families, disappear or

commit suicide; others would flow toward the mines and c i t i e s , creating
 134

94
a class of lumpen p r o l e t a r i a t . " Equally as s o c i a l l y destructive, as

the February 1886 issue of the Nihon Keizai kai hokoku (Report of Japanese

Economics and Society) t e l l s us, "Presently there are great numbers of

debt disputes and gangs of tenants and paupers whose hardships push them
95

into our prisons." S i m i l a r l y , we read i n the newspapers of October 1884

of "the great increase of paupers i n many d i s t r i c t s , and i n more than one

instance so desperate were these people that they would resort to v i o -

96
lence." Not a l l resorted to violence. Some simply escaped from i t by
. . 97
emigrating, many of whom went to B r i t i s h Columbia or to Hawaii.

It i s impossible to say exactly how many emigrated, were impri-

soned, committed suicide or f l e d to the c i t i e s or mines as a consequence

of poverty and the loss of t h e i r lands, but we can gain some idea of how

many did i n f a c t lose t h e i r land. Hirano Yoshitaro says that between

1883 and 1890, those who l o s t t h e i r land because of tax defaults numbered

367,744. Seventy-seven per cent of these, he says, l o s t t h e i r land be-

cause of true impoverishment (as opposed to neglect), owing a t o t a l amount

98
of about 31 sen (.31 yen) apiece. The amount of land involved was
99
47,281 cho, having a t o t a l value of 4,944,393 yen!! Aoki K e i i c h i r o
further computes that the value of the land l o s t was twenty-seven times
100

greater than the value of the average debt each person owed i n taxes.

Based on these figures, Thomas Smith calculates that "something i n the

order of 11 percent of a l l peasant proprietors were dispossessed for non-

payment of taxes i n a seven year period [1883-90] . " " "

10 1
And as Smith also

notes, i t was probable that "only i n exceptional cases was land surren-

dered for back taxes"; that i n most cases the peasants borrowed from
 135

l o c a l usurers and consequently " i t seems a l l but certain that more land
102

was taken by foreclosure than was sold for taxes." Hence, we learn

that on 7 August 1884, seven l o c a l creditors i n the v i l l a g e of Togashira,

Kambara d i s t r i c t , Niigata prefecture, foreclosed on 513 v i l l a g e r s whose

t o t a l debts amounted to 10,000 yen. Elsewhere we read, "A large number

of householders i n the province of Harima—900, i t i s said—have declared

104

themselves insolvent, i n order to escape paying the autumn taxes."

Or, "During the l a s t year—and the same condition seems l i k e l y to apply

in the course of the present year—he [the farmer] has found too often

that, a f t e r labouring the whole year, he i s unable to pay the tax on his
farm." 105

The problem of indebtedness was further complicated by government

intransigency i n allowing deferred payment of taxes. E a r l i e r regulations

set by the Finance Ministry i n 1874 and 1876 imposed heavy interest pay-

ments f o r late taxes, and a short period of grace before the farmer's

land would be auctioned p u b l i c l y . 1 0 6

As i f t h i s was not tough enough,

in 1880 the government abolished the e a r l i e r "Rules for deferred payment"

(enno kisoku) and increased the interest charges applied to the deferred
107

payment period to over 50 per cent of the amount owed. Tough rules

l i k e t h i s one explain i n part why the number of incidents of farmers

s e l l i n g t h e i r land jumped so high. In 1887, there were 680,000 i n c i -

dents of land sales; i n 1888, there were 1,230,000; by 1891 the figure

exceeded 1,710,000. 108

Not only was the government less than lenient with regard to pay-

ment of the land tax i n depressed times, i t also wrote laws which
 136

encouraged usury. The Interest Limitation Law of 11 September 1877, for

instance, set the l e g a l maximum i n t e r e s t chargeable for private loans of

under 100 yen—an amount applicable to the vast majority of farmers seek-

ing c r e d i t — a t 20 per cent per annum. A r t i c l e Two of the same law, how-

ever, forbade l i t i g a t i o n i n cases where "people exceed these l i m i t s , "

thereby giving the creditor the r i g h t to exploit with impunity t i g h t

market conditions whenever he was able. Paul Mayet, the German economist

employed by the M e i j i government to study conditions of agriculture i n

Japan, commented on this law: "Hence we see the government takes no action
109

against the c r e d i t o r for overstepping the various rates of i n t e r e s t . "

Besides the wide-scale loss of property, increasing amounts of

land were f a l l i n g into tenancy: "The increase of 1.42% between 1883 and

1884 was probably the greatest annual increase for the entire M e i j i

period.""''''' 0
Also, since there existed r e s t r i c t i o n s on voting rights

according to the amount of taxes that were paid, the number of people

q u a l i f i e d to vote i n l o c a l elections also dropped: i f M e i j i fourteen

(1881) i s taken as 100, by 1884 the voting index was ninety-three, by

1887 i t was eighty-two, and by 1894 i t was fifty-nine. "'""''

1
Another common

occurrence during the depression was commodity speculation by large

merchants. As prices f e l l , they would buy up large quantities of a

product i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a l a t e r r i s e i n p r i c e s . Thus we read, "Con-

siderable purchases of r i c e by Yokohama firms are reported to have been

effected. I t i s supposed that the buyers intend to hold for a r i s e i n

112

the Japanese markets." The market was indeed down: i n 1881 one koku

(4.96 bushels) of r i c e was s e l l i n g for 11.2 yen; i n 1884 i t cost less

 137

113

than h a l f i t s 1881 p r i c e , only 5.14 yen. S t i l l , money was more expen-

sive i n 1884 than i n 1881, and therefore commodities were more d i f f i c u l t

to buy. Moreover, as r i c e and other commodities were removed from the

market by speculators, people could neither f i n d nor afford to buy basic

114
food staples; consumption rates therefore declined d r a s t i c a l l y .

This occurred despite the fact that, as one source has i t , r i c e produc-
115

t i o n rose by 27 per cent i n the period 1878 to 1885.

In view of a l l these facts, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to place too much

importance on the catastrophic consequences produced by the Matsukata

d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y of the early e i g h t i e s . The complete account of the

human suffering caused by t h i s p o l i c y w i l l probably never be known. What

can be known, however, i s the v i o l e n t reaction of thousands of farmers

to the s u f f e r i n g they endured because of a p o l i c y that sought to create

a s o l i d i n d u s t r i a l base on the backs of the a g r i c u l t u r a l population.

Smith maintains t h i s had to be the case:

Without an agriculture capable of producing a sizable surplus year
after year, the whole M e i j i programme, including i n d u s t r i a l develop-
ment, would undoubtedly have been impossible. The peasant had to be
relentlessly exploited for the modernization of the non-agricultural
sector of the economy.(Emphasis mine.)
Let us now look at the nature of that exploitation i n the l o c a l areas of

Fukushima, Saitama and Ibaraki.

Depression i n the Regions

In Chapter III we w i l l see that the patterns of landholding r e l a -

tions, at least among the r e b e l l i o u s farmers of Chichibu and Aizu, were

characterized by comparatively low l e v e l s of tenancy and high degrees of

landownership, e s p e c i a l l y of the general type known as "middle" farmers

 138

who owned one to two cho (2.45-4.90 acres) of land. Details are also

offered to show that a good percentage of the middle-level farmers had

mortgaged t h e i r land at the time of t h e i r r e b e l l i o n s . Paul Mayet's

figures for 1881, i n fact, show that i n terms of numbers of mortgages,

the farmers of Saitama ranked sixth i n the nation, r i g h t behind the c u l t i -

117

vators of Ibaraki, and the farmers of Fukushima ranked thirteenth.

There i s , then, l i t t l e question that indebtedness was widespread i n these

areas, but equally important as this i s the reason for i t , a question

which we s h a l l examine b r i e f l y here.

Fukushima was an economically segmented prefecture that demon-

strated various levels of economic development existing among i t s d i f -

ferent regions. (Economic development, f o r our purposes, i s measured by

the extent to which a g r i c u l t u r a l production i s commercial, i . e . , the

amount of cash crop production r e l a t i v e to staple production.) The mid-

northern region (Shinobu, Date, Adachi, Asaka) was c l e a r l y the most

developed region of the prefecture, devoting more than 50 per cent of i t s

a g r i c u l t u r a l production to such cash crops as cocoons, raw s i l k , and
118

eggworms. In contrast, the mid-southern region (Iwase, Tamura, I s h i -

kawa, Nishi-Ishikawa, Higashi-Ishikawa) was mainly a r i c e and staple-

producing area and, except for Tamura and Higashi-Ishikawa, devoted more

than 80 per cent of a l l production to such foods. The Aizu region, where

the Fukushima Incident was centred, stands i n contrast to both the other

two regions. I f the middle-northern region can be c a l l e d developed, and

the middle-southern region undeveloped, then the Aizu region can be

termed "developing."
 139

There cash crops accounted for roughly a quarter to a t h i r d of

a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l production, although some v a r i a t i o n existed within the

six d i s t r i c t s . Yama (30.9) and Onuma (29.7) d i s t r i c t s , located near the

major centres of trade and commerce, Kitakata and Wakamatsu, led i n cash

crop growing along with the huge d i s t r i c t of Minami-Aizu (34.3); a l l

three were p r i n c i p a l l y involved i n raw s i l k and cocoons. The diminutive

d i s t r i c t s of Kita-Aizu (9.3) and Kawanuma (11.9), along with Higashi-

Kabahara d i s t r i c t (21.6), made part of Niigata prefecture i n 1888, con-

centrated a g r i c u l t u r a l production on staples. In terms of productivity

as measured by average household production (1879), Yama d i s t r i c t was f a r

ahead of the other f i v e d i s t r i c t s , but s t i l l ranked far behind that of

119

household production of the middle-northern region.

Another feature of importance i s that as a developing region,

Aizu was a late-comer. Yama, Kawanuma and Onuma d i s t r i c t s dramatically

expanded cash crop production after 1877 when the country was enjoying

an era of prosperity. Yama d i s t r i c t , for example, reacted to the demands

of the market and more than doubled i t s production of cocoons and raw
120

s i l k i n the three-year period 1877 to 1880. Likewise, during the same

period when the cheaper imported cotton was causing a drop i n the public's

demand for domestic cotton, Yama farmers i n 1880 produced barely a t h i r d

121

of the amount they produced i n 1877. Yielding to the same kinds of

market demands of these three years, Yama farmers increased tea production

by 40 per cent and paper mulberry by more than 500 per cent; they de-
122

creased r i c e production by nearly 100 koku. Also, i n order to increase

production of cash crops, p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i c u l t u r a l items, they borrowed

 140

123
new techniques from the more advanced d i s t r i c t s l i k e Shinobu and Date.

Expanded production of, and therefore growing f i n a n c i a l depen-

dence on cash crops during good years, coupled with the fact of a system

of landholding dominated by small-scale i n d i v i d u a l proprietorships which,

because of the smallness are more vulnerable to dramatic changes i n the

market than large-scale landlord-dominated areas l i k e Shinobu, Date, and

Kita-Aizu and Minami-Aizu, together made the effects of the Matsukata

d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y — a n d such extra f i n a n c i a l burdens l i k e road l a b o u r —

especially hard to bear for the farmers of the regions where the Fuku-
124
shima Incident was centred.

Farmers i n many areas, such as the Aizu region, turned to s i l k

a f t e r the Restoration because of i t s high market value and because i t

was one domestic product that was not i n competition with any foreign

imports. The expansionist boom a f t e r 1877 had especially favourable

effects on the already t h r i v i n g industry, one which accounted for as

much as 42 per cent of Japan's t o t a l exports during the period of 1868
125

to 1893. So important was t h i s industry, especially immediately

after the Restoration when Japan was suffering from an unfavourable

balance of trade, that the government intervened i n an e f f o r t to estab-

l i s h controls over what i n early M e i j i was e s s e n t i a l l y a cottage industry.

One of the f i r s t areas affected by the new p o l i c y was Chichibu. In 1872,

when land deeds were being issued, the government established at Omiya

and Ogano (Chichibu) a "raw s i l k improvement centre" (ki-ito kai kaijo).

There i n an e f f o r t to standardize the quality of s i l k for export, govern-

ment o f f i c i a l s inspected production methods of export s i l k , stamped those

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126

r o l l s of s i l k e l i g i b l e f o r export, and kept records on the producers.

Cultivators complied with t h i s interference because they knew that export

s i l k brought a higher market p r i c e . They also went along with the govern-

ment's control over the introduction of a plan to universalize new tech-

niques of machine production, hoping that i t too would mean additional

revenue, even to the extent of t o l e r a t i n g the building of l o c a l f a c t o r i e s .

Of course, few small-scale producers could withstand competition from

factory produced s i l k , the owners of which increasingly directed t h e i r

attention to appropriate an even greater share of the means of production.

Hence, around 1880 to 1881, a whole series of tonya ("wholesale houses,"

but they actually were combines that owned land, controlled production,

processed i t i n t h e i r f a c t o r i e s , and marketed i t themselves) sprang up

127

throughout Chichibu and other silk-growing regions. It i s not just

coincidence that around t h i s time such men as Shibusawa E i i c h i , "the

father of Japanese capitalism," and his son Sosuke made t h e i r fortunes

i n the area neighbouring Chichibu by playing the s i l k and indigo market

of the region.

In Chichibu, s i l k was not merely an a t t r a c t i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l item

because of i t s export value, but also because i t could be cultivated

almost anywhere; i n a region where only 6 per cent of the land area was

arable and where most of i t was mountainous, t h i s was an important factor.

Also, since the dry land (as opposed to the paddy) was valued less, and

therefore land taxes were less, Chichibu farmers found s i l k a very s u i t -

able product. In fact, i t had been regarded as such since the middle of

the Tokugawa era, so that by the early 1880's, nearly 80 per cent of
 142

Chichibu's population was connected i n some way with the s e r i c u l t u r e i n -

dustry.

Like the majority of Aizu farmers, again a point elaborated on

in the next chapter, most of the Chichibu s e r i c u l t u r a l i s t s were middle-

l e v e l farmers—small-scale, self-owning and c u l t i v a t i n g proprietors of

130

about one cho of land. And they too, l i k e t h e i r Aizu counterparts,

had gone into debt during the expansionist boom of 1877 to 1881 i n order

to expand production to meet the growing domestic and international demand

for s i l k . Moreover, besides having to meet t r a d i t i o n a l consumption needs

that required the importing of twice the amount of r i c e and one-third of

131

the amount of wheat produced p r e f e c t u r a l l y , they also, as was observed

e a r l i e r , had to s a t i s f y a consumption l e v e l f o r luxury items that was on

the upswing.

Imagine, therefore, what e f f e c t the Matsukata p o l i c y had upon

them. The effects were not f e l t u n t i l 1883. Then the p r i c e of mulberry

leaves, one of Chichibu*s p r i n c i p a l items of production, f e l l from 3.5

132

yen per horseload (ichida) to 1.25. Likewise, the value of s i l k fell

Table 3. Market Value of One Roll of S i l k by Year
50 per cent between 1881 and 1884, as the following table shows.
Year Raw s i l k cloth Coarse s i l k

1878 2.60 yen 4.80 yen

1879 3.50 5.58
1880 4.50 6.50
1881 5.20 8.00
1882 5.40 8.50
1883 3.50 6.00
1884 2.26 4.50
1885 2.35 4.00

Source; Inoue K o j i , "Chichibu j i k e n : sono shakaiteki kiban," ed.

M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renrakukai, J i y u minken undo III (Tokyo, 1956):86.
 143

Just as the Chichibu s e r i c u l t u r a l i s t s income was d e c l i n i n g — s o

1

133

too of course was the purchasing power of many s i l k buyers —simul-

taneously, his taxes increased to three times the 1881 amount i n r e a l

134

terms. To make matters even worse, other government p o l i c i e s added

to the burdens of the already overburdened farmer: regional subsidies,

e a r l i e r given i n order to encourage production, were withdrawn; residents

were compelled to work on a new road l i n k i n g Chichibu to Takasaki (Gumma);

regional government increased i t s taxes by nearly 20 per cent; and

f i n a l l y , government ignored the appeals of Chichibu farmers to c u r t a i l

135

loan dealers from r e c a l l i n g loans during these hard-pressed times.

Together these developments caused many to f a l l into a Dickensian state

of p o v e r t y . 1 3 6
I t was that poverty, according to the eminent chronicler

of M e i j i peasant uprisings, Aoki K o j i , following on the heels of benefi-

137

cient prosperity, that was at the bottom of the Chichibu Incident.

Of course, impoverishment alone i s not s u f f i c i e n t cause to rebel.

Due to the d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y , we know, over three m i l l i o n people across

138

Japan suffered bankruptcy, but far from a l l of these expressed t h e i r

f r u s t r a t i o n (or, p r i o r to the fact, t h e i r fear of bankruptcy) by rebel-

ling. Certainly the farmers of Makabe d i s t r i c t i n Ibaraki prefecture,

to whom the Kabasan rebels appealed for support i n the r e b e l l i o n , for the

most part refused to acknowledge the rebels' appeal. I t i s necessary to

ask why. To anticipate l a t e r findings somewhat, i t appears that the

answer l i e s mainly i n the type of insurrection the Kabasan rebels planned,

and also perhaps i n the nature of the patterns of landholding and a g r i -

c u l t u r a l production peculiar to Makabe d i s t r i c t . Both points w i l l be

 144

elaborated upon i n subsequent chapters. Here we w i l l b r i e f l y examine

only the economic developments of early M e i j i and those stemming from the

d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y to see whether they affected the farmers of Makabe d i f -

ferently than they did the farmers of Yama and Chichibu.

At the outset i t i s necessary to point out that the farmers of

Makabe d i s t r i c t were neither passive toward poor economic conditions nor

reluctant to r i s e i n r e b e l l i o n against the authorities whom they regarded

as responsible for them. As late as 1876, for instance, the farmers of

Makabe and neighbouring d i s t r i c t s , especially Naka d i s t r i c t , were chief

among those areas v i o l e n t l y involved i n one of the larger peasant upris-

ings of the early M e i j i period. In late November and early December,

Makabe farmers joined i n what constituted the t a i l - e n d of a revolt

e a r l i e r begun i n Gifu, Mie and A i c h i over the government's land tax

policy. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Makabe farmers stemmed from d i s s a t i s -

faction over the l o c a l government's handling of petitions f o r tax r e l i e f

and tax reform. A one-time wealthy farmer and v i l l a g e headman, Honbashi

Jirosaemon, led about 2,500 farmers i n r e b e l l i o n against the l o c a l author-

i t i e s , but the unorganised army of farmers was soon dispersed by troops

139
c a l l e d i n from a nearby garrison.

If i t was not for want of f i g h t i n g s p i r i t that Ibaraki farmers

f a i l e d to respond to the c a l l for revolution issued at Mount Kaba i n 1884,

neither was i t because they had escaped the disastrous effects of the

Matsukata d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y . Between 1884 and 1885, a substantial 3.5

per cent increase i n the land area f a l l i n g under tenancy was recorded for

Ibaraki as a whole; the year before, a 2 per cent r i s e i n the tenancy

 145

rate was recorded for the farming population. In some v i l l a g e s more than

a 6 per cent r i s e was said to have occurred. Moreover, the source for

these s t a t i s t i c s t e l l s us that p a r t i c u l a r l y hard h i t were the farmers

140
of the Makabe d i s t r i c t .

A r i s e i n the tenancy rate i s a s i g n i f i c a n t index of the t o l l

the depression was taking on Ibaraki farmers. But also, as i n the cases

of Chichibu and Yama farmers, we must wonder whether the type of a g r i c u l -

ture the Makabe farmers were engaged i n might help to explain now vulner-

able they were to the v i o l e n t fluctuations i n commodity p r i c e s then

a f f e c t i n g the market.
Compared to the Yama and Chichibu farmers, and to the farmers of

other Ibaraki d i s t r i c t s , the Makabe farmers were "overwhelmingly producers

141

of staples." Secondly, the figures for 1884 show that the vast

majority of Makabe farmers were either tenants or part-tenant/part-small

landholder. Tenants worked usually on very large-scale r i c e and/or

barley farms and took home an average of 32 per cent of the crop y i e l d .

Tenants composed 23.5 per cent of the Makabe farming population and part
142
tenants/part landowners 44.7 per cent; tenant-worked land, however,
amounted to only 31 per cent of the t o t a l a g r i c u l t u r a l land area of the
143

district. Those figures, of course, translate into a very large land-

lord class having very large land holdings. In fact, i n 1879 Makabe
d i s t r i c t ranked t h i r d among the prefecture's seventeen d i s t r i c t s for the
144

size of i t s landlord c l a s s . Moreover, compared to the other d i s t r i c t s

in the prefecture, Makabe was r e l a t i v e l y "undeveloped" with regard to

cash crop production. Yet despite that, i t was the prefecture's leading
 146

producer of raw s i l k and cocoons (but an amount n e g l i g i b l e compared to

Chichibu or Yama), the second-ranked producer of cotton, the third-ranked

145

in red beans (azuki), and the fourth-ranking tea producer. Since we

know that most of Makabe's a g r i c u l t u r a l land area was i n the form of

large staple-producing landholdings, we can i n f e r that probably much of

the cash crop production was done by the large class of part-tenant/part-

small landholder, that 45 per cent of the population which owned less

than one cho of l a n d . 1 4 6

For t h i s group at least, the d r a s t i c drop i n commodity prices and

the more expensive taxes and money that attended the d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y to-

gether must have been catastrophic. L i k e l y i t s effects were indicated

in the r i s i n g tenancy rate mentioned above. Many part owners probably

became f u l l tenants, and although the f a l l into tenancy for these already

part-tenants was not as f a r or as steep as i t was for the small landowner

of Chichibu and Yama, we can nonetheless imagine i t to have been equally

as p a i n f u l .

To conclude t h i s section, we can say that although the f i n a n c i a l

losses encumbered by many farmers of Yama, Chichibu and Makabe d i s t r i c t s

because of the Matsukata d e f l a t i o n p o l i c y were indeed d i f f i c u l t to bear

passively, i n themselves they were not s u f f i c i e n t to cause r e b e l l i o n .

People who suffer economic misery, without having an understanding of i t s

basis, without having a c l e a r l y l a i d out programme of how to escape from

i t , or how to b u i l d the type of society where producers reap the f u l l

harvest of t h e i r e f f o r t s and production, w i l l merely remain miserable.

It was up to the popular rights movement to make the condition of economic

misery, l i t e r a l l y , meaningful to the sufferers.

 147

THE MOVEMENT FOR LIBERTY AND POPULAR RIGHTS

The t i t l e of this section i s the customary translation for j i y u

minken undo, the term for the movement o r i g i n a l l y begun i n the early- to

mid-1870 s by upper class anti-government forces (or more precisely,

1

anti-government-in-power forces) but which was l a t e r transformed i n the

early eighties by lower class democrats, some of whom were involved i n

the gekka jiken. Those involved i n both the early and l a t e r stages of

the popular rights movement were known as minkenka ("advocates of popular

r i g h t s " ) , but i n terms of the ideology which each supported they were

substantially d i f f e r e n t types. The reason f o r t h i s difference stems i n

part from the d i f f e r e n t class backgrounds, and i n part from the d i f f e r e n t

extent to which each group was t i e d to the central and l o c a l governments.

B r i e f l y , the early minkenka were samurai who played a role i n the M e i j i

Restoration and for a short period, p r i o r to consolidation of the new

regime, a role as leaders of the new government. The l a t e r minkenka for

the most part played no part i n the Restoration (Kono Hironaka i s one

who d i d ) , nor i n the central government, but who were oftentimes active

i n l o c a l government. A few declasse samurai could be found among t h e i r

ranks, but most were gono ("wealthy farmers"), primary school teachers,

p r i e s t s , petty merchants, or even small landholding farmers.

How great the differences were between the two groups can be

demonstrated by making an in-depth comparison of the two groups. Part

of t h i s w i l l be done i n the next chapter where we examine the kinds of

people who comprised the three incidents, and i n Chapter IV where we show

how these people were t i e d by organisation and ideology to the popular

 148

rights movement. Here we w i l l look at the movement i n i t s early years,

between 1874 and 1881, and the changes i t underwent to transform i t into

a predominantly r u r a l and increasingly mass-based movement.

To t h i s end, we divide the movement into three parts:

1) "the formative period," 1874 to 1878, which covers the time be-

tween the establishment of the Aikokukoto (Public Party of

Patriots) and the Risshisha (The Society to e s t a b l i s h One's Ambi-

tions) i n 1874, and the movement to re-establish the Aikokusha

(Society of P a t r i o t s , founded f i r s t i n 1875 a f t e r the Osaka Con-

ference, but abandoned the same year by i t s leaders who joined

the government);

2) "the period of promotion and organization," 1878 to 1881, begin-

ning with the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l o c a l popular rights s o c i e t i e s

and culminating with the establishment of the Jiyuto (Liberal

Party) i n October 1881; and

3) the t h i r d period, herein c a l l e d "the period of activism," which

began with the Jiyuto and ended with i t s break-up i n late October

1884, constitutes the core of the remainder of the thesis and

w i l l therefore be dealt with i n subsequent chapters.

The Formative Period

The f i r s t f i v e years of the movement was characterized by the for-

mation of several p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s . Most of the founders of these

s o c i e t i e s were samurai coming from old Tosa domain, or Kochi prefecture

147

as i t was then named. Their membership as well l a r g e l y consisted of

samurai, so i t was i n name only that these early s o c i e t i e s were c a l l e d

 149

"public p a r t i e s " (koto). In fact, they did not seek popular support. As

Robert Scalapino says, "The term 'people' was to be limited for the time

being to these groups [ex-samurai and wealthy commoners], and was not

intended even by the l i b e r a l s to include the obviously unequipped lower

148

classes." Examples of such "parties" include the Aikokukoto, the

Risshisha, and the Aikokusha; a l l either emerged i n Tosa or were estab-

l i s h e d by Tosa samurai, and were l e d by such figures as Itagaki Taisuke,

Kataoka Kenkichi, Furuzawa Uro, and Okamoto Kensaburo. Other ex-samurai

a c t i v i s t s involved i n these groups but coming from d i f f e r e n t areas of the

country include Kono Hironaka, Eto Shimpei, Ueki Emori, Goto Shojiro,
149
and Komuro Nobuo.
During t h i s early period a l l were active as p o l i t i c a l "outs" i n
150

c a l l i n g for the government to establish a representative assembly, a

demand made repeatedly i n the p e t i t i o n s and memorials they submitted to

the government."''"'" 5
Besides c a l l i n g for representative government—their

"panacea" to remedy the e v i l s of misgovernment, the concentration of

power i n the hands of a select few ex-samurai from the o l d domains of

Satsuma and Choshu, conscription, heavy taxes, mismanagement of foreign
152

a f f a i r s , etc. — t h e other p r i n c i p a l features common to most of these

documents was a notion of natural r i g h t that would have as i t s p o s i t i v e

expression the i n s t i t u t i o n s of self-government, l o c a l autonomy, and the

153

equality of the classes. "We, the t h i r t y m i l l i o n s of people i n Japan,"

a Risshisha statement of p r i n c i p l e s read, "are a l l equally endowed with

certain d e f i n i t e r i g h t s , among which are those of enjoying and defending

l i f e and l i b e r t y , acquiring and possessing property, and obtaining a

 150

l i v e l i h o o d and pursuing happiness. These rights are by Nature bestowed

upon a l l men, and, therefore, cannot be taken away by the power of any
154

man." If t h i s was an expression of the rights of the i n d i v i d u a l that

natural law demanded, then a representative assembly, guaranteed by a

constitution, was the least demand the popular rights advocates were

duty-bound to make of the government, the writers of p o s i t i v e law.

The p r i n c i p l e s of most p o l i t i c a l societies of t h i s time were not

as e x p l i c i t as those of the Risshisha. Most spoke more about "universal

155

p r i n c i p l e s " than about rights and freedoms. But i n either case, the

men who headed these societies employed such p r i n c i p l e s i n a very

Machiavellian manner, preferring more to r e c r u i t people to t h e i r cause

than to educate them i n the p r i n c i p l e s of natural r i g h t . Itagaki Taisuke,

President of the Risshisha and l a t e r head of the Jiyuto, was one such

man. E. H. Norman seems to be correct when he characterizes Itagaki as

having "the i n s t i n c t i v e s e n s i t i v i t y of a chameleon to the colouring of

156

his p o l i t i c a l environment." So too was Scalapino probably r i g h t m

his assessment that despite a few dedicated and p r i n c i p l e d men, "the

l i b e r a l movement was being used p a r t l y as a t o o l with which to bring

personal power to certain ex-members of a warrior class who could no

157

longer r e l y upon m i l i t a r y force or s o c i a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l prestige."

As noted e a r l i e r , the Aikokusha folded the very year of i t s establishment

when i t s leaders were co-opted by the government by being promised high

158

government posts; Itagaki was one of those leaders.

Itagaki's colours are also c l e a r l y shown i n the p r i n c i p l e s he

espoused. His well-known address, "On Liberty," delivered i n Kochi i n

 151

1882, shows c l e a r l y that h i s conception of equality and l i b e r t y , though

perhaps ideals sincerely sought, was a very r e s t r i c t i v e one. He makes

a clear d i s t i n c t i o n i n his speech between the value of the p o l i t i c a l

opinions of "the lettered and unlettered classes," that i s between the

samurai and most commoners, and implies that p o l i t i c a l power should be

159

held only by the upper and monied classes. Only t h i s group, he

believed, should have the franchise: "We would only give i t i n the f i r s t

instance to the samurai and the richer farmers and merchants, f o r i t i s

they who produced the leaders of the revolution of 1868." 160

In h i s way

of thinking, these people were the "public" that should be allowed to be

involved i n "public debate." "'' 16

Itagaki can hardly be faulted for being an i l l i b e r a l l i b e r a l . He

was merely a p o l i t i c i a n l i v i n g before the time when p o l i t i c i a n s made a

l i v i n g by being p o l i t i c i a n s . Instead of having other p o l i t i c i a n s as

opponents i n the contest for o f f i c e , he had the government to contend

with, and i t had the Emperor on i t s side. Although Itagaki and other

early popular rights leaders also invoked the name of the Emperor, they

were at a disadvantage because the government had the advantage of adminis-

t e r i n g the country i n the name of the Emperor. That l e f t the discontented

samurai and the wealthy commoners as the most natural a l l i e s i n the battle

to capture p o l i t i c a l power; they had, a f t e r a l l , been the o f f i c i a l and

u n o f f i c i a l powers, respectively, during the old regime. However, the

wealthy were too busy seeking more wealth to bother with p o l i t i c s (except

from behind the scenes) and the discontented samurai were too busy t r y i n g

to recover t h e i r former wealth to bother themselves. This s i t u a t i o n

 152

during the early period of the movement's development l e f t remaining,

i r o n i c a l l y , the 80 per cent or so of the population to whom the p r i n c i p l e s

of equality and l i b e r t y that Itagaki and others were preaching would

naturally appeal. Itagaki was too absorbed to r e a l i z e that. He wished

to "broaden the popular base of the movement," but only i n order to

unseat the government then i n power so he could embark on his own plans
162

for "national defense and commercial and p o l i t i c a l expansion." His

quandry was inescapable: how to broaden his base of support without

broadening i t too much? His answer was to t a l k equality to the dispos-

sessed samurai and the wealthy—and the government as well; i t had to

understand the.nature of the popular r i g h t threat i n order to be respon-

sive to Itagaki—and that meant invoking natural r i g h t , the "natural"

ideology to be employed against the government's "divine r i g h t . "

Of course, the inconsistencies are a l l too apparent. How they

manifested themselves i s seen through the a c t i v i t i e s and the ideas which

characterized the many l o c a l popular rights s o c i e t i e s that began spring-

ing up across the country around 1878. They were the unintended conse-

quence of the inconsistencies of thought and practice which the early

popular rights leaders exhibited. The l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s took to

heart the l i b e r a l ideas that were proclaimed during the early part of the

movement and they, unlike the fathers of the movement, practiced what

they preached.

The Period of Organisation and Promotion, 1878 to 1881

Despite the f a i r l y heavy repression which the p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s

163
suffered at the hands of the government at the outset of t h i s period,
 153

the movement to re-establish the Aikokusha met with a warm reception by

commoners throughout the countryside. Not only was "the economic and

p o l i t i c a l unrest of the o l d heimin classes, especially among the agrarian

164

group . •. . growing," but the movement's c a l l for "revision of land

taxes" brought more and more farmers into the l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s

that were beginning to be formed. Still, " I t i s clear that i n spite of

t h i s national growth the ' c i v i l rights movement' was s t i l l predominantly

in the hands of the southwest ex-samurai, more especially the men of the

Risshisha; not only d i d they hold the majority of high o f f i c e s , but their

views were the determinants of policy.""'' 65

The s i t u a t i o n was quickly changing, however, as large numbers of

l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s began bringing larger numbers of commoners

into the movement. Although as Nobutaka Ike says, "Exactly how many

s o c i e t i e s were formed i n t h i s period and how b i g a membership they

boasted i s not known,"" " 1 66

he also t e l l s us that " l o c a l societies affili-

ated with the Risshisha sprang up i n almost every c i t y and county" and
that "numerous groups were organized, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the v i l l a g e
167
level." One more recent study claims that there were more than 150
168

"well-known p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s at t h i s time." Another shows that as

of October 1881, when the Jiyuto was formed, there were 149 p o l i t i c a l

s o c i e t i e s which then became Jiyuto a f f i l i a t e s ; as of November 1880, these

same 149 societies were able to mobilize over 135,000 people for p a r t i c i -

pation i n a p e t i t i o n campaign for the establishment of a national

169
assembly.
Another recent study, t h i s one done by Shimoyama Saburo, provides
 154

us with a clear picture of the extent of popular rights growth during

170

t h i s period. The growth of r u r a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s was a r e s u l t of,

and concurrent with, a campaign o r i g i n a l l y spearheaded by the Aikokusha

"to p e t i t i o n for the establishment of a national assembly (Kokkai kaisetsu

kisei)." By the fourth general convention i n March of 1880 (when i t

changed i t s name to the "Association for the P e t i t i o n i n g of a National

Assembly—Kokkai kisei domeikai), 114 delegates present claimed to repre-

sent 96,900 members of organisations spread over twenty-eight prefectures

171
throughout Japan. In the same year, over 246,000 people i n twelve
d i f f e r e n t p e t i t i o n s and forty-two memorials had signed t h e i r names,
172

demanding the establishment of an assembly. Contrary to what Robert

Scalapino c l a i m e d — t h a t i t was s t i l l controlled by the early popular

rights leaders of Kochi at t h i s time—Shimoyama's more recent evidence

reveals otherwise, at least regarding the geographical origins of the

l a t e r leadership. Even by the time of the second Aikokusha conference

i n December 1879, the members of l o c a l s o c i e t i e s from Eastern Japan

accounted for 60 per cent of the national membership. The fastest growing

region, i n fact, was the Kanto (Tokyo area prefectures); i t s p o l i t i c a l

173
s o c i e t i e s could claim 24,166 members by late-1879. Tokyo alone with
174

twelve s o c i e t i e s was second only to Kochi with seventeen.

As regards the class leadership of the movement, Scalapino i s

probably mistaken as well. Ike for one maintains that after 1878, leader-

ship of the popular rights movement s h i f t e d to the heimin, the "rural

aristocracy" i n p a r t i c u l a r (by which i t i s assumed he means the gono or

"wealthy farmer"), due mainly to the greater wealth they had--as opposed
 155

to the d e c l i n i n g fortunes of ex-samurai—at t h e i r disposal to fund the

175

movement. Ike i s not alone i n taking t h i s p o s i t i o n . Goto Yasushi

t e l l s us that a substantial change i n the class basis of the leadership

of the minken movement occurred i n the half-year separating the Aikokusha

conference of March 1880 and the second meeting of the Association f o r

the P e t i t i o n i n g of a National Assembly i n November 1880. In the March

meeting 66 per cent of the representatives were ex-samurai (shizoku), but

at the November conference 53 per cent of the sixty-four delegates (repre-

senting 130,000 p o l i t i c a l society members) were heimin, most of whom

came from the "wealthy farmer" class of r u r a l society, holding such p o s i -

tions as p r e f e c t u r a l assembly representative or v i l l a g e headman. Of

course, the ascendency of the commoners i n the movement meant a corres-

ponding decline of shizoku power. An index of t h i s decline i s the fact

that the predominantly shizo&u-composed Kochi Risshisha was able to c o l -

l e c t only about 48,000 signatures on one of i t s p e t i t i o n s i n March 1880,

and on another i n November less than half that, only about 20,000.

The growing trend f o r commoners to take a leading role i n the

popular r i g h t s movement continued even after the Jiyuto was founded i n

October 1881. By November 1882, there were 769 known party members; 80

per cent were commoners. '''^ In some regions commoner predominence i n

the Party was even more pronounced. For example, again by November 1882,

a l l seventy-six of Kanagawa's Jiyuto members were heimin; sixty-one of

Saitama's sixty-two were as well; twenty-six of Ibaraki's twenty-seven,

178

and sixty-seven o f seventy-one i n Gumma were commoners. In terms of

geographical dominance, by t h i s time the Kanto region accounted f o r 59

 156

179

per cent of the Party's t o t a l membership. By the time the party d i s -

solved i n October 1884, the seven prefectures that compose the Kanto

region s t i l l predominated with 46 per cent of the party's t o t a l member-

180

ship. F i n a l l y , i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of subsequent chapters, i t might also

be mentioned that c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s (gun) within the prefectures that

make up the Kanto region had e s p e c i a l l y large memberships; Chichibu and

181

Makabe ranked f i r s t i n Saitama and Ibaraki prefectures respectively.

Thus we can conclude that at least by 1880, the s h i f t s i n the

class make-up and i n the geographical centre of a c t i v i t y had transformed

the popular rights movement into a Kanto-centred and commoner-led a f f a i r .

But besides these two s h i f t s , another occurred as well, an i d e o l o g i c a l

s h i f t , one more of emphasis than of content. As commoners wrested control

of the movement from the early shizoku leadership, they also took the

demand for a national assembly, and the p r i n c i p l e s of natural r i g h t which

supported that demand, from the power-seekers and made these t h e i r own.

Commoners coming e s p e c i a l l y from the Kanto region and contiguous prefec-

tures (e.g., Nagano and Fukushima) appear to have seriously believed that

a national parliament was needed i n order to implement the p r i n c i p l e s of

natural r i g h t . We s h a l l see the t r u t h of t h i s statement i n Chapter IV

where we examine several l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s and Jiyuto a f f i l i a t e s

that were formed between 1878 and 1884. There also we w i l l explore i n

depth the "period of activism" as i t was manifested at the l o c a l l e v e l .

 157

Notes

1
E r i c R. Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellions," International Social
Science Journal XXI, No. 2 (1969):291.

2
Ibid.; and i n the cases of England and France, George Rude,
The Crowd in History, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), Chapters I and I I .
3 .
See i b i d . , pp. 241-42 and the treatment of Antonio Gramsci i n
Charles T i l l y , "Town and Country i n Revolution," ed. John Wilson Lewis,
Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia (Stanford, 1974), esp.
pp. 271-76.
4
Irokawa Daikichi, "Komminto to Jiyuto," Rekishigaku kenkyu 247
(August 1961):1.
The average i s based on figures taken from Aoki K o j i , Tokugawa
5

Hyakusho ikki no sogo nempyo (Tokyo, 1971), Appendix. I say "no less
than" because t h i s i s Aoki's most recent finding. In his 1966 book con-
cerning the same topic, he c i t e d 3,804 as the t o t a l figure. One can only
suspect, therefore, that a future work by Aoki or someone else w i l l d i s -
cover even more instances of peasant uprising.

6
These figures were computed using the aggregate data supplied
by Aoki, Sogo nempyo (1971). The figures do not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between
hyakusho ikki (peasant uprising), murakata sodo ( i n t r a - v i l l a g e c o n f l i c t ) ,
and toshi sodo (urban or town-type c o n f l i c t ) . I n t r a - v i l l a g e c o n f l i c t s
he defines as "tenant c o n f l i c t s and internal struggles that are not re-
lated d i r e c t l y to anti-authority action." Urban type c o n f l i c t s "are
based mainly i n the town (machi), led by town people; or c o n f l i c t s that
occur i n urban areas." These d e f i n i t i o n s come from his Hyakusho ikki no
nenjiteki kenkyu (Tokyo, 1966) , Appendix, p. 2.
7
Actually, i t could be done i f one were w i l l i n g to count through
6,889 incidents, catalogued i n nearly 700 pages, and locate the origins
of each Musashi disturbance.
Q
Ono Fumio, Saitama ken no rekishi (Tokyo, 1971), p. 165.
9
Aoki, Sogo nempyo, pp. 146-68, 377-86, 477-84. Unless other-
wise stated i n the text, a l l figures refer to the t o t a l ikki, murakata
sodo, and toshi ikki. (See supra, n.6.)
Ono, Saitama, p. 30. Today even the Chichibu-Tama National
1 0

Park attests to the h i s t o r i c a l and geographical closeness of the two

regions.

Although Tokyo was i n fact the only major urban centre of the
 158

Musashi region, i t i s possible that toshi sodo could have occurred i n

the market towns of Chichibu since Aoki makes the class of the p a r t i c i -
pant the main distinguishing c r i t e r i o n of the " c i t y type" of c o n f l i c t ,
and not the area i n which the c o n f l i c t took place. See supra, n.6.
12
One need only c i t e Louis Riel i n the case of some Canadians,
Crazy Horse for American Indians, Jefferson for Americans, Saigo Takamori
for l a t e r Japanese, Zapata f o r Mexicans, etc., etc.
13
See the author's a r t i c l e , "The P o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Japanese
Social Bandits," ed. Paul Winther, Bandits, Rebellions and Revolutions
in Asia (Chicago, 1976) (forthcoming). Also see Aoki, Ikki, pp. 142-43.
14
Yokoyama Toshio, Gimin: hyakusho ikki no shidotachi (Tokyo,
1973) , pp. 10-19. Also, Inaoka Susumu, Nihon nomin undo shi (Tokyo,
1974) , pp. 28-29.
See Irwin Scheiner, "The Mindful Peasant: Sketches f o r a Study
1 5

of Rebellion," Journal of Asian Studies XXXII, No. 4 (August 1974):588.

Scheiner, unlike me, believes the association of Itagaki with the concept
of daimyojin was a proper one.
1 6
Aoki, Sogo nempyo, pp. 34, 38, 76, 88, 107, 110, 114, 127,
130-31, 134, 144, 151, 164, 166, 170, 184, 196, 201, 204, 207, 209, 211,
214-15, 234, 249, 259-60, 270, 276, 280, 283-86, 290, 322, 327, 332-33,
etc.
17 ^
Rude, Crowd, p. 22, makes the same point i n the case of late
eighteenth century France.
18 . .
The figures are computed based on the data i n Aoki, Sogo
nempyo, pp. 222-61, 393-98, 533-57; 147-67; 380-85, 478-82; 297-311;
405-8; 600-607.
19
Figures based on compilations made from i b i d . , pp. 276-98;
578-603. For an account, both o f f i c i a l and newspaper, of the large-scale
disturbances occurring i n Makabe d i s t r i c t between 1876-77, see Ibaraki
kenshi ryo, v o l . I of the Kindai seiji shakai hen (Ibaraki, 1974), 377-
420.
20
Figures taken from Aoki, Sogo nempyo, pp. 322-57; 613-18;
316-57; 611-16; 409; 355-60; 615-18.
21
Hugh Borton, Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period,
v o l . XVI of the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (1938);
Kokusho Iwao, Hyakusho ikki no kenkyu zokuhen (Tokyo, 1959); and Aoki,
Ikki. 22
Aoki, Ikki.
 159

23
Aoki, Ikki, pp. 33-34; also see Paul Varley, The Onin War
(New York, 1967), p. 213.
24
Quoted x n Aoki, Ikki, p. 139.
2 5
Ibid., pp. 34-37, 116, 148-51.
26
See the tables i n i b i d . , pp. 84, 92, 99, 118', 136. For a more
complete explanation see h i s discussion on 73-74, 81, 84.
27
Much of the following summary comes from Thomas C. Smith, The
Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (New York, 1966; o r i g i n a l l y published
in 1959).
28
Aoki, Ikki, p. 65.
29
Ibid., p. 58 f o r landholding patterns i n three Aizu v i l l a g e s ,
one i n Yama d i s t r i c t and two i n Onuma d i s t r i c t .
30
Smith, Origins, p. 104.
Aoki, Ikki, pp. 66-67; also see Ishikawa Naoki, Tdnegawa minken
3 1

kiko (Tokyo, 1972), pp. 37-41.

32
Aoki, Ikki, pp. 68-69; and Smith, Origins, pp. 9-10.
33
Ibid., Chapter I I I .
34
Ibid., p. 69.
35
Kurt Steiner, "Popular P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l
Development i n J a p a n : The Rural Level," ed. Robert E. Ward, Political
Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), p. 220, n.13.
3 6
Aoki, Ikki, p. 70.
37
Ibid., and Smith, Origins, pp. 43, 59.
38
E r i c Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York,
1969), p. 277; and Aoki, Ikki, p. 74. Even though a Bakufu law of 1643
forbade the s e l l i n g of wet and dry land, the p r a c t i c e continued anyway.
In Aizu, f o r instance, 19.3 per cent of the population was propertyless
as of 1684. See Aoki's Table 16 i n Ikki, p. 77.
39
Smith, Origins, p. 60.
40
Aoki, Ikki, p. 81.
41
Ibid., pp. 79-80.
 160

42
Aoki, Ikki, pp. 73-74.
43
For example, see the cases presented i n i b i d . , pp. 81, 83, 95,,
96.
44
Ibid., pp. 82-83; and Smith, Origins, pp. 74, 149.
45
Aoki, Ikki, p. 88.
4 6
Ibid., pp. 90-91.
47
See Motoi Hayashi, Zoku hyakusho ikki no dento (Tokyo, 1971),
p. 172; Ono Fumio, Saitama no rekishi, pp. 165-68.
48
Aoki, Sogo nempyo, pp. 128-29.
49
For more information on the sukego, see William Jones Chambliss,
Chiaraijima Village: Land Tenure, Taxation, and Local Trade, 1818-1884,
(Tocson, 1965), esp. p. 145.
50
Ono, Saitama no rekishi, p. 167.
5 1
Ibid., p. 168.
52
Smith, Origins, Chapter 10.
53
Aoki, Ikki, pp. 89-90.
5 4
Ibid., p. 94.
5 5
See Smith, Origins, Chapter 6.
56
Ibid., esp. p. 157.
57
Aoki, Ikki, p. 149; Hayashi, Dento, p. 173.
Ibid.; also, Shoji Kichinosuke, Yonaoshi ikki
5 8
no kenkyu (Tokyo,
1970), p. 123.
59
Ibid., p. 150.
6 0
Ibid., p. 140; Aoki, Sogo nempyo, pp. 299-301. For more de-
t a i l s on t h i s uprising, known as the Bushu Ikki, see Sasaki Junnosuke, ed.,
Yonaoshi, v o l . 5, Nihon minshu no r e k i s h i ser. (Tokyo, 1974):271-85;
Nakazawa Ichiro, J i y u minken no minshuzo (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 10-17; and
Omachi Masami and Hasegawa Shinzo, eds., Bakumatsu no nomin ikki (Tokyo,
1973), pp. 13-15.
61
Ono, Saitama no rekishi, p. 176.
 161

6 2
Chichibu kimpen uchikowashi ikki, quoted i n S h o j i , Yonaoshi,
pp. 139-40.

Ibid., pp. 141-42.

64
Ibid.; also see Herbert Norman, Soldier and Peasant: the Ori-
gins of Conscription (Vancouver, 1965; o r i g i n a l l y published i n 1943), esp.
p. 30, for additional information on the noheitai.
65
Shoji, Yonaoshi, pp. 141, 143.
6 6
Ibid., pp. 118-22; methods for f i l l i n g the o f f i c e of headman
d i f f e r e d according to region, although the three most common means were
e l e c t i o n , rotation, and inheritance, election being the least common.
Smith, Origins, p. 58, t e l l s us that e l e c t i o n was confined to v i l l a g e s
"where t r a d i t i o n a l status patterns had broken down under the impact o f
commercial farming. . . . " Shoji, Yonaoshi, p. 122, t e l l s us that begin-
ning i n the eighteenth century, practices of "bidding" (nyusatsu) and
"nomination" (suisen) were also used i n the Fukushima region as means to
f i l l the post.

For example, Shoji, Yonaoshi, p. 121.

68 . .
Tamura E i t a r o , Kmdai nihon nomm undo shiron, quoted i n i b i d . ,
p. 348.
69
Aoki K o j i , Meiji nomin sojo no nenjiteki kenkyu (Tokyo, 1967),
pp. 21, 25; and Shoji, Yonaoshi, p. 10; also Aoki, Ikki, p. 143. For
evidence r e l a t i n g to Gumma prefecture, with comparisons with other s e r i -
culture regions, see Nagatani Yasuo, "Gumma jiken no shakaiteki kiban
nikansuru kenkyu noto," Shien XXXII (February 1972):81-90.
70
See Scheiner, "The Mindless Peasant."
71
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 76-81. For information concerning
the emphasis placed on " l e v e l i n g " by the Akita Risshsha, see Masumi
Junnosuke, Nihon Seito shi ron I (Tokyo, 1965):274.
72
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, pp. 20-40; also, Kokusho Iwao, "Meiji
shonen no hyakusho i k k i , " ed. Honjo E i j i r o , Meiji isshin keizai shi
kenkyu (Tokyo, 1930), p. 713.
73
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, p. 36. I say "at l e a s t eight-five d i s -
turbances" because i t i s l i k e l y that as with Tokugawa ikki more M e i j i
c o n f l i c t s are probably being discovered by scholars other than Aoki.
Also, i n h i s 1971 Ikki (see Table 1, page 107), Aoki shows a considerably
higher number of disturbances occurring f o r early M e i j i than he does i n
his Meiji nomin sojo. I t i s also necessary to note that only one other
yonaoshi ikki was recorded for the entire M e i j i period, that one i n 1870.
 162

74
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, p. 35.

75
Kokusho, "Meiji shonen," p. 716.
76
Ibid., p. 717.
77
E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York,
1940), p. 73.
78
For example, i n Aizu. Shoji, Yonaoshi, pp. 141-43; also,
Kokusho, "Meiji shonen," p. 717.
79
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, p. 61.
80
Shimoyama Saburo, "Meiji junendai no tochi shoyu kankei o
megutte," Rekishigaku kenkyu, pp. 176, 3.
81
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, pp. 36, 64; a n t i - c r e d i t o r disturbances,
i f there were any, were not shown i n the table for 1868-77 disturbances.
82
Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-
war Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt (Berkeley, 1967), p. 61.
83
Ibid., p. 63.
84
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, p. 67.

85
Quoted i n Scalapino, Democracy, p. 52.
86
Probably the best treatment of i t s effects remains Chapter 12
of Nobutaka Ike's Political Democracy in Japan (New York, 1969; o r i g i n a l l y
published i n 1950), pp. 138-47. Also see Thomas Smith, Political Change
and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880
(Stanford, 1955), pp. 81-85, 95-100; E. H. Norman, Emergence, pp. 144-48;
K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "A Century of Economic Growth," William
Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton,
1965), pp. 63-66.
87
An indication of the peasant's joy of victory over the govern-
ment i s recorded i n a poem appearing i n Inaoka, Nihon nomin, p. 61:
"Farmers of various regions / celebrated t h e i r own victory, / When we
thrust our spears / we get 2^%." On the government's pledge to lower the
land tax: Paragraph Six of the o r i g i n a l land reform law said that when
taxation on commodities reached 2 per cent, then the land tax would be
reduced to 1 per cent of the land's assessed value. According to Shimo-
yama Saburo, that point had been reached by 1883. See his "Meiji j u s h i -
chinen n i okeru Jiyuto no doko to nomin sojo no keikyo," eds. Horie
Hideichi and Toyama Shigeki, Jiyu minkenki no kenkyu, v o l . 3, Minken undo
no gekka to kaitai, Part II (Tokyo, 1959):12. Corroborative evidence i s
 163

an a r t i c l e i n the J i j i Shimpo, r p t . i n trans., Japan Weekly Mail, 29

March 1884: "Ten years ago i t was announced that the land tax, although
fixed at 2% per cent, should gradually be reduced to one per cent."
Also, i n Paul Mayet, Agricultural Insurance in Organic Connection with
Savings Bonds, Land Credit, and the Commutation of Debts, trans. Rev.
Arthur Lloyd (London, 1893), p. 59: " . . . from the year 1873 the govern-
ment has been under a promise to lower i t [the land tax] to one per cent
of the estimated value of a g r i c u l t u r a l land."
88
Ike, Beginnings, p. 139.
89
Quoted i n Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 7-8.
90
Ibid., p. 8.
9 1
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
92
Smith, Political Change, p. 81. The quotation concludes,
"assuming that his crop was the same i n both years and c a l c u l a t i n g i t s
money value at Tokyo p r i c e s . "
93 Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nihon nomin undo shi II (Tokyo, 1958):295-96.

94
Ibid., p. 296.
95
Quoted i n i b i d .
96
From the Mainichi Shimbun, reported i n the Japan Weekly Mail,
25 October 1884.
97
Japan Weekly Mail, 20 December 1884. The same a r t i c l e says
that those desiring to emigrate to Hawaii w i l l be guaranteed free passage
and employment once they reach the islands. The Jiji Sjimpo, according
to the Japan Weekly Mail, advised ex-samurai to go to America rather than
Hawaii so that t h e i r talents would not be wasted on " i n s i g n i f i c a n t sugar
cane f i e l d s . "
98
Hirano i s quoted i n Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:296. Smith,
Political Changes, p. 83, n.33, mistakenly says "31 yen." Ike, Begin-
nings, p. 144, c i t e s the correct figure of 31 sen.
99

Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:296.

Ibid.
1 0 1
Smith, Political Change, pp. 82-83. Smith's figures come i n -
d i r e c t l y from Mayet, Agricultural Insurance. Hirano's and Aoki's probably
come from the same source.
Smith, Political Change, p. 83.
 164

103
A J i j i Shimpo report printed i n the Japan Weekly Mail, 23
August 1884.
104
Japan Weekly Mail, 8 November 1884.
105
Ibid., 25 October 1884.
1 0 6
Smith, Political Change, p. 83, n.33.

107
Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:298.
1 0 8
TV,
Ibid.
109
Mayet, Agricultural Insurance, pp. 110-11.
Namatame Yasushi, Kabasan jiken no ikkosatsu
1 1 0
(Takahagi, 1962),
p. 18. Also see Ike, Beginnings, pp. 145-46; and Aoki, Nomin undo 11:300.'
1 1 1
For figures on the number of people q u a l i f i e d to vote, see
Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:299.
112
Japan Weekly Mail, 11 October 1884.
113
Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:302.
114
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 126.
115
Morris D. Morris, "The Problem of the Peasant A g r i c u l t u r a l i s t
in M e i j i Japan," Far Eastern Quarterly XV, No. 5 (May 1956):361-62.
Smith, Political Change, p. 85. N

117
Mayet, Agricultural Insurance, p. 65.
118
The following s t a t i s t i c s are taken from Oishi Kaichiro, "Fuku-
shima jiken no shakai k e i z a i t e k i kiban," eds. Horie Hideichi and Toyama
Shigeki, J i y u minkenki no kenkyu II, Minken undo no gekka to kaitai I
(Tokyo, 1959):1-119. Oishi also uses percentage of cash crop production
as an index of economic development.
119
The percentage of household income derived from cash crops
was 34 per cent f o r Yama, 14 per cent f o r Kita-Aizu, 18 per cent f o r
Onuma, 39 per cent for Minami-Aizu, and 8 per cent for Higashi-Kabahara.
Though Minami-Aizu ranks higher than Yama i n t h i s regard, i t should be
noted that the average household income for a Minami-Aizu family i s less
than half that of a Yama d i s t r i c t family.
120
Oishi, "Shakai k e i z a i , " pp. 36-37.
121
For commentary and figures regarding the decline of the
 165

Japanese cotton industry v i s - a - v i s foreign imports, see Norman, Emergence,

pp. 162-63.
122
Oishi, "Shakai k e i z a i , " pp. 36-37. Yet i t should also be
pointed out that the farmers cultivated one more cho of land i n 1880 than
they did i n 1877.
123
Ibid., p. 50.
124
Shimoyama Saburo, "Fukushima jiken oboeshi," ed. M e i j i shiryo
kenkyu renraku kaiben, Jiyu minken undo III (Tokyo, 1956):148-86. Aoki
K o j i , Meiji nomin sojo, p. 73, says that the e f f e c t s of the d e f l a t i o n
p o l i c y f i r s t struck the farmers i n 1882.
125
Chambliss, Chiaraijima, p. 18.
126
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 9.
127
Ibid.; the government's " . . . intention was to transplant
the machine industry of the advanced countries into Japan with the fac-
tory as the unit, completely regardless of the actual conditions of
existing industries." Niwa Kunio, "The Reform of the Land Tax and the
Government Programme for the Encouragement of Industry," Developing
Economies IV, No. 4 (December 1966):466.
128
Chambliss, Chiaraijima, pp. 19-23.
129
Computed from the figures supplied by Inoue K o j i , "Chichibu
jiken: sono shakaiteki kiban," ed. M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renrakukaiben,
Jiyu minken undo III (Tokyo, 1956):79. Also see Chambliss, Chiaraijima,
pp. 16-22, for an impressive account of the importance of the s i l k i n -
dustry to the farmers of Hanzawa d i s t r i c t , which neighbours Chichibu.
130
Nihon seiji saiban shi 11:71.
131
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 4.
132
Nihon seiji saiban shi 11:71.
133
An index of the d e c l i n i n g purchasing power of the consumer
i s that i n 1884 he could buy less r i c e with one yen than he could i n
1877.
134
Nihon seiji saiban shi 11:71.
135
Ibid., pp. 71-72 and Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 16-17.
136
Sawada Shujiro, "Innovation i n Japanese Agriculture, 1880-
1935," ed. William Lockwood, The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan
(Princeton, 1965), pp. 340-41.
 166

137
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, pp. 83-84.
138 '
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 23.
139
Ibaraki kenshi hensan sogo bukai (comp.), Ibaraki kenshi:
shi, machi, mura hen I (Mito, 1973):626-30; Ibaraki kenshi hensan kindai
shi d a i i c h i bukai (comp.), Ibaraki kenshi ryo: kindai seiji shakai hen I
(Ibaraki, 1974):377-516; Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:233-43.
140
Namatame, Kabasan, pp. 20, 27.
141

Ibid., p. 38.
1 4 2
Ibid., pp. 27, 50, 58.
1 4 3
Ibid., p. 25.
144
Ibid., p. 23.
145
Ibid., p. 50.
146
Ibid., p. 21.
147
Scalapino, Democracy, p. 62.
148
Ibid., p.. 56.
149
Ibid., p. 45; and W. W. McLaren (ed.), "Japanese Government
Documents, 1867-1889," Part I, V o l . XLII, Transactions of the Asiatic
Society of Japan (Tokyo, 1914):426-27.
1
Scalapino, Democracy, pp. 40-60; Ike, Beginnings,
5 0
pp. 60-71;
Norman, Emergence, pp. 174-80.
151
Some of which can be found i n McLaren (ed.), Documents.
1 5 2
xi Beginnings,
Ike, „ • • p.an
67.

Ibid., p. 61.
154
Quoted i n i b i d . An equally l i b e r a l statement of party p r i n -
c i p l e s was made by the Aikokukoto on 12 January 1874; see Scalapino,
Democracy, pp. 45-46.
1
McLaren (ed.), Documents, p. 430: "Memorial on the E s t a b l i s h -
5 5

ment of a Representative Assembly," 17 January 1884.

156
E. H. Norman, Feudal Background of Japanese Politics, Ninth
Conference on the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, Hot Springs, V i r g i n i a ,
January 1945 (Secretariat Paper No. 9), International Secretariat,
 167

Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, p. 65.

157
Scalapino, Democracy, p. 69; also see pp. 70-72.
1 5ft
Ibid., p. 59.
159

McLaren, Documents, p. 445.

Scalapxno, Democracy, p. 56.

161
Ibid., p. 51.
1 6 2
Ibid., p. 58.
163
Ibid., p. 61.
Ibid.
165 _
Ibid., p. 62.

1 6 6
Ike, Beginnings, p. 68.

1 6 7
Ibid., pp. 65, 68.
168
Irokawa D a i k i c h i , "Freedom and the Concept of Peoples'
Rights," Japan Quarterly 14, No. 2 (June 1967):176.
169
Goto Yasushi, J i y u minken: Meiji no kakumei to hankakumei
(Tokyo, 1972), p. 95.
170
Shimoyama Saburo, "Jiyuminken undo—sono c h i i k i t e k i bunseki,"
Tokei Daikai shi 37 (February 1962):199-224.
171
Ibid., p. 203; Scalapino, Democracy, p. 62, using a d i f -
ferent source dated 1927, c i t e s the figure of 87,000 people and only
twenty-four prefectures.
Shimoyama, " C h i i k i t e k i , " p. 204.
1 7 2

Ibid.
174
Goto, Kakumei, p. 95; Kochi's membership, however, was f a r
greater than Tokyo's.
175
Ike, Beginnings, pp. 69-71.
176
Goto, Kakumei, pp. 105-6, 109.
177
My figures are taken from the several tables appearing i n
 168

Sato Seiro, "Meiji jushichinen gogatsu no J i y u t o - i n meibo n i t s u i t e , "

Rekishigaku kenkyu 178 (December 1954):31-38.
178
Ibid.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid., p. 31.
181
Ibid., p. 32. No r e l i a b l e figures are available either f o r
Fukushima as a whole or f o r i t s d i s t r i c t s . Shimoyama, " C h i i k i t e k i , "
explains that f o r some provinces, complicated membership rules meant that
the membership of many d i s t r i c t parties was either not recorded at a l l ,
or not recorded properly. See e s p e c i a l l y pages 209-11. We can say,
however, based on the data that we use i n Chapter III and the information
regarding party a c t i v i t y i n Chapter IV, the Jiyuto i n Fukushima appears
to have been as active and as large as that i n any other region i n the
country.
 CHAPTER III

THE PARTICIPANTS

I f History i s not merely a series of non sequitur's, i f i t is

characterized by continuity, then there must be a number of attributes

ascribed i n the l a s t chapter to the participants of the Tokugawa upris-

ings, and to the economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l conditions i n which the

uprisings occurred, that can provide us with some idea of who the p a r t i -

cipants i n the three M e i j i gekka jiken were l i k e l y to be. Now to sum-

marize b r i e f l y and i n general terms what they were.

