Fortich V Corona

Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier
Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not
effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been
referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.

Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc filed on
December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit: the movants have no legal personality
to further seek redress before the Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this case was
denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also denied in the
November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of December 3,
1998 is in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section
2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The
impropriety of movants December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering that
all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them (movants) in seeking a reconsideration
of the November 17, 1998 Resolution.1

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To
This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order) on
December 3, 1998. In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and
intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as
their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by
a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met.
Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the
following constitutional provision:

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.4

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the
framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand,
such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put,
the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the
rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words
appear.5
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the
Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely,
the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted
provision speaks only of case and not matter.

If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to
refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the
division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still
the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the
necessary vote for its reconsideration.

It is the movants further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this case to the
Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first impression. In the
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for
reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was expressed:

Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import
to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of
the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer
novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of
the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive
portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial courts order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to
obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five
(5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of
the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc.

The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the
earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently,
the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4,
in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have
ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first
obtained.7 In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more
importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due
course to their second motions for reconsideration.

The crux of the controversy is the validity of the Win-Win Resolution dated November 7, 1997.
We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996
decision of the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the
filing of the motion for reconsideration which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution.

The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was
disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants
purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution
was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights
of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the
November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz: Just as a losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.8

In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant
rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of
the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case,
therefore, is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit.9

In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they
have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they
are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have
already been raised in intervenors earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998
Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are
admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest
over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is
limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.10 Moreover, the Win-Win Resolution itself
states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform.11 Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as
to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not
grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal
rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals

This resolves petitioners’ Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which
the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably
filed by the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., Et Al., are
pending.

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution
of November 18, 1993: . . ., the following are considered en banc cases:

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;

2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,

Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;

7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed;

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit
the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of
the court en banc; and

9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.

The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares
presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to
private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said
decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated,
determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.
there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners’ Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc
these consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was presented but when
the same was first brought to its attention on March 7, 2000, the Court opined that since the
Third Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was then
premature for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Court succinctly cautioned that the
action of the Third Division on the matter would just be tentative.

On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners’ motion to transfer these
cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter,
voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases
above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the
Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads:
"All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention."

Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8)
Associate Justices who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given
any cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution
of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is
decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to
merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of the
Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve
their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious.

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its
resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of
rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the
cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has
taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding
and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed, subject cases
are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.

In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en consulta, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division
with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of
the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., Et Al., are pending and
unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous
value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the
prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the
Court En Banc. WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc
cases.

De Lima v. Guerrero

Decision:

Petitioner assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge Hon. Juanita
Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Case
No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1) the Order dated February 23, 2017
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2)
the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated
February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and
finally, (4) the supposed omission of the respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash,
through which she questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC.2

The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed
affidavits in support of their testimonies.3

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein the petitioner,
through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of
the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of
Justice ("Omnibus Motion").8 In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her.
Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the
DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the
Ombudsman.

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has decided
not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.12 The DOJ Panel,
however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all
pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved for but was denied
reconsideration by the DOJ Panel.13 On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari14 assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel
over the complaints against her.
Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel
proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated
February 14, 2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima.
Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and
several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20 mainly raising the following: the
RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority
to file the Information the Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the
recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on
testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the
testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order22 finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused.
The Order stated, viz.: After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of
Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest
against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE
PALISOC DAYAN.

The OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not
observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive
grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged
against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and procedural rules,
and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the assailed orders and
warrant.28

Procedural Issues:

A. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on

hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the
Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the
trial court renders the instant petition premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against
forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information
before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165
and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP
No. 149097, assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Substantive Issues:
 A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over
the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable
cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is resolved or
until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not notarize
the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in
this wise:

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was
informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.
6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De Lima and
confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator given our
personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her staff a photocopy of any of her
government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that it was
her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.
assuming the veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that
petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and
Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the
certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-
Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."

Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to sign the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the
evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due
execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered
controlling in determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." "A pleading required
to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shan be treated as an unsigned
pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under
oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals: In this case, it is undisputed that the
Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified
under oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the
pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent evidence of
identities.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the certification against
forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court explained that "non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons.'"
Here, the CA did not mention nor does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or
compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the
private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending
in another forum.

Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely
speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum shopping is required
based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be
simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation.
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It
must be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice,41 as what apparently
happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner
allegedly affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been
committed by the filing of the petition.

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification
and that of certification against forum shopping. A defective verificationshall be treated as an
unsigned pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to
allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certify against forum shopping shall be
cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, and is not curable by
amendment of the initiatory pleading. Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify
her failure to sign the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of
the notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-
compliance therewith.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

This Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower
courts.47 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and
arbitrary reasons.48 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,49:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.

The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify
an exception to the policy. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner.

recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances:

(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2)
when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6)
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes
questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as
to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts. Petitioner's allegation
that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by the
exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and
will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules
on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A
primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case.
Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first impression.
Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she the first
defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded
as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which
petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case
from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of
whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a
question of fact, determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended
to the Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate
court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February
23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the
recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not
ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.

More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b) of the
prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable
admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the
RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against interest binds the
petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute.56 It is based on the presumption that "no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true."57

Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in filing the instant
petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."
Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-
165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash
before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on
the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according
to the desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should not pre-
empt the action of a trial court: Here, the trial court has not yet made a ruling as to whether
the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be
made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their respective evidence
in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any right or benefit
under that provision at this point is premature.59

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 the Court likewise held that a petition
for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and actually rendered its
decision. It held, viz.: the appellate court never actually ruled on whether or not petitioner's
right had prescribed. It merely declared that it was in a position to so rule and thereafter required
the parties to submit memoranda. In making such a declaration, did the CA commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? It did not. All things considered, this petition
is premature. The CA has decided nothing and whatever petitioner's vehement objections
may be (to any eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should be raised only after such
ruling shall have actually been promulgated.

Diaz v. Nora: he has not denied the motion for execution filed by the petitioner. He merely did
not act on the same. Neither had petitioner urged the immediate resolution of his
motion for execution by said arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was not even given
the opportunity to pass upon the question raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the appeal, so the records of the case can be remanded to the respondent labor
arbiter for execution of the decision.

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground that these were not
criminal cases that involved a pending motion to quash. However, it should be obvious from the
afore-quoted excerpts that the nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of
prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that the lower courts had not
yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to make, a ruling before the parties came before this
forum.

Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of
"final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction
of any lower court is in issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash - which puts the jurisdiction of the
lower court in issue - there is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final
judgment or order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the
block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum
nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review a non-existent court action. It can only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling
by a lower tribunal.

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional
requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or
ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no
occasion for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy found in law."66 Thus, the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later
discussed, before a premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24, 2017 Orders
she is currently assailing in this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman, "[a] motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to
correct its factual and legal errors x x x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition
for certiorari."67

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court. It is
considered an act of malpractice as it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes.68

The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court
processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts. What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation
caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar
reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon
the same issues.

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any
confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any
violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. The acts committed and described
herein can possibly constitute direct contempt.70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which states that
"[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia,
or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping
therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.71

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal
case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor General, have
substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to Quash will
reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both,
petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged
multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of
the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all
non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and
the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and
freedom.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165,
the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the
Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice
with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the
Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to
try the case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately related to her
position as the Secretary of Justice.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations
of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was
never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public
officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the
Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft
and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct
Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other
allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter
crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a global illicit
trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,"79 necessarily
involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and corruption of
government officials.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the
Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of
the RPC.80 As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in
the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on
how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP."

Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for
a valid Information for Illegal Drug Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of
these cases was "Illegal Sale" of dangerous drugs - a crime separate and distinct from
"Illegal Trading" averred in the Information against De Lima. The elements of "Illegal Sale"
will necessary differ from the elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section
3(jj), of RA 9165.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes much
broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered as only one
of the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be committed through two modes:
(1) illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a broker in any transactions
involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

By "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can
be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the
subject of the illegal sale. A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a
commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no
concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name, but in the name of
those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both
parties.84

The DOJ's designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all,
the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of
whether, what, and whom to charge.88 The exercise of this discretion depends on a
smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be
no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but with
violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as in this case, possibly
bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the
information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

The DOJ's designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all,
the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of
whether, what, and whom to charge.88 The exercise of this discretion depends on a
smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be
no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but with
violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as in this case, possibly
bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the
information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of
RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively
vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.

drug-related cases: Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals.

Section 90. Jurisdiction. -The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall
be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases.

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x x x
The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically
lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e. g., (a)
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written
defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests
upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless
of the imposable penalty and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in
the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided for in
the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of R.A. No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by P.D.
No. 44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of B.P. Blg. 129 abolished the Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While,
indeed, Section 44 provides that these courts were to be "deemed automatically abolished" upon
the declaration by the President that the reorganization provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been
completed, this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely
replaced the Courts of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of
Section 44, to wit: Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts
of First Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug
cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44.

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial
Courts therein designated as special courts.94 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The dissents would
highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs law, which
provides: Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit Criminal Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a
clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original
jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal
prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is

unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the
several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of [RA 9165]." If at all, the change introduced by the new phraseology
of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction"
but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each
judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill No.
4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No.
6425, as amended:"

Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Case, which
provides that "the Supreme Court shall designate regional trial courts to have original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable by this Act," Rep. Dilangalen inquired whether it is the
Committee's intention that certain RTC salas will be designated by the Supreme Court to
try drug-related offenses, although all RTCs have original jurisdiction over those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the Supreme Court's
assignment of drug cases to certain judges is not exclusive because the latter can still
handle cases other than drug-related cases. He added that the Committee's intention is to
assign drug-related cases to judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to
them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he would like to propose the
following amendment; "The Supreme Court shall designate specific salas of the RTC to try
exclusively offenses related to drugs."
Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate
Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of RTCs that will exclusively
handle drug-related offenses was used to skirt the budgetary requirements that might accrue by
the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to divest the RTCs of their
exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases. Any comments?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr. Chairman, but I'd like
to call your attention to the fact that my proposal is only for designation because if it is for a
creation that would entail another budget, Mr. Chairman. And almost always, the
Department of Budget would tell us at the budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have
money. So that might delay the very purpose why we want the RTC or the municipal courts to
handle exclusively the drug cases. That's why my proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation. Approved.96

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher,
regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the
Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and
prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges
damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts
in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft
court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its characterization and
continuation as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD
1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catch all provision,
does not operate to strip the RTCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA
9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that
public officials were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165
punishes government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs,
while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and
employees. The adverted sections read:

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation,

Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties
Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to
account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for
in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the
trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking
dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its
divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

Section 4(b) of PD 1 RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to
"exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165]." This is an exception,
couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD
1606, as amended by RA 10660. 606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general
rule, couched in a "broad and general phraseology. RTC is likewise given "exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code,"103 regardless of whether such violation was committed by public officers
occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact, offenses
committed by members of the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of RA
7055,104 "service-connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan but by
court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined
solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In
determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws
governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be considered.

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165.
However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express
repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two
laws cannot be enforced.106

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general
law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking
public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers.
Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over violations
of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs cases pending
before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before the Sandiganbayan
from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs law. Instead, true to
its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before the Sandiganbayan involve
violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation.111

Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate for
emphasis, states:

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges
damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts
in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases
handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking
public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-
related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan would
all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the
accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the more proper.
Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions
when confronted with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Information;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or
3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious.
Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the Information be deficient or
lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the amendment of the
Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information;
rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment.
This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by
simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to
prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a matter
of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the February 17, 2017
Information filed against the petitioner. This power to order the amendment is not reposed with
this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the
Information, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order
sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution113

Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint
or information be filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117
states, thus: Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as
provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not
be discharged unless admitted to bail.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an
information on only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been
extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to
Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even granting,
for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the warrant for her arrest is
an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against this court action is to
proceed to trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari.

Galzote v. Briones: A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen
legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion
to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to gnash filed by the accused
results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is
appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of
his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an
appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used
only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain
and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial.

The trial court has been denied the opportunity to act and rule on petitioner's motion when the
latter jumped the grin and prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the
trial court in its tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her motion to
quash instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.
RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST

finding probable cause to arrest the petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first
resolved the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no
probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to
Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence
to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the
respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a
limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.- (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer and first
attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible
administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Her
exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the Rules of Court
considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any
time before the accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more, it is in accord with this
Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller119 that "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon
the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused."

Personal•determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a

warrant of arrest may issue. The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the
prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances
presented by both parties."125 This much is clear from this Court's ruling in Soliven cited by the
petitioner, viz.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.126
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden
trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic
notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.

Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the
accused.129 She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.130

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy
by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the allegation that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order for
petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is
inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons and
whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this Court rule
that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held that said
testimonies should be received with great caution, but not that they would not be considered. The
testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited case. Furthermore, this Court
explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman138 that hearsay evidence is admissible
during preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does
not finally adjudicate rights and obligations ofparties.139

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with
dispatch with Criminal Case No. 17-165.

Dissent Carpio

The petition should be GRANTED for the following substantive reasons:

(1) The Information does not allege any of the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale or
illegal trade of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, hence the charge of illegal trade of
drugs is void ab initio;
(2) The exclusive original jurisdiction over bribery, the offense actually alleged in the
Information, lies with the Sandiganbayan; hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 17-165; and

(3) In the Memorandum of Agreement dated 29 March 2012 between the DOJ and the
Ombudsman, the DOJ expressly recognizes the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigations in complaints for crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan; hence, the DOJ Panel had no authority to file the Information.

Substantive Matters
The Information does not allege any of the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale or
illegal trade of drugs.

De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position and authority, demand, solicit and
extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial
bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and electronic devices, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and
deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug
trading amounting to Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
weekly "tara" each from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.

The allegations in the Information against petitioner do not constitute an offense under any
provision of R.A. No. 9165. The investigation and eventual prosecution of her case fall under
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, specifically as amended by R.A. No.
10660, bringing her case within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandigan bayan.

For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence.

It bears stressing that what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. In other words, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs are: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew
that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As it were, the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the offense of
possession or sale of prohibited drugs. Withal, it is essential in the prosecution of drug cases that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. This means that on
top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally sold or
possessed is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be
established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a conviction.

However, the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, as filed against petitioner, clearly and
egregiously does not specify any of the essential elements necessary to prosecute the crime of
illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, or of illegal trade of drugs under Section 5 in relation to
Section 3(jj). Indisputably, the Information does not identify the buyer, the seller, the
object, or the consideration of the illegal sale or trade. The Information also does not make
any allegation of delivery of the drugs illegally sold or traded nor of their payment. The
Information does not state the kind and quantity of the drugs subject of the illegal sale or
trade.

Without these essential elements alleged in the Information, the actual sale or trade of dangerous
drugs can never be established. For without the identities of the seller and buyer, and without an
allegation on the kind and quantity of the drugs and the consideration of the sale, as well as the
delivery of the object of the sale and the payment, there is no sale or trade of dangerous drugs
that can be established during the trial. As this Court has repeatedly held:

x x x. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.32

In illegal sale of drugs, the corpus delicti is "the actual sale"33 of the dangerous drugs, which
must be alleged in the Information. This can be done only if the Information alleges the identities
of the seller and buyer, the kind and quantity of the drugs which constitute the object of the sale,
the consideration, the delivery of the dangerous drugs and the payment.

In short, it is simply impossible for the Information, as presently worded, to make out a
case of illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165,
which is the governing provision of R.A. No. 9165 prescribing the essential elements and
penalties of the illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs.

The present Information against petitioner alleges only the "use of electronic devices" but does
not allege any of the essential elements of "illegal sale" under Section 5. This Court cannot allow
a prosecution for "illegal trade" of drugs where none, repeat absolutely none, of the essential
elements of "illegal sale" of drugs is present. In short, in the present Information for the
offense of "illegal trade" of drugs, only the circumstance of "use of electronic devices" is
alleged, with no allegation on the identity of the seller, identity of the buyer, the kind and
quantity of the illegal drugs sold or traded, the consideration and the delivery of the illegal
drugs, and the actual payment. To allow such prosecution is obviously contrary to the
constitutional due process requirement that the accused shall "be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him," as expressly mandated in Section 14(2), Article III in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated in the information must be determined
by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crime.41(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there can be no dispute whatsoever that each and every essential element of the offense
charged must be alleged in the Information. This, in fact and in law, is axiomatic. Nothing. can
be more fundamental than this in initiating any criminal prosecution, as the right to be informed
of the "nature and cause of the accusation" is a fundamental right of an accused enshrined in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

Failure to allege any of the essential elements of the offense invariably means that probable
cause cannot be determined on the basis of the Information, both as to the commission of
the offense and as to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Here, the present Information against petitioner does not allege any of the essential elements of
the crime of illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs. In short, the Information does not
charge the offense of illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs. Ineluctably, the present Information
against petitioner is patently void to charge petitioner of illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous
drugs. The trial court's only recourse is to dismiss the Information with respect to the charge of
trade of dangerous drugs.

The ponencia insists that the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
is separate and distinct from the crime of illegal trade of drugs in Section 3(jj) of R.A. No.
91655.50The ponencia asserts that the Information charges petitioner for illegal trade of drugs
under Section 3(jj), not under Section 5. This is gross error.

The title of Section 5 expressly states "Sale, Trading x x x of Dangerous Drugs." The text itself
of Section 5 penalizes the unauthorized "sale, trade" of drugs. Indeed, the sale of drugs means
the trade of drugs. Section 3(jj) defines "[t]rading" of drugs to refer to "[t]ransactions
involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs x x x using electronic devices." Thus,
Section 3(jj) describes illegal "trading" of drugs as the illegal sale, illegal trade or illegal
trafficking of drugs "using electronic devices." In illegal trade of drugs, there is an illegal sale of
drugs but this illegal act is committed "using electronic devices."

Significantly, Section 3(r) defines "Illegal Trafficking" as "[t]he illegal cultivation, culture,
delivery, administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution,
importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical." Thus, illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs means the illegal sale or
illegal trading of dangerous drugs. Section 3(jj) defines "trading" of dangerous drugs as the
"illegal trafficking" of dangerous drugs. Thus, the "trading" of dangerous drugs means "illegal
trafficking," which under Section 3(r) means the "sale, trading" of dangerous drugs. Section 5
punishes the illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs. In short, the illegal sale, illegal
trade, and illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs refer to the same crime that is punished
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

R.A. No. 9165 does not provide a separate or higher penalty when the illegal sale or illegal
trade of drugs is committed with the use of electronic devices. With or without the use of
electronic devices, the crime committed is illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs if all the essential
elements of illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs in Section 5 are present. The circumstance of
'use of electronic devices' is not an essential element of illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs in
Section 5. Certainly, the crime of illegal trade of drugs can be committed even without the use of
electronic devices. To trade in illegal drugs is to sell or to traffic in illegal drugs. The use of
electronic devices does not create a separate crime or even qualify the crime of illegal sale of
drugs. The penalty for illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs is the same. The circumstance of "use
of electronic device" does not increase the penalty or create a separate penalty.

