PASCUAL V. BALLESTEROS G.R. NO.

186269 FEBRUARY 2012

FACTS:
The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, Laoag City and
covered by TCT No. T-30375[3] of the Laoag City registry.
The subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of their respective shares over the
same: (1) the spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, 330 square meters; (2) Angela Melchor (Angela),
466.5 square meters; and (3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor (Spouses Melchor), 796.5 square
meters. Melchors share upon the death of the spouses Melchor property was inherited by their daughter -
Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros.
Lorenza and her husband Antonio acquire Angela's share by virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Absolute Sale. Margarita, together with her children, sold the the property when she became widow to
Spouses Pascual and Francisco.
Petitioner's claim that there's no co-ownership over the subject property considering the shares of the
registered owners. Hence the respondents have no right to redeem the portion of the subject property that was
sold to them.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co- owners of the subject
property who have the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code;
2. WON that right was seasonably exercised by the respondents within the 30-day redemption period under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
1. The RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co- owners of the
subject property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective
shares of each of the registered owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided.
2. The RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day
period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice of the sale of a
portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had
actual notice of the said sale. Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of
the said sale, the RTC opined that the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the property as
against the petitioners.
Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
 SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR VS. CA G.R. NO. 180462 : FEBRUARY 9, 2011

FACTS:
In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño
and La Niña phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87), facilitating sugar importation
by the private sector.
On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for
sugar importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working
days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.
The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if the imported sugar fails to
arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration.
The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the invitation to bid. Several sugar
importers submitted sealed bid tenders. Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar Mill) and
South Pacific Sugar Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tranches.

Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P14,340,000.00, while
Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P28,599,000.00. As it turned out, Sugar Mill and
Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only 10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000
metric tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar import
allocation blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations sought immediate reimbursement of
the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.

The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 77) of Quezon City.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRA’s legal department to assist
the OSG in this case. The RTC held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival
of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to
the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation. the deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul
Labay, received his own copy of the Decision and filed a notice of appeal. The sugar corporations moved to
expunge the notice of appeal, which was thereafter granted, on the ground that only the OSG, as the principal
counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be made. The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA
counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

2. Whether or not the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

First issue: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OSG to represent
the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986, in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured when the OSG
subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal.

Second issue: The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P38,637,000.00.

Paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules provides that if the importer fails to make the importation, 25% of the
conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA. In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar
corporations are deemed to have assented to the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under
paragraph G.1.
 SIMNY G. GUY, AS MINORITY STOCKHOLDER AND FOR AND IN BEHALF OF GOODLAND
COMPANY, INC. VS. GILBERT G. GUY, ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO AND JOHN AND/OR JANE
DOES G.R. NO. 184068. APRIL 19, 2016.
FACTS:

GCI is a family-owned corporation of the Guy family duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Simny
Guy is a stockholder of record and member of the BOD of the corporation. Gilbert Guy, et al. are also GCI
stockholders of record who were allegedly elected as new directors by virtue of the assailed stockholders'
meeting held on 7 September 2004.

On 10 September 2004, Paulino Delfin Pe and Benjamin Lim (stockholders of record of GCI) informed Simny
that they had received a notice dated 31 August 2004 calling for the holding of a special stockholders' meeting
on 7 September 2004 at the Manila Diamond Hotel. The said meeting is for the purpose of the election of the
BOD for the year 2004-2005. 15 days after the stockholders' meeting, Simny received the said notice.

On 30 September 2004, Simny, for himself and on behalf of GCI and Grace Guy Cheu, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC for the "Nullification of Stockholders' Meeting and Election of Directors,
Nullification of Acts and Resolutions, Injunction and Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." It was assailed on the following grounds: (1) there was no previous notice to Simny and Cheu; (2)
the meeting was not called by the proper person; and (3) the notices were not issued by the person who had
the legal authority to do so.

Gilbert argued that the meeting on was legally called and held; that the notice of meeting was signed by the
authorized officer of GCI and sent in accordance with the by-laws of the corporation; and that Cheu was not a
stockholder of record of the corporation, a status that would have entitled her to receive a notice of the meeting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the notice of the stockholders' meeting was properly sent in compliance with law and the by-laws
of the corporation

RULING:

YES. Special meetings of stockholders or members shall be held at any time deemed necessary or as provided
in the by-laws: Provided, however, that at least one (1) week written notice shall be sent to all stockholders or
members, unless otherwise provided in the by-laws. Notice of any meeting may be waived, expressly or
impliedly, by any stockholder or member.