F i r s t , i t was shown that throughout Tokugawa and roughly u n t i l

the end of the f i r s t decade of M e i j i (to 1877), those who involved them-

selves i n Kanto and Fukushima disturbances were landowners, and i n general

middle-income farmers. 1
Though often led by farmers coming from a high-

income stratum, and followed by the poorer peasants, the i n i t i a t o r s ,

organizers, and most of the participants i n the disturbance came from the

middle-income, s e l f - c u l t i v a t i n g strata of the r u r a l peasantry. Secondly,

economically speaking, they usually possessed about one cho (2.5 acres)

or less of land, and usually produced .some portion of t h e i r crop for the

market. In many cases t h e i r crop was s t r i c t l y oriented to the market,

for example, mulberry, cocoons, s i l k , lacquer, tobacco and so on. Indeed,

in much of Chichibu and Aizu, the mountainous t e r r a i n was unsuited for

r i c e or cereal c u l t i v a t i o n and required such an orientation. Because of

such a concentration on marketable items, a good number of farmers from

these areas expanded t h e i r economic role beyond mere farming into

169
 170

merchandizing as well, and t h e i r t i e s to the market came to be firm;

therefore the farmers were deeply affected by fluctuations i n the prices

of commodities.

Thirdly, s o c i a l p o s i t i o n during Tokugawa was usually a conse-

quence of economic status i n the v i l l a g e . The meiboka ("men of high

repute") of the v i l l a g e were usually among the l o c a l wealthy who i n turn

were members of some of the older families of the v i l l a g e . During the

e a r l i e r part of the period, wealth and s e n i o r i t y translated into p o l i t i c a l

authority as the members of such families assumed control over v i l l a g e

offices. They served as headmen, elders and peasant representatives,

positions which then came to be regarded as hereditary o f f i c e s . During

much of Tokugawa, such positions c a r r i e d with them the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of

representing the v i l l a g e i n making appeals for tax r e l i e f to the domain

authorities, and, f a i l i n g there, leading the v i l l a g e r s i n "house-wreckings"

against creditors, merchants and government o f f i c i a l s . But as the period

approached i t s end, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was oftentimes "relinquished" to

leaders of the middle-income peasantry who, unlike the old established

officialdom, were not so t i e d to the old order nor as f i n a n c i a l l y immune

to natural or man-made, market-produced calamities.

This l a s t fact relates to the f i n a l point made i n the l a s t chap-

ter. P o l i t i c a l l y , the r o l e of the peasantry was defined i n terms of

t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n with the a u t h o r i t i e s . They were not, as mere residents

of the country, ipso facto, p o l i t i c a l beings. Usually represented by one

of t h e i r own, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l role may be termed as that of "supplicants"

entreating the authorities to act on t h e i r behalf, either as mediators,

 171

in the case where merchants, c r e d i t o r s , or wealthy farmers were the

second party, or as (hopefully) benevolent a r b i t r a t o r s i n the case where

government i t s e l f was the second party. When peaceful p e t i t i o n i n g f a i l e d

to produce r e s u l t s , they turned to the only other means to influence the

authorities available to them—rebellion. But even then, the success of

the r e b e l l i o n depended on the authorities r u l i n g i n t h e i r favour. Hence,

p o l i t i c s for them was more of an appeal or request process, whether

peaceful or v i o l e n t , expressing the desire to have some need s a t i s f i e d ,

than i t was a demand-making function based upon the state's recognition

of individuals or c o l l e c t i v i t i e s possessing certain r i g h t s . It i s this

d i s t i n c t i o n , perhaps more than any other, that illuminates the e s s e n t i a l l y

feudal cum Confucian nature of Tokugawa and early M e i j i p o l i t i c a l culture.

While feudal i n form, l i k e the European version, having certain estab-

lished relationships involving rights and obligations between rulers and

ruled, i t was nonetheless Confucian i n substance and therefore highly

r e s t r i c t i v e of the manner by which the ruled could make the rulers

observe what was regarded as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l feudal obligations.

What t h i s suggests i s that with the new Meiji p o l i t i c a l settle-

ment, as the e a r l i e r begun process of the market society replacing the

feudal society was accelerated, and therefore market r e l a t i o n s between

individuals and c o l l e c t i v i t i e s increasingly took the place of feudal

r e l a t i o n s , there necessarily occurred some kind of change i n the way indi-

viduals and c o l l e c t i v i t i e s made grievances. With the feudal structure

collapsing and the c a p i t a l i s t one r i s i n g , the Confucian form of expressing

grievances by supplication gave way to the market form of bargaining

 172

through demand and counter-demand.

These issues are raised here i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of Chapter IV,

"Ideology and Organisation," because t h i s present chapter intends to

look at the socio-economic and biographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of p a r t i c i -

pants of the Fukushima, Kabasan, and Chichibu rebellions with one eye on

t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l and organisational t r a i t s . For ultimately the i n d i -

vidual gua i n d i v i d u a l was less important i n expressing grievances than

was the i n d i v i d u a l gua member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y . After a l l , organisa-

t i o n for supplication by farmers, up to 1877, generally made use of the

communal t i e s of the village.' V i l l a g e s voiced grievances and appealed

for aid as villages, oftentimes even coercing the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of fellow

residents by resorting to violence or by threats of ostracism. Without,

i t was presumed, the moral (and sometimes, physical) force of the entire

v i l l a g e population behind an appeal, there was l i t t l e hope of i t s being

met.

As we saw i n the l a s t chapter, the intrusion of the market

economy caused the strong communal t i e s of the v i l l a g e to disintegrate.

Cash t i e s interfered with group s o l i d a r i t y and s o c i a l harmony—Confucian

notions i n themselves—and forced v i l l a g e members to redefine t h e i r own

s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economic roles vis-a-vis the v i l l a g e as a unit.

This s i t u a t i o n required them to search for an i d e o l o g i c a l substitute for

the now i r r e l e v a n t , Confucian cum feudal form of expressing grievances.

They had to search for a new ideology which could impart both morality

and e f f i c a c y into t h e i r p o l i t i c a l demands. What they f i n a l l y s e t t l e d

upon, we know from the l a s t chapter, was the popular rights movement. We
 173

know t h i s to be the case because we have seen the increasing extent to

which the commoners were populating the ranks of that movement. This

fact i n i t s e l f represents a profound change. During Tokugawa, when

f i n a n c i a l disaster struck, the peasants' could only invoke some vague

notion of natural justice—something which could only be granted by

Heaven or Nature and not by the p o l i t i c a l system i n which they l i v e d but

of which they were not a p a r t — a n d could expect nothing but taxes from

the r e a l dispensers of " j u s t i c e , " the r u l e r s of the p o l i t i c a l system.

The peasants received nothing i n return, save for the law which existed

more for the protection of the r u l e r s than for the ruled. But i n the

M e i j i period, commoners became part of the p o l i t i c a l system—education,

conscription and some l e v e l i n g of the class system made them into c i t i -

zens; they were no longer mere subjects. No longer were they aware only

of t h e i r duties; they now had some conception of t h e i r r i g h t s . This

growing awareness moved many thousands to j o i n the popular r i g h t s move-

ment. So impressed by t h i s development, one commentator contemporary to

the period coined a term to characterize i t s i d e o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l under-

3

p i n n i n g s — h e i m i n s h u g i of "commonerism."

It i s not unusual that such a development should have made an

appearance i n modern Japanese history. In his study, Modernization:

Protest and Change, S. N. Eisenstadt has shown that t h i s development,

what he c a l l s the "consensual mass tendency," has characterized the

4
p o l i t i c s of a great number of countries undergoing p o l i t i c a l development.

G. B. Macpherson and Barrington Moore, i n tying economics to p o l i t i c s ,

have quite reasonably shown that i n developing p o l i t i c s the abandonment

 174

of a feudal economic system for a c a p i t a l i s t one usually r e s u l t s i n the

transfer of the economic p r i n c i p l e s of the market—freedom of ownership

of property, free access of the market, free contracts, s o c i a l and'

p o l i t i c a l mobility stemming from economic mobility, e t c . — t o the p o l i t i c a l

realm. 5
The l o g i c a l outcome of such a transfer, as I hope to show i n the

next chapter, i s the development among the members of the p o l i t y of a

b e l i e f that recognizes the r i g h t of each to p a r t i c i p a t e f r e e l y and

equally i n the p o l i t i c a l a r e n a — o r stated d i f f e r e n t l y , the philosophical

expression of the market society i s "natural r i g h t , " the r i g h t of each,

by v i r t u e of being an economic being, to acquire and to lose property

freely; to be free to advance, or to lose (in the case where his chosen

representative loses an e l e c t i o n ) , via the franchise, p o l i t i c a l power.

Universal franchise i s the l o g i c a l p o l i t i c a l concomitant to the economics

of the market society.

Whatever the reason for the increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the lower

classes (heimin) i n the minken movement, i t i s clear that during the-late

seventies and early eighties they were j o i n i n g parties and " s o c i e t i e s "

i n increasing numbers. In his seminal work, The Beginnings of Political

Democracy in Japan, Ike recognized t h i s f a c t , but added, "Without the

extensive use of a r c h i v a l material and l o c a l h i s t o r i e s , one cannot make

a s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of the membership of these s o c i e t i e s . " Nor, !•

would add, of the " p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . " 6

Using just the sort of material

Ike suggested, t h i s chapter w i l l attempt to make such an analysis. First,

however, a few words of caution are required.

The reader must remember that the purpose of t h i s chapter i s to

 175

i d e n t i f y the participants who were involved i n the three incidents accor-

ding to a number of commonly used c r i t e r i a . But even when t h i s i d e n t i f i -

cation process i s completed, the task s t i l l remains unfinished. The next

chapter w i l l f i n i s h the process by examing the participants i n terms of

p o l i t i c a l society and/or party membership. This chapter can, however,

stand by i t s e l f insofar as we can appreciate that.simple p a r t i c i p a t i o n

in the various incidents i s perhaps a better means to trace the c o l l e c -

t i v e action of heimin than i s membership i n an established p o l i t i c a l

party or society. Though i n many i n d i v i d u a l instances the l a t t e r was

necessarily anterior to the former, i t was far from being the r u l e . A

broader s t r a t a of people could be mobilized f o r , say, attacking a wealthy

r i c e merchant, than they could for membership i n a society or party. In-

deed, ofttimes such membership was exclusive, r e s t r i c t e d to those with

education, wealth, and s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l standing, while p a r t i c i p a t i o n

in a r e b e l l i o n lacked such r e s t r i c t i o n s . Consequently, by looking at

these three incidents of c o l l e c t i v e action, we gain exposure to a larger

number of people; we lose, however, due to that very f a c t , a c e r t a i n

degree of p r e c i s i o n , i . e . , the kind of detailed information that accom-

panies a study working with a limited sample. S t i l l , as with any study

dealing with large numbers of people coalesced into a movement of some

s i z e , the best h i s t o r i c a l records tend to be those that t e l l of a move-

ment's leadership; t h i s study i s no exception. Indeed, to make the study

manageable, there i s l i t t l e other choice. I t i s hoped, however, that" by

including a number of those arrested i n the various incidents who were

c l a s s i f i e d as "blind followers" (fuwa zuiko) by the a u t h o r i t i e s , as well

 176

as by u t i l i z i n g some aggregate figures concerning those involved, a

better understanding of the s o c i a l breadth of the movement can be appre-

ciated .

Membership i n a p o l i t i c a l society and/or party was mentioned as

one of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that w i l l be used to i d e n t i f y the incidents'

participants. The others used i n the analysis are residence, age, occu-

pation, status ( i . e . , o f f i c i a l s t a t u s — s h i z o k u or heimin), land ownership/

f i n a n c i a l status, arrest record, and l i t e r a c y . Also, where applicable,

a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between party and/or society leader and followers.

In addition, information concerning the nature of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s connec-

t i o n with other p a r t i c i p a n t s ; the prison sentence he received; and certain

post-incident biographical data that seem relevant are used to i d e n t i f y

the p a r t i c i p a n t s further. Most of the basic biographical information

comes from p o l i c e interrogations, or from court records; much of the

rest comes from secondary sources: contemporary accounts, recent studies,

biographies and the l i k e . A l l these d e t a i l s appear i n Appendices I I , I I I ,

and IV.

Although an e f f o r t has been made to provide the same information

for a l l of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n each of the incidents, i n some cases i t

was either not attainable, or i t was simply not relevant. In the former

instance, for example, i n the cases of l i t e r a c y and p r i o r arrests, f r e -

quently these questions were simply not asked by the prosecutor during

his interrogation of the suspects. In the l a t t e r instance, there i s the

example of Chichibu, where l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s were v i r t u a l l y non-

existent and hence t h i s category of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t .

 177

The biographical information of the participants i s employed i n

order to determine relationships and patterns among the biographical vari-

ables. By showing exactly who did involve themselves i n the incidents,

how factors such as residence, age, economic status, and so on related

to p a r t i c i p a t i o n , then the way i s cleared for a deeper understanding of

the nature of t h e i r organisation, ideology, targets, goals, and the

reaction by the authorities to the rebels. For at the lowest l e v e l of

analysis i t i s clear that who was involved s i g n i f i c a n t l y determines the

what, why and wherefore of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . It w i l l also

aid i n finding out how deeply into society notions of freedom and peoples'

rights penetrated, and how, once penetrated, such actions were translated

into e f f e c t i v e action. In short, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the participants pre-

pares the way for f i n d i n g the point at which ideas and p r a c t i c e meet.

THE SAMPLES

In Chapter I, where the story of each of the incidents was t o l d ,

mention was made of the large number of participants i n both the Fukushima

("several thousand") and Chichibu ("ten thousand") incidents. (The

Kabasan Incident, as was shown, i s a special case.) For obvious reasons

i t would be impossible to treat the biography of each of the participants

individually. The problem would be s l i g h t l y eased i f we were to work

only with those arrested i n each case, but even then not only are the

figures unmanageable (Fukushima—from one thousand to several thousand,

depending on the source; Chichibu—one source counts over 3,100 either

arrested or having surrendered; another, almost 4,500 i f those caught i n

 178

Gumma and Nagano prefectures are included) but also s u f f i c i e n t biographi-

c a l information i s missing for the vast majority o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s .

(Most were merely fined and therefore not as thoroughly interrogated as

suspected "ringleaders.") Even i f the study were to focus only on those

arrested who came from the two most active d i s t r i c t s i n each of the i n c i -

dents, Yama and Chichibu, the figures are s t i l l unweildy, amounting to

518 and 234 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 10

Since i t i s c l e a r l y necessary to arrive at some figures that are

manageable, that have substance, and that i n some way are representative

of larger numbers of p a r t i c i p a n t s , the samples were derived i n the f o l -

lowing way. In the case of the Fukushima Incident, the f i f t y - e i g h t

individuals charged with treason (Kokujihan, l i t e r a l l y , "a crime [against]

national a f f a i r s " ) and sent to the High Crimes Court (Kotoko-in) i n Tokyo

make up the sample. (See Appendix I I : Fukushima A c t i v i s t s . ) The weak-

nesses of t h i s sample are several: (1) a disproportionately high number

of them, t h i r t e e n i n a l l , are from outside Fukushima—six from Gumma,

four from Kochi, and one each from Miyagi, Yamagata, and Ehime. This

d e f i n i t e l y does not accurately r e f l e c t the r e a l percentage of non-

Fukushima people who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the incident; (2) only eight of the

f o r t y - f i v e Fukushima p a r t i c i p a n t s came from the Aizu region; t h i s figure

does not represent accurately the high percentage of a c t i v i s t s coming

from Aizu; (3) of the f i f t y - e i g h t indicted for treason, only s i x were con-

victed; the other fifty-two were released for lack of s u f f i c i e n t evidence

i n March and A p r i l , 1883. This fact causes us to query: I f so many were

found innocent, and therefore f a l s e l y charged, then surely the charges

 179

were trumped up, making us wonder whether these fifty-two " a c t i v i s t s "

were as active i n the incident as the treason charge led us to believe.

The facts seem to indicate that the charges were, i f not fabricated,

then at least inaccurate. This i s suggested by the number of times,

four i n a l l , between 13 January and 4 February 1883, that the government

made a l t e r a t i o n s , i . e . , additions and deletions, to the l i s t of those

to be t r i e d for t r e a s o n . 11
In any case, those who made the " f i n a l list,"

for whatever reason, were ultimately prosecuted as the r e a l "ringleaders"

(shukai) of the disturbance, and, not i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h i r t y of whom, as

i t turns out, had a d i r e c t relationship with the great popular r i g h t s

leader of the region, Kono Hironaka, who was i n fact convicted of treason.

Whether or not i t can be termed a " p o l i t i c a l trial"--Takahashi among

12

others claims that i t was — i t i s clear that most of those t r i e d were

p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s , the government's accusations notwithstanding, and

t h i s fact makes the sample relevant to t h i s study. Moreover, i t should- be

mentioned that throughout the ensuing discussion, information regarding

a number of other major figures who were not t r i e d as " t r a i t o r s " i n Tokyo,

but who were prosecuted l o c a l l y at Wakamatsu and elsewhere, w i l l also be

provided i n order to supplement out sample. F i n a l l y , i n an e f f o r t to

learn about the "followers," we w i l l make use of government reports on the

v i l l a g e s and v i l l a g e r s involved i n the anti-road construction movement.

Similar kinds of l i m i t a t i o n s also help to determine who is in-

cluded i n the Chichibu s a m p l e — s u f f i c i e n t biographical information, and

the nature of the crime by, and therefore the thoroughness of the i n t e r -

rogation of, the i n d i v i d u a l s . In t h i s case, however, the sample i s not

 180

r e s t r i c t e d to those o f f i c i a l l y considered a c t i v i s t s , i . e . , those pub-

l i c l y t r i e d , but includes most of those whom the Komminto i t s e l f regarded

as a c t i v i s t s . The sample consists of those forty-seven men (concerning

whom more-or-less complete data exists f o r thirty-eight) whose activism

earned them an " o f f i c i a l l y appointed" Komminto army post just p r i o r to

13

the outbreak of the incident. (See Appendix I I I : Chichibu A c t i v i s t s . )

Although these individuals form the core of t h i s section of the study,

in order to provide a wider perspective of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' i d e n t i t y ,

supplementary data w i l l also be u t i l i z e d . General, aggregate data w i l l

be used f o r : (1) the 115 people who "instigated the masses into joining

p r i o r to the outbreak of violence"; and (2) the 103 people c l a s s i f i e d as

"members of the Komminto" who destroyed the homes of "wealthy farmers

14

and merchants and instigated violence i n t h e i r v i l l a g e s . " Among the

other supplementary data to be used i s Inoue Koji's analysis of 261

people prosecuted i n Gumma prefecture, which he took from the fourteen-

volume, Criminal Records of Chichibu Rioters (Chichibu Boto Hanzai ni

Kansuru Shoruihen). His findings may also serve as a check against, and

as a standard by which we can judge the representativeness of the s t r i c t l y

Saitama data marshalled here. F i n a l l y , i t should also be pointed out

that i n the next chapter interrogation records of several participants,

categorized by the government as "blind followers," w i l l be used i n order

to gain an appreciation o f the type o f "followers" who involved themselves

i n the r e b e l l i o n .

The limitations of the Chichibu and Fukushima data are absent

from or, rather, d i f f e r e n t from those connected with the Kabasan incident,
 181

l a r g e l y due t o i t s b e i n g a very d i f f e r e n t type o f d i s t u r b a n c e . In a d d i -

t i o n to the twenty p r i n c i p a l c o n s p i r a t o r s , the Kabasan sample w i l l also

i n c l u d e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h i r t e e n o t h e r s who were, f o r a v a r i e t y o f reasons,

i m p l i c a t e d i n the a b o r t i v e r e b e l l i o n , thus b r i n g i n g the t o t a l sample t o

thirty-three. (See Appendix IV: Kabasan A c t i v i s t s . )

F i n a l l y , before examining the d a t a , i t i s necessary to caution

the r e a d e r once more about the problem o f how representative of the

l a r g e r p o p u l a t i o n are the i n d i v i d u a l s i n c l u d e d i n the t h r e e samples.

F o r the most p a r t , the i n d i v i d u a l s who comprise the samples were l o c a l

e l i t e s — s o c i a l l y , economically, and p o l i t i c a l l y . Most came from one of

the o l d e r and w e a l t h i e r f a m i l i e s o f t h e i r v i l l a g e , and many o f them h e l d

p o s i t i o n s o f l e a d e r s h i p i n the l o c a l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y or party. These

f a c t s o b v i o u s l y s e t them a p a r t from the l a r g e r l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n . Yet,

a t the same time, as f a r as t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the i n c i d e n t s o r i n the

popular r i g h t s movement i s concerned, these l o c a l e l i t e s were s e r v i n g as

representatives as w e l l as l e a d e r s o f the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n . The social,

economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s advantages they h e l d over the l o c a l popula-

t i o n may have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r having been a b l e t o assume

l e a d e r s h i p o f the i n c i d e n t s and of the movement, but o n l y inasmuch as

t h e i r views and actions genuinely r e f l e c t e d the a s p i r a t i o n s o f those

whom they led. E l i t e s , yes, but a t the local l e v e l , and, as the next

chapter w i l l show, they were the e l i t e of a movement whose g o a l s t r a n -

scended the t r a d i t i o n a l s t a t u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p a r o c h i a l p o l i t i c s , but

more important, the g o a l s were shared by l o c a l e l i t e s and their followers.

 182

RESIDENCE

The p r i n c i p a l question being asked here i s to what extent geo-

graphical origins of the participants clustered around some areas (and

not others)? Did certain areas tend to turn out more a c t i v i s t s than

others? In what way, and how much, d i d residence a f f e c t participation?

Once these questions are answered and once these findings are correlated

with other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , then i t i s hoped that i n

the following chapter these variables w i l l provide insight into questions

concerned with the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' organization.

I f we abstract the information on residence which appears i n

Appendix I I , we see that of the f i f t y - f i v e names of Fukushima Incident

a c t i v i s t s f o r whom we have residence information, forty-two are from

Fukushima. I f broken down according to d i s t r i c t (gun), Tamura accounts

for over h a l f , t o t a l l i n g twenty-four i n a l l , followed by Yama (seven),

Ishikawa (four), Atachi (three), with one apiece for Soma, Kawanuma,

Shinobu, and Futaba d i s t r i c t s ; i n a l l , only eight of Fukushima prefec-

15

ture's twenty-one d i s t r i c t s are represented. (See Table 4.)

If t h i s breakdown i s compared with the l i s t of people o r i g i n a l l y

accused of treason, dated 31 January 1883, we see a somewhat d i f f e r e n t

d i s t r i b u t i o n , a l b e i t that once again Tamura d i s t r i c t continues to rank

highest. (See Table 4.) On that date not only were f i f t e e n of the d i s -

t r i c t s of Fukushima represented, but also the difference between Tamura

and Yama—the l a t t e r commonly regarded by the authorities as the hub of

the anti-road construction a c t i v i t y 1 6

— i s reduced to only three. If

those from Kawanuma, Yama's neighbour and a l l y i n the anti-road f i g h t

 183

Table 4. A Comparison of Residence of Fukushima

A c t i v i s t s O r i g i n a l l y Listed for Crime of Treason
with those Actually Tried

0 R IG I N A L L I S T T R I E D
(13 January 1883) (March and A p r i l 1883)

PREFECTURE
Kochi 6 4

Gumma 7 6

Yamagata 2 1

Ehime 1 1

Tochigi 1
—
Fukushima 55 42

DISTRICT
Tamura 14 24

Yama 11 7
Kawanuma 5 1

Minami-Aizu 1
—
Futaba 1 1

Kita-Aizu 1
—
Adachi 2 3

Soma 1 1
Asaka 1
—
Iwase 4
—4
Ishikawa 2
Shirakawa 1
—1
Shinobu 9
Iwaki 1
—
Onuma 1
—
Total 82 55

Source: For the "Original L i s t , " Shoji Kichinosuke, ed., Nihon

seisha seito hattatsu shi (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 560-62. For those "Tried"
see Appendix II for references.
 184

are added to the Yama figure, then we have a better idea of that area's

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the incident r e l a t i v e to the other areas.

The discrepancy between this o r i g i n a l l i s t of t r a i t o r s and that

of those who were f i n a l l y sent to the Tokyo t r i a l s i s probably accounted

for i n an observation made by Takahashi. Speaking of the unusually

large percentage of Tamura d i s t r i c t " t r a i t o r s , " he writes, "This fact

c l e a r l y indicates that the Aizu disturbance [Kitakata Incident] was

merely a pretext for the [subsequent] large-scale arrests; that the r e a l

aim [of the government] was the extermination of the Jiyuto within the
17

prefecture, which was then under the influence of Kono [Hironaka]."

And, i t i s necessary to add, the strength of the eastern Fukushima Jiyuto,

and many of the p o l i t i c a l societies supporting i t , was concentrated

mainly i n Tamura d i s t r i c t , Miharu Town, where, importantly, Kono was i t s

most distinguished popular rights advocate. A l l other things being equal,

t h i s fact, more than any other, appears to account for the high number

of Tamura d i s t r i c t residents appearing i n our sample.

But regardless of the reason for the arrest of so many (relatively)

Tamura residents, there exists other data that shows the vast majority of

the participants i n the Kitakata/Fukushima incident did i n fact reside i n

the western region of Fukushima, that i s , i n the s i x d i s t r i c t s that com-

prised the Aizu region. Of those having leadership positions i n the Aizu

Rengokai (see Chapter I ) , only two, Uda S e i i c h i and Miura Bunji, were sent

to the Tokyo t r i a l s (and appear therefore i n our sample). Most of the

others--Hara Heizo, Kojima Chuya, and Monna Shigejiro, for example—

described by the authorities as "ringleaders and i n s t i g a t o r s , " were t r i e d

 185

18

i n the l o c a l courts of Fukushima and Wakamatsu towns. These a c t i v i s t s

came from the Aizu d i s t r i c t s of Yama, Kawanuma, and Onuma.

As with the leadership, most of the followers i n the incident

resided i n the western part of the prefecture. Shimoyama Saburo c i t e s

19

Yama, Kawanuma, and Onuma as the three most active d i s t r i c t s . In fact,

i f we examine the figures provided by the authorities at that time, i t

appears that a p l u r a l i t y i f not a majority of the followers were residents

of Yama d i s t r i c t . Using as the t o t a l number involved i n the Kitakata

Incident that imprecise figure "several thousand" as a basis o f comparison,

we see i n "A Report On Those Who Support the L i t i g a t i o n [against the govern-

ment] and who Protest against the Road Building" that twenty-seven Yama

d i s t r i c t v i l l a g e s involving 2,120 people were regarded as the most active

20
areas. After the wholesale arrests i n December, i t i s known that at
21
least 500 v i l l a g e r s were fined, among whom 214 were charged as having
been "blind followers who massed f o r rebellion""(Kyoto shushu fuwa zuiko).
22

A l l but three of the 214 were residents of Yama d i s t r i c t .

Again r e f e r r i n g back to Appendix- I I , i f we look at the even lower

l e v e l of administration, the village/town/city l e v e l , the most s t r i k i n g

fact, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i s the large number of p a r t i c i p a n t s , twenty i n

a l l , who resided i n the town of Miharu, the p r i n c i p a l urban area of

Tamura d i s t r i c t , and i n i t s surrounding v i l l a g e s . The other i n t e r e s t i n g

finding to be extracted from the sample, again not p a r t i c u l a r l y s u r p r i s -

ing, i s the absence of any s i g n i f i c a n t c l u s t e r i n g i n Yama d i s t r i c t . Of

the seven residents l i s t e d , only Atsushio-kano v i l l a g e , located about

ten kilometres due north of Kitakata, had more than one person, i n fact
 186

only two people, sent to the Tokyo t r i a l s .

Once again, however, by looking at other data, c e r t a i n patterns

emerge. In the l i s t of Yama d i s t r i c t "ringleaders" (kyokai) provided by

d i s t r i c t head Sato J i r o to Governor Mishima on 29 November 1882 (the day

following the Kitakata Incident), we see that i n addition to Akagi Heiroku

who was l a t e r sent to Tokyo for prosecution, Wajima Akigo and Ueda
23
Kiyomaru both came from Shinai v i l l a g e . In the case of Atsushio and
Kano v i l l a g e s (later consolidated), Uryu Naoshi, prosecuted i n Tokyo, was
24

joined by Yama "ringleader" Endo Yuhachi. We also see that the very

v i l l a g e s from which these people came were among the most active i n terms

of the number of residents mobilized. Atsushio-kano accounted for 221

25

participants, Shinai for ninety-five; respectively, these two v i l l a g e s

ranked f i r s t and fourth i n Yama d i s t r i c t .

To summarize, then, what has been said about residence and p a r t i -

cipation i n the Fukushima incident: f i r s t , based upon our sample, i t i s

clear that urban-based a c t i v i s t s , namely, those from Miharu of Tamura

d i s t r i c t , were regarded by the authorities as having been most responsible

for i n s t i g a t i n g the disturbances of November 1882. Secondly, r e l y i n g on

other evidence, i t appears that those leaders from the Aizu region, and

especially from Yama d i s t r i c t , were equally as active as those from

Miharu, but that, for whatever reason—probably p r i n c i p a l l y a p o l i t i c a l

one—they were omitted from the government's " l i s t of t r a i t o r s . " Thirdly,

perhaps a majority of "followers" involved i n the incident were concen-

trated i n the Aizu,region, p r i n c i p a l l y Yama d i s t r i c t and secondarily

Kawanuma and Onuma d i s t r i c t s . F i n a l l y , at the lowest l e v e l of administration,

 187

the village/town/city, there appears to e x i s t a close r e l a t i o n s h i p be-

tween the v i l l a g e from which a "ringleader" came, and the number of par-

t i c i p a n t s coming from the same v i l l a g e . This f i n a l point, however, must

be considered as a tentative one for the present, as i t s i d e o l o g i c a l and

organisational implications w i l l be explored further i n the next chapter.

Before we move on to look at the r e l a t i o n s h i p of residence to

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Kabasan Incident, a few words about the thirteen

individuals i n the sample who came from outside Fukushima are needed.

We know from Chapter I that Sato and Sugiyama, from Miyagi and

Ehime prefectures respectively, were sent by Kono Hironaka to investigate

the s i t u a t i o n i n Aizu p r i o r to the Kitakata Incident. Since we have no

other information on these two, we must conclude that sometime e a r l i e r

they must have abandoned t h e i r native prefectures to l i v e , and probably

to study, at one of the popular r i g h t s academies i n eastern Fukushima.

Matsumoto, from neighbouring Yamagata prefecture, appears to have been a

primary school teacher who relocated i n order to teach i n Miharu; i t i s

known that he was a Jiyuto member, so very l i k e l y he moved i n order to

involve himself i n the most active of the popular rights centres of the

Tohoku region. In the case of the four men from Kochi prefecture, since

we know that a l l four hailed from the fountainhead of early popular r i g h t s

activity—Tosa—we can therefore imagine that they were popular rights

activists. A l l we know for c e r t a i n , however, i s that one was a Jiyuto

member who was i n Fukushima v i s i t i n g i t s Jiyuto headquarters. The other

three quite possibly could have been teachers of popular rights thought

at one of the l o c a l academies (see Chapter IV), for i t i s known that

 188

several Tosa popular r i g h t s advocates were i n t h e i r employ as teachers.

About the s i x who came from Gumma we can be more d e f i n i t e . They were a l l

members of the most prominent of the p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s of Gumma, the

Yushinsha, and went to Fukushima, i n the words of the leader of the expe-

d i t i o n , Nagasaka Hachiro, "because i t was clear that [Governor] Mishima's

road construction plan was unjust; therefore, we went i n order to i n s t i -

gate the people t o take court action." It i s necessary to point out,

however, that they did not even a r r i v e i n Fukushima u n t i l 9 December,

well a f t e r the Kitakata Incident and the s t a r t of the wide-scale arrest

26
campaign against the l o c a l Jiyuto members.
An understanding of how residence related to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the

Kabasan incident i s even more c r u c i a l — a n d c e r t a i n l y more obvious—than

i t was i n the case o f Fukushima. The most s i g n i f i c a n t and consequential

f a c t about residence i s that o f the twenty p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i s t s who

plotted and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the incident, twelve of them were natives of

27

Fukushima prefecture. (See Appendix IV.) Two of the twelve, i n fact,

Kono K i r o s h i and Miura Bunji, appeared i n the previous sample, having

been accused of "treason" for t h e i r part i n the Fukushima Incident.

Several of the other Fukushima people as well were involved i n that i n c i -

dent, but were t r i e d at lower courts and subsequently released: Monna

Shigejiro, Yokoyama Nobuyuki, and Isokawa Motoyoshi. Several of the

others were also involved, such as Hara Rihachi and Kotoda Iwamatsu, but

either escaped arrest or were simply disregarded by the Fukushima p o l i c e

after the incident. In any case, as Takahashi has said, "Most of them
28
were active i n the Fukushima Incident."
 189

Of the other eight p r i n c i p a l conspirators i n the Kabasan Incident,

Ibaraki and Tochigi prefectures each accounted for three and A i c h i and

Ishikawa one each. A l l three of the Ibaraki participants were from

Shimodate Town, Makabe d i s t r i c t , while two of the three from Tochigi

(information i s absent for Hirao Yasokichi) came from Shimotsuga d i s t r i c t ,

but from d i f f e r e n t v i l l a g e s . Ten of the twelve conspirators from Fuku-

shima were either residents of Tamura (five) or Yama ( f i v e ) , and a l l of

those from Tamura were Miharu Town residents; v i l l a g e residence was dif-

ferent for each of those from Yama d i s t r i c t .

Twelve of the other thirteen people appearing i n the sample were

a c t i v i s t s who were l a t e r arrested for complicity i n the incident. The

remaining figure, Fukao, on whom no biographical information e x i s t s , d i s -

appeared p r i o r to the incident, thereby lending support to the contention

29

of Yokoyama and others that he was a p o l i c e spy. (Actually large

numbers of reputed minken advocates, of Fukushima e s p e c i a l l y , were l a t e r

arrested for suspicion of involvement; more about t h i s w i l l be mentioned

in Chapter V.) Six of the twelve accomplices were Tochigi residents; two

were from Fukushima; and one each from Ibaraki, Tokyo, Iwate, and A i c h i

prefectures.

In order to comment here on the importance of residence as i t

relates to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Kabasan Incident, i t i s necessary to a n t i -

cipate some of the findings that w i l l appear i n the next chapter on

organisation and ideology. B r i e f l y stated, other than i n the case of the

twelve p r i n c i p a l conspirators from Fukushima, and even here to a large

extent, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the incident appears to have been due more to a

 190

common desire to overthrow the government than to the fact of common

place of residence. To be sure, common geographical o r i g i n s were impor-

tant to the growth of the conspiracy, mainly because i t made for easier

communication among the rebels. Yet even with that, as we saw i n Chapter

I, many of the rebels f i r s t became acquainted with one another not i n

t h e i r home d i s t r i c t s , but i n Tokyo at one of several Jiyuto meetings or

organisational functions. Common residence might have been a necessary,

but c e r t a i n l y not a s u f f i c i e n t , condition that favoured participation;

more important, i t would seem, were the facts of shared experience in a

p r i o r incident ( i . e . , the Fukushima), membership i n the same p o l i t i c a l

s o c i e t i e s (in Tochigi, Ibaraki, and i n Fukushima), and the b e l i e f shared

by a l l conspirators that the government should be toppled. Hence, while

- i t was not unimportant, ultimately i t was the superimposition of other

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the rebels upon the factor of residence that gave i t

whatever importance i t has.

The s i t u a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t i n the case of the Chichibu

Incident, as a glance at Appendix III w i l l show. Of the forty-seven

names appearing on t h i s l i s t — r e p r e s e n t i n g the leadership of the Komminto

30

army — f o r t y are Saitama residents and thirty-seven of -these are -"

r

from Chichibu. With such a preponderance -of 'Chichibu 'residents,

d i s t r i c t residency becomes v i r t u a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n helping to locate

p a r t i c u l a r l y active p o l i t i c a l areas, making i t necessary therefore to use

the village/town administrative unit as a basis of reference. (See Table

5.) Upon doing t h i s , we see that of the twenty-one v i l l a g e s and one town

(Omiya) shown on the l i s t , only nine had more than one Komminto army
 V 191

Table 5. Comparison of Residence of Komminto Army

Leaders by Town and V i l l a g e with Residence of those
Charged with "Massing to Riot"

Town/Village Army Leaders (no.) "Massing to Riot"

Shimo-yoshida 5 7
Kami-yoshida 2
Shimo-hinozawa 3 7
Kami-hinozawa 3
Akuma 3 1
Isama 4 6
Fuppu 4 6
Omiya 2 2
Shiroku 2 1
Ota 1 1
Yokose 1 2
Iida 1 3
Misawa 1 5
Shimo-ogano 1 1
Sanyama 1 3
Ikoda 1
Honnogami 1 2
Onohara 1
Nakino 1
Nishinoju 1
Makinichi 1 1
Nagaru 1
Minano 1
Komori 2
Nogamishimogo 1
Hio 1
Sakamoto 1
Kanezawa 1
Kawahar az awa 1
Terao 1
Toyaen 2
Yoshigekubo 1

Total 40 61

Source.- Data for "Army leaders" i s abstracted from Appendix I I I ;

for "Riot," CJSR 1:378-83.
 192

leader representing them; i n fact, i f we combine the "Upper" and "Lower"

Yoshida v i l l a g e s , and do the same f o r the "Upper" and "Lower" Hinozawa

v i l l a g e s , then the figure i s reduced to seven. Thus amalgamated, these

"two" v i l l a g e s had the highest representation, with seven and s i x respec-

tively. They are followed by Isama and Fuppu, each having four; by

Akuma with three; and by Omiya and Shiroku with two each. I t i s perhaps

also s i g n i f i c a n t that those v i l l a g e s with the greater representation were

also those whose leaders held some of the higher ranks within the Kom-

minto army.

If arrests can be regarded as an indication of activism, then

the very same v i l l a g e s also rank high for producing a c t i v i s t s , as seen

in a government document e n t i t l e d , "A table of those defendants charged

31

with massing to r i o t . " (See Table 5.) I t shows that of sixty-one

Chichibu residents coming from a t o t a l of twenty-eight v i l l a g e s , Hinozawa

(seven), Yoshida (seven), Isama (six), Fuppu (six), and Sanzawa (five)

v i l l a g e s ranked highest. In yet another government document, e n t i t l e d

simply "Names of Rioters" (Boto kimmei), l i s t i n g 224 people from Chichibu,

again ranked highest was Hinozawa (thirty-one: "Upper" and "Lower"),

followed by Yoshida ( t h i r t y : "Upper" and "Lower"), Fuppu (twenty-seven),

32

and Isama ( f i f t e e n ) . These v i l l a g e s , i t i s important to note, were

a l l located within ten kilometres of one another and were situated i n

the north-west corner of Chichibu d i s t r i c t , near the Gumma prefectural

border. I t was t h i s area where many of the Komminto members resided,

33
and where during November much of the f i g h t i n g occurred.
That these v i l l a g e s predominated i n the Chichibu Incident i s
 193

confirmed by the f i n a l count of the number of r i o t e r s involved, according

34

to v i l l a g e , that was calculated by the courts at the end of the year.

(See Table 6.) This table shows that i n terms of the absolute number of

participants, Yoshida ("Upper" and "Lower"), Hinozawa ("Upper" and

"Lower"), Isama, Iida, Sanyama, and several others ranked highest. (The

significance of the f i n a l column, showing the number of participants

r e l a t i v e to v i l l a g e population, w i l l be commented upon i n the conclusion

to t h i s chapter and also i n the next chapter.) In general, because these

findings compare favourably to those of our sample, and to the other

Chichibu data thus far presented, we can conclude that the above-mentioned

v i l l a g e s were the p r i n c i p a l centres of activism at the time of the i n c i -

dent, both i n terms of the number of individuals mobilized from them,

and the number of Komminto leaders representing them.

To summarize: i n each of the three cases, certain areas produced

more a c t i v i s t s than others. Tamura d i s t r i c t i n eastern Fukushima and

Yama d i s t r i c t i n western Fukushima i n the case of the Fukushima Incident,-

Fukushima prefecture i t s e l f i n the case of the Kabasan Incident; and the

v i l l a g e s of Yoshida, Hinozawa, Isama, and Fuppu i n the case of the Chi-

chibu I n c i d e n t — a l l these areas contributed an inordinate number of both

leaders and followers, followers notwithstanding i n the case of the

Kabasan r e b e l l i o n , to the common body of participants i n each of the i n c i -

dents. Moreover, i n both the Fukushima and Chichibu incidents, not

surprisingly, the l o c a l areas that boasted the more a c t i v i s t of the i n c i -

dent 's leadership also vaunted a larger number of followers. In both

cases, t h i s fact probably r e f l e c t s the endurance of a t r a d i t i o n of l o c a l

 194

Table 6. Number of Participants i n Chichibu Incident

by V i l l a g e , Relative to V i l l a g e Population, f o r V i l -
lages Contributing more than F i f t y "Direct" Participants

% Pop.
No. Participants Village
Village Total Mobilized
Direct Indirect Pop.
(rounded)

Shimo-Yoshida 324 360 684 2,516 27

Kami-Yoshida 236 155 381 1,612 24
Shimo-Hinozawa 139 139 378 986 36
Kami-Hinozawa 77 120 297 565 52
Fuppu 35 63 98 411 24
Isama 111 174 285 865 21
Ofuchi 57 126 183 330 55
Nomaki 72 79 151 454 33
Hisanaka 76 78 154 436 35
Akuma 50 50 100 375 27
Hio 92 82 174 598 30
Fuj ikura 130 159 289 944 30
Iida 142 190 332 888 37
Sanyama 162 222 384 1,150 33
Kawahar az awa 94 96 190 584 33
Susuki 134 152 286 2,446 12
Shimo-Ogano 159 151 340 1,325 25
Hanni . 74 74 148 658 23
Nagaru 141 164 305 1,062 28

Source: CJSR 1:340-43. Population figures are based on govern-

ment figures c i t e d i n i b i d . ; no c r i t e r i a are given to d i s t i n g u i s h " d i r e c t "
from " i n d i r e c t " p a r t i c i p a n t s . Total number of participants i s shown as
6,017; t o t a l number of " d i r e c t " participants i s 2,644; " i n d i r e c t " i s
3,373.
 195

co-operative s p i r i t , r e l a t i v e l y strong communal t i e s , and the organisa-

t i o n a l prowess of the incident's leaders. Yet at the same time, as we

s h a l l see i n the next chapter, high rates of p a r t i c i p a t i o n also r e f l e c t

the increasing extent to which farmers were receptive to the ideology of

the popular rights movement.

AGE

It has been frequently observed that the leaders of r e b e l l i o n and

35
revolution are comparatively young men. We know for instance, that i n
3<
the case of the M e i j i Restoration, of "revolution" as some would have i t ,
37

most of the p r i n c i p a l rebels were i n t h e i r twenties or t h i r t i e s . With

minor q u a l i f i c a t i o n , the same observation applies to the leaders of the

Fukushima, Kabasan, and Chichibu incidents.

Again abstracting from our Fukushima sample (see Table 7a) we

can see that i f the age breakdown were graphed, i t would c l o s e l y resemble

a bell. Of the thirty-nine Fukushima residents on whom we have informa-

t i o n , twenty-eight f a l l between the ages of twenty and t h i r t y - n i n e .

Seven persons were i n t h e i r late teens, three i n t h e i r f o r t i e s , and only

one was i n his f i f t i e s . The o v e r a l l sample exhibits an average and

median age of twenty-nine and a range of seventeen to f i f t y years. It i s

youth,..however, which appears to be conspicuous. There are other data

that lend support to t h i s impression.

Takahashi has analyzed the age structure of the forty-four leaders

— c o n s i s t i n g of t h i r t y - f o u r from Fukushima, f i v e from Kochi, and f i v e

from Gumma—arrested after the Kitakata incident on 28 November at the

 Table 7. Age Structure of Sample Participants of Fukushima,
Chichibu and Kabasan Incidents (abstracted from Appendices
II, I I I , and IV)

a. Fukushima (residents only) b. Kabasan (all.participants) c. Chichibu .(residents only)

Average Median Average Median Average Median

Age group Number Number Number
Age Age Age Age Age Age

- 19 7 7 1

20 - 29 13 12 8

30 - 39 15 10 10

40 - 49 3 1 12

50 - 59 1 0 3

60 - 69 0 0 0

39 29 29 30 26*2 24 34 35 36+

VO
 197

home of Aizu Jiyuto leader, Akagi Heiroku. The youngest person present

was seventeen (Yasuda Keitaro), the oldest t h i r t y (Iga Wanato), and the
38

average age was only twenty-two. He also records, i n combining both

leaders and followers into a sample of one hundred participants (includ-

ing those sent to the Tokyo t r i a l s ) , that the average age was twenty-

39

eight. In a l l , the data forces the conclusion that youth and activism

were c l o s e l y associated, at least i n the case of the leadership of the

Fukushima Incident; the absence of evidence r e l a t i n g s t r i c t l y to f o l -

lowers prevents us from making a similar conclusion.

If youth characterized the participants of the Fukushima Incident,

i t was even more so i n the Kabasan case. (See Table 7b.) Here the range

was eighteen to forty-three, and showed an average of about twenty-six-

and-a-half, and a median age of twenty-four. Those under t h i r t y predomi-

nated, nineteen persons i n a l l , while the t h i r t y to thirty-nine range

accounted for ten. Tanaka Shozo, who gained notoriety i n the 1890's f o r

the f i g h t he led against the p o l l u t i o n caused by the Ashio copper mines,

was the "old man" of the group at a f r i s k y forty-three. The youth of

the Kabasan participants places them very neatly therefore into that uni-
40

versal category known as "young revolutionaries."

Compared to the youthful, participants of the Fukushima and Kabasan

incidents, those who led the Chichibu Incident were "middle-aged." (See

Table 7c.) S l i g h t l y over t h i r t y - s i x i s the average age of the t h i r t y -

five individuals comprising the Chichibu sample. I f graphed, then the

age structure more closely resembles a two-dimensional mountain, gradually

r i s i n g on one side and dropping steeply on the other. At the summit would
 198

appear those i n the forty to forty-nine age group, the largest group with

twelve members. On the l i n e up to the summit are the twenty to twenty-

nine age group (eight) and the t h i r t y to thirty-nine age group (ten). At

one base i s a single i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s late teens, and at the other base

three who are between f i f t y to f i f t y - n i n e years. The range was nineteen

years to f i f t y - s i x years o l d .

The age structure of t h i s sample can be compared to the ages of

those appearing i n an earlier-used document, "A table of those defendants

41

charged with massing to r i o t , " i n order to assess i t s representative-

ness; since t h i s was a lesser crime, we can assume that many of the i n d i -

viduals included were followers. The c o l l a t e d results and a graphic

representation of them appear i n Table 8.

Table 8. Age Structure with Graph, of Seventy-seven
Defendants Charged with Rioting

Late teens 5 no.

20 - 29 27 25

30-- 39 25 20

40 - 49 15 15

50 - 59 5 10

60 — 69 0 5

Total 77 0

Age 0 10 20 30 40 50—

Average Age - 33 years (rounded)

Median Age 31 years

 199

By again using the analogy of a two-dimensional mountain to de-

scribe the age structure of the participants, we see that the data i n

t h i s case shapes up to be just the reverse of the former sample. Here

the mountain r i s e s steeply on the f i r s t side, peaks at the twenty to

t h i r t y age grouping, and slopes gradually on the second side, thereby

indicating a younger group of p a r t i c i p a n t s . The picture derived from the

second set of data, however, i s somewhat deceptive, much l i k e the steep-

ness of a mountain i s to someone standing at i t s bottom, since only three

years separate the average age of the f i r s t set from the second set of
. . 42
participants.

To summarize, the average age of the Kabasan participants at

around twenty-six was lowest, and Chichibu's at around thirty-three to

t h i r t y - s i x was highest; the average age of the Fukushima participants at

twenty-eight or twenty-nine f e l l i n between.

A f i n a l important point to made about age as i t concerns partici-

pation i s how i t a f f e c t s organisation. Given the well-known r o l e that

age plays i n ordering personal r e l a t i o n s i n Japanese s o c i e t y — t h e dictum

of the Confucian value system i n s t r u c t i n g the young to show deference to

43

t h e i r elders — d i d t h i s s o c i a l fact a f f e c t the ordering of organisations?

A quick glance at our Chichibu sample, especially at the column i n d i -

cating the rank of the i n d i v i d u a l within the Komminto army, indicates

that many, but not a l l , of the higher ranks were held by older men. The

exceptions, however, stand out, such as Arai Shuzaburo, Inoue Denzo, and

Akihara Shojiro. Likely, such exceptions—and they are present i n the

other two incidents as w e l l — a r e explained by the fact that such notions

 200

as jinzai • ("capable man"), meiboka ("man of high repute") and minkenka

("advocate of peoples' rights") were increasingly being operationalized

44

i n heimin organisation during the early- and middle-Meiji periods.

STATUS

Like residence and age, status was fixed, or rather, "nearly

fixed" for upon performance of some meritorious deed f o r the community
45

or state a heimin could be elevated to shizoku status. (The opposite

was also true, as w i l l be shown presently.) For most, however, to be

born a heimin usually meant to die a heimin. This i s not to say that

there were no heimin who prospered; nor does i t mean that commoner status

prevented s o c i a l , economic, or p o l i t i c a l upward mobility, or that shizoku

status meant automatic..'prosperity. The point i s merely that with shizoku

status one's l i f e chances were better. Shizoku referred to the ex-

samurai who u n t i l 1877 received stipends from the government—free money

in e f f e c t — a n d by v i r t u e of t h e i r status had connections with those i n

high places, had avenues open to them that were denied to the vast

majority of commoners. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , heimin, referred to a l l those

who occupied the lower orders during Tokugawa—some goshi ("lower samurai";

two important examples of declassed goshi are Kono Hironaka and Tashiro

Eisuke), but mainly farmers, artisans, and merchants, most of whom

entered M e i j i with meagre assets; an o f f i c i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as heimin

merely increased the chances that one's assets were l i k e l y to remain

meagre.
Like the other "fixed" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , an o f f i c i a l status of
 201

heimin was no guarantee that one would p a r t i c i p a t e i n the popular rights

movement, or i n any of the three incidents examined here. The purpose,

therefore, of i d e n t i f y i n g the participants i n terms of status i s to t e s t

the proposition that the movement and related incidents included a grow-'

ing number of commoners, and to use the findings l a t e r i n order to deter-

mine whether status was a factor that contributed to p a r t i c i p a t i o n and

i f so, to what extent.

The breakdown by status according to incident appears i n Table 9.

Table 9. O f f i c i a l Status of Participants i n

the Three Incidents

Fukishima (N-45) Kabasan (N-31) Chichibu (N-35)

Heimin 30 15 35

Shizoku 14 16 0

Unclear* 1 0 0

*
"Unclear" does not r e f e r to cases where data i s absent, but
only to those cases where an i n d i v i d u a l was c l a s s i f i e d by the authori-
t i e s as "shizoku" but who, during interrogation, c l a s s i f i e d himself as
"heimin." Except for the Kabasan, the figures include only residents of
the area where the disturbances broke out.
Source: Abstracted from Appendices I I , I I I , and IV.

From this table we can say that the percentage of heimin among

the participants i n the three incidents was respectively two-thirds, one-

h a l f , and one-hundred per cent. But since our samples r e a l l y r e f l e c t

only the leadership s t r a t a of each of the incidents, i t remains necessary

to inquire into the status composition of the followers as well.

To t r e a t the most obvious f i r s t . One Chichibu document, dated

 202

2 December 1884, that helps i n determining the status composition of the

followers i n this incident i s e n t i t l e d , "A l i s t of names of those charged

with r i o t i n g who surrendered themselves to the authorities between

46

November 4 and November 30, 1884." The l i s t consists of 160 people

coming from seven d i f f e r e n t v i l l a g e s i n Chichibu d i s t r i c t . A l l 160

people were heimin. I f we again use the "Table of those defendants

charged with massing to r i o t " as a rough index of those who were followers,
. 47

we see that a l l seventy-seven persons were c l a s s i f i e d as heimin. Using

the even larger sample of 254 persons, including leaders and f o l l o w e r s —

Tashiro Eisuke's appointed o f f i c e r s , those charged with " i n s t i g a t i n g the

masses . . .," and those accused of membership i n the Komminto—it i s s i g -

48

n i f i c a n t that there are no shizoku l i s t e d among them. This evidence

supports the contention that the Chichibu Incident was a heimin distur-

bance. The only exception to this generalization might be Tashiro Eisuke,

the Commander of the Komminto army. Though born a goshi, h i s family

49
f a i l e d to receive shizoku status a f t e r the Restoration.

Although not as marked as the Chichibu sample, the Fukushima one

does show that heimin predominated by a r a t i o of two to one over the

shizoku involved i n the incident. I f we look again, however, to the

50

f i r s t indictment l i s t of 13 January 1883, then the percentage of shizoku

involved i s even smaller. Assuming that only leaders i n the incident

were indicted for "treason" and/or for " i n s t i g a t i n g the masses," then we

see that of the sixty-four leaders so charged, only ten of them were

shizoku. Also, importantly enough, no shizoku appear among the 285 Fuku-

shima residents charged with "blindly massing to r i o t . " From t h i s we may

 203

gather that, (1) the heimin dominated the leadership at least by a r a t i o

of two to one over the shizoku; (2) that most or a l l the followers i n

the incident were probably heimin; and (3) that i f a shizoku were to

play a part i n the incident, not only would he l i k e l y be a resident of

Tamura but he would also hold a p o s i t i o n of leadership (Tamano, Aizawa,

Sawada, and Hanaka, just to name some of the more important f i g u r e s ) .

Shizoku were e s p e c i a l l y important i n the Kabasan Incident as well,

so much so, i n fact, that i t would be f a i r to ask why this incident was

included i n a t r e a t i s e concerned with heimin revolts. For of the twenty

p r i n c i p a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , only six were heimin and of the t o t a l sample, as

we saw, not quote one-half were heimin. Now that the question has been

posed, i t seems appropriate to respond.

The Kabasan incident was included for three main reasons. First,

ostensibly at any rate, the participants conspired to overthrow the

existing government i n order to erect a new government more responsive

to the needs of the vast majority of Japanese, who were of course com-

moners. Secondly, the intent of the conspirators was to mobilize the

people to achieve t h i s . That the response of l o c a l farmers to the c a l l

for r e b e l l i o n was poor bespeaks several things, not the least of which

was the poor organisation of the rebels and probably the good sense of

the l o c a l farmers not to involve themselves i n an apparently futile

attempt at revolution which they regarded, perhaps, as a vendetta against

Governor Mishima. (See Chapter I.) This relates to the t h i r d reason

for including this disturbance i n our study. Even if the Kabasan i n c i -

dent was i n part a tomurai gassen or "battle of revenge" as i t i s

 204

51
frequently regarded, the point s t i l l remains that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of

heimin v i t i a t e d the shizoku class basis of the a f f a i r . This becomes a l l

the more obvious when i t i s r e c a l l e d that the prime mover of the entire

scheme was Koinuma, a heimin. Moreover, as we s h a l l see i n the next

chapter, the participants themselves e x p l i c i t l y stated i n t h e i r manifesto

that they regarded class as unimportant insofar as recruitment was con-

cerned.

A f i n a l remark about the importance of status considerations as

they r e l a t e to the three incidents i s necessary. It would be a mistake

to regard the d i s t i n c t i o n between heimin and shizoku as anything akin to

the Marxist proletariat/bourgeoise dichotomy that i s usually made i n

terms of the "consciousness" each class has of i t s e l f as a c l a s s . Though

one might p r o f i t a b l y talk about the existence of a "shizoku conscious-

52

ness," i t was premature at that time, despite such notions as "com-

monerism" (chiefly the product and property of a few i n t e l l e c t u a l s ) , to

t a l k about a "heimin class consciousness." Indeed, heimin and shizoku

are not terms denoting economic classes; they are descriptive terms used

to refer e s s e n t i a l l y , on the one hand, to the many who were not of samurai

o r i g i n and, on the other, to the few who were; the p r i n c i p a l c r i t e r i o n

for d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n was simple—the place i n the feudal hierarchy of one's

Tokugawa ancestor. I f "class" as a descriptive term i s at a l l useful, i t

i s i n how i t relates to occupation, and the income and s o c i a l status

derived from i t . To t h i s we now turn.

 205

OCCUPATION

For several reasons i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the participants by occu-

pation i s not as straightforward as i t was by residence, age, or status.

F i r s t , there are many instances where one individual has more than one

occupation, the most frequent example being the farmer/merchant, i . e . ,

one whose farm produces a surplus of cash crops s u f f i c i e n t to allow him

to market d i r e c t l y a sizeable portion of h i s crop i n either raw or pro-

cessed form. In the case of processed goods, such as s i l k clothing, dye,

paper and the l i k e , the farmer bypasses the merchant and s e l l s l o c a l l y .

There are also examples of farmer/"lawyer," where "lawyer" (or daigennin)

may r e f e r to the p r a c t i c e of mediating between debtors and creditors,

for example, and receiving a "fee" for the service, usually i n the form

of a favour or some commodity. Farmer/"village head" (kocho, shoya,

kimoiri, nanushi), farmer/priest, farmer/teacher, and craftsman/farmer

are additional examples. Secondly, there i s the problem of individuals

who are unemployed, bankrupt, or who simply have "no occupation" (e.g.,

due to youth). And t h i r d l y , there i s the further problem of discrepancy

between d i f f e r e n t sources concerning the facts about i n d i v i d u a l s . Hence,

i n i d e n t i f y i n g the occupation of individuals, i t has often been necessary

to make a choice, based on what appears to have been t h e i r p r i n c i p a l

occupation. In many cases, however, what the individual himself i d e n t i -

f i e d as his occupation during the course of p o l i c e interrogation has

served as the source of our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .

The breakdown of the Fukushima sample shows that for the t h i r t y -

f i v e people on whom we have information, farmers constituted a clear

 206

p l u r a l i t y of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , numbering fourteen i n a l l . Following

them were what could be termed the " l o c a l i n t e l l i g e n s i a , " namely teachers

(five) and p r i e s t s (Shinto four, and Buddhist one). Next came merchants,

and those who responded "none" during interrogation, each with three.

There were also two doctors, one druggist, one assistant i n v i l l a g e

government, and one lawyer's aid.

Takahashi has shown that i n the Fukushima case there existed a

close c o r r e l a t i o n between the occupation of a p a r t i c i p a n t and his r e s i -

53

dence. Most popular rights leaders from the Aizu region, for example,

were farmers, mainly small landlords and well-to-do, self-cultivating

farmers. The question of the nature of landholdings aside, our sample

lends support to his findings: a l l of the Yama residents were i n fact

farmers (and heimin). They were also, as Takahashi claimed about most of

the leadership from this area, kimoiri or " v i l l a g e heads." There were

s u f f i c i e n t numbers of v i l l a g e heads i n t h i s region involved i n the Aizu

Jiyuto—more than the 80 per cent of the party membership, he says—that

i t almost warrants c a l l i n g i t the kimoirito, "party of v i l l a g e heads."

In our sample, eleven individuals were " v i l l a g e heads."

Our sample also shows a few " v i l l a g e heads" coming from the

Tamura-Ishikawa region, but most of the i n d i v i d u a l s from t h i s area were

teachers, p r i e s t s , and merchants. Again, t h i s finding squares with Taka-

55

h a s h i s own
1
investigations. So too i n the case of those coming from

the coastal region—Soma and Futaba d i s t r i c t s : a c t i v i s t s from these areas,

56
who
suchhad returnedandto Kariyado
as Aizawa farming, Nakae,
or p r i ewere
s t s on
and the
teachers.
whole either ex-samurai
 207

Most of the followers i n the Fukushima incident, we saw e a r l i e r ,

came from the Aizu region and Yama d i s t r i c t i n p a r t i c u l a r . Since i t was

a farming d i s t r i c t , i t seems safe to assume that most of the followers

were farmers. More about the scale and type of farming i n that region

w i l l be discussed i n the section immediately following t h i s one.

More participants i n the Kabasan Incident, nine i n a l l , engaged

in farming at one time or another than i n any other occupation. But of

the nine, i t appears that only three or four made i t their sole vocation.

Of those claiming to be farmers, for example, Koinuma was more a merchant/

landlord than he was a farmer; Kokugi derived most of his income from the

r a i l r o a d , even though he farmed part-time; and Tamamatsu served as a

57 '

bodyguard to Tomatsu. Indeed, there were probably as many "intellec-

t u a l s " — f o u r j o u r n a l i s t s and one teacher—as there were full-time farmers.

The category into which most of the p a r t i c i p a n t s f a l l i s "unemployed/no

occupation," accounting for eight, a l l of whom were shizoku. This fact

tends to lend additional support to the widely held b e l i e f that a large

f l o a t i n g body of unemployed ex-samurai were becoming p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s

58

i n the post-Restoration, period. Also included i n the sample were two

" v i l l a g e heads" (one kimoiri and one kocho), and three ex-policemen, one

of whom we know—Monna Shigejiro—began to be active i n the movement dur-

ing the period i n his p o l i c e career when he was required to attend and
59

spy upon popular r i g h t s ' lecture meetings.

As might be expected, there i s not the same variety of occupations

among Chichibu Incident p a r t i c i p a n t s . Twenty-four, or nearly a l l of those

appearing i n our sample, were farmers. Although some individuals engaged

 208

in subsidiary s e r i c u l t u r a l work such as silk-weaving, the vast majority

spent most of t h e i r energies i n the c u l t i v a t i o n of mulberry or i n the

60

r a i s i n g o f silkworms. Even the seven individuals who are l i s t e d as

having non-farming jobs—craftsman, blacksmith, dyer, merchant, "lawyer"

(daigennin), priest (Shinto), and teacher—were probably closely t i e d

to the a g r i c u l t u r a l community. The previously used "Table of those

charged with massing to Riot" again supports the representativeness of

our Chichibu sample. Of the sixty-one names for whom occupation data

exists, f i f t y - f i v e were l i s t e d as farmers. The other six were seaman,

day-labourer, s o l d i e r , carpenter, mortuarist, and (bamboo) craftsman. 61

In Inoue Koji's study of the occupational structure of the 261

people arrested i n Gumma prefecture for t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Chi-

chibu Incident (among whom ninety-two were Chichibu residents), we see

that 70 per cent were farmer-cultivators, a figure lower than we would

expect given the evidence just presented. However, he also notes that of

the other 30 per cent, "very few of them were not t i e d to agriculture i n
62

some way," and l i s t s "lawyers" (daigennin), charcoal makers, roof-

thatchers, forest labourers, day-labourers, servants, dyers, plasterers,

s i l k weavers, etc., as examples of this close t i e .

