1) The controversy between Newton and Leibniz was one of the most important events in the history of modern thought. They disagreed on issues relating to physics, metaphysics, God, and space and time.
2) More significantly, the dispute represented a clash between two opposing philosophical methods - Newton defended an empirical, inductive approach while Leibniz advocated for a deductive ideal.
3) Behind their disagreements on particular issues, the debate reflected a deeper divergence between their philosophical visions for the future of scientific and philosophical thought.
1) The controversy between Newton and Leibniz was one of the most important events in the history of modern thought. They disagreed on issues relating to physics, metaphysics, God, and space and time.
2) More significantly, the dispute represented a clash between two opposing philosophical methods - Newton defended an empirical, inductive approach while Leibniz advocated for a deductive ideal.
3) Behind their disagreements on particular issues, the debate reflected a deeper divergence between their philosophical visions for the future of scientific and philosophical thought.
1) The controversy between Newton and Leibniz was one of the most important events in the history of modern thought. They disagreed on issues relating to physics, metaphysics, God, and space and time.
2) More significantly, the dispute represented a clash between two opposing philosophical methods - Newton defended an empirical, inductive approach while Leibniz advocated for a deductive ideal.
3) Behind their disagreements on particular issues, the debate reflected a deeper divergence between their philosophical visions for the future of scientific and philosophical thought.
HE controversybetweenNewton and Leibniz is one of the
most important phenomenain the historyof modernthought. If we follow this controversystep by step,if we studythe cor- respondencebetweenLeibniz and Clarke,who acted as spokesman for Newton,we are immediatelyaware that much more was at stake than the particular physical and metaphysicalquestions which are explicitlytreatedby the two adversaries.Newton and Leibniz disagreednot merelyas to the solutionof thesequestions. They not only had different views on the nature and properties of God, on the structureof the materialuniverse,the conceptsof space and time,and the possibilityof an "action at a distance". However importantall these questions may be, they have here only a mediate and subordinatesignificance.They are over- shadowed by anotherproblemwhichwas of vital interestfor the futuredevelopmentof scientific and philosophicthought.Modern thoughthad reacheda partingof the ways whereit had to choose between two alternatives.In the dispute between Newton and Leibniz thesealternativeswere clearlyindicated.The two oppos- ing theses were representedand defendedby two powerfuland originalthinkerswho stoodwithouta rivalin contemporary science or philosophy.1 This is not, therefore,a mere scholasticdisputa- tion.For behindthe catchwordsof the two schoolsof thoughtwe feeltheclash and trialof strength of two greatintellectualforces. Nor is thissimplya controversy betweenindividualthinkers;it is rathera collisionbetweentwo fundamental philosophicalmethods. And it is thisfeatureof the disputewhichmakes it importantand interesting even for the present-dayreader. Perusal of the various papers which passed betweenLeibniz and Clarke in the years I715 and 17162 does not sufficefor an understanding of the fullmeaningand purportof thispolemic.At firstsuch a perusal is very disappointing.Both sides repeat the 1 The fullauthenticityof the Clarkepapersis provedby the factthatthe outlinesof Clarke's replieshave been foundamongNewton'smanuscripts. 2 In the followingI referto the EnglisheditionpublishedafterLeibniz' death: A Collectionof Papers whichPassed Betweenthe Late Learned Mr. Leibniz and Dr. Clarke in the Years 17-5 and T716. Relatinq to the Principlesof Natural Philosophyand Religion.By Samuel Clarke,Lon- don I717. 366
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 367
same argumentsover and over again until interactionbetween
theirviews seems impossible.For each partyobstinatelyholds its ground refusingto enter into his opponent'sviews. Moreover, fromthe outsetthe controversy was obscuredby personalinvec- tive. Each side accused the otherof undermining the foundations of naturalreligion.The more the discussionproceededthe more thistone of arguingand reasoningtendedto prevail.Yet thiswas natural and unavoidable. For Samuel Clarke, who pleaded for Newton,was neithera scientistnor a philosopher.He was one of the best known theologicalcontroversialists of his time. In his book A Demonstrationof theBeing and Attributesof God he had undertakento demonstratethe existenceof God and all the other fundamentaltruthsof the Christianreligionby merelylogical argumentsand to answerall theobjectionsof the "free thinkers", the sceptics,the deists,and atheists.3This book became so famous thatVoltaire could not forbearpayinghis respectsto its author. In his Lettres sur les Anglais Voltaire spoke of Clarke as "a veritable reasoning machine" (une vraie machine 'a raisonne- ments) .4 And therewere stillotherfactorstendingto obscurethe pointat issue. The old disputebetweenNewtonand Leibniz about the priorityof the inventionof the infinitesimal calculus was not forgotten.Personal ambitionsand jealousies, even nationalpreju- dices, began to awake again. For us this side of the questionhas lost its interest.After the most careful historicalinvestigations thispointseemsnow to be entirelyclearedUp.5 We knowthatboth Leibniz and Newton,on the basis of independentconsiderations, had come to the same results; we know that each method,the methodof fluxionsand that of the differential and integralcal- culus, has its peculiarcharacterand its peculiarmerit."From the pointof view of the historyof ideas"-it has been rightlysaid- "there exists no controversyin the annals of science more de- 3The full titleof the book is: A Demonstrationof theBeing and Attri- butesof God, the Obligationsof NaturalReligionand the Truthand Cer- taintyof the ChristianRevelation,More Particularlyin Answer to Mr. Hobbs,Spinozaand theirFollowers.London1705/I706. 4Voltaire, Lettres sur les Anglais,VII, in Oeuvres, Paris i82i, chez Lequien,XXVI 33 ff. 6 For thehistoryof thiscontroversyI referto MoritzCantor,Vorlesungen uiberdie Geschichteder MathematikIII (Leipzig i898) 274-3i6; and to David Brewster,Memoirs of the Life, Writings,and Discoveriesof Sir Isaac Newton,Edinburgh,I855,vol. II, chap.xv, pp. 36-83.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 368 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
plorableand less fertilethanthisdiscussionof the priorityof the
inventionof the infinitesimal calculus. It is remarkablethat this famous dispute which originatedunder quite accidentalcircum- stancesdid notaffector modifyin any respecttheideas of thetwo adversaries or the philosophicaltendenciesof their pupils. It would be difficult to show thata singlestep of progresswas made by this controversy over the new conceptionsof the infiniteand the infinitelysmall. As a resultof this conflictthe English school and the Germanschoolof thoughtdeprivedthemselvesfor a long time of all the advantageswhich they mighthave derived from unitedefforts. The quarrelbetweenNewtonand Leibniz, founded upon mere personal rivalries,left the two philosophicalmethods stationary.The detailed study of this quarrel supplies us in the main with interestingobservationsconcerningthe psychologyof Leibniz, of Newton,and of othereminentscholarsof theirtime. But it givesus verylittleinformation aboutthedistinctivefeatures of the Leibnizian and Newtoniansystems."" In orderto discoverthesedistinctivefeatureswe must,indeed, trya different approach.We mustendeavorto traceback the dis- pute betweenLeibniz and Newton to its real source,and to look behindthescenesof the greatintellectualspectaclepresentedhere. In thiscase we shall findthatthe ideas propoundedand defended by these two adversarieshave by no means lost theirvalue and interest.These ideas are still alive, and, to a certainextent,they are stillin the focusof modernphilosophicaland scientific thought -even thoughwe may, indeed we must,express themin a dif- ferentmanner.There was no real dissensionbetweenLeibniz and Newtonabout the fundamental problem:thevalidityand necessity of a mathematicalscience of nature. We may call Newton a "physicist",and Leibniz a "metaphysician";but Leibniz himself would neverhave subscribedto such a distinction betweenmathe- maticaland metaphysicalthought,forhe admittedno chasm here. Whenever he mentionedhis metaphysicshe described it as a "metaphysicof mathematics"."Ma Metaphysique",he wrotein a letter,"est toutemathematique".7
e Leon Bloch,La Philosophiede Newton (Paris i908) II5 f.
