ANSUANS-1-2000

conduct of critical experiments

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S T D O A N S 1-ENGL 2000 0729818 020317b 979 M

ANSUANS-1-2000

American National Standard

for Conduct of Critical Experiments

Secretariat
American Nuclear Society

Prepared by the
American Nuclear Society
Standards Committee
Working Group ANS-1

Published by the
American Nuclear Society
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park,Illinois 60526 USA

Approved March 23,2000

by the
American National Standards Institute, Inc.

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S T D - A N S l-ENGL 2000 H 072LiB38 0203397 320 W

American Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests that

the principles of openness and due process have been followed in the approval
National procedure and that a consensus of those directly and materially affected by
Standard the standard has been achieved.

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ican National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American
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had a n opportunity to participate.

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 S T D = A N S 1-ENGL 2000 0 7 2 V B L B 0203198 2 b 7

(This Foreword is not a part of American National Standard for Conduct of Critical Experiments,
Foreword ANS1/ANS-1-2000.)

Criticai experiments are a n essential part of nuclear research and development. They yield
information valuable for the design of nuclear reactors, for the specification of processes and
operations with fissionable materials, and for furthering fundamental scientific knowledge.

Because of this diversity of purpose and the exploratory nature of critical experiments, their
conduct differs from routine reactor operation. In many cases, for example, it is not possible
to predetermine the exact value of operational controls or of shutdown devices, for to obtain
the required information is the purpose of the experiment. Good practice dictates a minimum
of perturbations extraneous to the equipment necessary to the objective of the experiment.
Accordingly, assemblies for this purpose are operatedremotely behind shielding, and are often
equipped with control and safety devices quite different from those in reactors designed to
produce power. The information demanded from critical experiments requires great latitude
in both the equipment and the operational practices, to allow the necessady frequent and
often extensive changes in the assembly configuration.

These characteristics result in a higher probability of an accidental nuclear excursion than

could be tolerated for reactors. This greater probability is made acceptable by the absence of
the large fission-product inventory and large internal energy that characterize reactors which
have produced power; effective radiation protection therefore can be provided in a properly
designed facility by adherence to simple operating rules.

This standard contains nuclear safety criteria and practices that have evolved and have been
tested during half a century of critical experimentation. It was initially prepared by
Subcommittee ANS-1, Performance of Critical Experiments, of the American Nuclear Society
Standards Committee, and was approved by the Subcommittee on November 1, 1966. On
August 18, 1967, the document was certified by the Board of Directors of the Society as
ANS-STD.1-1967.
waspreparedby SubcommitteeANS-1 on July6,1971 andwas
ArevisionofANS-STD.1-1967
certified by the Society as ANS-STD.l-1972 on September 19, 1972. The membership of the
subcommittee which prepared that revision was:

A. D.Caüihan, Chairman, Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division

E. B. Johnson, Secretary, Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division
E. D.Clayton, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
D.F.Hanlen, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Atomic Power Division
R.G. Luce, General Electric Company, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
E. 1. Nowstrup, US.Atomic Energy Commission
H.C. Paxton, Los Alamos Scientific Labomtory
G. A. Price, Brookhaven National Laboratory
W. C. Redman, Argonne National Laboratory
N. L.Snidow, Babcock and Wilcox Company

The stature of, and the breadth of interest in, this standard were increased on April 29,1975,
when it was approved as an American National Standard by the American National Standards
Institute, Inc. The designation then was ANSI N405-1975.

The content of N405-1975 was reaffirmed October 21,1981, and the standard was revised in
1986, with consensus being achieved on November 7. The membership of the ad hoc group
performing those actions was:

E. D.Clayton,Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories

E. B. Johnson, Oak Ridge, National Laboratory
D.W. Magnuson, Individual
H.C. Paxton, Individual
A. D.Callihan, Individual

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 STD-ANS 1-ENGL 2000 8 072483B 0203399 I T 3

That version included textual modifications solely for the purpose of updating references and
of recounting procedural matters necessary to the action. The technical content was in no way
altered.