Given the conditions of the M e i j i economy at that time (as out-

l i n e d i n Chapter I I ) , i t i s not surprising that so many of the p a r t i c i -

pants should have been farmers. At the same time, however, unlike many

teachers and p r i e s t s , members o f the " i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a s s , " whose p a r t i c i -

pation i n an anti-government movement finds many h i s t o r i c a l p a r a l l e l s

63
elsewhere, the fact of the farmers' t i e s to an essential l i b e r a l and,
 209

at the same time, anti-government movement was c e r t a i n l y new to Japan

and probably r e l a t i v e l y rare h i s t o r i c a l l y when compared to other parts

64

of the world. Certainly a p a r t i a l explanation for t h i s development

l i e s i n a study of the property r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g at the time of these

rebellions.
FINANCIAL STATUS/LAND OWNERSHIP

In the second section of Chapter II i t was shown how farming i n

Fukushima had come to be increasingly devoted to production of commodities

s t r i c t l y for the market. I t was shown that the impetus behind increased

production was the i n f l a t i o n of the late seventies, and the r i s i n g demand

domestically for sake, pottery, lacquer ware, wax, etc., and internation-

a l l y for s i l k . Farmers of Fukushima (and of Chichibu i n the case of s i l k )

responded to t h i s demand by devoting more and more land and energy to the
65

production of such items. I t was also shown that due to the success

of the Matsukata deflationary p o l i c y , and to new quality control standards

imposed by the government, prices for such products f e l l d r a s t i c a l l y .

That fact, coupled with the constant pressures of taxation and demands

by creditors for repayment of the loans taken out e a r l i e r during the

expansionist boom brought on the bankruptcy, or the threat of i t , of

innumerable farmers. We can imagine as well that farmers from some

a r e a s — f o r instance Chichibu, where crop production was not d i v e r s i f i e d —

were more affected by such changes i n fortune than were farmers i n Fuku- •

shima where crop d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was a long-established practice.

Within t h i s rapidly changing economic context the gekka jiken

 210

broke out. Given the depressed state of the economy, the following ques-

tions a r i s e : Were those who rebelled the down-trodden, the d i s i n h e r i t e d ,

the dispossessed? Were they the tenants, wage-labourers, or subsistance

farmers? Was i t poverty that s i g n a l l e d the c a l l for rebellion? Popular

conceptions would have i t so. But the question requires i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

This section intends to examine the income and land ownership

d i s t i n c t i o n s that existed among those belonging to the farmer c l a s s , for

as i t has already been shown, the farmers were the group that predominated

in the Fukushima and Chichibu incidents. Moreover, inasmuch as the

Kabasan conspirators directed t h e i r revolutionary energies at the mainly

r u r a l population of Ibaraki prefecture, i t would be'instructive to look

at i t s r e l a t i o n s of landownership there as a possible means to explain

why the farmers, unlike the people of Fukushima and Chichibu, did not

r i s e i n r e b e l l i o n when the opportunity presented i t s e l f .

A second reason for investigating d i s t i n c t i o n s of wealth among

the participants i s to t e s t the claim that the leadership of the popular

rights movement was changing hands from the shizoku to the heimin class

(which, from the evidence presented i n the section of "status" we saw

was true), and to the gono or "wealthy farmers," i n p a r t i c u l a r . We will

look at t h i s l a s t point f i r s t .

In the Fukushima sample of leaders fourteen i n d i v i d u a l s were

i d e n t i f i e d as farmers, and of these information on property holdings

exists for ten. Here we w i l l supplement t h i s sample with the same kind

of information on nine others who were active i n the popular rights move-

ment, and also i n the Kitakata Incident, as attested by t h e i r l a t e r

 211

arrests. F i f t e e n of the nineteen farmers, i t should be pointed out,

were residents of Yama d i s t r i c t . (See Table 10.)

Table 10. Size of Land Holdings of Twenty-four

Fukushima Men'Involved i n Fukushima-Incident
(abstracted from Appendix II)'

Land Area Number of Farmers Others

landless 1 2
-1 cho 0 1 (priest)

.1 - 2 cho 2 0
3 - 5 cho 4 1 (priest)
6-10 cho 7 1 (sake manufacturer)

11 - 20 cho 3 0
above 21 cho 2 0

Total 19 5

Based on t h i s sample i t appears that most of the leadership, at

least that part of i t coming from the farming contingent, was drawn from

landowners having more than two or three cho. I t was this group, c o l l e c -

t i v e l y referred to as gono, that "participated i n the Aizu Jiyuto [branch];

they were small landlords having about ten cho, or prosperous s e l f -

c u l t i v a t o r s having two or three cho." The question remains, however,

that i f t h i s amount of land ownership characterized the gono qua leaders,

what amount characterized t h e i r followers? In terms of t h e i r property

holdings how are the followers to be distinguished from the gono?

Most students of t h i s period generally d i s t i n g u i s h between the

various economic s t r a t a within the farmer class i n the following manner:

landlords, l a n d l o r d / s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r , s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r , s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r /
 212

68
tenant, tenant, tenant/wage labourer, and wage labourer. In t h i s way

d i s t i n c t i o n s are made i n terms of each person's place (role) i n a g r i c u l -

t u r a l society. But since i t i s clear that those individuals encompassed,

for example, i n the categories of l a n d l o r d / s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r and s e l f -

cultivator/tenant may, because of t h e i r " s p l i t roles," share much i n com-

mon with either the stratum d i r e c t l y above or below—depending upon to

what extent t h e i r property holdings place them more i n one category than

in the o t h e r — t h e even broader but perhaps more pertinent d i s t i n c t i o n i s

made between strata of farmers according to the extent of t h e i r landhold-

ings. They are: (1) jonoso, or "upper l e v e l farmers," r e f e r r i n g to those

whose c u l t i v a b l e land holdings are two cho or more; chunoso, or "middle

l e v e l farmers," those who have between one and two cho of land; and

genoso, or "lower l e v e l farmers," those owning less than one cho of land.

To gain an understanding of how such a breakdown related to Fukushima

prefecture, the :reader i s referred to Table 11.

Table 11 Average Area of Land Managed in Fukushima Pre-

fecture, by Strata (1875)

Total
Wet Dry Total % of Total
Farmer Forest Cultivated
Field Field Land Farming
Level Average Land (excl,
Average Average Average Population
Forest)

Upper 1.4 cho .93 1.83 - 4.26 8.0% 2.33 cho

Middle .8 .68 1.2 2.74 28. 0% 1.48

Lower .3 .3 .43 1.03 64.0% .6

Source; Shoji Kichinosuke, "Jiyu minken undo no k e i z a i t e k i h a i -

k e i , " M e i j i Shiryo Kenkyu Rengokaihen (comp.), Jiyuminken undo 3 (Tokyo,
1956):189.

i
 213

Several comments need to be made about t h i s table. First, its

t i t l e t e l l s us that the figures therein represent not the average amount

of land owned, but only the average amount of land managed. Secondly, as

the author of the a r t i c l e i n which this table appears says, the two

strata, middle l e v e l and lower l e v e l , include s e l f - c u l t i v a t i n g farmers,

70

s e l f - c u l t i v a t i n g tenant farmers, and tenant farmers. And, thirdly, i t

may safely be assumed that the 8 per cent representing the upper l e v e l

farmers—included are 199 households with t o t a l family property i n excess

of 4,000 yen, the so-called funo, or " r i c h farmers"—were actual owners

of property and, i t i s important to add, were landlords.

This l a s t point i s an important one for i t c l e a r l y shows that

within the upper s t r a t a there existed d i s t i n c t i o n s of wealth not ade-

quately represented by the categorization as i t appears i n Table 11.

Hence i n speaking of t h i s group, c o l l e c t i v e l y known as gono, the modifiers

"small," "medium," and "large" are usually employed. Returning for a

moment to those individuals coming from our sample, we can say first

that sixteen of the nineteen individuals were c l e a r l y gono, i . e . , among

the upper 8 per cent of Fukushima farming society, but, secondly, that

the majority, the eleven who held between three and ten cho, were "small"

gono. The three owning between eleven and twenty cho were "medium" gono;

and the two possessing more than twenty cho were "large" gono.

Most Japanese s p e c i a l i s t s on the subject view t h i s phenomenon of

gono leadership as a "contradiction" i n the popular rights movement be-

cause the "class" interests of the gono were squarely i n c o n f l i c t with the

"revolutionary tendencies" found within the small-scale farmer class who,

 214

in t h e i r capacity as followers, comprised the vast majority of the move-

ment. Ultimately, t h i s "contradiction" i s usually c i t e d as the p r i n c i p a l

cause for the f a i l u r e of the incidents i n p a r t i c u l a r , and the popular

72

rights movement i n general. This thesis i s propounded despxte the

knowledge that the comparative history of r e b e l l i o n and revolution i s

replete with examples of such movements being headed by members of a

class or strata ranking above those from which most of i t s followers

73
came. I t i s also advanced despite i t s c o n f l i c t with much of the data
coming from the gekka r e b e l l i o n s , which indicate i f not prove that i n
74
terms of property r e l a t i o n s (and even values) those who were most l i k e l y

the followers i n these incidents were not very far removed from the

leadership. "Most l i k e l y , " because the data on the property holdings of

individual followers i s very poor; we can only guess at who they were by

looking at the general, aggregate data on property r e l a t i o n s within a

given geographical area. Since, i n the case of the Fukushima incident,

we know that the vast majority of the following were residents of the

Aizu region, we s h a l l focus our attention there.

A f a i r index of how landownership was d i s t r i b u t e d within Fukushima

prefecture can be seen i n Table 12. Keeping i n mind the facts that the

payment of between f i v e to ten yen i n land tax meant ownership of between

.86 and 1.7 cho and payment of more than ten yen meant holding more than
75

1.7 or 1.8 cho of land, what i s most s t r i k i n g i s f i r s t , the high percen-

tage of i n d i v i d u a l s owning land i n the Aizu region (Yama, Kawanuma, Onuma,

Kita-Aizu, Minami-Aizu, and Higashi-Kabahara) and e s p e c i a l l y Yama d i s t r i c t

where, as i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , the Kitakata Incident was centred; and

 215

Table 12. Strata Structure by D i s t r i c t Using Land Tax

Payments (1883)

Land Tax Payments % of D i s t r i c t Population

Less 5 yen % paying more

District than to 10 more than than
5 yen yen 5 yen 10 yer

Shinobu 65% 17% 18% 35%

Date 59 19 22 41

(AIZU REGION)

Yama 41 34 25 59

Kawanuma 59 14 27 41

Onuma 57 23 20 43

Kita-Aizu 48 17 35 52

Minami-Aizu 90 9 1 10

Higashi-Kabahara 86 12 2 14

Source: Oishi Kaichiro, "Fukushima Jiken no shakai K e i z a i t e k i

kiban," Horie Hideichi and Toyama Shigeki (eds.), Jiyuminkenki no kenkyu
II, Minken undo no gekka to kaitai I (Tokyo, 1959):21.

secondly, the predominance of middle and upper l e v e l farmers among land-

owners there. Shimoyama, i n fact, t e l l s us that the average area of land

held by the average household i n Yama d i s t r i c t was 1.7 cho, or translated

V6
into land tax terms, an annual payment of f i v e to ten yen.

The observation that middle-income farmers predominated i s r e i n -

forced by the data provided i n Table 13 which shows the land ownership

r e l a t i o n s f o r a more-or-less t y p i c a l v i l l a g e of Yama d i s t r i c t .
 216

Table 13. Farmer Strata According to Size of Landholdings,

Fukuzawa V i l l a g e , Yama D i s t r i c t , Fukushima Prefecture (1872)

Land Area (cho) Number of Households

2.5 to 3.0 1
8%
2.0 to 2.5 1

1.5 to 2.0 8
67%
1.0 to 1.5 11

.7 to 1.0 3
17%
.5 to .7 2

.3 to .5 0

.1 to .3 1 8%

.0 to .1 1

landless 0

Total 28 households (100%)

Source: Oishi, "Shakai K e i z a i , " p. 64, Table 18.

A high rate of i n d i v i d u a l landownership, of course, necessarily

means a low rate of tenancy. How t h i s rule applied to Fukushima prefec-

ture i s shown i n Table 14.

The d i s t r i c t s which provided most of the manpower i n the incident

—Yama, Kawanuma, and Onuma—stand out from the r e s t as having a low rate

of tenancy and a high percentage of s e l f - c u l t i v a t i n g farmers, most of

whom we may i n f e r from Tables 12 and 13, were "middle-level" farmers.

The figures for Asaka d i s t r i c t are obviously very similar to the three

above-mentioned d i s t r i c t s ; why i t s farmers were not active i n the

 217

Table 14. Percentage of Households and Land by Type of

C u l t i v a t i o n for the Sixteen D i s t r i c t s of Fukushima (1883)

% of Households (1883) % of Land (1883)

self self self tenant

District tenant land
cult. tenant cult.land

Shinobu 55.5% 23.2% 21.3% 79.9% 20.1%

Date 55.9 26.2 17.9 25.5 24.5

Atachi 69.0 21.8 9.3 91.1 8.9

Asaka 81.0 17.8 1.2 88.9 11.1

Iwase 64.5 31.0 4.5 85.8 14.2

Nishi-Shirakawa 62.4 29.4 8.3 83.8 16.2

Higashi-Shirakawa 58.8 36.2 5.1 82.1 17.9

Ishikawa 61.1 29.0 9.8 85.0 15.0

Tamura 79.0 19.5 1.5 93.7 6.1

Yama 80.6 10.0 9.4 88.4 11.6

Kawanuma 82.8 13.2 3.9 97.0 3.0

Onuma 81.7 15.0 3.3 88.2 11.8

Kita=Aizu 52.3 43.6 4.1 85.0 15.0

Minami-Aizu 64.1 34.7 1.2 91.4 8.6

Higashi-Kabahara 70.0 27.1 2.9 85.8 14.2

Source: O i s h i , "Shakai K e i z a i , " p. 20, Table 3.

Fukushima Incident i s not altogether c l e a r . However, one very plausible

explanation for this has to do with the great f i n a n c i a l benefits the

people of the d i s t r i c t received from the government the year before i n

the form of the Asaka land reclamation project. Quite possibly t h i s

 218

disposed them favourably toward the intrusion of the central government

into l o c a l a f f a i r s , and hence they were not very sympathetic to the pro-
77
tests coming from Aizu.

Since, as we have seen i n Chapter I I , the Aizu farmer had only

since the late seventies begun to enjoy unprecedented prosperity accruing

from a switch from staple to cash crop production, we may suppose that

the threat of losing his newly acquired wealth seemed a l l the more odious

a prospect to him. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that de Tocqueville, and

more recently, George Rude, observed a s i m i l a r pattern i n prerevolutionary

France: r e b e l l i o n does not come merely when times are hard, but instead
78

i t comes when a period of prosperity begins to collapse. When t h i s

happened, those individuals most c l o s e l y t i e d to the market, and hence

most vulnerable to i t , namely the small s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r and self-

c u l t i v a t o r / tenant, rose to protest against the economic forces of the

market of which they were part but over which they had no control.

For similar reasons, i n part, the farmers of Chichibu revolted.

Their close t i e s to the market were described i n Chapter I I : (1) a very

sizeable dependency on the import of staples from outside the d i s t r i c t ,

stemming from a shortage of arable land (only 6 per cent of the t o t a l

area); (2) the almost t o t a l devotion to producing s i l k for the market,

engaged i n by at l e a s t 80 per cent of a l l farm households i n Chichibu;

and (3) the growth of market towns—Omiya, Ogano, Shimo-Yoshida and

Nogami—since the mid-Tokugawa period to handle the processing and sale

of t h e i r s i l k .
It i s necessary to note the strong t i e s to the market as a
 219

preliminary to i d e n t i f y i n g the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the incident according to

the nature of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l status. There are several reasons f o r

this. F i r s t , since data on land ownership by individuals i s scanty,

then only by showing the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the market to general patterns

of land ownership and type of crop c u l t i v a t i o n can we i n f e r t h e i r economic

status. Secondly, one reason for a paucity of data relates to what was

one of the main objectives of the Incident's p a r t i c i p a n t s , i . e . , the

destruction of a l l documents r e l a t i n g to indebtedness; t h i s i n turn t e l l s

us i n d i r e c t l y of the f i n a n c i a l status of many of the farmers involved.

And t h i r d l y , most discussions of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' resources are usually

vague and i l l - d e f i n e d , speaking p r i m a r i l y i n terms of "bankrupt," "near-

bankrupt," or "indebted" farmers as those who composed the vast majority

of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Incident.

Like Yama d i s t r i c t i n Aizu, Chichibu d i s t r i c t displayed a r e l a -

t i v e l y low rate of tenancy and a f a i r l y high rate of landownership, but

i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, unlike Yama there were very few gono. In 1885,

one year a f t e r the r e b e l l i o n , the percentage of households owning land

i s set out i n Table 15.

Two points need to be made: (1) Even allowing f o r a measure of

s t a t i s t i c a l error, the jump i n tenancy—11.6 per c e n t — i n one year i s

extraordinary; (2) This happened i n a region where, "There were no great

landlords; most people i n the mountain v i l l a g e were s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r s ;

79

there was no such thing as a landlord-tenant problem." According to

one contemporary observer, a Shinto p r i e s t named Tanaka Senya, there

were only three families that could be c a l l e d landlords, and they held
80
only two to four cho of land.
 220

Table 15. Percentage of Households by Type of Landholding

for Chichibu D i s t r i c t and Saitama Prefecture

1883
1885 1885 1886 1887
National
Chichibu Saitama Chichibu Chichibu
Average

Self-Cultivator 59.5 28% 39.8 50% 50%

Self-Cultivator/Tenant 32.1 57% 38.6 29% 25%

Tenant 8.4 13% 21.9 20% 25%

Source: Inoue, Chichibu, p. 13; Shimoyama "Minken Noto," p. 302.

Though undoubtedly an exaggeration, i t does point to a s i g n i f i c a n t

fact about land-owning relations within the d i s t r i c t . Unlike the Aizu

area where we saw a r e l a t i v e l y high percentage of landowners paying land

taxes exceeding f i v e yen, the figure for Chichibu was an inconsequential

4 per cent of the population (1885); those paying more than ten yen i n
81

land taxes was a diminuative 0.8%. I f we consider t h i s fact along with

the high rate of landownership and the low rate of tenancy, t h i s i n d i -

cates that the average area of land owned by s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r s was small,

c e r t a i n l y less than one cho. In fact, i f we glance at Table 16 on the

next page, we see that the average area of wet and dry f i e l d s cultivated

by one Chichibu farm household (which averaged 5.2 family members) i n 1884
82

was, respectively, .05 cho and .59 cho. Of course, as we saw i n Chapter

I I , i t could hardly have been otherwise: with only 6 per cent of i t s t e r -

r i t o r y arable and with a population over 50,000, landholdings had to be

small. Not only were t h e i r landholdings small, they were also the least

valued i n a l l of Saitama prefecture, worth only about forty yen and nine

yen per tan (.245 acre; one tenth of a cho) for wet and dry f i e l d s
 221

Table 16. Selected S t a t i s t i c s for Saitama Prefecture

and Chichibu District.(1885)

Rank among 18 f.
Category Chichibu Dist. S a i t a m a P r e

districts

Type of holding s e l f 88.3% s e l f 58%

(% t o t a l land tenant 11.7% tenant 42%
area)

Avg. area c u l t , wet .05 cho 15th wet .37 cho

by household dry .59 cho dry .73 cho

% of land i n 3,389 cho 1st 12%

mulberry

% of land area 32%

in d r y f i e l d

Amount of s i l k - 9,736 koku

1st
worm prod. (1 7co.fcu=4.96 bu.)

Avg. silkworm .95 koku

prod./household

Value of same 28 yen

Avg. annual 2.1 yen

land tax

No. residents
paying more than 687 15th
5 yen i n land tax

% of same of a l l 4%
households

No. paying more

than 10 yen i n 138 18th
land tax

% of same of a l l 0.8%
farm households

Raw s i l k prod. 6,963 kan

1st
(1 kan=8.3 lbs.)

Source: Shimoyama Saburo, "Minken undo noto," ed. Sakane Yoshihisa,

Jiyu minken 10, Nihon r e k i s h i ser. (Tokyo, 1973):302.
 222

83
respectively. About a l l the land was good f o r , as we saw e a r l i e r , was

the c u l t i v a t i o n of mulberry, the p r i n c i p a l crop of the d i s t r i c t , which,

once harvested, was used to feed the silk-worms, the other main "crop."

Since the land area under management or ownership of the c u l t i -

vator was small, the scale of production of the farmers was also small,

too small for the farmer to serve as h i s own merchant (as did many of
84

the farmers of Yama d i s t r i c t ) . I t appears that t h i s s i t u a t i o n encour-

aged merchants under the aegis of several large tonya ("wholesale busi-

n e s s " ) — f i v e i n a l l that sprang up i n 1880 to 1881 (see Chapter I I ) — t o

85

handle the mulberry and s i l k trade of the many small producers. Once

the farmer sold his mulberry leaves, or cocoons, or raw s i l k to an agent

of the tonya, which of course existed to make a p r o f i t , his income i n

86

1884 was only about twenty-eight yen. This was not nearly enough to

pay taxes, repay debts, buy r i c e , and generally, to survive.

A quick glance at our p a r t i c i p a n t sample w i l l c l e a r l y show just

how meagre that annual income was. For the s i x individuals for whom we

have data, the range of indebtedness i s twenty-five to 225 yen, with an

average of seventy-five yen per person, although the mean indebtedness

of about f i f t y yen i s probably a more representative figure. Indebted-

ness as such, however, was no stranger to the Chichibu farmer; indebted-

ness had been necessary during the seventies i n order to finance expanded

production to meet the r i s i n g demand for s i l k . What was i n the end

disastrous for him was the type of indebtedness he was frequently com-

p e l l e d to bear. One type, getsu shibari ("bound by the month"), the

predominant type used by loan companies, had a 15 per cent interest rate
 223

per three month period, or 60 per cent annually. Another type, the

kirikanekashi, or "limited loan" ( i . e . , short term), often meant an i n -

terest rate of 20 to 30 per cent per month, so i f a farmer borrowed ten

87

yen i n January, by November he would owe between twenty and t h i r t y yen.

Tashiro Eisuke, leader of the Chichibu Komminto, was himself an

indebted, small s i l k farmer; he owed money to two or three loan companies,

88

and had a mortgage on his small p l o t of land. Tashiro, according to

one source, paid land taxes on his .6 cho (dry) of land amounting to 2.4

yen (about the d i s t r i c t average; see Table 16) and was representative of
89

the majority of "lower middle l e v e l " farmers of Chichibu.

Although we lack figures on the f i n a n c i a l status of most of the

other individuals included i n our sample, there i s reason enough to

believe they suffered similar misfortune. The very demands made by the

Komminto—tax reduction, loan exemptions, etc.—probably bespeak the

f i n a n c i a l d i s t r e s s of i t s members. C o l l a t e r a l evidence seems to support

this contention. As we saw i n the l a s t chapter, Saitama prefecture was

among the nation's highest i n terms of the t o t a l amount of loans made to

90

i t s residents, and the number of properties mortgaged. Also, data on

the f i n a n c i a l status of members of the Hachioji Komminto, a neighbour and

probably mentor of the Chichibu party, reveal that most of i t s members

91

were either bankrupt or approaching i t .

These facts considered along with the small land area cultivated

by the average Chichibu farmer, the extremely high proportion of farmers

engaged i n producing s i l k , and the depressed state of the s i l k market,

together characterize the f i n a n c i a l status of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the

 224

Chichibu r e b e l l i o n . I t i s important to note, however, that while the

deteriorating f i n a n c i a l status of the farmers appears to have been an

important contributing factor i n bringing about the r e v o l t , i t was, none-

theless, only one of several. I t seems i n s t r u c t i v e to repeat that

economic misery i s a necessary, but not a s u f f i c i e n t cause for r e v o l t .

There existed then (and yet e x i s t today) too many examples of people

passively l i v i n g i n a state of poverty to think otherwise. As was i n d i -

cated i n the l a s t chapter, the farmers of Ibaraki, Makabe d i s t r i c t ,

stand as an example of t h i s p a s s i v i t y .

In Chapter I we t o l d of how hundreds of farmers from neighbouring

Gumma prefecture, especially from Minami-Kanra d i s t r i c t , and also from

Minami-Saku d i s t r i c t of Nagano prefecture, used the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n

as an opportunity to j o i n i n "house-wreckings" against l o c a l landlords,

loan i n s t i t u t i o n s , and i n d i v i d u a l creditors. We also observed that h i s -

t o r i c a l l y t h i s instance was merely one of a number of rebellions that

had spread to encompass entire areas, crossing prefectural boundaries

and behaving much l i k e a "chain-reaction" e f f e c t . Recognition o f t h i s

pattern, however, requires that we ask why the same did not occur i n the

case of the Kabasan Incident. We must ask why the Ibaraki v i l l a g e r s ,

unlike the Gumma and Nagano participants i n the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n , d i d

not use the Kabasan revolt as an opportunity to r i s e up. As we know,

they were not immune to the economic misery of the depression that was

plaguing much o f the r e s t of the country. Was there something then about

l o c a l conditions that prevented them from responding to the c a l l for

rebellion? The answers to these questions, I believe, l i e elsewhere than

 225

i n the single feature of landholding r e l a t i o n s , probably i n the type of

revolt the conspirators planned. The r e b e l l i o n was mainly intended to

be for, rather than by, the people. This discussion however, has more

to do with ideology and organisation and s h a l l therefore be postponed

u n t i l the next chapter for a f u l l e r consideration. Here our attention

w i l l focus upon the landholding r e l a t i o n s and economic status of those

farmers who resided i n the immediate area of Mount Kaba i n Makabe d i s t r i c t ,

Ibaraki prefecture.

As might be r e c a l l e d , despite the o r i g i n a l intention of the

rebels to begin the revolution i n Tochigi prefecture at Utsunomiya Town

— f o r t h i s reason Endo Shizu suggests renaming the a f f a i r the "Utsunomiya

92

Jiken" — t h e conspirators were ultimately forced to make t h e i r appeal

for revolution to the farmers of Makabe d i s t r i c t . Except for several

hundred poorly organised l o c a l farmers, who were quickly intercepted by

the authorities before they could j o i n the conspirators atop Mount Kaba,

the people of t h i s d i s t r i c t were unresponsive. What, then, d i f f e r e n -

t i a t e d the farmers who t r i e d to answer the c a l l for revolution from

those who did not? At least part of the answer seems to be related to

the type of landholdings. In looking at t h i s Tables 17, 18, and 19 w i l l

serve as the basis for analysis of the landholding r e l a t i o n s i n Makabe

district.

From these tables, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First,

for the d i s t r i c t as a whole (Table 17) i t i s apparent that compared to

the percentage of farmers c u l t i v a t i n g t h e i r own land i n Yama (Fukushima)

and Chichibu (Saitama) d i s t r i c t s , the Makabe rate i s very low, revealing

 226

Table 17. Landholding Relations, Makabe D i s t r i c t , Ibaraki

Prefecture (1884)

(Makabe dis.) ibaraki ,• , % of t o t a l

_ • , _ National ,
% of t o t a l prefect- n
land area
population average (Makabe dis.)

Self-Cultivators 31.7 38.0 39.8 69.1

Self-Cultivators/Tenant 44.7 41.0 41.0

Tenant 23.5 21.0 21.9 30.9

Source: Namatame Yasushi, Kabasan jiken no Ikkosatsu (Takahagi,

1962), pp. 20, 23, 24, 25.

Table 18. Landholders by Strata According to Size of

Holding, Makabe D i s t r i c t (1879)

Category Amount of Land Held Percentage of Total

Poor Farmers less than one cho 45.8

Middle Level 1 - 2 cho 24.3

Upper Level 2 - 5 cho 22.8

Landlords 5-10 cho 5.2

Large Landlords 10 cho 1.9

Source: Namatame Yasushi, Kabasan jiken no ikkosatsu (Takahagi,

1962), pp. 20, 23, 24, 25.
 Table 19. Landholding Relations i n Two Villages of Makabe D i s t r i c t :
Number 1 Responded to C a l l for Revolution; Number 2 Did Not (1879)

Size of cho
Landholding 0-.1 .1-.5 .5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-3 3.0-5 5.0- Total

1. V i l l a g e

Kadoi
Number 69
21 21 12
of house-
holds

Per cent 1.5 13.0 30.4 30.4 17.4 4.3 2.9 100%
rounded

2. V i l l a g e

Teraueno
Number 12 64
30
of house-
holds

Per cent 9.4 46.9 18.8 6.6 3.1 9.4 4.7 1.5 100%
rounded

Source: Namatame Yasushi, Kabasan giken no ikkosatsu (Takahagi, 1962), pp. 20, 23, 24, 25.

to
to
 228

a difference of 48.9 per cent and 27.8 per cent respectively. Accor-

dingly, Makabe d i s t r i c t also displays a much higher rate of tenancy than

do the other two d i s t r i c t s , respectively, .14.1 per cent and 15.1 per cent

higher. Makabe then, unlike the other two, comes very close to the

national average, as well as to the p r e f e c t u r a l average. I t also f o l -

lows that the amount of land under s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n , and tenancy, i s

respectively, l e s s and more than i n the case of Yama and Chichibu. They

each had about 18 per cent more land under s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n and 20 per

cent less under tenancy than Makabe.

Table 18 shows several things, but i n order to make sense of i t ,

i t i s f i r s t necessary to r e c a l l from the l a s t chapter that the p r i n c i p a l

crops of Makabe were r i c e and barley and hence i t was primarily a staple-
93

producing region. T h i s i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from Yama and Chi-

chibu, where cash-crops such as s i l k , lacquer, tobacco and the l i k e

predominated i n the primarily d r y - f i e l d areas. There, although the land

was not very valuable i n terms of i t s assessed tax rate, the crop was.

In Makabe, the land was valuable since much of i t was i n wet-field, but

r e l a t i v e l y speaking, the crop was not. This meant that the net income

from one cho of Makabe rice-producing land would be worth less than, f o r

example, that from one cho of Chichibu or Yama, mulberry-producing land.

Hence, the Chichibu farmer with l i t t l e land was probably better o f f

f i n a n c i a l l y than the Makabe farmer with more land. E s p e c i a l l y so since

tax rates on rice-paddy land were more than on d r y - f i e l d land and, i n a

cash economy, that often meant the difference between solvency and i n -
94
solvency. Consequently, the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n "lower-strata" farmer has
 229

a d i f f e r e n t meaning according to the area to whose farmers the term i s

applied.

This said, i t seems necessary to "weight" Table 18 i n order to

make i t comparable to the figures for Yama and Chichibu. To do t h i s we

add roughly half of the figure for "middle l e v e l " farmers to the figure

for "poor farmers" and estimate the "poor" or "lower strata" farmers to

comprise around 57 to 60 per cent of the t o t a l Makabe farm population,

which of course puts i t considerably higher than the percentage i n Yama

d i s t r i c t , where wealth was concentrated among the middle-level strata,

and i n Chichibu d i s t r i c t , where wealth was very d i f f u s e and no great d i s -

p a r i t i e s i n property-holding or income existed.

The implication of t h i s argument i s , of course—and i t receives.

considerable support from comparative h i s t o r i c a l works—that somehow the

poor, or at least the poor r e l a t i v e to a given population, are not the

95

ones who join in rebellion. A glance at Table 19 lends support to

t h i s hypothesis. There we see that the v i l l a g e which did not heed the

c a l l of the Kabasan rebels exhibits a very marked d i s p a r i t y i n land

holdings: the moderately wealthy with more than three cho of land, 6.2

per cent of the v i l l a g e population; the r e l a t i v e l y poor, 75.1 per cent

of the population, who owned less than one cho; and a very small "middle

stratum." The other v i l l a g e , Kadoi, i n contrast, which was active i n

the popular rights movement, and which responded to the rebels' c a l l ,

shows a strong middle stratum and weak upper and lower strata. I t should

be kept i n mind that, based upon the landholding relations for the d i s -

t r i c t as a whole, Kadoi v i l l a g e was the exception, and not Teraueno

village.
 230

The absence of a strong middle stratum of landowners residing i n

the area seems to help explain why the rebels were unable to mobilize

the l o c a l population, and, ultimately, why the revolution f a i l e d . Yet

at the same time i t i s probably less important than other factors, such

as weak planning, mistaken p o l i c y , f a c t i o n a l infighting, and fanciful

notions of capturing p o l i t i c a l power. The next chapter w i l l treat these

other factors, but, now, before continuing i t would be wise to summarize

the findings presented i n t h i s chapter.

CONCLUSION: LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

The participants i n the Fukushima, Kabasan, and Chichibu i n c i -

dents have been i d e n t i f i e d according to f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s — r e s i d e n c e ,

age, occupation, status, and property holdings. The other characteris-

t i c s shown i n the three s a m p l e s — l i t e r a c y , arrest record, and membership

i n p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s and/or p a r t i e s — p r o p e r l y require consideration

elsewhere i n the thesis. Using, then, the findings presented thus f a r ,

what can be said of the participants?

F i r s t of a l l , from the conventional perspective, they were what

the newspapers of that time reported them to be. The leaders were c a l l e d

"pettifoggers"; "banditti and common j a i l - b i r d s " ; "broken-down gentlemen,

indigent burghers, and professors of vice"; and "desperadoes." The fol-

lowers were depicted as "slow-thinking masses"; " i n s i g n i f i c a n t mobs";

96

and the l i k e . Such epithets, however, do l i t t l e to provide an accurate

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the participants; what they probably do provide i s an

accurate account of o f f i c i a l opinion of those people suspected to have

 231

been most active i n the various anti-authority disturbances. The Kabasan

97
rebels, for example, were portrayed as a "band of thieves" who " d i s -
98
graced the cause of l i b e r t y by an exhibition of mad licence," and were
mistakenly i d e n t i f i e d as "six shizoku, f i v e professional gamblers, and
99
eleven heimin." The Fukushima Incident was described as a case where
"a few reckless r a d i c a l s succeeded i n persuading the farmers that the

taxes they were required to pay for l o c a l purposes were quite super-
100
fluous. . . . " The Chichibu a c t i v i s t s were c a l l e d "gamblers and hair-
101
brained radicals" and "members of the old Jiyu party, gamblers and
102

low-level l e g a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s . "

Somewhere i n a l l t h i s invective there i s a measure of truth; rob-

bery (or banditry) was committed i n the course of these incidents; a few

a c t i v i s t individuals had sometime i n the past been convicted of gambling,

e.g., Tashiro Eisuke; some participants were r a d i c a l l i b e r a l s ; and so on.

But from the perspective of the participants themselves, from the point

of view of those so l a b e l l e d by the press, "robbery" would probably have

been regarded as the mere act of r e t r i e v i n g a r t i c l e s of value out of

which they had e a r l i e r been cheated; "gambling" would probably have been

treated as a harmless means to chance to supplement an otherwise meagre

income; and "radicalism" perhaps would have been interpreted as b e l i e f

i n an ideology which happened to be contrary to that of the government's.

Such language i s of course evaluative, and outside of the objec-

t i v e c r i t e r i a that have been used thus far i n t h i s chapter to i d e n t i f y

the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the three incidents. To point out the past use of

such language i s , however, important at t h i s stage, for i n the final

 232

analysis evaluative language i s what i s used by opposing sets of p o l i t i c a l

actors i n r e a l c o n f l i c t situations; and i t undoubtedly r e f l e c t e d the

image that one set of actors had of i t s opponents. But, more to our pre-

sent purpose i s the d i s t i n c t i o n made by such language between the few

leaders ("agitators") and the many ("blind") followers. This d i s t i n c t i o n

w i l l be employed for the remainder of the summary.

Leaders, those who appear i n the three main samples, generally

came from only a c e r t a i n few geographical regions of the many areas encom-

passed by each of the incidents. Yama and Tamura d i s t r i c t s accounted for

most of the a c t i v i s t s involved i n the Fukushima incident; the conspirators

of the Kabasan Incident came mainly from Fukushima, from Shimotsuga

d i s t r i c t of Tochigi, and from Makabe d i s t r i c t i n Ibaraki; and within

Chichibu d i s t r i c t c e r t a i n v i l l a g e s such as Hinozawa, Yoshida, Fuppu, and

Isama turned out the greatest number of a c t i v i s t s . The geographical dis-

t r i b u t i o n of followers, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , pretty much coincided with

that of the leaders. This applies a l l the more i n cases where organiza-

t i o n was a function of residence i n a v i l l a g e community (as we s h a l l see

in the next chapter). Though not uniformly so, this was more the case

with Chichibu than with Fukushima. With Chichibu we saw that the very

same v i l l a g e s which produced most of the leaders—"Upper" and "Lower"

Yoshida, "Upper" and "Lower" Hinozawa, Fuppu and Isama—also were ranked

among the highest for the number of followers they turned out. Sanyama,

Iida and Shimo-Ogano v i l l a g e s were among several exceptions to that r u l e ,

and the explanation for t h i s probably l i e s i n the factor of organisation.

So too, i t would seem, i s the case where the following from some v i l l a g e s
 233

was not great i n absolute terms, but did show a large p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e l a -

t i v e to the small number of v i l l a g e inhabitants. (See Table 6.)

The factors of organisation and ideology also appear to be r e l e -

vant i n explaining how so many leaders of the Fukushima Incident came

from areas, p r i n c i p a l l y Tamura d i s t r i c t , other than from where most of

the followers resided. Where residence of leaders and followers most

c l o s e l y corresponded was the Aizu region, and c h i e f l y Yama d i s t r i c t where

the Kitakata incident occurred.

Because the demographic factor pertaining to the leadership i n

the Kabasan Incident was not l o c a l but i n t e r - r e g i o n a l , i n fact i n t e r -

prefectural, and because the appeal by the conspirators to the farmers

was made at a place where most of them had no l o c a l following, residence

was of l i t t l e importance as a factor i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n among the r e l a t i v e l y

few farmers who did heed t h e i r c a l l . In fact, from the outline of the

incident as i t was presented i n Chapter I, i t can e a s i l y be inferred

that two of the other factors, age and status, were also of l i t t l e sig-

nificance i n moving l o c a l residents to j o i n i n the Kabasan disturbance.

It was shown that i f any of the f i v e factors were important, then i t was

the r e l a t i o n s of landholdings that existed i n Makabe d i s t r i c t , and only

coincidentally, the further factor of occupation, since t h e i r c a l l to

arms was made i n an area largely a g r i c u l t u r a l .

The age of the participants was the second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c treated.

The leaders of a l l three incidents were f a i r l y young. We saw that the

Kabasan leaders were youngest, the Chichibu leaders the oldest, and the

Fukushima leaders f a l l i n g somewhere i n between, but closer to the Kabasan

 234

than to the Chichibu leaders. Regardless of incident, most leaders were

either i n t h e i r twenties or t h i r t i e s and therefore we are allowed to con-

clude, with minimal reservation, that our age data supports the whole

notion of the "young rebel." About the followers i t can be said that i n

the case of Fukushima the evidence i s scanty, but that based on Taka-

hashi 's sample of 100 p a r t i c i p a n t s , there was l i t t l e difference between

the ages of leaders and followers. The Chichibu evidence on followers,

using the lesser crime of "massing to r i o t " as a crude index of p o s i t i o n

i n the movement, was more complete, and hence i t i s .likely that most were

in the twenty to forty age group. E s p e c i a l l y i n the Chichibu case, the

factor of age as i t relates to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n r e b e l l i o n , however,

should be regarded as an empirical observation rather than as a causitive

explanation of why individuals rebelled.

O f f i c i a l s o c i a l status, i . e . , shizoku versus heimin, was the

t h i r d factor treated, and was chosen i n order to t e s t , i n part, the propo-

s i t i o n that the popular rights movement and related disturbances, such as

the three under study here, were increasingly coming under the leadership

of commoners. The evidence for the leadership of each incident strongly

suggests that the proposition i s a true one, even though t h i s conclusion

must be regarded as tentative u n t i l the next chapter establishes to what

extent each of the incidents was related to the movement.

Occupation was the fourth c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the participants

that was examined. We saw that the leadership of the Fukushima Incident

was characterized by a variety of occupations—farmer, merchant, teacher,

p r i e s t , doctors—and that a close r e l a t i o n s h i p existed between the type

 235

of occupation and the residence of the i n d i v i d u a l . Most of the leaders

coming from Yama d i s t r i c t , f o r example, were farmers; most from Tamura

were merchants, teachers and p r i e s t s . The Kabasan p r i n c i p a l s also held

a variety of occupations, but the most s t r i k i n g fact about these rebels

was the r e l a t i v e l y large number of umemployed shizoku, or, as they would

have been characterized during the Tokugawa period, ronin ("masterless

samurai").

The occupations of the Chichibu leaders showed much more uniformity

than i n the other two cases. Most were farmers, s e r i c u l t u r a l i s t s i n fact,

and even many of those who were not farmers per se were somehow t i e d to

sericulture. The same can be said not only f o r the occupations of the f o l -

lowers i n the Chichibu Incident, but f o r the followers i n the other two

incidents as well. Of course, i t could hardly have been otherwise since

not only did the incidents take place i n r u r a l areas but also because of

the simple fact that the population of M e i j i Japan of the 1880's was over-

whelmingly r u r a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l .

This l a s t fact c h i e f l y determined the focus of inquiry i n treating

the l a s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the participants that was looked at i n t h i s

chapter, namely, relations of land ownership. There an attempt was made

to determine whether members of c e r t a i n economic s t r a t a , and not others,

were more i n c l i n e d to rebel; and secondly, i n order to b u i l d upon the

e a r l i e r tentative finding that the heimin were rapidly taking over the

leadership of the popular rights movement from the shizokui we sought to

discover whether i t was the gono. stratum of the heimin that were c h i e f l y

among the new leaders.

 236

In going about t h i s task we decided that i t was useful to d i s -

tinguish between strata of farmers according to the extent of t h e i r land-

holdings. Accordingly, the d i s t i n c t i o n was made between "upper," "middle"

and "lower" strata farmers. But because within the "upper" category,

there was considerable variance i n the extent of landholdings, a further

d i s t i n c t i o n was made between "small," "medium," and "large." When the

c r i t e r i a of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was checked against the Fukushima sample i t

was shown that the largest percentage of leaders came from the "small

gono" stratum. This fact obviously squared well with the thesis that the

gono s t r a t a was assuming leadership i n the popular rights movement

(subject, of course, to the establishment of a l i n k between the incidents

and the movement). But when we examined the landholdings of the leader-

ship of the Chichibu Incident, we were unable to find anyone among the

leadership approaching gono status. Instead, what was found was a great

number of small s e l f - c u l t i v a t o r s , many of whom were apparently i n con-

siderable debt, and where, i n terms of landholdings, there was very little

difference between leader and followers. The c r u c i a l variable, i t would

seem, that separated the Chichibu p a r t i c i p a n t s from the Fukushima ones,

again i n terms of landholdings, was the type of agriculture that the Chi-

chibu residents engaged i n . I t was a predominantly single-crop area—by

necessity, as we saw—that because of a very limited arable land area

permitted very few large landholdings. This fact also resulted i n a very

low rate of tenancy.

The Aizu region also had a very low rate of tenancy, but what ap-

peared to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from Chichibu was the larger area of c u l t i v a t a b l e

 238

land, the greater v a r i a t i o n i n crops, and consequently, the greater

wealth, comparatively, of its, farmers. Although the farming of both

areas was s i m i l a r i n the sense that cash crops represented most of the

a g r i c u l t u r a l production of each, ultimately the Aizu farmer was less

vulnerable to the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the market because of the d i v e r s i f i c a -

t i o n i n his farm produce and, secondly, because of his greater wealth

stemming from his larger landholding. S t i l l , regardless of the d i f f e r -

ence between the landholding characterizing both areas, within each area,

r e l a t i v e to the landholdings of others, most of the participants of each

incident came from the "middle l e v e l " s t r a t a of farmers. The same, we

saw, was the case with the Makabe d i s t r i c t farmers who responded to the

c a l l for r e b e l l i o n made by the Kabasan conspirators. This finding lends

support to the thesis that i t i s not the very poor who involved them-

selves i n r e b e l l i o n and revolution, but instead "some sector of the

103

middle classes that i s upwardly s t r i v i n g and finds i t s way blocked."

If "middle classes" i s understood i n a very precise fashion, then speci-

f i c a l l y , within the farmer or peasant class as a whole, as E r i c Wolf

points out, i t i s the "middle peasant," the sector "most vulnerable to

104

economic changes wrought by commercialism," who i s revolutionary.

This summary concludes the f i r s t stage of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the

participants who were involved i n the three disturbances. We say "first

stage" because at present the participants yet remain " i n d i v i d u a l s , " not

t i e d to any larger group that attaches some purpose to i t s actions. In

order to complete the task of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , then, i t i s necessary to

define i n as precise terms as possible the nature of the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s

 239

purposive action; the extent to which they, as members of groups, can be

defined i n such terms; i n short, the ideology and organisation of the

participants.
 240

Notes

Shoji Kichinosuke, ed., Nihon seisha seito hattatsu shi (Tokyo,

1959), p. 314. This book i s a c o l l e c t i o n of primary materials and the
editor's commentary on the materials.
2
The subject of the influence of Confucianism on Japanese p o l i -
t i c a l culture has been treated by many, among whom are: Scalapino,
Democracy, Chapter IV; Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Boston, 1957);
G. B. Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867 (Stanford, 1963).
Taoka Reiun (pseud.), Meiji
3
hanshin den (Tokyo, 1953; o r i g i n a l l y
published i n 1909), pp. 22, 30, 33.
4
S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood
C l i f f s , N.J., 1966), pp. 15-16.
5
C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Toronto, 1965);
Barrington Moore J r . , Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston,
1966) .

6
Ike, Beginnings, p. 69.
7
Charles T i l l y , Louise T i l l y , and Richard T i l l y , The Rebellious
Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), esp. pp. 287-90.
8
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 189; S h o j i , Nihon seisha, p. 307.
9
CJSR 1:509; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 194.
1 0
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 189; CJSR 1:632-39. A l l but
ten of the 234 arrested were natives of Chichibu d i s t r i c t .
1 1
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 224-25.
12
Ibid., p. 225.
1 3
These are l i s t e d i n CJSR 1:640-43.
14
Ibid., pp. 643-56. Other relevant aggregate data can be found
on pp. 204, 292, 312, 329, 343-45, 464.
There were twenty-one administrative d i s t r i c t s as of 1882. In
1 5

1896 the prefecture was reorganised to include only seventeen d i s t r i c t s .

See Kobayashi S e i j i and Yamada Akira, Fukushima ken no rekishi (Tokyo,
1973), pp. 24-33.
1 6
Shimoyama Saburo, "Fukushima jiken oboegaki," Jiyuminken undo,
comp. M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renraku k a i hen, III (Tokyo, 1956):144-51.
 241

17
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 225.
18
Fukushima ken shi, 11 (Aizu, 1964):482-83 (hereafter abbrev.
FKS); Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 165, 227.
19
Shimoyama, "Oboegaki," p. 151.
20
FKS, pp. 483-84. The average v i l l a g e p a r t i c i p a t i o n was
s l i g h t l y less than eighty; the range was seven to 128.
21
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 227.
22
FKS, pp. 941-49. The report was dated 13 January 1883.
23
Ibid., pp. 482-83.
24
Ibid.
2 5
Ibid., pp. 483-85.
26
Fukuda Kaoru, Sojo roku: Meiji jushichinen Gumma jiken (Tokyo,
1974), pp. 50-51.
27
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 264, states the number was
thirteen instead of twelve, having added Kobayashi Mojiro who was o f f i -
c i a l l y l i s t e d as a resident of A i c h i prefecture. He was- i n fact born i n
Fukushima, but his family moved to A i c h i when he was only s i x years old,
and i t i s therefore problematic how strong his l o y a l t i e s were toward
Fukushima prefecture.
28
Ibid., p. 259.
29
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 58.
3 0
Most a l l studies of t h i s incident reproduce t h i s l i s t , though
frequently some names are added and some omitted. Mine comes from the
o r i g i n a l document, appearing i n CJSR 1:640-42, i d e n t i f i e d as "Those Ap-
pointed Positions by Tashiro Eisuke at Hinozawa V i l l a g e , Chichibu Dis-
t r i c t , on October 31, 1884."

3 1
CJSR 1:378-83.
32
Ibid., pp. 632-39. This document i s dated 28 November 1884.
33
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 89.
34
The issue date of the court report i s 30 December 1884. These
figures represent only the number of people prosecuted for involvement.
It seems safe to say that a good many others escaped prosecution. See
CJSR 1:340-43.
 242

35
See for example, Carl Leiden and Karl Schmitt, The Politics of
Violence: Revolution
in the Modern World (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., 1968),
pp. 78-89, esp. p. 86; also see Rude, Crowd, pp. 209-10.
36
W. G. Beaseley, The Meiji Restoration (Oxford, 1973).
37
W. G. Beaseley, " P o l i t i c a l Groups i n Tosa, 1856-68," Bulletin
of School of
Oriental and African Studies XXX, No. 2 (1967):382-90;
Albert Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, 1961); and
Sakata Yoshio and John W. H a l l , "The Motivation of P o l i t i c a l Leadership
i n the M e i j i Restoration," Journal of Asian Studies XVI (November 1956):
31-50.
38
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 187; Takahashi Tetsuo, Fukushima
jiyu minken undoshi (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 177-80.
39
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 61, 226-27.
40
For an i n t e r e s t i n g comparison, see Sidney R. Brown, " P o l i t i c a l
Assassination i n Early M e i j i Japan: The Plot Against Okubo Toshimichi,"
ed. David Wurfel, Meiji Japan's Centennial: Aspects of Political Thought
and Action (Lawrence, Kans., 1971), pp. 18-35.
4 1
CJSR 1:378-83.
42
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 91.
43
Bellah, Religion; Scalapino, Democracy.
44
See, for example, Sidney R. Brown, "Kido Takayoshi: M e i j i
Japan's Cautious Revolutionary," Pacific Historical Review XXV (May 1956):
152-62, for a general treatment of the concept of jinzai; for meiboka
see Takahashi, Fukushima minken, pp. 181-297; for the importance of
minkenka, see i n f r a , Chapter IV.
45
For example, see K e e - i l Choi, "Tokugawa Feudalism and the
Emergence of the New Leaders of Early Modern Japan," Explorations in
Entrepreneural History IX, No. 1 (1956):72-84.
46
CJSR 1:403-8.
4 7
Ibid., pp. 378-83.

4 8
Ibid., pp. 640-56.
49
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 50-52. Kikuchi Kanbei of Saku d i s -
t r i c t was a self-declared shizoku (CJSR 1:49; and CJSR 11:431), but a l l
o f f i c i a l records show him to be a heimin.
5 0
FKS, pp. 939-49.
 243

51 Endo Shizuo, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1971), p. 19.

52
See Brown, "Assassination."
53
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 39-42.
54
Ibid., p. 58.
55
Ibid., p. 39.
56
Ibid.
57
Nojima, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1966; o r i g i n a l l y published i n
1900), pp. 207-8.
58
See Brown, "Assassination"; Scalapino, Democracy.
59
Ishikawa Naoki, Tonegawa minken kiko (Tokyo, 1972), pp. 170-78.
60
Assuming that the occupation structure remained f a i r l y stable
after the incident, the following breakdown for 1888 i s of interest:
Occupations Related to Sericulture, 1888
Occupation No. of Households
sericulturists 9,123
s i l k thread manuf. 563
specialty s i l k manuf. 86
weavers 7
cocoon & s i l k merchants 586
Total 10,365
Total No. households Chichibu d i s t . 13,071
Source: Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 12.

6 1
CJSR 1:378-83.
62
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 91.
63
See f o r example, Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New
York, 1956); Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," i n
History and Theory IV (1965):133-63.
64
The reason for t h i s was perhaps described i n the "Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon" by Karl Marx, Selected Works I (Moscow, 1969)
478: "The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which
l i v e i n similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations
with one another. Their mode of production i s o l a t e s them from one
another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The i s o l a t i o n
 244

i s increased by France s bad means of communication and by the poverty

1

of the peasants. . . .The great mass of the French nation i s formed by

simple addition of homologous magnitudes, such as potatoes i n a sack form
a sack of potatoes. . . . " Applying the same s t r u c t u r a l analysis to
Japanese a g r i c u l t u r a l society, we might hypothesize that t h e i r p r i n c i p a l
mode of production, i . e . , co-operative r i c e production, allowed them the
i n t e r a c t i o n denied to the French peasant.
65
Oishi K a i i c h i r o , "Fukushima jiken no k e i z a i t e k i kiban," eds.
Horie Hideichi and Toyama Shigeki Jiyu minkenki no kenkyu I I , Minken undo
no gekka to kaitai I (Tokyo, 1959):36-37.
The additional individuals are Watanabe Ichiro, Kojima Shuya,
6 6

Miura Shinroku, Endo Naoyuki, Hara Heizo, S a j i Kohei, S a j i Kumimatsu,

Maeda Kosaku, and Ijima Kotaro. The data comes from Takahashi, Fuku-
shima minken, pp. 173-74, and from Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 60.

Ibxd.
68
Though the d i s t i n c t i o n between wage-labourer and servant i s
usually made, i t i s not relevant here since neither category provided
any leaders i n these incidents. On the d i s t i n c t i o n , see, f o r example,
Nagatani Yasuo, "Gumma jiken no shakaiteki kiban nikansuru kenkyu noto,"
Shien XXXII, No. 1 (February 1972):81-90.
69
A cho equals 2.45 acres. The three categories are applicable
to landholders across Japan, although the amount of land equivalent to
each size of holding w i l l vary s l i g h t l y according to region. They cer-
t a i n l y are applicable to Fukushima; they come from the source c i t e d i n
note 70.
70
Shoji Kichinosuke, "Jiyu minken undo no k e i z a i t e k i haikei,"
comp. M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renraku kai hen, J i y u minken undo III (Tokyo,
1956):189. The same table but accompanied by more elaborate analysis
can be found i n Oishi, "Shakai k e i z a i , " pp. 108-9.
71
Ibid.
72
For example, see Goto, J i y u minken.
73
Cf. Rude, Crowd,, p. 248.
74
'Value" i n the sense that production of cash crops and the
corresponding tendency to merchandice as well indicates some b e l i e f i n
c a p i t a l i s t i c values.
75
Shimoyama, "Oboegaki," p. 158.
76
Ibid., and Oishi, "Shakai k e i z a i , " p. 20.
 245

77
Shimoyama, "Oboegaki," pp. 55-58.
78
A l e x i s de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolu-
tion (New York, 1955), pp. 176-77; and Rude, Crowd, p. 20.
79
Inoue K o j i , "Chichibu j i k e n : sono shakaiteki kiban," Jiyu
minken undo 111:67.
80
Ibid., and Ishikawa, Tonegawa, p. 212; and CJSR 11:551-88.
81
Gakushuin hojinkai, shigakubu, comp., Chichibu jiken no
ikkosai (Tokyo, 1968), p. 70.
82
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 9. Another source claims the t o t a l ,
wet and dry, f i e l d c u l t i v a t i o n average area was .63 cho (Ikkosai, pp. 17-
18). The discrepancy may be due to which year's s t a t i s t i c s the d i f f e r e n t
sources r e l i e d upon.
83
Ikkosai, p. 17.
84
Shimoyama, "Oboegaki," p. 165: "There was a preponderant ten-
dency for d i r e c t producers—middle l e v e l f a r m e r s — a l s o to act as small
merchants."
85
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 10-11.
86
Ibid., p. 12.
87
Ibid., pp. 19-21.
88
Ibid., p. 28.
89
Shimoyama Saburo, "Minken undo noto," Jiyu minken, v o l . 10,
Nihon Rekishi ser. (Tokyo, 1973):304; also Goto, Jiyuminken, p. 182.
90
Paul Mayet, Agricultural Insurance in Organic Connection with
Savings Banks, Land Credit, and the Commutation of Debts, trans. Rev.
Arthur Lloyd (London, 1893), p. 65.
Irokawa Daikichi, "Komminto to Jiyuto," Rekishigaku
9 1
kenkyu,
247:1-30.
92
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 9.

93
Namatame Yasushi, Kabasan jiken no ikkosatsu daiishu (Taka-
hagi, 1962), p. 20.
94
J i j ' i Shimpo, 29 March 1884 has a report on the effects of the
new tax regulations of 15 March. Japan Weekly Mail, 31 May 1884, has a
s p e c i a l supplement on taxation. Also see Chambliss, Chiaraijima.
 246

95
See Rude, Crowd, pp. 199-201; E r i c R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of
the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969), pp. 290-92; and Kathleen Gough,
"Peasant Resistance," Pacific Affairs XLI, No. 4 (Winter 1968-69):540.
96
These characterizations come from a variety of newspapers:
J i j i Shimpo, Tokyo NichiNichi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Yubin Hochi
Shimbun, Choya Shimbun, and the Japan Weekly Mail and cover the period
14 A p r i l 1883 to 13 December 1884.
97
Japan Weekly Mail, 27 September 1884.
98
J i j i Shimpo, 2 October 1884.
99
J i y u Shimbun, 8 October 1884.
1 0 0
Japan Weekly Mail, 21 A p r i l 1883.

1<
"
)1
Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 9 December 1884.

102
Ibid. Compare the use of t h i s kind of evaluative language
with that i n French history; see Rude, Crowd, pp. 198-212.
103
Leiden and Schmitt, Politics of Violence, p. 87.
104
Wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 289-94, esp. p. 292.
 CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATION

INTRODUCTION

Organisation i s the most e f f i c i e n t means for a number of separate

individuals to accomplish a commonly desired goal. I t i s the r e s u l t of

recognition of the truth of the old adage, "Strength l i e s i n numbers,"

and the further recognition that the "numbers" must be purposively ordered

in order to maximize that strength. At the base of organization, then,

i s "purpose" and "goal"; and while these two terms may be defined by the

a c t i v i t y involved i n achieving them, they may also be properly defined i n

terms of the ideas, or p r i n c i p l e s , that more-or-less expressly support

them. I f the act i t s e l f i s examined, then the "targets" for which the

organization was created are i d e n t i f i e d . I f the ideas, or p r i n c i p l e s , of

the organizations are examined, then the ideology or type of thinking

that the organization professes i s i d e n t i f i e d . In fact, of course, "the

purpose of organization i s action,""'" so, by looking at one, of necessity

the other i s also examined. Abstract ideas are transformed into action

when ideology i s made into a j u s t i f i c a t i o n or rationale by the organiza-

t i o n for choosing something or someone as a target.

This chapter i s an attempt to define the ideologies that under-

pinned the organisations involved i n the Fukushima, Kabasan, and Chichibu

incidents. It i s an inquiry into those p r i n c i p l e s which the p a r t i c i p a n t s

of the incidents employed to define their goals and to order themselves;

247
 248

and secondly i t i s an inquiry into the make-up, workings, and tasks of

the organisations themselves.

It i s well to note here that the p l u r a l form of the nouns, "organ-

i s a t i o n " and "ideology" i s used, for although there were c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i -

t i e s between the organisation and ideology found i n each of the incidents,

there were also differences. The organisation of the participants encom-

passed such widely d i f f e r i n g forms as p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; " p o l i t i c a l

s o c i e t i e s " (seisha), and the private schools operated by these s o c i e t i e s ;

" c i r c l e s " or small l o c a l groups consisting of a few " l i k e - t h i n k i n g men"

(doshinsha); "friendly associations" (shinbokukai); "cells" (saibo), or

l o c a l units of a larger organisation; lecture s o c i e t i e s and the l i k e .

Moreover, not only did such forms of organisation serve to order the r e l a -

tionships and purposes of those involved, but they also served as vehicles

or as agencies for the further expansion of other organisations. They

performed a function basic to the v i a b i l i t y of organisation, that i s , the

task of recruitment. For t h i s , i n addition to the organisations them-

selves, a variety of means were used: lectures, debates, demonstrations,

and p e t i t i o n campaigns; f a m i l i a l and e x t r a - f a m i l i a l relationships such as,

respectively, marriage and "parent-child" (oyabun-kobun) l i n k s ; speaking

tours aimed at various v i l l a g e s and t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r a l associations;

p o l i t i c a l party and society newspapers and b u l l e t i n s ; handbills and even

songs and poems. Thus, not only could and did organisations take on a

variety of forms but so too did t h e i r methods of recruitment.

The forms which organisations and the recruitment function took

varied i n degree, type, i n t e n s i t y and place. Not a l l forms nor recruitment

 249

patterns could be found i n any one place. In some areas, such as Chi-

chibu, people tended to coalesce more around t r a d i t i o n a l v i l l a g e forms

of organisation than they did around " p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s " or " c i r c l e s . "

There, "parent-child" relations between individuals, or f a m i l i a l , connec-

tions a r i s i n g from marriage, tended to predominate as vehicles of organi-

sation. In other areas, however, such as eastern Fukushima, the p o l i t i c a l

society, or " c i r c l e , " found f e r t i l e s o i l to nurture organisational growth.

Recruitment was often impersonal, and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s were less

t r a d i t i o n a l , t i e d more by shared ideas than by shared in-laws or by common

place of b i r t h .

As such, the role of ideology i n uniting individuals also d i f -

fered according to place. I t was, for instance, more important to the

organisations i n Tamura than to those i n Chichibu. Ideology also d i f f e r e d

according to the l e v e l at which i t was expressed. If i t was expressed

at the l e v e l of day-to-day concerns—food, housing and c a p i t a l expendi-

tures i n general—then i t appealed to, and served to organise, those who

were i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y ; the demands, therefore, expressed by such

people were p a r t i c u l a r and immediate ones. On the other hand, ideology at

the more general l e v e l as an expression of a desire for a certain kind of

society r e f l e c t e d concerns other than the issue of economic security. The

point i s that the same ideology, a l b e i t expressed d i f f e r e n t l y at d i f f e r e n t

l e v e l s , was manifested by d i f f e r e n t forms of organisation, recruitment

patterns, demands, issues and the l i k e , according to who voiced i t and to

where i t was voiced.