Contrary to the position of the ponencia, the crimes of "illegal sale" and "illegal trade" of drugs
are both violations of Section 5, except that "illegal trade" involves the use of electronic devices
in the sale of drugs. Thus, "trading" is defined in Section 3(jj) as "[t]ransactions involving the
illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs x x x using electronic devices such as, but not limited to,
text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act."

Section 3(jj) falls under Section 3 on "Definitions." Section 3 is not the operative provision
that prescribes the essential elements of the crime and its penalty. Section 3(jj) does not
penalize "illegal trade" of drugs; it is Section 5 that penalizes "illegal trade" of drugs. Section
3(jj) has the same status as the other terms defined in Section 3 - they are mere definitions and do
not prescribe the essential elements of an act that constitutes a crime to which a penalty is
attached by law for the commission of such act. No person can be charged and convicted for
violating a term defined in Section 3 separate and distinct from the provision of law prescribing
the essential elements of the offense and penalizing such offense.

Thus, the Information charging the accused of "illegal trade" must allege all the essential
elements of the offense of "illegal sale," and if the prosecution wants to be more specific, the
Information can also allege the circumstance that there was "use of electronic devices" to
facilitate the illegal sale. The absence of an allegation of "use of electronic devices" will not take
the offense out of Section 5. The circumstance of "use of electronic devices" is not an essential
element of the crime under Section 5. There is also no provision whatsoever in R.A. No. 9165
that makes this circumstance a separate crime or qualifies the crime of illegal sale under
Section 5. Nullum crimen sine lege.No crime without a law.51

R.A. No. 10660 took out of the jurisdiction of the RTC cases involving public officials with
salary grade 27 or higher where there is allegation of damage to the government or bribery
in an amount exceeding P1,000,000, and these cases now fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This amendment in R.A. No. 10660 now applies to the
case of petitioner, taking her case out of the jurisdiction of the RTC since in the present
Information there is an allegation of bribery exceeding P1,000,000 and petitioner had
salary grade 31 as then Secretary of Justice.

In the present case, the ponencia attempts to replicate the logic of People v. Benipayo to conform
with its strained conclusion that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try Senator De
Lima. However, it is clear as day that People v. Benipayo does not apply to the present case
because R.A. No. 10660, enacted after People v. Benipayo was decided, has already taken the
present case out of the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over bribery, the crime actually alleged in the Information.
In insisting on the jurisdiction of the RTC, the ponencia sets aside R.A. No. 10660 as if this law
does not exist at all. R.A. No. 10660 was approved on 16 April 2015, a date later than the
approval of R.A. No. 9165. Section 2 of R.A. No. 10660 further amended Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 to read as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b)
alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related
transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 10660, explicitly states that
the Sandiganbayan "shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases" involving:

(1) Violations of R.A. No. 3019,54 as amended, R.A. No. 1379,55 and Chapter II, Section 2
(Bribery), Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and other officials
specifically enumerated under Section 4a(1)(a) to (g) and (2) to (5);

(2) Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, committed in
relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection "a"; and

When R.A. No. 10660, the latest amendment to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, mandated that the
Sandiganbayan "shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases" involving the
offenses specified in the amended Section 4, it meant all cases without exception unless
specifically excepted in the same or subsequent law. When the law says "all cases," it means
there is no exception. R.A. No. 10660 wiped out all previous exceptions in all laws prior to
R.A. No. 10660, and the only exceptions now are those found in Section 4 as amended by
R.A. No. 10660.

Black's Law Dictionary60 defines "all" in this manner:

All. Means the whole of - used with a singular noun or pronoun, and referring to amount,
quantity, extent, duration, quality, or degree. The whole number or sum of - used collectively,
with a plural noun or pronoun expressing an aggregate. Every member of individual
component of; each one of - used with a plural noun. In this sense, all is used generically and
distributively. "All" refers rather to the aggregate under which the individuals are subsumed than
to the individuals themselves.

Clearly, when the law says "all cases," the law means the whole number of cases, every one and
each one of the cases. There is no exception, unless the same or subsequent law expressly grants
an exception.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction in "all cases" of bribery where
the accused is a public official with a Salary Grade 27 or higher and the amount involved
exceeds P1,000,000. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan also exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction in "all cases" involving other offenses or felonies committed in relation to their
office by the officials and employees enumerated under Section 4a, a situation applicable to
petitioner Senator De Lima.

At the time that the alleged crime was committed, Senator De Lima was Secretary of Justice with
Salary Grade 31.61 Her alleged acts of demanding, soliciting, and extorting money from high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison were committed in relation to her office, as the
Information expressly alleges that she used her "power, position and authority" in committing
the offense. The unnamed high profile inmates are detained in the New Bilibid Prison. The New
Bilibid Prison is a facility under the administration of the Bureau of Corrections.62 The Bureau of
Corrections, in turn, is a line bureau and a constituent unit of the Department of Justice.63 The
amounts in the Information exceed P10,000,000 (ten million pesos), because aside from the
P5,000,000 given twice, Senator De Lima also allegedly received P100,000 (one hundred
thousand pesos) weekly from the unnamed inmates.

Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code defines direct bribery as: Art. 210. Direct Bribery. - Any
public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received
by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of [not less than the value of the gift and]
not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime
agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.

The elements of direct bribery are:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by himself or

through another;

3. Such offer or promise is accepted, or the gift or present is received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an unjust
act which does not constitute a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his
official duty to do; and

4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected to the
performance of his official duties.64
The Information stated that: (1) The accused petitioner was the DOJ Secretary and the Officer-
in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections at the time of the alleged crime; (2) Petitioner demanded,
solicited and extorted money from the high profile inmates; (3) Petitioner took advantage of her
public office and used her power, position and authority to solicit money from the high profile
inmates; (4) Petitioner received more than P10,000,000 (ten million pesos) from the high profile
inmates; (5) "By reason of which" referring to the payment of extortion money, the unnamed
inmates were able to unlawfully trade in drugs. Thus, based on the allegations in the Information,
the crime allegedly committed is direct bribery and not illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs.

Clearly, based on the allegations in the Information, jurisdiction lies with the
Sandiganbayan and not with the RTC since petitioner allegedly used the "power, position
and authority" of her office as then Secretary of Justice. Even if the Information
designated the offense charged against petitioner as "Violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b) and Section
28, Republic Act No. 9165 (Illegal Drug Trading)," such caption in the Information is not
controlling since it is the description of the crime charged and the particular facts alleged
in the body of the Information that determine the character of the crime.65

The ponencia further insists that as a co-principal and coconspirator, petitioner is liable for the
acts of her co-principals and co conspirators even if the Information does not allege that
petitioner actually participated in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs but simply alleges
that petitioner allowed the NBP inmates to do so.68 The Information does not identiy the actual
"illegal traffickers" of drugs who are supposedly unnamed high profile inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison. The Information does not also identify the buyers of the dangerous drugs, or the
kind and quantity of the dangerous drugs illegally sold or traded. There is further no allegation
on the delivery of the illegal drugs or payment for the illegal sale or trade of the drugs. How can
petitioner be made liable as co-principal and co-conspirator when there is no allegation
whatsoever that she committed an act constituting part of the illegal sale or trade of drugs and
not one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs is
alleged in the Information for "violation of Section 5, in relation to Sections 3(jj), 26(b), and 28
of R.A. No. 9165?" .Certainly, an allegation of conspiracy in the Information does not do away
with the constitutional requirement that the accused must be "informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation" against her.

In the present case, petitioner cannot be held liable for conspiracy in the illegal sale or illegal
trade of dangerous drugs where none of the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale or
illegal trade of dangerous drugs is alleged in the Information. Besides, the Information does not
even allege that petitioner actually participated in the commission of acts constituting illegal
sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs to make her liable as a co-principal and co-conspirator.
It is self-evident that in any sale or trade of goods or services, there must be an actual seller
and actual buyer. There is no illegal sale or illegal trade of dangerous drugs if there is no actual
seller and actual buyer of the dangerous drugs.

The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over complaints for crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 29 March 2012, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice signed a
Memorandum of Agreement70 (MOA) which stated that the Ombudsman has "primary
jurisdiction in the conduct of preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings over
complaints for crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." Based on the MOA, the DOJ
should have turned over to the Ombudsman the preliminary investigation of petitioner on four
grounds. First, there is an allegation of bribery against the public officer, which is alleged in the
Information against petitioner. Second, the offense charged was allegedly committed in relation
to the public officer's public office, which is alleged in the Information against petitioner. Third,
the public officer has Salary Grade 27 or higher, which is the situation of petitioner. Fourth,
there is an allegation of corruption by a public officer, which 1s alleged in the Information as
committed by unnamed high profile inmates.

In any of the first three circumstances, the MOA expressly states that exclusive original
jurisdiction belongs to the Sandiganbayan. In the fourth circumstance, exclusive original
jurisdiction belongs to the Sandiganbayan if the public officer has Salary Grade 27 or
higher, which is the situation of petitioner. Thus, any one of these four circumstances is a
ground for the turn over of petitioner's preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman. The
DOJ obviously failed to comply with its obligation under the MOA. In short, the DOJ under the
terms of the MOA had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case
No. 17-165 against petitioner.

The prosecution's dilemmas: incurable defects in the Information, effective denial of the Motion
To Quash, duplicity of offenses in the Information.

Pages 41 to 44 of the ponencia instruct the DOJ prosecutors how to correct the patent defects in
the Information filed against petitioner should this Court order its quashal. The ponencia cites
Rule 117, Sections 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to justify petitioner's
continued detention.

Section 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the an1endment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this
rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to
bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time
specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the
accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.

The ponencia further states that "in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been arraigned,
the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the February 17, 2017 Information filed
against petitioner."
The ponencia's statements tend to mislead. The ponencia overlooked procedural errors in its
suggestions. The defects in the Information cannot be cured by mere amendment.

An Information cannot be amended to vest jurisdiction upon a court.

The trial court can only order the prosecution to amend the Information as provided under
Section 4 of Rule 117 if the trial court finds that there is a defect in the Information which "can
be cured by amendment."73 An amendment of the Information to vest jurisdiction upon a court
is not allowed.74 As held in Gonzales v. Judge Salvador:75 Not all defects in an information can
be cured by amendment.

The Information as regards the charge of illegal trade of dangerous drugs is void ab initio.
There is complete and utter absence of the essential elements of the crime. Section 4 of Rule 117
allows an amendment of the Information if the defect "can be cured by amendment." A
defective Information can be cured if it alleges some, but not all, of the essential elements of the
offense. However, if the Information does not allege any of the essential elements at all, the
Information is void ab initio and is not merely defective. As held in Leviste v. Hon. Alameda:77

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior
to entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a
ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.78

An amendment that cures a defective Information is one that supplies a missing element to
complete the other essential elements already alleged in the Information. But when none of the
other elements is alleged in the Information, there is nothing to complete because not a single
essential element is alleged in the Information.

The Information already charges direct bribery.

The Information would be void for duplicity of offense, because it would then charge petitioner
with two crimes: direct bribery and illegal trade of drugs. Duplicity of offense is prohibited under
Rule 110, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that
"[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a
single punishment for various offenses." There is nothing in our laws which states that there
should be a single punishment for the two offenses of direct bribery and illegal trade of drugs.

No prematurity since this petition is for certiorari under Rule 65

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction x x x over petitions for certiorari x x x. Petition for
certiorari under this Section as provided in Rule 65 is an original action that waits for no final
judgment or order of a lower court because what is assailed is the lower court's absence of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or its grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner is assailing an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment or order.
Absence or excess of jurisdiction is the very basis for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

What the ponencia wants is for petitioner, who is being held for a non-bailable offense, to wait
for the final judgment or order of the trial court on the merits of the case before resorting to this
Court on the fundamental and purely legal issue of jurisdiction. That obviously would not be a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy as petitioner would be detained during the entire duration of
the trial of the case. Certiorari under Rule 65 is properly available when "there is no appeal, nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."79 There can be no appeal
because there is still no final judgment or order of the RTC. Unless there is resort to certiorari
under Rule 65, petitioner will continue to be deprived of her liberty for the duration of the trial.
The situation of petitioner in this case is precisely why the certiorari under Rule 65 was created.

Issuance of Warrant of Arrest effectively denied the Motion To Quash

The ponencia also insists that petitioner should have waited for Judge Guerrero's resolution on
her Motion To Quash before proceeding to this Court. This is error. There is no longer any need
to wait for the trial court's resolution on the Motion To Quash because the trial court had issued a
Warrant of Arrest against petitioner after petitioner filed her Motion To Quash.

In the case at bar, the petitioner assails the very jurisdiction of the court wherein the criminal
case was filed. Certainly, there is a more compelling reason that such issue be resolved soonest,
in order to avoid the court's spending precious time and energy unnecessarily in trying and
deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety and embarrassment,
let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in
which could possibly be annulled for want of jurisdiction. Even in civii actions, We have
counseled that when the court's jurisdiction is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the
court to resolve the same as soon as possible in order to avoid the unwholesome consequences
mentioned above. The Information against petitioner was filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa
City on 17 February 2017. Petitioner filed a Motion To Quash on 20 February 2017. Judge
Guerrero found probable cause and issued Warrants of Arrest against petitioner and her co-
accused on 23 February 2017.

By issuing the Warrant of Arrest, Judge Guerrero found probable cause that petitioner most
likely committed the offense of illegal trade of dangerous drugs. This means that Judge Guerrero
believed that the Information alleged all the essential elements of the offense charged, her court
had jurisdiction over the offense charged, the DOJ Panel had authority to file the Information,
and the Infonnation does not charge more than one offense. In effect, Judge Guerrero already
ruled on the merits of petitioner's Motion To Quash.

Thus, Judge Guerrero's issuance of the Warrant of Arrest is an effective denial of petitioner's
Motion To Quash. Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest means that the trial comt judge accepted the
contents of the Information as well as the evidence supporting it, and found probable cause.
However, it is a legal impossibility for the judge to find probable cause when the Infonnation
does not allege any of the essential elements of the offense charged. It is an oxymoron to say that
the Information does not allege any of the essential elements of the offense charged and yet there
is probable cause that the accused committed the offense charged, justifying the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest.

Thus, there is no longer any room for the amendment of the Information at Judge Guerrero's
level since she already effectively denied the Motion To Quash. Moreover, the effective denial of
petitioner's Motion To Quash through the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest is a proper subject
matter of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 41. A denial of a Motion To
Quash is an interlocutory order.85 To repeat, Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that the "aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65" to assail "[a]
interlocutory order"86 where the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. This is exactly what petitioner has done in the present petition.

For Judge Guerrero to issue the Warrant of Arrest despite the failure of the Information to
allege any of the essential elements of the offense is an extreme case of grave abuse of
discretion that must be struck down by this Court in the appropriate case, and that
appropriate case is the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

No Forum-Shopping
The ponencia insists that petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping when she filed the
present case against Judge Guerrero before this Court while her Motion To Quash was still
pending before Judge Guerrero. However, as we have previously shown, Judge Guerrero's
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest after petitioner filed her Motion To Quash is a denial of
petitioner's Motion To Quash. Contrary to the ponencia's assertion, there is no longer any
Motion To Quash pending before the trial court.

There is a clear recognition that petitioner filed the case in the Court of Appeals to question
the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel, and not the jurisdiction of Judge Guerrero. There is no
identity of parties, neither is there an identity of reliefs. Thus, there is obviously no forum-
shopping.

Dissent Caguioa

This case, in almost every aspect, involves a constitutional issue - and presents itself as a
moment in the country's history where the Court could, as indeed it was called upon, to lay down
clear and unambiguous positions on the primacy of the Constitution. Instead of seizing this
golden opportunity, and bravely asserting its role as guardian, the Court, speaking through the
majority, has chosen to, once again, retreat and find refuge in technical and procedural niceties,
totally brushing aside the paramount constitutional significance of this case.

The constitutional questions raised in this case are crystal clear:

Can an Information - void on its face - warrant a determination of probable cause against
petitioner and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant against her and cause her arrest and
detention without violating her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her - when this very same Court en banc has previously ruled1 that such an
Information is violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and should be acquitted?

Can a trial judge, when called upon to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest,
simply ignore the accused's motion to quash the Information raising lack of jurisdiction on the
expedient pretext that the rules of procedure are silent in this respect, without violating these
constitutional rights of the accused?
Is it constitutional to first incarcerate an indicted person charged by a void Information, and then
afterwards order its amendment because that is what the rules of procedure insinuate, without
violating the accused's constitutional rights?

Can a trial judge postpone the resolution of a motion to quash the Information-based on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction where the accused is charged with a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 9165) without any reference to a specific dangerous drug
(the corpus delicti), and the specific acts constituting the offense and all the elements of the
offense averred in statements of fact (and not conclusions of law) - until after the determination
of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, without violating his constitutional rights?

Are the above constitutional issues not sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the rigid application
of the rules of procedure in this case - when, in innumerable other occasions,2 this very same
Court had given due course to a certiorari petition despite its procedural defects?

In his Dissenting Opinion in Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman,3 where former Senator Ramon
"Bong" Revilla, Jr. is one of the accused, the ponente invoked, as an argument to free the
accused, the balancing rule (ensuring that, on one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted, and,
on the other, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution). This balancing rule, according
to the ponente, is intended to guarantee the right of every person from the inconvenience,
expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until
the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed and to guard the State against the
burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials
arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges, so that the Court's duty is to temper the
prosecuting authority when it is used for persecution.4 Why is the ponente not according
petitioner here the same treatment?

In Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,5 the majority of the Court decreed that the situations in which
the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited because to do so would destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. This was the reasoning of the majority to justify the Court's
cognizance of a special civil action for certiorari assailing the denial of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's demurrer to evidence before the lower court notwithstanding the express
procedural rule6 that an order denying a demurrer shall not be reviewable by appeal
or certiorari before judgment. Why could not petitioner, in this case, be allowed to avail of the
comprehensive and useful certiorari action even if she did not comply strictly with the
procedural rules? Why is she being treated differently?

The Constitution affords the individual basic universal rights that must be safeguarded, protected
and upheld before he is detained to face trial for a crime or offense leveled against him in an
Information or complaint. The Constitution guarantees under the first section of the Bill of
Rights that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.

The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
Without cavil, before a person is deprived of his liberty, he must be accorded due process, and a
determination of probable cause by the judge is mandatory before a warrant for his arrest may
issue.

The Constitution further provides under Section 14, Article III that "(1) No person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right x x x to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights guarantee these basic rights, viz.:
Under the Declaration:

Article 3: Right to life

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. x x x x
Article 9: Ban on arbitrary detention

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

And, under the Covenant:

Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest
and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.

The Rules of Court has a counterpart provision on determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record fails to clearly establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.

Still another mechanism in the Rules to safeguard the accused's right to liberty is the motion to
quash under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 117 allows the accused to file a
motion to quash the Information or complaint at any time before entering his plea. Under Section
3 of Rule 117, the accused may move to quash the complaint or Information on the grounds,
among others, that (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (b) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The Substantive Issues
The Information leveled against Petitioner under the caption "For: Violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section
26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 916510 (Illegal Drug Trading11) Accused Leila M. De
Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z.
Ragos, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of
their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an
employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy
or influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal
drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power,
position and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason
of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile
phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and
traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and
Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The plain language of the Information reveals that it: (1) does not charge Petitioner with "attempt
or conspiracy to commit illegal trading of dangerous drugs" under Section 26(b) of RA 9165; (2)
does not charge Petitioner with illegal "Trading" of dangerous drugs as defined under the Act;
(3) is fatally defective as an indictment of illegal drug "trading" as the term is ordinarily
understood; (4) does notcharge Petitioner with violation of Sections 27 and 28 of the Act; and (5)
does not validly charge Petitioner with any unlawful act under the Act.