Whenever, for any cause, there is no person authorized to call a meeting, the SEC, upon petition of a
stockholder or member, and on the showing of good cause therefor, may issue an order to the petitioning
stockholder or member directing him to call a meeting of the corporation by giving proper notice required by this
Code or by the by-laws. The petitioning stockholder or member shall preside thereat until at least a majority of
the stockholders or members present have chosen one of their number as presiding officer.

In the case at bar, under the by-laws of GCI, the notice of meeting shall be mailed not less than five
(5) days prior to the date set for the special meeting. The pertinent provision reads:

Section 3. Notice of meeting written or printed for every regular or special meeting of the stockholders shall be
prepared and mailed to the registered post office address of each stockholder not less than five (5) days prior to
the date set for such meeting, and if for a special meeting, such notice shall state the object or objects of the
same. No failure or irregularity of notice of any meeting shall invalidate such meeting at which all the
stockholders are present and voting without protest.

The Corporation Code itself permits the shortening (or lengthening) of the period within which to send the notice
to call a special (or regular) meeting. Thus, no irregularity exists in the mailing of the notice sent by respondent
Gilbert on 2 September 2004 calling for the special stockholders' meeting to be held on 7 September 2004,
since it abides by what is stated in GCI's by-laws as quoted above.

The Court finds that the provisions under Sec. 50 of the Corporation Code and the by-laws of GCI are clear and
unambiguous. They do not admit of two or more meanings, nor do they make reference to two or more things at
the same time. The provisions only require the sending/mailing of the notice of a stockholders' meeting to the
stockholders of the corporation. Sending/mailing is different from filing or service under the Rules of Court. Had
the lawmakers intended to include the stockholder's receipt of the notice, they would have clearly reflected such
requirement in the law. Absent that requirement, the word "send" should be understood in its plain meaning:

"Send" means to deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communication
with postage or cost of transmission provided for and properly addressed and in the case of an instrument to an
address specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there be none, to any address reasonable under the
circumstances. The receipt of any writing or notice within the time at which it would have arrived if properly sent
has the effect of a proper sending.
Clearly, respondents are only mandated to notify petitioner by depositing in the mail the notice of the
stockholders' special meeting, with postage or cost of transmission provided and the name and address of the
stockholder properly specified. With respect to the latter part of the definition of "send" under Black's Law
Dictionary, the term "receipt" only has the effect of proper sending when a mail matter is received in the usual
course of transmission.

It should be emphasized here that the period of mailing, that is, at least five (5) days prior mailing of notice of
meeting as provided in the By-laws of GOODLAND is reasonable enough for the petitioner Simny Guy to
receive the notice of meeting prior to the holding of the subject stockholders' meeting considering the relative
distance of the Post Office (Meralco Post Office, Pasig City) where the said notice of meeting was mailed vis-à-
vis the place of residence of petitioner Simny Guy located at Greenmeadows, Quezon City.

Therefore, petitioner is considered to have received notice of the special stockholders' meeting after said notice
was properly mailed by respondents.
 ALDOVINO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 184836 DECEMBER 23, 2009

FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order
was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in
violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
- it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term
limitation mandated by the first branch. A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state
that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a
full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an
interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance
in determining constitutional intent.
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed
 ABELLANA V. MARAVE G.R. NO. L-27760 MAY 29, 1974

CASE:
Petition for certiorari from the decision of the Judge of RTC of Ozamiz City was issued with grave abuse of
discretion, to dismiss the Independent civil action filed by defendants for failure to reserve their right to institute
it separately, when the criminal case for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was commenced.
FACTS:
Abellana while driving his cargo truck hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, private
respondents, Lamason, Gurrea, Flores, Nemeno resulting in the crime of physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence.
RTC of Ozamis found Abellana guilty of the said crime in the criminal case, damages was in favor awarded to
the offended parties. Abellana appealed this decision. Likewise, the offended parties filed a separate and
independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them for reckless driving of Abellana. Crispin
Abellana, as employer of Francisco was included as defendants in the complaint. Both Crispin and Francisco
sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof
in the City Court of Ozamis. They argued it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already
on appeal.
ISSUE:
WON separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution of the criminal
action
RULING:
No. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this Court:
"That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution, or the right to file
such separate civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to
the next higher court." It admits of no doubt that an independent civil action was filed by private respondents only
at the stage of appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the
city court of Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule
111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred.
The restrictive interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only resulting its emasculation but
also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In cases of ...
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. "As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the
present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantiveright.22It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a
manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural
rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. The
commitment of this Court to such a primordial objective has been manifested time and time again.
 CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. OPLE GR. NO. L-44717 28 AUGUST 1985