For t h i s reason, and i n t h i s sense, i t seems appropriate to speak

 250

i n terms of ideologies rather than ideology. For instance, the demands

made by the Chichibu farmers, as we outlined i n Chapter I I , were mainly

at the l e v e l of day-to-day concerns—tax reduction, debt exemption, etc.

But i n order to secure a remedy for such economic problems the farmers

believed that a representative c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system of government was re-

quired. P o l i t i c a l reform, they thought, would provide a cure for economic

ills. Although i t i s with some hesitation that we refer to them as pro-

ponents of a democratic ideology, or at least as " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s , "

because of t h e i r s t r i c t l y economic reasons for desiring such a system,

they remain, nonetheless, democrats of a defineable type.

By way of h i s t o r i c a l comparison, the reasons they had for sup-

porting c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government are not altogether d i f f e r e n t from those

which served the American colonists as a rationale i n demanding the same

kind of system a hundred years e a r l i e r . The theme of "no taxation with-

out representation" can be found i n both cases.

Although similar i n t h i s respect, the American and Japanese cases

d i f f e r e d with regard to the p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n that the proponents of

constitutionalism i n each case had inherited. Unlike the Japanese case,

the Americans had inherited the English p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n of "natural

r i g h t " which they drew upon i n order to underpin t h e i r e s s e n t i a l l y eco-

nomic reasons for supporting constitutional government. "Natural r i g h t "

doctrine, as long ago expounded by John Locke, and underscored by Thomas

Paine and Thomas Jefferson was, or could be when deemed necessary, used

as a rationale f o r revolution. But even before "natural r i g h t , " England

had had a t r a d i t i o n of r e v o l t . Speaking of England--and Americans of

 251

c o u r s e , i n h e r i t e d much o f E n g l i s h t r a d i t i o n — E l i e Halevy wrote, " . . .

the r i g h t t o r i o t o r as i t was termed by the lawyers, 'the r i g h t o f r e s i s -

3

t a n c e , ' was an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e n a t i o n a l traditions."

L a r g e l y C o n f u c i a n Japan, o f c o u r s e , had no " n a t u r a l r i g h t " doc-

t r i n e t o draw upon as a r a t i o n a l e f o r r e v o l t , a l t h o u g h as we saw i n

Chapter I I , Japan d i d have i t s own t r a d i t i o n o f r e v o l t , and as we a l s o

saw, t h e t r a d i t i o n was s t r o n g e r i n some a r e a s , namely Kanto and Fukushima,

than i n o t h e r s . E v i l r u l e r s and bad government, as evidenced oftentimes

by economic d i s t r e s s a t t e n d a n t upon n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s , was reason enough

4

i n t h e C o n f u c i a n v a l u e system t o p r o v i d e t h e p r e t e x t f o r r e v o l t . The

q u e s t i o n then a r i s e s : W i t h i n the changing economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l

c o n t e x t , as e a r l i e r o u t l i n e d , when C o n f u c i a n v a l u e s were b e i n g supplanted

by c a p i t a l i s t ones, was i t n o t then n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e Japanese t o d i s c o v e r

new and d i f f e r e n t r a t i o n a l e f o r r e v o l t ? D i d n o t they t o o need something

a k i n t o " n a t u r a l r i g h t , " o r even " n a t u r a l r i g h t " i t s e l f , t o p r o v i d e p h i l o -

s o p h i c a l , p o l i t i c a l and moral support f o r r e v o l t s a r i s i n g from p u r e l y

economic causes?

The answer t o these q u e s t i o n s d i f f e r s a c c o r d i n g t o the i n c i d e n t .

R e s i s t a n c e t o change, and hence t h e v i a b i l i t y o f t r a d i t i o n , was c l e a r l y

s t r o n g e r i n C h i c h i b u than i n t h e o t h e r two c a s e s . Very l i k e l y t h e t r a d i -

t i o n a l C o n f u c i a n r i g h t t o r e v o l t s e r v e d t o pave the way f o r t h e acceptance

o f , and perhaps t o r e i n f o r c e , t h e r i g h t t o r e v o l t as i t was expressed i n

natural right doctrine. T h i s i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g and can f i n d support from

comparative h i s t o r y , such as t h a t o f p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y France where even

a f t e r t h e n o t i o n o f n a t u r a l r i g h t had more-or-less become the o f f i c i a l

 252

5
ideology of the state there were s t i l l many instances of revolt that con-

formed to t r a d i t i o n a l modes of organisation and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 6

But even

when they did so, the fact that they occurred against a changed p o l i t i c a l ,

s o c i a l , and economic backdrop, d i f f e r e n t from the one against which they

had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been expressed, gave them a greater intensity or impact,

7
or a new direction.

But for the Fukushima and Kabasan disturbances the "new" notion

of "natural r i g h t " was indeed i n f l u e n t i a l , not only as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for

revolt i n p a r t i c u l a r , and c o l l e c t i v e action i n general, but also as a

p r i n c i p l e by and around which the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the two incidents

organised themselves. The people involved i n these incidents, l i k e the

American colonists, drew upon the p r i n c i p l e s of natural r i g h t i n order to

j u s t i f y t h e i r opposition to the government, and to give purpose to t h e i r

c o l l e c t i v e action.

Instead of using ideology to support demands a r i s i n g from day-to-

day concerns, i . e . , economic concerns, the participants i n the Fukushima

and Kabasan r e b e l l i o n s employed ideology i n t h e i r organisations to express

and to underpin a desire for a c e r t a i n kind of society, namely, a c o n s t i -

t u t i o n a l system of representation. Hence, though at both l e v e l s , the day-

to-day and the whole society, the goal that was sought was the same, only

the reasons for invoking, and the function and importance of, ideology

were d i f f e r e n t . At the l e v e l of day-to-day concerns, ideology was ex-

pressed mainly i n economic, immediate, and l o c a l terms; at the l e v e l of

the whole society i t primarily expressed p o l i t i c a l , long-term, and

national goals. This d i s t i n c t i o n between the two levels at which

 253

constitutionalism and natural r i g h t found expression i s important i n char-

a c t e r i z i n g the differences i n ideology and organisation between the three

incidents.

NATURAL RIGHT AND LITERACY

In Chapter II the point was made that p r i o r to the founding of

the Jiyuto i n late 1881, the leadership of the popular rights movement, as

well as much of i t s following, was largely commoner-composed and Kanto-

centred. It was also stated that the new leadership had adopted natural

r i g h t doctrine to serve as the i d e o l o g i c a l basis of the movement and that

they embraced i t s p r i n c i p l e s more strongly than had the early popular

rights advocates. Here we w i l l attempt to substantiate the l a t t e r point

by discussing the nature of the natural r i g h t component as i t appeared i n

late 1870's and early 1880's minken thought and action at the l o c a l l e v e l

of p o l i t i c s . Following that, we w i l l look at l i t e r a c y rates i n the coun-

tryside i n order to see whether r u r a l f o l k were able to comprehend such a

system of thought as natural r i g h t . Before doing so, however, we will

f i r s t define what i s meant by "natural r i g h t . "

Natural Right: Western and Japanese

There exists no one spokesman for natural r i g h t i n the sense that

i t has one "thinker" who has c o d i f i e d i t s p r i n c i p l e s and l i s t e d i t s

r i g h t s , but without too many q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i t would be safe to say that

"natural r i g h t , " as i t i s understood today, and was understood i n Japan

of the 1880's, consists of the p r i n c i p l e s enunciated by John Locke i n his

Second Treatise as well as the way his ideas were operationalized i n the
 254

American Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and B i l l of Rights.

I m p l i c i t l y , or e x p l i c i t l y , natural r i g h t consists of a number of proposi-

tions :

1) Nature bestows on man gua man certain inalienable r i g h t s , such

as l i f e , l i b e r t y , property, security, and the r i g h t to take
measures to protect these r i g h t s .
2) Natural r i g h t i s anterior to the establishment of the state.
3) The state comes into existence when men contract with one another
to establish an agency (the state) whose sole purpose i s to pro-
tect and guarantee these r i g h t s .
4) The authority of the state i s derived from i t s duty to promote
and protect these r i g h t s . Laws should r e f l e c t the recognition of
natural r i g h t s .
5) I f the state f a i l s to perform t h i s duty properly, then revolution
is j u s t i f i e d .
8

These f i v e points, of course, only represent a digest of a much more com-

p l i c a t e d system of ideas, which at the very l e a s t involves a number of

propositions c o r o l l a r y to these main f i v e . For example, a c o r o l l a r y to

proposition Number 3 would be popular representation, e s s e n t i a l l y a check

on the state to insure that man's fundamental rights be protected. Corol-

lary to proposition Number 1 i s the notion of equal r i g h t s , i . e . , no

d i s t i n c t i o n s of wealth, status, etc. should be made between men i n terms

of t h e i r natural r i g h t s . These propositions constitute what i s meant by

natural r i g h t i n the remainder of t h i s work.

If there was any one "natural r i g h t " t h e o r i s t within the popular

r i g h t s movement, then i t was Ueki Emori. He, more than any other served

as the " i d e o l o g i c a l godfather" to many of the leaders of the three inci-

dents under study here, and i t was he who was the clearest exponent of

the Japanese version of natural r i g h t doctrine.

Ueki i s known to us primarily as the "brain t r u s t " of Itagaki and

9
of the Jiyuto party. But he, unlike the other primxnent popular rights
 255

10 . .
t h e o r i s t at that time, Nakae Chomin, was also an a c t i v i s t . In one way

or another, he was t i e d to the Fukushima, Kabasan and Chichibu incidents.

He was, for instance, i n Fukushima for over a month i n August through

September 1882, at the i n v i t a t i o n of the Jiyuto branch t h e r e . 1 1

He

attended a congratulatory banquet on 15 A p r i l 1883, that celebrated the

release of those t r i e d for "treason" for t h e i r part i n the Fukushima I n c i -

12
dent. He was also a good f r i e n d to Kono Hironaka and to his nephew,
13

Kabasan conspirator Kono Hiroshi. When several of the Kabasan rebels

were convicted and sentenced to death, he wrote a newspaper a r t i c l e i n

t h e i r defense: "These death sentences given to these p a t r i o t s , these

friends of our Party, must be condemned. Let's p e t i t i o n [for commuta-

14
t i o n ] , and inscribe our names deeply!"
When Chichibu a c t i v i s t Murakami T a i j i was executed, Ueki wrote a
memorial for him and read i t at his f u n e r a l . 1 5
He had also been active

as a t r a v e l l i n g lecturer i n Saitama and surrounding areas since May of

16

1883. He i s even known to have written a revolutionary manifesto f o r

the participants of the Iida Incident (Nagano prefecture), an unsuccessful

attempt to overthrow the government that took place less than a month.
17

after the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n . Most importantly, however, throughout

his entire career as an a c t i v i s t he r e l e n t l e s s l y fought for a constitu-

t i o n a l government based on universal franchise (for men and women), and

18
on a guaranteed b i l l of r i g h t s .
In his c a l l for i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t i e s and freedoms he drew upon
the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart M i l l , and much of his
19
natural r i g h t learning he apparently took from Vissering's Naturrecht.
 256

He i s also known to have read Guizot, Tocqueville, Spencer, Burke, and

20

others. Nobutaka Ike cxtes Rousseau and M i l l as the dominant influences

on Ueki's thinking. Although neither of these can t r a d i t i o n a l l y be re-

garded as "natural right thinkers," Ueki perhaps was able to deduce, as

1

several have since his time, the intimacies of thought that e x i s t between
21

Locke, Rousseau, and M i l l . In any case, at the very base of Ueki's

thought was the concept of natural r i g h t . In the following song, written

in 1879, and reproduced i n f u l l here, a l l the propositions e a r l i e r c i t e d

as the essential components of natural r i g h t are strongly suggested. This

song, i n c i d e n t a l l y , was written i n simple language expressly f o r the

people of the countryside, as the t i t l e i t s e l f indicates. Yoshino Sakuzo,

the great democrat of the Taisho period, edited t h i s song for publication.

He notes, "This song was said to have been exceedingly popular among pea-

sants and common people."

"Country Songs of Peoples' Rights" (Minken inaka uta)
by Ueki Emori
Man i s free.
The head thinks and the heart f e e l s ;
The body moves and runs;
Man surpasses a l l other wonderful creatures.
The heart and body are
comparable to the universe.
Man's freedom does not allow a dearth of l i b e r t y ;
We are free; we have r i g h t s .
The people of Japan must claim their rights;
i f we do not, then our companion i s shame.
Though the birds have wings they cannot f l y ;
The caged b i r d can see the outside.
Though the f i s h have f i n s they cannot swim;
the netted f i s h sees the sea beyond.
Though the horses have hooves they cannot run;
the tethered horse sees the grass out of reach.
Men are endowed with arms and legs,
 257

we have hearts and minds

but today we have no l i b e r t y or r i g h t s .
If we c a l l ourselves men
then each person must himself stand up and say,
"Man has r i g h t s . "
The mind must think and the mouth must say,
"Whether freedom continues or ceases
We a l l hear and f e e l i t s c a l l . "

The rights of freedom are possessed by everyone;

freedom i s a g i f t of heaven.
Men have both i n t e l l i g e n c e and strength;
there i s no gain i n not using them.
Living without freedom, not having freedom
i s the same as being dead.

Think of the s a l t : s a l t i s s a l t because i t i s salty;

i f i t ' s not salty then i t i s the same as sand;
Sugar i s sugar only because i t i s sweet;
i f i t ' s not sweet i t might as well be d i r t .
Man i s man only i f he i s free.
If he i s not free, he i s l i k e a puppet.

From ancient times government has been oppressive and tyrannical.

It destroys homes and k i l l s people,
It suppresses speech and prohibits discussion.
Does i t do anything that i s good?
For t h i s kind of government
the granting of rights and l i b e r t y i s seen
as swallowing a b i t t e r mixture of s a l t and sand,
not sweet l i k e the earth.
Whether r i c h or poor, strong or weak,
a l l men are the same under heaven.
No one i s above another and no one i s beneath another.

The people of Japan c a l l for the extension of r i g h t s ,

but there are no methods to extend our r i g h t s ,
because the law allows us no freedom.
If a government i s e v i l ,
i f i t checks the freedom of the people,
i f i t checks t h e i r wealth and takes their money,
i f i t does these wicked things without good reason,
then i t makes a great mistake.

The peoples' welfare i s unobtainable.

Let's resolve for constitutional laws
and for the early popular election of an assembly.
Onward! Onward! People of our country.
Let's push for the rights of l i b e r t y .
Work d i l i g e n t l y , t h i r t y m i l l i o n people,
 258

a l l together;
Rise up, be prosperous and go forward
A p o l i t i c a l system of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l freedoms
i s the pressing need of today.
Cultivate wisdom and pursue scholarship.
Become enlightened people and 2 2

l e t ' s make b r i l l i a n t the majesty of our country.

The content of t h i s song shows, as well as anything, the revolutionary

implications of natural r i g h t doctrine. Although i t does not e x p l i c i t l y

urge a c a l l to arms, nor the overthrow of the government, i t does define

the contemporary s i t u a t i o n i n such a way that the reader (or singer) i s

compelled to conclude that i f the government f a i l s to erect a constitu-

t i o n a l system, then there i s l i t t l e alternative but revolution.

S t i l l , i t s content does d i f f e r somewhat from the Western variety

of natural r i g h t . Although i t claims that r i g h t i s anterior to the state,

that the people possess natural r i g h t , i t does not go the entire distance

and suggest that the locus of sovereignty resides with the people. By

i t s omission of any negative reference to the Emperor and the imperial

system i t stops short of suggesting the entire notion of "popular sover-

eignty." Ueki was not alone i n t h i s regard. Other natural r i g h t advo-

cates also stopped short of c a l l i n g for popular sovereignty. One example

of t h i s i s c l e a r l y seen i n a p e t i t i o n sent to the Emperor on 7 December

1880 by four representatives of the Aizu region, Endo Naoyuki, Hara

Heizo, Okada Kensho, and Kuroda Yutaka. After making the standard,

p o l i t e introduction, the p e t i t i o n e r s wrote:

In r e f l e c t i n g upon present day conditions i n our country, we have
reached a point where a l l the people sincerely and completely wish
f o r a national assembly. Compared to giving free play to the menace
of a Western type of revolution which would strip [your majesty] of
sovereignty and give it to the people, the strengthening of coopera-
t i o n between those high and low by allowing [an assembly] would be
better ....
 259

In these times we must f i r s t ask what i s the proper road to take.

If we ask what are the peoples' wishes for the future, then i t i s the
convening of a national assembly; the establishment of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
laws; the declaration of the rights of both the monarch and his sub-
jects; the expansion of the l i b e r t i e s of c i t i z e n s ; and, i n general,
the advancement of the prosperity and the good health of the country
based on the development of s p i r i t (seishin). . . ,
2 3
(Emphasis
mine.)

If the meaning of natural r i g h t as expressed by these advocates

has any Western p a r a l l e l , then i t would probably be the English exper-

ience of the seventeenth century when the p o l i t i c a l system was troubled

over the task of defining the relationship between, and the respective
24

rights of, the king and parliament. There i s even evidence, a l b e i t of

an anecdotal type, that some individuals were aware of the s i m i l a r i t y of

the conditions p r e v a i l i n g i n Japan and England of the two respective

periods. In the song, Jiyu no U t a ("Song of L i b e r t y " ) , which, as Nobutaka

Ike notes, "became very popular i n t h i s period," we read,

Follow the path of the English Revolution
Yesterday a King, today a rebel.
Cromwell's beckoning with a f l a g of Liberty i n h i s hand
Almost upset Heaven.
By putting King Charles to death
The basis f o r l i b e r t y was l a i d . ^
2

As songs, t h i s one and Ueki's "Country Song of Peoples' Rights"

probably reached the attention of many i n the countryside who lacked the

education, and therefore the a b i l i t y to read the memorials and manifestos

written by the leaders of the popular rights movement. Still, i t is

probably impossible to measure the extent to which such o r a l means of

communication of popular rights notions affected country f o l k , l e t alone

to determine whether they were important i n moving people to r e b e l l i o n .

For most, names of persons such as "King Charles" and "Cromwell," or of

 260

events such as "The English Revolution" were probably just that—names,

and probably therefore not a l l meaningful. The thoughts expressed by

Ueki—intended for r u r a l people—probably were meaningful, although t h i s

may not be obvious to the reader because much of the s i m p l i c i t y of the

song i s l o s t i n t r a n s l a t i o n . Nonetheless, i t seems f a i r to assume that

the l i k e l i h o o d of r u r a l people comprehending the meaning of such songs,

or manifestos, p e t i t i o n s , memorials, etc., was increased to the extent

that they either were (1) l i t e r a t e ; or (2) were members of, or had con-

nections with, p o l i t i c a l societies or p a r t i e s . We w i l l examine the i n -

stance of l i t e r a c y first.

Literacy i n the Countryside

Innumerable students of Japan have c i t e d the r e l a t i v e l y high rate

of l i t e r a c y among the Japanese population at the time of the Restoration

as a p a r t i a l explanation of how Japan was able to modernize so e f f i c i e n t l y

and quickly after that date. By the end of Tokugawa there were some

17,000 d i f f e r e n t schools i n Japan, 15,000 of which were terakoya ("pari-

26
shioners' schools") that served the common people i n towns and v i l l a g e s ,

and an estimated 40 to 50 per cent of the male population and about 15

27

per cent of the female were l i t e r a t e . This legacy from the Tokugawa

period, moreover, was enhanced when^in 1872 the Education code was enacted

by the government, c a l l i n g for the eradication of i l l i t e r a c y . By 1875,

40 per cent of a l l boys and 15 per cent of a l l g i r l s were attending

2
elementary school; by 1883, the figures were 67 per-cent and 34 per cent.
Although up to t h i s time the content of schooling was largely Confucian
29
and n a t i o n a l i s t i c and hence showed largely " u t i l i t a r i a n " motives (one
 261

index of i t s " u t i l i t a r i a n i s m " was the proscription of teachers from j o i n -

ing p o l i t i c a l movements), i t did nonetheless provide a great many with

the basic tools needed to learn and absorb new ideas. Also, i t s emphasis

on "merit," "success," "talent," and so on, though u t i l i t a r i a n i n motive,

were values universal i n e f f e c t and therefore e a s i l y adopted by the

p o l i t i c s and movements i n opposition to the government. In any case,

from t h i s b r i e f outline, we may assume that many of the a c t i v i s t s i n -

volved i n the popular rights movements, would l i k e l y have been l i t e r a t e .

How, then, does this generalization square with the data presented i n the

participant samples f o r the three studies appearing i n Chapter III?

We w i l l look at the Chichibu case f i r s t , for i f any of the three

incidents could be suspected of having a leadership and following that

was largely i l l i t e r a t e , i t would be t h i s one. The data appearing i n the

sample i s f a r from conclusive, but when i t i s supplemented by other

c o l l a t e r a l data, a clearer picture emerges.

The most immediate l i m i t a t i o n of the data stems from the f a c t

that usually the question of l i t e r a c y was never asked during interroga-

t i o n (for t h i s reason there appears no special column i n the sample f o r

t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , but i t i s contained under "other": see Appendix

III). Only f i v e people questioned by the authorities were expressly

asked about l i t e r a c y . Four of these f i v e claimed to be l i t e r a t e . (It

should be noted that Ochiai T o i s h i was' not l i t e r a t e at the time of the

r e b e l l i o n , but l a t e r taught himself reading and writing while serving a

prison sentence for his involvement i n the Osaka incident [November 1885].)

I f , however, we use such information as whether or not a person acted as

 262

a p e t i t i o n e r at some time, whether his business required reading and

writing s k i l l s , whether he was known to have done w r i t i n g of one sort

or another, whether he was a former goshi, as was Tashiro, and so on, as

probable signs of l i t e r a c y , then within the sample there are ten others

i n addition to the above-mentioned f i v e i n d i v i d u a l s who could be c l a s s i -

f i e d as l i t e r a t e . About the rest of the leadership appearing i n the

sample i t i s impossible to say, although we may conjecture as to t h e i r

l i t e r a c y based on certain other b i t s of evidence.

In 1874, when many of the rebellion's p a r t i c i p a n t s would have

been of school age, the percentage of Saitama c h i l d r e n i n school was 29.4

per cent; the breakdown by sex was 47.1 per cent for boys, and 11.7 per

cent for g i r l s . By 1879, the figure for boys had increased to 63.6 per
30

cent, and for g i r l s to 21.6 per cent. I t i s also known that Chichibu

ranked among the highest of Saitama d i s t r i c t s i n terms of the number of

children i n school as of 1884 through 1885. 31

That education i n Saitama

progressed so quickly, moreover, i s not s u r p r i s i n g when i t i s r e a l i z e d

that during the Bakumatsu period (1853-68) about f i f t y private schools

32

and about 600 "parishioners' schools" were i n existence.

In Inoue Koji's sample of 261 Chichibu Incident p a r t i c i p a n t s

arrested by the Gumma prefecture p o l i c e , who during t h e i r interrogation

did question the suspects on t h i s point, 202 i n d i v i d u a l s or 77 per cent

claimed they could at least write t h e i r name and p o s i t i o n . Among these

202 persons, Inoue was only able to d i s t i n g u i s h between the barely

33
about
l i t e r a t60
e per
and cent and 40 perl icent.
the completely t e r a t e ; respectively, the figures were
 263

Another piece of evidence pointing to a f a i r l y high rate of

l i t e r a c y i n Chichibu has to do with i t s close t i e s to the s i l k market.

Inoue t e l l s us that i t was not unusual for Chichibu residents to read

newspapers frequently i n order to gain information about the conditions

34
of the Yokohama and (even) American markets. "Even v i l l a g e s located
35
i n the deepest v a l l e y s were aware of how close Tokyo and Yokohama were."
Also, the prosperity of the region p r i o r to 1884 served to bring merchants,
36
politicians (Oi Kentaro, for instance, v i s i t e d Chichibu i n early 1884),
and even a r t i s t s to Chichibu. "At t h i s time Chichibu was not a closed
37

society; and i t s openness was accompanied by a p o l i t i c a l awakening.

To whatever extent a p o l i t i c a l awakening did occur i n Chichibu, based on

the evidence presented thus far i t seems l i k e l y that the f a i r l y high

l i t e r a c y rate p r e v a i l i n g i n the region was p a r t l y responsible for i t .

A l l twenty-five of the Fukushima individuals for whom we have i n -

formation were l i t e r a t e , and most of them, i t appears, could be termed

highly l i t e r a t e . Newspaper reporters, former and present shizoku, town

and v i l l a g e chiefs (who had to f i l e monthly reports to t h e i r government

superiors), doctors, students of private p o l i t i c a l society schools or

party schools, lawyer's aides, and so on, bespeak of a very high degree

of l i t e r a c y competency. Even the one i n d i v i d u a l ( I s h i i Teizo, who during

interrogation, said he was "barely [literate])," was known to have formed

his own l o c a l study c i r c l e . Also, other leaders, mainly from Yama d i s -

t r i c t , whose names were frequently mentioned i n the l a s t chapter—Hara

Heizo, Uda S e i i c h i , Endo Naoyuki, Nakajima Yuhachi, Watanabe.Shuya, e t c . —

appear to have been highly l i t e r a t e , indicated not only by the p e t i t i o n s

 264

they wrote, but also by the v i l l a g e government posts they held. Of

course, t h i s high l e v e l of l i t e r a c y among the leaders of the incident i s

not surprising once we r e c a l l the types of occupations they held (Chapter

I I I ) — t e a c h e r s , p r i e s t s , merchants, " v i l l a g e heads," and so on.

There i s some reason to believe that many of the followers i n

the incident were also l i t e r a t e . In addition to the high national

l i t e r a c y rate, as e a r l i e r shown, i t i s known that i n the l a s t years of

Tokugawa 521 terakoya existed i n Fukushima prefecture, of which over 90

38

per cent were operated by wealthy farmers. We may also assume that a

f a i r l y high rate of " p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a c y " existed among the followers. In

one document dated 20 November 1880, e n t i t l e d , "Facts r e l a t i n g to the

delegation of Hara Heizo, representative of Yama d i s t r i c t , f o r the p e t i -

tioning for a national assembly," we see that 271 people, a l l heimin,

39

from twenty-eight d i f f e r e n t v i l l a g e s , affixed t h e i r signatures.

Although i t may be argued that some or even many of these people had

l i t t l e idea of what they signed, i t seems more l i k e l y , given the evidence

thus f a r presented, that i t was otherwise. Moreover, i t i s easily

imagined that even i f they were unable to read the document, someone,

probably the l o c a l organiser, explained the significance of the document

to them.

Take f o r instance the testimony of I s h i i Teizo, who e a r l i e r dur-

ing interrogation responded "barely" to the question of l i t e r a c y :

Q. Had you e a r l i e r [before the incident] joined the Jiyuto?
A. Yes, I had.
Q. What do you believe to be .the purpose of the Jiyuto?
A. To e s t a b l i s h a Constitutional form of government.
 265

Like the Fukushima case, i t appears that most of the individuals

of the Kabasan Incident appearing i n the sample were l i t e r a t e . Most

either responded p o s i t i v e l y during interrogation to the question of

l i t e r a c y , or were known to have attended either a domain,.prefectural or

seisha ( " p o l i t i c a l society") school. Several even were probably "highly

l i t e r a t e , " as seen by t h e i r occupations—teaching, writing, government

and p o l i t i c s . There i s the further fact of so many having come from Fuku-

shima, and having been involved i n the Fukushima Incident, and therefore

i n terms of background were probably equally as l i t e r a t e .

Literacy as such, however, means only that the individuals of

the three incidents were capable of reading, t a l k i n g i n t e l l i g e n t l y , and

presumably understanding p o l i t i c a l ideas such as natural r i g h t , freedom,

representative government and constitutionalism. S t i l l , not a l l p o l i t i c a l

a c t i v i s t s need be l i t e r a t e , even though, as we have just seen, many of

those who are included i n the three samples were. As i t was intimated

e a r l i e r , an understanding of p o l i t i c a l notions, i . e . , " p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a c y , "

i s augmented by membership i n , or a connection with some type of p o l i t i c a l

group. Here, we .will look at two such groups that came into existence

during the second period of popular rights development referred to

e a r l i e r as "the Period of Organization arid Promotion."

Both of these groups are p o l i t i c a l societies of Fukushima prefec-

ture, but one, the Sanshisha ("Society of Miharu D i s t r i c t Teachers"), was,

as i t s name suggests, based i n Eastern Fukushima, and was, for reasons

soon to be revealed, representative of a good number of other p o l i t i c a l

s o c i e t i e s that emerged i n the late 1870's. The other i s the Aishinsha

 266

("Society f o r Mutual Regard") and i t was based i n the Aizu region. Since

both were forerunners of the Fukushima Jiyuto, and since the members of

both were deeply involved i n the Fukushima Incident several years l a t e r ,

they are therefore important for understanding organisational and ideo-

l o g i c a l antecedents. Also, as we s h a l l l a t e r see, a good number of the

Kabasan participants were e a r l i e r t i e d to one or the other of these two

societies. F i n a l l y , before examining these two s o c i e t i e s , i t i s neces-

sary to mention that during t h i s second stage of popular rights develop-

ment, Chichibu and most of i t s residents drop out of sight and do not

emerge as relevant p o l i t i c a l actors u n t i l the early 1880's.

NATURAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL SOCIETIES

Sanshisha

In January 1878, on his way from Ishikawa d i s t r i c t to take up a

new government post at the Fukushima p r e f e c t u r a l government o f f i c e , Kono

Hironaka, ex-samurai (goshi) of old Miharu domain, stopped i n Miharu

Town to renew relations with several o l d friends. While there he con-

tacted the v i l l a g e head of the town, Noguchi Kazushi, Shinto p r i e s t Tamano

Hideaki, ex-samurai Matsumoto Shigeru and Sakuma Shogen, druggists Asaka

Gihei and Kageyama Masahiro, sake manufacturer Matsumoto Eicho and head-
4]

men Iwasaki Seigi and Miwa Shoji. Together they established the Sanshisha.

(Note that five of these individuals appear i n our sample, and were there-

fore t r i e d for "treason" i n 1883.)

Just two years e a r l i e r , Kono, inspired by the formation of the

R i s s h i s h a of Tosa, had organised the Sekkyosha ("Open Society of Ishikawa"),

 267

42
in Ishikawa d i s t r i c t while serving there as kucho ("ward c h i e f " ) . As

legend would have i t , however, or as Kono himself would have i t i n his

biography, i t was not just the formation of the Risshisha that served as

the i n s p i r a t i o n , but, rather, his reading of J . S. M i l l ' s On Liberty.

Kono wrote:

U n t i l then [March 1872] 1 had been nurtured on Confucian and Kokugaku

(native Japanese) studies . . . but then, [after reading M i l l ] I
r e a l i z e d the importance that should be placed on the rights of the
people and on the l i b e r t i e s of the p e o p l e . 43

In the statement of p r i n c i p l e s and the rules of organisation of the Sek-

kyosha we are able to see the influence of M i l l , and of democratic

notions i n general. Free speech as the best means to a r r i v e at enlight-

ened decisions on important matters; the importance of the p o l i t i c a l

education of youth; the importance of a representative assembly to express

the aspirations of the people, and so on, t e l l of the influence of M i l l

and other democratic thinkers on the society, and on Kono himself, who

served as the f i r s t President of both the Sekkyosha and the Sanshisha.

The p r i n c i p l e s , rules, and organisational structure of the two societies

are v i r t u a l l y indistinguishable and therefore an in-depth examination of

either would be equally p r o f i t a b l e . But since the Sanshisha appears to

have had more influence on both the Kabasan and Fukushima incidents and

t h e i r p a r t i c i p a n t s , we w i l l examine i t .

A document e n t i t l e d , "The P r i n c i p l e s and Rules of the Sanshisha"

(Sanshisha shishu oyobi shasoku) best characterizes the nature of the

44

society. In i t s "Statement of P r i n c i p l e s " we see a very sophisticated

treatment of the essential argument of natural right doctrine. I t reads

in part:
 268

Society consists of a union of people who have both rights (kenri)

and duties (gimu), which run p a r a l l e l to one another. They cannot
be separated even for a short time because they are the important
truth of human existence. Even though they are s t e a d i l y assaulted
by placing excessive importance on wealth and honor, they cannot be
beaten. They are inherent natural rights (tempu koyu no ken). . . .
They are the true road of nature, of heaven and of earth, and i n
truth are both private and public. Although these rights and duties
have always existed [in nature] they have not yet been s e t t l e d to a
s u f f i c i e n t degree, and can only be determined by energetic public de-
bate and discussion. To fail to do this is to deny our nature as
men. . . . The people of Japan today perform t h e i r duties. . . . A
s e t t l e d p o l i c y i s needed to advance i n a d i r e c t i o n that w i l l benefit
society by enlarging the natural rights of the people. . . . To t h i s
end, having concluded that a permanent and widely held public debate
[is needed] l i k e - t h i n k i n g individuals have formed a compact.^5
(Emphasis mine.)

Following t h i s preamble i s a statement of the rules of the San-

shisha that consists of forty-eight a r t i c l e s , divided into f i v e sections.

The f i v e sections concern: (1) general rules; (2) meetings; (3) d e f i n i -

tions and duties of Society o f f i c e holders; (4) rules of debate and d i s -

cussion; and (5) Society finances. Although the l a s t four sections are

of some i n t e r e s t , i t i s section One dealing with general rules that t e l l s

most concerning the p r i n c i p l e s of the society and t h e i r operation. It

consists of eleven a r t i c l e s , f i v e of which seem the most pertinent:

Article I: This Society w i l l be c a l l e d the Sanshisha, taking i t s name

from Miharu machi of Tamura d i s t r i c t where i t w i l l be established.

Article II: There w i l l be no d i s t i n c t i o n made between the high and

the low [or r i c h and p o o r — k i s e n ] for membership i n t h i s society. A l l
have equality of rights (doto no kenri); no one w i l l lose his rights
so long as he performs his duties.

Article III: Those who become members of t h i s society are expected to

perform the duties assigned to them by the headquarters and branches
with a docile devotion (wajun mame). They are expected to study the
p r i n c i p l e s we p r a c t i c e ; to take them seriously; to f i n d and correct
t h e i r weak points; to nurture conditions for self-government; and to
work to extend the rights of l i b e r t y .
 269

Article V: Members must obtain the permission of the society head be-
fore joining another society.

A r t i c l e VI: A l l positions other than "head of the society" (shacho)

and conference head (gicho) w i l l be elected by b a l l o t . A l l o f f i c e r s
may stand for r e - e l e c t i o n and a period of one week every year w i l l be
set aside for elections. [The gicho i s elected at each 'general meet-
ing by those i n attendance: A r t i c l e VIII.]46

The natural r i g h t and democratic content of t h i s document speaks

for i t s e l f — t h e notions of equal r i g h t s , c r i t i c a l thinking, self-govern-

ment, extension of rights and l i b e r t i e s , and an open b a l l o t . The only

questionable parts of i t are the expectation i n A r t i c l e III that the

members serve with "docile devotion," and the r e s t r i c t i o n i n A r t i c l e V

on the freedom of members. The former case can be written o f f as' the

Japanese version of "party d i s c i p l i n e , " e s p e c i a l l y since i n the same

a r t i c l e we see that members are encouraged to study and improve them-

selves . This s t r i c t u r e i s also merely an extension of the idea pronounced

i n the society's "Statement of P r i n c i p l e s " : obligations must necessarily

accompany rights i f organisation i s to work e f f e c t i v e l y . This i s prob-

ably the case with A r t i c l e V as w e l l . After a l l , Kono himself served

two s o c i e t i e s at once and the Sanshisha was i n correspondence and had

relations with twenty-seven d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s of fourteen

prefectures, among them four from Fukushima i t s e l f (Sekkyosha, Aishinsha,

Kyofusha, and the Boshinsha). In fact, probably because of Kono's dual

leadership, the r e l a t i o n s between the Sekkyosha and Sanshisha were very

close.

There i s also one other rule of the society that may cause some

doubt as to how democratic i t was. And that i s the f i r s t sentence of

A r t i c l e VI that removes the o f f i c e of "society head" from e l e c t i o n . In

 270

Section 3, a r t i c l e 34, defining the o f f i c e and i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s we

read, "The Society head presides over a l l general a f f a i r s of the society,

oversees correspondence with other s o c i e t i e s , punishes members who break

t
the rules of the society, and interprets the laws i n cases where members

bring disgrace to the society; he has t h i s authority u n t i l he r e t i r e s

47

from o f f i c e . " Since no rationale i s provided for permitting Kono to

wield such strong executive and j u d i c i a l authority, the reason can only

be conjectured. Possibly i t represents an instance of h i s t o r i c a l con-

t i n u i t y , taking as i t s precedent the tendency prevalent during Tokugawa

(and before) to elevate a single i n d i v i d u a l to an all-powerful position

of authority, e.g., the Shogun or the daimyo. Or possibly i t was the

fact that Kono Hironaka himself held the post; he was, after a l l , a

nationally recognized minken leader and a man of charismatic q u a l i t i e s

to whom people naturally looked f o r leadership. "His personal charm

brought into the movement a l l sorts of men irrespective of class or
48

age." In this sense he was l i k e Itagaki, a drawing card f o r the move-

ment and therefore of such importance that i t was d i f f i c u l t to conceive

of someone of s u f f i c i e n t renown able to replace him. Also, h i s views

were recognized by most as democratic and populist, and hence probably

produced l i t t l e apprehension among h i s following that he would abuse h i s

authority. For Kono himself, the rule c e r t a i n l y was not the r e s u l t of a

fear of not being elected, because the head of the Sekkyosha, which p o s i -
49

t i o n he held, was an e l e c t i v e post. But whatever the reason for the

decision not to elect the President, the more important point of the

society's e s s e n t i a l l y democratic nature should not be overlooked.

 271

Besides the objectives l a i d out i n the aforementioned statement

of p r i n c i p l e s , the Sanshisha, l i k e the Sekkyosha before i t , had as one

5C
of i t s main purposes "the p o l i t i c a l education of the youth" of the area.

The Sekkyosha, i n order to achieve t h i s goal, b u i l t the Sekkyokan, a

" h a l l " for i t s society where lectures, meetings, and discussions concern-

ing p o l i t i c s could take place. Although used by a l l of i t s some 200

members—most of whom were farmers and heimin of Ishikawa and Shirakawa

51

d i s t r i c t s , according to one p o l i c e report — i t was intended mainly as an

educational i n s t i t u t e , an "academy" for the youth of the region. The

Sanshisha, for the same reason, established the Seidokan ("Academy of

the Right Road"), probably around 1881. A handbill c i r c u l a t e d to adver-

t i s e i t s opening (scheduled for 9 January 1882) said i t s purpose was "the

study of scholarly materials dealing with p o l i t i c s , law, economics, and
52
history." On the same handbill appeared "a summary of i t s aims"—"to
further educate men of talent (jinzai) and to study scholarly materials
53

broadly related to our region."

The Seidokan was headed by Sakuma Shogen, Matsumoto Shigeru and

Asaka Saburo. ( A l l three were l a t e r t r i e d for "treason"; see Appendix

II.) I t was housed i n an o l d domain school building and provided dormi-

tory rooms and dinners for three yen a month to those students coming

from outside Miharu. For those residing i n the town, only s i x sen a

month was charged for fees. The Seidokan also brought i n lecturers, some,

such as Hirozaki Masao and Nishihara Keito, from as far away as the Ris-

shisha of Kochi prefecture. Although lectures were the primary mode of

education, debates were also organised. Another i n t e r e s t i n g feature was

 272

that instructors and students ate together, a somewhat "democratic" fea-

ture i n those times.

Although i t i s not known f o r certain what the topics of study

were, i t can be assumed that they resembled those emphasized at the Sek-

kyokan. There, students were divided into three "organs," each of which

specialized i n the study of certain subjects. "Organ One" studied "the

s p i r i t of the laws," science, theories of s o c i a l equality, and methods

of thinking. "Organ Two" dwelled on the history of England, the origins

of freedom, the basis of law, s o c i a l contract, notions of r i g h t , morality,

theories of p o l i t i c a l economy, and of representative government. "Organ

Three" studied the French Revolution, comparative p o l i t i c a l systems,

p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i t i c s , the economics of wealth, and the p o l i t i c a l h i s -

tory of the West. Each Saturday evening representatives of the various

organs would lecture and discuss the past week's research, and a l l were
54
obliged to attend.
Most students, i t appears, were seventeen or eighteen years old,
5!

and were the sons of "small gono," headmen, and ex-samurai of the region.

Many from the Seidokan were l a t e r active i n the Fukushima and Kabasan i n -

cidents. Kotoda Iwamatsu, Isokawa Motoyoshi, Yamaguchi Moritaro, Amano

Ichitaro, and Kono Hiroshi (nephew of Kono Hironaka), for example, were

a l l students at the Seidokan who l a t e r rebelled at Mount Kaba. (See

Kabasan sample, Appendix IV.) Kono, Yamaguchi, and Isokawa had also

studied at the Risshisha school before entering the Seidokan.

The authorities, naturally enough, counted such schools as sub-

versive. At least one attempt was made to close down the school, i n
 273

March 1882, and i t i s known that one of i t s leaders, Matsumoto Shigeru,

was imprisoned and fined for refusing to obey a court injunction to.close
57

down the school. In one government report about the Seidokan, i t was

said: "There are no rules i n the organization, no one who manages i t .

Consequently, the conduct of i t s students i s l i k e l y to become exceedingly

violent. Its members agitate ignorant people. . . . I t i s l i k e a poison

58

slowly flowing into the veins of society." On the lines of t h i s meta-

phor, Governor Mishima t r i e d to play the r o l e of "doctor" by n e u t r a l i z i n g

the e f f e c t that the minken "poison" had on the body p o l i t i c .

The p o l i t i c a l education of the region's youth, however, was a

p o l i c y with long-term consequences. In the short term the Sanshisha

sought to bring about a national assembly. I t therefore was continually

involved i n p e t i t i o n i n g the government. Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g ,

and most t e l l i n g point regarding i t s democratic nature, was a d r a f t of a

p e t i t i o n to e s t a b l i s h a national assembly written by Sakuma Shogen, mem-

ber of the Sanshisha and head of the Seidokan. Dated 1880, i t provides

a scheme for convoking a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention that would write a

p r o v i s i o n a l constitution, which would i n turn provide for a national

assembly. Sakuma's scheme worked i n t h i s way:

1) A l l males over twenty-two years who are family heads elect f i v e
representatives from t h e i r d i s t r i c t (gun).
2) A l l gun representatives e l e c t three representatives from the pre-
fecture.
3) The prefectures' representatives w i l l meet i n Tokyo and elect
forty members to s i t on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention. They would
study the laws of various countries and r e l y on the expertise of
public and private c i t i z e n s knowledgeable i n this area.
4) The members would then elect seven from among themselves to draw
up a p r o v i s i o n a l d r a f t of the constitution.
5) Upon completing i t , the (forty) members would discuss, debate,
 274

and decide on sending i t to the government.

6) The government would set up a national assembly based on the pro-
v i s i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n and would discuss and debate i t s merits
and decide on making i t the Constitution of Japan.^9

In some respects this scheme i s reminiscent of the American exper-

ience, 6 0
although perhaps i t i s even more democratic i n the sense that

the Japanese Constitution would be the product of a male franchise that

was free of any property q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . In any case, i t underscores the

e s s e n t i a l l y democratic nature of minken s o c i e t i e s of eastern Fukushima.

As a basis of comparison, we now turn to western Fukushima and examine the

Aishinsha of the Aizu region.

Aishinsha

Just as the Sanshisha and several other such s o c i e t i e s were the

forerunners of the Jiyuto branch of eastern Fukushima, the Aishinsha was

the p o l i t i c a l antecedent of the Aizu branch of the Jiyuto. Yet despite

t h i s commonality, there were d i s t i n c t differences between these two poli-

t i c a l societies. I f a contemporary p a r a l l e l can be made, then we could

compare the differences between the Aishinsha and the Sanshisha with the

differences between, say, the Democratic Party of Indiana and the Demo-

c r a t i c Party of New York. H i s t o r i c a l , geographical and s o c i o l o g i c a l

factors separated the two s o c i e t i e s , though members of each would claim

allegiance equally strong to the p r i n c i p l e s espoused by the greater

minken (and l a t e r , the Jiyuto) movement.

The Aizu region had consisted of d i f f e r e n t domains during Toku-

gawa, most of which were l o y a l to the Tokugawa rule, and hence opposed to

the new Restoration government. Even as late as 1869, Aizu l o y a l i s t s had

 275

continued f i g h t i n g against the Imperial forces being sent from Tokyo and

from Eastern Fukushima as w e l l , i n what historians have come to term

"The Boshin War." 61

A number of individuals appearing i n our sample,

for example, were victims of that war, either having themselves fought or

having l o s t fathers who did. 6 2

In either case, they l o s t much of t h e i r

property and fortunes, and several were reduced to penury. Takahashi

asserts i n this regard: "The d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n stemming from such exper-

iences was probably the reason they attached themselves to a new poli-

t i c a l movement." 63

Geographically, Aizu was situated far to the west, part of i t

bordering on Niigata and Yamagata prefectures. I t was also cut o f f from

Eastern Fukushima by high mountains, which made communication a slow and

d i f f i c u l t ordeal. Also, the centres of p o l i t i c a l activism, which en-

c i r c l e d Kitakata Town i n Yama d i s t r i c t , were mainly a g r i c u l t u r a l areas,

thus further distinguishing the region from the centres of activism i n

Eastern Fukushima where trade and commerce dominated.

S o c i o l o g i c a l l y , as the above point suggests, most of i t s inhabi-

tants were farmers who, as we have already seen, composed the body of

participants i n the Fukushima Incident. In the less commercialized

farming d i s t r i c t s , organisation for any purpose, including p o l i t i c a l ,

tended to centre around the already e x i s t i n g v i l l a g e structure. At the

apex of the v i l l a g e structure was the v i l l a g e head, who tended to be a

hereditary holder of t h i s o f f i c e , and c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , one of the larger

64

land holders i n the region. From t h i s superior p o l i t i c a l and economic

p o s i t i o n , he would t r a d i t i o n a l l y be i n charge of v i l l a g e a f f a i r s , p o l i t i c a l
 276

or otherwise. As the linchpin for community s o l i d a r i t y and s o c i a l har-

mony, he could either promote or hinder p o l i t i c a l organisation.

I t would be expected then that those c o n d i t i o n s — t h e p o l i t i c a l ,

geographical and economic—might make the ideology and organisation of

the Aishinsha d i f f e r e n t from that of the Sanshinsha. We could expect,

for example, the Aishinsha to employ e i t h e r a more t r a d i t i o n a l ideology

as a rationale for i t s a c t i v i t i e s , or perhaps a modified version of

natural r i g h t , or even a complicated combination of the two. Yet pre-

viously i n our discussion of natural r i g h t doctrine and i t s r e l a t i o n to

the minken movement we quoted at length the 7 December 1880, p e t i t i o n by

four Aizu region representatives that c a l l e d for a national assembly as

the best means to give vent to popular opinion, and thereby to avoid a
65

"Western type of revolution." Although t h i s document provides some

indication of the i d e o l o g i c a l basis of the Aishinsha, other supporting

evidence i s required. Unfortunately, as Shoji Kichinosuke informs us,

the same kind of d e t a i l e d information e a r l i e r provided for the Sanshisha

—a statement of p r i n c i p l e s with rules of o r g a n i s a t i o n — i s simple non-

existent today. S t i l l , the following document does provide good insight

into the nature of the p r i n c i p l e s governing the Aishinsha:

"A Statement of Aims" (10 November 1878)
Man i s separated from birds and animals by the protection he pro-
vides for himself through h i s miraculous i n t e l l i g e n c e to produce
a r t i c l e s f o r h i s s u r v i v a l . We can say that using h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
which secures for him the a b i l i t y to use his powers for s e l f -
protection, i s i n the end a self-duty, one of several. I f he does
not understand that he must protect h i s own l i b e r t y i n order to ex-
tend his r i g h t to r e a l i z e t h i s basic duty, then i n fact nothing sep-
arates him from the birds and animals.
Today, people are resigned to s e r v i l i t y , because s e r v i l i t y means
peace, and take a l l of t h i s from those under the Emperor [ i . e . , the
 277

government]; but the time has come when-we ought to consider our own
happiness, and demonstrate a s p i r i t of self-government (jichi). Like
the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers [China] that consist of the drops of
water from many roofs, the State consists of i n d i v i d u a l s .
If we a l l cooperate and work together, even though we bear the
i n s u l t s of foreign countries, we w i l l come together into one body as
do the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers.
There are both f o o l i s h and wise people, though even the f o o l i s h
may become wise, and through communication with one another, a l l
ought to see to t h e i r own best i n t e r e s t s . Accordingly, we promise
to t r y to spread wisdom i n t h i s country, and to get together and meet
with the people to share our views. Talking and lecturing about
where rights and duties reside, i n other words, teaching regard for
oneself as one would regard h i s country, i s our purpose, so we w i l l
c a l l our society the "Society for Mutual-Regard. 1,66

What appears most important about t h i s document i s that while i t

lacks a strong, e x p l i c i t statement against government abuses of power, i t

also i s a clear, and somewhat sophisticated, pronouncement of the rights

of men as a consequence of t h e i r duty to preserve themselves. In t h i s

sense, i t i s unlike the Lockean p r i n c i p l e s of natural r i g h t as outlined

by the Sanshisha, and closer to the Hobbesian concept of natural r i g h t .

At the same time, however, i t s attack on s e r v i l i t y — o r as Hobbes would

have had i t , obedience to the Leviathan as the best means to secure l i f e

and property—and the attendant c a l l for self-government, brings i t back

closer to Lockean natural r i g h t . This fact suggests what many recent

theorists have noted about Hobbes and Locke, i . e . , the philosophical debt
67

that Lockean natural r i g h t owed to Hobbes.

As well as t h i s intimation of the right and duty to secure s e l f -

government there exists additional evidence that helps to define more

p r e c i s e l y the i d e o l o g i c a l nature of the Aishinsha. I t i s known, for i n -

stance, that Uda S e i i c h i , l a t e r t r i e d for "treason," and Anse Keizo, v i l -

lage head of Kitakata where the society was founded, wrote the Aishinsha
 278

charter, which consisted of four sections and twenty-five a r t i c l e s , and

that the names of f i f t y - f o u r individuals appeared on the document as

founding members. I t i s known that the Aishinsha, founded one year a f t e r

the Sanshisha, bore some resemblance i n terms of p r i n c i p l e s and organisa-

t i o n to the l a t t e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y so since Anse was a native of Tamura

d i s t r i c t , Tsuneha v i l l a g e , where Kono Hironaka once served as vice-head,

and during which time they became good f r i e n d s . 6 8

Other than Anse and

Uda, the other p r i n c i p a l movers behind the Aishinsha, were Nakajima

Yuhachi, Yamaguchi Chiyosaku, Kojima Chuya, Akajiro Heiroku, Endo Naoyuki,

and Igarashi Takehiko, a l l of whom, i n c i d e n t a l l y , were l a t e r prosecuted

for "treason." (See Appendix II.)

It i s further known that these same individuals, and others such

as Hara Heizo and Watanabe Shuya, were l a t e r the leaders of both the Aizu
69

Rengokai and the Aizu Jiyuto. With this knowledge, and since the

Aishinsha "Charter" i s l o s t , i t has become customary to i n f e r the ideology

and organisation of the Aishinsha from that of subsequent organisations,

especially i t s Jiyuto branch.

There exists j u s t i f i c a t i o n for doing t h i s , over and above the

fact that pertinent Aishinsha documents are missing. F i r s t , only four

years separate the founding of the Aishinsha and the Aizu Jiyuto branch

(February 1882) . Secondly, during t h i s time i t appears that no dramatic

change i n the leadership composition of the l o c a l popular rights movement

occurred. Anse became the f i r s t head of the Aizu Jiyuto, and the other

party o f f i c i a l s were Miura Mojiro (V.P.), Uda S e i i c h i , Nakajima Yuhachi,

and Miura Nobuyuki. A l l but the two Miura's were signatories to the
 279

"Statement of Aims" quoted previously. Also, a p o l i c e report concerning

the Aishinsha, dated 3 July 1880, says that i t was composed mainly of

"prefectural assembly men, wealthy farmers, and v i l l a g e heads coming

70

from the various v i l l a g e s . " Checking t h i s against the Aizu Jiyuto

membership we see that p r e f e c t u r a l assemblymen Endo Naoyuki, Uda S e i i c h i ,

Kojima Shuya, Nakajima Yuhachi, Watanabe Ichiro, and Yamaguchi Yoshisaku

71

were a l l members of the Aizu Jiyuto. The same i n d i v i d u a l s , plus Hara,

Miura Nobuyuki, Miura Bunji, Igarashi Takehiko and Akajiro Heiroku

(among others) were gono; and f i n a l l y , as we saw i n the l a s t chapter,

most of the above-mentioned individuals were " v i l l a g e heads," provoking

one s p e c i a l i s t on t h i s incident to characterize the Aizu Jiyuto as the

72

"party of v i l l a g e heads."

A t h i r d and f i n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for i n f e r r i n g the i d e o l o g i c a l

character of the Aishinsha from the Jiyuto branch subsequently formed i n

Aizu has to do with what appears to have been the existence of i d e o l o g i c a l

continuity, and also with i t s close i d e o l o g i c a l connections with the San-

shisha and other natural r i g h t organisations of Eastern Fukushima. In

March 1881, fourteen i n d i v i d u a l s from d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s from

a l l over Fukushima, including Endo and Hara from Yama d i s t r i c t i n Aizu,

signed "A Draft of the P r i n c i p l e s of the 'Society of Resolve' of the

Tokoku Region" (Tokoku Yushikai no shishu soan). I t represented a r e -

affirmation of the p r i n c i p l e s enunciated i n July 1879, when the Kyoaido-

bokai ("Society Aiming at Mutual Respect") was founded as a secret

a l l i a n c e of a l l the p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s i n Fukushima and as a means to

73

strengthen t h e i r region's t i e s to the national Aikokusha. This docu-

ment began:
 280

Man i s a creature deriving freedom from heaven. He therefore has

the rights of freedom. On t h i s depends his happiness. . . . When he
loses his rights he cannot secure the safety of his l i f e or his
property; he cannot have nor,enjoy prosperity; i t does not take a
scholar or a genius to know t h i s . . . . To protect our [natural]
rights we need [legal] r i g h t s i n our country and i n our s o c i e t y . 7 4

This might appear to confirm only Hara and Endo's personal b e l i e f i n

natural r i g h t were i t not for the fact that they were acting as repre-

sentatives of the entire membership of the Aishinsha. Underscoring t h i s

contention that the predominant ideology of the Aishinsha was natural

r i g h t i s the knowledge that at the lecture meetings of the Aishinsha,

Hara and Endo, along with Miura Shinroku and Uryu Naoshi, were the most

frequent speakers, teaching "a simple straight-forward, pure natural

75

right doctrine."

Hence we can conclude that despite the peculiar h i s t o r i c a l , geo-

graphical and s o c i o l o g i c a l factors of the Aizu region that would tend to

have made i t s p o l i t i c a l society, the Aishinsha, impervious to the natural

right notions characterizing the eastern Fukushima s o c i e t i e s , i t was

nonetheless r e l i a n t on some version of natural r i g h t , though as we saw,

i t was less anti-government and more Hobbesian than that of the Eastern

Fukushima s o c i e t i e s .

Where these h i s t o r i c a l , geographical, and s o c i o l o g i c a l facts

had some influence on the character of the Aishinsha, and l a t e r on the

region's Jiyuto branch, was i n the p a r t i c u l a r way i t organised itself.

Put very simply, "as opposed to the [Eastern] Fukushima branch which

assembled representative p e r s o n a l i t i e s of various d i s t r i c t s , aiming i t s

recruitment primarily at meiboka ("men of renown"), the Aizu branch

organized i t s e l f around v i l l a g e s which served as the basic organizational

 281

unit." By using t h i s more t r a d i t i o n a l means of organisation, Takahashi

77

adds, "The Aizu branch was stronger as a r e s u l t . "

Several years before "The Period of Activism," therefore, Fuku-

shima prefecture boasted of a number of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s that shared

the b e l i e f that natural r i g h t doctrine was the best ideology to govern

their a c t i v i t i e s . Now to continue the discussion begun i n the l a s t sec-

t i o n of Chapter I I , we w i l l study how natural right doctrine was mani-

fested i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the l o c a l L i b e r a l Party branches a f t e r the

founding of i t s national headquarters i n October 1881.

PERIOD OF ACTIVISM, 1881-1884

The Jiyuto i n Fukushima

The Aizu Jiyuto branch was established i n February 1882, four

months a f t e r the establishment of the national party and two months a f t e r

the Fukushima branch was formed i n Fukushima Town. Hence, Fukushima pre-

fecture had two Jiyuto branches. This came about i n spite of e a r l i e r

attempts by members of each area's p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s to form a u n i f i e d

party. The Kyoaidobokai, as we saw, was one such attempt. Symptomatic

of i t s f a i l u r e , as far as Aizu popular rights groups were concerned, was

i t s building of the headquarters i n distant Sendai, situated on the

P a c i f i c coast, as far away as i t possibly could be from Aizu and yet s t i l l

78

be situated i n Tohoku. The Tohoku Yushikai, whose p r i n c i p l e s to which

Hara and Endo were signatories, was referred to above as another such

attempt; i t experienced b r i e f success for about one year, u n t i l the Aizu

popular rights leaders broke from the group and formed t h e i r own Jiyuto

branch.
 282

Although the various s o c i e t i e s that composed the Tohoku Yushikai

(Sanshisha, Aishinsha, Sekkyosha, Boshinsha, etc.) shared common p r i n -

c i p l e s as the basis of organisation, i n practice they could at best

only unite into a loose confederation. The shukuen or the "old grudge"

that had existed since the "Boshin War" when Aizu residents fought against

Miharu Imperial troops, as one source puts i t , s t i l l served as an obstacle

79

preventing organisational unity. Also, the strong sense of regionalism

characterizing Aizu, i n part due to i t s geography and i n part to i t s d i f -

ferent patterns of landholding and a g r i c u l t u r a l production, had been

manifested as recently as 1878, when, during the government's reorganisa-

t i o n of the prefectures, the people there had sought to have the govern-
80
ment create a separate Aizu prefecture.

The strong sense of regionalism could also be seen i n the e x p l i c i t

emphasis of the Aishinsha on "self-government" (in the e a r l i e r quoted

"Statement of Aims"), and the i m p l i c i t emphasis on natural r i g h t while

f a i l i n g to mention i t s broader implications such as representative and

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government. That task had been l e f t to a few i n d i v i d u a l s ,

such as Hara and Endo, but mainly to popular rights advocates of eastern

Fukushima. For t h i s reason Takahashi could say about the Aishinsha, and

hence about the Aizu Jiyuto, that "Its p o l i t i c a l colouring was d u l l e r

81

than the other two s o c i e t i e s [ i . e . , the Sanshisha and Sekkyosha]."

Of course, when the road project commenced under Governor Mishima's

orders, the sense of regionalism and hence the Aizu Jiyuto's desire f o r

l o c a l self-government and, conversely, i t s d i s l i k e of central government

intrusion into l o c a l a f f a i r s , was heightened. As pointed out i n Chapter I,

 283

i t was a tension and c o n f l i c t that has attended the p o l i t i c s of moderni-

zation i n a l l places, i . e . , the c o n f l i c t between centralism and region-

82

alism. I t was perhaps no accident, therefore, that the Aizu Jiyuto

was formed i n the same month Mishima was appointed to Fukushima. Cer-

t a i n l y , i t was no accident that the Aizu Rengokai, "based on the aims and

p r i n c i p l e s of the [local] Jiyuto that p r i n c i p a l l y sought to crush the

83

road-building project" (as the Yama d i s t r i c t head characterized i t ) ,

rose to defend the Aizu Jiyuto's notions of self-government.

"The Provisional rules governing the Aizu branch of the Jiyuto"

(Jiyuto Aizubu kari no moa kisoku) was not prefaced by a statement of

p r i n c i p l e s — i t probably was not necessary since by i t s name alone i t i e n -

dorsed the p r i n c i p l e s of the national p a r t y — b u t from the a r t i c l e s them-

selves we can derive some notion of what ideas guided the Aizu branch.
A r t i c l e I: We w i l l e s t a b l i s h a regional branch of the Jiyuto at
Kitakata, Iwashiro shu, and c a l l i t the "Jiyuto Aizu Branch." The
party members of t h i s branch w i l l determine the nature of the organi-
zation i n accordance with the conditions of t h i s region.
A r t i c l e II: There w i l l be one d i r e c t o r (buri) and three o f f i c i a l s
for party a f f a i r s . A l l w i l l serve a one-year term and w i l l be elec-
ted by those i n attendance at the regular party meeting.
A r t i c l e III: The Director w i l l oversee (sotoku) and supervise party
a f f a i r s i n the name of a l l branch members and s h a l l supervise a l l
decisions made at ordinary and extraordinary party meetings.

A r t i c l e IV: Party A f f a i r s o f f i c i a l s s h a l l handle regular party mat-

ters of the branch under the supervision of the President.

A r t i c l e V: O f f i c i a l s w i l l receive a wage to be determined by the

president.

A r t i c l e VI: The expenses of the branch w i l l be borne by the party

membership.

A r t i c l e VII: A l l sub-branches w i l l have one executive and, for con-

venience sake, a l l other functionaries s h a l l be appointed by him.
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A r t i c l e VIII: A l l those j o i n i n g or leaving the party ought to be i n -

vestigated by the leadership of the sub-branches.

A r t i c l e IX: In the various sub-branches, a l i s t of the membership

w i l l be made at the end of every month and sent to headquarters at
Kitakata.

A r t i c l e X: At the same time d e t a i l e d reports about the s i t u a t i o n and

conditions of the region should be reported.

Article XI: In March and September of each year there w i l l be a

general meeting to which each sub-branch w i l l send f i v e delegates.
The location of these meetings w i l l be decided by a resolution at the
immediately previous meeting.