The standard was again revised in 1998 with consensus achieved on August 27, 1999. The
membership of the working group responsible for the revision is:

' R. L. Seale, Chair, University of Arizona

R. D. Busch, University of New Mexico
R. A. Knief, XE Corporation
T. P. McLaughlin, Los Alamos National Laboratory
R. Paternoster, Los Alamos National Laboratory
S. S. Payne, U. S. Department of Energy
J. S.Philbin, Sandia National Laboratories
T.R. Schmidt, Sandia National Laboratories

Consensus Committee N17, Research Reactors,Radiation Physics and Radiation Shielding,

had the following membership at the time of its approval of this standard:

Ta& M. Raby, Chair

Shawn Coyne-Nalbach, Secretary
A. D.Callihan .................................................................. Individual
R. E. Carter.. ......... .............................................. E.G.&G.
D. C o h o s . . .......... ......................... Brookhaven National Laboratories
E.Dodd ............................................................ .Health Physics Society
D.Duffey ........................................... .American Institute of Chemical Engineers
W. A. Holt ........................ American Public Health Association
W.C. Hopkins.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... Bechtel Corporation
L.B. Marsh ............................................. .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. W e r ....................................... .Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
J.E.Olhoeít ................................................................... I n ~ ~ d u ~
T.M .&by ........................... .......................... American Nuclear Society
W. J. Richards. .................................................. .U.S. Department of Defense
R. Seale ......................................................... .American Nuclear Society
T. Schmidt ..................................................... Sandia National Laboratories
k Smetana ...................................................... .Savanna River Laboratory
J. F.Torrence ...................................... .National Institute of Standards Technology

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S T D - A N S 1-ENGL 2000 0721iBL8 0203200 7 ' i 5 I

Page

1. Scope ............................................................. 1

2. Definitions ........................................................ 1
2.1 Limitations ................................................... 1
2.2 Shall. Should. and May ......................................... 1
2.3 Glossary of Terms ............................................. 1

3. Administrative Practices ............................................. 1

4. Design Criteria ..................................................... 2

5. Operational Practices ............................................... 3

6 . References ........................................................ 3

...
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S T D * A N S 3-ENGL 2000
Conduct of Critical Experiments
1. Scope
This standard provides for the safe conduct of
critical experiments. Such experiments study
.neutron behavior in a fission device where the
energy produced is insufficient to require auxil-
iary cooling, and the power histoqy is such that
the inventory of long-lived fission products is in-
significant.
2. Definitions
2.1 Limitations. The definitionsgiven below are
restrictive for the purposes of this standard.
Other specialized terms are defined in the Glos-
sary of Tenns in Nuclear Science and Technology
[i]’ or have definitions accepted by usage.
2.2 Shalì, Should, and May. The word “shall”
is used to denote a requirement, the word
“should” to denote a recommendation, and the
word “may” to denote permission, neither a re-
quirement nor a recommendation. To conform
with this standard, all operations shall be per-
formed in accordance with its requirements, but
not necessarily with its recommendations.
2.3 Glossary of Terms
assembly area. A region in the vicinity of a cri-
tical assembly where personnel would have inad-
equate protection from radiation associated with
a criticality accident.
assembly shutdown. The state of the assembly
when it is subcritical by at least one dollar.
critical assembly (assembly).A device or phy-
sical system for performing critical experiments.
In a critical assembly, the energy produced by
fission is insufficientta require auxiliary cooling,
and the power history is such that the inventory
of long-lived fission products is insignificant.
critical experiment (experiment). An experi-
ment or series of experiments performed with a
fissionable material configuration which may be
at or near critical. The principal purpose of the
experiment is the study of neutron behavior with-
in the critical assembly.
’Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in
Section 6,References.
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0724838 O203203 b 8 1
critical facility. All areas directly associated
with operation of one or more critical assemblies.
criticality accident. The release of energy as
a result of accidentally producing a self-sustain-
ing or divergent fission chain reaction.
management. The administrative body to
which the supervision of a critical facility reports.
neutron source. Any material, combination of
materials, or device that emits neutrons, includ-
ing materials undergoing fission.
remote operation. Planned reactivity additions
to a critical assembly with no personnel in the
assembly area.
safety device. A mechanism designed to reduce
the reactivity of a critical assembly.
scram. A rapid reduction of reactivity for shut-
ting down the assembly.
3. Administrative Practices
3.1 Management shall assign responsibility and
commensurate authority for the safe operation of
critical experiments unambiguously and singu-
larly through the line organization.
3.2 Written general operational restrictions for
each critical facility, based on a safety assess-
ment and consideration of characteristics includ-
ing shielding and confinement,shall be approved
by management and the cognizant regulating
authority. Criteria for the safety assessment
may be derived from American National Stand-
ard Format and Content for Safety Analysis
ReportsforResearchReactors,ANSUANS-15.21-
1996 [23. Criteria for operational restrictions
may be derived from American National Stand-
ard for the Development of Technical Specifica-
tions for Research Reactors, ANSUANS-15.1-
1990 [31.
3.3 Each new program of experiments shall be
documented, independently reviewed, and ap-
proved in a manner established by management.
3.4 Operations personnel shall be trained to en-
sure that they are capable of performing their
assigned work. Continuing training shall be pro-

