Fault Tree Analysis for Emergency Process of Fire

Accident in Oil-Gas Storage and Transportation

Changfeng Yuan 1; Hui Cui 2; Bin Tao 3; and Wanlei Wang 4
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Abstract: From the perspective of the safety of the emergency process, this paper studies cause factors in the emergency process of fire
accident for oil-gas storage and transportation. Nineteen cause factors are summarized based on the statistical analysis of actual accident
cases. Based on this, fault tree analysis (FTA) method is used to establish the fault tree of secondary accidents. Forty-four minimal cut sets of
this fault tree are calculated, and the possible ways to cause secondary accidents are obtained. Eight minimal path sets are calculated, and the
possible approaches against secondary accidents are learned. Moreover, probability importance of each basic event is solved, and their
influence degrees on secondary accidents are obtained. Through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the fault tree, the possible risks
in emergency process are found, and some countermeasures are put forward. Finally, FTA method is applied to the analysis of cause factors in
the emergency process of two practical accident cases. The results show that the occurrence mechanism of secondary accidents in the emer-
gency process of an oil-gas storage and transportation system and the safety of the whole life cycle are of great scientific and guiding
significance. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)HZ.2153-5515.0000402. © 2018 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Fault tree analysis; Emergency management; Fire accident; Oil-gas storage and transportation.

Introduction
Oil-gas storage and transportation safety involves many aspects,
such as economy, people’s livelihood, defense, and environment.
Once a fire accident of oil-gas storage and transportation breaks
out, it will cause huge economic losses and casualties and bring
bad social influence. Recent accident statistics reports of China
Petrochemical show that if classified by accident type, fires in
oil storage account for about 17% and explosions account about
22%. However, fire usually accompanies explosion. The death toll
caused by fires and explosions account for about 9 and 26% of the
total death toll, respectively. As a result, fire and explosion accident
is the most harmful accident in terms of both frequency and extent
of injury (Zhou and Liu 2012). So, timely emergency disposal must
be carried out after the accident so as to eliminate or minimize the
damage caused by the accident as much as possible. However, a
large number of live accident cases in real life taught us that sec-
ondary accidents, such as expanding casualties, worsening situa-
tion, and environmental pollution, often occurred due to the
improper emergency after the initial accident. According to the
public reports, just in China in 2007, there were more than seven
accidents that further caused the casualty expansion (25 people
1 safety level based on five different classes of the physical resources,
Associate Professor, Transportation Management College, Dalian
Maritime Univ., Liaoning 116026, China (corresponding author). Email:
ycf1028@163.com
2
Master Student, Transportation Management College, Dalian Maritime
Univ., Liaoning 116026, China. Email: cuihuidlpu@163.com
3
Senior Engineer, Safety Engineering Laboratory, Sinopec Research
Institute of Safety Engineering (Qingdao), Shandong 266000, China.
Email: 13145329123@163.com
4
Associate Professor, College of Electromechanical and Information
Engineering, Dalian Minzu Univ., Liaoning 116600, China. Email: wanlei
_wang@163.com
Note. This manuscript was submitted on October 19, 2017; approved on
January 4, 2018; published online on April 23, 2018. Discussion period
open until September 23, 2018; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Hazardous,
Toxic, and Radioactive Waste, © ASCE, ISSN 2153-5493.
were killed and eight injured) because of the inappropriate emer-
gency disposal in coal mines, chemical industry, and other fields
(Chinese State Administration of Work Safety 2007). Secondary
accidents in the emergency process cause more harm to lives,
property, safety, and environment. It fully shows that there are
some potential hazards in the process of emergency disposal
and reconstruction. These potential hazards will be the cause fac-
tors leading to secondary accidents. Therefore, we should find out
the possible cause factors, make a qualitative and quantitative
analysis, put forward the possible advanced countermeasures,
and integrate emergency process safety into the essential safety
design. The system’s essential safety management in the full life
cycle will be further improved.
The possible cause factors of the accident can be obtained by
adopting risk source identification method. At present, many
researchers have put forward several risk source identification
methods. For example, some common methods of hazard and risk
analysis were reviewed in detail, including safety checklist analysis
(SCL), preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), hazard and operability
analysis (HAZOP), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA),
fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), and cause-
consequence analysis (Eckhoff 2016; Moreno and Cozzani 2017).
Haeri (2016) designed SCL to identify risk source and determine
such as fire protection systems. Alileche et al. (2017) focused on the
analysis of domino effect in the oil-gas accident based on ETA
method to identify the most dangerous storage or process factors.
Liu et al. (2016a, b) used FMEA by integrating fuzzy set to establish
the risk factor fuzzy digraph and matrix for accurate risk identifica-
tion. The work in Alkhaled et al. (2015) used FTA to identify the risk
source and type in three gas explosion accidents that occurred in
AI-Ahmadi, Kuwait. Zhou et al. (2017) incorporated FTA and
human reliability analysis (HRA) for risk identification and assess-
ment in fire and explosion hazards due to liquefied natural gas spill
accidents. Isimite and Rubini (2016) used a dynamic HAZOP
method to identify possible risk factors in a case study about the
Texas City refinery explosion accident. In Mohammadfam and
Zareil (2015), a HAZOP method along with the preliminary risk