A r t i c l e XII: At the ordinary meetings the president w i l l make a r e -

port on the budget, the finances, and the conditions of the p a r t y . ^ 8

The important ideas to be gleaned from t h i s document are: (1) i t s

r e a l i s t i c emphasis on a party that accurately r e f l e c t s conditions of i t s

immediate area, which, put into h i s t o r i c a l context, probably meant that

some issues and p r i n c i p l e s espoused by the national party were considered

more pertinent than others to the Aizu branch; (2) a strong executive,

but one nonetheless checked by democratic elections by the party member-

85

ship (estimated at about 300); and (3) reasonably firm control by the

centre over i t s sub-branches, and within the sub-branches themselves,

control over t h e i r own a f f a i r s by one figure who was appointed by central

headquarters.

The manner i n which the Aizu Jiyuto branch organised i t s sub-

branches c l e a r l y t e l l s of i t s wish to r e f l e c t p r e v a i l i n g regional condi-

tions. From evidence taken from l a t e r court testimony by party members

and from the personal papers of Aizu Jiyuto member Miura Shinroku, we can
86

c l e a r l y discern the nature of i t s l o c a l organisation. The basic unit

of l o c a l organisation was the " c e l l , " as i t was termed by the incident's

 285

participants during court interrogation; or the "organ" (kumi), as i t

was termed by Miura i n his diary. Each " c e l l " consisted of anywhere from

two to seven v i l l a g e s and had one "person responsible" (sekininsha) at

i t s head. These " c e l l " leaders were appointed by the Aizu Jiyuto head-

quarters, presumably by i t s four o f f i c i a l s . Each " c e l l " took i t s name

from the p r i n c i p a l v i l l a g e included i n i t , and i t s leader usually came

from t h i s v i l l a g e .

Records leave us with examples of eleven " c e l l s , " consisting of

thirty-nine v i l l a g e s i n a l l . Here we provide only three examples. (1)

The Komeoka " c e l l " was comprised of Komeoka i t s e l f , Kanno, and Miyakawa

villages. I t was headed by Miura Bunji, who was l a t e r t r i e d for "treason"

for his part i n the Fukushima Incident, released, and then subsequently

convicted for his r o l e i n the Kabasan Incident. (2) The Atsushio "cell,"

led by Endo Yuhachi, i d e n t i f i e d as one of the p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i s t s during

87

the incident, consisted of Atsushio, Sota, Torimiyama and Santa v i l -

lages. (3) The Yamato " c e l l , " located ten kilometres west of Kitakata,

included the v i l l a g e i t s e l f , Kofuneji and Honhata, and the "person respon-

s i b l e " was Saito Yamokichi, one of many individuals whose claim to fame

stopped there, as far as h i s t o r i c a l records are concerned.

It i s also important to note as a basis of temporal comparison

how these same v i l l a g e s , before they became units or " c e l l s , " responded

several years e a r l i e r to the Yama d i s t r i c t p e t i t i o n to open a National

Assembly (quoted e a r l i e r ) . Of the 271 signatories from Yama d i s t r i c t ,

the Komeoka " c e l l " accounted for 152, the Atsushio " c e l l " for only nine

(Santa v i l l a g e was not l i s t e d as having any p e t i t i o n e r s ) , and the Yamato

 286

" c e l l , " ninety-six signatures; together these three c e l l s contributed

94 per cent of the signatures appearing on the p e t i t i o n . Hence consider-

able continuity existed from the second stage of popular rights develop-

ment into the t h i r d stage.

The leadership of the " c e l l s , " and of the Aizu Jiyuto i n general,

was a remarkably homogeneous group i n terms of s o c i a l , economic, and

p o l i t i c a l status. Most were, as we have seen, v i l l a g e heads, and most

came from v i l l a g e s situated i n the northern h a l f of the Aizu b a s i n —

Atsushio, Komeoka, Kanno, Shinai, etc. But superimposed on these common-

a l i t i e s , Takahashi t e l l s us, were the " t i e s of blood and of marriage."

Takahashi counts between t h i r t y and forty v i l l a g e heads as minken leaders

88

related by such t i e s . Three brothers of Nakajima Yuhachi, for instance,

were v i l l a g e heads of d i f f e r e n t Aizu v i l l a g e s and were l a t e r imprisoned

after the incident. The headman of Kanno, Endo Naoki, and Toyama T e i j i ,

headman of Iwatsuki v i l l a g e , were both brothers-in-law to Nakajima. In

a l l , more than ten members of t h i s family were l a t e r arrested. Another

instance i s that of Miura Bunji and Makabe Kijo who were members of

"branch f a m i l i e s " (bunke) of Jiyuto a c t i v i s t Miura Shinroku's "main

family" (honke). The l i s t goes on and on. Takahashi claims not only

that "blood relations and marriage were at the core i n the formation of

the Aizu Jiyuto leadership," but also that when government repression be-
89
came severe these relationships held the movement together.

When repression became more intense during the months leading up

to the Kitakata incident, the " c e l l s " were employed i n the tax boycott

and mass l i t i g a t i o n movements. I t appears that i n some v i l l a g e s , for

 287

example Shinai v i l l a g e (part of the Kumagaya " c e l l " ) , where Akajiro was

a "hereditary" v i l l a g e head and, during v i l l a g e meetings, sat i n the t r a -

d i t i o n a l seat of honour, the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these movements was large

and very e f f e c t i v e , no one having broken the boycott under government

90

pressure. Komeoka i s another such example: i n that v i l l a g e headman

Miura Bunji and gono Watanabe Shuya used the t r a d i t i o n a l moral force of

t h e i r s o c i a l positions to keep the members of t h e i r v i l l a g e s together

during the tax boycott.

This point was suggested i n the l a s t chapter, that i s , the close

c o r r e l a t i o n between the v i l l a g e from which a leader came and the number

of v i l l a g e r s mobilized from the same v i l l a g e . However, the reason for

high rates of mobilization and v i l l a g e s o l i d a r i t y was not necessarily due

only to bonds of t r a d i t i o n a l relationships between a v i l l a g e authority

figure and i t s inhabitants, as suggested i n the above two cases. I t may

also have been due to p o l i t i c a l reasons, i . e . , p o l i t i c a l indoctrination

of the v i l l a g e inhabitants by a p o l i t i c a l leader who, coincidentally,

was also a headman. This seems to have been true of the influence of

Akajiro and Miura Bunji, i n the two cases just c i t e d . In short, i t

seems that both t r a d i t i o n a l relationships and those defined by new

p o l i t i c a l ideas served to bring v i l l a g e r s into the movement. Yet, a l -

though both were operative, the leaders of the movement were not appealing

to t r a d i t i o n i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to mobilize supporters, but instead were

proclaiming the rights of man.

In addition to the " c e l l s , " the Aizu Jiyuto also organised itself

through, and lent i t s own organisation to, the Aizu Rengokai, which
 288

consisted of eighty-six towns and 493 v i l l a g e s located within the s i x

91

d i s t r i c t s comprising the Aizu region. The executives of t h i s organi-

sation were Nakajima Yuhachi ("head"), Uda S e i i c h i , Hara Heizo, Miura

Mojiro, Kojima Shuya, S a j i Yomatsu, and Watanabe Ichiro, a l l of whom

were i d e n t i f i e d i n the l a s t chapter as among those who were arrested

for t h e i r part i n the Fukushima Incident. Government reports at that

time singled out Hara, Uda, and Maeda Kosaku as the p r i n c i p a l "trouble-

makers." One report claimed, "These three Jiyuto members are repre-

sentative of the malcontents; they c a l l extraordinary meetings of the

92

Aizu Rengokai and make motions against the road-building." Once the

Rengokai was suspended by Governor Mishima (see Chapter I ) , these same

Jiyuto members plus several others—Yamaguchi, Akajiro, Igarashi, e t c . —

commenced organising the tax boycott, mass l i t i g a t i o n , and p e t i t i o n move-

ments to reconvene the Rengokai, taking a l l of these issues to the people

of the region i n the form of lecture meetings. At least fifty-two

lecture meetings were held i n A p r i l 1882, involving over 200 lecturers

who t r a v e l l e d throughout the t e r r i t o r y to speak about the various move-

ments under f o o t . 9 3

It was also during t h i s time that party a c t i v i t y , perhaps due to

94

these lectures, spread to Aizu d i s t r i c t s outside of Yama.

Lecture meetings, rather than "academies" as i n the case of the

Eastern Fukushima Jiyuto, served as the primary means to p r o s e l y t i z e and

r e c r u i t members to these various movements i n Aizu. The topics of the

lectures were as varied as the speakers. On one occasion Hara, Uryu,

Miura Shinroku, Endo Yuhachi and Miura Mojiro were the p r i n c i p a l

 289

95
speakers. Hara lectured about "The B a t t l e f i e l d of Reason" (Dori no

senjo), wherein he explained that " i n a young society, only i f reason i s

employed on the [ p o l i t i c a l ] b a t t l e f i e l d can the ways of brute force be

completely overcome," and moved on to discuss how that thought related

96

to the current p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . Uryu lectured on the natural

rights of man and how t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n i n p o s i t i v e law would bring

society the rewards of heaven. Miura Shinroku gave a lecture e n t i t l e d

"The Incompatabilities of Society" (Shakai no futekigo), which anticipated

by four years the r a d i c a l l i b e r a l Oi Kentaro's famous Jiji yoron (1886;

"A Treatise on the Needs of These Times") wherein Oi c a l l e d for a law to

97

equalize landholdings. In Miura's words, the lecture t r i e d "to explain

how i n an enlightened society the i n e q u a l i t i e s of i n t e l l i g e n c e and wealth

can be overcome" and argued that "now i s the time to apply one's energies
98

to the task of equalization (yonarashi) of wealth and education." In

another lecture, "Chitose no ichigu" ("One Chance i n a Thousand Years"),

he said that the Imperial W i l l c a l l i n g for a national assembly and "giv-

ing people p o l i t i c a l rights to p a r t i c i p a t e i n government" would only have

"one chance i n a thousand" of being r e a l i z e d i f i t were postponed u n t i l

1890. For his part, Endo e x p l i c i t l y urged members of his audience "to
99

j o i n our p o l i t i c a l party i n order to safeguard i t s p r i n c i p l e s . " A l l of

these addresses, i n c i d e n t a l l y , were given on 2 May 1882, at Kitakata, and

i n "forced" attendance, taking notes, was a Kitakata policeman appointed

by the l o c a l constabulary.

These speeches and ones l i k e them were given throughout the Aizu

region beginning i n A p r i l 1882, and continued u n t i l the Kitakata incident

 290

in November. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say exactly how many heard them. It i s

known, however, that at one lecture broken up by the p o l i c e at Wakamatsu,

100

300 people were i n attendance. At another on 12 May 1882, at Waka-

matsu, with Hara and Miura Shinroku speaking, over 200 attended. Aver-

age attendance was less i n smaller v i l l a g e s ; f o r example, at Aoki v i l l a g e

on 26 May, broken up by the p o l i c e , eighty v i l l a g e r s attended. Takahashi

reports that the usual figure for a v i l l a g e lecture was "several tens,"

but also notes that there was at l e a s t one instance of 1,200 people f i l - '
101

l i n g the lecture h a l l at an Aizu Jiyuto meeting. Whatever the figure,

i t i s c e r t a i n that the Aizu Jiyuto reached a good number of ears through

i t s lecture meetings.

For t h i s reason, and f o r the other reasons that have been men-

t i o n e d — " c e l l s " r e l y i n g on v i l l a g e leaders who were also Jiyuto members,

strong family t i e s among the leadership, and the use of the Aizu Rengokai

—Takahashi was correct i n s t a t i n g that i t s organisation was stronger

than that of eastern Fukushima. The Eastern Fukushima Jiyuto was d i f f u s e

and u n i v e r s a l i s t i c , looking more to the Tokyo central headquarters and

to the Kochi branch f o r i d e o l o g i c a l and organisational leadership, than

to i t s e l f . In a very r e a l sense i t s location, i . e . , the fact that i t was

the Fukushima Jiyuto, was i n c i d e n t a l . I t was Jiyuto, f i r s t and foremost,

and the Fukushima Jiyuto only secondarily. The writers of the history of

the L i b e r a l Party recognized this. In r e f e r r i n g to the Sanshisha of

Miharu (along with the Kyugasha of Iwate), they said, "Suddenly they
102
have become the leading advocates of l i b e r a l i s m (jiyushugi)."
In great part this universalism was undoubtedly due to Kono
 291

Hironaka's leadership. Not only, as we have seen, was he the founder of

l o c a l p o l i t i c a l societies i n Fukushima, but he was also one of the early

a c t i v i s t s i n the national popular rights movement and a founding member

of the national Jiyuto i n October 1881. His goals for the nation were

i d e n t i c a l to his goals for Fukushima. These goals were best defined on

1 October 1881, i n a platform p o l i c y of the Jiyuto signed by himself and

ninety-eight others.

Our party seeks to expand freedom, defend r i g h t s , increase welfare

and happiness, and map out s o c i a l reform. . . . Our party seeks to
establish a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government i n order to f u l f i l l the above
goals.103

Like most of the others who were national leaders of the Party,

Kono too was i n favour of legal and non-violent means to accomplish the

above goals. Only once i n his long and successful career as a p o l i t i c i a n

of national importance did he advocate violence (as we s h a l l see). For

the most part he s t r i c t l y abided by the law. In fact, i t was r e a l l y only

"accidental" that he became embroiled i n the Fukushima Incident. Even

after Governor Mishima had overturned the anti-road b i l l passed by the

prefectural assembly, of which he was chairman, Kono said, "This problem

of road construction should d e f i n i t e l y not be the main business of our

104

party." That he t r i e d to ensure that t h i s was the case i s shown by

the agenda of items discussed i n the t h i r d regular meeting held at Fuku-

shima Town on 20 May 1882, and attended by Kono and twenty others. The

four issues discussed were:

1) The submission of a written report to the Emperor asking for a
shortening of the waiting period for convening the national
assembly.
2) The warning to Governor Mishima about his arbitrary actions.
 292

3) The recruitment of new party members and the establishment of

party branches i n other d i s t r i c t s .
4) The decision whether to send party members to speak at various
d i s t r i c t s within the prefecture.1^5

Notice that nothing here was mentioned about aiding the Aizu Jiyuto; i n

fact i t was not u n t i l October that the struggle i n Aizu became the most
106

important item on the Fukushima Jiyuto agenda. But most importantly,

throughout the e n t i r e episode, i t appears that Kono (and other easterners)

was unable to extrapolate the important and more general question of

self-government from the single issue of the Aizu road construction

scheme.

It was only after repeated suppression of party a c t i v i s t s by the

Governor, and the continued introduction of the Aizu a f f a i r as an impor-

tant topic into party meetings by others (such as Aizawa, Hanaka, Hira-

jima, etc.) that Kono and several others committed the crime of sedition

for which they were l a t e r prosecuted. The evidence for the crime of

sedition ("treason") was a "written vow" (seiyaku) i n the form of a

"blood pledge" (ketsumei) that was l i t e r a l l y sealed i n blood by s i x

young Jiyuto members—Kono Hironaka (thirty-three), Tamano Hidaeki

( t h i r t y - f o u r ) , Aizawa Yasukata (thirty-three), Hirajima Matsuo (twenty-

eight) , Hanaka Kyojiro (twenty-six), and Sawada Kiyonosuke (twenty); i t

was dated 1 August 1882. Since t h i s document bears considerable resem-

blance to manifestos subsequently drawn up by the Kabasan and Chichibu

rebels, we quote i t i n f u l l here.

(1) Our party w i l l overthrow the oppressive government which i s the
public enemy of freedom and w i l l endeavour to construct a p o l i t i c a l
system that r e f l e c t s the views of the p u b l i c .
(2) In order to achieve t h i s goal of our party, we renounce personal
 293

l i f e and property, we free ourselves from the t i e s of mutual kindness

and a f f e c t i o n , and w i l l concern ourselves completely with the s i t u a -
t i o n confronting us.

(3) Our party honours and defends the constitution, as we resolved

in our party conferences, and we endeavour to act as one mind and
body i n t h i s matter.

(4) In the event that r e a l i t i e s crush the intentions of our party

and we encounter a l l manners of disaster, even i f time lapses over
years and months, our party w i l l never disband.

(5) I f a member transgresses h i s written vows and betrays the

secrecy of our party and i t s members, then he should immediately k i l l
himself.

These f i v e a r t i c l e s of our vow should be carried out d e c i s i v e l y , l e s t

our party die.107
108
The vow was written by Hanaka and edited by Sawada, and was found by
the p o l i c e on 1 December 1882, during an extensive search of the Mumeikan
, ,• 109

("The H a l l of No Names"), the Jiyuto headquarters i n Fukushima Town.

The blood pact i s interesting for i t s curious combination of

natural r i g h t doctrine, as seen i n i t s f i r s t a r t i c l e , with the s e l f -

s a c r i f i c i n g , "honour-above-everything" mentality that so strongly charac-

terized the samurai of the Tokugawa period. I t i s no mere accident, then

that a l l s i x oath-takers were born into the shizoku class (though Kono

and Tamano were declasse).

The Mumeikan, where the oath was found, was the central head-

quarters of the Eastern Jiyuto branch. To a great extent, i t took over

the duties of the Seidokan and the Sekkyosha (and of other p o l i t i c a l

societies) once the Eastern Jiyuto branch was founded. I t was o r i g i n a l l y

situated at the home of Okano Chizo i n Fukushima Town; there i n late

December 1881, twenty men from throughout a l l of Fukushima met to estab-

l i s h a Jiyuto branch " "

1 1 0
(eight of them were l a t e r t r i e d f o r treason) .
 294

P r i o r to i t s f i r s t general meeting i n March, i t set up a schedule for

regular party meetings, appointed representatives from each d i s t r i c t to

serve as l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , made preparations to e s t a b l i s h the Fukushima

J i y u Shimbun, and appointed editors for the paper; i t established en-

trance and fee requirements, meeting times, and election procedures; i t

set up dormitories for v i s i t i n g lecturers and popular rights advocates;

and i t established r e l a t i o n s with the Tokyo headquarters and professed

allegiance to the National Party.'''''' 1

In short, i t was thoroughly organ-

ised as a Jiyuto branch to serve a l l d i s t r i c t s within Fukushima prefec-

ture. However, since i t made no mention of organising v i l l a g e membership,

i t s organisational and i d e o l o g i c a l character more closely p a r a l l e l e d that

of the National Party than i t did the Aizu branch.

This i s not to say, however, that i t was i n e f f e c t i v e i n spreading

popular rights ideas. Although l i k e the Seidokan and Sekkyosha i n that

i t directed recruitment toward i n d i v i d u a l meiboka whom these organisations

sought to mold into minken shishi ("warriors for peoples' r i g h t s " ) , the

Mumeikan was also i n d i r e c t l y responsible for the growth of the popular

rights movement among those l i v i n g i n the countryside. I t had a " r i p -

p l i n g e f f e c t " when an i n d i v i d u a l trained by these organisations would

return to h i s v i l l a g e and organise a " p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e . " Takahashi

claims that many p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s sprang up throughout eastern Fukushima

112

during the late seventies and early eighties; here we w i l l look at

one named the Doshinkai ("Society for Mutual Advancement") that began

operation i n December 1881, at the v i l l a g e of Utsu, located about twenty

kilometres north of Miharu (Tamura d i s t r i c t ) .

 295

During the interrogation of Kamada Yuzan (eighteen), the name of

his friend and fellow v i l l a g e r , Okawa Masaeizo (twenty-five) (both were

t r i e d for treason and are therefore l i s t e d i n our sample) came up and

the following exchange took place between Kamada and the prosecutor:

Q. From whom did you receive the rules o f the Miharu Jiyuto organi-
sation [the Seidokan]?
A. They were d i s t r i b u t e d by Okawa of the Doshinkai of "Upper" Utsu
v i l l a g e , Tamura d i s t r i c t .
Q. When was this Doshinkai established?
A. Around December, 1881.
Q. How many members does i t have and who were i t s central figures?
A. There are fourteen or f i f t e e n members and Okawa i s i t s leader.
Q. Who i s t h i s Okawa?
113

A. He was a primary school teacher, but now he s e l l s wine b o t t l e s .

The questioning then changed topics to find out Kamada's r e l a t i o n s h i p with

Kono and the Mumeikan:

Q. Around what month did you become acquainted with Kono Hironaka?
A. On July 24, 1882, I f i r s t met him at the Mumeikan.
Q. When you came to the Mumeikan, whom did you speak about?
A. About Matsumoto M i y a j i .
Q. Who i s t h i s Matsumoto Miyaji?
A. A primary school teacher i n Miharu town who at the time was work-
ing for the Jiyuto Party newspaper.
Q. For what purpose did you come to the Mumeikan, the "hangout of
the Jiyuto?"
A. In order to k i l l time with some friends . . . and to speak with
Miyaji and Kono about working for the newspaper . . .

Eventually the questioning moved on to Kamada's journey to Aizu

on 13 October 1882, i n order to meet Uda S e i i c h i about a f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i -

bution to the party newspaper. He then recounts h i s reasons for deciding

to stay and help i n the f i g h t there, mainly out of sympathy for friend

Akajiro Heiroku who was losing his property to public auction for h i s re-

f u s a l to pay taxes.

He was also asked:

Q. For what reason did you j o i n the Jiyuto?
A. To promote i t s p r i n c i p l e s of expanding the rights of l i b e r t y .
 296

Kamada, then, a Jiyuto member with close connection to the Doshinkai, a

" p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e , " t y p i f i e s the " r i p p l i n g e f f e c t " that the Seidokan (via

Okawa) had upon young heimin farmers of the r u r a l areas. From contact

with Okawa, he became involved i n Mumeikan a f f a i r s , which i n turn led him

to the Aizu road struggle, then to befriend Akajiro, and to be t r i e d

eventually as a " t r a i t o r " for a p o l i t i c a l crime.

Nor i s this an i s o l a t e d example.

Sugamura T a i j i , also t r i e d for treason, and s i x other members of

a p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e , the Taishokan ("Great Righteousness Society") of a

small v i l l a g e midway between Miharu and Utsu, were known to have marched

into Aizu to a s s i s t the struggle i n late October, announcing themselves

as Tamura soshi ( " p o l i t i c a l stalwarts of Tamura"). " " 1 1 6

Their actions be-

speak of the influence that the various "academies" of the Jiyuto had

upon i n d i v i d u a l s , of the way the Mumeikan could transform abstract ideas

into concrete action.

But the Mumeikan's existence, l i k e that of the Aizu Jiyuto, was

short-lived. Once the Kitakata Incident occurred i n late November 1882,

and the wholesale arrests began, both Jiyuto branches and the various

"academies" e f f e c t i v e l y folded. Although a few party stalwarts continued

to f i g h t for the p r i n c i p l e s of the Jiyuto, by l i t i g a t i o n and l o c a l organ-

i s i n g , most members merely faded away. Not u n t i l the f i r s t Diet e l e c t i o n

i n 1890 did any re-emerge, and then, as we s h a l l see i n the l a s t chapter,

some exchanged the clothes of the popular rights a c t i v i s t for the new

s u i t of the n a t i o n a l i s t .
 297

The Jiyuto and the Kabasan Rebels

Of a l l the p r i n c i p a l characters involved i n the three incidents

under study, the Kabasan rebels d i s t i n g u i s h themselves by placing ideology

above organisation. They were men of action who believed that acting

according to the dictates of t h e i r i d e a l s — q u i c k l y and without reserva-

tion—was more important than building an e f f i c i e n t organisation that

might implement t h e i r i d e a l s . They, more than any of the other rebels

of the gekka jiken, were true revolutionaries, b l i n d l y determined to over-

throw the r u l i n g authority of the M e i j i State. In many ways t h e i r

actions, i f not t h e i r ideas as well, resemble those of nineteenth-century

European and Russian populists whose "conceptions of 'obligations' towards

117

the people, and s a c r i f i c i n g oneself for the people'" prompted them

to attempt s u i c i d a l attacks against the Russian State. The Kabasan rebels

seemed to have believed with Herzen, "the true founder of Populism,"

The people suffer much, t h e i r l i f e i s burdensome, they harbour deep
hatreds, and f e e l passionately that there w i l l soon be a change. . . .
They are waiting not for ready-made works but for the revelation of
what i s secretly s t i r r i n g i n t h e i r s p i r i t s . They are not waiting for
books but for apostles—men who combine f a i t h , w i l l , conviction and
energy; men who w i l l never divorce themselves from them; men who do
not necessarily spring from them, but who act within them and with
them, with a dedicated and steady f a i t h . The man who feels' himself
to be so near the people that he has been v i r t u a l l y freed by them
from the atmosphere of a r t i f i c i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n ; the man who has
achieved the unity and i n t e n s i t y of which we are speaking—he w i l l be
able to speak to the people and must do so.-'--'- 8

And l i k e Herzen, Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Nechaev and other Western Popu-

l i s t s , the Kabasan rebels believed that i f they acted f a i t h f u l l y for "the

people," the people themselves would respond i n revolution. I t was the

Bakuninist idea that " i t was not the peasant masses who had to be pre-

pared, but the small group of revolutionaries which would l i g h t the spark."
 298

In fact, as we saw i n Chapter I, the Kabasan rebels, much l i k e

t h e i r Western counterparts, did not really go to the people. In part t h i s

was due, again as i n the case of the Russian populists, to "the need for

secrecy" which "had prevented them from establishing even those personal

and d i r e c t relations with the peasants" that were absolutely necessary

120

i n order to gain t h e i r support. Conspiracy, intrigue, secrecy, and a

self-imposed i s o l a t i o n from the very ones they intended to serve were a l l

conditions that the Kabasan rebels had to endure because they had opted

for the "small movement" strategy, but only a f t e r considerable debate

within t h e i r ranks over the merits of the strategies of assassination

versus r a i s i n g a peoples' army. Nor surprisingly, the Russian populists

of the late-nineteenth century had experienced a similar debate: between

the forces of the Zemlya I Volya (Land and Liberty) who argued for "going

to the people," and the Narodnaya Volya (The W i l l of the People) who

favoured employing small, c o n s p i r a t o r i a l groups armed with bombs to assas-

121

sinate government o f f i c i a l s . In both the Russian and Japanese cases,

the "assassination faction" emerged as the v i c t o r i n the debate, but only

a f t e r the f r u i t l e s s n e s s of the methods of t h e i r opponents i n the "debate"

had been demonstrated.

What the adoption of the strategy of assassination does to organi-

sation has already been indicated i n Chapter I. What happens i s that a

small, c o n s p i r a t o r i a l organisation comes to be the f i n a l outcome of

recruitment, a process defined i n terms of p e r s o n a l i t i e s , t a c t i c s , dates

of events, chance and other forces over which the men involved have very

l i t t l e control, rather than i n terms of rules, guidelines, programmes, i n

 299

short, anything which may impart v i a b i l i t y to the group. Compared to the

organisations of the Fukushima and Chichibu rebels, that of the Kabasan

i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s was ad hoc, dictated more by shared b e l i e f s than by

r a t i o n a l structures. In t h i s section, we s h a l l examine those "shared

b e l i e f s , " the ideology of natural r i g h t which committed i t s believers to

make revolution i n i t s name.

Throughout much of the planning for the assassination Koinuma

Kuhachiro played the p i v o t a l r o l e i n the conspiracy, or as one s p e c i a l i s t

has phrased i t , "Koinuma was the p r i n c i p a l axis of the p l o t from the be-
122

ginning." I t was Koinuma who devised the plan of employing bombs,

and, along with Kono Hiroshi, d i d much of the r e c r u i t i n g . But i f Koinuma

was able to a t t r a c t members to the group because of h i s strong commitment

to assassinationism, he was also capable of alienating them from the.

group. Ohashi Genjiro was one example. In the early stages of planning,

Ohashi's home had been used as a meeting place, and l a t e r as a place to

make bombs. But disagreement with Koinuma over the "small movement"

issue caused him to break with the rebels shortly before the r e b e l l i o n .

Ohashi said:
In our t a l k s Koinuma and I could not come to an understanding. He
disregarded a l l that I said. Even though I frequently stated my
p o s i t i o n to our companions, I was worried since they disagreed with
me. 123

Saeki Masakado was another example. He expressed doubts that p o l i t i c a l

reform would necessarily follow once high-ranking o f f i c i a l s were assas-

sinated. He argued for more preparation and planning, especially among

l o c a l residents whom he f e l t should be included. But "from the f i r s t my

opinion was not acceptable as workable by the others, especially with

 300

124
regard to planning matters i n l o c a l areas." Consequently, Saeki

quietly disappeared several days before the r e b e l l i o n .

Koinuma's commitment to assassination was as strong as h i s commit-

ment to the popular rights movement. His s t a r t i n the movement may have

had something to do with his f a i l u r e as a businessman. We know that he

suffered frequent f i n a n c i a l losses during the time he assisted the family

125

business of tea r e f i n i n g , milk production, and dyeing i n the mid-seventies.

In any event, by 1879 or 1880, when he was i n his late twenties, Koinuma

began to get involved i n the popular rights movement. His introduction

to the movement probably came from h i s friends Arai Shogo and Shioda
Okuzo, two of the p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i s t s of the Shimotsuga d i s t r i c t (Tochigi
126
prefecture). These three friends were among the hundred or so popular
rights advocates of Tochigi who were o r i g i n a l l y involved i n p e t i t i o n i n g
127

for the establishment of a national assembly i n 1880. In February of

that year, Koinuma, A r a i , and Shioda attended a large popular rights con-

ference held i n Tsukuba, Ibaraki prefecture, where members of p o l i t i c a l

128

s o c i e t i e s from across the country attended. On 1 October 1882, these

same three were among the leaders of the prefecture who established the

Tochigi Jiyuto; i t s membership eventually was the second highest i n the

129 . . . .
nation (after Akita). With the founding of the party, Koinuma lmmedi-
130
ately began serving as one of i t s many " t r a v e l l i n g lecturers."
In January 1883, however, after the Fukushima incident, and after

repeated setbacks i n the push f o r self-government i n the Tochigi prefec-

131
t u r a l assembly (of which Arai and Shiota were members), Koinuma, A r a i ,
Shiota, Fukao Masashi (later discovered to be a p o l i c e spy by Yokoyama
132
Nobuyuki) and others held a secret conference i n a small inn located
 301

i n Tochigi town to discuss the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Fukushima Incident and

how i t would a f f e c t the expansion of party strength. Several other such

meetings were held during the same year, but the d e t a i l s are not known.

I t i s known, however, that around t h i s time Koinuma was becoming disen-

chanted with the ineffectiveness of peaceful p o l i t i c s . He said then,

The carrying out of p o l i t i c a l intrigue by the clique government and

i t s allegiance to a philosophy of conservatism, more than the rem-
nants of feudalism, the authority they hold, and the arbitrary way
they u t i l i z e the law to obstruct the advancement of popular s e n t i -
ments, i s responsible for the arrest i n s o c i a l progress. Also, the
c i t i z e n r y behaves l i k e a puppet, allowing the s o c i a l order to become
petrified . . . . 1 3 3

Once having characterized this p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l malaise, he proffered

his solution: "An extraordinary sickness demands an extraordinary

A " 1 3 4

remedy.

The "remedy" that Koinuma chose, we of course know. I t seems that

he regarded the method as inseparable from the "remedy." He stated during

interrogation, "I decided to use bombs for assassination as I r e c a l l e d my

e a r l i e r experience and imagined what a suitable device they would be for
135
t h i s purpose." The "experience" to which he referred was the lessons
he took i n 1877 or 1878, from a c e r t a i n Fukuda of Fukushima on how to
136

make bombs. Koinuma's story, however, d i f f e r s from that of h i s d i s -

c i p l e , Yokoyama Nobuyuki. Yokoyama t e s t i f i e d :

Q. State the source of the invention.

A. In producing the bombs, there were many hardships we encountered:
the use of detonators, the [ d i f f i c u l t y ] of s c i e n t i f i c books, etc.
Q. Yes, but weren't there other reasons for using bombs?
A. I got some facts from newspapers that t o l d about t h e i r use by
European and Russian n i h i l i s t s (kyomuto), and f e l t they were
better for assassinating p e o p l e . x37

It i s strange that Koinuma's and Yokoyama's stories are not the same;
 302

since November 1880, Yokoyama had been Koinuma's near-constant companion,

138

when at the age of sixteen he became Koinuma's permanent boarder. An

answer can only be conjectured: although Yokoyama undoubtedly learned

about bombs from Koinuma, he was attracted to the reports on the n i h i l i s t s

and decided to imitate them.

The methods that Koinuma chose, however, were l e s s important than

the end he sought. During his t r i a l he i d e n t i f i e d the nature of the prob-

lem and proposed the necessary solution:

Today's p o l i t i c a l system displays i t s oppression of l i b e r t y by high
taxes and high prices for goods, by the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the people,
and by t h e i r suffering. My hope i s f i r s t , to aid the people i n
accordance with Jiyuto ideas. My other hope, the highest one, i s
for like-minded men and myself to communicate and then to summon our
energies for a revolution that ends only i n death (kesshi kakumei).
,139

Like the Russian populists, Koinuma's f i r s t hope, then, was "to a i d the

people," but he r e a l i z e d that i n order to do this i t was f i r s t necessary

to a l l y himself, not with "the people," but with "like-minded men."

Nonetheless, he sought "from the beginning," i n his own words, "to act on
140

the hope that I might s a c r i f i c e myself for the nation. But that note

of patriotism does not make Koinuma one of the i d e o l o g i c a l ancestors of

the m i l i t a r i s t i c "Young O f f i c e r s " of the 1930's, as one might suspect.

The f a s c i s t s of the t h i r t i e s j u s t i f i e d t h e i r violent a c t i v i t i e s by invok-

ing the names of samurai who led the Restoration. Koinuma, however, drew

upon an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t precedent, i n his own words, "the overthrow

141

of the English government that had obstructed the rights of l i b e r t y . "

No less committed "to aid the people" was the more cerebral

Tomatsu Masao, the head of a popular rights academy for Jiyuto youth and
 303

the man to whom the leaderless Kabasan rebels turned i n l a t e September

after Koinuma had been injured by one of his own bombs. Tomatsu, unlike

Koinuma, was a Jiyuto leader of national renown and known i n his native

Ibaraki as "one of the great men of t h i s region" (ikkojin no ketsubutsu).

Along with such notables as Itagaki, Ueki Emori, Nakae Chomin, Kono

Hironaka, Tanaka Shozo, Miyabe Noboru, Naito Roichi, and Oi Kentaro, he

was a signatory to the early Aikokusha p e t i t i o n s for a national assembly?

Because of his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the popular rights movement, and because

of a new law proscribing the involvement of teachers and government

143
o f f i c i a l s in p o l i t i c s , Tomatsu l o s t his job as a primary school
144

teacher i n Shimodate around 1880. This experience undoubtedly embit-

tered him even more toward the government. He regarded t h i s law and the

loss of his job as an infringement of the individual's r i g h t to establish

relations with whatever and whomever he wished (the popular r i g h t move-

ment and his friends i n i t ) . His f e e l i n g for the r i g h t of free asso-

c i a t i o n was r e f l e c t e d i n the short poem he composed upon l o s i n g his job:

If we search for the thing
that makes >a man what he i s ,
i s n ' t i t one's true friends?- - 1 J

Having l o s t his job, he devoted more time to p o l i t i c s . In

October 1881, he was present at the establishment of the National Jiyuto,

and for whatever reason, came to a l i g n himself with his good f r i e n d and

r a d i c a l Jiyuto member, Oi Kentaro. Within the Jiyuto i t s e l f , Tomatsu was

regarded as a r a d i c a l . A secret Jiyuto report written i n June 1884

(Jiyuto no seiryaku oyobi naijo) about the i n t e r n a l conditions of the

party, said,
 304

Within the L i b e r a l Party i t s e l f there are, of course, r a d i c a l s

(kageki kyushin no mono [ l i t e r a l l y , "people of extreme and v i o l e n t
persuasions"]). They have come to carry out r a d i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , i n -
dependent of the Party. They have come to be c a l l e d the Kesshi-ha
("Death-seeking f a c t i o n " ) . There are several factions and they are
dispersed among several areas, and take as t h e i r leaders Miyabe
Noboru, Saito Isao, and Oi K e n t a r o . 146

Following t h i s appeared the names of twenty-four i n d i v i d u a l s l i s t e d accor-

ding to prefecture. Gumma had nine, Ibaraki eight, Chiba four and

several other prefectures one apiece. The report guessed that about 500
147

party members (between 20 to 25 per cent of the t o t a l membership) were

active i n this f a c t i o n . Tomatsu was named as one of i t s Ibaraki leaders.

The Gumma Kesshi-ha formed the core of the Gumma Incident (May 1884) and

l a t e r Tomatsu remarked i n a l e t t e r about this incident, " I f the Gumma

Incident had not occurred, then the [Kabasan] probably would not have
148
taken place." This connection was also noted by Endo Shizuo: "The Oi
Kentaro f a c t i o n was b u i l t upon the support of two groups, Miyabe's of
149

Gumma and Tomatsu s of Ibaraki."

1

What "membership" i n the "Death-seaking Faction" meant, i n the

case of Tomatsu at least, was a commitment to revolution. As we have

seen, his p a r t i c u l a r scenario for revolution i n Japan was somewhat d i f -

ferent from the "assassination-ism" advocated by most of his fellow

Kabasan rebels. Tomatsu's plan for revolution can be understood by look-

ing at a pact that he, along with Oda J i r o , who was l a t e r t i e d to the

Chichibu Incident, and Seikyo Kyodo, a resident of Chichibu, wrote

j o i n t l y i n Hachioji (Kanagawa) on 2 August 1880, but dated by them, "Year

one of the Era of Free Self Rule":

We j o i n forces to r a i s e an army of revolution i n Kanto, covering
Kanagawa, Saitama, Tokyo, Gumma, Ibaraki and Tochigi. I t w i l l
 305

overthrow the oppressive government that makes i t s e l f the enemy of

freedom, and we w i l l b u i l d a new government that i s completely free.
Under heaven we join forces and make t h i s great a l l i a n c e that w i l l
bring good fortune to our country.150

In order to r e a l i z e t h i s ambitious plan, Tomatsu understood that

the organising of a r e b e l l i o n would mean involving the one organisation

that had the necessary resources and the connections—with the various

popular rights organisations of the Kanto a r e a — t o allow i t to superintend

the r e b e l l i o n and, subsequently, to form a new government. This central

organisation was, of course, the Jiyuto headquarters i n Tokyo. Accord-

ingly, Tomatsu dispatched one of his followers to go to Tokyo and to

speak to Oi and Ueki about receiving party aid for t h i s plan. Oi, how-

ever, objected, arguing that the time was not yet ripe for a revolution;

only Ueki Emori d i d not oppose the scheme. 151

That f a i l u r e did not stop Tomatsu from trying on his own to

organise a r e b e l l i o n around the c a p i t o l . In early August, Tomatsu sent

future Kabasan rebels Kobayashi, Isokawa, and Hirao to meet with some of

his contacts i n the Hachioji Poor Peoples' Party (Komminto). The goal

of the emmisaries was to t r y to persuade the Hachioji Komminto to j o i n

the revolution. Upon returning, they reported to Tomatsu: "They are

unable to understand our reasons for revolution. They are lacking i n

p r i n c i p l e s , s p i r i t and w i l l , and they would not discuss the matter s e r i -

152

ously." Another attempt by Tomatsu to r e c r u i t the copper miners at

Ashio, Gumma, also met with f a i l u r e . This series of f a i l u r e s to t r y and

mobilize "the people" probably made Tomatsu a l l the more receptive to

the Kabasan rebels' request for Tomatsu to serve as leader. (See

Chapter I.)
 306

Tomatsu s commitment to revolution was not limited to attempts

1

to r a i s e armies. He also t r i e d to educate those whom he regarded as

p o t e n t i a l revolutionaries. To t h i s purpose, Tomatsu established an

"academy" for young popular rights advocates i n his home at Shimodate,

probably i n August 1884, although i t was l i k e l y operating informally

153

before that time. The name of the academy was the Yuikan ("Academy

for Those with Purpose"). I t appears that both i t s name and purpose were

modeled after the central party's youth academy, the Yuikkan ("Academy

of Unity"), as the following quote taken from the o f f i c i a l Party history

indicates:
The d i f f e r e n t Yuikkan that have been b u i l t i n several areas seem to
have members who are i n c l i n e d toward the use of arms, stressing
bravery among t h e i r young members, promoting sword competition, horse
races [and so o n ] . . . . Among these small societies that study the
l i t e r a r y and martial arts that are most popular are the Yuikan of
Shimodate [Tomatsu's] and those found i n Kochi prefecture.154
Helping Tomatsu manage the Yuikan was fellow Kabasan rebel Tamamatsu;
155

he served both as fencing instructor and as bodyguard to Tomatsu.

They were described by one of t h e i r contemporaries i n t h i s way: "These

two men nurtured p o l i t i c a l ideas and planned together i n order to inspire

a c t i v i t y among the young men of the area; they b u i l t t h i s research

academy that taught the l i t e r a r y and martial arts.""'" 56

One of i t s mem-

bers and l a t e r Kabasan rebel, Kobayashi, even l e f t the presumably more

prestigious central party's Yuikkan to study at Tomatsu's: "I went for

the opening of the Yuikan so I could study l i t e r a r y and martial arts. I

decided to attend on the advice of [fellow Kabasan rebel] Hota Komakichi.

Hota, however, d i d just the reverse of Kobayashi and l e f t Ibaraki

 307

before the Yuikan was opened to become a student of the Tokyo Yuikkan.

Hota also t e l l s us (in courtroom testimony) that there were "about t h i r t y -

158
seven or t h i r t y - e i g h t students at the Yuikkan." We also know that at
least thirteen of the Kabasan rebels met each other for the f i r s t time
159

there, and l a t e r did much of t h e i r planning there as well. Kobayashi

maintained, i n fact, that the very decision to begin the r e b e l l i o n was

made at the Tokyo Yuikkan. Also, some of i t s students who were l i v i n g i n

the Yuikkan dormitory took advantage of t h e i r residency to purchase and

hide bomb materials i n t h e i r r o o m s . 160

One of i t s older students, Hirao

Yasokichi, who also rebelled at Mount Kaba, wrote the manifesto which was
161

copied and l a t e r distributed to Ibaraki peasants.

It i s not surprising that the Tokyo Yuikkan served as a hotbed

of r a d i c a l a c t i v i t y . In fact, i t had been founded by the Jiyuto head-

quarters i n the hope that i t would help to divert the r a d i c a l tendencies

162

of the party's more youthful members. I t had opened on 10 August 1884,

a f t e r nearly a year of "concentrating i t s [the Jiyuto's] energies on get-

t i n g f i n a n c i a l contributions." Its f i r s t d i r e c t o r was the old popular

rights stalwart Kataoka Kenkichi, and at i t s opening ceremonies were

Oi Kentaro, Miyabe Noboru and Tomatsu Masao; i n a l l , some 500 party mem-
other such Jiyuto notables 164 as President Itagaki, Hoshi Toru, Ueki Emori,
s
bers were i n attendance. Like the Ibaraki one, the Tokyo Yuikkan was
L65 lf
set up as "an i n s t i t u t e for the study of the l i t e r a r y and martial arts.'

Although i t i s not known p r e c i s e l y what kinds of subjects were studied,

we can guess at what they were by examining some of the ideas of several

of i t s students, a l b e i t i t s more r a d i c a l students—the ones who partici-

pated i n the Kabasan Incident.

 308

As stated e a r l i e r , Hota was one who studied at the Tokyo Yuikkan.

From the following exchange between Hota and the prosecutor, we c l e a r l y

see that his reference to "the cabinet" (Council of State or Dajokan;

the cabinet as such did not come into existence u n t i l 1885) indicates an

awareness.of i t s o l i g a r c h i c powers:

Q. What was your purpose for attacking government o f f i c i a l s ?

A. To e s t a b l i s h a p o l i t i c a l system having true l i b e r t i e s , not encum-
bered by existing organizations such as the cabinet; the present
government interferes and oppresses; i t needed to be overthrown.
Q. What methods could you properly use other than brute force?
A. Our party members have made speeches, pointing out the lack of
government reform and i t s i r r a t i o n a l operation, and have discussed
the c r u e l way i t treats i t s c i t i z e n s . We seventeen [rebels]
wanted to reform p o l i t i c s , to base i t on free speech and d i s -
course. . . .166

The arguments-for less concentration of power i n the hands of the cabinet

and for free speech as a way to reform the p o l i t i c a l system might very

l i k e l y have come from a reading of Locke or Rousseau, and M i l l , respec-

tively. Whatever the source, the emphasis i s on the need to overthrow

the government i n order to create conditions which would allow p o l i t i c a l

reform. The same thought i s echoed i n the words of Kobayashi, the

Kabasan rebel who l e f t the Tokyo Yuikkan i n order to study at the Shimo-

date Yuikan:

I had always hoped for, and thought how to bring about, the pros-
p e r i t y and freedom that would advance the nation. Above a l l , I
thought that the extremism (kyushinshugi) of the r a d i c a l party
(Kagekito) might bring about an atmosphere of l i b e r t y ; i t might r e -
form p o l i t i c s by overthrowing the oppressive government of J a p a n . I 67

These ideas were not necessarily learned at either academy, f o r

Kobayashi subsequently remarks that J.'I had held these ideas for several

years and had mentioned them more than once to those I v i s i t e d on my

168
journies throughout our country." As l i k e l y as not his ideas merely
 309

received i n t e l l e c t u a l reinforcement from his studies. An equally impor-

tant influence on his thinking were those with whom he discussed these

ideas. He names them as, fellow Kabasan rebels Kono Hiroshi, Sugiura,

Isokawa, Yamaguchi and Amano, "people l i k e myself who were of the opinion

that t h e i r goal should be to reform our wicked society (ja-aku shakai) .by
169
embracing liberalism (jiyushugi)." His appraisal of his friends was
indeed correct. Kono sought to e f f e c t h i s "greatest hope, revolution,
170
i n order to create a decent order." Kotoda's " p r i n c i p a l purpose was
171
to use brute force (wanryoku) to reform the M e i j i government."
172
Isokawa simply wanted to "reform p o l i t i c s . " Sugiura's goal was "to
assassinate ministers of state i n order to bring about the revolution
173
(kakumei)." In short, a l l seemed to agree with Kobayashi's definition
of "wicked society": "an oppressive system of p o l i t i c s that crushes the
174

common people." But perhaps the most eloquent and heart-rending

statement made by any of the rebels was that made by Kokugi Shigeo i n a

l e t t e r dated 1 August 1883, sent to Miura Bunji:

My words seem inadequate to express how unbearable and strong my re-
sentment i s . I r e l e n t l e s s l y plan reform for our society and commit
myself to advancing the l i b e r t y and r i g h t s of the people whenever I
look upon the wretched conditions e x i s t i n g today. My heart i s nearly
s p l i t t i n g , and you, my friend, I am sure, must f e e l the same. Our
p o l i t i c a l system only treats unimportant, t r i v i a l d e t a i l s , and ignores
the basic problems. Perhaps that i s a job that you and our friends
must take on.-'-^ 7

A l l these personal statements made by the d i f f e r e n t Kabasan rebels

are important for the i n d i v i d u a l hopes, goals, plans and frustrations that

they express. But perhaps the most important statement made by any of

the rebels i s the one they made c o l l e c t i v e l y , the manifesto written by

the Yuikkan student Hirao, but signed by a l l sixteen men who climbed Mount
 310

Kaba. I t i s also important for the statement i t makes about the nature

of the ideology they shared, the doctrine of natural r i g h t . Because of

i t s importance, we quote the entire document.

Of f i r s t importance i n making a nation i s to equalize the wealth and

rights that heaven has bestowed on each i n d i v i d u a l , and to make clear
the basis of equality. Secondly, the p r i n c i p l e behind s e t t i n g up
government i s to :r.etraiir. and to preserve both the well-being of ..its:
c i t i z e n s , and t h e i r l i b e r t i e s coming from t h e i r natural rights (jimmin
tempu). Having done t h i s , government should enact r i g i d laws, and
should administer them i m p a r t i a l l y .
Looking closely at the s i t u a t i o n i n our country today we see that
i n t e r n a l l y we do not yet have a national assembly, and externally we
have not revised the foreign t r e a t i e s . In order to achieve these
objectives we embark on a course of p o l i t i c a l treason. I t appears
that our wise and virtuous Emperor i s being n e g l e c t f u l , not r e a l i z i n g
that this i s not the time to make great exactions on the people who
are walking the road of starvation. As individuals who regard them-
selves as humanitarians and as p a t r i o t s , we regret this p i t i f u l s i t u -
ation and cannot endure i t . We cannot endure witnessing this break-
down, s i t t i n g i d l y by, and must, therefore, prop up our great country,
as one would do for a large tree. Accordingly, we w i l l assemble an
army on Mt Kaba, Makabe gun, Ibaraki ken, to f i g h t for revolution,
and to overthrow the despotic government that has made i t s e l f the
enemy of freedom; and then to e s t a b l i s h a completely free constitu-
t i o n a l form of government.
Fellow countrymen, a l l thirty-seven m i l l i o n of you, heed the c a l l
of our party. We who are here are not for the most part p a t r i o t s of
the shizoku type. Spread the word and announce i t to your fellow
countrymen.-'- 76
[Dated, 23 September 1884, and signed by sixteen men.]

The philosophical basis of the Kabasan manifesto i s s t r a i g h t -

forward natural r i g h t doctrine; a l l men possess the fundamental rights

of l i b e r t y , property and "well-being"; i n some unexplained way, a l l men

have contracted with one another "to r e t a i n and preserve" these rights by

establishing a state; the legitimacy of the state rests upon t h i s "con-

t r a c t " ; at present, however, the manifesto maintains, neither the laws

enacted by the state, nor the administration of them, are i n accordance

with the terms of the contract; neither foreign nor domestic p o l i c y i s

 311

responsive to the rights of the c i t i z e n r y ; as "humanitarians and as

p a t r i o t s " the Kabasan rebels are duty-bound to overthrow the government

that has betrayed the t r u s t of the people, and to erect i n i t s stead a

constitutional government which manifestly guarantees the natural rights

of the people. F i n a l l y , i n the l a s t paragraph the rebels make e x p l i c i t

that they are acting not as t r a d i t i o n a l s t y l e samurai who are intent

merely to revenge some empty, valueless feudal code of honour, but i n -

stead are acting as p a t r i o t s concerned only for the rights of t h e i r fellow

citizens.

This f i n a l point deserves some elaboration. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d

from Chapter I that the recruitment process was guided not by the attempt

to e n l i s t "men of high repute" as was the case with, say, the young samurai
177

who assassinated Okubo Toshimichi i n 1878. Instead they sought l i k e -

minded men, setting aside the factor of s o c i a l status. I t was a classless

a f f a i r , a point the government never quite understood, as the following

exchange between Miura and his interrogator shows:

Q. Who was the leader?
A. No one.
Q. Was i t Tomatsu? 1 7 8

A. Only nominally; i t was a heimin-shizoku [affair].

It would be a mistake nonetheless to confuse i t s c l a s s l e s s nature with

the fact that i t was also "leaderless," and to combine the two facts to

make the incident even more democratic than i t r e a l l y was. As the follow-

ing testimony by Hota indicates, the exigencies of the s i t u a t i o n did not

lend themselves to the creation of a structured organisation headed by a

chosen or elected leader:

Q. Who were the ringleaders (kyokai) of the uprising?

A. There were no ringleaders.
 312

Q. How could that have been?

A. We were never quite sure of the exact moment we would r i s e up,
so we had no ringleaders or i n s t i g a t o r s .
Q. That being the case, then who among you acted as manager (shukan)?
A. If you use the term "manager" (shuji) i n the sense of overseeing
our finances, then i t was the eldest (nencho), Tomatsu Masao,
although he did not ever refer to himself as a manager, even at

the Yuikan. 179

To some extent, these remarks may have been made i n an e f f o r t to save

Tomatsu from the death penalty ( i f so, i t did not work), which i s what

leadership of the incident almost c e r t a i n l y meant, we can be sure, i n the

eyes of the rebels at the time of the t r i a l s . For we know from Chapter I

that the rebels headed straight for Tomatsu's Yuikan after the robbery

f a i l e d and after Koinuma was injured. Tomatsu's reputation, the name of

the Yuikan, and i t s close location to Utsunomiya were a l l factors that

drew the leaderless rebels there, but undoubtedly, Tomatsu gave the group

some leadership that i t would not have had otherwise. Hence, the issue

of leadership, while important, should not obscure the more important

point of the c l a s s l e s s nature of the incident. For i t i s t h i s fact which

points to the emergence of a new type of r a d i c a l i n M e i j i p o l i t i c s : a

type of r a d i c a l who believed that shared ideas, rather than shared class

status, was the most important factor i n co-operating to bring about a

democratic revolution.

And i t was indeed revolution, and not mere r e b e l l i o n , they i n -

tended to make. As t h i s was the f i r s t instance of attempted revolution

during M e i j i — a f t e r many rebellions that sought only to make the govern-,

ment responsive to c e r t a i n l i m i t e d demands—the authorities were anxious

to discover whether i t was an attempt at revolution. Consider t h i s :

Q. In one instance, you said your aim was "to change" (henkaku) the
 313

government i n the sense of bringing i n a new administration. In

another you said your goal was "to overthrow" (tempuku) the
"wicked Japanese government." Which i s i t ?
A. Our goal was to overthrow completely the present government.

The term "tempuku" was used too often by other rebels as well to allow

us to think that their aim was less than revolution. No! A l l seem to

have digested enough natural r i g h t doctrine to be able to understand and

act upon i t s revolutionary implications. Certain laws were regarded by

the rebels as i n f r i n g i n g upon, even v i o l a t i n g the basic natural rights

of a l l men: the right to associate with whomever one wishes, as i n the

case of Tomatsu; the right to take legal action without fear of arrest,

as i n the case of Monna; the r i g h t to have laws administered impartially

and the right to equal voice i n government through a representative

assembly, as declared by t h e i r manifesto. That a l l of t h i s was not mere

rhetoric was, of course, proven by t h e i r subsequent attempt at revolution

which sought to give concrete expression to t h e i r abstract ideas of

natural r i g h t .

If the Kabasan rebels are to be faulted, i t cannot be for not

acting according to p r i n c i p l e s . Rather, i t must be for what Toyama

Shigeki described i n t h i s way: "The mistakes they made during the pre-
181

r e b e l l i o n process, one could say, were s i l l y . " "Naive," " u n r e a l i s t i c , "

"ill-planned," _"poorly organized" are a l l appropriate designations, i n

retrospect, for many of t h e i r actions and the rationale underlying them.

They made no r e a l nor earnest attempt to establish relations with the

people i n the l o c a l area, nor did they take any positive action to

mobilize l o c a l farmers, as did the leaders of the Fukushima Incident.

They were "isolated men," as Endo put i t , "caught i n t h e i r own trap

 314

(jijo-jibaku), and l i k e the Russian populists, purposely separated them-

182
selves from the people." "Although the l o c a l people probably under-

stood what the manifesto said, for them i t was only an act of dangerous

183

violence." Only Tomatsu, Monna, and Hirao believed throughout the

entire a f f a i r that members of t h e i r party should endeavour to r e c r u i t

l o c a l residents. But the few attempts that were made ended i n f a i l u r e .

In contrast, the others appear not to have thought much beyond the

o r i g i n a l plan of assassination, which, of course, precluded any thought

184

of r e c r u i t i n g large numbers of people. Instead, they believed b l i n d l y

that this act i t s e l f would serve as an i n s p i r a t i o n for "the masses" to

r i s e i n r e b e l l i o n . A representative view of such b l i n d t r u s t was stated

during the court interrogation of Yokoyama, Koinuma's right-hand man.

Q. . . . how were the people able to t r u s t i n you?
A. They could c l e a r l y judge our purity (integrity: kepakku) by the
, manifesto we issued.
Q. What i s the g i s t of the manifesto?
A. That i t was necessary to raise an army (gihei or l i t e r a l l y ,
"righteous army"), to make the government good, and to obtain
and protect the freedom and natural rights of a l l men.

The Kabasan rebels did indeed resemble the participants of the

Narodnaya Volya. That movement's p r i n c i p a l " t h e o r i s t , " Nechaev, promoted

the "propaganda of the deed," which c a l l e d for " l i q u i d a t i n g the worst

o f f i c i a l s to give constant proof that i t i s possible to f i g h t to govern-

18

ment [and] to strengthen the revolutionary s p i r i t of the people . . . .

Yokoyama's testimony, as we saw, attributed some influence to Russian

n i h i l i s t s and t h e i r use of bombs, probably r e f e r r i n g to the 1881 assas-

sination of Alexander I I . Only the use of bombs i n assassinations was

new, however, for assassination as "propaganda of the deed" had a long

 315

history i n Japanese p o l i t i c s . After r e c i t i n g a l i s t of a number of high

Tokugawa and M e i j i government o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s who had met

t h e i r end by an assassin's sword, W. W. McLaren remarked, "There i s some-

thing i n the taking of the l i f e of a fancied enemy of the country, no

matter how highly placed, as a protest against or a c r i t i c i s m of h i s

actions, that appeals to the Japanese mind, and the nation looks upon

such conduct with a leniency[! Not with the Kabasan rebels] that i s only

to be explained by the defects of the m i l i t a r y despotism under which

187

they l i v e d for centuries."

For the Kabasan rebels, however, assassination was not a t o o l to

be used merely to dramatize a cause. I t was also for them a means to

effect the type of p o l i t i c a l change that was dictated by t h e i r i d e a l s .

It was perhaps another of the ironies of history that the p r i n c i p a l i n s t i -

tution and instrument promoting much the same cause for which the Kabasan

rebels fought, the Jiyuto, was p u b l i c l y embarrassed by t h i s incident,

and by others that had preceded i t , and dissolved i t s e l f a month l a t e r ,

shortly before the outbreak of violence i n Chichibu.

The Komminto and the Jiyuto

In both the case of the Fukushima and Kabasan incidents, many of

the participants had a more-or-less d i r e c t relationship with the popular

rights movement. The Sekkyokan, Seidokan, and the Aizu Jiyuto branch,

the Fukushima Jiyuto branch, the Mumeikan, the Ibaraki and Tochigi Jiyuto

branches, the Yuikan and the Yuikkan, and relationships with well-known

individuals of the central Jiyuto had some influence on most of the Fuku-

shima and Kabasan leaders, and even on some of the followers.

 316

In the case of the participants i n the Chichibu Incident no such

clear relationship existed.

By the time of the d i s s o l u t i o n of the national Jiyuto, on 29

October 1884, just two days before the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n began, Saitama

prefecture could only boast of a Jiyuto membership of between 121 and

188
135 people; Chichibu d i s t r i c t i t s e l f accounted for t h i r t y of these.
And twenty of these t h i r t y did not become members u n t i l late i n the l i f e
189

of the party, between October 1883 and May 1884. Among those l i s t e d

i n our sample fourteen were either members, claimed to be members, or

were l o c a l l y regarded by fellow v i l l a g e r s to be members, but two of the

fourteen came from outside the prefecture. Consequently, on the surface,

at any rate, the relationship between the Jiyuto and the Chichibu I n c i -

dent participants i s not a very strong one.

In order to investigate the i d e o l o g i c a l and organisational basis

of the Chichibu Incident, therefore, i t w i l l be necessary to see whether

a less d i r e c t relationship existed between the incident and the Jiyuto

s p e c i f i c a l l y , or the popular rights movement generally. The key, i t

seems, to approach t h i s question i s the nature of the organisation that

the Chichibu participants themselves b u i l t , the Komminto. We should see

whether t h i s organisation was sui generis, or whether i t modeled i t s e l f

in some way after the Jiyuto or some other organisation. We ought also

to examine whether i t s members drew upon p r i n c i p l e s espoused by the popu-

l a r rights movement or whether, for instance, they drew upon t r a d i t i o n a l

190
peasant notions of "natural j u s t i c e " as a rationale for r e v o l t .
Writers contemporary to the incident seem to have had no
 317

d i f f i c u l t y i n categorizing the Chichibu revolt, although the categoriza-

tions of each writer d i f f e r e d substantially. The author of the Tosui

minken shi (1903) wrote, "Since the common people were motivated by the

desire to exterminate high interest creditors, and to p e t i t i o n for tax

191

reduction, i t was a peasant uprising." Thus by looking only at the

immediate aims and targets of the rebels, Sekido Kakuzo was able to say

that i t d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from a t r a d i t i o n a l Tokugawa-type peasant uprising.

Today's p r i n c i p a l chronicler of M e i j i disturbances, Aoki K o j i , shares

t h i s view of seventy years e a r l i e r , modifying i t only i n quantitative

terms by r e f e r r i n g to the incident as a " r e b e l l i o n " (hoki) because of the

192

large numbers of people who participated. Inoue K o j i takes exception

to t h i s view, however, making what seems to be an important d i s t i n c t i o n

between the hyakusho ikki of Tokugawa and the Chichibu Incident: "With

a simple peasant uprising, at the sound of gunfire the people scattered

and t h e i r swords glistened i n f l i g h t , but i n the case of the Chichibu

Incident the farmers displayed the attitude, 'Stop only after death'

(taorete nochi yamen)," and for t h i s reason he says i t was more comparable
193

to the famous Satsuma Rebellion (1877).

In the o f f i c i a l Jiyuto party history, the Jiyuto-shi, the i n c i -

dent and i t s participants were characterized i n t h i s way:

This group that gathered was composed of discontented farmers, gam-
blers and hunters, and having assembled i n force mainly wrecked
government property, threatened government o f f i c e r s , burnt land deed
c e r t i f i c a t e s , punished high-interest creditors and landlords, stole
and d i s t r i b u t e d money and goods, and generally expressed t h e i r d i s -
content i n a d i r e c t fashion. They took the name of Shakkinto (Deb-
tors' Party) or Kosakuto (Tenants' Party) and i n fact we probably
ought to look upon them as one vehicle for the extension of social-
ism. ^19
(Emphasis mine.)
 318

This i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note because even though i t mentions, a l b e i t more

p r e c i s e l y , the same type of a c t i v i t i e s that characterized a t r a d i t i o n a l

peasant uprising as outlined by Sekido, the Jiyuto-shi writers a r r i v e at

a vastly d i f f e r e n t conclusion about the fundamental i d e o l o g i c a l character

of the incident. Granted, t h i s characterization may merely r e f l e c t an

incomplete understanding of socialism at t h i s time, or even a more general

195

fear of socialism, but i t does nonetheless point to the existence of

some i d e o l o g i c a l underpinnings to the p o l i t i c a l party formed by the

Chichibu rebels.