The Information does NOT charge "attempt or conspiracy to commit illegal trading of
dangerous drugs" under Section 26(b) of RA 9165.
The caption and the prefatory clause or preamble of the Information unequivocally states that
Petitioner is being charged with "violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b)
and Section 28," of RA 9165.

Notably, Section 3(jj) is not a separate offense because it merely defines the term "trading,"
while Section 28, in turn, relates only to the imposable penalties on government officials and
employees, to wit: "The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided in this Act shall be
imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found
guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees." In simple terms, therefore,
the lynchpin to the charge of the Information is the violation of Section 5 of RA 9165.

It is thus immediately evident that "Section 5 in relation to x x x Section 26(b)" is a misnomer, if

not totally nonsensical because Section 5 and Section 26(b) are two separate unlawful acts or
offenses penalized under RA 9165.
Section 26(b) of RA 9165 in part states: SEC. 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or
conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty
prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

Clearly, the foregoing provision punishes the mere agreement or conspiracy to commit illegal
trading. This is one of those situations where the law itself makes the mere agreement
punishable. That said, it is likewise ineluctably clear that what Section 26(b) means is that the
illegal trading has not been committed - which is completely opposite to the situation of Section
5 which requires that the trading has already been committed. In other words, the moment the
illegal trading has been committed, then it is Section 5 that is the applicable provision of RA
9165 and no longer Section 26(b) - which is the commonsensical conclusion to make especially
since the penalty in the latter is provided to be the same penalty provided for Section 5, or the
consummated act.

Nothing could be clearer: the purported offense described in the Information is illegal drug
trading as a consummated crime, and not as a conspiracy to commit the same. Thus, the claim
that Petitioner was charged for conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading under Section 26(b) of
RA 916513 is egregious error, if not a clear afterthought on the part of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) after it had itself realized that, for the reasons to be stated later, the Information
filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) which charges a violation of Section 5, RA 9165, is
wholly insufficient and void.

To be sure, nowhere in the language and wording of the Information can a conspiracy or attempt
to commit trading of dangerous drugs be even inferred. To read the above-quoted acts in the
Information to only be at the preparatory stage, or just about to be committed, is an unforgivable
perversion of the English language and an insult to the intelligence of the Court.

Therefore, Petitioner is correct when she argues in her Memorandum that her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was violated when she was
charged, arrested, and detained for consummated illegal drug trading despite Respondents' claim,
now, that she was really charged for conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading. Indeed,
Respondents' sudden change in stance, through the OSG, along with the subsequent concurrence
of the DOJ, violated Petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.

Given the foregoing, the insistence of some members of the Court that the Information, as
worded, validly indicts Petitioner with conspiracy to engage in illegal drug trading, referring to
an unconsummated act, is beyond comprehension.

The Information does NOT charge Petitioner with illegal "Trading" of dangerous drugs as
defined under RA 9165.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
rooms or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act.
To be sure, the definition of "[t]rading" above does not identify the act or acts that the offender
must commit to make him liable for illegal drug trading. It merely refers to "[t]ransactions
involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs."

"Illegal Trafficking," on the other hand, is defined in Section 3(r):

SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(r) Illegal Trafficking. The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration, dispensation,
manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution, importation, exportation and possession
of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.

Based on the foregoing definitions, the term "illegal trading" is nothing more than "illegal
trafficking" "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in
any of such transactions." Or stated differently, illegal trading is "[t]he illegal cultivation, culture,
delivery, administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution,
importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical" "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail,
mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a
broker in any of such transactions."

In this regard, the term "trading" in the definition of "illegal trafficking" should now be
understood in its ordinary acceptation - the buy[ing] and sell[ing] of goods, exchang[ing]
(something) for something else, typically as a commercial transaction.25

While the Information employs the terms "drug trading" and "trade and traffic dangerous
drugs," it does not, however, contain a recital of the facts constituting the illegal "trade" or
"traffic" of dangerous drugs. Since "trading" and "illegal trafficking" are defined terms under
RA 9165, their use in the Information will carry with them their respective definitions. Viewed
in the foregoing light, the Information is fatally defective because it does not allege the specific
acts committed by Petitioner that constitute illegal "trading" or "illegal trafficking" of dangerous
drugs as defined in Section 3(jj) and Section 3(r) of the Act. Rather, it relies only on
conclusionary phrases of "drug trading" and "trade and traffic of dangerous drugs."

Without doubt, the Information did not mention if Petitioner cultivated, cultured, delivered,
administered, dispensed, manufactured, sold, transported, distributed, imported, exported,
possessed or brokered in any transaction involving the illegal trafficking of any dangerous drug.

Accordingly, while the word "trading" is attributed to Petitioner in the Information, the essential
acts committed by Petitioner from which it can be discerned that she did in fact commit illegal
"trading" of dangerous drugs as defined in RA 9165 are not alleged therein.

Since the Information does not mention the constitutive acts of Petitioner which would translate
to a specific drug trafficking transaction or unlawful act pursuant to Section 3(r), then it is fatally
defective on its face. Thus, it was improvident for the respondent Judge to issue a warrant of
arrest against Petitioner.
The ponencia, while it enumerates the purported two modes of committing illegal trading: (1)
illegal trafficking using electronic devices; and (2) acting as a broker in any transaction involved
in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs, and as it correctly points out that the crime of illegal
trading has been written in strokes much broader than that for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, still conveniently avoids specifying and enumerating the elements of illegal trading.

While it may be true that a person accused of illegal "trading" by acting as a broker need not get
his hands on the substance or know the meeting of the seller and the buyer, still, the transaction
that he purportedly brokered should be alleged in the Information for the latter to be valid,
and thereafter proved beyond reasonable doubt, for the accused to be convicted. The seller
and the buyer or the persons the broker put together must be identified. If he brokered an
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, then the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and
consideration are essential.

Thus, I take exception to the wholesale importation of the concept of "brokering" in the offense
of illegal "trading" of dangerous drugs without specifying the predicate illegal trafficking
transaction which the accused "brokered". To repeat, this transaction must be sufficiently alleged
in charges against an accused indicted for having acted as a broker because that is the
requirement of the law - "acting as a broker in any of such transactions [involving the illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs]".

The Information does NOT charge Petitioner with illegal drug "trading" as the term is
ordinarily understood.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information
the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The
requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from
the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with.

The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific
name, but did be perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth. If be did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or
of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute,The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in
the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal.

Does the Information under scrutiny comply with the requirement of sufficiency as explained
above? It clearly does not. The elements of the offense or unlawful act charged are not contained
in the Information. Are all the elements of illegal trade or trading of dangerous drugs by
Petitioner alleged in the Information? Again, they are not.

None of the elements of illegal drug trade or trading is present in the Information insofar
as Petitioner is concerned. The Information does not identify Petitioner as the trader, or
merchant, or broker. There is no indication in the Information that she ever possessed any
dangerous drug prior to the purported trading. The Information does not identify any purchaser
or customer. It does not state the consideration. It does not identify the specific dangerous drug
that she traded or brokered. Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective
Information. An Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not charge an
offense39 or when an essential element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged.40
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no other
recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused.41

A charge under Section 5 of RA 9165 requires allegation of corpus delicti.

The Court in People v. Enumerable,48 citing People v. Watamama,49 held that the existence of
the dangerous drug and the chain of its custody have to be proven in all prosecutions for
violations of RA 9165: It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not
only must the essential elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but likewise
the identity of the prohibited drug. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of
the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.

Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from the accused is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, the prosecution must sufficiently
prove the unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drug. In all prosecutions for
the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the
prohibited drug has to be proved.

The Information does NOT validly charge Petitioner with violation of Sections 27 and 28 of
the Act.
Section 27 of RA 9165 provides: SEC. 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for
Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the
Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the
trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking
dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions,
subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

The quoted portion of the Information is not sufficient to charge Petitioner with the unlawful act
of misappropriation, misapplication and failure to account for the proceeds obtained from illegal
drug trading allegedly committed by high-profile NBP inmates. Petitioner, as then DOJ
Secretary, did not have any legal duty or obligation to take custody of or account for proceeds
obtained from unlawful acts committed under RA 9165. Without the allegation in the
Information that, as DOJ Secretary, Petitioner had such duty or obligation, she could not have
committed misappropriation, misapplication and failure to account for the so-called "proceeds of
illegal drug trading." Besides, as explained above, "illegal drug trading" is a conclusion of law
and not an averment of specific facts. At the very least, the specific acts of Petitioner constituting
illegal "trading" of dangerous drugs should be alleged in the Information. Again, there is even no
mention in the Information that Petitioner transacted dangerous drugs "using electronic devices
such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, [etc.]."

Also, Petitioner cannot be held liable under the second paragraph of Section 27. She was not an
"elective local or national official" when "proceeds of illegal drug trading" were purportedly
delivered to her. Section 28 of RA 9165 cannot as well be invoked as a possible source of
Petitioner's indictment because it does not provide an additional unlawful act for which a penalty
is provided. Rather, it only provides the appropriate penalty to be imposed if a government
official or employee is found guilty of any unlawful act under RA 9165.

The Information does NOT validly charge Petitioner with any unlawful act under the Act. In
plain terms, the foregoing remedies need not be availed of by the accused - they do not apply
when the defect of the Information cannot be cured by an amendment because a null and void
Information cannot be cured by an amendment.

The acts alleged in the Information constitute, at most, a charge for indirect bribery.
Petitioner asserts that the offense charged by the Information is neither illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, nor conspiracy to commit the same - positing instead that the acts alleged in the
Information constitute direct bribery penalized under Article 21056 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

Direct bribery has the following elements:

(1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift
or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration
of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise
of his functions as a public officer.

75. Third, it is also alleged that the money is given in exchange for special consideration,
such as convenient and comfortable spaces in the NBP or just not being transferred to a
less hospitable detention area.

76. Lastly, the Information also alleged facts that relate the special consideration/protection to be
a function of the accused as Secretary of Justice. x x x57(Emphasis supplied)

However, while the first, second, and fourth elements of direct bribery are indeed alleged in the
Information, the third is not. Nowhere within the four corners of the Information is it alleged
that the money or "proceeds" purportedly delivered to Petitioner by the NBP high-profile
inmates was premised upon any agreement to afford special consideration and/or
treatment in their favor.
It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public
officer receives gift. While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public
officer and the giver of the gift or present, in indirect bribery, usually no such agreement
exists. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing
something, because of the gift or promise; in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer
should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts
offered to him by reason of his office.61 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indirect bribery is an offense cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial
Court.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. (PO) 1606,62 indirect bribery falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan when committed by officials of the
executive branch occupying positions classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher, it being among the
offenses treated in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC, viz.:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act,63 the position of department secretary
is classified as Salary Grade 31. Hence, the offense - indirect bribery - that Petitioner may be
charged with in the Information, having been allegedly committed at the time when Petitioner
occupied the office of DOJ Secretary, undoubtedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case and issue the warrant of arrest against Petitioner.

The respondent Judge effectively denied Petitioner's Motion to Quash when she took
cognizance of the case and found probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against
Petitioner.

As stated earlier, the availment by an accused of a motion to quash the information is in

furtherance of his constitutional rights not to be deprived of liberty without due process, to be
presumed innocent and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
These same rights are safeguarded by the provision requiring the determination of probable
cause before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, both should be decided prior to or
simultaneous with the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In plain language, the provision, in providing a period within which to file the motion to quash,
intends to put a time limit on when the motion can be entertained by the trial court. It
does not provide that the resolution of the motion cannot be made during the determination
of probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest.

As already explained, the respondent Court's jurisdiction over the case is, given the language of
the Information, tenuous at best. Thus, when the respondent Judge took cognizance of the case
despite the clearly insufficient manner in which the Information charges Petitioner with a
violation of RA 9165, she effectively denied the ground in Petitioner's Motion to Quash that the
RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case. By the same token, she also denied the ground that
the allegations and recital of facts in the Information do not allege the corpus delicti of the
unlawful act penalized under RA 9165 which the Information is supposed to charge.

Justice Peralta's Concurring Opinion also observes that sustaining the contention that a judge
must first act on a pending motion to quash the information before she could issue a warrant of
arrest would render nugatory the 10-day period to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest under Section 5, Rule 112. Again, this is incorrect. As stated, in the face of the
constitutional rights of an accused, that same 10-day period was ample time for respondent Judge
to simultaneously rule on the motion to quash and determine probable cause - especially where,
as in this case, the Information is patently defective.

The respondent Judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.

The Procedural Issues

Proceeding now to the procedural issues, the ponencia asserts that the Petition is plagued with
procedural defects that warrant its outright dismissal. This is error. The Court in numerous cases
has set aside procedural issues to give due course to certiorari petitions.

The verification and certification requirements under Rule 65 were substantially complied
with. As stated in Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo's Affidavit,68 Petitioner's staff informed her in advance
that the Petition had already been signed by Petitioner, and that the same was ready for
notarization. Thereafter, the signed Petition was handed to her by a staff member. Because of her
familiarity with Petitioner's signature, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo was able to ascertain that the
signature appearing on the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping appended to
the Petition was Petitioner's.69 Nonetheless, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo still requested, and was
thereafter provided a photocopy of Petitioner's passport.70

Based on the foregoing narrative, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo was able to sufficiently ascertain that
the person who had signed the Petition and the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping appended thereto was, in fact, Petitioner herself.71No doubt exists as to the identity
of Petitioner as the affiant, and the authenticity of the signature appearing on the
document in question. Petitioner herself does not question the authenticity of her signature.

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance with the
verification requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if
the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby." "Verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct."

Petitioner, being the sole party in interest in the present case, undoubtedly qualifies as one with
ample knowledge to affirm the veracity of the allegations in the Petition, and with sufficient
capacity to certify that its filing does not constitute forum shopping. This serves, as it should, as
sufficient basis to hold that the verification and certification requirements have been substantially
complied with.

The principle of substantial compliance remains controlling with respect to the verification
and certification requirements under Rule 65.

It has been argued that while there is jurisprudence to the effect that an irregular notarization
does not necessarily affect the validity of a document, but merely reduces its evidentiary value to
that of a private one, such principle should not be deemed controlling with respect to petitions
filed under Rule 65, since the Rule specifically mandates that petitions for certiorari be verified
and accompanied by a sworn certificate against forum shopping. This position proffers the view
that strict compliance with the verification and certification requirements shall, at all times, be
necessary. Again, this is wrong.

The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition signed the
verification attached to it, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.

Further, in Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals,75 the Court held that verification is not a
jurisdictional requirement but a formal one which may be subsequently corrected or cured upon
order of the courts. The Court further held that contrary to the actuations of petitioners therein,
the CA did not err when it permitted respondent's counsel to cure the defects in the verification
and certification appended to the joint petition for certiorari which respondent filed before the
CA via Rule 65.

Still, in the more recent case of Ingles v. Estrada,76 the Court held that the CA erred when it
dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioners therein on the ground of non-compliance
with Section 1 ofRule 65, because its verification and certification lacked the signatures of 3 out
of the 5 named petitioners. In so ruling, the Court found that the verification and certification
requirements should be deemed to have been substantially complied with.

The Petition constitutes an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts, as it presents

novel questions of law and raises genuine constitutional issues.

The ponencia holds that Petitioner violated the rule on hierarchy of courts and failed to
sufficiently establish the existence of reasons that warrant the application of its recognized
exceptions. As discussed in the first portion of this Dissenting Opinion, the Petition involves
novel questions of law and genuine constitutional issues that justify a direct resort to this Court.
Foremost is the recognition and application of the constitutionallyguaranteed rights of Petitioner,
as an accused, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her and to be
presumed innocent given the nullity of the Information because it does not contain the essential
facts constituting the unlawful act of illegal trading of dangerous drugs. Whether the Motion to
Quash should be resolved simultaneously with the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against Petitioner, so that her right not to be deprived of liberty
without due process would not be curtailed, is a novel question of law.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first
impression, no .iurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter x x
x92 (Emphasis supplied)

The Petition, having presented, at the very least, a question of first impression and a genuine
constitutional issue, is exempted from the rule on hierarchy of courts. Hence, it is indeed
lamentable that the majority of the Court has shirked its duty to resolve the Petition to determine
whether Petitioner's rights to due process, to be presumed innocent and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her had in fact been violated in the face of apparent
defects plaguing the Information. To uphold the technical rules of procedure without due
deference to these fundamental constitutional rights would be to defeat the very purpose for
which such rules, including the hierarchy of courts, were crafted.

The factual precedents that gave rise to this Petition have left Petitioner with no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The ponencia finds that the Petition is premature, as there is still something left for the trial court
to do - that is, resolve petitioner's Motion to Quash. Such position is anchored on the cases
of Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corporation93 (Solid Builder's), State Investment House,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals94 (State Investment House) and Diaz v. Nora95 (Diaz), which uphold the
dismissal of the petitions therein on the ground of prematurity.

However, as previously narrated, considering that the Petition had been prompted precisely by
the RTC's inaction on Petitioner's Motion to Quash, then the cases relied upon to support the
contrary view are inapplicable.

Proceeding therefrom, it bears stressing that Petitioner filed her Motion to Quash before the RTC
precisely for the purpose of assailing the latter's jurisdiction. Through the filing of the Motion to
Quash, the RTC was afforded the opportunity to address the issue head on. By failing to
seasonably rule on the same - and instead, immediately ordering Petitioner's incarceration with
the issuance of a warrant of arrest - the respondent Judge left Petitioner with no other recourse
but to elevate the matter to this Court via Rule 65, in view of the nature of the issues herein.
Thus, to dismiss the Petition on the ground of prematurity would be to punish Petitioner for the
respondent Judge's inaction, over which she has no control.

Not only was there inaction on the part of the respondent Judge, her Order for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against Petitioner without resolving the Motion to Quash (which put in question
the court's very jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the Information) effectively denied the
Motion to Quash. The respondent Judge had in effect found that the Information was sufficient
pursuant to the Rules of Court and the trial court had jurisdiction over the case. For her to
subsequently "rule" on the Motion to Quash would be illusory-because by refusing to rule on the
Motion to Quash simultaneously with the determination of probable cause, the respondent Judge
had already disregarded and trampled upon Petitioner's rights not to be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process, not to be deprived of liberty without due process, to be
presumed innocent and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

With the glaring defects in the Information and the patent violation of Petitioner's constitutional
rights smacking of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, it will be the height
of unfairness to insist that the speedy, adequate, and appropriate remedy is to proceed to trial.

The rule against forum shopping was not violated.