7Leibniz, Letter to de L'Hospital, December27, i694. See Leibnizens mathematische Halle I849 ff.) II 258. Schriften(ed. C. I. Gerhardt,
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 369
It would be a morecorrectstatementof our problemto say that
Leibniz defendsa "deductive"ideal of scientificthoughtwhereas Newtonspeaks as the championof an empirical,a merely"induc- tive" method.But even this distinctionwould be misleadingin many respects. "Induction" and "deduction" are rather vague terms.They have beenused in variousand widelydivergentsenses. If we understandthe ideal of inductionin the sense of Bacon's Novum Organum,or of some more recentlogicians,as, for in- stance,John Stuart Mill, then we must say that Newton never recommendedor defended a strictly"inductive" method. The methodintroducedby Newtonwas of a quite different type.What in Bacon's aphorismshad onlybeen dreamedof seemedsuddenly to have become a reality.Newton's firstpupils reveredhim not merelyas one of the greatestscientistsof all time.They saw in him the veryincarnationof the philosophicspiritbecause he was the firstto understandwhat a philosophyof nature reallyis and means. JohnFriend, an Oxford professorof Chemistry, who in his PraelectionesChymicaewas one of the firstto try to apply the Newtonian principlesof mechanics to chemical problems, spoke of Newton as the "prince of mathematiciansand philo- sophers"."By his excellentgenius",he said, "he has taughtus a sure way for the improvement of physicsand has fixednatural knowledgeon such weightyreasons that he has done more to illustrateand to explain it than all philosophersof all nations." Friend declared that Newton's conclusionsin philosophyare as demonstrativeas his discoveries are surprising.9"It has been ignorantly objectedby some",wroteanotherof Newton'sdisciples, "that the Newtonian philosophy,like all others before it, will grow old and out of date and be succeededby a new system.... But thisobjectionis veryfoolishlymade. For nevera philosopher before Newton ever took the methodhe did. For whilst their systemsare nothingbut hypotheses,conceits,fictions,conjectures and romancesinventedat pleasureand withoutany foundationin
8John Friend, in his remarksupon an account of his Praelectiones
Chymicae,givenin the Acta Eruditorum, i7ii.-See PhilosophicalTransac- tions,abridgedand disposedunderGeneralHeads, V 429 sq. 'See the English editionof his PraelectionesChymicae.Chymicallec- tures: in which almost all the operationsof Chymistry are reduced to theirtrueprinciplesand the laws of nature,London I7i2, Appendix,174.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 370 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
thenatureof things,he, on the contrary,and by himselfalone, set
out upon a quite differentfooting. . . . The foundation is now firmlylaid: the Newtonianmethodmay indeed be improved,and furtheradvanced,but it can neverbe overthrown."'10 But what was the true characterof this method? By which fundamentalfeatureis it to be distinguishedfromthatotherideal of "induction"whichis represented in Bacon's methodof "positive and negativeinstances"?To answer this questionhistoricallywe may say that Newton in his Principia carriedon and broughtto completiontheworkof Galileo,not theworkof Bacon. There is a fundamentaldifference betweenGalileo's and Bacon's conception of a true inductivemethod." Even Bacon was strivingfor a "rational"methodof science.He was an empiricistbut no sensa- tionalist.He has describedhis aim in a shortand characteristic formulaby sayingthathis Novum Organumwas composedwith the intentionof puttingan end to all those unfortunateconflicts and dissensionswhichhithertohad disturbedthe human family; and to establish,for all time,a firmand legitimatematrimony between the empiricaland the rational facultiesof the human mind.'2 But the Baconian ideal was an ideal of extensionand amplification,whereasthe ideal of Galileo and Newton is one of intensionand simplification. Bacon hoped to attain his end, he hoped to promoteand secure the "advancementof learning",by steadilyand incessantlyincreasingthe bulk of our empiricalevi- dence. If we collectand compareall the available data we shall be in a positionto disclose and isolate the "pure forms"of things. Newton imposeda different task upon science.As a physicisthe was not investigatingthese substantialforms-the formof heat or the "essence" of gravity.He wished to reduce the phenomena of nature to general laws and to derive these laws frommathe- matical principles.'3For this purpose the accumulativeand com- parativeprocess of the Baconian inductionhad to be turnedinto an analyticalprocess.Withoutthelatterall our empiricalevidence would remainsterile;it could notbear its fruit.In all thedifferent 'William Emerson, The Principlesof Mecianics (London I773) v ff. "Concerning this question I refer to my remarks in a recent article on Galileo, published in The AmericanScholar (January i143) XII 5-I9. 12 See Bacon, Novum Orclanum,Praefatio.-Works, ed. by Ellis, Spedding,
and Heath, London i857 ff.,I, I3I.