That such was the case i s further attested by yet another contem-

porary writer, the Shinto p r i e s t and Chichibu resident, Tanaka Senya.

He d i d not see socialism as the d r i v i n g i d e o l o g i c a l force of the rebels

but rather saw " l i b e r a l i s m " (jiyushugi) at i t s base. I t was he who sug-

gested the term, J i y u Komminto ("Liberal-Poor Peoples' Party") to de-

scribe the Komminto's ideology i n a term which has recently been popular-
196

ized by the works of Inoue K o j i . But while Tanaka credited the

existence of an i d e o l o g i c a l relationship between the Jiyuto and Komminto,

he also noted that Komminto members had l e s s than a complete understand-

ing of Jiyuto p o l i c y and p r i n c i p l e s , which i n turn l e d to t h e i r f a i l u r e

to accurately r e f l e c t the ideas of the Jiyuto: "The various types of

wild language used by the poor people i s connected to the Poor Peoples'
197

Party and f a l s i f i e s the orders of Mr. Itagaki." A clear instance of

t h i s can be seen i n the testimony of "blind follower," Kobayashi Kenkichi

(twenty-four), farmer and heimin from Gumma prefecture arrested f o r vio-

lent a c t i v i t y .
 319

Q. What do you t h i n k the i d e o l o g y (shugi) o f the J i y u t o i s ?

A. I t s i d e o l o g y i s t o d e s t r o y those who c o n t r o l the money market,
those banks and those u s u r e r s who g r e e d i l y charge e x c e s s i v e

i n t e r e s t ; and i t i s t o h e l p the poor people. 1 9 8

T h i s seems t o r e p r e s e n t a c l e a r i n s t a n c e o f t r a n s l a t i n g a politi-

cal i d e o l o g y w i t h a g o a l o r i e n t a t i o n expressed a t the l e v e l o f the entire

s o c i e t y , i n t o a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a c t i o n which i s o r i e n t e d toward the

achievement o f g o a l s a t the l e v e l o f l o c a l s o c i e t y . I t also points to

o t h e r t h i n g s Tanaka s a i d about the C h i c h i b u r e b e l l i o n . He noted four

p r i n c i p a l causes o f the r e b e l l i o n . The i n f l u e n c e o f the J i y u t o was only

one; the o t h e r t h r e e were usury, a n t i s o c i a l gamblers, and an unresponsive-

ness on the p a r t o f the a u t h o r i t i e s toward the economic d e p r i v a t i o n s

199

b e i n g s u f f e r e d by the p e o p l e . Although Tanaka, l i k e the v e r n a c u l a r

p r e s s a t the time, seems t o p l a c e undue emphasis on the i n f l u e n c e o f

"gamblers" (bakuto)—we w i l l examine t h i s a s p e c t l a t e r — h e does seem t o

have been c o r r e c t i n the importance he p l a c e d on economic p r i v a t i o n , and

the a u t h o r i t i e s seeming unresponsiveness t o i t , as a source o f the rebel-

lion. T h i s can be seen by examining f i r s t , the demands t h a t were made

by the Komminto and s e c o n d l y , the nature o f the t a r g e t s o f the Komminto.

The source o f the Komminto demands i s seen most c l e a r l y i n a poem

w r i t t e n j u s t b e f o r e the r e b e l l i o n by an unknown C h i c h i b u r e s i d e n t , en-

titled "Making Tombstones":

The wind blows.

The r a i n f a l l s ,
Young men d i e .
The groans o f p o v e r t y
F l u t t e r l i k e f l a g s i n the wind.
When l i f e makes no sense,
even the o l d p e o p l e q u a r r e l .
 320

The words on our tombstones,

buried i n the snowstorms of 1884,
are not v i s i b l e to the a u t h o r i t i e s .

In these times 2QQ

we must cry out loudly.

P r i v a t i o n , despair, and rebelliousness are the themes of t h i s poem, and

the eradication of the source of these problems was the purpose behind

the demands made by the Komminto. They were: (1) a ten-year debt mora-

torium on repayment of a l l loans, and a repayment schedule based on

annual installments over a forty-year period; (2) the closure of l o c a l

schools (and hence no school tax) for three years; (3) consideration by

the Home Ministry (Naimusho) of a reduction of miscellaneous taxes, and

201

also the land tax; and (4) a reduction of l o c a l , v i l l a g e taxes.

Several things need to be mentioned about these demands. First,

a l l are obviously economic demands, lacking i n p o l i t i c a l content. The

only p o l i t i c a l facet of them i s that they were directed at the government.

Even the f i r s t demand, which sought debt r e l i e f from the f i n a n c i a l burdens

contracted p r i v a t e l y between farmers and loan dealers, was directed at

the government as i t was the only authority with power enough to resolve

the problem. This could of course be construed as " t r a d i t i o n a l " inasmuch

as there were instances during feudal times when because of crop f a i l u r e

a benevolent domain lord would respond to peasant demands and order a l l

202

debts of farmers i n his region to be cancelled. Yet i n the Chichibu

r e b e l l i o n the four demands were being made of the government not by a

v i l l a g e leader acting as a representative of the feudal community, but

rather by individuals chosen from a political party whose membership tran-

scended the village. It i s also important to r e c a l l that the p o l i t i c a l

 321

context i n which these demands were made was also vastly d i f f e r e n t from

that of even t h i r t y years e a r l i e r .

Secondly, the occasion of the r e b e l l i o n was not the f i r s t time

the demands were made. In late August, Sakamoto Sosaku had gone at the

behest of other leaders to p e t i t i o n a loan dealer of Ogano for a four-year

203

debt moratorium and a forty-year repayment scheme. In early September,

Tashiro Eisuke, Kato Orihei and Okashiwa Tsunejiro, Jiyuto member from

Gumma, met and decided: "Prom now on, no more meetings! We w i l l assume

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to unite the poor people and go to and p e t i t i o n the Omiya

authorities, state the s i t u a t i o n , and take whatever court action i s
204

necessary." They spoke to various v i l l a g e leaders, gained their sup-

port, and on 30 September, they, along with four others, representing

twenty-eight v i l l a g e s , petitioned at the Omiya p o l i c e headquarters,

c a l l i n g for the authorities to take action against usurers. The p o l i c e

chief, however, refused to meet with even one of t h e i r party. They t r i e d

the next day, t h i s time sending Takagishi Zenkichi to Ogano and Ochiai
205

T o i s h i to Omiya, but again the authorities refused to see them. At

t h i s , a small peaceful demonstration of 500 to 600 people was organised

at Ogano for the same purpose as that of the p e t i t i o n e r s , but once again

the authorities refused to meet with any of t h e i r representatives. More-

over, t h i s second p e t i t i o n was even more modest than the l a s t ; i t c a l l e d

for only a four-year moratorium on debt repayment and a ten-year repay-

ment s c h e d u l e . 206
Also, simultaneously, individual Komminto members

t r i e d negotiating with i n d i v i d u a l creditors, but met with l i t t l e success.

These attempts at using legal and peaceful means to make the

 322

authorities respond to t h e i r demands are emphasized here i n order to show

that the r e b e l l i o n , and the demands made during i t , was not spontaneous

nor e n t i r e l y unprovoked.

Nor was there a lack of precedent or motivation f o r abandoning

the law and turning to violence. In early September while these Chichibu

individuals were busy using peaceful t a c t i c s , the Komminto of Hachioji

had assembled 8,000 v i l l a g e r s , attacked the homes of loan dealers and

government o f f i c e s , and succeeded i n having t h e i r v i l l a g e taxes reduced

207

and i n having the terms of loan repayment eased.

These instances underscore Tanaka Senya s contention that one of

1

the reasons f o r r e b e l l i o n was the growing unresponsiveness of the author-

ities. Due i n part to the flood of p e t i t i o n s coming since 1880, demanding

a national assembly, and the t i d a l , wave of p e t i t i o n s f o r f i n a n c i a l a i d

since the Matsukata d e f l a t i o n policy began taking i t s t o l l , the central

government reacted by writing an ordinance requiring that the approval

of l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s was necessary before a p e t i t i o n would be

2 08

accepted by the Tokyo government. This action merely shifted respon-

s i b i l i t y to l o c a l governments which, as we have seen, were no more

responsive than the central government. That d i d not stop, however, a

few "concerned i n d i v i d u a l s " from beginning a p e t i t i o n drive which some-

times developed into a larger movement. In this sense, the p e t i t i o n s

themselves helped serve to r e c r u i t members to the poor peoples' movement.

The f i n a l point to be made about the Komminto demands i s the ex-

tent to which they had become slogans among the people of Chichibu by

the time the r e b e l l i o n began. On the morning of the f i r s t day of r e b e l l i o n ,

 323

1 November 1884, at the Muku shrine i n Yoshida v i l l a g e , a scene described

i n Chapter I, the "Rebels' Agreement" (Boto yakujosho) was announced and

a l l were asked to swear allegiance to the following purposes:

1. We w i l l a i d the poor people.

2. If negotiating with a money lender out of court, and he deserts

the negotiations, we should take the s p e c i f i c remedy of "house-
wrecking" and k i l l him.

3. We w i l l take over the v i l l a g e government o f f i c e s of the various

v i l l a g e s and destroy or take the signed documents found there.

4. I f one of our Party i s apprehended or arrested during t h i s i n c i -

dent, we w i l l take s p e c i f i c action of rescuing him by attacking
and destroying the p o l i c e station or prison i n question.

5. We w i l l make a f o r c i b l e appeal (goso) to have various taxes and

school expenses abolished, a l l taxes except the national land
tax. 2 0 9

Reading t h i s agreement, i t i s easy to r e c a l l the e a r l i e r quoted testimony

of Kobayashi Kenkichi who recited the Jiyuto "ideology" i n much the same

terms as the agreement. Also, i n going through the court testimony of a

number of those captured early i n the incident, we see such comments as:

The reason [for joining] was to reduce school fees, defer loans, and
to stamp out usury.

The reason was to destroy public documents concerned with loans and
mortgages.

[The reason was] to besiege creditors and government o f f i c e s and de-

stroy a l l public documents concerned with debts.^10

And so goes the testimony. Here we are not only seeing the Komminto

demands being expressed as reasons for p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n violence, i . e . ,

in order to have these demands r e a l i z e d , but we are also seeing what the

targets of r e b e l l i o n were.

What then were these targets? A p o l i c e report dated 6 November

 324

1884, stated: -

With a common hatred they unite to coerce the authorities and money
dealers, and the young r i o t e r s set f i r e to t h e i r buildings, destroy-
ing them completely. They also combine to menace r i c h farmers and
i n great numbers they plunder the goods and the money of the r i c h .
After f i n i s h i n g there, they attack government o f f i c e s . . . . They
are led i n this by gamblers and t h e i r spokesmen are members of the
Jiyuto; both these groups have authority.211

The invective aside, the facts support t h i s report, at least concerning

the targets of attack by the rebels. In a comprehensive report e n t i t l e d ,

212

"The Condition of the Towns and V i l l a g e s Where the Rioters Raided,"

eighty-four v i l l a g e s and towns are l i s t e d as having been attacked.

Within a l l of these towns, private homes were most affected, 556 i n a l l

having been damaged or destroyed. V i l l a g e government o f f i c e s were second

with seven, followed by s i x p o l i c e stations and four court houses. Rob-

bery was the most frequently committed crime—510 homes (497 i n Chichibu

d i s t r i c t , thirteen i n Kodama d i s t r i c t ) had either food, money or weapons,

etc. taken from them. At court houses or p o l i c e stations, over 500

o f f i c i a l documents were either destroyed or damaged by f i r e — l a n d r e g i s -

t e r s , tax assessments, mortgage papers, house r e g i s t e r s , etc. In terms

of t o t a l property damage, the government estimated i t as 43,783 yen. In

terms of i n j u r i e s sustained by the people involved, only sixteen people

in a l l l o s t t h e i r l i v e s (two policemen, fourteen r i o t e r s ) and only

twenty-two were reported injured (seven policemen, f i f t e e n r i o t e r s ) . Of

course, although a l l these figures are questionable as to accuracy, they

nonetheless indicate how limited was the personal and property damage

done, when contrasted to the great numbers of p o l i c e and rebels involved.

The fact of t h i s r e l a t i v e l y minor damage also contrasts with what

 325

was reported i n the newspapers at the time. Reports of widespread l o o t -

ing, plundering, rape, b r u t a l i t y , and violence i n general dominated the

newspapers. Even "the k i l l i n g of women and children for the amusement

of the r i o t e r s " was reported i n a government pamphlet released to a l l the

213
newspapers i n mid-November, e n t i t l e d Saitama jiken dempo roku. The

Choya Shimbun referred to v i l l a g e s controlled by The Poor Peoples' Army

214

as "anarchist v i l l a g e s " (musei no kyo). When on 5 November i t was re-

ported that the Tokyo garrison had been mobilized, the newspapers d i s -

played even greater alarm concerning the extent of the violence.

Once members of the Komminto were arrested and interrogated and

something was learned about the nature of i t s organisation, and once the

government figures came out showing how mild the violence had been, govern-
215

ment leaders and others expressed surprise. Probably the p r i n c i p a l

reason for so l i t t l e violence was (1) the s p e c i f i c i t y of the targets

chosen by the Komminto, as we saw e a r l i e r i n t h e i r "Rebels Agreement"

(and indicated by the figures just shown); and (2) the s t r i c t organisation

guiding the Komminto.

On the same day the "Rebels Agreement" was announced, President

Tashiro Eisuke had a subordinate read the Five A r t i c l e s of the "Army Code":

I personally w i l l behead any and a l l persons who:

1. commit robbery;
2. v i o l a t e women;
3. drink wine;
4. rob and burn without permission, or

5. v i o l a t e orders given by leaders.216

It i s of course impossible to say whether the threat of decapitation

served to deter rebels from committing such crimes, e s p e c i a l l y since i t

i s not known i f the occasion ever arose. Regardless, most of the evidence
 326

points to a considerable measure of party d i s c i p l i n e ; c e r t a i n l y no acts

of rape of l i c e n t i o u s drinking took place. That the Komminto was so

d i s c i p l i n e d , and that i t s targets were so s p e c i f i c , can be seen i n the

organisational character of the Komminto army i t s e l f , the process of

organisation leading up to i t s establishment, and i n the i d e o l o g i c a l

cohesiveness of i t s leadership. Now to consider each of these i n turn.

From our sample alone (Appendix III) where the "rank" or p o s i t i o n

of each i s l i s t e d , we can r e a d i l y discern the t i g h t manner i n which the

Komminto army was structured; we find a president (commander), a vice-

president, d i v i s i o n and v i c e - d i v i s i o n commanders, squad commanders, secre-.

t a r i e s , treasurers, supply o f f i c e r s , communication o f f i c e r s , and so on.

With t h i s kind of m i l i t a r y ordering of the party we might expect a r i g i d

chain of command to have existed that would have made Tashiro, at i t s

apex, a supreme commander whose authority was i n v i o l a b l e . This, however,

was not the case. What existed instead was a sharing of authority among

a few i n d i v i d u a l leaders, not a l l of whom held the highest ranks. (Pos-

s i b l y some were given higher ranks but no r e a l authority, i n order to

induce them to exercise t h e i r l o c a l prestige to a t t r a c t greater numbers

of recruits.)

We can see how power was shared by r e l a t i n g what happened at a

meeting of the p r i n c i p a l leaders held at Anoyama on 26 October, five days

217

before the outbreak of violence. In attendance at Anoyama (see Chapter

I) were: Tashiro, Kato O r i h e i , Inoue Denzo, Kokashiwa Tsunejiro (Gumma),

Kikuchi Kanbei (Nagano), Ide Tamekichi (Nagano), Shibaoka Kumakichi, 2'

Sakamato Sosaku, Kadodaira Sohei, Takagishi Zenkichi, and Arai Shuzaburo.
 327

Although they decided there to postpone the start of the r e b e l l i o n to 1

November, before t h i s decision was made Tashiro had proposed that they

wait even longer, suggesting at least t h i r t y days. His reasons, undoub-

tedly revealed at this meeting, come to us from a l a t e r p o l i c e i n t e r r o -

gation :

Q. Why did you wish a postponement?

A. Had we gotten a 30 day postponement, i n addition to Saitama pre-
fecture we could also have organized a simultaneous r e b e l l i o n
among the people i n Gumma, Nagano, Kanagawa and Yamanashi pre-
fectures. This would have created a situation where a f o r c e f u l
p e t i t i o n to the government to reduce taxes would have been
accepted due to the violence. . . . Also the army we would have
mobilized could have withstood an assault by the p o l i c e and
army. . . . Finally, t h i s [extra mobilization] was necessary due
to the proximity of our region to Tokyo.219

Tashiro, however, received support for his proposals only from Inoue

Denzo. Whether a formal vote was taken or whether the numerical strength

of each side was only intimated during discussion, i t i s not known.

Regardless, those who favoured commencing the r e b e l l i o n immediately pre-

dominated.

It i s claimed that Inoue's support of Tashiro's postponement

argument stemmed from his v i s i t to Oi Kentaro i n Tokyo on 20 September.

Inoue t o l d Oi of the Komminto intention to rebel i n l a t e October and Oi

supposedly expressed his strong disapproval, arguing as he d i d with the

Kabasan rebels, that i t was a "rash undertaking" and that the time had

not yet come for a Kanto-wide r e b e l l i o n , especially since i t appeared

220

that the Komminto had not prepared s u f f i c i e n t l y . To insure that his

views would be well represented i n Komminto councils, on 23 October he

sent to Chichibu his own envoy, Shige Naokuni, i n order to persuade the
Komminto to abandon t h e i r plans for r e b e l l i o n . Shige, however, as Oi
 328

l a t e r t e s t i f i e d , found himself i n sympathy with the rebels and joined

221

them.

According to testimony l a t e r given by Kokashiwa, i t was Kato

Orihei, V.P. of the Komminto army, who was the p r i n c i p a l advocate of the
222

" r e b e l l i o n now" argument. Reminiscent of the Kabasan rebels, Kato and

the others of t h i s "faction" (mentioned above) apparently assumed that

once the Chichibu farmers rose i n r e b e l l i o n , those a c t i v i s t s i n surround-

ing areas would do the same. The l o g i c of t h i s dominant group was, " I f

the poor people of Saitama are planning [rebellion] independently, then

223

so must those of the other prefectures as well." Although t h i s may

have been faulty reasoning on t h e i r part, Tashiro was f i n a l l y convinced

by i t . To the question put to him by the prosecutor, "Why d i d you l i m i t

yourself to the Chichibu region?" Tashiro r e p l i e d :

My Gumma friends, Kokashiwa Tsunejiro and Horiguchi Kosuke, had been
active there for three years, and Shimaki T a i r o k i c h i of Kanagawa
prefecture whom we may regard as a person of Chichibu, [was active
there]. Kato Orihei, acting as a gambler, also mingled among the
people t h e r e . 2 2 4

At the r i s k of o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , but drawing a contemporary p a r a l l e l ,

i t appears that" Tashiro, at least, put himself into a Nixon/Watergate

s i t u a t i o n , allowing himself to believe the fables, derived from hope more

than from fact, t o l d to him by his "advisors." Whether or not i t was

t h i s self-deception that f i n a l l y caused him to abandon the plan for a

Kanto-wide r e b e l l i o n and opt for the " r e b e l l i o n now" argument i s not

known. Inoue K o j i does conjecture, however, that what may have convinced
Tashiro ultimately was the experience of seeing the large crowd of 3,000
225
that f i r s t day.
 329

In either case, the point i s that despite the m i l i t a r y structure

of the Komminto army, decision-making power was not monopolized by i t s

leader Tashiro. The second most important decision of a l l — w h e n to

rebel—was made c o l l e c t i v e l y . The most important decision—whether to

r e b e l — h a d already been made by most of these very same individuals on

13 O c t o b e r . 226
(See Chapter I.)

In t h i s regard, although Tashiro was the one who determined who

would f i l l which positions i n the party-army, the authority to do t h i s

227

was conferred upon him by these other leaders. In fact, before he

even began assigning duties he f i r s t conferred with Inoue, Kato, Sakamoto

and Takagishi. Based on these t a l k s he said, "We w i l l gather our com-

rades together and select people for roles and instruct them on t h e i r

228
duties." He did that with the advice of the above-mentioned members
on the eve of the r e v o l t . "Thus, i n t h i s way," he said, "we together
229

assigned roles and our course of action advanced." Also, s p e c i a l

authority was entrusted to b a t t a l i o n chiefs (daitaicho) Iizuka Seizo of

Shimo-yoshida v i l l a g e and Arai Shuzaburo (Obusuma d i s t r i c t ) , as well as

to Kikuchi Kanbei. "We decided that t h i s arrangement would l a s t from

October 31 to about noon on November 8. I t e l l you, during the process

230

of deciding roles, there was no q u a r r e l l i n g . "

Tashiro's interrogator, probably r e f l e c t i n g wide-spread official

surprise at t h i s high degree of organisation, questioned Tashiro repeatedly

about the v i o l e n t a c t i v i t i e s of Komminto members, whom the interrogator

believed had contravened the oath they took on the f i r s t day of the rebel-
231
lion. During t h i s questioning, Tashiro readily admits that men under
 330

his command set f i r e to the houses of usurers, destroyed p o l i c e stations,

and extorted money, but i n s i s t e d nonetheless, "We decided from the f i r s t

that we would l i m i t and r e s t r i c t destruction to government places, p o l i c e

232

s t a t i o n s , and so on; our intention was not only to destroy. . ."

(emphasis mine). In speaking of burning the home of one usurer who had

accumulated 50,000 yen " i n ten years of cheating the poor," Tashiro said,
233

"We put our lives on the line in order to aid these poor people"

(emphasis mine). As Shibaoka, b a t t a l i o n commander and kobun to Tashiro,

phrased i t , "Extreme steps had to be taken to aid the poor people. The
r i c h people aren't dying; i t i s the poor people i n Chichibu who are star-
234

ving to death."

Neither d i d they confine themselves to destroying the homes of

the r i c h ; they also extorted money. Ide Tamekichi, c o l l e c t o r of funds

for the Komminto, was delegated the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to v i s i t the wealthy

during the r e b e l l i o n and convince them "to give money as a condolence

gift (koden) i n order to redeem themselves, acquire the proper attitude,

and a t t a i n innocence by providing for m i l i t a r y expenses as a non-military

235
way to a i d the poor. . . . " In this manner, Tashiro informed the
interrogators, almost 3,000 yen was c o l l e c t e d , adding that for every
236
"donation" a receipt was given. (The Kabasan rebels had done the same
237

for most of the money, food, and weapons they had appropriated.)

Thus having structured i t s e l f along m i l i t a r y l i n e s , having estab-

lished a pattern of decision-making among the leadership, and having found

rather unconventional means of financing i t s e l f , the Komminto showed a l l

the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an on-going organisation save one, that of

 331

recruitment. How d i d the Komminto go about getting new members? What

means were employed i n mobilizing the 3,000 people who assembled at

Hinozawa on 1 November 1884, and the other 7,000 or so who joined once

the r e b e l l i o n began?

About the 7,000, the authorities were probably correct i n describing

them as "blind followers" (fuwa zuiko), although l i t t l e about them i s

r e a l l y known. Most were probably not unlike young Kobayashi of Gumma,

e a r l i e r quoted, who gave us the rather pedestrian view of what the Jiyuto

ideology meant. He was also one of the many whom the authorities claimed
238
was "coerced" into p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the r e b e l l i o n . Paraphrased, the
story he l a t e r gave the p o l i c e went t h i s way:

I l e f t home on October 31 to go to Saku d i s t r i c t i n Nagano to c o l l e c t

stones and charcoal with my brother. The f i r s t night we stayed at
an inn i n Minami-Kanra d i s t r i c t (Gumma) and l e f t the next morning
early, and by night reached the Chichibu border, where we stopped f o r
a drink.- At about 10 p.m., "400 Jiyuto people" arrived at this inn.
We were asked to j o i n the party and were t o l d that i f we d i d so, our
f i n a n c i a l troubles would soon end. They were a l l armed with guns, or
knives, or bamboo spears. We decided to join.239

He went on to r e l a t e how during the next few days he was assigned the

task (along with 100 others) of transporting ammunition to various army

squads. He was then asked:

Q. While on the march did other people j o i n the Jiyuto?

A. Laborers (ninsoku) who were then working joined, but they d i d
not know what they joined.^40
241
We also see examples of t r a v e l l i n g salesmen caught i n the r e b e l l i o n ;
242
friends of friends who heard of a "gathering"; people whose r e l a t i v e s
243
were i l l and needed money for medicine; people merely caught looting
244

a place the rebels had already attacked; and so on. I t was probably

people similar to these who were among the group known as "blind
 332

followers." Whether, l i k e our f i r s t example, they were "coerced" into

joining i s questionable. No doubt many claimed that they were coerced,

once i t was learned that the authorities would not prosecute i n such i n -
245

stances. This fact probably explains why such a large number, 3,238,

surrendered themselves to the authorities. Moreover, "coercion" to

p a r t i c i p a t e should also be understood i n the sense that Inoue interprets

i t : " I t was a function of the strength of the cooperative relations of

the v i l l a g e . " He does concede, however, that there were instances where

ninsoku saisoku ("forced labour") and ka.rid.ashi ("those rounded-up") were

246

compelled to p a r t i c i p a t e by v i l l a g e organisers.

To some extent this was also probably the case for a f a i r portion

of the 3,000 o r i g i n a l participants as well, although with this number

"the strength of cooperative relations of the v i l l a g e " probably played a

much larger r o l e than did karidashi. Inoue provides us with a schema

24"
showing how t h i s large number of people f i t into Komminto organisation.

Source: Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 84.

F i g . 1. Schema of Komminto Organisational Structure

 333

"C" represents the 3,000 mobilized by the Komminto; "B" represents the

100 to 130 people who were l o c a l organisers of the Komminto; and "A" rep-

resents the t h i r t y Jiyuto members of Chichibu d i s t r i c t . The "grey" area

shows that about one-half of the t h i r t y were Jiyuto/Komminto members,

i . e . , the fourteen individuals from our sample (mentioned at the outset

of this section) who were either o f f i c i a l l y l i s t e d as members (e.g.,

Iizuka and Ochiai), claimed to be members (e.g., Tashiro and Kato), or

were regarded l o c a l l y as members (e.g., Ono Naekichi and Arai Makizo).

Inasmuch as those i n "C" were the objects of mobilization f o r those i n -

cluded i n "B," we may treat them simultaneously. (Those i n "B" may be

considered the 127 people i d e n t i f i e d i n Chapter III as "ringleaders and

instigators" [for whom data was presented concerning age, residence, and

occupation].)

The t i e between those i n "B" and "C" that bound them together

during the r e b e l l i o n were the co-operative t i e s of the v i l l a g e . Indi-

vidual v i l l a g e s tended to be characterized by a population most of whom

engaged i n the same type of a g r i c u l t u r a l production, e.g., s i l k , mulberry,

lacquer, etc. This required co-operation among the farmers i n the har-

vesting and marketing of the same item. V i l l a g e meetings became a g r i c u l -

t u r a l society meetings. The person or persons who dominated such meet-

ings, the "men of renown," were usually the ones who were economically

better o f f than the rest. At the time of the r e b e l l i o n , however, many

such individuals found themselves i n as much f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y as the

rest of the v i l l a g e population. In such cases, they often became the

l o c a l organiser for the Komminto.

 334

Consider the case of Arai Shigejiro of Isama v i l l a g e (which, as

seen i n Chapter I I I , was ranked among the highest for contributing p a r t i -

249

cipants); he served as a "provisions o f f i c e r " i n the Komminto. He

specialized i n producing lacquer and cocoons, and according to an 1873

survey owned .68 cho of dryland, enough to make him a middle-income

farmer, i f most of his production was cocoons and lacquer. In an 1884

survey he was c l a s s i f i e d as shiryoku naishi or "without means." In late

August, as "a new debtor," he began helping to organise the Komminto and

was known to have been i n contact with Tashiro. A contemporary, Tanaka

Senya, characterized him i n this way: "There are many [Komminto members]

in Isama v i l l a g e . The lacquer tree farmer, Shigejiro, neglected h i s

family business, trained his wife and daughter to use a sword, and f r e -
250

quently stopped farming upon hearing reports of freedom [movements]."

He had also recruited t h i r t y households i n Isama v i l l a g e for the Komminto.

By the time of the r e b e l l i o n he and four other Isama organisers (includ-

ing Kato Orihei) led more than 180 people to the f i g h t .

Ono Naokuni, a heavily indebted farmer from Fuppu v i l l a g e and

251

Vice-Commander of the F i r s t B a t t a l i o n , i s another example. Like A r a i

Shigejiro, he was known l o c a l l y as a Jiyuto member and had i n the past

served v i l l a g e members as a spokesman i n meetings with creditors. Using

three or four young men, he extended his recruitment drive outside his

own v i l l a g e , even into Nagano prefecture, and by the time f i g h t i n g com-

menced he had 140 people i n what he c a l l e d the Fuppu-so or "Fuppu organ."

He i s also known to have come under the p o l i t i c a l wing of A r a i Shuzaburo,

252
a former primary school teacher and " r a d i c a l a c t i v i s t " from Obusuma
 335

district. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that Ono has been credited with lese

majeste, the only known instance of t h i s i n a l l three of our studies:

253
"Since we fight the Imperial Court i t s e l f , we w i l l need reinforcements."

No mention i s made whether reinforcements ever arrived, but i t i s known

that Ono's very t i g h t - k n i t following remained that way u n t i l the very

end of the r e b e l l i o n .

Less s p e c i f i c i n the way of evidence but equally as meaningful i n

showing how Komminto members were able to organise the v i l l a g e r s of t h e i r

area i s a comparison of Table 6, showing those•villages contributing more

than f i f t y " d i r e c t " p a r t i c i p a n t s (Chapter I I I ) , with those v i l l a g e s from

which the leaders, as they appear i n our sample, came. Kami-hinozawa,

for instance, the v i l l a g e organised by Muratake Shige and Morikawa Sakuzo

contributed 52 per cent of i t s population to the r e b e l l i o n . Shimo-

hinozawa, led by Iizuka Seizo, A r a i Makizo and Kadodaira Sohei, mobilized

36 per cent of i t s population. The c o r r e l a t i o n between these high rates

of mobilization and Komminto organisers i s not a spurious one. We see

i t with Inuki Jiyusaku and Iida v i l l a g e ; Imai Kozaburo and Sanyama v i l -

lage, Miyakama Tsuari and Inoue Denzo and Shimo-yoshida v i l l a g e , and so

on.

At t h i s l e v e l of organisation, between those i n groups "B" and

"C," using the schema e a r l i e r extracted from Inoue, the unifying, ideo-

l o g i c a l basis appears to have been expressed i n terms of the four Komminto

demands e a r l i e r quoted. Relief from taxes and usurious loan rates was

probably what ultimately convinced most to organise i n the one instance,

and to be mobilized i n the other. But superimposed upon this b a s i c a l l y

 336

economic bond was one which originated with that group labeled "A" i n

Inoue's scheme, i . e . , the "Jiyukomminto" members as Tanaka Senya c a l l e d

them. Most of these fourteen individuals were t i e d to one another since

August, when they i n i t i a t e d the formation of the Komminto. And although

d i f f e r e n t kinds of relationships existed between d i f f e r e n t "Jiyukomminto"

individuals and t h e i r l o c a l Komminto organisers, the relationship between

these fourteen was e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l , and s p e c i f i c a l l y , was based

upon the common t i e each had to the Jiyuto. Recognizing t h i s f a c t , and

given the nature of the organisational relationship between Komminto

organisers and the v i l l a g e r s , then we would expect a certain amount of

Jiyuto ideology to have f i l t e r e d down d i r e c t l y to the Komminto members,

and i n d i r e c t l y to some of the 3,000 or so v i l l a g e r s .

Among the so-called Jiyukomminto, those d e f i n i t e l y l i s t e d i n

the Jiyuto party membership l i s t from Chichibu were Inoue Denzo, Iizuka

Zeizo, Ochiai T o i s h i , Takagishi Zenkichi, Akihara Shojiro, Kadodaira

Sohei, and Sakamoto Sosaku; from Nagano, Ide Tamekichi, and Kokashiwa
254

Tsunejiro from Gumma. Although not usually credited with Jiyuto mem-

bership, even though he claimed i t , Kikuchi Kanbei's name appears i n a .

255

9 October 1884 l i s t i n g of Nagano prefecture members. A l l but a few of

these ten individuals appear to have been very active members as well.

Takagishi was one of eight Saitama representatives at a Jiyuto meeting

in Tokyo i n March 1884, also attended by Kabasan leader Tomatsu Masao of

256

Ibaraki and by Fukushima Incident participant from Gumma, Iga Wanato.

It i s also known that Takagishi, along with Ochiai, Sakamoto, Inoue

Zensaku (not a Jiyuto member, but among our sample), and Arai T e i j i r o
 337

(also i n the sample) signed a "blood pact" i n February 1883 that called

for a national assembly, a decrease i n taxes, and reform of the govern-

257
ment. Ochiai, Takagishi and Sakamoto were, moreover, the i n i t i a t o r s
258
and o r i g i n a l organisers of the Chichibu Komminto i n August 1884.
Ochiai re-emerged a year l a t e r when he was arrested along with Oi Kentaro
259

i n the abortive Osaka Incident. He was also among those who joined

the Party after Oi Kentaro lectured i n Chichibu i n February 1884. After

Oi's tour, Jiyuto membership i n Chichibu rose from eight to f i f t e e n i n

March, to twenty-six i n early May, and to twenty-eight i n late May.

Besides Ochiai, two of the new inductees were Takagishi and Sakamoto. 260

Moreover, Inoue Denzo, as we have already seen, was i n communica-

t i o n with Oi Kentaro i n October 1884, and supposedly had spent some time

at the Tokyo Jiyuto headquarters i n December 1883 with Iga Wanato, Kono

Hiroshi and Murakami T a i j i . Murakami, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe, was

a Chichibu resident, but a member of the r a d i c a l Jiyuto p o l i t i c a l society,

the Yushinsha of Takasaki i n Gumma. I t was headed by Miyabe Noboru, who

was connected with the Kabasan conspirators, and e a r l i e r had been

261

arrested for allegedly taking part i n the Gumma Incident of May 1884.

An early twentieth-century h i s t o r i a n writing on the Chichibu

Incident claimed that Murakami was the important connecting l i n k that

262

t i e d the Tokyo and Chichibu Jiyuto to.the Gumma Yushinsha. Not only

did Murakami apparently serve as a messenger between Takasaki, Tokyo,

and Chichibu, but he i s also credited (by Tashiro) as having recruited

Tashiro into the Jiyuto. Tashiro's interrogation went:

Q. Are you a f f i l i a t e d with a p o l i t i c a l party?

 338

A. In late January or early February of t h i s year (1884), I joined

the Jiyuto.
[Questioning the truth of Tashiro's answer, the interrogator asked:]
Q. Did you formally j o i n the Jiyuto at that time?
A. . . . Murakami T a i j i , who belonged to the Jiyuto of our region,
and who served as an intermediary between the Tokyo headquarters
and our region, invited me to j o i n the Jiyuto i n a conversation
we had. I questioned him on i t s ideology (shugi). . . . He
answered by r e c i t i n g twice i n a loud voice, two poems.
Q. Do you remember these poems?
A. One I've forgotten. I can r e c a l l one or two l i n e s of the other.
Q. State them.
A. One was, "Cut up wicked people, p u r i f y the public party; people
who f i s h must seek them i n valley r i v e r s . "
Q. Do you remember the other one now?
A. Now I r e c a l l very l i t t l e . Something l i k e , "Look upon your wife
and children and do for c i v i c a f f a i r s what a husband [does for
his family]. . . ."
Q. What then? „_
A. I continued thinking about what these poems meant.
The questions and answers continued i n t h i s manner without Tashiro ever

saying d i r e c t l y , or the interrogator ever believing, that he became a

member of the Jiyuto.

He was also asked about his r e l a t i o n to Inoue Denzo, Iizuka, Kato,

and Takagishi, and whether they "were friends before the r e b e l l i o n . "

Tashiro r e p l i e d , "No, we only became friends i n the course of the recent

264 . 265
uprising." He further i d e n t i f i e d them a l l as Jiyuto members.

Subsequently, Tashiro was asked a question the answer to which

explains an important aspect of the relationship between the Jiyukomminto

members and Komminto organisers.

Q. Inoue and Murakami were both important people within the Jiyuto,
but you were made President over both of them. [Why]?
A. I w i l l guess why t h i s was so. By nature I l i k e to help the weak
and crush the strong. During these times when poor people suffer
and many are affected, I have served as a middleman (nakama) i n
t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s and have served as a mediator for 28 years.
The number of people I c a l l kobun exceeds two hundred. I guess
I was made president because I have demonstrated a b e l i e f i n the
 339

necessity to a i d the poor, as seen i n my commitment to the four

demands as outlined by Inoue Denzo [cited e a r l i e r ] . ^ 6
2

This "Robin Hood" attitude was formally recognized by the Court when i t

sentenced Tashiro to death on 19 February 1885, i d e n t i f y i n g him as

"known i n the r u r a l party as a kyokaku ('chivalrous man' or 'Robin

267
Hood') ."

But besides t h i s aspect of s o c i a l concern shown by Tashiro to-

wards the poor i s the important point he made about his kobun. As we ,

just saw, Tashiro claimed some 200 kobun to his c r e d i t as an oyabun-

kyokaku. Most were probably farmers who asked Tashiro, known l o c a l l y as

a "lawyer" (daigennin), to intercede on t h e i r behalf as a spokesman to

creditors. In fact, when asked about occupation, Tashiro i d e n t i f i e d

himself as a chusaisha, one "who mediates f o r farmers i n cases of lending,

268

borrowing and other matters."

Among those i n the Chichibu sample at least four were known to

be kobun of Tashiro: Shibaoka, Ide, Horiguchi, and Akihara. From the

court testimony of these four i t appears that t h i s oyabun-kobun rela-

tionship was at least p a r t l y responsible for t h e i r involvement i n the

rebellion. The clearest evidence of t h i s relationship i s the case of

Shibaoka, the only other person i n the sample, besides Tashiro, who was

a resident of Omiya. In explaining how he became involved, he makes i t

clear that his personal relationship with Tashiro was among the p r i n c i p a l

factors.

Q. Are you i n debt?

A. I took out a loan'in August 1878, from Zawayama Yuno of about 24
or 25 yen.
Q. And therefore you became a ring-leader i n t h i s violence?
 340

A. I t i s not true that I hoped to have my debt cancelled by joining

the violence. . . . The poor people suffer high i n t e r e s t loans
demanded by usurers. This makes them poorer; that, and the drop
i n prices of various goods. I decided that I would l i k e to see
those deplorable conditions ended and decided to devote a l l my
energy, even my l i f e , to aid the poor people. My hopes rose
gradually after talking with Tashiro and I gradually became a
ringleader of the r i o t e r s i n t h i s s p i r i t . . . . It was not for my
own gain that I joined the Komminto.
Q. T e l l us about the deliberations that led to your joining the
Komminto.
A. Around September 2, [1884] I spoke with Tashiro rEisuke ....
Q. Was there a compact (keiyaku) that t i e d you [to the party]?
A. No . . . i t was due to a debt of obligation (ongi) I owed to
Tashiro.'269 (Emphasis mine.)

Ide's r e l a t i o n s h i p to Tashiro, as that of Horiguchi and Akihara

as well, was not as c l e a r l y spelled out during interrogation. Although

270

Ide characterized himself as "a simple follower of Tashiro Eisuke,"

his involvement i n the r e b e l l i o n did not stem from t h i s alone. A Jiyuto

member since October 1882, he was an a c t i v i s t who, along with Kikuchi,

went to Chichibu i n late October i n order to present a p e t i t i o n to shor-

271
ten the waiting period for the convening of the National Assembly.
As Kikuchi stated t h e i r purpose:

It should be obvious that the present day government has rejected

a l l v i r t u e . It promises a national assembly by 1890. But now i t i s
November 1, 1884. Today we w i l l overthrow the present government by
s t a r t i n g a r e b e l l i o n that w i l l spread throughout the entire nation.
This w i l l then become the revolution (kakumei) that w i l l convene the
national assembly.272

Ide was a serious revolutionary. In passing sentence on Ide,

the court l i s t e d as one of his crimes the s i g n i f y i n g of an Omiya govern-

ment b u i l d i n g occupied by the rebels as the "Revolutionary Headquarters"

273

(kakumei honbu). Ide, moreover, was not employing mere r h e t o r i c , for

i n his capacity as the p r i n c i p a l i n t e l l e c t u a l involved i n the r e b e l l i o n ,

he had considerable knowledge of notions l i k e revolution. In the summer

 341

of 1970 one of his descendents discovered a number of h i s books i n an

old family storehouse. Among them were Volumes 2 to 4 of A History of

the French Revolution (Fukkoku kakumeishi); a volume of Herbert Spencer's

Social Statistics; a number of volumes on French laws, constitution and

contracts; Mosse's Lectures on Self Government (Jiji sei kogi); and so

274 That he read these i s suggested by the fact that he was known to
on.
have spoken to lecture societies i n Saku (a d i s t r i c t i n Nagano), where
275
among other things he preached the need for self-government.

When Ide and Kikuchi f i r s t arrived i n Chichibu they stayed at

276

the home of another l o c a l l y well-known oyabun, Kato Orihei. Like

Tashiro, Kato claimed Jiyuto membership, and a large kobun following of

t h i r t y or forty people, acquired mainly due to his renowned generosity

277

as a "good pawnshop owner" (shichiya ryosuke). Among his kobun were

Ochiai, Takagishi Zenkichi, and Sakamoto Sosaku (the three i n i t i a t o r s of

the Komminto, and a l l Jiyuto members). The court's prosecutor charac-

t e r i z e d Kato as the "person of the strongest character among the leaders

278
of the r i o t e r s . " He was also known to have served as a p e t i t i o n e r
279
for fellow v i l l a g e r s plagued by unpaid loans and high i n t e r e s t c r e d i t o r s .

Kato and Tashiro were also the ones to whom the press and the

authorities referred when they spoke of the Chichibu rebels being led

by "gamblers." Tashiro had, i n fact, been arrested and fined on charges

of gambling i n mid-1884. But not only was t h i s h i s only p r i o r arrest; i t

should further be noted that gambling was not outlawed by the M e i j i

280

government u n t i l January of that same year. Since mid-Tokugawa,

gambling had flourished i n r u r a l areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n market towns l i k e

 342

281
Omiya where crops were sold for cash. I t was not unusual for success-

f u l gamblers to act as l o c a l kyokaku, "godfather-style," i n order to

b u i l d up a following large enough to make the authorities think twice

282

before i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . But the close association

of these two roles of kyokaku and "gambler" i s not i n i t s e l f reason

enough to regard Tashiro as a mere gambler. He was also "lawyer,"

farmer, and one who did good deeds for those i n his community. The same

applied to Kato as well. As Inoue K o j i has said, "Kato was an oyabun,

but this relationship of patronage did not necessarily mean that i t was

expressed through [relations between people frequenting] gambling h a l l s .

It was rather b u i l t upon the human relationships existing i n the mountain
283

villages." But i n any case, i n those f i n a n c i a l l y troubled times, i t

seems quite probable that good numbers of farmers sought to supplement

t h e i r regular income by gambling (to which development the anti-gambling

ordinance was probably a response).

Having seen that the relationships between the Jiyukomminto mem-

bers were based on both shared (Jiyuto) ideology and on oyabun-kobun

r e l a t i o n s , we must now ask how these relations worked i n organising

s t r i c t l y Komminto members (having already seen how these Komminto members

mobilized t h e i r own v i l l a g e r s ) , and also inquire whether the ideas of

those at the top f i l t e r e d down among organisers and followers.

We saw i n Chapter I already how the Komminto began, i . e . , how on

10 August 1884, about a dozen men at the Ogano market happened to get

into a discussion about how bad the times were, and decided then to meet

two days l a t e r at Anoyama mountain to discuss whether they could do

 343

anything about i t ; how they decided to begin a p e t i t i o n campaign against

creditors and how the p o l i c e continually broke up t h e i r meetings. The

p e t i t i o n campaign was spearheaded by Jiyu-komminto members and was appar-

ently the o r i g i n a l and c e n t r a l vehicle by which the 130 or so Komminto

members organised themselves. They i n turn organised the members of the

v i l l a g e s from which they came. Some, such as Tashiro, were responsible

for a number of v i l l a g e s . Tashiro spent ten days i n mid-October t r a v e l -

l i n g between eight v i l l a g e s for which he claimed mobilization responsi-

bility. Undoubtedly, Tashiro r e l i e d on h i s kobun of these v i l l a g e s to

284

aid i n h i s e f f o r t s . But besides this type of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p ,

there are also strong indications that the organisational a c t i v i t i e s of

Komminto members employed the impersonal, Jiyuto ideology as a means to

mobilize v i l l a g e r s .

The Jiyuto fu, or "Liberal Party current," had great influence on

the l o c a l farmers according to A r a i Shuzaburo, Komminto organiser. One

instance of t h i s i s the statement of a fifty-two-year-old i l l i t e r a t e

farmer:
As f a r as the t e r r i b l e hardships being suffered by the general farm-
ing population during these times are concerned, we of the Jiyuto
and i t s President, Itagaki Taisuke, w i l l carry out programs that w i l l
aid those people. . . .We w i l l eradicate high interest loans and
w i l l work to have the various taxes reduced.
This, according to Inoue K o j i , was an example of b e l i e f i n the "myth

(shinwa) of Itagaki" shared by many farmers. "The farmers," he said,

286

"probably f e l t proud of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the Jiyuto." For many,

of course, the Jiyuto was interpreted simply i n terms of i t s a b i l i t y to

have demands met, and was used to j u s t i f y "house-wreckings" against

 344

creditors and usurers. Some, as the testimony of Hondo Isao indicates,

equated t h e i r relationship with the Komminto to a t i e with the Jiyuto:

Q. Are a l l the r i o t e r s Komminto members? 237

A. No, you are mistaken. They are c a l l e d Jiyuto members.

And when asked to i d e n t i f y the ringleaders, he was e a s i l y able to c i t e

Kikuchi, Murakami, Tashiro and others as ones who were "fervent believers
288
i n l i b e r a l i s m " (jiyushugi). Another p a r t i c i p a n t referred to l o c a l
289

organisational meetings i n Hinozawa as "Jiyuto meetings."

Such evidence of v i l l a g e r awareness of the existence of the

Jiyuto, and i t s connection, however tenuous, with the Komminto, does not

of course prove, nor even suggest, that they involved themselves i n the

r e b e l l i o n because of a b e l i e f i n Jiyuto p r i n c i p l e s learned from l o c a l

Komminto organisers. I t only indicates a possible awareness of an. extra-

t r a d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for r e v o l t that they may have adopted through

Komminto organisers, who i n turn adopted them from the so-called J i y u -

komminto members.

CONCLUSION

Shoji Kichinosuke has written, "In t h i s period of Absolutism,

when the p o l i t i c a l parties were as yet undeveloped, p o l i t i c a l creeds

290

centered around the problems of land and taxes." Nakajima, one of the

Aizu a c t i v i s t s i n the Fukushima Incident, made much the same point when

he wrote, "The people who say give us back our rights and give us happi-

ness are b a s i c a l l y making one point about the road construction problem,

namely, that by carrying out our goals for p o l i t i c a l reform, they can
291
have t h e i r rights and t h e i r happiness." Land, taxes, r i g h t s , and
 345

happiness—the people involved i n the three incidents were protesting

against an absolute government that denied them any measure of control

over any of these. Their protest was a f i g h t to gain control. To gain

control they understood that f i r s t the government had to be reformed.

And i t had to be reformed i n such a way as to allow the people continued

control over t h e i r land, t h e i r taxes, t h e i r r i g h t s , and t h e i r happiness.

Necessarily, a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l form of government that guaranteed the

"inherent natural r i g h t s " (tempu koyu no ken) of a l l men was the best and

only way to ensure continued popular control. To t h i s end, a popularly

elected national assembly had to be convened immediately, not i n 1890

when i t was convenient for the government, but i n 1882 or 1884—Now! what-

ever the date—when the People needed i t . But granting, even, that set-

t i n g up an assembly was no easy task, that i t was not to be entered into I

either quickly or l i g h t l y , at least i n the meantime permit free speech

and association i n order to enable the c i t i z e n r y to arrive at enlightened

decisions on important matters.

This was the reasoning the popular rights movement imparted to

the people of the countryside; t h i s , and what Ueki wrote i n his song f o r

the farmers: " I f we c a l l ourselves men, then each person must himself

stand up and say, 'Man has r i g h t s ! ' " In each of our three cases, t h i s

i s what happened. The farmers of Fukushima said they had the right to

p a r t i c i p a t e i n decisions a f f e c t i n g t h e i r land, t h e i r roads, t h e i r labour,

t h e i r taxes, and t h e i r l i v e s ; the Kabasan rebels said that a l l the people

of Japan, and.especially the poor who were victims of an oppressive

government, had natural rights to share equally i n the wealth of the

 346

nation; the Chichibu rebels said they had the r i g h t not to suffer impover-

ishment because of usury, speculation i n the markets, excessively high

taxes, and government p o l i c y which aided the entrepreneur and hindered

the small independent producer.

Very l i k e l y under similar circumstances of the ancien regime, at

least the Fukushima and Chichibu rebels would have done what they d i d i n

1882 and 1884. But, they would have done so i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t

way. They would have been organised by v i l l a g e only, and they would

have j u s t i f i e d t h e i r r e v o l t by invoking the same rationale that t h e i r

grandfathers had. In the 1880's, however, they rebelled as members or

a f f i l i a t e s of a p o l i t i c a l party which told them that they had r i g h t s ,

p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , because they were men. As we saw, of course, they

employed certain t r a d i t i o n a l means of organisation—oyabun-kobun rela-

tionships, f a m i l i a l t i e s , communal relationships and the like--but only •

after reconceptualizing them as elements of organisation which tran-

scended the old types. "Rice roots" democracy had, at least for the

moment, found f e r t i l e soil.

 347

Notes

Franz Schumann, Ideology

1
and Organization in Communist China
(Berkeley, 1968), 2d ed., p. 18.
2
Jefferson wrote i n a l e t t e r to James Madison, 30 January 1787:
"I hold i t that a l i t t l e r e b e l l i o n now and then i s a good thing, and as
necessary i n the p o l i t i c a l world as storms i n the physical. Unsuccess-
f u l r e b e l l i o n s indeed, generally e s t a b l i s h the encroachments on the
rights of the people which have produced them. . . . I t i s a medicine
necessary for the sound health of government. . . . " Quoted i n Adrienne
Koch, ed., Jefferson (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., 1971), pp. 36-37.
3
E l i e Halevy, England in 1815 (New York, 1961), p. 148 and
quoted i n Charles T i l l y , "Collective Violence i n European Perspective,"
eds. H. D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, The History of Violence in America
(New York, 1969), p. 6.
4
Irokawa Daikichi, "Freedom and the Concept of Peoples' Rights,"
Japan Quarterly (June 1967), p. 181.
I t was " o f f i c i a l ideology" i n the sense that the "Declaration
5

of the Rights of Man" (27 August 1789), the Constitution of 1791, and
the Jacobin Convention of July 1793 endorsed the p r i n c i p l e s of natural
right.

For example, see Charles T i l l y , The Vendee

6
(New York, 1967),
for instances i n the French case. Also see George Rude, The Crowd in
History (New York, 1964), esp. pp. 241-42.
7
Ibid.; p. 219.
8
A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law (London, 1951); Kingsley Martin,
French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1962; o r i g -
i n a l l y published, 1927); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass, 1967), esp. pp. 77-86.
9
Ike, Beginnings, p. 130.
10
Ibid., pp. 124-29.
11
227-31. Ienaga Saburo, Ueki Emori kenkyu (Tokyo, 1960), pp. 753;

12
Ibid., p. 754.
13
He was known to have met with Kono Hiroshi on 21 October 1883.
Ibid.
 348

14
Nojima Kitaro, Kabasan jiken (Tokyo, 1890), p. 394. The
a r t i c l e appeared i n the Tosa Shimbun sometime i n June 1886 and was en-
t i t l e d "The Court Verdict of Tomatsu Masao and the Eighteen."
15
Jun Shiyoda, "Murakami T a i j i no saiban," Rekishigaku kenkyu
186 (August 1955):28.
1 6
Ienaga, Ueki, p. 754.
17
Goto Yasushi, "Iida jiken," comp. M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renraku
kai hen, Jiyu minken undo 3 (Tokyo, 1956):112; 120-22; and Ienaga, Ueki,
pp. 426-34. The manifesto i s reproduced i n f u l l i n i b i d . , pp. 716-19.
18
See Ienaga Saburo, ed., Ueki Emori senshu (Tokyo, 1974), pp.
149-51.
19
Ienaga, Ueki kenkyu, p. 349.
20
Ibid., pp. 349-51.
21
See for example Kmgsley Martin's astute analysis of the i n t e l -
l e c t u a l debt that u t i l i t a r i a n and s o c i a l contract thinkers owed to Locke
and other natural r i g h t thinkers; French Liberal Thought, p. 8.
22
Yoshino Sakuzo et a l . , comp., Meiji Bunka Zenshu, 24 vols.,
Jiyu minken hen (Tokyo, 1930) 5:194-95. Yoshino's remark i s found on
p. 513 i n t h i s volume.
23
Shoji Kichinosuke, ed., Nihon seisha seito hattatsu shi (Tokyo,
1959), pp. 154-55.
24
For example, see Maurice Ashley, Oliver Cromwell and the Pur-
itan Revolution (New York, 1958); or J . H. Plumb, The Growth of Political
Stability in England, 1675-1725 (Middlesex, Eng., 1967).
25
Translated i n Ike, Beginnings, p. 106.
26
Herbert Passin, "Japan," ed. James S. Coleman, Education and
Political Development (Princeton, 1965), pp. 274-75.
27
Ibid., p. 276.
28
Ibid., p. 272.
29
Ibid., p. 277; and Ronald P. Dore, "Education: Japan," eds.
Robert E. Ward and Dankart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan
and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), p. 179; and Ronald Dore, "The Legacy of
Tokugawa Education," ed. Marius Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes To-
ward Modernization (Princeton, 1965), p. 105.
 349

30
Ono, Saitama, p. 195.
3 1
Ibid., p. 196.
3 2
Ibid., pp. 154-55.
33
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 90.
34
Ibid., p. 22.
35
Ibid., p. 23.
36
Ibid., p. 38.
37
Ibid., p. 23; and Hirano Yoshitaro, Oi Kentaro (Tokyo, 1965),
pp. 111-12.
38
Irokawa, "Freedom," p. 177, quoting a study done by Shoji
Kichinosuke.
39 \
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 151-54.
40
Ibid., p. 332.
41
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 16-17.
42
Ibid., p. 14.
43
Kono Banshu hensai kai, Kono Banshu den I (Tokyo, 1924):186-87
and quoted i n Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 14. A longer version and
t r a n s l a t i o n can be found i n Ike, Beginnings, p. 112.
44
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 13-18.
45
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
4 6
Ibid., pp. 14-18.
47
Ibid., p. 16.
48
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 40. Instances of individuals
who were influenced by Kono to j o i n the movement include Kariyado,
S h i r a i , and Matsumoto Yoshinaga. See Takahashi Tetsuo, Fukushima jiyu
minken undo shi (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 277, 288; also Shoji, Nihon seisha, p.
334.
49
A r t i c l e VI of the Sekkyosha charter; i b i d . , p. 15.
50
Ibid., p. 16.
 350

51
This p o l i c e report was dated 3 July 1880 and can be found i n
i b i d . , p. 7.
52
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 24.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid., p. 23. Given the topics of study, these "academies"
may very well have been the f i r s t schools that taught P o l i t i c a l Science
in Japanese history.
5 5
Ibid., pp. 26-27.

Ibid.
5 7
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
58
Ibid., p. 26.
59
Reproduced i n Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 156-57.
"The state r a t i f y i n g conventions were elected by voters who
6 0

themselves constituted only a small f r a c t i o n of the American population.

To that extent, the process of r a t i f i c a t i o n [of the U.S. Constitution]
was not a democratic action." From Louis H. Pollak, ed., The Constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court: A..Documentary History I. (Cleveland,..1966) :
116. Also.see Pollak's discussion on.literacy and property q u a l i f i c a -
tions as revealed i n the "Randolph Plan" and the "Patterson Plan," pp.
60-63.

Takahashi, Fukushima jiken,

6 1
pp. 31, 45. On the "Boshin War"
as a source of l a t e r Aizu enmity towards the East,, see Kobayashi and
Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, pp. 158-77.
62
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 46.
6 3
Ibid.
64
Oishi, "Shakai k e i z a i , " p. 112.
65
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 154-55.
66 ,. ,
Ibid., p. 44.
67
For example, see Raymond P o l i n , "John Locke's Conception of
Freedom," ed. J. W. Yolton, John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 1-18.
68
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 17; and Kobayashi and Yamada,
Fukushima r e k i s h i , p. 181.
 351

69
"[The Aishinsha] served as the womb for the formation of the
Aizu Jiyuto." Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 18.
70
In Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 6-7.
71
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 73; Shimoyama Saburo, "Fuku-
shima jiken koron," ed. Sakane Yoshihisa, Jiyu minken, v o l . 10, Nihon
Rekishi Ser. (Tokyo, 1973):167-68.
72
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 40.
7 3
Ibid., p. 20.
74
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 161-62.
75
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 86.
7 6
Ibid., p. 37.
77
Ibid., p. 38.
78
A r t i c l e II of i t s "Provisional Rules," appearing i n Shoji,
Nihon seisha, p. 162.
79
Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, p. 188.
80
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 31.
81
Ibid., p. 18.
82
See for example Samuel P. Huntington, P o l i t i c a l Order in Chang-
ing Societies (New Haven, 1968), esp. pp. 72-92.
83
Fukushima kenshi (FKS) XI:457. The report was dated 11 July
1882 and was submitted to the governor.
84
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 55-56.
85
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 39.
Document No. 10 ("The Selection of C e l l Leaders and t h e i r
8 6

Apportionment by Village") i n Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 62-63; i t i s d i s -

cussed by Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 36-39.
87
Ibid., p. 163.
88
Ibid., pp. 62-63.
89
Ibid.
 352

90
Kobayashi and Yamada, Fukushima rekishi, p. 204.
9 1
Ibid., p. 188.
9 2
FKS XI:457-58.
93
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 174.
94
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 38.
95
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 58-59.
9 6
Ibid., p. 59.
97
Hirano, Oi, pp. 65-70. Also see Marius Jansen, "Oi Kentaro:
Radicalism and Chauvinism," Far Eastern Quarterly II, No. 3 (May 1952):
305-16.
98
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 59.
99
Ibid.
1 0 0
Ibid., p. 60.
1 0 1
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 98.

102
Itagaki Taisuke, Jiyuto shi, 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1973; o r i g i n a l l y
published 1910 i n 2 vols.) 2:248.
103
Quoted i n Goto Yasushi, Jiyu minken: Meiji no kakumei to
hankakumei (Tokyo, 1972), p. 173.
104
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 178.
1 0 5
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 33.

1 0 6
TV,
Ibid.
107
Itagaki, Jiyuto-shi 11:254-55 or i n Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp.
425-26.
108
Itagaki, Jiyuto-shi 11:255.
109
Maeda Rensan, Jiyuminken jidai (Tokyo, 1961), p. 265.
110
Sho^i, Nihon seisha, p. 436.
1 1 1
Ibid., pp. 435-43.
112
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p. 27.
 353

113
The complete interrogation i s reproduced i n Shojx, Nihon
seisha, pp. 485-94.
1 1 4
TV," /I
Ibxd.
1 1 5
TV,
Ibxd.
116
Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 28-29.
117
Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of Populist
and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, trans. Francis
Haskell, Introd.. Isaiah B e r l i n , (New York,.1966), p.. 2.
118
Quoted i n i b i d . , pp. 1, 35.
119

Ibid., p. 580.

Ibxd.
121
Ibid., chaps. 20 and 21.
122
KJKS, p. 772.
123
Ibid., p. 122.
124
125 Ibid., p. 798.
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, pp. 33-36; also Endo, Kabasan, pp.
31-32.
1 2 6
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
127
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, pp. 44-45.
128
Ibid.; also Ibaraki kenshi: shi, machi, mura hen I (Mito,
1972):155.
129
Sato, "Jiyuto-in meibo," p. 31.
1 3 0
Endo, Kabasan, p. 28.
131
Akagi Etsuko, "Tochigi no jiyuminken undo—chiho jxjx no yoso
no megutte," Tochigi shiron 2:1-12.
132
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 58; and Endo, Kabasan, p. 36.
133
Quoted i n i b i d . , pp. 32-33.
1 3 4
TK',
Ibxd.
 354

135
KJKS, p. 103.

Ibid.
137
Ibid., p. 21.
138
Endo, Kabasan, p. 35.
139
KJKS, p. 103.
140
Ibid., p. 102.
141
Ibid., p. 107.
142
Ibid., pp. 541-46.
143
1880.
A r t i c l e VII of the Shukai Joretsu, made into law i n A p r i l

144
Endo, Kabasan, pp. 57-58.
145
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 58.
146
Quoted i n f u l l i n KJKS, pp. 549-51; also i n Goto Yasushi,
"Jushichinen gekka jiken n i t s u i t e , " eds. Horie and Toyama Jiyuminkenki
II, Gekka to kaitai 1:246.
147
Sato, "Jiyuto-in meibo," p. 31.
148
Goto, "Jushichinen," p. 259.
149
Endo, Kabasan, p. 128.
150
Quoted i n f u l l i n Ebukuro Fumio, Chichibu Bodo (Kumagaya,
1952), p. 29; Goto, "Jushichinen," p. 262; Endo, Kabasan, p. 159.
151
Emura E i i c h i and Nakamura Seisoku, eds., Kokumm to minken
no sokoku, v o l . 6, Nihon Minshu no Rekishi ser. (Tokyo, 1974):164-65.
152
Nojima, Kabasan, p. 55.
153
Nojima, supra, p. 219, says the founding date was 4 September;
Taoka Reiun, another contemporary, says 10 August, Meiji hanshin den
(Tokyo, 1953; rpt., o r i g i n a l l y published 1909), p. 68.
154
Nojima, Kabasan, p. 219; the pronounciation i s almost the
same. Each i s a three-character word having the same f i r s t and l a s t char-
acters. But for the Tokyo Yuikkan the middle character means "one"; for
Tomatsu's Yuikan i t means "to do" or "to perform."
 355

155
KJKS, p. 467.
156
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 219.
157
KJKS, p. 453.
1 5 8
Ibid., p. 467.
159
See Kobayashi's testimony, ibid., pp. 455-56.
1 6 0
Ibid., p. 23; and Itagaki, Jiyuto-shi 111:49.