In the recent case of Ient v. Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc.,97 the Court had the occasion to
determine whether petitioners therein committed forum shopping, as they resolved to file a
petition for certiorari before this Court during the pendency of their motion to quash with the
RTC. Ruling in the negative, the Court held:

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. There is no forum shopping
where the suits involve different causes of action or different reliefs.98 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On such basis, no forum shopping was committed in this case for two primary reasons.
First, the criminal case pending with the RTC, on the one hand, and the Petition on the other,
involve different causes of action. The former is a criminal action which seeks to establish
criminal liability, while the latter is a special civil action that seeks to correct errors of
jurisdiction. Second, the two cases seek different reliefs. The RTC case seeks to establish
Petitioner's culpability for the purported acts outlined in the Information, while the Petition seeks
to correct the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the respondent Judge when she
proceeded to issue a warrant of arrest against Petitioner despite the pendency of the latter's
Motion to Quash, which, in turn, assailed the respondent Judge's very jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.99

The rules of procedure are intended to facilitate rather than frustrate the ends of justice.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, it is necessary to stress that the Rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
are promulgated by the Court under Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution. It cannot
diminish or modify substantive rights,100 much less be used to derogate against constitutional
rights. The Rules itself provides it must be construed liberally to promote the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding101 and thus must always yield to the
primary objective of the Rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice.
Time and again, this Court has decreed that rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at
facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration.102 This principle finds emphatic
application in this case.

The message is clear and unmistakable: Arrest first; resolve the motion to quash and amend the
Information later; then proceed to trial; finally, acquit after ten years or so. It does not matter if
the accused is to languish in detention. Never mind the accused's constitutional right to be
presumed innocent, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and not
to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Never mind if the
Information is void for containing mere conclusions of law, for failing to identity and quantify
the specific dangerous drug which is the object or corpus delicti of the alleged RA 9165
violation, and for not alleging all the facts needed to establish the elements of the offense
charged. Never mind if previously this same Court has ruled that such a void Information
warrants the acquittal of the accused.

Caoibes v. Ombudsman

Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the
Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal
Complaint 1 for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s
eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20,
1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Piñas City, he requested
petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not
answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted
"Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of
his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had
the incident blottered with the Las Piñas Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed
before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint 2 against petitioner, this time an
administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying
for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability
of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its
exclusive supervision and control.

On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order 5 denying the motion for
referral to the Supreme Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of
the Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the criminal charges of
respondent Judge against petitioner.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on
Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.

The issue is not novel. In Maceda v. Vasquez, this Court resolved in the affirmative the issue of
whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a
court employee where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking
cognizance of Case No. MB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, allegedly, the
accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling within the
parameters of its constitutional power and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission
of any public officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, the following powers and duties to the Office of the
Ombudsman: Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its
jurisdiction over the charges of physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in
authority filed by respondent Judge against petitioner. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by
Section 16 of R.A. 6770 which states that the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman apply to
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.

The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation, in Lieu of Comment, correctly opined
and we quote: ". . . the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the Ombudsman is not
tantamount to giving it exclusive authority thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is
relied upon by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that it has primary,
not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases and felonies committed by public
officers in relation to their office. Moreover, it was held in Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
627 [1993], that the Ombudsman’s power under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a
fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court
employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold
true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before
the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or
does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the Ombudsman is hereby
directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer
the same of this Court for appropriate action.

Jardeleza v. Sereno

The selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for
being constitutionally infirm. The heart of the debate lies not only on the very soundness and
validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power. More
significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlist from
which the President appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal of the land. To add yet
another feature of novelty to this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice
herself, was being impleaded as party respondent.

The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto
Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in
accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation
for the said vacated position. On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo
Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position.

It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received
telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member,
Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on
June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
(Chief Justice Sereno), manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to “make himself available” before the JBC on
June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.

According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties
of his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international
arbitration case for the government. Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno
if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that
he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically
demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that
he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same
directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio.
Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment
of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to
be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the subject shortlist of four (4)
nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with
six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four
(4) votes. 7 A newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, stating that the Court’s Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were
actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.

The Petition
Seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate
Justice vice Associate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition
and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day
after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for
deliberation by the Court en banc on July 8, 2014, the disputed shortlist had already been
transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributed this belated action on his letter-petition to
Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those impressed with urgency,
was discretionary.

An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention
hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his
constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation,
of its own rules.

Jardeleza’s Position
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process in the events
leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. When accusations
against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him
of the nature and cause thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza
was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process when
he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that
the objections to his integrity would be made known to him on the same day. JBC fail to
ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his rights
as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:

Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on
the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of
the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall
be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.

Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be

given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief
that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation
or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.

B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist
of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The “unanimity requirement” provided under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an
objection to an applicant’s integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership
of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable of taking hostage the
entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection.

C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC
to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist. Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides that a
nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a
majority of all members of the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that
Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of
the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.

D. The unlawful exclusion of the petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the
President’s constitutional power to appoint. Jardeleza’s exclusion from the shortlist has
unlawfully narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to
choose from among four (4) nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the
position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through
a process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair
play.

Comment of the JBC

The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not
exercise any of these functions. In a pending case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for
the government, argued in this wise: Certiorari cannot issue against the JBC in the
implementation of its policies.

In the same vein, the remedy of mandamus is incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a
discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among other things, show that
the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional
and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand
that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.

JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice
Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice
Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his integrity based
on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman
spoke briefly about the case and his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary
De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against his
application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014
meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations against him, as he chose to
deliver a statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn
statements so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses; and that the procedure be done on record and in public.

In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member
of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the voting process. His request for a sworn
statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is
not a fact-finding body. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10, JBC-009 are merely directory as
shown by the use of the word “may.” Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of
an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the
truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid
undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or her own
appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.

The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant
is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all
the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an
applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice
Sereno invoked the said provision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC members
to be included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was
not counted. Even then, he needed the votes of the five (5) remaining members. He only got four
(4) affirmative votes. As a result, he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B.
Daway, who got four (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was
not challenged. As to him, the “majority rule” was considered applicable.

Lastly, the JBC ruled that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General.
Despite claiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all pleadings filed with the Court
were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private
interest while retaining the office of the Solicitor General.

Comment of the Executive Secretary

The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where all that a
member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a
majority vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said provision is
given a veto power that undermines the equal and full participation of the other members in the
nomination process. A lone objector may then override the will of the majority, rendering
illusory, the collegial nature of the JBC and the very purpose for which it was created—to shield
the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
may be violative of due process for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to
refute the challenges to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC rules provide
mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject
rule does not afford the same opportunity.

The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is held to
be constitutional, the “unanimity rule” would only be operative when the objector is not a
member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting of the body would not be
rendered inconsequential. In the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have
been applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains their
respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the
unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist
submitted to the President.

The Issues the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the
substantive rights of applicants.

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
(WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT

“QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY” AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER
SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE

COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR
OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.

III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE

SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.

I – Procedural Issue: The Court

has constitutional bases to assume
jurisdiction over the case

A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC

Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court
was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus

The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. “Mandamus lies to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is
discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.

C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari

Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial function. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion
of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action using discretion of a judicial nature.”18 It asserts that in the performance of its function of
recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Hence, the resort to such remedy to question its actions is improper.

II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the
JBC in cases where an applicant’s
integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional
declaration that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.” To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the
Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment.

As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in
JBC-009, “integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards.

Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is
challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified
for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council
must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. It follows then
that the “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put
in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral
uprightness.

Examining the “questions of

integrity” made against Jardeleza
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that
during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his actuations in the handling of a
case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to
show his lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider
trading.26 In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim against
Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof were only supplied
to the Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to
Jardeleza’s demand to make the accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined
to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its significant
bearing on the country’s foreign relations and national security.

Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity? Does his adoption of
a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge
against his moral character? Does the “unanimity rule” apply in cases where the main point of
contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior?

The Court answers these questions in the negative.

While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not
borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an “act of disloyalty” committed by
Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule
was the “disagreement” in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The
approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said
reason, criticism was hurled against his “integrity.” The invocation of the “unanimity rule” on
integrity traces its roots to the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No
connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to
trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution.

As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether the
ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified as a “question of integrity” under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the fact that
there was no clear indication that the tactic was a “brainchild” of Jardeleza, as it might have been
a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different manner of presenting the
country’s arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even
Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that Jardeleza’s acts were urged by politicking or lured by
extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final say on the conduct of the
country’s advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted disloyalty
or a betrayal of the country’s trust and interest.

As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-
marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time only during the June 30, 2014 meeting
of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of
these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of
“immorality” against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the “immorality” issue
referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza
was still the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC
had the duty to “take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants,” it might as
well be clarified.33

Do these issues fall within the purview of “questions on integrity” under Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.

the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral
character. Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation in extra-
marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral principles. The
bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is
expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate could
still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a
relationship which was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than
friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to
objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristic of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the
opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the
public in the place where she is known.38

The element of “willingness” to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in one’s

values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is a bold disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in the
Judiciary. Insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities
market.40 Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a
monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When someone trades in the
market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other
participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock
market scandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a
severe drain of capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure with their money
invested elsewhere.41

These two issues can be properly categorized as “questions on integrity” under Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of “questions on integrity.” Hence, the “unanimity
rule” may come into operation as the subject provision is worded.

The Availability of Due Process in the Proceedings of the JBC

In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the
accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the accusations, that is,
“a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrity objection”; 3] instead of
heeding his request for an opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to
explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the unspecified
allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged “discretionary” nature of
Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of
which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within which
any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section
2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in writing and under oath, copies of
which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his comment within five (5) days
from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and
sequential series of steps in securing a candidate’s right to due process.

The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing
in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold
hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based
on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not
aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain
the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the
proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza.

The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. After a
tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments, the Court concludes that the right to due
process is available and thereby demandable as a matter of right.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they
are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused
is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President
cannot be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense
and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. While the
facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not
demandable.

The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however, does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is well-established in
jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are
neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. 44 Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is
availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the
fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its
discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.

A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the Court
to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-
010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the
applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall
submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials
and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of
Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council may order a discreet background check on the
integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public,
which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.

SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant
on ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the
oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be
allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.

SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be

given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief
that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet
investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.

JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:

SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates
meet prima facie the qualifications for the position under consideration. For this purpose, it shall
prepare a long list of candidates who prima facie appear to have all the qualifications.

The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in alphabetical order.

The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be
filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.

SECTION 2. The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible
copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the qualifications of the
candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, as well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.

The Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition
against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his
comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.

SECTION 3. The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive
session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates and the complaint or opposition
against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the
background of the candidates.

On the basis of its evaluation of the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare the
shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for its further consideration.

SECTION 4. The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the
interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It shall
likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the date and place of
the interview.

SECTION 5. The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the
members of the Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among other things, the candidate
can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.

SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive
session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates which shall be sent to the Office
of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment.

Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10
of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use of the word “may.”
Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the
part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is
discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations.
Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing
when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to
accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, “what is mandatory, however, is that if the
JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given
to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor.”47

Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due process is a part of JBC’s
discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it may so rely on “other
means” such as character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in forming
a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is
given a full rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to
question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain
himself.

Application to Jardeleza’s Case

Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the
events leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the
application of the “unanimity rule” on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his
right to due process.

As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza
was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was
later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an
immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure
laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as
its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary within ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely,
this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day
period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not
discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have
raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and
desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then.
It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza,
by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource person would
shed light on the matter.

What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring
Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to
listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the
context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster
a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right
then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations
of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014
meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014,
Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These
circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is
given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and
sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and
futile exercise.

Consequences
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:

1. There was a misapplication of the “unanimity rule” under Section 2, Rule 10 of

JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the government.

2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall
within the contemplation of a “question on integrity” and would have warranted
the application of the “unanimity rule,” he was not afforded due process in its
application.

3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts,
exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nominees to the President.
The sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority
to disregard the due process under JBC-010.

4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC
rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was
provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.

With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in
the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the “unanimity rule” as it reflects the
JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to
turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that
Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but
this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of
due process.

Need to Revisit JBC’s Internal Rules

Primarily, the invocation of the “unanimity rule” on integrity is effectively a veto power over the
collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member after voting
seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes
of the other members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can
recuse himself or herself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote of the Council is
quite high.

Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to
the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things. In fact, the
minutes of the JBC meetings in this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to
its precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing.
It must be distinctly specified and delineated.

Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be
invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also by a
member?

Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is “sui generis” and need not be formal or trial type,
they must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an applicant should be
given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there
are any.

At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its
function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair, reasonable,
unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor

General Francis H. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the President
for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad . The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW,
and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly
JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of
this Decision.

Aguinaldo V Ochoa

Before this Court is a Petition for Quo Warranto. The Petition assails President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.2
Presidential Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan composed of a
Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the President, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government owned or
controlled corporations.3 Presidential Decree No. 1606,4 which elevated the rank of the members
of the Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of
Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices
each.5 Republic Act No. 79756 was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the
composition of the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of
three members each. Republic Act No. 10660,7 recently enacted on April 16, 2015, created two
more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby resulting in six vacant
positions.

On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star and
Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for
applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan.8

Petitioners base their instant Petition on the following arguments:

PRESIDENT AQUINO VIOLATED SECTION 9, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IN THAT:

(A) HE DID NOT APPOINT ANYONE FROM THE SHORTLIST SUBMITTED BY THE JBC
FOR THE VACANCY FOR POSITION OF THE 16TH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN; AND

(B) HE APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY MUSNGI AND JUDGE ECONG AS

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE VACANCY FOR THE
POSITION OF 21STASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

(C) THE APPOINTMENTS MADE WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

SHORTLISTS SUBMITTED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EACH
VACANCY, THUS AFFECTING THE ORDER OF SENIORITY OF THE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES.16
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to reduce the
politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary, i.e., "to rid the process of appointments to the
Judiciary from the political pressure and partisan activities."17

Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution contains the mandate of the JBC, as well as the
limitation on the President's appointing power to the Judiciary, thus:
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President
shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees recommended for
appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified nominees for a
particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall appoint
from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a
shortlist of nominees to the President for "every vacancy" to the Judiciary, as well as the
limitation on the President's authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the
nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC. In this case, the JBC submitted six
separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan,
particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices.

Petitioners observe the following infirmities in President Aquino's appointments:

a. Michael Frederick L. Musngi, nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
Justice, was appointed as the 16th Associate Justice;

b. Reynaldo P. Cruz, nominated for the vacancy of the 19th Associate Justice, was
appointed as the 17th Associate Justice;

c. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, also nominated for the vacancy of the 21st Associate
Justice, but was appointed as the 18th Associate Justice;

d. Maria Theresa V. Mendoza[-Arcega], nominated for the vacancy of the

17thAssociate Justice, but was appointed as the 19th Associate Justice;

e. Zaldy V. Trespeses, nominated for the vacancy of the 18th Associate Justice, but
was appointed as the 21st Associate Justice.

60. Only the appointment of Karl B. Miranda as the 20th Associate Justice is in accordance
with his nomination.18

Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee from each of the six
separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other; and any
appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Respondents

First, President Aquino should be dropped as a respondent in the instant case on the ground of
his immunity from suit.

Second, petitioners Aguinaldo, et al. cannot institute an action for quo warranto because
usurpation of public office, position, or franchise is a public wrong, and not a private injury.
Hence, only the State can file such an action through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor,
under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 6620 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, an individual may
commence an action for quo warranto in accordance with Section 5, Rule 6621 of the Rules of
Court if he/she claims entitlement to a public office or position. However, for said individual's
action for quo warranto to prosper, he/she must prove that he/she suffered a direct injury as a
result of the usurpation of public office or position; and that he/she has a clear right, and not
merely a preferential right, to the contested office or position.

Third, petitioner IBP can only institute the certiorari and prohibition case, but not the action
for quo warranto against respondents Musngi and Econg because it cannot comply with the
direct injury requirement for the latter. Based on Topacio v. Ong,22 a petition for certiorari or
prohibition is a collateral attack on a public officer's title, which cannot be permitted. Title to a
public office can only be contested directly in a quo warranto proceeding.

Fourth, petitioners have erroneously included Jorge-Wagan, Romero Maglaya, Zuraek,

Alameda, and Fernandez-Bernardo (Jorge-Wagan, et al.) as unwilling co-petitioners in the
Petition at bar. And fifth, petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly filing the
instant Petition for Quo warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court.

The OSG submits that the core argument of petitioners stems from their erroneous premise that
there are existing numerical positions in the Sandiganbayan: the 1st being the Presiding Justice,
and the succeeding 2nd to the 21st being the Associate Justices. It is the assertion of the OSG that
the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices, without any
numerical designations. Numerical designations are only used to refer to the seniority or order of
precedence of Associate Justices in collegiate courts such as the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, and Sandiganbayan.

The OSG further contends that the power to determine the order of precedence of the Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan is reposed in the President, as part of his constitutional power to
appoint. Citing Section 1, third paragraph of Presidential Decree No. 160623 and Rule II, Section
1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,24 the OSG explains that the order of
precedence of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan shall be according to the order of
their appointments, that is, according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when two
or more commissions bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions had
been issued by the President. It is the averment of the OSG that the constitutional power of the
JBC to recommend nominees for appointment to the Judiciary does not include the power to
determine their seniority.

The OSG interprets Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution differently from petitioners.
According to the OSG, said provision neither requires nor allows the JBC to cluster nominees for
every vacancy in the Judiciary; it only mandates that for every vacancy, the JBC shall present at
least three nominees, among whom the President shall appoint a member of the Judiciary. As a
result, if there are six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC shall present, for
the President's consideration, at least 18 nominees for said vacancies. In the case at bar, the JBC
submitted 37 nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan; and from said pool of 37
nominees, the President appointed the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, in faithful
compliance with the Constitution.

It is also the position of the OSG that the President has the absolute discretion to determine who
is best suited for appointment among all the qualified nominees. The very narrow reading of
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution proposed by petitioners unreasonably restricts
the President's choices to only a few nominees even when the JBC recognized 37 nominees
qualified for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. This gives the JBC, apart from its
power to recommend qualified nominees, the power to dictate upon the President which among
the qualified nominees should be contending for a particular vacancy.

Since respondents Musngi and Econg were indubitably qualified and obtained sufficient votes, it
was the ministerial duty of the JBC to include them as nominees for any of the six vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan presented for the President's final consideration.

Furthermore, the OSG alleges that it is highly unjust to remove respondents Musngi and Econg
from their current positions on the sole ground that the nominees were divided into six groups. It
was only on October 26, 2015, the date of submission of the shortlists, when the nominees had
been clustered into six groups. The OSG notes that there are no JBC rules on the division of
nominees in cases where there are several vacancies in a collegiate court. In this case, the OSG
observes that there were no measurable standards or parameters for dividing the 37 nominees
into the six groups. The clustering of nominees was not based on the number of votes the
nominees had garnered. The nominees were not evenly distributed among the six groups.