13 Cf. Opticks,Book III, part i; Principia,Preface to the firstedition.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 37I
fieldsof physicalinquiryNewton always insistedupon this char-
acter of his "analyticalinduction"."As in Mathematics,so in Natural Philosophy",he said in his Opticks,"the investigation of difficult thingsby the Methodof Analysis,ought ever to precede the Method of Composition.... In the two firstbooks of these Opticks,I proceededby this analysis to discover and prove the originaldifferences of theraysof lightin respectof refrangibility, reflexibility and colours.... And these discoveriesbeingproved, theymay be assumedin themethodof compositionfor explaining the phenomenaarisingfromthem."'14 Newton did not arrive at his principaltheoriesby simplycol- lectingnew facts. Most of the empiricalevidencehe needed for constructing his optical theoriesor his theoryof gravitationwas containedin the work of formerscientistsor contemporaries-in theworkof Galileo and Kepler,of Snelliusand Fermat,of Chris- tian Huyghens,and of Halley-orHooke. Newton's real meritlay in unitingand concentrating the differentand dispersedachieve- ments of these men. The most importantand the most charac- teristicfeatureof his workwas not so muchthediscoveryof new facts as the new interpretation of data already available. The generallaw of gravityhad been discussedlong beforethe publica- tion of Newton's Principia. All the great physicistsand astro- nomersparticipatedin thisdiscussion.They saw the problemand examined the methodsof its solution. Even Newton's formula was not an entirelynew discovery.ChristopherWren, Hooke, and Halley, had developedtheirtheoriesof attractionin which, on the basis of independentconsiderations,theywere led to the conclusionthat the centripetalforce decreased in proportionto the squares of the distancesreciprocally.Newtondid not denyor underratethe meritsof his predecessors.When he publishedhis Principia he added a special scholiumin which these meritsare franklyacknowledged;he declaredthatWren,Hooke, and Halley, had independently deduced the law of gravityfromthe second law of Kepler.'5 Since the time of Kepler the hypothesisof general attraction betweenall the celestialbodies had, indeed,been underconsidera- "4Newton, Opticks,Book III, part i; reprintedfromthe fourthedition (London I730), New York I93I, p. 404 ff. 15 See Principia,Liber I, PropositioIV, Corollarium6, Scholium.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 372 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
tionby all thephysicistsand astronomers. Kepler had assertedthat
not onlydoes theearthattractthestone, but thestonealso attracts the earth. And this conceptionplays an importantpart in his reformof the Aristoteliancosmology.Twelve years before the appearance of Newton's Principia Hooke had submitteda paper to theRoyal Societyin whichhe investigatedthe natureand mag- nitudeof thisattractiveforce.He declares that the action of the attractiveforcesof the celestialbodies increasesin proportionto the proximityto theircentersof the body on whichthese forces act. "Now what these several degreesare", continuedHooke, "I have not yet experimentally verified,but it is a notionwhich,if fullyprosecuted,as it ought to be, will mightilyassist the as- tronomersto reduce all the celestial motionsto a certain rule, whichI doubtwill neverbe done withoutit. He thatunderstands the natureof the circularpendulum,and of circularmotion,will easilyunderstandthewholeof thisprinciple,and will knowwhere to finddirectionsin natureforthetruestatingthereof.This I only hintat presentto such as have abilityand opportunity of prosecut- ing thisinquiry,and are notwantingof industryforobservingand calculating,wishingheartilysuch may be found,having myself manyotherthingsin hand whichI would firstcomplete,and there- forecannotso well attendit. But this I durstpromisethe under- taker that he will findall the great motionsof the world to be influencedby thisprinciple,and thatthetrueunderstanding there- of will be the trueperfectionof astronomy."' We may inferfromthesewords thatNewton's discoverycould not come as a surpriseto the astronomersand physicistsof his own time.This eventwas carefullypreparedfor,both in its ex- perimentaland in its theoreticalaspect. But the reallynovel, and subsequentlydecisive, elementconsistedin Newton's systematic proof of his theory.In this regardhe was entirelyoriginal.We have indeed very interesting biographicalproof thatNewton saw his problemin this light.While preparingthe firsteditionof his Principia in I786 he had a letterfromHalley in which he was toldthatHooke had some pretensionswithregardto the firstdis- coveryof the law of gravity.Newton,when he heard of Hooke's IG Hooke, "An Attemptto Prove the Motionof theEarth",Philosophical MemoirsI 286 f. No. ioi, p. I2.-See Brewster, Transactions,
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 373
claims,becameso frightened at theprospectof becominginvolved
in a publiccontroversy on a questionof prioritythathe wishedto suppress his third book rather than undergo such an ordeal. "Philosophy",he wroteto Halley, "is such an impertinently liti- gious Lady, that a man had as good be engaged in lawsuits,as have to do with her. I found it so formerly,and now I am no sooner come near her again, but she gives me warning."'7 The fact thatthereever was a momentin Newton's life in which he seriouslyresolvedto suppressone of the mostimportantparts of his classical work, is one of the greatestparadoxes in Newton's biographyand in the whole historyof science. Many modern writershave been at a completeloss to understandthis factwhich seemedto be a blot on his personaland scientific character."One cannotexcuse Newton",says one of his most recentbiographers, "for his decision to suppress the third book.... What manner of a man was Newton who could thus contemptuously cast offhis own intellectual child?There is certainlyno parallelto the incident in all history.Did any otherman ever show a deeperjealousy and vanitythan Newton,who could let the personal criticismof an- other,and a slightreflexionon his own character,outweighthe workof his life and the fruitof his genius?"18 I think,however,that we can exculpate Newton from this charge. It is true that duringhis whole life he feared nothing more than involvementin public disputesabout his work. But to ascribe this fact to a sort of moral weakness,let alone to mere vanityor jealousy,seemsto me a verypoor psychologicalexplana- tion.Vanityand jealousy would have had theoppositeeffect;they would ratherhave incitedhim to such disputationthan deterred him fromit. There was more than the mere personal factorin Newton's desire for peace. This desire originatedin his respect forhis workand forthegreatnessof his scientific task.If Newton was ever able to bringhimselfto suppressthe thirdbook of the Principia,he must have been convincedthat this omissioncould 17 Newtonto Halley,June20, i686.-The correspondence betweenNewton and Halleywas firstpublishedin theAppendixto Rigaud'sHistoricalEssay on theFirst Publicationof the"Principia",Oxford I838. It has sincebeen reprintedin Brewster'sMemoirs,I, AppendixNo. viii,437-456. '8Louis TrenchardMore, Isaac Newton,a Biography,New York and London I934, 3II.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 374 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
not affectthe fundamental value of his work.He thoughtthatthe