In Yokoyama's testimony, KJKS, p. 25, we read: "Q. 'Who wrote

1 6 1

the manifesto?' A. 'Hirao did.'" Even from contemporary s o u r c e s — T o s u i

minken shi, Meiji. hanshin den, Kabasan jiken (Nojima), and Jiyuto-shi—
we learn l i t t l e about Hirao. For a comparison of Hirao's manifesto and
Ueki Emori's for the Iida jiken, see Endo, Kabasan, pp. 204-5. For a
l i s t of Hirao's personal effects found on his body, and for a physical
description (post mortem), see KJKS, pp. 375 and 360.

162
Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 137.
163
Endo, Kabasan, p. 144, quoting.from the Jiyuto-shi.
164

Nojima, Kabasan jiken, p. 138.

Ibid., p. 137.

1 6 6
KJKS, p. 468.

1 6 7
Ibid., p. 455.
168
Ibid.
169 p- 462.
Ibid
170 p- 235.
Ibid
1 7 1
T V .
p- 42.
Ibid
T V .
p- 46.
1 7 2

Ibid
X V .
p. 191.
1 7 3

Ibid
T V .
p- 455.
1 7 4

Ibid
175

Quoted i n Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, pp. 267-68.

1 7 6
KJKS, p. 476.
 356

177
Sidney R. Brown, " P o l i t i c a l Assassination i n Early M e i j i
Japan: The Plot against Okubo Toshimichi," ed. David Wurfel, Meiji Japan's
Centenniel (Lawrence, Kans., 1971), pp. 18-35.
178

KJKS, p. 32.

1 7 9
Ibid., pp. 469-70.

Ibid., p. 461.
181
From his Introduction to KJKS, p. 1.
182
Endo's commentary i n Appendix of KJKS, p. 797.
183
Ibid., p. 798.
184
Endo, Kabasan, pp. 104, 138-41. Endo believes the s e l f -
imposed i s o l a t i o n was a function of the rebels' own sense of the lonely
l i f e of the " t e r r o r i s t . " Goto, "Gekka," p. 217, also uses the term
" t e r r o r i s t " to describe the Kabasan rebels. Unfortunately, I believe
both are g u i l t y of reading twentieth-dentury "terrorism" into the nine-
teenth-century l i b e r a l movement.
185
KJKS, p. 25.
David C. Rappoport, Assassination
1 8 6
and Terrorism (Toronto,
1971), pp. 47, 49, 52.
187
W. W. McLaren, A Political History of Japan (New York, 1916),
pp. 105-6. Also see Morikawa Tetsuro, Meiji Ansatsu shi (Tokyo, 1969);
and also his Bakumatsu Ansatsu shi (Tokyo, 1967). Also of interest i s
James Soukup, "Assassination i n Japan," eds. James Kirkham, Sheldon Levy,
and William J . Crotty, Assassination and Political Violence, vol. 8,
Supp. D, A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 531-36.
188
Sato, "Jiyuto-in meibo," pp. 31-32. The figures 121 and 135
represent respectively the number of members recorded by the Jiyuto
party i t s e l f , and the number counted by Sato from the periodic membership
l i s t s published by the J i y u Shimbun.
Ibid.
190
See Rude, Crowd, pp. 22-23, 30, 225, f o r the European notion
of natural j u s t i c e used by the peasants, especially one manifestation of
i t , the "taxation populaire."
191
Written by Sekido Kanzo, Tokyo, 1903. This passage i s quoted
in Nihon seiji saiban shi roku, 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1969), 2:68.
 357

192
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, pp. 73, 83. Referring to the Chi-
chibu Incident, Aoki said, " I t was an economic c o n f l i c t between debtors
and c r e d i t o r s . "
193
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 183-84.
194
Itagaki, Jiyuto-shi 111:93.
195
There i s evidence that t h i s was the case. Consider t h i s
short a r t i c l e i n the Japan Weekly Mail, 7 June 1884: "A s o c i a l i s t i c mass
meeting was held i n Osumi d i s t r i c t , Sagami, Kanagawa prefecture on the
27th of l a s t month. . . . " I t was l i k e l y r e f e r r i n g to a Komminto meeting.
196
Tanaka Senya, "Chichibu bodo zatsuroku," 1884, from h i s
diary; reprinted i n i t s e n t i r e t y i n Chichibu jiken shiryo (CJSR), 2 vol.,
ed. Saitama Shimbunsha (Urawa, 1970), 2:551-85. Also see Inoue, Chichibu
jiken, pp. 74-79.
197
CJSR 11:564.
198
Ibid., 1:66.
199
Ibid., 11:563.
Reproduced i n Takamoto Gise, "Komminto jiken," Rekishi
2 0 0
hyoron,
Special ed. (November-December 1954), p. 57.
201
From the court interrogation of Tashiro Eisuke, Komminto Army
Commander, CJSR 1:101.
202
For example, see Hugh Borton, Peasant Uprisings, pp. 99-106;
115-16; 146-54 f o r three instances of successful protests i n this regard.
203
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 42.
204
Ibid., pp. 43-45.
205
Ibid., p. 46.
206
Ibid.
207
Gakushuin hojinkai, Shigakubu, comp., Chichibu jiken no
ikkosai (Tokyo, 1968), p. 46; also see "Kanagawa jiken," Nihon Rekishi
Daijiten 111:69.
208
Ikkosai, p. 45.
209
Tanaka Senya's papers i n CJSR 11:553. Also reproduced i n
Nihon Seiji saiban shi roku 11:75. This l a t t e r work claims that Kikuchi
Kanbei was the author.
 358

210
CJSR 11:14-46.
211
Ibid., 1:621.
2 1 2
Ibid., 1:421-24; 446; 458; 487-502; 506-8.
213
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 180.
214
Ibid., p. 185.
Ibid.
2 1 6
CJSR 1:106-7.
217
Related i n Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 61-64; compare with
those meeting on 12 October, at Shimo-yoshida, mentioned i n Ide Magoroku,
Chichibu Komminto gunsho (Tokyo, 1973), p. 21.
218
Ebukuro, Bodo, pp. 68-69.
219
CJSR 1:102-3.
220
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 67-68.
221
Ibid., p. 68.
2 2 2
TK',
Ibid.
223
Ibid., p. 69.
224
CJSR 1:117.
225
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 70.
2 2 6
See footnote 217.
227
CJSR 1:103.
2 2 8
TK',
Ibid.
2 2 9
TK',
Ibid.
230
Ibid., pp. 104-5. Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 71, mistakenly claims
that a l l ranks were assigned by Tashiro, Inoue and Kato together.
231
For the entire but lengthy exchange between Tashiro and h i s
interrogator, see CJSR 1:106-8.
232
Ibid., p. 107. Emphasis mine.
233
Ibid., pp. 109-10.
 359

234
CJSR 1:56.
235
Ibid., 1:111.
2 3 6
Ibid.; also see E r i c J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (London, 1969), p.
96 for a discussion of the same practice as i t was done by the "expro-
p r i a t o r " type of European bandit.
237
KJKS, pp. 138-41.
CJSR 11:270-71; CJSR 1:492.
239
Ibid., pp. 65-66.
240 ,. ,
Ibid., p. 67.
241
Ibid., 11:14.
2 4 2
TV, rr
Ibid., p. 5.
243
Ibid., p. 11.
244
Ibid., p. 6.
245
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 194.
2 4 6

Ibid.,
TV,
p. ac
86.
247
Ibid., p. 84.
2 4 8
Inoue uses the same figure, i b i d .
249
Ibid., p. 85.
2 5 0
Reproduced i n i b i d . , p. 86.
251
Ide, Komminto, pp. 65-78.
252
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 82; also see Hirano, Oi, p. 110,
where he refers to Arai as one of the l o c a l " i n t e l l i g e n s i a " (interi),
along with seven other school teachers, two Shinto p r i e s t s , and two school
administrators, a l l of whom were members of the Komminto.
253
Quoted i n Tanaka Senya's diary; CJSR 11:570.
254
See sample, Appendix I I I .
255
This l i s t i s reproduced i n Uehara Kunichi, Saku jiyu minken
undo shi (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 273-77.
 360

2 5 6
Ide, Komminto, p. 43.
2 5 7
CJSR 11:612-13.
258
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 38.
259
Hirano, Oi, p. 112.
260
Ikkosai, p. 44.
2 61
Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 34.
2 6 2
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
2 6 3
CJSR 1:114-15.
264
Ibid., pp. 115-16.
265 ,. ,
Ibid.
266
Ibid.
Ibid., 1:362; also quoted i n Ebukuro, Bodo, p. 205. Also see
2 6 7

"Kyokaku" i n the Nihon Rekishi Daijiten III (Tokyo, 1968):508-9.

268
CJSR 1:100.
269
Ibid., 11:55-66. Emphasis mine.
270
Ibid., 1:120.
271
Ibid., 11:214.
272
Quoted i n Ikkosai, p. 56.
273
CJSR 11:215; Ide, Komminto, p. 119.
274
Ibid., pp. 121-22.
275
Ibid., p. 127.
276
For example, see the testimony of Hondo Issan, i b i d . , 11:15.
277
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 37. Kato was even said to have
renounced a debt of 150 yen. Hondo, a Kato kobun, revealed much about
his oyakata's S t i r l i n g personality during h i s interrogation. See CJSR
11:15.
278
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 37.
 2 7 9
CJSR 1:46 and 359.

280
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 92.
281
Nihon Rekishi Daijiten 111:509.
282
Ibid.
283
Inoue, Chichibu jiken, p. 37.
284

Ibid., p. 71.

2 8 5
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 71.

Ibid., p. 81.
28 7
CJSR 11:16.
2 8 8
Ibid., p. 15.
289
Ibid., p. 10.
290
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 236.
291
Ibid., pp. 310-11, from a document e n t i t l e d "Tokubetsu
Naisoku," r e f e r r i n g to the internal rules of the Aizu rokugun rengoka.
 CHAPTER V

CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS

The decade of the 1880's was not a propitious period for rebel-

lions and rebels, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they happened to be connected with the

popular rights movement. In t h i s l a s t chapter we w i l l show what happened

to the rebels a f t e r t h e i r capture by the a u t h o r i t i e s , to the i n d i v i d u a l

rebels themselves and to the groups of which they were part. We will

show i n the f i r s t part of t h i s chapter that to a considerable extent the

rebels of a l l three incidents were victims of a pattern of p o l i t i c a l

oppression that was well established by the time of the r e b e l l i o n s , that

indeed was i t s e l f i n large measure a reaction to the advances made by

the popular rights movement. We can say now that the repression which

the rebels of each of the incidents suffered was excessive, and far beyond

(at least) a modern Western conception of fairness or j u s t i c e . The penal-

t i e s imposed on the participants of the three incidents far outreached

either the nature of t h e i r crime or any p r i o r criminal records. Only

four of the Fukushima p a r t i c i p a n t s , that we know of, had a p r i o r record

of crime; only two of the Chichibu leaders, and eleven of the Kabasan

rebels had criminal records. But even i n the l a t t e r case, the crimes

were of a p o l i t i c a l nature, and most stemmed from t h e i r part i n the Fuku-

shima Incident, and most were acquitted. This i s necessary to r e a l i z e

at the beginning of t h i s chapter for i n the f i r s t section we seek to

answer the question, "What happened to the rebels?"

The second section of t h i s chapter w i l l address i t s e l f to the

362
 363

issues raised i n the Introduction, a l l of which revolve around the one

central question, "Did the popular rights movement f a i l ? " In approaching

t h i s question we w i l l draw upon many of the findings we reported earlier

i n the thesis and b r i e f l y touch upon some not reported but which nonethe-

less help to provide us with an answer to t h i s question. These findings

concern the farmers' movement that occurred a f t e r the 1880's. Based on

our own findings and others, we w i l l challenge the dominant interpreta-

tions of North American scholarship that argue either that "the f i r s t

attempt (at democracy) f a i l e d i n Japan" or that i t could not have f a i l e d

because i t was never t r i e d . To anticipate somewhat, we w i l l argue that

democracy did not f a i l and that i t was i n fact " t r i e d . "

CONSEQUENCES

What then of t h i s so-called "pattern of p o l i t i c a l oppression?"

It was based on two separate but i n t e r r e l a t e d facets of the immediate

post-Restoration problems attending what some modernization theorists

have termed "the c r i s i s of consolidation." The f i r s t of these facets was

the new government's demonstrated a b i l i t y to e f f e c t one major type of

s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l reform a f t e r another without suffering any serious set-

backs. The a b o l i t i o n of the o l d domains and the creation of c e n t r a l i z e d

administration; the land reform and land tax of 1872 and 1873; the legal

d i s s o l u t i o n of the feudal class system; the u n i f i c a t i o n of the national

market; conscription, reforms i n education, banking, communication, and

i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n — a l l were effected i n quick succession with remarkable

success while at the same time demonstrating a c a p a b i l i t y of dealing with

 364

unarmed and armed opposition to them. With such success at reform, the

government grew more and more c e r t a i n of i t s power and authority, but, at

the same time, more and more anxious about i t s maintenance. This cer-

t a i n t y and anxiety were increasingly and s t e a d i l y manifested i n the

number of repressive laws i t proclaimed to ensure continued and future

success at i t s programme of fukoku kyohei ("rich country, strong m i l i -

tary" ) .

This point related to the second facet dealing with the "crisis

of consolidation." Domestic order was absolutely necessary i n order to

modernize, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the midst of an international context rife

with great power imperialism. Without domestic order, Japan could not

modernize; without modernization she could not r e t a i n her p o l i t i c a l sover-

eignty. Indeed, i t had already been v i o l a t e d by embarrassing t r e a t i e s

of e x t r a - t e r r i t o r a l i t y and "most-favoured nation" trading r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

To Japan's modernizing leaders, these threats from without must have made

the threats from within seem a l l the more dangerous. No sooner had i t s

new conscript army subdued the thousands of discontented samurai under

Saigo Takamori i n 1877, i t must have seemed, than an equally subversive

body c a l l e d the popular rights movement began to r a i s e i t s ugly head.

Yamagata Aritomo, chief a r c h i t e c t of Japan's modern m i l i t a r y forces and

Home Minister at the time of the Kabasan and Chichibu r e b e l l i o n s , p r i -

vately confided to a l l i e d o l i g a r c h Ito Hirobumi i n a l e t t e r dated 4 July

1879:

Itagaki's scheme i s to c a l l for the peoples' r i g h t s , slander the

government, abuse o f f i c i a l s with reckless and groundless attacks and
thereby arouse disgruntled shizoku and spread unrest throughout the
 365

land. By prolonging this s i t u a t i o n he hopes to unite the people and

overthrow the government at the opportune moment. 1
(Emphasis mine.)

Four years l a t e r when many thousands were organised into Jiyuto branches,

Yamagata was no less apprehensive. Complaining again to Ito about pre-

sent laws not being harsh enough, he wrote:

With t h i s condition p r e v a i l i n g at present, I am apprehensive that un-

less we take d r a s t i c measures to deal with the p o l i t i c a l parties, i t
w i l l prove hopeless to attempt to achieve the goal of preserving the
independence of our imperial nation.

At l e a s t Yamagata, Japan's Bismarck, wanted yet more blood and more iron

i n order to preserve his nation's sovereignty. To do t h i s he believed

that yet stronger pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n had to be added to an already

well established pattern of p o l i t i c a l oppression.

What then was the nature of t h i s p o l i t i c a l oppression?

It began i n 1873 when newspaper codes and l i b e l laws were enacted

i n order to c u r t a i l a press already showing signs of libelous l i b e r a l

independence. In 1875 the press laws were made even more stringent,

threatening fines, imprisonment, and suspension of publication for news-

papers whose editors allowed intemperate c r i t i c i s m of the government and

its policies. More than two hundred writers were punished during the
3

next f i v e years for v i o l a t i n g i t s provisions. Shortly a f t e r the Jiyuto

and other parties were formed and had established t h e i r own organs, such

as the Jiyu Shimbun, the government responded with an even tougher law

i n A p r i l 1883. For v i o l a t i n g this new newspaper and publishing code 474

4

writers and editors were prosecuted during 1883 and 1884.

Freedom of speech was limited i n other areas as w e l l : On 9 Decem-

ber 1880, the f i r s t of several laws r e s t r i c t i n g the r i g h t to p e t i t i o n was

 366

proclaimed. 5
A year before, i n A p r i l 1879, less than a year a f t e r the

government allowed prefectural assemblies to be elected to serve as advi-

sory bodies to the governors, a law was invoked that threatened assembly-

men with deprivation of a l l rights for a seven-year period i f they

"treasonably" overstepped t h e i r already much c u r t a i l e d prerogative to

debate l e g i s l a t i o n . In December 1882 the government went even further

by proscribing communication and meetings between members of d i f f e r e n t

prefectural assemblies. 6

This l a s t law was actually an amendment to the e a r l i e r Law of

Public Meetings (shukai jorei) that had been enacted on 5 A p r i l 1880.

This law forbade students, teachers, policemen, s o l d i e r s , and other

government personnel to attend any p o l i t i c a l meeting or to j o i n any

p o l i t i c a l organisation. I t also placed r e s t r i c t i o n s on the scheduling

and the content of p o l i t i c a l meetings and i t furthermore prohibited

p o l i t i c a l societies to combine or to communicate with one another.

Violators could be prosecuted f o r treason. In January 1882 the e f f e c t of

the Public Meetings law on p o l i t i c a l society members worsened when a new

ordinance was issued, making offenders of t h i s law and others subject to

prosecution for a felony rather than a misdemeanour. Between 1883 and

1884, 309 individuals were prosecuted for breaking the Meetings law,
7

among whom were several of the leaders of the three incidents. But per-

haps more important than numbers arrested was the countless numbers of

p o l i t i c a l meetings broken up by the p o l i c e who were acting i n accord with

the provisions of t h i s law. I t i s known, for instance, that i n the f i r s t

eight months of 1882 the Fukushima p o l i c e reported observing 306 p o l i t i c a l

 367

Q
meetings (Jiyuto), broke up sixteen of them, and arrested two speakers.

C l e a r l y , the popular rights movement by t h i s time was " . . . considered

9

a r e a l and present danger by the Oligarchs." But how then d i d t h i s pat-

tern of p o l i t i c a l oppression manifest i t s e l f - i n the three incidents?

We saw i n Chapter I that after the Kitakata incident of 28 Novem-

ber, wholesale arrests were made throughout the entire prefecture, not

just i n Yama d i s t r i c t where the incident occurred or even i n Tamura where

the eastern Jiyuto headquarters was located. Estimates vary, but any-

where between one and two thousand party members or supporters were

arrested i n l a t e 1882, although more than half of these never set foot

i n Aizu during the entire summer of that y e a r . 1 0

The reason f o r such

wide-scale arrests seems to be c l e a r . On 28 November, Governor Mishima

wrote a secret message to h i s secretary Murakami Juncho:

Concerning the wicked r i o t e r s at Kitakata> i t i s an opportune moment
to arrest a l l those related people yet remaining [unarrested]. I f
you have an i n s u f f i c i e n t number of policemen, talk to the other
p o l i c e branches i n the region, and mobilize and deputize the 150 men
of the Miharu Fencing Club (Gekkento). Dispose of t h i s problem
firmly, omitting no one. Time i s of the essence. You ought t o c a l l
i n the p o l i c e from other d i s t r i c t s i f yours are i n s u f f i c i e n t . Send
me a reply immediately.H

That night the Aizu Jiyuto headquarters was assaulted by forty

policemen aided by s p e c i a l deputies, and forty-four Jiyuto members were

arrested. Within the next several weeks, 518 Aizu Jiyuto supporters and

members were charged with crimes ranging from being a "ringleader" and

" i n c i t i n g crowds to r i o t " to " i n s t i g a t i o n " and mere " r i o t i n g " ; these were

a l l felonies. About 325 of the 518 men were charged with "blindly f o l -

lowing and assembling to r i o t , " a misdemeanour punishable by a fine of

12
one to two yen. Many of those Aizu men charged with the more serious
 368

crimes—and t h i s applies to those from eastern Fukushima as well—found

themselves thrown into v e r i t a b l e torture chambers without even being i n -

formed of the nature of t h e i r crime. I t i s claimed that about 200 Jiyuto

members and supporters were tortured, and prison d i a r i e s , memoranda be-

tween o f f i c i a l s , court records, and newspaper accounts seem to substan-

t i a t e at least the fact i f not the. number as well. Igarashi Takehide's

court testimony, for instance, includes references to the marks on his

body which he revealed to the c o u r t . 1 3

In A p r i l the Choya Shimbun pub-

lished a report about a prisoner "frequently ordered to leave the jail

and appear i n the p o l i c e station i n muddy and snowy weather; that he was

kept standing day and night without a morsel to eat; that he was refused

food and that the p o l i c e sergeants sometimes kicked his feet, causing
14

blood to flow." Jiyuto member Haneda Kiyomizu from fair o f f Soma d i s -

t r i c t was a v i c t i m of the arrest campaign; he was charged with " i n s u l t i n g

an o f f i c i a l " and forced to stand out i n the cold; he contracted pneumonia

15

as a r e s u l t , and died i n prison. There are too many stories to discount

them, stories of beatings, torture and even suicide taking place i n

prison while these " t r a i t o r s " were waiting to be t r i e d .

Those who a c t u a l l y made i t to court seem not to have fared much

better. Most of the known Jiyuto members were prosecuted at the Fuku-

shima Felony Court or at the Wakamatsu Misdemeanour Court. Those..found

g u i l t y at the former court were sentenced to six or seven years i n prison;

those found g u i l t y at the l a t t e r to between one and f i v e y e a r s . 1 6

About

t h i r t y of those found g u i l t y of felony charges l a t e r appealed the c o u r t s 1

v e r d i c t , and i n a l l cases the lower court's decision was overturned,

 369

t e s t i f y i n g therefore to the p o l i t i c a l nature of the charges brought

against these men. Moreover, by the time these men were released, the

judge who f i r s t sentenced them to prison, Akagi Kenichi, had been p o l i t i -

17

c a l l y rewarded and promoted to succeed Mishima as Governor of Fukushima.

If these are two indications of the p o l i t i c a l nature of the

arrests, then the treason t r i a l s i n Tokyo was another. The basis of

the charge brought against a l l fifty-seven men was an alleged connection

between the "blood pact" promising to overthrow the government signed by

Kono Hironaka and f i v e others (earlier quoted; see Chapter IV), and the

Kitakata incident that was supposedly led by the other f i f t y - o n e men

charged with treason. The t r i a l lasted nearly two months, from early

February 1883 to early A p r i l , and during that time i t became apparent

that there was no evidence to connect the Kitakata incident to the "blood

pact," and hence f i f t y - o n e of the men were acquitted. The "Blood Pact

Six" d i d not do as well. Two of t h e i r lawyers, Hoshi Toru and Oi Kentaro,

used the t r i a l as a p o l i t i c a l platform to i n d i c t the government for i t s

18
crimes; t h i s c e r t a i n l y did not help the s i x . Kono defended himself
by arguing that when he used the word tempuku ("overthrow") he r e a l l y
19

meant kairyo ("reform"). Hanaka and Hirajima, however, said that the

word tempuku meant for them what i t did for everyone else, adding that

"reform" could only occur i f the government were overthrown. A l l six

were found g u i l t y of "conspiring to overthrow the government." Kono was

sentenced to seven years imprisonment, and the others to s i x years.

Tamano died i n prison the next January, and the others' were released i n

February 1889 when they were pardoned on the occasion of the promulgation

of the M e i j i Constitution.
 370

For both the eastern and western branches of the Jiyuto, the

aftermath of the Kitakata incident was disastrous. Overt p o l i t i c a l op-

pression had cost the Jiyuto i t s best leaders, a hundred or so at the

upper levels of the party hierarchy, and hundreds at the lower l e v e l s .

Among the many followers a fear of being arrested kept many away from

party-related lectures and meetings; attendance dropped. Some a c t i v i s t s ,

such as Monna, Hara, and S a j i who were acquitted of treason, t r i e d taking

Governor Mishima to court for abuses of power, but were threatened with

arrest; many others who had escaped arrest e a r l i e r went into hiding,

only to be caUght two and three years l a t e r and sent to prison. Others,

we know, turned to scheming and p l o t t i n g the overthrow of the government;

such was the case of the Fukushima men involved i n the Kabasan Incident.

One would imagine that the Kabasan r e v o l t was the perfect, c l e a r -

cut case for the government to prove - treason. After a l l , sixteen men

openly declared t h e i r intent to bring down the government by force, and

actually t r i e d to do so. Moreover, "Since the government o f f i c i a l s r e -

garded the Kabasan Incident as extremely serious, they employed a l l t h e i r

20

p o l i c e and investigative powers to arrest a l l those concerned."

Obvious evidence, concerted investigation, and even an open admission of

g u i l t by the rebels during p r e t r i a l interrogation pointed to treason. As

Kono Hiroshi stated t h e i r crime, "We who involved ourselves i n t h i s i n c i -

dent can only be understood as having committed treason . . . ." What

could be clearer? Let Kono himself explain what the government did. Con-

tinuing his above-quoted statement, Kono said:

. . . but the p o l i c y of t h i s administration i s to pervert the law
greatly. We ought not to be prosecuted as ordinary criminals. In
 371

other words, what the Justice Ministry has done i s to manipulate the
law by debasing the charge, but this cannot even for one day f o o l
the Japanese people; i t cannot protect the authority of the govern-
ment; ultimately t h i s act w i l l come to be regarded as a great blot
i n the records of the Japanese j u d i c i a r y . (Emphasis mine.)
2±

In other words, the government changed the charge against the Kabasan

rebels from treason to "armed robbery," presumably i n order to "de-

p o l i t i c i z e " the t r i a l and to. prevent the kind of negative p u b l i c i t y the

government received as a r e s u l t of the Fukushima Incident treason t r i a l .

That t r i a l had also served to catapult Kono Hironaka into the ranks of

the great p a t r i o t s ; the government d i d not want the same to happen to

Hironaka's nephew Hiroshi and h i s fourteen compatriots.

The a l t e r i n g of the charge surprised the Kabasan rebels. A l l the

p r e t r i a l questioning by p o l i c e and government prosecutors—some of which

was related i n Chapter IV—concerned i t s e l f with the nature of t h e i r

treasonable act, and i n fact the rebels had been charged with treason on

the basis of t h i s early investigation. Not u n t i l 6 March 1885, a f t e r

the preliminary hearings had been completed, was the charge changed to
22

armed robbery r e s u l t i n g i n murder.

This a l t e r a t i o n also made necessary changes i n nearly 300 other

charges, ones which had been l a i d against about 300 accomplices who
23

came from Tochigi, Ibaraki, Fukushima, Yamanashi, Chiba, and Tokyo.

The l i s t included such prominent popular rights advocates as prefectural

assembly member Naito Roichi of A i c h i prefecture and Tanaka Shozo of the

Tochigi prefectural assembly—the government said about him: "Tanaka has

long [behaved] l i k e a c r a f t y cancerous tumour; taking a hatchet to i t was
24
long overdue" — a n d included such unknowns as Koinuma's entire family.
 372

A l l but a handful of the 300 were released within a month to ten months

a f t e r t h e i r arrest. Only such " p r i n c i p a l offenders" (seihansha) as

Ohashi and Naito were indicted for having given money or shelter to the

rebels after the incident. Now instead of being charged with aiding

t r a i t o r s , they were charged with aiding robbers.

Not u n t i l September 1885 did the t r i a l s begin. The f i f t e e n rebels

were t r i e d i n four d i f f e r e n t courts—Tokyo, Tochigi, Chofu, and C h i b a —

nearest to the place where each was captured. In a l l four courtrooms

sat policemen whose duty was to report on a l l Jiyuto members and sup- .
25

porters attending the t r i a l s . Once again, Oi Kentaro was serving as

defence attorney, but unlike the Fukushima t r i a l s Oi did not remain

throughout the t r i a l period, resigning i n late September, probably i n

26

order to begin planning for his i l l - f a t e d expedition to l i b e r a t e Korea.

The t r i a l s began with protestations made by Kono, Koinuma, Amano,

and others against the change i n the indictment. For example, Kono

reasoned, " I f you examine the manifesto d i s t r i b u t e d by the defendants,

then i t ought to be readily apparent that the crimes of stealing money

and army were committed i n order to carry out a crime against the State."

Koinuma simply claimed, "Making the bombs was for one purpose o n l y — t o

use them to overthrow the M e i j i government." Yamaguchi advised, meta-

p h o r i c a l l y , " I f the court cannot judge our unworthy crime with the public

eye of j u s t i c e , then i t s incompetent eyes ought to be closed forever."

But i t was Amano who pointed out to the authorities the r e a l nature of
the t r i a l : "You fear that by punishing us correctly you w i l l make us into
27
martyrs." The government i n fact disallowed the manifesto and the o r a l
 373

declarations of the rebels as evidence. One prosecutor argued, "Their

p l o t to overthrow the government i n order to e f f e c t s o c i a l reform i s

merely an o r a l declaration; there i s no evidence that makes them g u i l t y

28

of treason." Yet one judge of the Tokyo t r i a l s believed t h e i r "mere

o r a l declarations" and wished to t r y them for treason; he was dismissed.

In July 1886 the sentences were read. A l l were found g u i l t y of

armed robbery r e s u l t i n g i n murder. After a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r had passed

through the hands of each of the four t r i a l judges, allowing them to

agree on a proper sentence, Tomatsu, Yokoyama, Miura, Kokugi, Kotoda,

Sugiura, and Hota were sentenced to death. Kusano, Isokawa, Kono,

Kobayashi, and Amano were given i n d e f i n i t e prison terms. Due to commiser-

ative c i r c u m s t a n c e s — i t i s not clear what t h i s refers to—Tamamatsu and

Hara received i n d e f i n i t e prison terms, reduced from the death penalty.

Koinuma was sentenced to f i f t e e n years imprisonment, Monna to thirteen,

Saeki to ten, and Ohashi to nine; the "complicitors" escaped with l i g h t

sentences. Of the p r i n c i p a l rebels, only Yamaguchi was not sentenced;

he died i n prison while awaiting what most c e r t a i n l y would have been the
29

death sentence. Except for Tomatsu, a l l those given the death sentence

appealed, but on 12 August 1886 t h e i r appeals were denied. Yokoyama

died i n prison a month before he was to walk to the gallows; the others

were hung on 6 October 1886.

One year l a t e r , a memorial service was held i n Tokyo for the

seven dead Kabasan rebels. Hoshi Toru, l a t e r a Diet member, Minister

of Communications, and a victim of p o l i t i c a l assassination i n June 1901,

decried p o l i t i c a l extremism while at the same time intoning, "Those for

 374

whom we hold t h i s memorial service did not lay down t h e i r l i v e s i n vain.

30

Was not t h e i r purpose to put an end to bad laws?" Just three months

a f t e r making that speech a new law was passed—the Peace Preservation

Law (hoan jorei)—that gave the authorities the r i g h t to expel anyone

31

"scheming something detrimental to public t r a n q u i l i t y . . . " from the

c a p i t a l for a fixed period of time? Hoshi Toru was one of the 570

writers and p o l i t i c a l figures ordered out of the c a p i t a l .

What of the Kabasan rebels not executed? Hara and Ohashi died

i n prison from tuberculosis. The others were passed over i n February

1889 when i n celebration of the new Constitution most p o l i t i c a l prisoners

were released from prison. Not u n t i l 1893 through 1894 were they freed,

and then, even for the shizoku among them, t h e i r Constitutional rights

were not restored u n t i l July 1897, but even then they were only given
32
the rights accorded to heimin.

Most of the Chichibu rebels were heimin; no vainglorious protests

were uttered by them i n an e f f o r t to convince the prosecutors of t h e i r

treason. Yet as we s h a l l see, the newspapers at least were ready for a

treason t r i a l to be c a l l e d a treason t r i a l , and for the government to

prosecute on the basis of hard evidence. And i n t h i s case, both the news-

papers and the government were able to i d e n t i f y the r e a l " t r a i t o r s " : they

were the "agitators" and " i n s t i g a t o r s , " not the "blind masses" who had

been "led astray." In fact, the more than 3,000 farmers who surrendered

themselves to the authorities for the most part escaped with an average

fine of about one-and-a-half yen, although during the depression when the

average annual income was only twenty-eight yen, the fine must be regarded
 375

as h e a v y . J J
The l u c k y ones escaped altogether, retreating to distant
34

hamlets where they e a s i l y found anonymity among t h e i r a g r a r i a n p e e r s .

The a u t h o r i t i e s d i d not seek them out as they had done w i t h those who

escaped a f t e r the K i t a k a t a i n c i d e n t . I n s t e a d , they sought o n l y those

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r working the common people i n t o such a f r e n z y t h a t they

revolted.
35

These t y p e s — " g a m b l e r s , J i y u t o and Komminto members, and lawyers"

— w e r e the t a r g e t s o f the law. And i t was not the same k i n d o f law that

was p r a c t i c e d i n the o t h e r two incidents. In those i n c i d e n t s months and

even a c o u p l e o f y e a r s s e p a r a t e d a r r e s t , t r i a l , and p r o s e c u t i o n . In the

C h i c h i b u case, s e v e r a l days b e f o r e the r e b e l l i o n had ended, Home M i n i s t e r

Yamagata i n s t r u c t e d h i s s e c r e t a r y t o have a c e r t a i n Judge Shimada and a

p r o s e c u t o r Okada s e n t t o Omiya t o h e l p the l o c a l j u d i c i a r y s e t up an E x t r a -

o r d i n a r y Crimes Court (ring! jusai saibanjo) i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h what

36

he c a l l e d the " b a n d i t s " (hito). Yamagata a l s o o r d e r e d a b a t t a l i o n o f

g a r r i s o n t r o o p s t o h e l p round up the " b a n d i t s , " as w e l l as the "wandering

outlaws" (furo no kyoto) who "prey on the s u f f e r i n g s o f l a w - a b i d i n g

citizens.

P r o b a b l y r e f l e c t i n g the government's views on the " b a n d i t s , " the

Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun wrote:

The immediate cause [of the r e b e l l i o n ] was mainly the a g i t a t i o n o f
v i l l a i n o u s gamblers and r a d i c a l wanderers. . . . S i n c e they c o u l d not
r e a l i z e t h e i r European-type s o c i a l i s t p a r t y , they sought t o c r e a t e
m i s e r y and death. . . . They a g i t a t e d the u n t h i n k i n g poor p e o p l e .
. . . I t was a t e r r i b l e crime o f t r e a s o n . Treason was t h e i r o b j e c -
t i v e , the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e danger i n these t i m e s . This wide-scale
r e b e l l i o n gave r i s e t o f e a r s i n everyone t h a t we were heading toward
the point of revolution. 38
(Emphasis mine.)
As i f t o emphasize the p o i n t even more, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi
 376

Shimbun was very s p e c i f i c i n a 14 November (1884) e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d

"Destruction i s the Enemy of Society." After observing the tendency for

"parties of destruction" (hakaito) to emerge i n other areas of the world

— t h e anarchists i n Russia, the S o c i a l i s t Party i n France, and the Fabian

s o c i a l i s t s i n E n g l a n d — i t said that i n the Chichibu r e b e l l i o n :

Those responsible for the destruction i n t h i s uprising were the ones

known as "Radical Party Members" (kageki no seito-in). They preached
about the expansion of "unlimited freedom" (museigen no jiyu) to
t h e i r followers. . . . Their r a d i c a l t a l k about freedom i s an empty
and abstract theory. I t i s not possible to make a l l people equal, to
do away with differences between the r i c h and the poor, between the
high and the low. . . . Theirs i s a p o l i t i c s of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ; they
c a l l for the very destruction of the law.39

In subsequent a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s , Jiyuto party members came

to be c i t e d repeatedly as those "agitators who were appealing to the

40
aspirations of society's lower classes." C a l l s for the prosecution of
41
the Jiyuto, "not yet s i l e n t , " though i n fact already dissolved, grew
more frequent, even i n newspapers other than the Tokyo Nichi Nichi,

42
a l b e i t i n a less v i n d i c t i v e tone. In the other papers the " p l i g h t of
the poor farmer" was stressed equally, and i t was emphasized that i n many
43
cases " r i o t e r s reportedly compelled people to p a r t i c i p a t e . " Whether
i t was because the newspapers c a l l e d for leniency for the poor farmers,
44

or because the sheer number of them (3,249 by 28 November) would have

made prosecution an impossible task, the government decided to prosecute

only the thirty-seven men known as Tashiro's lieutenants (see Appendix

I I I ) , the 115 who "instigated the masses," and the 103 men l i s t e d as
45

"members of the Komminto." Since a l l but fourteen were residents of

Chichibu, we may seriously question the allegations of the government

and the newspapers concerning the important role played by "outside

 377

agitators" and "wandering outlaws" i n s t i r r i n g up the "unthinking masses"

to r e b e l . In any case, the s p e c i f i c charges l a i d against the nearly 250

rebel leaders were fomenting r e b e l l i o n , robbery, and i n s t i g a t i o n of

violence.

Most of the Chichibu rebels received sentences of f i v e to eight

years imprisonment, although some, such as Tashiro's eighteen-year-old

son, received as l i t t l e as s i x months. Those receiving the longer sen-

tences were for the most part released i n February 1889 as part of the

general amnesty. Tashiro himself and seven other "ringleaders" were sen-

tenced to death i n February 1885, less than three months after t h e i r

arrest. Two months l a t e r Tashiro, Kato, A r a i Shusaburo, Takagishi, and

Sakamoto were unceremoniously hung. The other three had been sentenced

to death i n absentia. Inoue, as we know, had already escaped to Hoddaido

where he l i v e d the remaining t h i r t y years of his l i f e q u i e t l y as a farmer.

Kikuchi had gone underground a f t e r the incident and was not apprehended

u n t i l two years l a t e r . For some reason his sentence was commuted from

death to l i f e imprisonment, but he was released i n 1905 as part of an

amnesty granted i n celebration of Japan's v i c t o r y over Russia. He re-

turned to his v i l l a g e i n Saku where he l i v e d the remainder of his l i f e

47

quietly with his son, the v i l l a g e doctor. The t h i r d Chichibu rebel

sentenced to death i n absentia was Ochiai. Insofar as his l a t e r exper-

iences p a r a l l e l those of some of the post-incident experiences of rebels

involved i n a l l three incidents, we w i l l give them more attention.

Ochiai did not resurface u n t i l the t r i a l s for the p a r t i c i p a n t s of

the Osaka Incident i n 1887 when i t was discovered that he had been l i v i n g
 378

the l a s t several years under a false name. He related a story that i n -

cluded working i n a mine for a while, brooding over the death sentence

his fellow rebels received, and wondering how he could save them. He

then went to Tokyo to seek the one man whom he believed might be able to

a s s i s t , Oi Kentaro. He f i r s t v i s i t e d Naito Roichi, who had just recently

been released from prison (Kabasan Incident), and together the two men

went to the Yuikkan to speak with Oi. Besides Oi, also present were A r a i

Shogo (also arrested for complicity i n the Kabasan Incident), the

brother of convicted Kabasan rebel Tamamatsu, and Kobayashi Kazuo. They

explained t h e i r p l o t to e f f e c t a " l i b e r a l revolution" i n Korea, and Ochiai

agreed to j o i n them. Ochiai was appointed to a s s i s t several others i n

robbing Tokyo merchants to r a i s e money for the p l o t . He successfully

completed that task and along with the others headed toward Nagasaki

where they were to meet the army of over 100 men that Oi had assembled.

But on the way there Ochiai and his companions were arrested. Ochiai

was subsequently sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Upon his release

he returned to his Chichibu v i l l a g e where he spent the remaining forty

years of his l i f e as a C h r i s t i a n convert working for the Salvation Army,

and, according to another source, as an active supporter of n a t i o n a l i s t i c

48

causes.

If the l a t t e r i s true, then Ochiai was not alone i n "switching"

his l i b e r a l colours for n a t i o n a l i s t i c ones. His mentor i n the Osaka

Incident, Oi Kentaro, i s c e r t a i n l y one of the other, better-documented
49

cases of t h i s . Less well known figures who were also participants of

one or the other of our three incidents can also be c i t e d . S h i r a i Enbei,

 379

for example, one of the young Tamura minken a c t i v i s t s indicted (but

acquitted) for treason i n the Fukushima Incident i s another. First

elected to the National Assembly i n 1890, and again i n the second Diet,

he was an avid supporter of the Navy Expansion B i l l (Kaigun kakucho-an).

When he subsequently l o s t his Diet seat to Kono Hironaka, S h i r a i turned

to banking, using his close contacts with the zaibatsu ("financial

clique"). By 1915 he was again serving i n the Diet as a Seiyukai Party

member, i n large part due to the aid he received from the Party leader

and l a t e r Prime Minister, Hara K e i . 5 0

Two other examples of converts to n a t i o n a l i s t i c causes are A r a i

Shogo (Osaka Incident) and Koinuma Kuhachiro, leader of the Kabasan

Incident. After his release from prison i n 1889, Arai was elected to

serve as a member of the Tochigi p r e f e c t u r a l assembly i n 1890; several

years l a t e r he served i n the Colonial Ministry. Koinuma, "father of the

assassination f a c t i o n , " also spent his l a t e r years as an assemblyman i n

the Tochigi l e g i s l a t u r e , where he oftentimes had to suffer the opposi-

tion's jeers of "Kabasan General" (Kabasan shogun). Koinuma's biggest

disappointment during this period stemmed from the f a i l u r e of Kono

Hironaka, then Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, to get him a post i n

a central government m i n i s t r y . 5 1

These examples r a i s e doubts as to the seriousness of the early

minken leaders' commitment to the p r i n c i p l e s of natural r i g h t and to the

movement that incorporated those p r i n c i p l e s . Such cases as these seem

to lend support to the argument that says the l i b e r a l movement was never

very l i b e r a l , that Itagaki's chameleon-like q u a l i t i e s were not unique to

 380

the upper echelons of the popular rights movement, but i n fact charac-

terized a l l levels of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Yet at the same time, i s i t f a i r

to assume that men l i k e Koinuma did i n fact abandon t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s ?

Would this not be an act of assigning g u i l t by association? To ascertain

whether they did i n fact abandon t h e i r e a r l i e r held p r i n c i p l e s would

require an in-depth examination of t h e i r l a t e r acts and speeches i n the

prefectural assembly and elsewhere. To do this would take us well beyond

the immediate focus of the t h e s i s . However, we may suggest that a com-

mitment to democracy as well as to nationalism i s not necessarily a

contradiction i n values, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f s u f f i c i e n t attention i s

accorded to the international context i n which Japan, the Japanese i n

general, and the democrats within Japan found themselves i n the 1880's

and 1890's. I t should be remembered that t h i s was a time of interna-

t i o n a l violence, of big power diplomacy and imperialism, which taught

the weaker nations that armed might best served as the basis of a

nation's sovereignty. Japanese conservatives and l i b e r a l s a l i k e under-

stood this lesson. However, the l i b e r a l s , unlike the conservatives,

believed that the necessity of Japan being m i l i t a r i l y strong should not

i n t e r f e r e with the development of s o c i a l j u s t i c e at home. But again, to

treat the entire question of the compatibility of a b e l i e f i n democracy

with n a t i o n a l i s t i c sentiments would require much more attention than i s

possible to give.here. Having said t h i s , i t seems necessary to treat

one other r e s u l t of the gekka jiken for which we have s u f f i c i e n t e v i -

dence: the d i s s o l u t i o n of the i n s t i t u t i o n to which these incidents were

so closely t i e d , the Jiyuto.

 381

It would be a mistake to say that the Jiyuto dissolved i t s e l f on

29 October 1884, a month after the Kabasan Incident and two days before
52
the Chichibu Incident, because of these and other incidents l i k e them.
There i s l i t t l e doubt, however, that the s i x gekka jiken that occurred •
53

p r i o r to d i s s o l u t i o n were an important contributing factor. Despite

the party's claims each time one broke out that the party had nothing to

do with them, the fact that the leadership i n each were members of the

party (or claimed to be), and t h e i r following adopted Jiyuto p r i n c i p l e s

as slogans of r e b e l l i o n , was a l l too evident to ignore i n the case of the

54

authorities and impossible to disprove i n the case of the party. The

o f f i c i a l party history, the Jiyuto shi, makes the further point that

these incidents served to provoke ever stronger government oppression:

"Beginning with the Fukushima and Takada ' h e l l s , ' and continuing with

the Gumma and Kabasan v i o l e n t uprisings, the government e f f e c t i v e l y pro-

hibited the freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly. As a r e s u l t ,

i t became impossible for the Jiyuto to carry out i t s movement with unity
55

and moderation." Of course, since we know that these "freedoms" had

been severely r e s t r i c t e d well before the occasion of the incidents, we

must conclude that the authors were speaking i n r e l a t i v e rather than

absolute terms. In any case, the party historians point especially to

that section of the Public Meetings Law that forbade communication between

the central headquarters and i t s "branches" (in fact, the law also for-

bade combinations, so the branches were separate e n t i t i e s ) as responsible

for party disunity, because i t prevented central control over the

a c t i v i t i e s of the members on the periphery.

 382

Not only the deleterious effects of repressive l e g i s l a t i o n con-

tributed to the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Jiyuto. Since i t s inception the party

had been plagued by factionalism between the radicals and the gradualists

at the highest levels of the party hierarchy. The party s p l i t between

these two factions had been very pronounced at the time of I t a g a k i s 1

t r i p abroad i n 1882, but was even more evident i n March 1884, when at

the party convention the two members most c r i t i c a l of President Itagaki's

p o l i c i e s and furthest removed from him i d e o l o g i c a l l y , Oi Kentaro and

Hoshi Toru, were elected as advisors to the President, contrary, needless

to say, to Itagaki's w i s h e s . 56
Against t h i s backdrop of repressive laws

and party factionalism the Kabasan Incident occurred, guaranteeing dis-

solution. As the party history says, "After that our party decided to

57

dissolve."

Dissolution, however, was effected only at the centre. I t cer-

t a i n l y did not a f f e c t the decision of the Chichibu Komminto to rebel.

Neither did i t have any impact on the popular rights societies of Iida

and Nagoya i n December 1884 when they t r i e d t h e i r hand at revolution.

B r i e f l y , the Iida-based Aikoku Seirisha (Nagano prefecture) and the

Nagoya-based Aikoku Kodo Kyokai (Aichi prefecture) together conspired to

overthrow the M e i j i government. Their plan involved the use of counter-

f e i t money to r a i s e funds for arms, the i n f i l t r a t i o n of the Nagoya army

barracks by minken advocates for purposes of r e c r u i t i n g soldiers to

mutiny, and the mobilizing of farmers i n A i c h i , Nagano, and Kanagawa.

Planning lasted over a year, and the leaders of the incident recruited no

less a personage than Ueki Emori as author of t h e i r revolutionary manifesto.

 383

The p l o t , however, was discovered i n the early stages of i t s execution

58

and quickly suppressed. But even t h i s was not the l a s t of the gekka

jiken. In June 1886 the Shizuoka Incident occurred; i t was a p l o t by

ex-Jiyuto members to assassinate the leaders of the government who were

due to meet at a resort i n Shizuoka. Not even planned as well as the

Kabasan Incident, t h i s l a s t of the "incidents of intense violence"

59

ended not with a bang, but with a whimper.

After t h i s succession of f a i l u r e s on the part of Jiyuto members

to a l t e r the M e i j i government by employing violence, the popular rights

movement changed considerably. By 1886 the depression that had so

oppressed farmers e a r l i e r i n the eighties had subsided and signs of pros-

p e r i t y were beginning to manifest themselves. The new p o l i t i c a l movement

that sprang up i n 1887, the Daido Danketsu Undo (The Movement for a .Union

of Like Thinkers), seemed p o l i t i c a l l y a t a v i s t i c , resembling more the min-

ken movement as i t was i n i t s e a r l i e r stages than as i t was i n i t s devel-

oped stage: i t was largely led by and composed of ex-samurai and sprang

from the issue of Japan's independence (or lack of i t ) from foreign control,

especially the t r e a t i e s imposing e x t r a - t e r r i t o r a l i t y . But as t h i s move-

ment took shape, i t included a number of former l i b e r a l s whose concerns

for the nation went beyond that of treaty r e v i s i o n , also emphasizing the

need for reduction of the land tax and for freedom of speech and assembly.

But i n part because i t did not seek support on a wide scale from the

m i l l i o n s of farmers i n the countryside, i n part because i t s leaders were

co-opted by the government, i n part because of new repressive l e g i s l a t i o n

(e.g., the Peace Preservation Law), and i n part because s p l i n t e r groups

 384

were forming i n preparation for the altered p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n that

would attend the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l phase of Japan's p o l i t i c a l development,

the Daido Danketsu movement c o l l a p s e d . 60

Several new p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s

emerged to take i t s place, but, unlike the old Jiyuto before i t s demise,

the new p a r t i e s did not seek mass support; they did not have to, for

under the new c o n s t i t u t i o n property q u a l i f i c a t i o n s determined that only

460,000 c i t i z e n s out of Japan's population of f i f t y m i l l i o n would deter-

mine by t h e i r votes which of the e l i t i s t p a r t i e s would control the par-

liament .

CONCLUSIONS

Japan entered i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l era with seven "national" p o l i -

t i c a l parties. None were popularly based, and a l l were very national-

istic. A mere 1% per cent of the population could vote i n Diet e l e c t i o n s .

The government was controlled by oligarchs and "transcendental cabinets"

which permitted the p a r t i e s l i t t l e power, and no power to the people

whom they regarded as children to be l e d . 6 1

New laws restructuring l o c a l

government i n 1888 were implemented i n order to i s o l a t e the v i l l a g e s ,

foster patriotism, and to prevent "the spread of i d e o l o g i c a l movements

and . . . party s t r i f e into the realm of l o c a l government," i n short, to

keep "the countryside peaceful and s t a b l e . " 6 2

Forty per cent of Japan's

farming population were tenants. Only an estimated 5 per cent of the

population could vote i n l o c a l elections, i . e . , 5 per cent were regarded

o f f i c i a l l y as c i t i z e n s (komin). And f i n a l l y , i f the Fukushima case i s

at a l l representative, then r u r a l p o l i t i c a l societies i n 1890 were-

 385

dominated by shizoku and wealthy heimin, mainly the gono stratum of the

farming c l a s s . 6 3

In the face of a l l t h i s evidence, not to mention the l a t e r devel-

opments of the 1930's, how can we argue that the f i r s t attempt at democ-

racy succeeded i n Japan? And, can we say that i t was even attempted?

The findings presented i n t h i s thesis strongly suggest that democ-

racy was attempted, e s p e c i a l l y at the lower levels of society and p o l i t i c s .

Now to summarize b r i e f l y what those findings were. In the f i r s t chapter

i t was shown how the rebels of each incident invoked Jiyuto symbols,

slogans, and organisational precepts as a means to give to t h e i r a n t i -

government a c t i v i t i e s a measure of legitimacy and coherence. In a l l

three incidents a recurrent demand of the rebels was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

and representative form of government; t h i s they regarded as necessary

for the implementation of a system of l o c a l self-government, of a p o l i t i -

cal system based on the natural rights of man, and of an economic system

responsive to the f i n a n c i a l p l i g h t of small independent producers of

a g r i c u l t u r a l commodities. In the second chapter we outlined those h i s t o r -

i c a l , s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l elements that together combined to

create the necessary objective conditions f o r the emergence of a l i b e r a l -

democratic movement. They were: a t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n i n the areas

where the gekka jiken of the 1880's occurred, a t r a d i t i o n that included

an important economic " l e v e l l i n g " component; a constantly changing agrar-

ian s o c i a l structure that witnessed the p o l i t i c a l ascendency of the

middle-level farmers, whose v u l n e r a b i l i t y to the changing market s i t u a -

t i o n was accompanied by increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , and leadership of,

 386

peasant uprisings against l o c a l and domain authorities; the attempts by

the new M e i j i government to exploit the agrarian community i n order to

create a s o l i d i n d u s t r i a l base for the modernizing economy; and the r i s e

of the popular r i g h t s movement which changed dramatically from a movement

led and composed by the old feudal e l i t e of southwest Japan to a Kanto-

centred and commoner-led and composed l i b e r a l party that derived i t s

strength from the hundreds of member and a f f i l i a t e d p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s

spread throughout Japan.

The types of people who were members of the l o c a l popular rights

societies and p a r t i e s , and more p r e c i s e l y , those whose membership i n such

groups was recorded by t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n one of the three r e b e l l i o n s

(a fact i n i t s e l f an i n d i c a t i o n of how deep was t h e i r commitment to the

movement) were the topic of the t h i r d chapter. There we saw that the

leadership i n each incident was l a r g e l y drawn from the l o c a l e l i t e and

was a f a i r l y homogeneous group i n terms of the d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

for which information was given, but that differences existed between the

leadership of each according to incident. One important difference was

that the leadership i n the Fukushima Incident came mainly from the small

gono stratum of agrarian society but i n the Chichibu Incident from the

middle-level farmer stratum. However, despite t h i s difference, i t ap-

peared that r e l a t i v e to landholding patterns the leadership of each was

neither very wealthy nor very poor, but rather f e l l somewhere i n between.

Also i n t h i s respect, i t appeared that the following c l o s e l y resembled

the leadership, although to a much greater extent i n Chichibu than i n

Fukushima. Yet i f the economic p o s i t i o n of the followers i n the Kabasan

 387

Incident i s any indication, then the followers i n the Fukushima Incident

also were middle-level farmers. I t was also suggested that t h i s fact of

middle-level farmers involving themselves i n r e b e l l i o n finds considerable

support i n the comparative history of r e b e l l i o n and revolution.

Chapter IV sought to place the people examined i n the previous

chapter into an i d e o l o g i c a l and organisational context. We saw that the

d i f f e r e n t organisations employed by the rebels were governed by a l i b e r a l -

democratic ideology that made the rights of the i n d i v i d u a l , as opposed

to the rights of the State, into the central p r i n c i p l e governing socio-

economic and p o l i t i c a l existence. Although the p o l i t i c a l creed they f o l -

lowed, natural r i g h t , was oftentimes centred around problems of land,

labour, and taxes, and t h e i r organisations around t r a d i t i o n a l types of

s o c i a l relationships, nonetheless t h e i r democratic organisations and ide-

ology d i f f e r e d from and transcended the l o c a l economic concerns and t r a -

d i t i o n a l s o c i a l relationships. Evidence was also offered to show the

existence of extensive " r i c e roots" p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n popular rights organ-

isations and enthusiasm for democratic ideas, though i t must be conceded

that l o c a l e l i t e s seem to have been more involved and to have had a

deeper understanding than t h e i r followers.

This b r i e f review of the evidence marshalled i n t h i s thesis, I

believe, should remind us that democracy was i n fact " t r i e d . " Those who

say i t was not appear to be g u i l t y of deducing antecedent p o l i t i c a l devel-

opments from the nature of succeeding p o l i t i c a l circumstances. In other

words, those who say democracy was not t r i e d look mainly at the l i s t of

undemocratic, socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l features characterizing Japan

 388

in i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l era and i n f e r from that set of circumstances that

e a r l i e r movements could not have been democratic. Or i n other terms,

they look at the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Japanese state as of 1890,

conclude they are o l i g a r c h i c or Confucian, and then further conclude that

the processes leading up to that s i t u a t i o n must have been consistent with

that outcome. In part t h e i r mistake stems from the l e v e l of p o l i t i c s at

which they focus t h e i r study and perform t h e i r analysis, namely, the

e l i t e l e v e l , staffed by national government and party figures and the i n -

s t i t u t i o n s through which they expressed themselves. A study, for example,

of Itagaki and the other early popular rights advocates w i l l show that

they were not interested i n , nor d i d they promote, universal franchise

free of property q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ; but a study of the Sanshisha and the Sei-

dokan, and one of i t s leaders, Sakuma Shogen, w i l l show that minken advo-

cates at the l o c a l l e v e l were interested i n , and did promote, these ideas.

There i s also l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n that the early leaders of the popular

rights movement sought to educate a l l men, i r r e s p e c t i v e of s o c i a l status,

about t h e i r inherent natural r i g h t s ; but the p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s of Fuku-

shima d i d , and the Kabasan rebels sought to create just such a society

where natural rights would be the l e g a l rights of a l l men. A study

focused at the national e l i t e l e v e l of p o l i t i c s would also f a i l to show

that both the Fukushima and Chichibu rebels sought to e f f e c t a type of

national government that would be more sensitive to the needs of the

people as they were expressed at the l o c a l l e v e l of government. Even the

less a r t i c u l a t e Chichibu rebels r e a l i z e d that t h i s could only come about

by democratic reform at the highest l e v e l s of government; nowhere i s

 389

there any indication that the early national minken leaders or the

national government were responsive to t h i s notion of l o c a l s e l f -

government, perhaps the very foundation of a democratic system.

Hence, i t i s quickly and unreservedly conceded that at the upper

levels of party p o l i t i c s and government, democracy was not attempted.

But to say i t was not attempted at a l l because " . . . none of the M e i j i

leaders advocated the establishment of a democratic form of government,"

i s not only to ignore the proclaimed purposes of thousands of commoners

who came to believe i n and f i g h t for t h e i r rights as men, but also i t i s

to neglect that vast majority of the population who l i v e d t h e i r s o c i a l ,

p o l i t i c a l , and economic l i v e s not i n the c a p i t a l but i n the many small

hamlets spread throughout Japan. Though many of them may not have been

"relevant p o l i t i c a l actors" i n the sense that they were without substan-

t i v e p o l i t i c a l rights and i n the sense that they were unable to r e a l i z e

a democratic system of government, t h e i r f i g h t for rights made them

nonetheless p o l i t i c a l actors.

This brings us to the second and more d i f f i c u l t question, "Did

t h i s early attempt f a i l or succeed?" Having already admitted that i t

f a i l e d i n terms of not being able to e f f e c t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democratic

form of government, and conversely, to prevent the establishment of the

imperial absolutist form of government (as embodied i n the M e i j i Consti-

tution) , we must at the same time emphasize that " f a i l u r e " can only be

understood as having occurred at one l e v e l , again at the l e v e l of

national p o l i t i c s , or i n Robert Scalapino's terms, at the l e v e l of "the

landed and c a p i t a l i s t e l i t e s , " those whom he i d e n t i f i e s as early popular

 390

rights l e a d e r s . 6 5
I t was these types of early " l i b e r a l leaders" who

f a i l e d , because, again i n Scalapino's terms, " . . . neither of these

groups could t r u l y represent the cause of l i b e r a l i s m or the p r i n c i p l e s

of a l i b e r a l party movement." 66
The landed groups, he says, "were

interested primarily i n r e f i g h t i n g the b a t t l e of feudalism and i n stem-

ming the t i d e of urban i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . They had an i n t e r e s t i n

l i b e r a l i s m mainly to the extent that i t could be used as a t o o l i n

battle." The c a p i t a l i s t e l i t e s , as he expresses i t , "Rather than concen-

t r a t i n g upon broadening i n d i v i d u a l and corporate r i g h t s beyond the sphere

of government . . . were quite n a t u r a l l y seeking to exploit the full

p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of governmental paternalism."

On this point I stand i n complete agreement. At the national

e l i t e l e v e l , the democratic movement did f a i l . Nearly his entire anal-

y s i s of the minken movement was performed at this l e v e l , and on these

terms i t i s much too i n c i s i v e to argue against. Yet because Scalapino

concerns himself almost e n t i r e l y with the national e l i t e s of the movement,

he necessarily ignores the l o c a l e l i t e s and non-elites, those who have

served as the focus of our study. He says of them: "The lower economic

classes could scarcely play a v i t a l r o l e i n a sustained p o l i t i c a l move-

ment, p a r t i c u l a r l y a l i b e r a l movement, occurring i n t h i s period." He

concedes that " . . . the peasant class, whose a c t i v i t i e s , as we have seen,

took the form of scattered violence under the impetus of economic misery"

could serve "as a subsidiary force i n some respects." But he adds that,

"The rigorous l o g i c of Japanese p o l i t i c a l evolution dictated that the

role of the masses i n t h i s period would be one e s s e n t i a l l y negative i n

68
character."
 /

391

On the contrary, our study indicates that the "lower economic

classes" were coming to play a more " v i t a l r o l e " i n the movement a l l the

time, f i r s t through the organisation of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s , p o l i t i c a l

study c i r c l e s , lectures, p e t i t i o n s , and so on, and then l a t e r through

the increasing extent to which they were organising themselves i n the

Jiyuto i t s e l f and i n related parties such as the Komminto. Moreover, who

i s to say whether they could have "sustained" the movement; the law and

the national party leaders hardly gave them a chance. Furthermore, when

Scalapino says " p a r t i c u l a r l y a l i b e r a l movement," we must interpret this

to mean that the undifferentiated "masses" were unable to understand

liberal principles. Yet we have seen instances where admittedly i l l i t e r -

ate farmers claimed they were r e b e l l i n g for a constitution and for Jiyuto

principles. Although t h i s might be regarded as mere "mouthing borrowed

slogans, though even these were of some importance i n mustering popular

69

support for a r a d i c a l cause," there i s no reason not to believe that,

l i k e the Parisian crowds mouthing Vive le Tiers Etat!, the Komminto

rebels, for instance, had assimilated these ideas and given them a con-

tent more i n l i n e with t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r economic i n t e r e s t s . Cer-

t a i n l y even the most i l l i t e r a t e of the peasants could understand that

element of natural r i g h t doctrine which says a l l men are equal. I t was

not altogether d i f f e r e n t , after a l l , from the " l e v e l i n g " aspects of the

yonaoshi ikki that t h e i r fathers, or perhaps even they themselves joined

i n the late 1860's. Moreover, we have seen how such slogans as "Itagaki's

World Reform" and "aid the poor, equally d i s t r i b u t e the wealth" were

employed by the Komminto rebels.