Quo Warranto
Sec. 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position
or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act
Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. - The Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof, must commence such action.
Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. - The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in
which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of
another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by
the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
Sec. 5. When an individual may commence such an action. - A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action
therefor in his own name.
In Topacio v. Ong,31 the Court pronounced that: A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General
or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Feliciano v. Villasin: for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing
must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to
be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as nominees for the 16th Saridiganbayan Associate Justice, did not
have a clear right to said position, and therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding.
Being included in the list of nominees had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty,
of being appointed to the position, given the discretionary power of the President in making
judicial appointments.
Nevertheless, the Court takes in consideration the fact that the present Petition is also
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which alleges that
President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his appointment of respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent taking into account that when this
Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed
immunity from suit. The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit "to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention."36 It is sufficient that former Executive
Secretary Ochoa is named as respondent herein as he was then the head of the OP and was in-
charge of releasing presidential appointments, including those to the Judiciary.37
Given that the constitutional issue in the Petition at bar is of transcendental importance and of
public interest, and for the above mentioned reasons, the Court shall accord petitioners the legal
standing to sue.
The instant Petition fundamentally challenges President Aquino's appointment of respondents
Musngi and Econg as the 16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Petitioners contend
that only one of them should have been appointed as both of them were included in one cluster of
nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Petition presents for resolution of
the Court the issue of whether President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution and gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each specific vacant position
of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The issue is of paramount importance for it affects the
validity of appointments to collegiate courts and, ultimately, the administration of justice, for if
there are questions as to the right of the appointee to his position as judge/justice, then doubts
shall likewise shadow all his acts as such. This will indubitably undermine the faith of the public
in the judicial system.
The OSG also prays for the dismissal of this Petition on the additional ground that petitioners, by
coming directly before this Court, violated the hierarchy of courts. Relevant to this matter are the
following pronouncements of the Court in Querubin v. Commission on Elections42:
Notwithstanding the non-exclusivity of the original jurisdiction over applications for the issuance
of writs of certiorari, however, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
Lastly, respondent Econg opposes the Petition at bar for being filed out of time. According to
respondent Econg, the 60-day period for petitioners to file this Petition commenced on January
20, 2016, the date she and her co-respondent Musngi were appointed by President Aquino. Based
on respondent Econg's argument, the 60-day period ended on March 20, 2016, Sunday, so
petitioners only had until March 21, 2016, Monday, to timely file the Petition. For their part,
petitioners aver that after learning of the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the media, they obtained copies of the shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices on March 22, 2016. Counting
the 60-day period from March 22, 2016, petitioners allege that they had until May 21, 2016 to
file their Petition.
Rule 65, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to
be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. The question though is
when said 60-day period began to run in this case. The Court refers to its ruling in Velicaria-
Garafil v. Office of the President.43In said case, the Court declared that appointment is a process.
For an appointment to be valid, complete, and effective, four elements must always concur, to
wit: "(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of authority, (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal, (3) a vacant position at the time of
appointment, and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications." The Court
expounded on the importance of the last element as follows:
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath
amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil which we
seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will only
provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of
acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the
abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers
and make it appear that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to
simulate the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee.44
The records show that on January 25, 2016, the appointment papers were transmitted to and
received by the six newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including respondents
Musngi and Econg, who, on the same day, already took their oaths of office. Therefore, pursuant
to Velicaria-Garafil, the appointment process became complete and effective on January 25,
2016. If the Court is to count the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari from January 25, 2016, it expired on March 25, 2016. The present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed on May 17, 2016.
The peculiar circumstances of this case, plus the importance of the issues involved herein, justify
the relaxation of the 60-day period for the filing of this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Indeed, the official act assailed by petitioners is the appointment by President Aquino of
respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which was completed on
January 25, 2016 when said respondents took their oaths of office. Yet, petitioners could not
have sought remedy from the Court at that point. As basis for petitioners' opposition to the said
appointments, they needed to see and secure copies of the shortlists for the 16th to the
21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It was only after petitioners obtained copies of all six
shortlists on March 22, 2016 that petitioners would have been able to confirm that no one from
the shortlist for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was appointed to any of the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; and that respondents Musngi and Econg, both in
the shortlist for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, were appointed as the 16th and
18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, respectively. In addition, respondent Econg is not
unjustly prejudiced by the delay, but will even benefit from the Court resolving once and for all
the questions on her right to the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."
The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if there is only one vacancy to
consider at a time. The power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary is beyond
question, subject to the limitation that the President can only appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. However, the controversy in this case arose
because by virtue of Republic Act No. 10660, creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan
with three members each, there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate Justice of said
collegiate court; and that the JBC submitted six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the
16th to the 21stSandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The primordial question then for resolution of the Court is whether President Aquino, under the
circumstances, was limited to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the
JBC for each specific vacancy.
The Court answers in the negative. The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the
principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary.47 It is a body, representative of
all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities.48 The
extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President to
appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of
members of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower courts. At present it is the President who
appoints them. If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the President with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to establish a
new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members, called the Judicial and Bar Council.
And while the President will still appoint the members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the
recommendees of this Council.
MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO: And the Council will, whenever there is a vacancy, recommend three.
MR. CONCEPCION: At least three for every vacancy.
MR. RODRIGO: And the President cannot appoint anybody outside of the three recommendees.
MR. CONCEPCION: Nomination by the Council would be one of the qualifications for
appointment.49
It is apparent from the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the JBC shall be
a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot
appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed herein that
respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC and, hence, qualified to be
appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit
the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the
end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a
numerical order of seniority of the prospective appointees.
(b) Rule on Precedence - The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the other members of
the Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence
according to the order of their appointments.
Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most
Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,50 which
involved the Court of Appeals, another collegiate court:
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of
the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals
in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the
earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear
the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes
material.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court,
such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such
newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies,
the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating
unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.
Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances
for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy
is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed
from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster
for the other vacancies.
Applicants, including respondents Musngi and Econg, applied for the vacancy for "Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan." Throughout the application process before the JBC, the six
newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were not specifically identified and
differentiated from one another for the simple reason that there was really no legal justification
to do so. The requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and responsibilities
are the same for all the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. If an individual is found to be
qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is also qualified for all the other vacancies.
There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired the power of the
President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory authority to determine
seniority in a collegiate court.
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint
members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the
paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not
violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint
from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the
minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there
should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for
the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article
VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and
Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
The Court denies the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in this Petition.
The JBC asserts that it has legal interest in the matter of litigation because it will be adversely
affected by the judgment or decision in the present case, having submitted the controverted
shortlists of nominees to the OP. The JBC likewise claims that its intervention will not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in the case. The JBC, thus,
prays that it be allowed to intervene in the instant case and to submit its complaint-in-
intervention within 30 days from receipt of notice allowing its intervention.
Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the Court.53 It is not an
absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown.
The instant Petition was filed before this Court on May 17, 2016, yet, the JBC filed its Motion
for Intervention only on November 26, 2016, more than six months later, and even praying for an
additional 30-day period from notice to submit its complaint-in-intervention. Therefore, allowing
the intervention will undoubtedly delay the resolution of the case; and further delay in the
resolution of this case will only perpetuate the doubts on the legitimacy of the appointments of
respondents Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, to the detriment of said
court, in particular, and the entire justice system, in general. What is more, unless promptly
resolved by the Court, the instant case is capable of repetition given the forthcoming vacancies in
collegiate courts, particularly, the Supreme Court.
The JBC, through its own fault, did not provide the Court with a way to make such a
determination. The Revised Rules of Court explicitly requires that the pleading-in-intervention
already be attached to the motion for intervention.55 The JBC could have already argued the
merits of its case in its complaint-in-intervention. However, the JBC not only failed to attach its
complaint-in-intervention to its Motion for Intervention, but it also did not provide any
explanation for such failure.
Despite its knowledge of the appointment and assumption of office of respondents Musngi and
Econg in January 2016, the JBC did not take any action to challenge the same on the ground that
President Aquino appointed respondents Musngi and Econg in disregard of the clustering of
nominees by the JBC through the separate shortlists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. The silence of the JBC all this while, for a period of eleven (11) months, can
already be deemed as acquiescence to President Aquino's appointment of respondents Musngi
and Econg. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Motion for Intervention of the JBC.
There are several other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court takes
cognizance of as a separate administrative matter.
Item No. 1: The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the JBC promulgated on September
20, 2016 JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council" (Revised JBC
Rules), to take effect on October 24, 2016. Notably, the Revised JBC Rules explicitly states
among its Whereas clauses:
WHEREAS, the President of the Philippines may appoint only one from the list of at least three
nominees for every vacancy officially transmitted by the Council to the Office of the President[.]
This is an obvious attempt by the JBC to institutionalize through the Revised JBC Rules its
newly-introduced practice of clustering nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate
courts. The timing likewise is disturbing as the instant case is pending resolution by this Court
and with existing and upcoming vacancies in several collegiate courts, i.e., the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Appeals, and even this Court. As the Court has categorically declared herein, the
clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts constitute
undue limitation on and impairment of the power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary under the 1987 Constitution. It also deprives qualified nominees equal opportunity to
be considered for all vacancies, not just a specific one. Incorporating such Whereas clause into
the Revised JBC Rules will not serve to legitimize an unconstitutional and unfair practice.
Item No. 2: The same Revised JBC Rules deleted a significant part of JBC-009, the former JBC
Rules, specifically, Rule 8, Section 1, which provided:
Sec. 1. Due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court. - In every case
involving an appointment to a seat in the Supreme Court, the Council shall give due weight and
regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court. For this purpose, the Council shall submit to
the Court a list of candidates for any vacancy in the Court with an executive summary of its
evaluation and assessment of each of them, together with all relevant records concerning the
candidates from whom the Court may base the selection of its recommendees.
The deletion of this provision will likewise institutionalize the elimination by Chief Justice
Sereno of the voting by the Supreme Court Justices on who among the applicants to the Supreme
Court they believe are most deserving.
The Court calls attention to the fact that the JBC, in JBC-009 and the Revised JBC Rules, invites
the public to give any comment or opposition against the applicants to the Judiciary.
According to Rule 1, Section 9 of JBC-009: Sec. 9. Publication of list of applicants. The list of
applicants or recommendees which the Council shall consider in a given time shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and once in a newspaper of local
circulation in the province or city where the vacancy is located. The publication shall invite the
public to inform the Council within the period fixed therein of any complaint or derogatory
information against the applicant.
Sec. 8. Publication of List of Applicants. The list of applicants who meet the minimum
qualifications and the Council's evaluative criteria prescribed in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 3 of
these Rules, which the Council shall consider in a given time, shall be published once in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The publication shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against applicants
may be filed with the secretariat of the Council. A copy of the list shall likewise be posted in
the JBC website.
Without notice, warning, or explanation to the Supreme Court En Banc, Chief Justice Sereno
recently unceremoniously relieved Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr.
and Teresita J. Leonardo De Castro as JBC consultants, and in their stead, the Chief Justice
appointed retired Chief Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Artemio V. Panganiban, and Reynato S.
Puno as JBC consultants. The experience and wisdom of the three retired Chief Justices are
undisputed. However, practicality and prudence also dictate that incumbent Associate Justices of
the Court should be retained as JBC consultants since their interest in the Judiciary is real, actual,
and direct.
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
These changes in settled rules and practices recently adopted by the JBC under Chief Justice
Sereno are disconcerting. There appears to be a systematic move by the JBC, under Chief Justice
Sereno to arrogate to itself more power and influence than it is actually granted by the
Constitution and this Court, and at the same time, to ease out the Court from any legitimate
participation in the nomination process for vacancies in the Judiciary, specifically, in the
Supreme Court. This behooves the Court, through the exercise of its power of supervision over
the JBC, to take a closer look into the new rules and practices of the JBC and ensure that these
are in accord with the 1987 Constitution, the pertinent laws, and the governmental policies of
transparency and accountability in the nomination process for vacancies in the Judiciary.

Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution gives the JBC the principal function of
"recommending appointees to the Judiciary," but it also explicitly states that the JBC shall be
"under the supervision of the Court" and that "[i]t may exercise such other functions and duties
as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(2) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of the Philippines, defines supervision as follows:
Sec. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. - Unless otherwise expressly stated in the
Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defmed as follows:
(2) Administrative Supervision. - (a) Administrative superviSion which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or
other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of the department or
its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them;
(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1) appointments and other personnel actions in
accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions under the Code, except when appeal
is made from an action of the appointing authority, in which case the appeal shall be initially sent
to the department or its equivalent, subject to appeal in accordance with law; (2) contracts
entered into by the agency in the pursuit of its objectives, the review of which and other
procedures related thereto shall be governed by appropriate laws, rules and regulations; and (3)
the power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of regulatory agencies in the
exercise of their regulatory or quasi-judicial functions; and
(c) Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies, the word "supervision" shall encompass administrative
supervision as defined in this paragraph.
The Court also provided the following definition of supervision in the Jardeleza Decision59:
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It
ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed
and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do
not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.
They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Citation omitted.)
"Supervision" is differentiated from "control," thus: Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over such body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate
or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act.60
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition for Quo
Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the
clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan, as VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the
Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to
docket as a separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar
Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item No.2: the
deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred
to in pages 35 to 40 of this Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council
to file its comment on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.

People V Gacott

Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529
of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance
of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated
April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995. In the
judgment now sought be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be resolved in this case was
whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash
the aforementioned criminal case.

The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of
P.D. No. 1 LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy
Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming
that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to
Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent
judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1.

Obviously, respondents judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he
would have readily acknowledge the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by
the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the
laws enacted by Congress.

But even more glaring than respondent judge’s utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of
the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a
particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the
court. Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of
all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court).
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could have been entirely
avoided were it not for the public respondent’s irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it
is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for grave
ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge’s error is not simple error in judgment but one
amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public’s perception of
the court’s competence.

Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that" (t)he only purpose of
(h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind reconsideration" of
the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law and as
such. (he) was reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid
decision is to be spread on (his) personal records."

The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into consideration
and is not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad misericordiam. It feels, however, that
there is more than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in the main case, and
compelling legal warrant for the administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than
those meted by it under similar and comparable situations.

The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official procedure and
requirements which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very Court to violate and
forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official documents.

Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrien chant to a public career,
judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently demonstrating his true worth
through observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a misjudgment which is the
heritage of the heedless and to rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving.
Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming as valid his meticulosity on the confidential nature of
disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies of his motions to all the persons enumerated at the
start of this resolution.

The Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes such raffles of its cases "with
solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case was validly and solemnly
raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin who was then with the Third Division of the Court. On January 23,
1995, he was transferred to the Second Division where he served as working chairman until his
retirement on April 7, 1995. In accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case
remained with him as the original ponente and he accordingly penned the decision therein for
and as a member of the Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the parties be
informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as respondent judge would want or
except. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of the ponente which is precisely what
some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.

Finally, shifting to what he obvious to be high gear on a constitutional basis, respondent judge
questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to administratively discipline him.
Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a constitutional issue as to require the referral
of this case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof to the Court en banc. The disposition of
that matter involves a clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably
because of his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them
being on internal procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware of
the submissions of respondent judge on this point through the copies of the motions which he
furnished them, and he insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc
resolved to accept this aspect of the case from the Second Division.

His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution
which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of
and was taken from the second sentence of Section 7 Article X of the 1973 Constitution which
provided: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior court and, by
a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."

Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc"
in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he
argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.

The writer of this resolution, as a member of the committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that precise matter with the
committee chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent
provision in the 1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court,"
without qualification. It was accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to
discipline is concerned, the qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a reference to
the Court by itself necessarily means the Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc"
there because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial functions,
are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On the other hand, where the reference
is to the Court acting though its divisions, it would necessarily be so specified. For lack of
transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said Commission, the writer has perforce to
rely on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts as they
transpired.

At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declarations of the grant
of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by,
the Court en banc. it was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be
explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case
must be deliberated upon decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc,
on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. —
In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and
Resolutions," and providing inter alia:

For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases: 6. Cases where the penalty to be
imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer,
or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding
P10,000.00, or both.

This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted
provision was maintained. Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate
in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would
result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially
in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require
action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to
adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court of the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc
or in divisions of three, five or seven members. 10

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a
thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only
when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.

It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular
No. 2-89 which clarifies that: 2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when
concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of
such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987
Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof
rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said
respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more
perspicacity and circumspection.

WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the
case at bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.

In re Manzano

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and
duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on
Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable
Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and

discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither

violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7,
Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way
amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive
Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the

primary functions of an Executive Judge.

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City

Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties
and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to

the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that— Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the
supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to
the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes
for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

Impeachment: Ronald Ray K San Juan, Bryan Dennis G Tiojanco

A. Introduction
1. Definition
1. Impeachment is a formal proceeding instituted by a public body (usually the legislature) for
determining through a trial whether a public official—usually although not necessarily high
ranking, and who has a fixed term of office or protected tenure—must be either removed from
office or held accountable in other ways. The word impeachment means ‘accusation’ or ‘charge’
(Black 5) and pertains, in most jurisdictions, to the indictment stage of the entire proceeding.
After a public official is impeached, trial follows to determine their guilt or innocence.

2. Nature of Impeachment
3. Impeachment is both a political and legal process (Amar (1999) 294). Four features explain
why impeachment is considered a political process. First, the power to impeach is lodged, not in
courts, but in other, political institutions. Second, the offences committed and penalties imposed
are also generally considered political. Third, not all impeachable offences are criminal in nature.
And fourth, the outcome of an impeachment case is largely influenced by both public opinion
and the public official’s political capital (see Baumgartner and Kada 8–12, 148–150). As James
Wilson points out, impeachment is ‘confined to political characters, to political crimes and
misdemeanours, and to political punishment’ (Wilson 426; political crimes). Also, from its
beginning, impeachment has been ‘associated with moments of political crisis’ and ‘used as a
weapon in factional rivalry’ (Tite 7; factions).

4. In many cases, an impeachment will connect itself with pre-existing factions, and enlist all
their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other. In such cases
there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt (Hamilton
350).

5. To avoid this danger, emphasis is placed during the conduct of the actual indictment and trial
on the nature of impeachment as a legal process. This can be seen from the respect of the
proceeding respect for minimum due process requirements, as well as certain textual cues (eg
‘trial,’ ‘violation of common crimes,’ ‘charge’). This ensures that a public official, who usually
holds a democratic mandate, may be removed from office only on clear grounds and in
accordance with accepted standards of fairness.

6. Impeachment is not the only official proceeding for removing public officials. But while it
shares certain features with other removal proceedings (eg recall or no confidence vote),
impeachment is distinguishable by its nature, scope, and procedure. In an impeachment, an
official is removed from office only after an indictment and a trial conducted by a
constitutionally designated body. In contrast, recall partakes the nature of a general election
initiated by voters to remove or replace an elected official before the end of his term. While the
subjects of impeachment are usually high ranking elective or appointive officials, recall usually
concerns low ranking elective officials.

7. A vote of no confidence (or motion of no confidence), on the other hand, is a legislative

procedure to remove a person or persons in the government whom the legislature deems unfit to
continue in office. While impeachment targets officials with protected tenures or terms of office,
a vote of no confidence is practiced mostly in parliamentary systems—where ministers are not
protected by fixed tenures and are subject to the pleasure of the parliament. A vote of no
confidence in presidential systems is generally symbolic, and cannot remove a public official on
its own (eg United States and Russia), since cabinet members serve at the pleasure of the
president (Berger 4). Impeachment, on the other hand, is used mostly in presidential systems
(Baumgartner and Kada 2).

B. Brief History
8. Drawing inspiration from the ancient German practice of trying in their great councils certain
capital accusations relating to the public (Blackstone 257), the Parliament of Great Britain
devised impeachment in the fourteenth century as the ultimate weapon in its constant power
struggles against the Crown (see Hatsell 63). The first recorded impeachment in Great Britain
was that of Lord William Latimer in 1376. The doctrine of the divine right of kings rendered the
monarch divine and thus unaccountable. The king’s ministers and his favourite men, however,
shared neither this divinity nor unaccountability, and impeaching them was a way of defeating or
reversing unpopular acts or views which the king supported (Morgan 17–37; Tite). This early
variant of impeachment implemented Parliament’s criminal jurisdiction—with the House of
Commons and House of Lords acting as prosecutors and jurors, respectively (Tite 1; Morgan
31; Lidderdale 66). Punishments ranged from a fine, restitution of property, forfeiture,
banishment, or imprisonment, to execution (Tite).