firsttwo books had an independentmeaningand merit.And on this point,I suppose,he was quite right.The traditionalview is to connectNewton'sname with Newton'slaw. We usuallydo not differentiate betweenthe two: we see in the law of gravityhis principalmeritand his real claim for immortality.From theview- pointof the generalhistoryof ideas, however,we oughtto revise this judgment.Paradoxical as it may sound, it mustbe conceded thatevenwithoutthelaw of gravitythePrincipiawould stillstand as one of thegreatestachievementsof modernscience.For in this work Newtonbequeathedto posteritynot merelya universallaw of nature,but also a universalinstrument of scientific thoughtand of scientificresearch.No one beforehim had the same clear con- ceptionof what a "theoreticalphysics" is and means. Newton's empiricaldiscoverieswere the ripe fruitsof this originalconcep- tion. In his ideal of a "scientificinduction"the empiricaland theoreticalelementsare welded into an indissolubleunity. Leibniz's natural philosophyexhibits throughouta different orientation.Whereas Newtonstartedout withthestudyof certain natural phenomena-withan investigationof optical phenomena and with a theoryof the motionof the moon, Leibniz, on the otherhand,began witha logicalanalysisof truth."As a man who wishes to constructa buildingupon sandyground",he writesin a fragment,"must continueto dig withhis spade untilhe comes to a solid and stonybasis, as a man who wishes to untiean intricate knot must findsome startingpoint,and as Archimedesrequired an immovablepointin orderto be able to lifttheuniverse;-so we are in need of a fixedpointas a foundationupon which we may establish the elementsof human knowledge.And this starting point is the analysis of the different kinds of truth."'9Leibniz fullyacknowledgesthe value of empiricaltruth.But to his mind empiricaltruthis only a small part,a fragment,a single sector, of theuniverseof truth.Behindindividualstatements of empirical fact, it is the task of the philosopherto discover the necessary forms of thought.In physics we find factual truth; in logic, arithmetic, geometry,we have necessaryor eternaltruth.But the 19 See Leibniz,Opusculeset fragments inedits,ed. Louis Couturat,Paris I1903, 401.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 375
factualtruthof physicsdoes not forman independent realmwhich,
in its fundamental character, is opposed to the truthof logic and mathematics.Both realms have, so to speak, theirown rational, constitutionallaws. "The great foundationof mathematics",says Leibniz in the second paper addressedto Clarke,"is the principle of contradiction or identity,that is, that a propositioncannotbe trueand false at the same time; and thatthereforeit is what it is, and cannot be what it is not. This one principleis sufficient to demonstrateevery part of arithmetic and geometry, that is, all mathematical principles.But in orderto proceedfrommathematics to natural philosophy, another principle is requisite . . . the prin- ciple of a sufficientreason, viz., that nothinghappens withouta reason why it should be so ratherthan otherwise.And therefore Archimedes,when proceedingfrommathematicsto naturalphilo- sophy,in his book De aequilibrio,was obliged to employa par- ticular case of the great principleof a sufficient reason."20It is this principlethatmakes physicspossible,because it allows us to make thegreatstep frommathematics to nature,to throwa bridge across thegap which,at firstsight,seemsto separatefactualtruth (veritesde fait) fromnecessarytruth(veriteseternelles). This is not,however,a solutionof the problem; it is only the statementof the problem.What does Leibniz mean by his "prin- reason"? We cannotgrasp his meaningso long ciple of sufficient as we take his termsand his argumentsat their face value. For his own descriptionof his principle,as containedin his repliesto Clarke, is rathervague. "The principlein question",he says, "is the principleof the want of a sufficient reason, in order to any thing'sexisting,in orderto any event'shappening,in orderto any truth'stakingplace. Is thisa principlethatneeds to be proved?"'21 Such argumentation seems scarcelyworthyof so great a logician as Leibniz. It was open to all the attackswhich Hume later di- rectedagainst the objectivevalidityof the principleof sufficient reason. To discoverthe true and deeper sense of Leibniz's prin- ciplewe mustconsultthewholeof his logicalwork.Leibniz always insists that his principle is pregnantwith the most important consequences.From it he expectsa real revolutionin philosophic ' Leibnizto Clarke,Second Paper, sect. i, p. 2I. 2 Ibid.,FifthPaper, sect. I25, p. 275.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 376 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
and scientificthinking.If understoodin its fullestsense thisprin-
ciple will alter the whole realm of metaphysics.It will make metaphysicsoperativeand demonstrative whereas before it gen- erally consistedonly of emptywords.22"It must be confessed", statesLeibniz, "thatthoughthis greatprinciplehas been acknow- ledged,yet it has not been sufficiently made use of. Which is, in greatmeasure,thereasonwhythePrima Philosophiahas notbeen hithertoso fruitfuland demonstrative, as it should have been."23 Whereinconsiststhe"greatness",the novelty,the revolutionary power that Leibniz ascribes to the principleof sufficient reason? Leibniz began witha descriptionand classification of the various typesof truth.He insistedthat logical and mathematicaltruthis "necessary",whereasempiricaltruthis "contingent".But he was not contentwith this discrimination.According to Leibniz this distinctionbetweenfactualand necessarytruth,betweenthe"verites de fait" and the "veriteseternelles",has only a relative,not an absolute value. It is true that the two kinds do not belongto the same class. They cannot be reduced to a commondenominator. But that does not mean that theyare opposed to one anotheror are mutuallyexclusive.However different theymay be, yet they are interrelated. by a Leibniz liked to illustratethis interrelation mathematicalexample.We may say that"factual" truthis incom- mensurablewith logical and demonstrative truth.There appears to be no commonmeasure.But it is preciselythis conceptof in- commensurability which can lead us to the rightsolution.If in geometrywe speak of incommensurablelengthswe mean that theselengthscannotbe expressedby our ordinary"rational"num- bers. They correspondto "surd" or "irrational"numbers.But these irrationalquantitiesare by no means indeterminatequan- tities.If we cannotexpress themby an ordinaryfractionalnum- ber, we can findan infiniteseries of rationalnumbersby which this value is fully determined.The fartherwe proceed in this infiniteseries of rationalnumbers,the more nearlywe shall ap- proximatethe "true" value of the surd quantity.It is the same with empirical and rational truth.24Of course Leibniz admits 22Ibid.,FourthPaper, sect.5, p. 95. ' Ibid.,FifthPaper, sect.2I, p. I73. 2Leibniz stresses this analogy in many passages. See especially"De libertate",Nouvelleslettreset Opusculesineditsde Leibniz,par Foucherde
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 377
thatthereare wide areas of humanknowledgein which we have
to be contentwith mere factual truth.All we can do here is to collect the empiricalevidence withoutbeing able to deduce the factsfromhigherreasonsor principles.But thisis onlya firstand preliminarystep. The philosopherand the scientistwill never be satisfiedwiththisstateof affairs.They will continuetheiranalyses untiltheycome nearerand nearerto theirultimategoal-the goal not merelyof collecting,butalso of understanding, thephenomena of nature.Rational or necessarytruthmust be conceivedas the ideal, the "limit"of empiricaltruth.This ideal is not immediately given, but the search for it is the essentialtask of science and philosophy.Rational truthis the eternalthemeof scientificand philosophicalinvestigation.In this sense Leibniz often calls his principlenot only the "principleof sufficient reason", but the "principiumreddendaerationis".25We do not know the reasons behindall things,but we mustneverdespairof findingand prov- ing these reasons. The progressof knowledgeis unlimited;nor does knowledgeadmitof any fixedboundaries.The maxim "plus ultra" was a favoriteof Leibniz's.26What the "principleof suffi- cientreason",or stillbetter,the "principiumreddendaerationis", really means and emphasizesis that in the last analysis all em- pirical truthis describablein termsof rationaltruthand reducible to the typeof rationaltruth.27 Behind everyscientificachievement we are sure to finda new scientificproblem.But this infinity is in a no sense opposed to genuinerationality.On the contrary,it is the very expressionof such a rationality.It means thatthe indi- vidual stepstakenin the advancementof our empiricalknowledge forma convergent, not a divergent,series. By virtueof this con- vergence,whichis ascertainedby theprincipleof sufficient reason, we can be sure that there is a constantapproximationtowards truth,thatour empiricalknowledgeof particularfactswill,more and more,be reduced to a knowledgeof general rules and uni- versal principles.
Careil (Paris I857) i83; in PhilosophischeSchriften (ed. Gerhardt)VII
200. 25 Cf. "Specimen inventorum de admirandisnaturae Generalisarcanis", PhilosophischeSchriftenVII 309 Gerhardt. 26 Cf. "GuilelmiPacidii Plus Ultra, sive initia et speciminascientiae
generalis",ibid. VII 49-51.