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STD-ANS 3-ENGL 2000 I 0 7 2 4 8 3 8 0203202 518
American National Standard ANSUANS-1-2000
vided to ensure maintenance of job proficiency.
Criteria for personnel qualifications may be
derived from American National Standard for
Selection and Training of Personnel for Research
Reactors, ANSYANS- 15.4-1988 141.
3.5 At least two persons who have qualifications
approved by management shall be present while
a critical experiment is being performed.
3.6 Before an experiment begins, the operation-
al and safety aspects shall be reviewed by all
who are expected to take part in the operation.
3.7 Operations shall be planned so that no sin-
gle operational action or procedural violation
could lead to a criticality accident. Planned su-
erprompt criticality is outside the scope of this
standard. Guidance for performance of experi-
ments of that type is provided in American
National Standard for Operation of Fast Pulse
Reactors, ANSUANS-14.1-1989 151.
3.8 Manual operations with fissionable material,
such as transfer and storage, shall be performed
in accordancewith American National Standard
for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with
Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, ANSU
ANS-8.1-1998[6].
3.9 Manual operations that result in reactivity
additions to a critical assembly should be limited
to a predicted kRof0.9(a neutron multiplication
of 10)for unknown configurations. Manual oper-
ations of known configurations with adequate
control and analysis should use a predicted keR
not to exceed 0.95 (a neutron multiplication of
20). When available, measured multiplication
values shali take precedence over computed
values.
3.10 Additions of reactivity to a critical assem-
bly beyond those permitted by 3.9 shall be made
by remote operation. Such additions shall be con-
tinuously adjustable, except when the resulting
reactivity is known with an accuracy such that
safety is not compromised.
3.11 No person shall enter an assembly area
during the performance of a critical experiment
without the prior approval of the person respon-
sible for safety.
3.12 During an addition of reactivity that re-
quires remote operation, personnel shall be pro-
tected by distance or shieldingfrom the effects of
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radiation or kinetic energy that might be
liberated as the consequence of accidental criti-
cality.
3.13 If anyone participating in the operation of
a critical experiment expresses doubt about the
safety of a particular action or step, the experi-
ment shall be suspended until the doubt is re-
solved.
3.14 A record of the status and operation of the
critical assembly,with particular reference to its
safety features, shall be maintained until the
value of the records has no influence on the
safety of future operations.
3.15 An emergency plan approved by manage-
ment shall be in effect.
3.16 Radiation monitoring, personnel dosime-
try, and contamination control shall be provided
for both normal and emergency conditions. Cri-
teria for a radiation protection program may be
derived from the American National Standard
for Radiation Protection at Research Reactor
Facilities, ANSUANS-15.11-1993 E71. Guidance
for dosimetry following a criticality accident is
contained in American National Standard for
Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents, ANSI N-
13.3-1981[8].
3.17 A knowledgeable group independent of the
facility staff shall review the critical facility's
administrative, operational and safety practices
at least annually. The results of the review
shall be documented.
4. Design Criteria
4.1 Safeguards shall be provided to prevent op-
eration of critical assembly equipment by unau-
thorized personnel.
4.2 Communicationshall exist between person-
nel at the control console and those who are in
the assembly area.
4.3 A signal audible to personnel within the as-
sembly area shall provide an indication of the
neutron multiplication during adjustments that
affect reactivity.
4.4 A source of neutrons, sufficient in strength
and at a location to produce a meaningful indi-
cation of assembly multiplication, shall be
present during each approach to critical. Neu-
 S T D - A N S Ir-ENGL 2000
tron detectors shall be located so that source
neutrons will interact with the fissionable mate-
rial configuration prior to detection. Remote op-
eration experiments may be performed without
a source provided that the reactivity effects are
known to such a degree that safety will not be
compromised.
4.5 Each critical assembly shall be provided
with at least two safety devices that are actuated
automaticallyat a preset radiation level and that
can be actuated manually. Each device shall be
capable of shutting down the assembly. These