9. This process, however, was deemed clumsy and by 1641 better methods for keeping ministers
accountable (eg parliamentary approval of Crown appointments) were already being proposed
(Morgan 36). Because of the development of collective ministerial responsibility, which holds
the entire government responsible instead of ministers individually, and because of the fact that
this early version has not been used since 1806, this variant may now be considered obsolete
from disuse (see Keeton 46; Hamilton 349). Also, the problem of cabinet accountability to
Parliament may now be more easily addressed through a vote of no confidence.

10. American framers envisioned impeachment as a principal check against executive tyranny
after deciding to separate the executive branch from the legislative, thereby creating a
presidential system of government. Familiar with British politics and the excesses that marred
the English treason trials, the American framers opted to limit the powers of the legislature not
only by banning bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, but also by separating impeachment
from criminal prosecution

11. The twentieth century saw the collapse of several despotic regimes and the consequent rise
of new liberal constitutional democracies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Chen 3; Tate and
Vallinder 2). These young democracies incorporated impeachment in their constitutions as a
democratic safety valve which could obviate familiar extra-constitutional methods (eg coups and
assassinations) for resolving political crises.

12. In 2000, then Philippine President Joseph Ejercito-Estrada was also impeached and
ultimately removed from office due to events spiralling out of his impeachment trial (see Estrada
v Desierto (Phil)). Impeachment was in the news again recently, in 2012, as Philippine Supreme
Court Chief Justice Renato Corona was impeached and removed from office (Ager), and again in
2016, as Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was removed from office after a 61-20 vote by the
Brazilian Senate (Shoichet and McKirdy).

C. Grounds for Impeachment

13. In modern democracies, the expressed electoral will of the people is protected by
guaranteeing certain public officials a definite term of office. Impeachment threatens to reverse
the popular will by removing an elected public official.

14. The specific grounds for impeachment in various constitutions differ, but the nature of the
differing impeachable offences are similar. These offences can be grouped into two types:
determinate offences are those which constitute violations of written laws, such as the
constitution (eg Argentina, Philippines, Germany, India, South Africa, Croatia, Romania) and
criminal statutes (eg Argentina and Poland), or wrongdoings that are well-defined in
jurisprudence; and corruption, which covers a wide range of unscrupulous activities such as
graft, plunder, and bribery, is almost always statutorily prohibited (corruption and bribery).
Treason, a ground widely found in numerous constitutions (eg United States, Philippines, Russia,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Italy), is also included in this category.

15. Open-textured offences are those which are not specifically defined in the constitution, law,
or jurisprudence, but are of such a grave nature as to render a public official unfit for public
office. They are typically related to conduct and performance in public office, and may take the
form of misbehaviour, misdemeanour, misconduct, betrayal of public trust, poor performance, or
other similarly couched terms. Misdemeanour, misconduct, and other terms used for open-
textured offences are broad enough that they may include mere petty offences, but it is doubtful
that impeachment courts would consider such an offence a sufficient ground to remove a high
ranking official with protected tenure (eg a president or Chief Justice) from office. To avoid
confusion, some constitutions have qualified these terms with adjectives, such as ‘gross,’ ‘high’
or ‘grave’, which emphasize that in order for an offence to be impeachable it must be serious.

16. Because of the inherent ambiguity of these terms, what would constitute a behavioural
impeachable offence is left to the wide discretion of the public body or bodies with the power of
impeachment, converting impeachment from a matter of legal interpretation into one of political
judgment (discretion of the legislative body. Gerald Ford, then a US Congressman, said that an
impeachable offence is ‘whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at
a given moment in history’, alluding to this political character of impeachment (116 Cong Rec H
3113–3114 (daily ed 15 April 1970) (US)).

17. The essence of an impeachable offence, whether determinate or open-textured, is that it is

such a grave violation of the public trust that the offender becomes unfit to continue enjoying the
trust reposed on him by the people.

18. Other scholars, such as Story and Black, agree. To Story, impeachment ‘partakes of a
political character, as it respects injuries to the society in its political character’ (Story 744). In
defining the phrase ‘high crime or misdemeanour’ found in the United States Constitution, Black
states that the phrase ‘ought to be held to be those offences which are rather obviously wrong,
whether or not criminal, and which so seriously threaten the order of political society as to make
pestilent and dangerous the continuance in power of their perpetrator.

D. Impeachable Officers

19. Impeachment is most prominently a check against chief executives who by constitutional
design wield considerable power and have fixed terms of office. But, any public official can
theoretically be the subject of impeachment. This is the case under English law, where the
process originated. Similarly, under the US Constitution ‘all civil officers’ are impeachable;
while in practice members of the US Congress are not included in this phrase, Berger surmised
that they should be included.

20. Other countries make the list of impeachable officials exclusive. For example, the Philippine
Supreme Court has ruled that the enumeration of impeachable officers in the Philippine
Constitution is exclusive, thus the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official

21. Many parliamentary regimes limit impeachment to that of the president, whose role in
parliamentary systems is principally ceremonial, but whose office is nevertheless protected by
tenure (heads of state and government; immunity of heads of state under constitutional law).
Other executive officials or ministers are accountable to the parliament and can be removed
through the less cumbersome process of a vote of no confidence. In presidential systems,
members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the president, who can dismiss them at will.

E. Procedure
1. Models of Impeachment
22. How an impeachment process is carried out depends largely on which public bodies are
tasked to investigate and try an impeachable official. Based on the actors involved, two models
of impeachment can be distinguished:

23. Type I impeachment solely involves the legislature, from indictment stage to trial, and is of
two sub-types: those with unicameral legislature (Type I unicameral) and those with bicameral
ones (Type I bicameral) (Baumgartner and Kada 142); Kada classified countries with Type I
impeachment as ‘legislature-dominant’ systems ( bicameralism). The United States’ model,
where indictment is conducted by the House of Representatives and the trial by the Senate, is a
Type I bicameral impeachment. Those with a Type I unicameral system, where a unicameral
legislative branch acts as both prosecutor and juror.

24. Type II impeachment, on the other hand, involves a constitutional body other than the
legislature—either the judiciary or a special ad-hoc body—or employs other means such
as plebiscite (eg Iceland) or referendum (eg Austria; direct democracy). This model adds another
veto point in order to prevent potential legislative abuses.

2. Stages of Impeachment
26. Regardless of which model a country follows, the whole impeachment process is divisible
into two stages: (1) impeachment proper (or indictment); and (2) trial. Impeachment proper is
that stage where one public institution, usually the legislative, formally charges an official of an
impeachable offence or offences. Trial, usually conducted by another public body (except in
Type I-unicameral), determines the guilt or innocence of the respondent official, and imposes the
penalty, eg removal from office (removal of officials).

27. In the impeachment proper, the body in charge receives an impeachment complaint; it would
then assess the sufficiency of the complaint (usually through a committee) or launch its own
investigation. The charges, conventionally called ‘Articles of Impeachment’ (Black 5), will then
be drafted, presented to, and endorsed by the full membership of the body. Once this preliminary
step is accomplished, the body votes on the recommendation.

28. Once charges are approved or authorized by the legislature (or other public body in charge)
in the first stage, the public official is considered to have been ‘impeached.’ The charges are then
embodied in a resolution or ‘Bill of Impeachment’. Trial follows; this is handled either by the
same public body, the upper chamber of Congress, a high court, or a special body. In a Type I
bicameral model, the upper House (eg the Senate) establishes itself as an impeachment court,
which signals the taking on of a different role from its regular law-making function (Black 10).

29. Because of the sui generis character of impeachment trials, technical rules of evidence
generally do not apply, and all evidence otherwise inadmissible in ordinary cases may be
admitted and considered (Black 18). The exception would be when a country’s law provides that
rules on criminal litigation apply to impeachment cases. These voting thresholds, either in
indictment or trial, not only insulate public officials from needless harassment, but also give
enough sovereign weight to the actions of impeaching public bodies.
3. Standard of Proof and Non-Partisan Character

30. The standard of proof required to convict in impeachment cases is a delicate matter, and is
highly intertwined with questions of whether impeachment is a legal or a political process and
whether it is a criminal proceeding or not. While Black thinks that ‘overwhelming preponderance
of evidence’ is the ideal evidentiary standard in impeachment (Black 17), the issue remains
unsettled—especially in cases where a public official is accused of a criminal offence (where the
law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt). While it would be convenient to think that the
standard of proof depends upon the nature of the charges (eg Hungary), the bulk of surveyed
impeachment cases (where the charges ranged from treason to mere misfiling of statements of
assets and liabilities) were driven largely by politics, and were thus highly dependent upon the
actors involved and not on the charges filed.

31. That impeachment is political, however, does not mean that it is necessarily partisan. Even
the simple wearing of black robes and togas, which are distinctively judicial attires, symbolize
the taking on of a new role as an impartial jury. A country’s Chief Justice also usually presides
over presidential impeachment trials. In theory, because of the solemn oath taken by prosecutors
and jurors in an impeachment case they are expected to follow their conscience devoid of any
partisan tendency. In the impeachment trial of US Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, a
sufficient number of senators crossed well demarcated party lines in voting for acquittal.

33. The image of politicians sitting as judges in an impeachment trial in a Type I model remains
a classic portrayal of impeachment as a political exercise, but countries recognize that this is also
the model most susceptible to abuse. The involvement of another public body, whether the
judiciary or a special ad-hoc body, functions as a potential veto point to guard against attempts to
abuse this extraordinary remedy.

4. Impeachment Outcomes
34. Impeachments do not always result in removal. Baumgartner and Kada identify three
possible impeachment outcomes: (1) impunity, (2) survival, and (3) exit.

35. There is impunity when there is no vote taken in the impeachment proper to indict a public
official (Baumgartner and Kada 15–16).

36. A public official survives when a vote is taken, either in the impeachment proper or trial, but
the prosecution is defeated (Baumgartner and Kada 15–16).

37. Exit refers to the removal of a public official as a result of impeachment, by means other
than impeachment, or if the public official resigns before the end of the impeachment trial
(Baumgartner and Kada 15–16). It can occur at any point in the entire impeachment process.

F. The Judicialization of Impeachment

38. Impeachment is relatively unproblematic when the branch which has final authority to indict
and try impeachment cases is undisputed. In fact, many countries recognize impeachment as a
necessary political process for settling potentially explosive partisan disputes. Impeachment can
also be a democratic safety valve for releasing built-up pressure for significant political reform
(see Erskine 31–33). Problems arise, however, when impeachment, instead of resolving political
disputes or catalysing reforms, precipitates a constitutional crisis, as when there are several
claims over final authority to decide particular issues concerning the impeachment process.

39. In discussing United States impeachment, Posner and Black argue that judicial review has
no part to play in impeachment proceedings (Black 23; also see Posner 130). The US Supreme
Court, in Nixon v US, warned that judicial involvement in impeachment could prevent finality
and expose US political life to disarray during judicial review, exposing the country to a possible
constitutional crisis (Nixon v US (1993) (US)). Recent global developments, however, show an
emerging trend towards judicialization of impeachment. Increasingly, the judiciary finds itself
more and more involved in the process. This trend comes from the expectation that courts,
especially in newly established or re-established democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe,
and Southern Africa should be important participants in establishing constitutional rules and in
preserving new democratic arrangements (Tate and Vallinder 2). Courts have started to flex
judicial muscle by reviewing actions or decisions of impeachment bodies as part of their
constitutional mandate, as in the case of President Roh of South Korea (see Impeachment of the
President (2004) (S Kor)). Indeed, some constitutions with Type II impeachment make judicial
intervention part and parcel of the entire impeachment proceedings. Judicial intervention in these
cases is easily justifiable.

40. On the other hand, constitutions with Type I impeachments give the power to indict and
remove a public officer solely to the legislative branch, and do not mention any judicial
involvement in the process. Nevertheless, courts have started to get involved in impeachment
even without an express constitutional mandate to do so. An example of this is the impeachment
case of Philippine Chief Justice Hilario G Davide, Jr, where the Supreme Court called a halt to
the impeachment complaint filed in the House of Representatives.

Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,

Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question — has resulted in a
political crisis.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides: Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office,
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3.(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Impeachment. —

Impeachment Deemed Initiated. — In cases where a complaint shall be initiated only by a
verified Member of the House files a verified complaint for impeachment filed by complaint of
impeachment or a citizen any Member of the House of files a verified complaint that is endorsed
Representatives or by any citizen upon by a Member of the House through a a resolution of
endorsement by any resolution of endorsement against an Member thereof or by a verified
impeachable officer, impeachment complaint or resolution of impeachment proceedings against
such official are filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all deemed initiated on the day the the
Members of the House. Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes
to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the

case may be, by at least one- third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. — No Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of impeachment proceedings
shall be Impeachment Proceedings. — Within a initiated against the same official more period of
one (1) year from the date than once within the period of one impeachment proceedings are
deemed (1) year. initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the same official.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General of the
House 12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William
B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that"
[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year."

On October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases.

d) House’s "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate’s "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution; and

It is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia, Et. Al. that impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at
any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate’s "sole power to try"
impeachment cases 48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate’s power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, Et. Al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of
Nixon v. United States. 50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers’ decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system
of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents’ and intervenors’ reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate’s "sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations to the exercise
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, 57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." 67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature.
Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to
this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The
dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean’s position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of
Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it

Justiciability
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is applied."

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one’s self.

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors’ foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia Et. Al. argue that" [t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this argument is very much like saying
the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members
of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."
126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of
the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, Et. Al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th
Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order. "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to
mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. "to perform or facilitate the first
action," Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a complexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the
complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in
favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that
the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated.”
The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an
attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.

MR. MAAMBONG. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts
with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body. As the
phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the
word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded."

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers. 144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the
House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."

Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year,

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary . . . to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
of "to initiate" which means to begin.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," this is a misreading of said provision and is contrary
to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3.(1) . . .

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Fernando v. Honorable Commission on Audit En Banc

This is a petition for review on certiorari1, assailing Decision No. 2012-1652 dated October 15,
2012 of the Commission on Audit (COA) which disapproved the COA-National Government
Sector (NGS) Cluster-B Decision No. 2010-006 dated June 18, 2010 and effectively denied the
appeal of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) with modifications.3

On March 22, 2004, the MMDA conducted a public bidding for the Design and Construction of
Steel Pedestrian Bridges in various parts of Metro Manila, with William L. Tan Construction
(WLTC) emerging as the winning bidder.4 Thus, on March 24, 2004, the MMDA5 and
WLTC6 executed a Contract7 where the latter agreed to design and construct 14 steel pedestrian
bridges for a price of P196,291,834.718 to be completed within 120 calendar days from receipt of
the Notice to Proceed (NTP).

On post-audit, the Supervising Auditor of COA-MMDA issued Notice of Suspension on all

payments pending the MMDA's submission of required documents within 90 days from notice,
and by reason of the Technical Evaluation Reports (TERs) dated March 9, 2007 and June 18,
2007 of COA engineers assigned at COA-MMDA.15 The TERs concluded that the contract cost
of P199,801,671.91 was excessive for being 29.63% above the COA Estimated Cost of
P151,409,330.45 due to high percentage mark-up and erroneous computation of site
works.16 The TERs also showed that the liquidated damages to be imposed should be
P18,153,348.63, instead of P5,861 ,078.43, due to the delay in the construction for 344 days.17

MMDA appealed before the COA-NGS Cluster-B, attaching WLTC's request for extension of
the contract period dated February 10, 2005 and the approval of the MMDA dated February 17,
2005.22 Ruling on the appeal, the COA-NGS Cluster-B lifted the disallowance, except for
liquidated damages of P2,063,321.56. It re evaluated the disallowance and found that the
increased deployment of labor and equipment was necessary in the actual implementation of the
project.

The COA Proper disapproved the decision of the COA-NGS ClusterB and denied the appeal of
the MMDA with modifications. It reduced the original disallowance from P161,903,009.85 to
P37,255,307.46 consisting of liquidated damages of P18,153,348.63 and contract cost variance
of P19,101,958.83. This was further reduced to P22,341,658.55 considering that the MMDA
already withheld P9,052,570.48 as retention money and P5,861,078.43 as liquidated damages.
The COA Proper named WLTC and the responsible officials of the MMDA liable for the
disallowance.24 It further ruled that WLTC was liable for P18,153,348.63 due to the delay in the
construction for 344 days.

The COA Proper faulted the MMDA and the COA-NGS Cluster-S for considering the SO dated
March 23, 2004 and thusly using the April 21, 2004, the date of the RO, as the effective date of
the Contract.26 The COA Proper held that it was incorrect to do so because there was no project
to suspend yet on March 23, 2004 as the contract was executed on March 24, 2004. Said SO was
also merely signed by Ramon S. Ona (Ona), for and in behalf of the MMDA. The COA Proper
held that he did not have authority to issue any SO or contract that will bind the Government.

Hence, this petition which raises the issue of whether the MMDA and/or its concerned officers
can be held liable for the liquidated damages and/or contract cost variance. Petitioners argue that
WLTC bears the sole liability because the delay in the project and the additional costs incurred to
expedite its completion were the entire fault of WLTC.

We deny the petition. At the outset, we sustain petitioners' position that Ona, as Project Manager,
had the authority to issue the SOs and ROs, and to approve the request for extension of contract
time on behalf of the MMDA. Office Order No. 220, series of 200331 issued by then MMDA
Chairman Bayani F. Fernando, and which designated Ona as Project Manager, has the general
objective of ensuring the proper implementation of the project We find that the authority to
suspend construction work and grant requests for contract time extension are necessarily
included in Ona's tasks. We take note of the practice in the construction industry where the
Project Manager exercises discretion on technical matters involving construction work.

We note further that the MMDA never repudiated the acts of Ona, but has, in fact, ratified the
same. However, this is not to take anything away from the COA's duty to look into the propriety
of Ona's acts. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. As specifically applied here, it is well within the scope of the COA's authority to evaluate
and determine whether the SOs or the extension of the contract time, which necessarily includes
the waiver of any penalty or liquidated damages to be imposed, is valid. The plain reason is that
government funds are involved. Hence, even if the MMDA, through Ona, favorably granted the
requests for suspension of work and the extension of contract time, this cannot bind or preclude
the COA from exercising its constitutionally mandated function in reviewing the same and to
ensure its conformity with the law.33
It appears that petitioners, for some reason, treated the first SO and RO on March 23, 2004 and
April 21, 2004, respectively, to have pushed the effectivity of the contract to April 21, 2004. This
is erroneous. As the name itself suggests, the SO should have only suspended the operation and
nothing more. The SO,38 in fact, expressly directed WLTC to suspend all construction operation
and did not contain anything about revising or moving the effectivity of the contract.

Petitioners also failed to belie the COA's finding that the first SO was dated March 23, 2004.
This was highly suspicious, to say the least, because the Notice of Award and the NP were issued
on the next day, March 24, 2004. The COA is correct, therefore, in holding that there was no
contract or project to suspend yet when the first SO was issued. There was also no reasonable
explanation why WLTC's alleged request for suspension was dated March 24, 2004, when the
SO was issued a day before.

Considering, therefore, that the original effectivity (March 24, 2004) and expiry (July 21, 2004)
of the contract must stand, it follows that the succeeding SOs in July 30, 2004 and November 15,
2004 are invalid. No extension of contract time was issued before the expiry of the contract.
Even if we were to assume that the contract time was validly extended and the July and
November 2004 SOs could have been feasible, we stress that petitioners failed to refute the
findings of the COA that the reasons for these SOs are without legal basis for being inherent
risks of the project.