2 Cf. Leibniz,Lettre'a Arnauld,JulyI4, i686, ibid. I 382.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 378 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
By way of this conceptionof empiricaland rationaltruthLeib-
niz was led to his fundamentalphilosophicalconcept,the concept of a "Scientia generalis". The principal aim of this "General Science" was to transformall mere factual truthinto rational truth.By a completeanalysisof all our thoughtswe shall findthe means to change mere "facts" into "concepts" and "theories". Such a change is indeed a paradox; it would seem to involve a sort of logical transubstantiation.How can we ever hope to re- solve the conditionsof concrete,empiricalthoughtinto those of abstract,rationalthought-to reduce "veritesde fait" to "verites necessaires"? Leibniz was convincedthat he had succeeded in findingthe solutionof this riddle.The task will be solved by the power of symbolicthought.If we analyse all our ideas into their simpleelements,if we expresstheseelementsby adequate symbols, if we studythe rules of the connectionof these symbols,thenwe shall finda clue of Ariadnewhichmay serveus as a reliableguide in the labyrinthof human thought.Not only mathematical,but also empirical,thoughtis capable of such a progressivesymboliza- tion and formalization.If we understandLeibniz's principleof sufficientreason in thisway, we can easily accountfor the role it plays in the general structureof his philosophy.Leibniz's dis- coveryof the infinitesimal calculus was but one step in this di- rection.The plan of his "Scientia generalis", founded upon a "Characteristicageneralis",had been conceivedlong before. It becamethegreatunifyingforcein his thoughtand in his scientific work. The mindof Leibniz has oftenbeen describedas "encyclo- paedic". But such a descriptionis scarcelyadequate. For in addi- tionto a desireto masterall sortsof knowledge,he endeavoredto understandthe various formsof this knowledge;and to him this meantderivingand deducingthe formsfromuniversalprinciples. His encyclopaedism was of a systematic,not an eclecticor merely cumulative,type. The hopes which Leibniz built upon this plan of a "General Science" may seem extravagantto us. His faithin his logical ideal was unshakable.He was convincedthat nothingin natureor hu- man life could ever resist the power of rational thought.He applied his methodnot only to mathematicalor physical,but also to political,social, and religiousproblems.As a youthof twenty-
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 379
three in i659, he wrote his "Specimen demonstrationum politi-
carum pro eligendo rege Polonorum novo scribendigenere ad claram certitudinem exactum".28This politicalpamphletwas in- deed writtenin a new style.He triedto prove "moregeometrico", by mere "argumentsin form",that,of all the candidatescompet- ing for the Polish throne,Stanislaus Letizinskywas the most entitledand themostpromising.By thesame methodLeibniz tried to convinceLouis XIV that it was much betterto attack Egypt thanto conquerHolland.29Even problemsof Christiandogmatics were treated in similar fashion. In i669 Leibniz published a "Defensio trinitatisper nova repertalogica", in whichhe under- took to defend the Trinitariandogma against the objections of Wissowatius.0 In like mannerhe attemptedto refute,by mere logical arguments,the errors of Socinus and the adherentsof Socinian ism.3l
If we bear in mindthesecharacteristic featuresof Leibniz's and
Newton'sphilosophywe can easily understandtheirdiscussionof particularquestions.They differednot merelyin theirprinciples, but also in philosophicaltemperament, in theirgeneral frameof mind. Leibniz was perhaps the most resolute championof ra- tionalismwho ever appeared in the historyof philosophy.Not even Hegel could outdo him in this respect.For Leibniz there exists no separation,no chasm, between"reason" and "reality". There is nothingin heaven or on earth,no mysteryin religion, no secretin nature,whichcan defythe power and effortsof rea- son. "Le reel",he wrotein a letter,"ne laisse pas de se gouverner parfaitementpar l'ideal et l'abstrait; c'est parceque tout se gou- verne par raison et qu'autrementil n'y auroitpoint de scienceny regle ce qui ne seroitpas conformeavec la naturedu souverain principe."32 Newton's conceptionof the task of science was very different. He too felt the pride of a great scientificgenius,but this pride ' Leibniz, Opera omnia,ed. Lodov. Dutens,Genevae I768, Tom. IV, 3, 522-630. 29"Specimen demonstrationis politicae",in Leibniz' historisch-politische und staatswissenschaftliche Schriften(ed. Onno Klopp,Hannoveri864 ff.) II Io~oif. 30 Opera omnia (ed. Dutens) I io ff. ' Ibid., "Remarques . . . sur le livre d'un AntitrinitaireAnglais", I 24 ff. 2Leibniz,Letterto Varignon,Feb. 2, I702, in Mathematische Schriften (ed. Gerhardt,Berlin-Halle,i849 ff.) IV 93 f.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 380 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
was combinedwith a great modesty.He never would have ac-
cepted the praise contained in Alexander Pope's well known verses: Nature and Nature's law lay hid in night, God said, "Let Newton be", and -all was light. To Newtonnaturewas accessibleto,but notpenetrableby,human reason.Wheneverhe mentionedhis own discoveriesit was always in a humbleway. "I do not know", he once said, "what I may appear to theworld; but to myselfI seem to have been onlylike a boy playingon the sea-shore,and divertingmyselfin now and then findinga smootherpebble or a prettiershell than ordinary, whilstthe great ocean of truthlay all undiscoveredbeforeme."33 Science may lead us very far,but it cannothope to probe intothe real depthof the "ocean of truth".This depthremainsimmeasur- able and unfathomable to humanthought. We are now in a positionbetterto understandthe different role which mathematicsplays in the systemsof these two men. As regardstheobjectivevalue of mathematics and its indispensability fornaturalphilosophy, thereis nottheslightestdifferencebetween Leibniz and Newton. They both followthe maxim laid down by Galileo; they are convinced that without mathematicsnature would remaina sealed book. Moreover,Newtonand Leibniz made the same progress in the general developmentof mathematical thought.They createda new typeof mathematics:themathematics of variable quantities.It is, however,a veryremarkablefactthat even here Newton and Leibniz, thoughpursuingthe same end, did not go the same way. As we have indicated,Leibniz's in- finitesimalcalculus was merelya special applicationof his general logicalmethod.It is the creationof a new symbolismwhichis the most importantpoint in Leibniz's theory.This symbolism,in its clarityand simplicity, proved to be superiorto Newton'smethod of fluxions,and, after a short struggle,its victorywas decided. But it is not the technicalside of the problemwithwhichwe are concernedhere. What is more importantis the generalmethodo- logical aspect of the question.In order to express the difference betweenLeibniz's differential and integralcalculus and Newton's " See Brewster, MemoirsII 407.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 381
methodof fluxionswe may say thatNewton,as a physicist,began