FACTS:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint with the Department of
Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well
as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. Both the arbitrator
and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the Minister
of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its
decision on the provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law and abused his discretion in denying
the claim of petitioners
HELD:
While it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the
statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the
benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any slight doubts must
be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice and affording protection to labor.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal
the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the
entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion
from the benefit. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that
the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be
paid their regular holiday pay. This is flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code,
which states that 'All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.' Moreover, it shall always be presumed
that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect
that its language permits
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is
to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant
case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary
correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems
ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power.
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, GR NO. L-45459, MARCH 13, 1937
FACTS:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling,
as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a
particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
RULING:
YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor
upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’
and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating
the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino
people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied.
 LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL. VS. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, ET AL. (G.R. NO. L-63915, APRIL 24, 1985)

FACTS:
Petitioners invoke due process in its petition to the Court for requiring the publication of a number of presidential
issuance (i.e. PD’s, LOI’s, General Orders, Proclamations, EO’s, Letters of Implementation and Administrative
Orders) in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
W/N the presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
RULING:
The presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette to complete its effectivity.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code invokes publication as an indispensable requirement for laws to become
effective. The clause in such provision stating that “unless it is otherwise provided” pertains to the effective date
but subject to the requirement of a complete publication.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
"Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. "
The Court ordered that unless these presidential issuances were published in the Official Gazette, these shall
have no binding force and effect.
PRIMICIAS VS MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA G.R. NO. L-26702 OCTOBER 18, 1979
FACTS:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that
from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic
Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
RULINGS:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law
prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled
in favor of the statute. In so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by
Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964,
about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit
repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136
By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law, appellants are in error
in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is
not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law." Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the
ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992. The validity of
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother
statute" so to speak, which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the
violation of the said ordinance. An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not
contravene . . . the statute," for it is "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no
distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of
its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136.
The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that "no
provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum
allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act." In this case, however, there is no showing that the
marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done
with the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground alone, the Ordinance
becomes invalid. Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or municipal board or
council is enjoined under Section 62 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting or enforcing any
ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act."
 LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE TANKSHIP
DELAWARE LLC, and CARLOS C. SALINAS G.R. No. 180636, 13 March 2013
FACTS:
Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-an with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in
behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed for a period of six
months as chief engineer of the vessel the S.S. “Kure”. He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00;
vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount
of US$700.00 a month. On February 2002, Tangga-an was deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. Tangga-
an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s fees and interest.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitioner’s claim for back salaries, LA
said he is entitled not to four months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to
three months, inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3 months = US$24,600)
pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3months back salaries.
RULING:
No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, that an
illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10
clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e.,
whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has
a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the wording “for every year of the unexpired term”
which follows the wording “salaries x x x for three months.” To follow the thinking that private respondent is
entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and
overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule
in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given
effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to
have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-month employment
contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and
tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his
monthly salary and benefit package. Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 +
US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 months). “Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full
backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.” As we have time
and again held, “it is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole
amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would
have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working.”
 BANTANGAS CATV VS. C.A. G.R. NO. 138810. SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit
to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that
petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a
result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval
of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial
jurisdiction?
RULING:
No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises
regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to
prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized
that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the
"regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTC’s competence,
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.
Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and
maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.
210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well-recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation
policy over the CATV industry.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its
act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites
of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations
The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it
permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held
to be invalid.
The presumption of innocence is the legal principle that one is considered innocent until proven guilty.
Presumption of regularity is a principle applied in evidentiary evaluation that transactions
made in the normal course of business are assumed to have been conducted in the usual
manner unless there is evidence to prove otherwise.
Demurrer to evidence is a method of taking a case from the jury. It refers to a motion to dismiss filed by
the defendant after the plaintiff had rested his/her case, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer
to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to
evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case"
and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case
on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
In this case (Asistio v. People of the Philippines), however, the RTC granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of
petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case,
the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be
subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
The former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender,
while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special law enacting it.
Malum in se offense is "naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community," whereas
a malum prohibitum offense is wrong only because a statute makes it so