Moreover, in further revising the expiry of the contract and pushing it to March 2, 2005,
petitioners claim that WLTC, in its letter dated February 10, 2005, requested for an extension of
contract time and the MMDA granted the same on February 17, 2005. Again, even if we were to
assume that the contract time was validly extended to April 24, 2004 and that the subsequent
SOs could have likewise been feasible, the supposed contract time extension must still fail.
Records do not show what the reasons for such extension were and whether they were valid and
allowed under the law in the first place.40 Significantly, as admitted by Fainsan, the extension
was not covered with Performance Security.41

Petitioners, however, insist that the consequences of delay in the form of liquidated damages
should fall on the shoulders of WLTC alone because it was the one who requested the suspension
of work (and extension of contract time). The MMDA, on the other hand, never suspended the
work operations at its own discretion; it merely assented to the requests "upon finding of
reasonable justification therefor."42 As for the contract cost variance, petitioners posit it was due
to WLTC's act of subcontracting parts of the project.

The question, however, as to which party is at fault for subcontracting parts of the project is
beside the point. The same holds true with respect to which party initiated the requests for
suspension of work and extension of contract time, as petitioners suggest. The bottom line is
petitioners allowed and approved the disbursement of funds for the payment to WLTC, without
withholding or deducting the correct amount of liquidated damages and contract cost variance.

Petitioners are correct that under RA No. 9184, liquidated damages are payable by the contractor
in case of breach of contract. As the owner of the project, however, the MMDA has the
obligation to make sure that the contractor pays in case of breach. Paragraph 3, Item CI 8 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD No. 1594 provides that liquidated damages "shall be
deducted from any money due or which may become due the contractor under the contract,
and/or collect such liquidated damages from the retention money or other securities posted by the
contractor, whichever is convenient to the Government." This is mandatory.

Petitioners' position with regard to the contract cost variance also dovetails with the findings of
the COA that it was incurred by WLTC to expedite the completion of the project. The COA
found that by February 2005, the project was only halfway done despite having three
subcontractors already. WLTC executed another agreement with a fourth subcontractor, Yamato,
which finally expedited the construction. The COA is correct, therefore, in holding that these
alleged additional costs of manpower and equipment must not be borne by the Government.
These are not the same as additional or extra work which are performed over and above of what
is required under the contract (or would not have been included in the agreed contract price)
which would necessitate compensation for the contractor.

Worse, as admitted by petitioners, the alleged additional costs of manpower and equipment were
incurred by WLTC after having entered into subcontract agreements, in violation of its contract
with the MMDA.45 Thus, petitioners should not have allowed the disbursement to pay for this
alleged contract cost variance. All told, the disallowance, as modified by the COA Proper, must
be upheld.

Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 198747 expressly provides that
"[e]very expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in violation of the provisions of this
Code or of the general and special provisions contained in the annual General or other
Appropriations Act shall be void. Every payment made in violation of said provisions shall be
illegal and every official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or taking part
therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the
Government for the full amount so paid or received."

Complementarily, Section 103 of PO No. 1445 provides that expenditures of government funds
or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. In determining who are liable
for audit disallowances or charges, the COA is guided by Section 19 of the Manual of Certificate
of Settlement and Balances,48 which provides: 19.1 The liability of public officers and other
persons for audit disallowances shall be determined on the basis of: (a) the nature of the
disallowance; (b) the duties, responsibilities or obligations of the officers/persons concerned; (c)
the extent of their participation or involvement in the disallowed transaction; and (d) the amount
of losses or damages suffered by the government thereby.

19.1.3 Public officers who approve or authorize transactions involving the expenditure of
government funds and uses of government properties shall be liable for all losses arising out of
their negligence or failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family.

The liability of public officials who allowed the illegal expenditure or disbursement stems from
the general principle that public officers are stewards who must use government resources
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically to avoid the wastage of public funds.49 The
prudent and cautious use of these funds is dictated by their nature as funds and property held in
trust by the public officers for the benefit of the sovereign trustees the people themselves - and
for the specific public purposes for which they are appropriated.50 To maintain inviolate the
public trust reposed on them, public officers must exercise ordinary diligence or the diligence
of a good father of a family. This means that they should observe the relevant laws and rules as
well as exercise ordinary care and prudence in the disbursement of public funds. If they do not,
the disbursed amounts are disallowed in audit, and the law imposes upon public officers the
obligation to return these amounts.51

In our earlier discussion, we highlighted several dubious circumstances relating to the issuances
of the SOs, the contract time extension, and the payment of the contract cost variance. Coupled
with these is the own damning admission of petitioners about violations in the Contract. These
acts prove that petitioners had knowledge of facts and circumstances which would render the
disbursements illegal. They were thus grossly negligent in their duties.

WHEREFORE, the October 15, 2012 Decision and June 20, 2014 Resolution of the
Commission on Audit are AFFIRMED.

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and
prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice (public respondent). on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestano (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner.

On July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives,
transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by
Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.[4] On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group)
filed another impeachment complaint[5]

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11] After hearing,
public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient
in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient
in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on
September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13]

On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for
injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED
to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the
petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition.
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction[20]of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."[21]

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-
within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from
the Court.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have
acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of
one year.

Petitioner alleges that public respondent's chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep.
Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against
Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way
that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioner's allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being
hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26] The act of the
head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.

Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the
two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that
it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be

instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one's prompt dispatch may
be another's undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and
constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer's official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel's initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.[32]

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form
and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in
fact, conceded by petitioner's counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the
filing of an answer.

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure
at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that
petitioner's initial participation in the impeachment proceedings - the opportunity to file an
Answer - starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and
substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioner's motion for reconsideration from its
finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the
Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules.[35]

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the
discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum
constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioner's position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear
in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint
or resolution,"[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."[37]

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing."[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional
requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-Ã -
vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power[.]"[39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain
grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which
involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or,
more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public
respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with
that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]

Citing Tanada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section
3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in
any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation."[42]

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations[43] which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules
of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is
intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI
of Constitution.

Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal

act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an
agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.[44] While "promulgation" would seem
synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.[45] A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the
case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has
invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of
judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk
of court for filing and publication."[46]
As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation
or adoption.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood--that is,
to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall
be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49]

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.

The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution. Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could
have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative
inquiries, per Neri. Other than "promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section
because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for
impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for
impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose
that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid
harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read
as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these
other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.[52]

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing.
Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details. . . . in
case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing.

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings
taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant
self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-
day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House
would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending
the completion of the publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is
aimed at "effectively carrying out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on
Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in
keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress' Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may
be given retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws."[54] In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.[55]

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year."

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit
that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral
to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation
ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially
maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties' interpretation, its impeachment
complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action"[60] which
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas
and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of
initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.

"to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.[62]

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to

convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of

Impeachment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are
charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69]

MR. MAAMBONG. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
body.

It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution.
Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be
accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the
complaint moving.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House's action on the committee
report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step,
absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner's line of reasoning, the
verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House - steps done prior to
the filing - would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioner's emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is

impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word
"complaint"[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic
rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner's stance suggests that whoever files the
first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an
exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective
complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate
the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be
the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later
from filing an impeachment complaint.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants,
injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always
unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted
from directly participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of
Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same
impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already
initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate
a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment
complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of
the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment
complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement , the House, in taking
charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding,
subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of
Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its
processes.

With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and
further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer
has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest
it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment
proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is
afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
which to make the proper referral.

The Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter."

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly
"belated" referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the
said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only
four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15thCongress opened from which date the 10-day
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte
directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.[81]
Neither does the Court find merit in respondents' alternative contention that the initiation of the
impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at
the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of
initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of
all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
Committee on Justice's recommendation to the House plenary.[84]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not
its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow."[86]

Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too
frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation," with
main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public
officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the
legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of
time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that.[90]

Petitioner's claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources
runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the
Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself,
which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the
quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers,
the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges
entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with
the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated
on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by
the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should
be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a
vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole
import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules

on Criminal Procedure
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised. In the exercise of
the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides
that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply
to impeachment proceedings before the House."
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective
rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts
or rejects two procedural devices.

First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the
Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner,
the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her
with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that
public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing
her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment
process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official
functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report
within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be
defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the
grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor
also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a
political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the
complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment
complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure
that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if
Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner's case falls under the exception since
impeachment prescribes a single punishment - removal from office and disqualification to hold
any public office - even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner
concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.

Petitioner's claim deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the
indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment."[94] It, therefore,
follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.\

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her
within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its
chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to
consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the
sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will
decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."[95] Petitioner's
petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated."[96]

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a
consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be
premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010

and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

Sabio v. Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated January 31,
2017 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated July 28, 2011 of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the consolidated cases that adjudged petitioner
Camilo L. Sabio (petitioner) guilty of the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and thereby, imposed
upon him the penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued
leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

The Facts
This case stemmed from separate Complaints4 filed by respondent Field Investigation Office
(FIO) of the Ombudsman charging petitioner, former Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service arising out of the following acts: (1) excess monthly charges in the
official use of PCGG-issued cellular phones for the years 2005 to 2007 in the total amount of
P25,594.76,5 in violation of: (a) the P10,000.00 cap under Office Order No. CLS-001-2005 dated
August 25, 2005;6(b) Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 85-55-A7 against unnecessary,
excessive, and extravagant expenditures; and (c) Administrative Order No. 1038 dated August
31, 2004 requiring all government agencies to adopt austerity measures, including at least 10%
reduction in the consumption of utilities;9(2) failure to deposit the aggregate amount of
P10,350,000.00 consisting of the cash advances and partial remittances from sequestered
corporations, i.e., the Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development
Corporation (MPLDC),10 to the Agrarian Reform Fund of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP), through the Bureau of Treasury (BOT), as required under Section 63 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, as amended in relation to Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order
No. (EO) 229;11 and (3) failure to liquidate despite demand the amount of P1,555,862.03 out of
the total cash advances that he used in his travels and litigation of foreign cases,12 as required by
Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 144513 and COA Circular No. 97-00214 dated February 10,
1997.

In his defense,15 petitioner claimed that the PCGG's operations are financed from the recovered
ill-gotten wealth and from the P5,000,000.00 Confidential and Intelligence Funds (CIF)
appropriated annually.16 However, during his tenure, the CIF for the years 2005 to 2010 were
never released to him; hence, he had to utilize the cash remittances from the sequestered
corporations in lieu thereof. He further explained that he had to engage the services of foreign
lawyers who asked for hefty compensation in the litigation of foreign cases because while he
actively took part in the litigation, he was not duly licensed to practice law in foreign countries.17

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Joint Decision18 dated July 28, 2011, which was approved on October 11, 2011, the
Ombudsman found substantial evidence against petitioner and accordingly, adjudged him guilty
of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
pursuant to Section 52 (A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.19

The Ombudsman found that petitioner failed to: (a) refute the allegations relative to his unpaid
cellular phone charges, holding that his general denial along with the allegations concerning his
duties and responsibilities as PCGG Chairman and the accomplishments of his office were not
responsive to the charges; (b) refute the allegations concerning his non-remittance to the BOT of
the amount of P10,350,000.00 received from the sequestered corporations despite the showing
that he made use of the same as cash advances, and that he had, in fact, personally encashed the
majority of the checks corresponding to the remittances; and (c) account for his unliquidated
cash advance of P1,555,862.03 despite demand.20

The Ombudsman likewise found that petitioner's acts of appropriating and/or misappropriating
the proceeds of the ill-gotten wealth, excessive use of government resources, and failure to
account for his cash advances tarnished the integrity of his public office, thus constituting
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.22 However, considering that petitioner is
no longer connected with the PCGG, the Ombudsman declared the penalty of dismissal from the
service as having been rendered moot, and thus, imposed on him instead the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to re-employment in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.23

The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated January 31, 2017, the CA declared the Ombudsman ruling to be amply
supported by substantial evidence, and thus, affirmed the same.26

The Court's Ruling

Court emphasizes that as a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when
affirmed by the CA.28 In this case, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which the CA affirmed.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.

In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in
the former.29 On the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of
truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or
intent to violate the truth.30 Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 06-053831 classifies
dishonesty in three (3) gradations, namely: serious, less serious or simple. In this case, petitioner
was charged with serious dishonesty, (b) the respondent gravely abused his authority in order to
commit the dishonest act; (c) where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest
act directly involves property, accountable forms or money for which he is directly
accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and
corruption;

Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention.
In ascertaining the intention of a person charged with dishonesty, consideration must be taken
not only of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the act committed by the respondent, but
also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment.32 Both grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, of
which petitioner was charged, are classified as grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal
is meted even for first time offenders.33

With respect to petitioner's excess cellular phone charges aggregating to P25,594.76. Petitioner
himself set a P10,000.00 cap in the maximum monthly allocation of PCGG Commissioners in
the official use of PCGG-issued cellular phones35 and disallowed the previous practice of
justifying any and all amounts in excess thereof, which shall henceforth be paid by the end-
user.36 On January 30, 2008, petitioner issued Office Order No. CLS-092-2008 clarifying that the
monthly allocation fixed above shall not apply in cases where the official concerned is abroad,
on official business, and the charges on text messages and voice calls are made by virtue
thereof.37

As aptly pointed out by the CA, petitioner cannot disregard with impunity Office Order No.
CLS-001-2005 limiting the use of the PCGG-issued cellular phones, which he himself issued in
line with the austerity measures implemented by the government to lessen operating
expenses.39 Notably, in seven (7) of the 12 billing cycles concerned, the excess usage amounted
to between 15.96%40 and 62.77%41 over the P10,000.00 cap given for cellular phone usage,
rendering such excesses to be expenses that are irregular, or even excessive and extravagant[42

Flagrant disregard of rules has been jurisprudentially demonstrated, among others, in the
instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule; in the repeated voluntary
disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies; in the practice of illegally
collecting fees more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; when several
violations or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds were
committed; and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities that were clearly
beyond her given duties. The common denominator in these cases was the employee's
propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.44
Here, petitioner's flagrant disregard of the rule imposing a P10,000.00 cap on cellular phone
usage is readily apparent from his repeated incurrence of irregular, excessive, and/or extravagant
cellular phone charges over and above said cap for 7 of the 12 billing periods when excess
usages were noted.
With respect to petitioner's failure to remit to the CARP fund through the BOT the
P10,350,000.00 remittances from the sequestered corporations that he used as cash advances,
which he likewise failed to liquidate.46

Under Section 6347 of RA 6657, as amended, all amounts derived from the sale of ill-gotten
wealth recovered through the PCGG shall accrue to the CARP fund48 and shall be considered
automatically appropriated for such purpose pursuant to Sections 2049 and 2150of EO 229.
By its very nature, ill-gotten wealth51assumes a public character as they supposedly
originated from the government itself, and must, perforce, be returned to the public
treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be
adjudged by competent courts.52Accordingly, the proceeds from the sales thereof should
likewise be remitted to the public treasury.

However, despite the express provisions of Section 63 of RA 6657, as amended, petitioner

converted the P10,350,000.00 remittances from the sequestered corporations (P9,850,000.00 and
P500,000.00 of which were placed in the names of petitioner and IRC Chairman and President
Ernesto R. Jalandoni, respectively)53 and the proceeds of the sale of A. Soriano Corporation
shares, which formed part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,54 as
his cash advances, and admittedly failed to verify the exact amount of resources made available
to him to successfully carry out his tasks.55

Petitioner failed to show any law, rule, regulation or authority that permits him to utilize receipts
from the sale of the aforesaid shares – being classified as ill-gotten wealth – to be channelled for
any other purpose than that provided under Section 63 of RA 6657, as amended. Moreover, even
assuming that petitioner may utilize a portion of the proceeds from the sale of ill-gotten wealth as
cash advances, he failed to liquidate the same requires the liquidation of all cash advances at the
end of each year and the refund of any unexpended balance to the Cashier/Collecting Officer
who will issue the necessary official receipt.60 Notably, in order to excuse himself from
complying with the liquidation procedure under COA Circular No. 97-002, petitioner claimed
that he used the receipts from the sale of ill-gotten wealth in replacement of his unreleased
CIF,61 thereby implying that he could account therefor with a mere certification that the same
was utilized for a public purpose in the performance of duty.62 The claim must be rejected for the
reason that since the CIF is covered by an appropriation63 specifically identifying and
authorizing it as such, it is governed by a different set of liquidation procedures64 which was,
however, also not shown to have been followed in this case.

To add, the Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's claim that no bad faith can be attributed to him
since he signed the vouchers and the checks by virtue of his position as head of the PCGG,
but left the encashment of the checks and their use to his fellow Commissioners Ricardo Abcede
and Nicasio Conti, who were supposedly responsible for applying those cash advances to the use
of the PCGG.65 On the contrary, it fortified petitioner's liability for Grave Misconduct and
Serious Dishonesty because it sufficiently demonstrated his propensity to disregard the law and
established rules, and his predilection to distort the truth.

Petitioner invoked67 his acquittal in the allied criminal cases for Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
301968 and Malversation of Public Funds. However, the Court holds that such acquittal on the
basis of insufficiency of evidence which engendered reasonable doubt, cannot work in
petitioner's favor. An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings.
As such, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the
acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily
preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This
is because the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial
evidence, unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.71

Liability for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty does not rest on whether or not he has
appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take public funds for which he is accountable (which an accused in
malversation of public funds must be shown to have committed), but rather on whether or not he
flagrantly disregarded the law and established rules, or committed any distortion of the truth with
respect to his handling and accounting of the public funds which came into his hands, as
affirmatively shown in this case.

With respect to petitioner's failure to liquidate despite demand the amount of P1,555,862.03 out
of the total cash advances that he used in his travels and litigation of foreign cases.