witha studyof facts,whereasLeibniz,as a logician,began witha study of forms. Of all the facts of nature motionis the most generalone. Accordingto Newton'smechanicsthereis no natural phenomenonwhichis not reducibleto motionand its generallaws. Hence followsthatwe shall never finda true correspondence be- tween thoughtand reality,betweenmathematicsand physics,so long as we exclude the conceptof motionfromthe realmof pure mathematics.It was, however,preciselythisexclusionwhichcon- stitutedone of the fundamentaland most characteristicfeatures of classical mathematics.Classical mathematicshad its originin Platonic thought.All the great Greek mathematicians,from Eudoxus and Theaetetusdown to Euclid, were, directlyor indi- rectly,pupilsof Plato. But froma Platonicpointof view it would have been a contradiction in termsto admita conceptlike motion as a basic principleof geometry.Geometryhad been definedby Plato as the realm of the a&eo'. The knowledgeat which it aims is knowledgeof theeternal,and not of thatwhichis perishingand transient. To introduceinto pure mathematicsthe categoryof changewouldbe to undermineits truthand certainty. But thiswas preciselythe step taken by Newton. He was not exclusivelyor primarilyinterestedin the solutionof abstractmathematicalpro- blems.From the outsetof his scientific workhe had combinedthe studyof algebra or geometry-thestudyof infiniteseries,of the methodsof drawingtangents,of the quadratureof curvedlines- with a study of natural phenomena,of optical and mechanical questions. Constantlyand quite naturallyhe passed from one field to the other. To such a mind there could be no gap, no Platonic"severance",betweenthe ideal worldof mathematicsand the empiricalworld of physics.In orderto findthe "mathematical principlesof naturalphilosophy"Newton had to alter the tradi- tional conceptionof mathematicsitself. If mathematicswas to fulfillits principaltask, if it was destinedto give us a theoryof nature, it could not overlook or minimize nature's principal phenomenon.Motion could no longer be regarded as a mere physical fact; it became a basic concept,a categoryof mathe- matics. Such was the problem solved by Newton's theory of ' Plato, RepublicVII 527a.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 382 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
mittedto geometryand algebra. The increase and decrease of abstractquantitieswas describedin termsof mechanics-as an increaseor decrease in velocities.In orderto determinethe ratios of the incrementsof indeterminate quantitiesNewton described theseincrements by theterm"moments";and to thevelocitieswith whichthe quantitiesincreasehe gave the names "motions","velo- citiesof increase",and "fluxions".He consideredquantitiesnot as composed of indivisibles,but as generatedby motion.36"Quan- titatesmathematicas",he writes,"non ut ex partibusquam mini- mis constantessed ut motu continuodescriptashic considero."7 This was not in itself an entirelynew conception.We findthe same view of a "generation"of curved lines or solids by con- tinuous motionsin Descartes' geometryor in Kepler's "Stereo- metriadoliorum".But in these cases the term"motion" is used in a mere metaphoricalsense. It had not yet been naturalizedin the realm of mathematics.To legitimatizethis conceptof motion was one of theprincipalaims of Newton'stheoryof fluxions.For thispurposehe had to changethe wholehierarchyof the sciences. In his systemmechanicsis no longer subordinatedto geometry; it becomesthe verybasis of geometry."It is the gloryof geome- try",says Newtonin thePreface to thePrincipia,"thatfromfew principlesbroughtfromwithout,it is able to produce so many things.Thereforegeometryis foundedin mechanicalpractice,and is nothingbut thatpart of universalmechanicswhich accurately proposes and demonstratesthe art of measuring."38In Leibniz we find the classical hierarchicorder of scientificknowledge. Geometryand arithmetic are subordinatedto logic: all theirtruths can be derived fromthe mere principleof contradiction.In me- chanics and physicsit is necessaryto introducea new principle, "For the historyof the theoryof fluxionsand for all technicaldetails I must referthe reader to the monographson the subject. See, for in- stance,Ferdinand Rosenberger,Isaac Newton und seine physikalischen Prinzipien,Leipzig i895; and Leon Bloch, La philosophicde Newton, Paris i908. 88For furtherdetailssee Brewster,MemoirsII ii ff. ST "De quadratura curvarum",Introductio;in Isaac Newtoni Opuscula mathematicaphilosophicalet philologia (ed. JohannCastillioneus,Lau- sanneand Geneva I744) I 203. a Principia,Prefaceto first by AndrewMotte edition,Englishtranslation in I729; reprintedin the editionof the Universityof CaliforniaPress, Berkeley,California,1934.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 383
the principleof sufficient
reason. But even mechanicsis simplyan "applied" arithmeticsand geometry-a studyof geometricaland arithmeticalrelationsin concrete.By virtue of Newton's new orientationof mathematicalthought,by the introductionof the conceptof velocityinto "pure" mathematics,all this was com- pletelychanged.If we considerabstractquantitiesas generatedby continuousmotions,this is not a mere figureof speech. It ex- presses a real fact,"Hae geneses", declared Newton in his work on the quadratureof curved lines, "in rerumnatura locum vere habentet in motucorporumquotidiecernuntur."39 In otherwords, such generationsof quantitiesas are supposedin the new calculus are not figmentsof the human mind,nor are theymere mathe- matical conventions.They have a "fundamentumin re"-a sup- portand basis in the natureof things.We do not merelyconceive or imagine,we see and experience,thesegenerations. Leibniz's approach to the infinitesimalcalculus was quite dif- ferent.He saw the problemfromtheviewpointof logic,not from thatof thephysicist.As a mathematician Leibniz always remained faithfulto the great classical tradition.He spoke as a resolute Platonist.To him mathematics was a branchof logic. But it was logic itselfwhichin the philosophyof Leibniz had assumeda new shape. He by no means despisedthe methodsof traditionallogic, of Aristotleand the Schoolmen.He defendedtheirrightagainst the attacksof the moderns.In his Nouveaux Essais sur l'entende- menthumainhe praises the inventionof the various formsof the syllogismas one of the most beautiful,and as one of the most important,achievementsof the human mind. "It is a species of universal Mathematics",he asserted,"whose importanceis not sufficientlyknown; and it may be said that an infallibleart is thereincontained,providedwe know and can use it, whichis not always allowed."40The same view is given in a letterof Leibniz to Gabriel Wagner (i696), which was writtenfor the express purpose of defendingthe Aristotelianlogic against its modern criticsand detractors.41On the otherhand the syllogisticscience
"Newton, "De Quadraturacurvarum",Introductio,Opuscula,ed. Cas-
tillioni,I 204 f. 40 Nouveaux Essais, Livre IV, chap. 17, sect. 4.-Eng. translationby A. G. Langley,seconded., Chicagoand London,i9i6, p. 559. Schriften,ed. Gerhardt,VII 514 ff. 41 See Philosophische
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 384 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
of Aristotledid not representfor Leibniz the whole extentof
logic,but only a small portion.In his "Characteristicageneralis" he had foundand studiedtypesof arguingand reasoningentirely different fromthose containedin the classical logic. "You appear to apologize for common logic", replies Philalethes in the Nouveaux Essais, "but I see clearlythatwhat you bringforward belongs to a more sublime logic, to which the commonis only whatthealphabetis to scholarship."42Leibniz had in view not the destruction,but the perfection,of classical logic. He wished to analyseall thepossibletypesof deductivereasoningand give them adequate symbolicexpression.43 The new calculuswas but a single chapterin this larger work. It was not based on the observation of naturalphenomena;it was derivedfroma mathematicalcon- cept which firstbecameexplicitin the thoughtof Leibniz-in the general conceptof function.Leibniz's analysis broughtthis con- ceptinto focusso thatit becameone of the mostpowerfulinstru- mentsof modernmathematics. In thisregardwe cannotlook upon Leibniz and Newtonas rivals or adversaries.They set themselves different tasks,and theyperformedthesetasksby different means. Newtonattainedhis end by a new orientationof physicalthought; Leibniz attainedhis by a new orientationof logical thought. Looking at the conflictin this lightwe can give bothmen their due. We can freetheircontroversyfromall those accidentaland merelypersonal circumstanceswhich have obscured it fromthe start.Even one of the most intricateproblemsappears now in a new perspective.For a modernreader thereis perhaps no more interesting problemin thiscontroversy thanthatof space and time. On this issue the crisis of seventeenth-centuryphilosophicand scientificthoughtsuddenlydeveloped.For Newtonspace and time were notonlyreal things,but theveryframeworkof reality.They belong not merelyto the materialworld; theyare absolute attri- butesof God. All thisis assertedby Leibniz to be radicallywrong. Time and space are not separateexistences;theypossess no sub- stantialrealityof theirown. They are "forms" or "orders",not things; they are not absolute,but merelyrelative.Here Leibniz 4 NouveauxEssais, Livre IV, chap. 17, sect.7.-Eng. tr.,p. 566. " For all details I referto the excellentaccountin Louis Couturat,La Logique de Leibniz,Paris 1903.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 385