devices shall also be capable of removing reac-
tivity more rapidly than it can be added by any
anticipated operation. The safety devices shall
be able to perform their safety function inde-
pendent of the assembly control system.
4.6 At least two neutron or gamma-ray detectors
together with associated electronic and mechan-
ical components shall be capable of independ-
ently initiating a scram of the critical assembly
at a preset radiation level. These systems shall
be able to perform their safety function inde-
pendent of the assembly control system.
4.7 Loss of actuating power to any critical as-
sembly safety device shall produce a scram.
4.8 A scram signal shall preclude an operational
increase of reactivity in the critical assembly.
4.9 Throughout each critical experiment, at
least two instruments shall provide indication of
the neutron flux within the assembly. These
may be the same instruments required by 4.6.
4.10 The limiting conditions or positions of safe-
ty devices shall be displayed continuously at the
critical assembly’s control console. The status of
each variable used for h e control of reactivity
also shall be displayed.
5. Operational Practices
5.1 Requirements for conduct of operations and
quality assurance may be derived from the
American National Standard for Quality Assur-
ance Program Requirements for Research Re-
actors, ANSUANS-15.8-1995191.
5.2 Changes to the critical assembly shall be
controlled, reviewed, and documented. All par-
ticipants shall be informed of each change.
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0724838 02032U3 Li54
American National Standard ANSI/ANS-1-2000
5.3 The satisfactory performance of newly in-
stalled or altered control equipment or safety
devices shall be established before any attempt
to achieve criticality.
5.4 The frequency of periodic maintenance of
each piece of equipment should be commensur-
ate with the safety consequences of its failure.
5.5 A visual inspection of the critical assembly
shall be conducted each day before initial start-
UP.
5.6 The proper functioning of each required
safety device shallbe established before starting
operationseach day that a critical experiment is
to be initiated. In the course of these tests or
early in each day’s operation, the response of
each required detector system to a change in
neutron or gamma-ray intensity shall be ob-
served.
5.7 Additions of reactivity requiring remote op-
eration shall be guided by neutron detector re-
sponse. During an initial approach to criticality,
reactivity shall not be added unless the effect of
any preceding addition has been observed and
understood.
5.8 The safety consequences of unexpected be-
havior of the critical assembly or its associated
equipment shall be evaluated promptly and pri-
or to further operation that could lead to a cri-
ticality accident.
5.9 Additions of reactivity requiring remote op-
eration shall not be made simultaneouslyby two
or more persons, unless the effect of such addi-
tions has been evaluated and shown to be safe.
5.10 Additions of reactivity requiring remote
operation shall not be made simultaneously by
two or more distinct methods (e.g., by rod
motion and by water addition), unless the effect
of such additions has been evaluated and shown
to be safe.
6. References
[i] Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and
Technology.
[2J American National Standard for Format
and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for
Research Reactors, ANSUANS-15.21-1996.
 zooo m 0724838 02032OLi 390
S T D - A N S i-ENGL
American National Standard ANSUANS-1-2000
[31 American National Standard for Develop-
ment of Technical Specifications for Re-
search Reactors, ANSYANS-15.1-1990.
i41 American National Standard for Selection
and Training of Personnel for Research Re-
actors, ANSUANS-154-1988,
i51 American National Standard for Operation
of Fast Pulse Reactors, ANSUA.NS-14.1-
1989.
í61 American National Standard for Nuclear
Criticality Safety in Operations with Fis-
sionable Materials Outside Reactors, ANSY
ANS-8.1-1998.
í71 American National Standard for Radiation
Protection at Research Reactor Facilities,
ANSUANS-15.11-1993.
i81 American National Standard for Dosimetry
for Criticality Accidents, ANSI N13.3-1981.
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i91 American National Standard for Quality
Assurance Program Requirements for
Research Reactors, ANSI/ANS-15.8-1995.
When any of the American National Standards
referred to in this document is superceded by a
revision approved by the American National
Standards Institute, Inc., the revision shall
apply-
The references cited above can be obtained from
the following sources:
American Nuclear Society
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La Grange Park, IL 60304
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