Petitioner claims that the amount of P1,555,862.03 forms part of his CIF which he utilized to
successfully accomplish his mission and to carry out his tasks as then PCGG Chairman,72 and
that his acquittal in the related criminal case73 negates any gross misconduct and serious
dishonesty on his part. Instead of presenting documentary evidence, such as receipts and
vouchers, to satisfactorily show that the amount was spent for the purposes for which it was
released, [petitioner] proceeded to glorify the achievements of the PCGG under his watch and
discussed the historical origin of its mandate. His lengthy exposition, to be sure, is not responsive
to the charge and is deemed an extraneous matter that would not sway this Court in exonerating
him from administrative liability.74

Finally, the totality of petitioner's acts tarnished the image and integrity of his public office,
which is tantamount to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.75 Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service is a grave offense which carries the penalty of
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
on the second offense.76 However, in view of petitioner's culpability for all the three (3) charges,
Section 50,77 Rule 10 of the RRACCS dictates that the penalty to be imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge. Petitioner's administrative liability for Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty would have warranted his dismissal from the service even
for the first offense,78 if not for his separation from the office.79

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "[p]ublic office is a public
trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice
and lead modest lives."80

We emphasize that despite the exalted position that [petitioner] had occupied in the executive
arm of the government, he is not immune from administrative suit. As Chairman of the PCGG,
he had no blanket authority to do as he pleased with the money and property of the government.
He is covered by the same code of conduct and the rules and regulations pertaining to the
handling and accounting of public funds. As holder of a public office[,] he must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law; nothing less is expected. Instead of demonstrating a
conduct that is beyond reproach, [petitioner] abused his power and position to the detriment of
the government and the public as a whole.82

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31,2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123692, which upheld the Joint Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the
Office of the Ombudsman in the consolidated cases OMB-C-A-09-0611-J, OMB-C-A-09-0609-
J, and OMB-C-A-09-0608-J, is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Camilo L. Sabio is
found GUILTY of the administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and accordingly, meted the penalty of
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Ifurung v. Carpio Morales in her capacity as Ombudsman

Through this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Rey Nathaniel C.
Ifurung (petitioner), in propria persona, seeks a declaration from the Court that: (a)
Section (Sec.) 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, also known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, is unconstitutional for being an outright transgression of Sec. 11, in
relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Article (Art.) XI of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) all individual
respondents as de facto Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman, respectively, and all these
positions are vacant.1 Respondents are the incumbent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner maintains that the constitutional issue raised in his petition is of transcendental
importance since this Court's ruling will finally determine the correct term and tenure of the
Ombudsman and his deputies and settle the matter as to the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A.
No. 6770. He alleges that Sec. 8(3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that in
case of a vacancy at the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or
permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the newly appointed
Ombudsman and his deputies shall be appointed to a full term of seven (7) years, is
constitutionally infirm as it contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution. He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President, Vice-
President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Members of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission on
Audit (COA), the successor to the positions of the Ombudsman and deputies should serve only
the unexpired term of the predecessor.

To fortify his position, petitioner states that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
during its 26 July 1986 discussion was to constitutionalize the Office of the Ombudsman, i.e., by
granting it autonomy and independence the same as and equal to those of the other
constitutionally created offices and positions. Petitioner states that it can be gleaned from the
above data that the explicit seven-year term for the Ombudsman and the deputies has neither
been followed nor complied with.13
Petitioner claims that Ombudsman Morales should have ceased to hold office on 1 February
2015 considering that the unexpired term of the supposed fourth seven-year term ended on that
date; thus, Ombudsman Morales has been holding the position in a de facto capacity since 2
February 2015 up to the present. This observation, petitioner claims, holds true with the other
respondent deputies.14

Petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman is not sui generis; thus, what applies and
holds true for all the other constitutionally created offices and positions should also apply to this
office. Petitioner speculates that such fresh term of seven years could effectively deprive an
incoming President the power and opportunity to appoint an Ombudsman. Thus the term of the
Ombudsman will be subject to political maneuverings such that the outgoing President can divest
the next President of the prerogative to appoint.

The Comment of the Respondents

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claim that petitioner failed to
appreciate the verba legis approach to constitutional construction; and that, instead, petitioner
resorted to an interpretation that was not only self-serving but also devoid of basis and reason.21

Respondents aver that Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution is clear that the term of the
Ombudsman and the Deputies shall be seven years without reappointment without distinction on
the cause of filling the vacancy. According to the respondents, to follow petitioner's
interpretation would lead to a distinction not found in the law between: (1) the term of the
Ombudsman and the deputies who succeeded a predecessor who finished a full term of seven
years; and (2) the term of the Ombudsman and the deputies who merely succeeded the
predecessor who did not finish the full term of seven years.22

Respondents state that unlike Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, the term of office of the
constitutionally created offices provides that a successor who is appointed to any vacancy shall
only serve the unexpired term of the successor.23

Respondents allege that the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent to
grant the Ombudsman and his deputies the same rank and salary as the Chair and members of the
Constitutional Commissions but not by the staggered term.25

Respondents contend that the ruling in Gaminde where the rotational system of appointment of
the CSC chairperson and the commissioners was crucial to the determination of the start of
Commissioner Gaminde's term, does not apply to the Office of the Ombudsman where there are
no seven-five-three-year rotational intervals for the appointment. Moreover, the Office of the
Ombudsman is not a commission composed of a chairperson and several commissioners; thus,
whether the term of the first Ombudsman began on 2 February 1987 would be immaterial
because the succeeding Ombudsman shall have a fresh seven-year term.26

OUR RULING

A petition for certiorari is the

proper remedy to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of
R.A. No. 6770.
The pertinent provisions of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution which petitioner avers was
transgressed by Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 are as follows: Sec. 8. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at
least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine
Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding
election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.

Sec. 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which
shall not be decreased during their term of office.

Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.

The History of the Office of the

Ombudsman

The word "ombudsman" originated from Sweden when in 1809 it established the position
of Justlieombudsman with the purpose of overseeing government administration. The title
loosely translates as "citizen's defender" or "representative of the people."53 The Ombudsman
was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action
or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the appropriate
administrative agency based on his findings. The Ombudsman relied mainly on the power of
persuasion and the high prestige of the office to effect his recommendations.54

In the Philippines, the Office of the Ombudsman considers the Permanent Commission in the
Revolutionary Government as its precursor. The Permanent Commission, created pursuant to
Art. 2155 of the Decree of 23 June 1898, was designated to decide, on appeal, all criminal cases
resolved by the provincial councils involving the department secretaries and the provincial and
municipal officials.56 The Permanent Commission continued its existence after the ratification of
the Constitution of 1899, popularly known as the Malolos Constitution.

In May 1950, President Elpidio R. Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving
complaints against public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty, and irregularity in
office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints.58

On 30 December 1953, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1
creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission for the purpose of expediting
actions on all complaints against the manner of various officials and personnel of the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, instrumentalities, and government-owned or -
controlled corporations.

On 15 July 1958, President Carlos P. Garcia (President Garcia) issued E.O. No. 306 creating the
Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency (PCAPE). The PCAPE was
to be headed by a Technical Assistant designated by the President, and who shall be known as
the Chairman.
When President Diosdado P. Macapagal (President Macapagal) assumed office on 30 December
1961, he issued E.O. No. 1 re-creating the PCAPE for the purpose of achieving greater
efficiency, competence, and dedication in the administration of government and ensuring the
prompt and faithful performance of assigned duties, functions, and directives by the
implementing government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities.

On 18 January 1962, President Macapagal issued E.O. No. 4 which gave life to the Presidential
Anti-Graft Committee (PAGC) to be composed of such personnel as the President may designate
from time to time.

By virtue of E.O. No. 4 issued on 7 January 1966, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) which shall be directly under and responsible only to the President of the
Philippines. The PARGO shall be headed by the Assistant to the President, and is a member of
the Cabinet.

In 1970, President Marcos created a Complaints and Investigation Office and in the following
year, the Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee.65 In view of the failure of these
offices to accomplish the noble purpose for which they were created, the framers of the 1973
Constitution saw the need to constitutionalize the office of the Ombudsman, to be known as
the Tanodbayan, in order to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its
recommendations.66 Thus, the Tanodbayan was vested with the power to receive and investigate
complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or -controlled
corporations; make appropriate recommendations; and in case of failure of justice as defined by
law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative cases before the proper
court or body.67

Section 6. Term of Office.

 The Tanodbayan and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment unless removed by the President upon his determination that the
Tanodbayan or any of his Deputies has become incapacitated or has been guilty of
neglect of duty, or misconduct.
 If the Office of Tanodbayan becomes vacant for any cause, the Senior Deputy
Tanodbayan shall serve as Acting Tanodbayan until the Tanodbayan shall have
been appointed for a full term.

The independence of the Office of the Ombudsman was further reinforced under the 1987
Constitution. Sec. 7, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the existing Tanodbayan shall
hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor which shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the constitution. The Ombudsman and the deputies shall
have the rank of chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions, and
they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their term of office.71 The
Ombudsman and his deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation
from office.72
On 24 July 1987, President Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers pursuant to Sec. 6,
Art. XVIII73 of the 1987 Constitution, issued E.O. No. 24374 providing for the framework of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 243 is quoted:

Sec. 6. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which
shall not be decreased during their term of office.

On 17 November 1989, the Eighth Congress approved R.A. No. 677075 providing for the
functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. The pertinent provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 read:

Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special
Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. — (3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the
Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent
Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent
capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term. In case the
Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any
of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.

Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is not

unconstitutional.

Petitioner anchors his challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the
belief that because the Ombudsman and the deputies have the same rank and salary as the
chairman and the members of the constitutional commissions, their term of office, following the
Court's disquisition in Gaminde, shall always be seven years counted from 2 February 1987 and
seven years thereafter, and not the full term of seven years.

The Office of the Ombudsman is

not a constitutional commission.

Sec. 1, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution specifically enumerates the independent constitutional
commissions in the Philippines, viz: the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA. A commission is
defined as "a board or committee officially appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or
exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or relation."79 Noteworthy, the CSC is composed
of a chairman and two commissioners;80 the COMELEC, a chairman and six
commissioners;81 and the COA, a chairman and two commissioners. Clearly provided in Sec. 7 is
that these three constitutional commissions shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it; thus, the commissions are collegial bodies whose manner of
working is characterized by a sharing of responsibility among the chairman and the
commissioners of the commission.

The undeniable intent of the framers

of the 1987 Constitution in Sec. 10,
Art. XI was to provide that the rank
and salary of the Ombudsman and
his deputies shall be the same as that
of the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional
commissions.

Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution reads: SECTION 10. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their
term of office.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in
itself really. That is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and
salary, we thought we have to give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of
reference more than anything else.84

The discussion confirms that the intent of the framers of the Constitution in qualifying that the
salary and rank of the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same as that of the chairman and
the members of the constitutional commissions, was for the purpose of having a government
classification as to salary and a point of reference as to rank.

The words "salary" and "rank" were utilized by the framers in their ordinary and common usage.
The word "salary" is defined as "a reward or recompense for services performed. In a more
limited sense, a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered."86 The word "rank," on
the other hand, "is often used to express something different from office. It then becomes a
designation or title of honor, dignity or distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his
relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privilege, precedence, and sometimes
of command, or by which to determine his pay and emoluments."87 From these definitions, it is
obvious that neither the words "salary" nor "rank" even remotely includes the "term of office,"
which is the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.88

Applying the basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,93 it is beyond cavil that pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. XI, it is only with
reference to "salary" and "rank" that the Ombudsman and his deputies should be similar to the
chairman and the members of the constitutional commission. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.94 Thus, where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended
to other matters,95 like "term of office" for "rank" and "salary" as insisted by the petitioner. Time
and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, only application.96

The constitutional commissions

observe the regular rotational plan
which cannot apply to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
It is instructive that in the 1949 case of Nationalista Party v. De Vera,99 the Court laid down the
following ruling when it interpreted Sec. 1, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution[100 relative to the
term of office of the commissioners of the independent COMELEC, to wit:

In order to carry out the purpose of the Constitution of placing in the Commission a new member
every three years, it is essential that after the first Commissioners have been appointed, every
subsequent appointment shall so fix the appointee's term of office as to maintain the three years
difference between the dates of expiration of the respective terms of the incumbents. And this
can be done if after the appointments of the first three Commissioners, the successor of any one
of them who ceases prior to the expiration of his term, be appointed only for the unexpired
portion of that term. Of course, when a Commissioner ceases because of the expiration of his
term his successor must be appointed for a term of nine years; but when he ceases on other
grounds prior to the expiration of his term, his successor must be appointed only for the
unexpired portion of that term, otherwise the appointment would be offensive to the
Constitution.101

In Republic v. Imperial,102 the Court held that this particular provision of the 1935 Constitution,
when taken together with the prescribed term of office for nine years without reappointment,
evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the
COMELEC, by having subsequent members appointable only once every three years. With these
periods it was the intention to have one position vacant every three years, so that no President
can appoint more than one commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence
and impartiality of the Commission as a body, we may add, for the impartiality and
independence of each individual commissioner's tenure was safeguarded by other provisions in
the same Article X of the fundamental charter.103 Moreover, the rotation of the commissioners'
appointments at regular and fixed intervals of three years was a deliberate plan, was shown by
the history of the provision and by selection of the fixed term of nine years for all subsequent
appointees, since no other term would give such a result.

In Imperial, we established that for the operation of the rotational plan, two conditions, both
indispensable to its workability, are required, viz: (1) that the terms of the first three
commissioners should start on a common date; and (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term. Without satisfying these conditions, the regularity of the intervals between
appointments would be destroyed, and the evident purpose of the rotation, i.e., to prevent that a
four-year administration should appoint more than one permanent and regular commissioner,
would be frustrated.

Corollary to these provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the terms of the first chairmen and
commissioners of the constitutional commissions must start on a common date, irrespective of
the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the
expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of
the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.104

Unlike the constitutional commissions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Ombudsman and
the deputies do not make a collegial body thus, making it implausible to apply the regular
rotation or cycle in its membership. the Ombudsman and the deputies have their respective
jurisdiction; hence, they could not have common responsibility relative to the discharge of their
separate and distinct functions.

Petitioner avers that Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in so far as provides that the Overall Deputy
shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have
been appointed for a full term runs counter to what is uniformly provided in Sec. 2 of Art. IX(A),
(B), and (C) of the 1987 Constitution, viz: "In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."107

Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution refers exclusively to the constitutional commissions; thus, such
proscription as to the appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity of a member
applies only to the constitutional commissions and cannot extend to the Ombudsman and the
deputies. Indeed, Art. XI of the constitution does not provide for such prohibition. What is clear
however, is that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall, during their tenure, be subject to the
same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Sec. 2 of Article IX(A) of this
Constitution, "[n]o Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure; hold any
other office or employment.

The ruling in Gaminde as to the terms of

office of the chairman and members of the
constitutional commissions does not apply
to the Ombudsman and the deputies.

The Court draws attention to the fact that its ruling in Gaminde applies exclusively to the CSC,
the COMELEC, and the COA for the reason that Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution pertains solely
to the constitutional commissions.

Sec 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is

consistent with Sec. 11, Art. XI of
the 1987 Constitution.

Tracing the history of the creation of the now Office of the Ombudsman, the 1973 Constitution
provides: Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known
as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office,
including those in government-owned or -controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.109

It was by virtue of P.D. No. 1487 that President Marcos, in the exercise of his power under
Proclamation No. 1081, clearly defined the term of office of the Tanodbayan and his
deputies, viz: Section 6. Term of Office. If the Office of Tan On the one hand, Sec. 11, Art. XI
of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
The quoted provision of the Constitution is clear and explicit: (a) the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall serve the term of seven years; (b) that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not
be reappointed; and (c) the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

Contrary to the position of the petitioner, Sec. 11, Art. XI by itself is clear and can stand on its
own. Notably, the framers plainly provided for a seven-year term of the Ombudsman and the
deputies. For sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it be gathered that the appointment to any
vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. This can only mean that it was the intent of the framers that the appointment to
the positions of the Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it be for the expired or unexpired
term of the predecessor, shall always be for a full term of seven years. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.110 odbayan becomes vacant for any cause, the
Senior Deputy Tanodbayan shall serve as Acting Tanodbayan until the Tanodbayan shall
have been appointed for a full term.

In our review of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of death, resignation, removal,
or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman shall be appointed for a full
term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3), R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution in so far as it provides that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a term
of seven years.

Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of
the constitutional commissions.

Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any
vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration
of the term or death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the
successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven years.

Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of
office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February
1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of appointment. Accordingly, the present
Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from their date of appointment
unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo

This petition for certiorari assails the May 2, 2006 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, which
denied the motion for intervention and reconsideration of its January 21, 2005 Decision,2 filed by
petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman).

The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint lodged by Gilda D. Daradal.
against private respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar,
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual Harassment and
Oppression. On July 19, 1996, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning at the Motor Pool Division
of the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo asked her to massage his
forehead and nape. In the course thereof, he said, “You had been lying to me you have already
seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours?” She was appalled as the utterance was made
in the presence of her co-employees. She added that by virtue of a Memorandum,3 dated August
6, 1996, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to
perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the
personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office from August 16-31, 1996 because of her refusal
to submit to his sexual advances.

In his defense, Quimbo retorted that the charge instituted against him was fictitious. He claimed
that Daradal enjoyed a “very important person” (VIP) treatment for a long period of time and,
when required to work, rebelled against him. He asserted that the charge of sexual harassment
and oppression was intended to embarrass and ridicule him and that the discretion to order her
detail was validly exercised.

On December 9, 1998, after due proceedings, the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a

resolution4dismissing the case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of
oppression. The Ombudsman-Visayas imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months
without pay.

On January 21, 2005, the CA reversed the December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999
Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA ratiocinated: The Office
of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose sanctions against government officials and
employees who are subject of its investigation as its power is only limited to recommend the
appropriate sanctions but not directly to impose the same.\

In Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court pronounced: Besides, assuming
arguendo, that petitioner were (sic) administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position
in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be
at fault, to the public official concerned.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with the jurisdiction
to take cognizance of cases for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not public servants have
committed administrative offenses. However, their power is only to recommend to the
disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out and it is best left to the proper
disciplining authority to impose such penalty, which in this case is the Office of the Governor of
the Province of Samar.7

The Ombudsman’s Position

In its Memorandum,10 the Ombudsman stressed that, as the champion of the people, it had the
right and legal interest to seek redress on the apparent erroneous reversal by the CA of its
decision in an administrative disciplinary case. It insisted that, as the disciplining authority, it has
the power and prerogative to directly impose any administrative penalty. It asserted that the
obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman (Tapiador)11 heavily relied
upon by the CA, to declare its disciplinary powers as merely recommendatory had been rejected
by the Court in numerous cases.

Respondent Quimbo’s Position

In his Memorandum,12 Quimbo contended that the Ombudsman had no legal standing to
intervene or to seek reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the real party in interest
was Daradal. He further stated that the assailed CA decision was based on prevailing
jurisprudence at the time the said decision was rendered.

ISSUES
Based on the parties’ respective contentions, the issues for this Court’s resolution are as follows:

i. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman
lacks the power to directly impose administrative penalties against erring public
officials or employees.

ii. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying the Ombudsman’s plea
to validly intervene in its proceedings for lack of legal interest.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court grants the Ombudsman’s petition.

Preliminary matters
The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties against public
officials or employees.
In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio,13 the Court categorically delineated the Ombudsman’s
power to directly impose, not merely recommend, administrative sanctions against erring public
officials or employees, viz: The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power
to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory
powers, had already been rejected by this Court.

The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, where the Court,
speaking through Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, held:

The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus: RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his
deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and
criminal liability of government officers and employees in every case where the evidence
warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the
Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (Ledesma),14 the Court definitively stated that the statement
in Tapiador regarding the Ombudsman’s power was merely an obiter dictum and, as such, could
not be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement. Thus:

x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of
the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative
case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely
an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

The Ombudsman has the legal interest to intervene in the proceedings before the CA.
The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in
the proceedings where its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to
rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez.17 In the said case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the
Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers include
defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, 18the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the
matter is beyond cavil. The Court elucidated, thus:

The Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed
against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public
officers and employees) is at stake.

“2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the
apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision.

Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether
respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the
Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act
as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had to be
given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.

The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when
defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the
offense is committed against the government and public interest.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case, gravely erred in
disallowing the Ombudsman’s motion to intervene. It failed to consider the essence of the
Ombudsman’s constitutionally and statutorily conferred powers establishing its clear legal
interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 21, 2005 Decision and the May 2,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737 are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15,
1999 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486, are
hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of SUSPENSION to be
imposed upon Prudencio C. Quimbo be for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY without pay.