and explicit statement.For him space and time have no inde- pendentphysical or metaphysicalexistence. Space is the order whichrendersbodies capable of beingsituated,and by whichthey have a situationamongthemselves, whentheyexist together;time is thatorderwithrespectto theirsuccessivepositions.44 "In order to have an idea of place, and consequentlyof space, it is sufficient to considerrelationsand the rules of theirchangeswithoutneed- ing to fancyany absoluterealityout of the thingswhose situation we consider."45 I cannotenterintoa systematicdiscussionof theproblemitself. I wish only to elucidate the historicalside of the question. In Leibniz's and Newton's theoriesof space and time we findthe same fundamentaloppositionwhich we were able to observe in all otherfields.This oppositiondoes notoriginatein a meredispute betweenindividualthinkersor in a conflictbetweenphilosophical schools. Newton and Leibniz apply differentstandardsof truth and they employdifferentframes of reference.Newton argues upon a principlethatat firstsightseems to admitof no doubt.If thereis any truth,it mustbe found"in rerumnatura". All truth must be based on facts. Even mathematicaltruth-the so-called "ideal truth"-forms no exceptionto this general rule. Newton had found a new type of mathematics-themathematicsof va- riablequantities.He was convincedthatthisformof mathematics, the doctrineof "fluxions",would not be possible withouta sub- stantialfoundation,a substratumin reality.We cannotstudythe relationsbetween variable quantitieswithoutpresupposingthat uniform and continuousmotion which we call "duration" or "fluxof time".If we take away thissubstratumall physicalthings and all mathematicaltruthlose their foundation.Absolute,true, and mathematicaltime is no mere concept; it is a fundamental realitywhichof itselfand fromitsown natureflowsequablywith- out relationto anythingexternal.46 Leibniz, too, is convincedthat there must be conformity, if not identity,between"truth"and "reality".There is no chasm betweenthe "ideal" and the "real" " Leibniz,Third Paper to Clarke,sect. 4, p. 57; FourthPaper, sect.41, p. 113. 4 Leibniz,FifthPaper, sect.47, p. 199. "See Newton,Principles,Book I, Definition8, Scholium.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 386 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
world; theyare unitedby a "preestablishedharmony".But Leibniz
stressesthe oppositepole. The natureof thingsand the natureof mindagree.Yet veryoften-Leibniz objectsin criticizingLocke- "the considerationof the natureof thingsis nothingelse thanthe knowledgeof the natureof our mind,and of those innateideas whichwe have no need to seek outside."47To Newton's realistic theoryof space and timeLeibniz opposes his own idealistictheory. But the term"idealism" is not sufficientto give us a clear char- acterizationof the difference.As a resultof the wide varietyof senses in whichthistermhas been used in the historyof idealism, it has become vague and misleading.There are almost as many formsof "idealism"as thereare philosophicalschoolsor systems. Leibniz's idealismis an "objective",not a "subjective" idealism; a mathematical,not a psychologicalidealism; a Platonic, not a Berkeleyanidealism. Thus when Leibniz asserted the "ideality" of space and time he never meant to cast any doubt upon the objectivetruthof theseconcepts.He always comparesthisideality withthe idealityof numbers.Numberbeing the very foundation of mathematics,it is logically immuneto attack. But Leibniz objects to the interpretationof the objective truthof space and time containedin Newton's system.For Leibniz space and time are relationsor orders,not absoluteexistencesor entities.Space is the "order of coexistences";time the "order of successions". "These thingsconsistonlyin the truthof relations,and not at all in any absolute reality."48 This truthof relationsis dealt with in Leibniz's logic. For him the theoryof space and timebelongs to logic, not to physics.These conceptsare parts of a greateruni- verse,of theuniverseof logical formsor, as Leibniz calls it,of the intellectss ipse". We may conclude,then,thatthe theoriesof space and timeof Newton and Leibniz, while diametricallyopposed ontologically, have, nevertheless,a point of contact.This becomes clear when we approach the problemfromthe epistemologicalangle. Epis- temologicallythe two theorieshave a common featurebecause theyhave a commonadversary.They bothresistthe thesisupheld by all theschoolsof Englishempiricismand sensationalism.Space A7 ouveauxEssais, I, I, 21 (Englishtranslation by A. G. Langley,p. 74). 4 Leibniz,Fifth Paper, sect.47, p. 205.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 387
and timecannotbe describedand definedin termsof mere sense-
perception.With thisnegativestatementNewton and Leibniz are in completeagreement.But even here theirjudgmentsare based upon different reasons.For Newtonit is clear thatspace and time, as absolute entities,are beyond the reach of immediatesense- experience.For Leibniz, on the otherhand, theyare pure intel- lectual formswhich involve a constructivepower of the human mind. The equal and uniformfluxof time signifiedfor Newton an ultimatesubstantialreality;for Leibniz,however,it amounted to a necessaryassumption,a fundamental hypothesis.If, withour conventionalhistorical classifications mind, we study the in famous scholiumof Newton's Principia, in which he insists on the distinctionbetweenabsolute and relativemotion; we are at firstconfronted witha curiousparadox. Newtonbeginsby sharply distinguishing betweenthe conceptsof "the vulgar" and the true concepts.Commonpeople conceivespace, time,and mo- scientific tion,accordingto no othernotionsthan the relationsthese con- cepts bear to sensibleobjects. But fromsuch a habit of thinking certainerrorsand prejudices arise which have to be eradicated by philosophicthought.Because the parts of absolute space can- not be seen or distinguishedfromone anotherby our senses,we tend to substitutesense measures for absolutemeasures.This is withoutinconveniencefor the purposes of everydaylife, but it will not do for philosophy.Here we wish to know the true natureof things,and to thisend we mustabstractfromour senses and consider the things themselvesas distinguishedfrom our measuresof thingsaccordingto the standardsof the senses alone: "in philosophicisabstrahendum est a sensibus."49Who is speaking here,we are temptedto ask. Is it Newton,the great empiricist, or his adversary,the "intellectualist" and rationalistLeibniz? As a matterof fact both Newton and Leibniz reject the standards of sensationalism.The senses, taken in themselves,cannot yield us thetruth.But here again thetwo thinkerspursue thisprinciple in a twofolddirection.Newton is intentupon determiningthe substantialrealityof space and timeas two infinite, homogeneous things,independentof any sensible object. Leibniz no longer 'See Principia,Book I, Definition8, Scholium.-Englishtranslation by Motte,New Edition,Berkeley,Calif.,I934,p. 8 ff.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 388 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
admits such a reality.Accordingto him,if we wish to findthe