 392

Scalapino i s r i g h t , however, when he c i t e s "economic misery" as

an impetus behind peasant violence, but he i s wrong i f he believes i t to

have been the only factor. Ideas, as just indicated, were another

impetus; party organisers and p e t i t i o n s that communicated these ideas to

the farmers were c e r t a i n l y another; and another was the type or source

of economic misery, i . e . , whether i t stemmed from excessive taxation, or

from the knowledge that prices were high because of commodity speculation,

or from food shortages i n the countryside due to the need to feed urban

consumers; whether i t was due to loan dealers who fed upon those peasants

forced to mortgage t h e i r land (and hence, f a l l into tenancy); or whether

i t stemmed from producing a surplus of cash crops only to discover that

the market had no need for them. The point to be made i s that many

factors contributed to peasant violence, not simply undifferentiated

"economic misery."

F i n a l l y , i t i s questionable whether one can r e f e r to the "role of

the masses" as e s s e n t i a l l y negative i n character. Aside from the value

judgement implied with regard to the use of violence (particularly since

the farmers were also victims of violence), t h e i r role was negative only

i n the eyes of the a u t h o r i t i e s . And a f t e r a l l , the authorities had a

very narrow conception of what the "positive r o l e " of the farmers should

be: i n the earlier-quoted words of Thomas Smith, i t was "to be r e l e n t -

l e s s l y exploited for the modernization of the non-agricultural sector of

70

the economy." Naturally, any attempt to avoid e x p l o i t a t i o n , or con-

versely, to demand the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r i g h t s that should be

accorded to men gua man, would be regarded as "negative" by the

 393

authorities. But for the farmers who rebelled, r e b e l l i o n was a p o s i t i v e

action that circumstances and p r i n c i p l e s required them to take. I t was

a p o s i t i v e expression of s o l i d a r i t y , made i n the midst of a p o l i t i c a l

s i t u a t i o n that would not allow them to employ peaceful means with any

hope of success. I t i s t h i s s i t u a t i o n to which Scalapino should r e f e r ,

I believe, when he uses the expression "the rigorous l o g i c of Japanese

p o l i t i c a l evolution."

If then i t can be granted that the democratic movement f a i l e d at

the top, but succeeded, i f only for a short time, at the bottom, what

about the rest of the " f a i l u r e thesis?" Was t h i s f i r s t attempt i n the

1880's a prophesy i f not a prediction of the bankrupted attempt to estab-

l i s h a democratic form of government i n the Taisho period, the so-called

"Taisho Democracy?" Is i t true that, "The history of Japan a f t e r 1931

represented the l o g i c a l culmination of previous t r e n d s — a n era i n which

ultra-nationalism and m i l i t a r i s m took a dominant p o s i t i o n , easily break-

71

ing through such n e g l i g i b l e obstacles as were placed i n t h e i r path?"

In other words, d i d the " l o g i c " of Japanese history dictate that authori-

tarianism, ultra-nationalism, and m i l i t a r i s m were to be the-norm of

Japanese p o l i t i c s ? And, conversely, was the democratic experiment bound

to f a i l ? In other words, i s i t democracy, not fascism, which i s aberrant?

The implications of t h i s theory are vast and beyond our scope or

a b i l i t y to deal with here i n the concluding pages of t h i s thesis. But a

few words are necessary, not only because we must f i n i s h answering the

question concerning success or f a i l u r e of democracy i n the long run,

but also because of the relevance which t h i s entire proposition has f o r

 394

democracy i n Japan today. For i f the " f a i l u r e thesis" i s a sound one,

then we must prepare ourselves for a resurgence of ultra-nationalism i n

the Japanese body p o l i t i c i n the years ahead.

Even i f we accept Scalapino's f a i r l y elaborate d e f i n i t i o n of

democracy as an e s s e n t i a l l y correct o n e — b r i e f l y , recognition of the

innate dignity of man, and of his right to make choices i n an "open

72

society" —we must s t x l l regard i t as incomplete. These p r i n c i p l e s by

themselves, or even when they are incorporated i n p o l i t i c a l institutions

as guiding maxims and reinforced by the guarantee of p o s i t i v e , common, or

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, are meaningless unless there exists within the c i t i -

zenry such a firm commitment to these p r i n c i p l e s that they are w i l l i n g to

f i g h t to defend them. A t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n against p o l i t i c a l oppres-

sion i s needed, one that, whether i t i s c a l l e d democratic or not, mani-

fests i t s e l f over long periods of time as fights to preserve the innate

d i g n i t y of man and his r i g h t to make choices. This i s not to say that

a l l r e b e l l i o n i s inherently democratic, for certain conditions have to

p r e v a i l before l i b e r a l democracy i s possible; i t i s only to say that a

t r a d i t i o n of r e b e l l i o n can impart to those l i v i n g i n a post-feudal,

capitalistImarket s o c i e t y — o n e where choice i n the market place i s

inherent i n the o r d e r — t h e impetus to demand and f i g h t for the same

r i g h t s i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere as they have i n the economic. A free

market permitting the freedom to own and lose property and to enter

into contracts—where j u s t i c e comes to be defined i n terms of the keeping

of contracts and i n j u s t i c e i n terms of the breaking of c o n t r a c t s — l o g i -

c a l l y expresses i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y by the freedoms to choose governors

 395

and to enter into p o l i t i c a l associations that serve to defend these

economic r i g h t s . Also, needless to say, the r i g h t to enter into such

economic and p o l i t i c a l contracts must be p a r a l l e l e d by p o l i t i c a l freedom

of expression.

In the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l era, t h i s l o g i c manifested i t s e l f i n many

ways. The farmers of the 1880's had learned that imperial absolutism

was absolute and that they were not going to change the p o l i t i c a l system

by armed r e b e l l i o n . But that does not mean they ceased r e b e l l i n g . They

continued, but, as they had i n the past, t h e i r post-geJcfca jiken rebel-

l i o n s reflected the changing socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l context. Hence,

t h e i r r e b e l l i o n s after 1890 were not against the a u t h o r i t i e s — a trend we

already observed i n Chapter I I — b u t instead against landlords, v i l l a g e

o f f i c i a l s and merchants: rights could be demanded from these less-than-

absolute personages. Between 1888 and 1897, v i r t u a l l y a l l of the recorded

579 "disturbances" (inclusive of many forms of rebellion) were aimed

against these types of l o c a l power figures; less than 4 per cent were

aimed against the c e n t r a l government. Tenant-landlord c o n f l i c t s and

struggles against v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s accounted for 55 per cent of a l l the

73

disturbances of t h i s period. S u f f i c e i t to say that t h i s trend con-

tinued, both i n terms of quantity and type, through the remainder of

the M e i j i period, through the Taisho period, and even into the Showa

period, after the m i l i t a r i s t s were well into the process of assuming

power. There were, for example, more tenant disputes i n 1937—the year

Japan invaded China—6,170 of them, than there were during any year of
74
M e i j i or Taisho. Moreover, many of these tenant disputes against
 396

landlords were aided by tenant unions, a r e l a t i v e l y new feature i n the

ever-developing t r a d i t i o n of r u r a l r e b e l l i o n i n Japan.

Of course, these figures remain only a numerical intimation that

the vast majority of Japan's population, the farmers, were continuing to

f i g h t for t h e i r r i g h t s . Further studies are needed to determine whether

these struggles had strong anti-government undertones, whether they r e -

flected more generalized b e l i e f s i n the p r i n c i p l e s of equality, freedom,

and the rights of man. But i f we may do what we have accused others of

doing, and make two deductions, then we would say f i r s t that the warm

reception the people of Japan gave to Taisho Democracy, and second, the

equally warm one they gave to the democratic reforms effected by the

Occupation a f t e r the Second World War, lead us to i n f e r that effects of

the democratic experiment begun by the farmers of the 1880's was not

l o s t to subsequent generations.
 397

Notes

1
Quoted i n Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of
Modern Japan, 1838-1922 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 85.
2
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 101; the l e t t e r was dated 22 January 1883.
3
Scalapino, Democracy, p. 60, n.49.
4
Goto, Jiyu minken, p. 146.
5
Ibid., p. 145. According to the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 15
December 1882, p e t i t i o n i n g had to be conducted i n four steps, from the
v i l l a g e head to the prefectural governor, to the relevant ministry, and
then to the Dajokan.

Goto, Jiyu minken, pp. 145-46.

7
Ibid.; those among our sample prosecuted were Saeki, Matsumoto
Yoshinaga, and Yoshida Koichi.
Q
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 174.
9
Hackett, Yamagata, p. 97.
10
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 347; Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p.
224.
1 1
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 187.
1 2
Ibid., pp. 189, 224.
13
Ibid., p. 206.
Quoted i n the Japan Weekly Mail, 21 A p r i l 1883; also see Taka
1 4

hashi's version of the story, Fukushima jiken, p. 208.

1 5
Ibid., p. 210.
1 6
Ibid., pp. 226-27.
17
Ibid., p. 225.
i
18 .
19 Hirano, Ox, p. 81.
Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 429; and Takahashi, Fukushima jiken,
244.
20
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 243,
 398

21 Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 244.

22
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 78.
23
Ibid., p. 78; Endo, Kabasan jiken, pp. 240-41. The breakdown
by prefecture was Tochigi-115, Ibaraki-50, Fukushima-47, Yamanshi, Chiba,
and Tokyo made up the remainder.
24
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 241.
25
For example, at Kono's t r i a l on the day of 18 September, i t
was reported that twenty-eight or twenty-nine Jiyuto members were along
the 100 or so spectators. See Endo, Kabasan jiken, pp. 245, 252.
26
Wagatsuma et a l . , Nihon saiban shi, p. 54; and Hirano, Oi, p.
89; and Endo, Kabasan j i k e n , p. 251.
27
A l l quotes taken from i b i d . , pp. 246-47.
28
Quoted i n i b i d . , p. 248.
29
Taoka, Hanshin den, p. 79.
30
Quoted i n Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 260.
31
Quoted i n Ike, Beginnings, pp. 185-86; also see Hackett, Yama-
gata, p. 105; Hackett says that this law had the goal of "permanently
c r i p p l i n g the l i b e r a l movement with one blow . . . ." Aside from t h i s ,
another new law that was a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the Kabasan Incident was the
Regulations Governing Explosives (bakuhatsubutsu torishimaru k i s o k u ) of
27 December 1884. I t forbade the making of explosives and threatened
the death penalty for anyone using bombs for the purpose of injuring
people, damaging property, or disturbing the public order. See Endo,
Kabasan j i k e n , p. 265.
3 2
KJKS, p. 503.

33
Based on Tanaka Senya's 1884 account; see CJSR 11:553-54; also
see CJSR 11:271 for p o l i c e s t a t i s t i c s ; and Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp.
194-96.
34
See CJSR I:621 for information on the many rebels the govern-
ment was unable to apprehend and the reasons why.
35
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 2 November 1884.
Toyama, ed., Saitama
3 6
ken shi, l a s t v o l . , 585; and Chichibu
Kyoikudai, comp., Saitama ken C h i c h i b u gun shi (Tokyo, 1939), pp. 411-13.

Ibid., p. 409; and for the quote, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun,
 399

6 November 1884 i n an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "Boto i k k i . "

38
E d i t o r i a l , "Boto c h i n t e i , " 13 November 1884.
39
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 14 November 1884.
40
Ibid., 24 November 1884.
4 1
Ibid., 20 November 1884.
42
For example, the Choya Shimbun, Yubin Hochi Shimbun, and
Yomiuri Shimbun.
43
Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 November 1884; the Police also held t h i s
view; see CJSR 11:270-71, and CJSR 1:487-501.
44
CJSR 1:632-39; i f i n d i r e c t participants are counted, then the
figure exceeds 6,000!
45
CJSR 1:640-56. These figures are only f o r Chichibu. Equally
as many were prosecuted i n Gumma, Kanagawa, and Nagano. See Ide, Kom-
minto, pp. 196-97. CJSR 11:248, shows 201 people prosecuted i n Gumma as
of 8 December 1884.
46
CJSR 11:249. The p o l i c e chief o f Omiya described these leaders
as "party members and gamblers who disrupted the public peace and order."
47
Ebukuro, Bodo, pp. 174-76; Nakazawa Ichiro, Jiyu minken no
minshu-zo (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 156-58; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 190-96;
and CJSR 1:640-56.
48
Ishikawa, Tonegawa, p. 212; Inoue, Chichibu jiken, pp. 37,
192-93.
49
See f o r example, Marius Jansen, "Oi Kentaro: Radicalism and
Chauvinism," The Far Eastern Quarterly XI, No. 3 (May 1952):305-16.
50
See Appendix I I .
51
Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 272.
52
Note: Scalapino, Democracy, p. 107, says that the Jiyuto d i s -
solved after the Chichibu jiken; Norman, Emergence, p. 183, says the
Kabasan Incident occurred i n 1885; both are wrong.
53
Besides the Fukushima and Kabasan incidents, they are the
Takada jiken (March 1883) , the Gumma jiken (May 1883), the Kamo jiken
(July 1884), and the Akita jiken (June 1881). For the Akita and Takada
incidents, see Aoki K e i i c h i r o , Nomin undo 11:324-37, and 349-53; f o r the
 400

Kamo jiken, see Hasegawa Noboru, "Kamo jiken," eds. Toyama and Hori,
J i y u minkenki no kenkyu I I , Minken undo no gekka to kaitai 1:121-204.

54
For example, a Jiyu Shimbun e d i t o r i a l of 28 September, several
days a f t e r the Kabasan Incident, denied any party involvement. Yet the
party history says that i t was unable "to control innumerable fervent
p a t r i o t s . . . ." and c i t e s t h i s as one reason for d i s s o l u t i o n . See Endo,
Kabasan jiken, pp. 267-68.
55
Itagaki, Jiyuto shi 111:74. Also see Masumi, Nihon seito shi
1:349-61.
56
Goto, Jiyu minken, p. 186.
57
Itagaki, Jiyuto shi, p. 75.
Details of t h i s incident can be found i n Goto Yasushi, "Iida
5 8

jiken," comp. N e i j i shiryo kenkyu renraku k a i hen, Jiyu minken undo I I I :

102-47.
59
See Haraguchi S e i j i , "Shizuoka jiken no shakaiteki haikei,"
comp. M e i j i shiryo kenkyu renraku k a i hen, Minken undo no tenkai 9 (Tokyo,
1958):30-123.
60
See Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 566-69; Scalapino, Democracy, pp.
112-13; Ike, Beginnings, pp. 181-87; and Goto, Jiyu minken, pp. 193-213.
6 1
Steiner, Local Government, p. 36.

6 2
Steiner, " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " pp. 233, 235.
63
Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 571-72.
64
George A k i t a , Foundations of Constitutional Government in
Modern Japan, 1868-1890 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 161.
65

Scalapino, Democracy, p. 114. 0

6 6
Ibid., p. 115.

6 7
Ibid.
6 8
Ibid., p. 114.
69
Rude, Crowd, p. 221.
70
See Chapter Democracy,
Scalapino, I I , n.116.p. 346.
71
 401

72
Scalapino, Democracy, p. x i .
73
Aoki, Meiji nomin sojo, pp. 90-91, 122-23, 144-45.
74
Inaoka, Nihon nomin undo, pp. 104-5.
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 APPENDIX I

DECLARATION OF RESTORATION OF RIGHTS*

1) [Our purpose i s to] restore our rights and guarantee happiness.

2) * We w i l l carry out these resolutions with unbending w i l l .
3) The rights we want to be restored:
a) Improper elections of [Rengokai] council members.
b) Implementation of the road project i s contrary to [Rengokai] reso-
lutions .
c) The course (route) of the road was'arbitrarily decided.
d) A request f o r an extraordinary meeting [of the Rengokai] was
rejected.
4) Upon restoration of the above r i g h t s , the Rengokai should be recon-
vened and carry out the following objectives:
a) The route of the road should be i n accord with population density
in the Aizu region.
b) The route of the road should be responsive to the interests of
the people of the area.
c) A committee [of l o c a l representatives] should be established i n
order to inspect and decide upon how the road construction w i l l
be c a r r i e d out.
d) Unless the people i n the neighboring d i s t r i c t agree to carry out
t h e i r part of the road construction, no work w i l l be done.
5) I f these purposes just c i t e d are not attended to, then we w i l l not do
construction work.

APPENDICES I I , I I I , IV

INTRODUCTION

Appendices I I , I I I , and IV consist of biographical data on the

participants of the Fukushima, Chichibu, and Kabasan incidents respec-
tively. The reasoning behind the selection of the individuals who appear
i n each of these three appendices can be found i n the opening pages of
Chapter I I I . The code used i n each of the appendices to indicate bio-
graphical data i s as follows:

*
This document, of which the above i s an excerpt, appears i n
Shoji Kichinosuke (ed.), Nihon Seisha seito hattatsu shi (Tokyo, 1959),
pp. 312-13.

416
 417

1) Prefecture (ken)
2) D i s t r i c t (gun)
3) V i l l a g e (mura) or town (machi)
4) Age at the time of the incident
5) Status (heimin or shizoku)
6) Occupation
7) F i n a n c i a l status/land holdings (according to
cho)
8) Literacy
9) P o l i t i c a l party and/or p o l i t i c a l society a f f i l i -
ation
(In the Chichibu case only, rank i n the Komminto
Army i s substituted.)
10) P r i o r arrest
11) Other
12) Source of information

APPENDIX II

FUKUSHIMA ACTIVISTS

Kono Hironaka 4) 27
5) Shizoku
1) Fukushima
6) Doctor
2) Tamura
7) ?
3) Miharu
8) Yes
4) 33
9) Jiyuto
5) Heimin (declasse samurai)
10) ?
6) "None" (court testimony);
11) —
merchant, p o l i t i c i a n
12) FKS, pp. 774-75
7) Wealthy
8) Yes
9) Jiyuto; Sanshisha (head)
Uda Seiichi
Sekkyosha (head)
10) No 1) Fukushima
11) Leader of national Jiyuto; 2) Yama
l a t e r , govn't. o f f . 3) Shibage
12) Takahashi, Fukushima min- 4) 32
ken, pp. 181-85; FKS, pp. 5) Heimin
755-65 6) Farmer/village head
7) 3 to 8 cho
8) Yes
Kawaguchi Genkai 9) Jiyuto; Aishinsha
(head)
1) Fukushima
10) ?
2) Ishikawa
11) Pref. Assembly member, 1879,
3) Yotsugura
1881, 1892, 1896
 418

12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, 10) February 1882

pp. 229-34; FKS, pp. 725-32 ID V i l l a g e head, 1881, 1886, 1892
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, pp.
208-13; FKS, pp. 766-70
Hirajima Matsuo
1) Fukushima Tamano Hideaki
2) Atachi
3) Nihonmatsu 1) Fukushima
4) 28 2) Tamura
5) Shizoku 3) Miharu
6) Teacher 4) 34
7) ? 5) Heimin
8) Yes 6) Shinto p r i e s t
9) J iyuto 7) ?
10) ? 8) Yes
11) Friend of Ueki; elected to 9) Jiyuto; Sanshisha (founder)
Diet seven times 10) ?
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, 11) Friend of Oi Kentaro
pp. 185-88; FKS, pp.897-909. 12) Takahashi, Fukushima.minken, pp.
188-95; FKS, pp. 911-21

Miura Bunji
Akajiro Koichi
1) Fukushima
2) Yama 1) Fukushima
3) Komeoka 2) Yama
4) 26 3) Kumagaya
5) Heimin 4) 19
6) Farmer, v i l l a g e head 5) Heimin
7) 18.2 cho 6-11) ?
8) Yes 12) FKS, pp. 732-33
9) Jiyuto; Aishinsha
10) Yes (Kitakata jiken)
11) Kabasan participant Matsumoto Yoshinaga
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken,
1) Fukushima
pp. 251-53
2) Tamura
3) Miharu
Yoshida Koichi 4) 40
5) Heimin
1) Fukushima 6) Farmer/village head
2) Ishikawa 7) Bankrupt (landless)
3) Ishikawa 8) Probably
4) 37 9) Jiyuto; Seidokan head
5) Heimin 10) March 1882
6) Shinto p r i e s t ; v i l l a g e 11) Friend of Kono Hironaka
head 12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, pp.
7) .5 cho (1907) 200-203; Shoji, Nihon seisha,
8) Yes pp. 334-35
9) J iyuto; Sekkyosha
 419

Aizawa Yasukata 12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken,

pp. 196-99
1) Fukushima
2) Soma
3) Koze Hanaka Mojiro (Kyojiro)
4) 33
5) Shizoku 1) Fukushima
6) Farmer; teacher 2) Shinobu
7) 4.6 cho 3) ?
8) Yes (Confucian studies) 4) 26
9) Jiyuto; Boshinsha (head) 5) Shizoku
10) ? 6) None
11) Pref. Assembly, 1879-81; 7) (None?)
Newspaper ed., 1890's 8) Yes
12) FKS, pp. 765-66; Takahashi, 9) Jiyuto; Iwashiro kyokai
Fukushima minken, pp. 267-69 10) ?
11) One-time newspaper reporter
12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 527-28;
Igarashi Takehiko FKS, pp. 910-11, 928-29; Taka-
hashi, Fukushima minken, pp. 20,
1) Fukushima
33
2) Yama
3) Iwagetsu
4) 32
Akajiro Heiroku
5) Heimin
6) Farming; v i l l a g e head 1) Fukushima
7) 7 cho; l a t e r bankrupted 2) Yama
8) Yes 3) Shinai
9) Aishinsha 4) 47
10) Kitakata incident 5) Heimin
11) Rengokai leader; Dist. 6) Farmer
Council head, 1896, 1905 7) 1.6 cho
12) FKS, pp. 733-37; Takahashi, 8) Yes
Fukushima minken, pp. 265-66 9) Aizu Jiyuto; Aishinsha
10) ?
11) Home, headquarters f o r l o c a l
Kageyama Masahiro Jiyuto
12) FKS, pp. 851-54; Takahashi, Fuku-
1) Fukushima
shima minken, pp. 174, 247-49
2) Tamura
3) Miharu
4) 36
Suzuki Shunan
5) Shizoku (court t e s t . ,
heimin) 1) Fukushima
6) Druggist/merchant 2) Ishikawa
7) 7 cho 3) Iwase
8) Yes 4) 50
9) Jiyuto; Sanshisha 5) Heimin
10) ? 6) Doctor
11) Pref. Assembly, 1881; Friend 7) ?
of Kono Hironaka 8) Yes
 420

9) Jiyuto 7) ?
10) ? 8) Yes
11) Studied under Goto Shimpei 9) Jiyuto
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, 10) No
p. 48 11) —
12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 340-41

Sawada Kiyonosuke
Teruyama Shugen
1) Fukushima
2) Atachi 1) Fukushima
3) Nihonmatsu 2) Tamura
4) 20 3) Miharu
5) Shizoku 4) 36
6) Teacher 5) Heimin
7) Little 6) Buddhist priest/farmer
8) Yes 7) ?
9) Jiyuto (Mumeikan) 8) Yes
10) ? 9) Jiyuto
11) Hirajima was mentor 10) Yes
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, 11) —
pp. 224-25 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 335-36

Sato Kiyomasu Yaginuma Kamekichi

1) Fukushima 1) Fukushima
2) Date 2) Tamura
3) Okura 3) Miharu
4) 30 4) 22
5) Shizoku 5) Heimin
6) None 6) Teacher
7-8) ? 7) ?
9) Jiyuto 8) Yes
10) ? 9) Seidokan
11) Former pref. assembly member 10) ?
of Miyagi; helped Kono b u i l d 11) —
Kyoaidobokai 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 171-72;
12) FKS, pp. 776-80; Takahashi, Takahashi, Fukushima j i k e n , p.
Fukushima minken, pp. 20, 85
172

S h i r a i Enbei
Matsumoto Miyaji
1) Fukushima
1) Yamagata (born) 2) Tamura
2) Yama (relocated) 3) Sugeya
3) Yonezawa 4) 36
4) 33 5) Heimin
5) Shizoku 6) Sake-manuf./farmer/village head
6) Teacher 7) 6.7 cho; wealthy
 421

8) Yes Sato Somatsu

9) Jiyuto; Kyofusha 1) Fukushima
10) ? Tamura
2)
11) Pref. Ass. 1880; D i s t r i c t 3) Ogura
head, 1890; Diet, 1890, 4) •?
1892, 1915 (Seiyukai); Est. 5) Heimin
bank; friend of Hara Kei -11) ?
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken, 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, 561
pp. 286-90

Matsumoto Shigeru
Sugamura T a i j i
1) Fukushima
1) Fukushima Tamura
2)
2) Tamura 3) Miharu
3) K i t a c h i 4) 40
4) 18 5) Shizoku
5) Heimin 6-7) 7>
6) Shinto p r i e s t 8) Probably
7) ? 9) Sanshisha/Seidokan
8) Yes 10) •>
9) Taishokan (pol. c i r c l e ) 11)
10) ? 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. 561
11) Later a Diet rep.
12) Takahashi, Fukushima jiken,
p. 85; Takahashi, Fukushima Kono Hiroshi
minken, p. 56
1 Fukushima
2 Tamura
Yamaguchi Chiyosaku 3 Miharu
4 17
1) Fukushima 5 Heimin
2) Kawanuma 6 None
3) Onomoto 7 (Father wealthy)
4) 34 8 Yes
5) Heimin 9 Seidokan
6) Farmer/village head 10 No
7) 16 cho (landlord) 11 Kabasan p a r t i c .
8) Yes (Chinese and English 12 FKS, pp. 867-75
studies) (See Appendix IV)
9) Jiyuto; Aishinsha
10) ?
11) Pref. Assem. 1879,80,81; Kato Hiroshi
Diet, 1890, 1892; knew Ueki
Emori; l a t e r , pro-gov. 1) Fukushima
12) FKS, pp. 878-85; Takahashi, 2) Tamura
Fukushima minken, pp. 236- 3) Okura
40; Shoji, Nihon seisha, 4) (young)
p. 221 5) Heimin
6) Aid to v i l l a g e head
 422

-10) Sekine Tsunekichi

11) Fukushima
1)
12) FKS, pp. 865-67 Ishikawa
2)
3) Tadake
4) 17
Kariyado Nakae
5) Heimin
1) Fukushima 6) Farmer
2) Futaba 7) ?
3) Karino 8) Yes (former student)
4) 28 . 9) Connected with Mumeikan
5) Shizoku 10) •p

6) Shinto priest/farmer/ 11)

teacher 12) FKS, pp. 854-64; Shoji, Nihon
7) 6 cho seisha, p. 171
8) Yes
9) Jiyuto; Boshinsha
10) ? Nakajima Yuhachi
11) Ran f o r Diet seat, 1890,
1) Fukushima
1892; arrested f o r Kabasan Yama
2)
and Osaka incidents;
3) Sangawa .
Seiyukai party 30
4)
5) Heimin
6) Farme r/we ave r
Asaka Saburo 7) 2.4 cho
1) Fukushima 8) Yes
2) Tamura 9) Jiyuto; Aishinsha
3) Miharu 10)
4) 29 11) Pref. Assem. 1881,86, 1890,92
5) Heimin Rengokai leader
6) Merchant/druggist 12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken,
7) ? pp. 225-29; FKS, pp. 737-46-
8) Probably
9) Jiyuto
10) Enbe Yoshiko
11)
1 Fukushima
12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp.
2 Tamura
175-76; FKS, pp. 875-78
3 Miharu
4 27
5 Shizoku
Yamada Shingai V i l l a g e head
6
1) Fukushima 7 •?
2) Atachi 8 Yes
3) Nihonmatsu 9 Seidokan
4) •? 10
5) Shizoku 11
6-11) ? 12 Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 332-33;
12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, p. Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p.
561 85
 423

Miwa Shigesaemon 11) Head of Seidokan

12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 329-30;
1) Fukushima Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p.
2) Tamura
24
3) Okura
4) 35
5) Heimin
Okawa Masaezo
6) Farmer/village head
7) 7 1) Fukushima
8) Yes 2) Tamura
9) Sanshisha 3) Utsu
10) 4) 25
11) 5) p
12) FKS, p. 770; Shoji, 6) Teacher/peddler
Nihon seisha, pp. 333-34 7) 7
8) Yes
9) Seidokan; Doshinkai
Kata Katsuzo 10-11). 7
12) Takahashi, Fukushima jiken, p.
1) Fukushima
85
2) Tamura
3) Miharu
4) 7
Kurihara Sogoro
5) Heimin
6-11) 7 1) Fukushima
12) FKS, p. 770 2) Tamura
3) Miharu
4) 17
Matsuzaki Yoshikazu 5) Shizoku
6-7) 7
1) Fukushima
8) Yes
2) Tamura
9) Seidokan (student)
3) Yokodo 1

7
10)
4) 11)
5) Heimin 12) FKS, p. 865
6-11) 7
12) FKS, p. 770
Sato Mankichi
Sakuma Shogen 1) Fukushima
2) Tamura
1) Fukushima Kanya
3)
2) Tamura 7
Miharu 4)
3) Heimin
34 5)
4)
6-11)
5) Shizoku Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 560-62
12)
6) V i l l a g e head
7) ?
8) Yes
Suzuki Shigeru
9) Sanshisha
10) No 1) Fukushima
 424

2-11) ? I s h i i Teizo
12) FKS, p. 884
1) Fukushima
2) ' Tamura
3) Utsu
Kamada Yuzan 4) 20
1) Fukushima 5) Heimin
]) Tamura 6) Farmer
3) Utsu 7) (Son o f landlord)
4) 18 8) "Minimal"
5) Heimin 9) Jiyuto
6) Farmer 10) ?
7) ? 11) Formed own p o l . c i r c l e
8) Probably 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 330-32
9) Doshinkai; Seidokan; Jiyuto
10) ?
11) — Yasuda Keitaro
12) FKS, pp. 885-91 1) Fukushima
2) Tamura
3) Utsu
Uryu Naoshi
4) 17
1) Fukushima 5) Heimin
2) Yama 6) Son of farmer
2) Atsushio 7-8) ?
4) 23 9) Doshinkai
5) Heimin 10) ?
6) Farmer/village head 11) —
(father) 12) Shoji, Nihon seisha, pp. 330-32
7) 2.7 cho; bankrupt 1882
8) Yes
9) Aishinsha Nagasaka Hachiro
10) Yes (April 1882)
1) Gumma
11) — Nishi-Gumma
2)
12) Takahashi, Fukushima Takasaki
3)
minken, pp. 245-47 37
4)
5) Shizoku
6) None
Miura Tokujiro ?
7)
1) Fukushima 8) Yes
2) Tamura 9) Yushinsha
3) Miharu (?) 10) No
4) 26 11) Friend of Kono Hironaka
5) Heimin 12) FKS, pp. 783-89; Shoji, Nihon
6) Lawyer's a i d seisha, pp. 336-40
7-11) ?
12) Takahashi, Fukushima
jiken, p. 34 Yamaguchi Junshu
1) Gumma
2) Yutano
 3) Imori 3) Takasaki
4) ? 4) 7
5) Shizoku 5) Shizoku
6-8) ? 6-8) 7
9) Yushinsha 9) Yushinsha
10-11) ? 10-11) 7
12) Endo, Kabasan jiken, p. 53 12) FKS, p. 775

Iga Wanato Arao Kanzo

1) Gumma 1) Kochi
2) Nishi-Gumma 2) Tosa
3) Takasaki 3) Kotakasaka
4) 30 4) 27
5) Shizoku 5) Shizoku
6-8) ? 6) None
9) Jiyuto; Yushinsha 7-8) 7
10-11) ? 9) Connected with Mumeikan
12) FKS, p. 775 10) 7
ID Arrived i n Fukushima, 15
November 1882
Takahashi Sodai 12) FKS, pp. 781-83
1) Gumma
2) Nishi-Gumma Kawaguchi Seiju
3) Heika
4) ? 1) Kochi
5) Heimin 2) Tosa
6-8) ? 3) Kotakasaka
9) Yushinsha 4) 7
10-11) ? 5) Shizoku
12) FKS, p. 775 6-11) 7
12) FKS, p. 780

Oki Kenbei
Kogawa Matao
1) Gumma
2) Nishi-Gumma 1) Kochi
3) Takasaki 2) Tosa
4) ? 3) Karairu
5) Heimin 4) 7
6-8) ? 5) Heimin
9) Yushinsha 6-11) 7
10-11) ? 12) FKS, p. 780
12) FKS, p. 775

Okamoto Shoei
Matsui Tasuhito ^ Kochi
1) Gumma 2) Tosa
]) Nishi-Gumma 3) Choe
 426

4) 2) Onsen
5) Heimin 3) Sugiyama
6-11) 4) ?.

12) FKS, p. 781 5) Shizoku

6-10) ?
11) Leader of Kitakata incident;
Sugiyama Masagi l a t e r prof, at Waseda Univ.
12) Takahashi, Fukushima minken,
1) Ehime 246

APPENDIX III

CHICHIBU ACTIVISTS

Tashiro Eisuke 11) Claimed Jiyuto membership; l o c a l

notable
1) Saitama
12) CJSR 1:45-47, 359-61, 382, 631;
2) Chichibu
Inoue, Chichibu, pp. 37-38; Ide,
3) Omiya
Komminto, pp. 17, 33-34
4) 51
5) Heimin (ex-samurai)
6) Farmer; "mediator"
Miyakawa Tsuari
7) Indebted 80 yen; mortgage
on .6 cho 1) Saitama
8) Yes 2) Chichibu
9) President/Supreme 3) Shimo-yoshida
Commander 4) 56
10) Early 1884 5) Heimin
11) Claimed Jiyuto membership; 6) Shinto p r i e s t
l o c a l notable 7) •?

12) CJSR 1:100-118; Inoue, 8) Yes

Chichibu, pp. 27, 50-52 9) Treasurer
10) ?

Kato Orihei
11)
12) —
CJSR 1:384,. 6'
1) Saitama
2) Chichibu
Shibaoka Kumakichi
3) Isama
4) 34 1) Saitama
5) Heimin 2) Chichibu
6) Pawnshop owner 3) Omiya
7) 1.6 cho (mortgaged) 4) 46
8) ? 5) Heimin
9) Vice-President; Vice- 6) Farmer
Commander 7) Indebted 25 yen
10) No 8) "Barely"
 427

9) Treasurer/Battalion Com- Toda Seitaro

mander
1) Saitama
10) No
2) Chichibu
11) Kobun of Tashiro
3) Ota
12) CJSR 1:382; 11:50-66, 19
4)
218-20
5) Heimin
6) Farmer
7-8) ?
Kikuchi Kanbei
9) Platoon Commander
1) Nagano 10) ?
2) Minami-Saku 11) Early Komminto organizer
3) Aiki 12) CJSR 11:188-89; 1:380
4) 40
5) Probably heimin
6) "Lawyer" Inoue Denzo
7) ?
1) Saitama
8) Yes
2) Chichibu
9) Chief of Staff
•p 3) Shimo-yoshida
10)
4) 31
11) Wrote Army Code; Jiyuto
5) Heimin
member
6) S i l k broker
12) CJSR 1:380, 631, 640;
7) " F a i r l y wealthy"
11:431; Ide, Komminto, pp.
8) Yes (village copyist)
104-33; Inoue, Chichibu,
9) Treasurer
pp. 56-57
10) Yes (no conviction)
ID Jiyuto member; f r i e n d of Oi
Kentaro; escaped arrest (November
Arai Shusaburo
1884)
1) Saitama 12) Inoue, Chichibu, pp. 32-33, 191-
2) Obusuma 92; Ishikawa, Tonegawa, pp. 215-
3) Nishinoiri 18; Ide, Komminto, pp. 236-57;
4) 22 CJSR 1:640
5) Heimin
6) Teacher (primary school)
7) From a "propertied Nami Iya
family"
1) Saitama
8) Yes
2) Chichibu
9) Battalion Commander
3) Yokose
10) No
4) 26
11) Kobun of Kato Orihei;
5) Heimin
active i n p e t i t i o n move-
6) Farmer
ment •?
7-8)
12) CJSR 1:81-87, 325-26, 368-
9) Platoon Commander
70, 382, 640; Inoue,
10)
Chichibu, pp. 82-83; Ide,
11)
Komminto, pp. 136-58
12) CJSR 11:156-57, 226-28
 428

Arai Torakichi 7-8)

9) Commander, 2nd Battalion
1) Gumma 7
10)
2) Tago
11) Jiyuto member; escaped arrest
3) Kamihino
12) CJSR 1:640
4) 43
5) Heimin
6) Farmer/charcoal maker
Ochiai Toishi
7) "Poor farmer"
8) No 1) Saitama
9) Platoon Commander (for 2) Chichibu
Isama v i l l a g e ) 3) Shimo-yoshida
10) No 4) 35
11) Married; children 5) Heimin
12) CJSR 1:62-65; Ide, Kom- 6) Part-time farmer
minto, pp. 193-209; Inoue, 7) .7 or .8 cho
Chichibu, pp. 77-78 8) Learned reading and writing i n
prison
9) Vice-Battalion Commander
Genkubo J i r o s h i 10) 7
11) Jiyuto member; kobun of Kato
1) Saitama
Orihei; escaped arrest; arrested
2) Chichibu
for Osaka jiken
3) Akuma
12) CJSR 11:611-21; Ide, Komminto,
4-8) ?
pp. 34-53; Inoue, Chichibu, pp.
9) Ammunitions O f f i c e r
36-37; Ishikawa, Tonegawa, pp.
10-11) ? 212-15
12) CJSR 1:104

Takagishi Zenkichi
Arai Tonashi
1) Saitama 1) Saitama
2) Chichibu 2) Chichibu
3) Fuppu 3) Kami-yoshida
• 4) 7 4) 35
5) Heimin 5) Heimin
6-8) 7 6) Farmer/dyer
9) Vice-Commander, 1st Bat- 7) Indebted 20 yen; near bankrupt
talion 8) Yes
10-11) 7 9) Platoon Commander
12) CJSR 1:640 10) No
11) Jiyuto member; early Komminto
organizer; kobun to Kato Orihei;
Iizuka Seizo p e t i t i o n e r f o r debt r e l i e f
12) CJSR 1:47-48, 376-T77, 382; Ide,
1) Saitama Komminto, pp. 34-53; Inoue, Chi-
2) Chichibu chibu, pp. 37, 83; Nakazawa,
3) Shimo-yoshida
Bungei, p. 15
4) p
5) Heimin
6) Farmer
 429

Inuki Jiyusaku 5) Heimin

6) "Gambler"
1) Saitama 7-8) ?
2) Chichibu 9) Platoon Commander
3) Iida 10-11) ?
4) 32 12) CJSR 11:239-40
5) Heimin
6) Farmer
7-8) ? Henmi Yaichi
9) Platoon Commander
10) ? 1) Saitama
11) Early p e t i t i o n e r f o r debt 2) Chichibu
relief 3) Makinichi
12) CJSR 11:234-35; 1:382, 640 4) 47
5) Heimin
6) Farmer
Muratake Shige 7-8) ?
9) Platoon Commander
1) Saitama
10-11) ?
2) Chichibu
12) CJSR 1:379, 641
3) Kami-hinozawa
4) 45
5) Heimin Arai Makizo
6) Farmer
7-8) ? 1) Saitama
9) Platoon Commander 2) Chichibu
10) ? 3) Shimo-hinozawa
11) Prison sent.: 7 y r s . 6 mos. 4) 31
12) CJSR 11:179-80; Inoue, 5) Heimin
Chichibu, p. 99 6) Farmer
7-8) ?
9) Platoon Commander
Sakamoto Isaburo 10) ?
11) Known l o c a l l y as Jiyuto member;
1) Saitama
died while serving 6 yr. prison
2) Chichibu
term
3) Shiroku
12) CJSR 1:641; Inoue, Chichibu, p.
4) 34
87
5) Heimin
6) Bamboo craftsman
7-8) ? Akibara Shojiro
9) Platoon Commander
10) ? 1) Saitama
11) Kobun of Kato Orihei 2) Chichibu
CJSR 1:381, 640; 11:201 3) Misawa
4) 23
5) Heimin
Shioya Nagakichi 6) Farmer/fencing instructor
7) Indebted 50 yen
1) Saitama
8) ?
2) Chichibu
9) Platoon Commander
3) Shiroku
10) ?
4) ?
 430

11) Jiyuto member; kobun of Ide Tamekichi

Kato
1) Nagano
12) CJSR 11:185-86; Inoue, Chi-
2) Minami-Saku
chibu, p. 57
3) Kita-aiki
4) 25
5) Heimin
Inoue Zensaku
6) Farmer-ex-village head
1) Saitama 7) Father a landlord, land worth
2) Chichibu 725 yen
3) Shimo-yoshida 8) Yes
4) ? 9) Collector of funds
5) Heimin 10) No
6-8) ? 11) Jiyuto member; petitioned for
9) Provisions O f f i c e r n a t ' l . assembly, 1884
10) ? 12) CJSR 1:118-21, 382, 641; I I :
11) Died serving prison term 214-15; Inoue, Chichibu, pp.
12) CJSR 1:641 55-56; Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shim-
bun, 17 November 1884

Arai Shigejiro
Miyakawa Togoro
1) Saitama
2) Chichibu 1) Shizuoka
3) Isama 2) ?
4) 44 3) Hamamatsu?
5) Heimin 4) 40
6) Farmer ( s i l k and laquer) 5) Heimin
7) .68 cho; bankrupt (1884 6) Day-labourer
v i l l a g e survey) 7-11) ?
8) No 12) CJSR 11:230-32, 236-37
9) Provisions o f f i c e r
10) ?
11) Possibly Jiyuto member; Okubo J i r o s h i
advisor to Tashiro; sen-
1) Saitama
tenced to 6 y r . 6 mos.
2) Chichibu
prison term
3) Akuma
12) CJSR 1:381, 641; Inoue,
4) ?
Chichibu, p. 86; Ide, Kom-
5) Heimin
minto, p. 17
6-8) ?
9) Ammunitions o f f i c e r
10) ?
Izumida Shitomi
11) Died i n prison
1) Saitama 12) Ishikawa, Tonegawa
2) Chichibu
3) Shimo-ogano
4) ? Kadomatsu Shosaemon
5) Heimin
1) Saitama
6-11) ?
2) Obusuma
12) CJSR 1:641
3) Nishinoiri
 431

4) 53 4-8)
5) Heimin 9) In charge of pack horses
6) Farmer 10) 7
7-8) 7 11) Died i n prison
9) Ammunitions o f f i c e r 12) CJSR 1:641; Ishikawa, Tonegawa,
10) 7 p. 233
11) Died during 6-yr. prison
term
12) CJSR 11:161-62; 1:378, 641; Kokashiwa Tsunejiro
Ishikawa, Tonegawa, p. 233
1) Gumma
2) Tago
3) Shimohino
Arai Komakichi
4) 42
1) Saitama 5) Heimin
2) Chichibu 6) Carpenter
3) Akuma 7) 10 cho
4) 49 8) Yes
5) Heimin 9) In charge of pack horses
6) Farmer 10) 7
7-8) 7 ID Jiyuto member (wife also);
9) Firearms platoon commander friend of Miyabe Noboru
10) 7 12) CJSR 1:122-30, 622, 641; Inoue,
11) Komminto organizer Chichibu, pp. 43-44; Ide, Kom-
12) CJSR 11:220-21; Ishikawa, minto, pp. 160-82
Tonegawa

Ono Naekichi
Arai T e i k i c h i
1) Saitama
(or T e i j i r o )
2) Chichibu
1) Gumma 3) Fuppu
2) Tago 4) 7
3) Kamihino 5) Heimin
4) 24 6) Farmer
5) Heimin 7) Indebted 225 yen; 1.1 cho
6) Farmer land mortgaged
7) ? 8)
8) Yes 9) Battalion vice-commander
9) Firearms platoon commander 10) 7
10) ? 11) Known l o c a l l y as Jiyuto; died
11) Sentenced to death i n prison
12) Ide, Komminto, pp. 194-209; 12) CJSR 11:253-54; Inoue, Chichibu,
CJSR 1:641 pp. 40, 83, 87-88; Ide, Kom-
minto, pp. 65-78

Shimazaki Sosaku
Ishida Mikihachi
1) Saitama
2) Chichibu 1) Saitama
3) Nakino 2) Chichibu
 432

3) Fuppu 5) Heimin
4) 27 6) Farmer
5) Heimin 7-8) 7
6) Farmer 9) R i f l e platoon chief
7) Indebted 50 yen 10-11) 7
8) 7 12) CJSR 1:381; 11:366-67
9) Platoon Commander
10) No
ID Sentence: 6 y r s . Kobayashi Seizo
12) CJSR 1:379; Ide, Komminto,
1) Saitama
pp. 61-78
2) Chichibu
3) Ikoda
4) 22
Ono Yukichi
5) Heimin
1) Saitama 6) Farmer
2) Hanzawa 7-8) 7
3) Oka 9) Platoon Commander
4) 43 10) Twice for gambling
5) Heimin 11)
6) Farmer 12) Ide, Komminto, pp. 199, 204-7
7-8) 7
9) Platoon Commander
10) 7 Morikawa Sakuzo
11) Brother of Ono Naekichi
1) Saitama
12) CJSR 1:381; 11:208; Inoue,
2) Chichibu
Chichibu, p. 40
3) Kami-hinozawa
4) 35
5) Heimin
Imai Kozaburo Farmer
6)
1) Saitama 7-8) 7
2) Chichibu 9) Platoon Commander
3) Sanyama 10) 7
4) 36 11) Prison sentence of 15 yrs.;
5) Heimin died i n prison
6) Farmer 12) CJSR 1:382; 11:366-67; Ishikawa,
7-8) •? Tonegawa, p. 233
9) Platoon Commander
10)
11) Sentence: 7 y r s . imprison. Kadodaira Sohei
12) CJSR 1:378; 11:229-30,
1) Saitama
237-38
2) Chichibu
3) Shimo-hinozawa
4) 31
Arai T e i j i r o
5) Heimin
1) Saitama 6) Farmer
2) Chichibu 1-8) 7
3) Isama 9) Messenger
4) 44 10)
 433

11) Jiyuto member; one who 12) CJSR 1:642

f i r s t recruited Tashiro
12) CJSR 1:382; 11:232-34
Takagishi Kenzo
1) Saitama
Sakamoto Sosaku
2) Chichibu
1) Saitama 3) Isama
2) Chichibu 4) 45
3) Fuppu 5) Heimin
4) 27 6) Farmer
5) Heimin 7-8) ?
6) Blacksmith 9) Messenger
7) Near bankrupt 10) No
8) ? 11) Member of Isama v i l l a g e Health
9) Messenger Association; died i n prison
10) ? 12) CJSR 1:292-97, 379, 642;
11) Jiyuto member; kobun of 11:100-106
Kato Orihei; early Komminto
organizer; death sentence
12) CJSR 1:373-76; 11:9-10, Arai Makizo
135; Inoue, Chichibu, p.
1) Saitama
37; Ide, Komminto, pp. 34-
2) Chichibu
53
3) Onohara
4) ?
5) Heimin
Shimada Seisaburo
6-11) ?
1) Saitama 12) CJSR 1:642
2) Chichibu
3) Honnogami
4) 27 Horiguchi Kozuke
5) Heimin
1) Gumma
6) Farmer/rice-polisher 2) Nishi-Gumma
7-8) ? 3) Shibugawa
9) Messenger 4) ?
10) ? 5) Heimin
11) Prison term: 3 y r s . 6 mos. 6) Manager of Law o f f i c e
12) CJSR 1:378, 642; 11:168-69 7-8) ?
9) Messenger
10) ?
Komai Teisaku
11) Persuaded Tashiro Eisuke to
1) Saitama j o i n Komminto; kobun of
2) Chichibu Tashiro
3) Shimo-hinozawa 12) CJSR 1:642; Ide, Komminto, p.
4) ? 16; Inoue, Chichibu, p. 50;
5) Heimin Sakai, "Chichibu Sodo," p. 6
6-8) ?
9) Messenger
10-11) ?
 434

APPENDIX IV

KABASAN ACTIVISTS

Koinuma Kuhachiro 3) Shimodate

(Tadayaro) 4) 26
5) Shizoku
1) Tochigi
6) Farmer/fencing instructor
2) Shimotsuga
7) ?
3) Inaba (Mibu machi)
8) Yes
4) 32
9) Jiyuto; Yuikan
5) Heimin
10) ?
6) Landlord farmer/merchant
11) Bodyguard of Tomatsu
7) 60 cho
12) KJKS, pp. 50-52, 497-503;
8) Yes
Nojima, Kabasan, pp. 219-23
9) Jiyuto
10) No
11) Early popular rights Hota Komakichi
a c t i v i s t ; married, children
12) Endo, Kabasan, pp. 29-33; 1) Ibaraki (born i n Tokyo)
Nojima, Kabasan, p. 150; 2) Makabe
KJKS, pp. 102-16, 572 3) Shimodate
4) 24
5) Shizoku
Tomatsu Masao 6) "None"
7) Lived o f f others
1) Ibaraki
8) Probably
2) Makabe
9) Jiyuto (November 1882); Yuikkan
3) Shimodate
10) No
4) 36
11) —
5) Shizoku
12) KJKS, pp. 465-74; Nojima,
6) Ex-school teacher
Kabasan, pp. 207-8
7) p
8) Yes
9) Jiyuto; Yuikan head
Sugiura Kippuku
10) No
11) Friend of Oi Kentaro; 1) Fukushima
early popular rights a c t i - 2) Yama
v i s t ; founding member o f 3) Okawada
Jiyuto 4) 37
12) KJKS, pp. 44-48, 477-80, 5) Shizoku
484, 514-17, 519; Nojima, 6) Farmer
Kabasan, pp. 219-23; Endo, 7) ?
Kabasan, pp. 57-59 8) Yes
9) Boshinsha
10) ?
Tamamatsu Kaichi 11) Friend of Kono Hironaka
12) KJKS, pp. 189-204, 313-14, 809;
1) Ibaraki
Takahashi, Fukushima, p. 263
2) Makabe
 435

Miura Bunji 9) Risshisha; Seidokan

10) No
1) Fukushima 11) Died i n prison
2) Yama 12) KJKS, pp. 422-33, 809; Nojima,
3) Komeoka Kabasan, p. 104; Endo, Kabasan,
4) 28 pp. 59-60; Takahashi, Fukushima,
5) Heimin pp. 261-62
6) Farmer/village head
7) 18.2 cho
8) Yes Amano Ichitaro
9) Jiyuto;
10) Fukushima Incident, December 1 Fukushima
1882 2 Tamura
11) Executed 1886 3 Miharu
12) KJKS, pp. 28-32; Nojima, 4 19
Kabasan, pp. 146-47; Taka- 5 Shizoku
hashi, Fukushima, pp. 60, 6 None
. 251-53, 271-75 7 Poor
8 Yes
9 Seidokan
Isokawa Motoyoshi 10 •?

(Tagokichi) 11 Father friend of Kono Hironaka; '

k i l l e d i n Boshin War
1) Fukushima KJKS, pp. 216-26, 230-31;
12)
2) Tamura Nojima, Kabasan, pp. 103-4; Taka-
3) Miharu hashi, Fukushima, pp. 261-62;
4) 24 Endo, Kabasan, pp. 59-60
5) Shizoku
6) Farmer
7) Impoverished
Kotoda Iwamatsu
8) Yes
9) Seidokan 1 Fukushima
10) Fukushima Incident (re- 2 Tamura
leased) 3 Miharu
11) Friend of Kono, Kotoda, 4 23
Kusano; moved to Korea, 1904 5 Shizoku
12) KJKS, pp. 46-50; Nojima, 6 Journali s t/unemployed
Kabasan, pp. 113-18; Endo, 7 Father sake manuf.
Kabasan, p. 89 8 Yes
9 Jiyuto
10 Fukushima Incident
Yamaguchi Moritaro 11 Ties with Tochigi Jiyuto
12 KJKS, pp. 42-44, 602, 609; FKS,
1) Fukushima p. 790; Nojima, Kabasan, pp.
2) Tamura 97-98; Taoka, Hanshin, pp. 59-
3) Miharu 60; Endo, Kabasan, pp. 54-55,
4) 18 68-69
5) Shizoku
6) None
7) ?
8) Yes
 436

Kusano Sakuma 12) KJKS, pp. 247-55, 565, 809;

Taoka, Hanshin, pp. 59-61;
1) Fukushima Nojima, Kabasan, pp. 107-112;
2-3) No fixed residence Endo, Kabasan, pp. 65-70
4) 19
5) Shizoku
6) None Yokoyama Nobuyuki
7) ?
8) Yes 1) Fukushima
9) Jiyuto 2) Yama
10) ? 3) Atsugawa
11) Early a c t i v i s t i n popular 4) 21
rights 5) Shizoku
12) KJKS, pp. 44-46; Endo, 6) Ex-policeman
Kabasan, pp. 87-88; Nojima, 7) Unemployed; impoverished
Kabasan, pp. 118-20 8) Yes (Meiji horitsu gaku)
9) Jiyuto
10) Fukushima Incident
Hara Rihachi 11) Boarder of Koinuma; died i n
prison, 1885
1) Fukushima 12) KJKS, pp. 20-28; Endo, Kabasan,
2) Yama p. 36; Takahashi, Fukushima,
3) Shimoshiba pp. 266-71
4) 35
5) Heimin
6) Farmer Kokugi Shigeo
7) "Middle-income" farmer
8) Yes 1) Fukushima
9) Jiyuto (Aizu branch) 2) Nishi-Shirakawa
10) Escaped Fukushima arrest 3) Shinda
round-up 4) 21
11) Friend of Uda S e i i c h i ; 5) Heimin
died i n prison 6) Railroad repairman
12) KJKS, pp. 32-40; Endo, 7) Father—headman, sake-manuf.
Kabasan, pp. 142-48 8) Yes (Medical school)
9) Jiyuto, Sei'nenkan (Tokyo)
10) ?
Kono Hiroshi 11) Friend of Miura, Hara, and Kono;
executed 1886
1) Fukushima 12) KJKS, pp. 40-42, 580; Takahashi,
2) Tamura Fukushima jiken, pp. 266-71
3) Miharu
4) 19
5) Heimin Hirao Yasokichi
6) None
7) (Father, wealthy merchant) 1) Tochigi
8) Yes 2-3) ?
9) Risshisha; Seidokan 4) 30?
10) Fukushima Incident 5-7) ?
11) Nephew of Kono Hironaka; 8) Yes
active i n popular rights 9) Yuikkan
since 16 yrs. o l d . 10) ?
 437

ID K i l l e d during Incident 6) Farmer/merchant

12) KJKS, pp. 25-26, 38-39, 7) Wealthy farmer
360, 375; Nojima, Kabasan, 8) Yes
p. 137; Endo, Kabasan, pp. 9) Jiyuto
202-5, 219 10) March 1883 f o r i n s u l t i n g
official
11) Pref. assemblyman t i l l 1882
Kobayashi Tokutaro 12) KJKS, pp. 95-101; Nojima,
Kabasan, pp. 72-73
1) A i c h i (born i n Fukushima)
2) Hekiumi
3) Noda Sakagihara Keibu
4) 18
5) Shizoku 1) Tochigi
6) Farmer 2) ?
7) ? 3) Tochigi City?
8) Yes 4) p
9) Yuikan 5) Shizoku
10) No 6) Lawyer
11) Friend of Naito Roichi 7) ?
12) KJKS, pp. 453-64; Endo, 8) Yes
Kabasan, pp. 88-89, 91-93; 9) Yuikkan
Nojima, Kabasan, p. 112 10) ?
11) Pref. Assem. 1887; Mayor, 1937;
married to s i s t e r of Monna
Arai Shogo 12) Endo, Kabasan, p. 35

1) Tochigi
2) Shimotsuga Fukao J u j i r o
3) Sugami Tochigi
1)
4) ?
2-10)
5) Heimin Suspected p o l i c e spy
11)
6) Farmer/village head Endo, Kabasan, pp. 36-37
12)
7) Wealthy farmer
8) Yes
9) Jiyuto
Monna Shigejiro
10) March 1884 (Mojiro)
11) Joined Osaka Incident;
wife, daughter of Eto 1 Fukushima
Shimpei; l a t e r govn't. 2 Kita-Aizu
figure 3 Wakamatsu (no fixed address)
12) Endo, Kabasan, pp. 33-34 4 23
5 Shizoku
6 Ex-policeman
Shioda Okuzo 7 •p
8 Yes
1) Tochigi
9 Mumeikan
2) Shimotsuga Fukushima Incident (acquitted)
10
3) Sugami Admirer of Baba Tatsui
11
4) 35 KJKS, pp. 14-20, 28; Nojima,
12
5) Heimin Kabasan, pp. 191-92; Ishikawa,
Tonegawa, pp. 170-78, 234-46
 438

Ohashi Genzaburo 10-11) 7

12) KJKS, pp. 67-70
1) Tochigi
2) Shimotsuga
3) Tocho Iwamoto Shinkic
4) 32
5) Heimin 1) Tochigi
6) Farmer 2) Shimotsuga
7) Wealthy 3) Inaba
8) "Barely" 4) 20
9) Jiyuto; Yuikan 5) Heimin
10) No 6) Teacher
11) Friend of Koinuma; one of 7) ?
o r i g i n a l planners of 8) Yes
incident 9) 7
12) KJKS, pp. 116-31, 348-50; 10) No
Nojima, Kabasan, pp. 121- 11) Friend of Koinuma
22; Endo Kabasan, pp. 134- 12) KJKS, pp. 70-76
37

Tateno Yoshinosuke
Saeki Masakado 1) Ibaraki
1) Ishikawa 2) Tsuzurakaza
2) Kanezawa 3) Kotsutsumi
3) Shimoatara 4) 27
4) 24 5) Heimin
5) Shizoku 6) Farmer
6) Teacher/reporter 7) ?
7) Unemployed 8) Yes
8) Yes 9) Jiyuto (Spring 1883)
9) Jiyuto 10) No
10) Four times, 1881-83 11) Friend of Tomatsu; Later impli-
11) Friend of Koinuma cated i n Osaka Incident
12) KJKS, pp. 133, 315, 256- 12) KJKS, pp. 128-34
66; Nojima, Kabasan, pp.
122-25; Endo, Kabasan, pp.
82-85 Tanaka Shozo
1) Tochigi
2) Shimotsuga
Iwanuma Saichi
3) Yanaka
1) Tochigi 4) 43
2) Shimotsuga 5) Heimin
3) Tochigi 6) Farmer/ pref. assemblyman
4) 31 7) Wealthy farmer
5) Heimin 8) Yes
6) Attorney 9) Kaishinto
7) ? 10) ?
8) Yes 11) Diet member, 1890; after 1891,
9) Jiyuto a n t i - p o l l u t i o n campaigner
 439

12) KJKS, pp. 803-4; Nojima, 12) KJKS, pp. 512-13; Nihon Rekishi
Kabasan, p. 101; Strong, Daijiten VII:315
"Pioneer"

Yazumi Kinnosuke
Kurihara Sogoro
1) Tokyo
1) Fukushima 2) Nihonbashi
2) Tamura 3) Nihonbashi
3) Miharu 4) 22
4) 18 5) Heimin
5) Shizoku 6) Son of inn owner
6) Merchant (kitchenware) 7-10) ?
7) ? 11) Hid Tamamatsu after Incident
8) Yes 12) KJKS, p. 55
9) Seidokan
10) December 1882
11) Fukushima Incident p a r t i - Shinyama Yaro
cipant
1) Fukushima
12) KJKS, pp. 55, 512-13, 570
2) Onuma
3) Matsuya
4) 26
Yamada Y u j i
5) Heimin
1) Iwate 6-10) ?
2) Minami-Iwate 11) Hid Yokoyama, Hota and Kobayashi
3) Yamagiwa after Incident
4) 19 12) KJKS, pp. 55, 512-13
5) Heimin
6-10) ?
11) Hid Kobayashi after
Incident
12) KJKS, pp. 55, 511-12

Naito Roichi
1) Aichi
2) Hekiumi
3) Kami-jubara
4) 37
5) Shizoku
6) Politician/writer
7) Could vote i n l o c a l e l e c t .
8) Yes
9) Jiyuto; Yuikkan
10) No
11) Pref. Assemb., 4 terms;
Diet, 1906, 1908 as
Seiyukai party member
 GLOSSARY

Bakufu "Tent Government"; refers to the Tokugawa rule

under the Shogunate

C h i j i kenri The r i g h t of self-government

Daigennin "Lawyer" or mediator between debtors and

creditors

Daimyoj i n "Divine R e c t i f i e r " ; refers to god-like figure

who serves as guide to peasants i n world r e f o r -
mation uprisings (yonaoshi ikki)

Gekka j iken "Incidents of i n t e n s i f i e d [violence]"

Gimin Martyr; s p e c i f i c a l l y , a leader of a peasant up-

r i s i n g who i s prosecuted by the authorities

Administrative d i s t r i c t between the prefectural

Gun and v i l l a g e l e v e l s ; the government appointed
head i s the guncho

Feudal domain of the Tokugawa period

Han
Heimin "Commoner"; a status designation of the M e i j i
period used to refer to some ex-samurai, and
most farmers, artisans, and merchants whose fore-
fathers had the same occupation

Jiken "Incident"; refers to various kinds of d i s t u r -

bances ranging from popular demonstrations to
r e b e l l i o n s ; e.g., the Kitakata jiken and the
Chichibu jiken

Jiyu minken undo The Freedom and Popular Rights Movement

Jiyuto Commonly translated as "Liberal Party" although

"Freedom Party" i s more accurate

Kanto The region consisting of the seven prefectures

'surrounding Tokyo

Kuni Province of the Tokugawa period

Mac h i Town

Meiboka "Man of repute"; l o c a l or national personality

440
 441

Minken Popular rights; a minkenka i s an advocate of

the popular rights movement

Oyakata-kokata "Parent-child" relationship between s o c i a l

superiors and i n f e r i o r s unrelated by blood;
also known as oyabun-kobun

Ri A measurement of distance equalling 2.44 miles

Sen A monetary unit equalling one-hundredth of a

yen

Shizoku A status designation of the M e i j i period r e f e r -

ring to former nobles of the feudal period

Shoya V i l l a g e head; also known i n some areas as

nanushi, kimoiri, or as kocho i n the mid-Meiji
period

Uchikowashi "House-wrecking"; a form of v i o l e n t peasant up-

r i s i n g during the Tokugawa and M e i j i periods

Yonaoshi i k k i "World reform uprising"; a m i l l e n i a l or primi-

t i v e communistic form of peasant uprising pre-
dominating i n the late Tokugawa and early M e i j i
periods