ultimatesource of our ideas of "pure space" and "pure timely, we shall have to inquire into the nature of our intellectrather than into the natureof things.This differenceis veryclearlyex- pressed in a passage of the Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain. "A successionof perceptionsawakes in us the idea of duration,but it does not make it. Our perceptionsneverhave a constantand regularto correspondto that successionsufficiently of time,whichis a continuumuniformand simple,like a straight line. Changingperceptionsfurnishus the occasion for thinking of time, and we measure it by uniform changes. . . So that knowingthe rulesof different motions,we can always referthem to the uniformintelligiblemotions. . .. In this sense time is the measure of motion,i.e., uniformmotionis the measure of non-uniform motion."50 We have here the key to Leibniz's oppo- sitionto all sensationalisttheoriesas well as to his oppositionto Newton's realistictheory. It is usual, and it appears to be natural,to look upon the con- troversybetween Newton and Leibniz as a collision between scientificand metaphysicalthought.But if we accept this inter- pretationwe are faced with a grave difficulty. How can we account for the fact that our moderntheoriesof space and time have adopted the "relativistic"theoryof Leibniz, whereas they have very severelycriticizedthe Newtonianconceptsof absolute space and time? Shall we say that since the time of Newton science has developed froman empiricalstate to a more "meta- physical" state? This would of course be a very strange and dubious way of stating the problem.To regard Newton as a mere "empiricist"would be just as wrong as to regard Leibniz as a mere "metaphysician".In the seventeenth centurywe cannot draw such a line of demarcationbetweenmetaphysicaland mathe- matical,betweentheologicaland physicalthinking.5'What both Newton and Leibniz call "natural philosophy"is still embedded in the greaterwhole of metaphysics.Leibniz could not develop Nouveaux Essais, Livre II, chap. 14, sect. i6: English translationby Langley,p. 156. "' In the case of Malebranchethishas been shown in a veryinteresting and suggestivearticle by Paul Schrecker,"Le Parallelisme theologico- mathematique chez Malebranche",Revue PhilosophiqueLXIII (1938) 87- 124.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 389
his theoryof space and time withoutconstantlyreferringto his
fundamentalmetaphysicalconceptions,to his monadology,his principleof the "identityof indiscernibles",and his systemof "preestablishedharmony".Newton,on the other hand, however reservedin his judgmentabout the "ultimatecauses" of natural phenomena,never could avoid metaphysicalproblems.He had very definiteconceptionsof the nature of the deity,and of the general structureof the spiritualworld and its connectionwith the materialuniverse.52In the "queries" added to his Opticks Newtontreatedall thesequestionsexplicitly.To speak of Newton as if he were a precursorof Comteand his positivisticphilosophy is, indeed,impossible.The whole intellectualatmosphereof New- ton's thoughtand scientificwork is in flagrantcontradictionto the spiritof positivism.53When Newton'sPrincipia firstappeared it was hailed not onlyas the workof a great scientist,but also as the work of a great theologianand of a great religiousthinker. The most influentialtheologicalschools in England were unani- mous in this judgment.In Newton's book they saw the firmest strongholdagainst those systemsof natural philosophywhich threatenedto subvertthe foundationsof naturalreligionand the Christianfaith.54 The modernreader's interestin all this is little more than historical.What he seeks and findsin the documents of the dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton is somethingquite different. not a metaphysical, It is a logical and epistemological, problem.As has been shown,it is the logical structureof space and time which was seen in a new light in the philosophyof Leibniz. Insteadof propoundinga theoryof theabsolute"essence" of space and time, Leibniz began with a critical study of the "meaning" of theseterms.It was thiscriticaltendencyof thought which proved to be pregnantwith far-reachingconsequencesfor both science and philosophy.When Einstein,two centurieslater, 2 For fullerdocumentation I referto the detailedaccountof the meta- physicalbackground of Newton'stheoryof space and timein mybook,Das Erkenntnisproblem, thirdedition,Berlin 1922, II 442-472. " The bestand mostconvincing refutationof a "positivistic" interpretation of Newton'sworkhas been givenby Prof. E. A. Burtt,The Metaphysical Foundationsof ModernPhysicalScience,1924, RevisedEdition,New York I932. See especiallypp. 223 ff. " For this problemI referto the very interesting materialcontainedin the book of Helene Metzger,Attractionuniverselleet religionnaturelle chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton,Paris I938.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 390 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.
developedhis special theoryof relativityhe found it necessary,
firstand foremost,to analyse the "meaning"of time.This seems to me to be the real pointof contactbetweenthe views of Leibniz and those of modernscience. In the eighteenthcenturythe great scientistsstill had implicit faithin Newton's authority.In I748 Euler wrotehis Reflexions sur lespace et le temps,55 in which he tried to prove that with- out the Newtonian concepts of an absolute space the law of inertia and, accordingly,the whole systemof mechanicswould become meaningless.The results of Newton's physics were so closelyinterwovenwith his fundamentalconceptsthat it seemed impossibleto give up or change the latterwithoutendangering the former.Any such attempt-it was felt-was bound to end in completescepticismand anarchy. To many great physicists Leibniz's theories concerningthe relativityof space and time appeared to be subversivethoughts.An entirelynew and fresh intellectualimpulsewas requiredto perceivethatthese subversive thoughtscould be turnedinto constructivethoughts,that a new systemof physicscould be builtupon the ruinsof the Newtonian conceptsof space and time. "Several men had writtensystems of philosophybefore Sir Isaac", declared William Emerson in his commentaryon Newton's Principia (I770), "but, for their ignoranceof nature,none of themcould stand the test. But his principlesbeing built upon the unerringfoundationof observa- tions and experiments,must necessarilystand good till the dis- solution of nature itself."56Even as late as the mid-nineteenth century commentatorsand biographersof Newton were still talkingin a similarvein."To have beenthechosensage summoned to the studyof that earth,these systemsand that universe,-the favouredlawgiverto worlds unnumbered,the high-priestin the temple of boundless space", exclaimed David Brewster in his Memoirs of the Life, Writings,and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton,"was a privilegethat could be grantedbut to one mem- ber of the human family;-and to have executedthe task was an " Histoirede l'AcademieRoyale des Sciences et Belles Lettresa Berlin, Annee I748. William Emerson,"A Short Commenton Sir Isaac Newton'sPrin- cipia", in The MathematicalPrinciplesof Sir I. Newton (New Edition, London i803) III 86.
This content downloaded from 193.142.30.154 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:16:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 39i
achievementwhich in its magnitudecan be measured only by
the infinitein space, and in the durationof its triumphsby the infinitein time. That Sage-that Lawgiver-that High-priest was Newton."57No modern scientistwould subscribe to this judgmentwithoutcriticalreservations.Yet this apparentdetrac- tion takes nothingaway fromthe fundamentalmeritsof New- ton. For it is not the methodof Newton but the dogmaticfaith in his results,and the uncriticaluse made of his principles,which had to be overcome by the furtherdevelopmentof scientific thought.As Einstein said in an articlepublishedat the second centenaryof Newton's death,58theoreticalphysicsoutgrewNew- ton's framework,which for nearly two centurieshad provided fixityand intellectualguidance for science. From the dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton and its pro- longationthroughthe two followingcenturieswe may draw a general conclusion.Conflictswithinthe realm of scientificand philosophicthoughtappear to be unavoidable.But amid these in- cessant combatsit is comforting to see thatthe opposingpowers, insteadof beingmutuallydestructive, are of mutualassistanceto, and steadilycooperate with, one another.If, as in the case of Newtonand Leibniz,thebattleis foughtbetweentwo thinkersof equal intellectualstature,then the struggledoes not end in the defeator victoryof one party; it leads ratherto a new synthesis of scientificand philosophicthought. ERNST CASSIRER YALE UNIVERSITY