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 Table 1. Comparison on common risk source identification methods
Methods
Safety checklist (SCL)
(Eckhoff 2016; Moreno and
Cozzani 2017; Haeri 2016)
Preliminary hazard analysis
(PHA) (Eckhoff 2016;
Moreno and Cozzani 2017;
Mohammadfam and Zareil
2015)
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
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Evaluation means Application range
Qualitative analysis System design, acceptance,
operation, management stage
and accident investigation
process
Qualitative analysis Evaluation of inherent system
adopted new method, material,
and equipment; generally used
in the initial development stage
Qualitative and Aerospace, nuclear energy,
Advantages and disadvantages
Simple and easy operation;
difficult compilation and heavy
workload
Simple and economic; relatively
rough risk analysis and
depending on expert experience
Intuition, clarity, clear thinking,
Effectiveness
Giving conclusion about
whether evaluation results
meet the standard
Macroscopic and general
qualitative analysis for risks
and potential accidents
Qualitatively finding out all

(Eckhoff 2016; Moreno and
Cozzani 2017; Alkhaled et al.
2015; Zhou et al. 2017)
Event tree analysis (ETA)
(Eckhoff 2016; Moreno and
Cozzani 2017; Alileche et al.
2017)
Hazard and operability
analysis (HAZOP) (Eckhoff
2016; Moreno and Cozzani
2017; Isimite and Rubini
2016; Mohammadfam and
Zareil 2015)
Failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) (Eckhoff
2016; Moreno and Cozzani
2017; Liu et al. 2016a, b)
Fire and explosion index
(F&EI) (Nezamodini et al.
2017)
quantitative analysis petroleum, electronics,
machinery, chemicals, mining,
and other fields
Qualitative and Petroleum production, storage,
quantitative analysis transportation, and treatment
system
Qualitative analysis Chemical, petrochemical, and
other production equipment
Qualitative and Design stage
quantitative analysis
Qualitative and Technological process of
quantitative analysis petroleum production, storage,
transportation, and treatment
and strong logic; relatively
heavy workload for complex
system
Accurate risk analysis;
complex, heavy workload and
easy distortion
Applicable to design evaluation
and operation evaluation; with
limits to the complex causal
chain
Simple and easy operation;
analysis result with subjectivity
Concise and clear, wide
parameter value range; overall
macroscopic evaluation
the possible failures, and
quantitatively calculating
system failure probability
High accuracy and relatively
objective evaluation process
Comprehensive, systematic,
and meticulous evaluation
result
High accuracy
Comprehensive analysis and
ranking risk level

analysis (PRA) technique was used for determining main hazardous
sources and carrying out a qualitative risk analysis in hydrogen and
natural gas accidents. Nezamodini et al. (2017) adopted fire and ex-
plosion index (F&EI) method to estimate losses and risk source
analysis in a case study of a fire and explosion accident of an oil
extraction factory. The detailed analysis and comparison of these
methods are shown in Table 1.
From Table 1, it can be found that different analytical methods
have different focuses on the evaluation for a single factor or the
whole system. Among them, FTA is commonly used in risk man-
agement associated with identified hazards specific to focused
fields due to its advantages, such as intuition, clarity, clear thinking,
and strong logic. But according to the reviewed literature consult,
the existing risk source identification methods are mainly used to
analyze the possible risk sources in the initial accident phase but
often lack the risk source analysis in the emergency process that
may result in secondary accidents. So, we first propose from the
perspective of the emergency process safety to study the potential
cause factors that may cause secondary accidents in the emergency
process. The goal of this research is to learn the influence degree of
each cause factor on secondary accidents. The specific objectives of
the work are: (1) to find out cause factors of secondary accidents in
the emergency process, (2) to determine the influence degree of
each cause factor on secondary accidents, and (3) to put forward
some active preventive measures for these cause factors. This work
is distinct in the following ways: (1) on the basis of statistical char-
acteristics analysis in actual accident cases, we use FTA method to
establish a fault tree model of the secondary accidents and then
determine the potential cause factors in the emergency process;
and (2) by making qualitative and quantitative analysis for these
cause factors, we obtain the influence degree of each factor on sec-
ondary accidents and get the possible pathways resulting in secon-
dary accidents. Moreover, we summarize the possible problems in
the emergency process and finally put forward the corresponding
advanced countermeasures.
Throughout the study, we summarized 19 cause factors of sec-
ondary accidents in the emergency process related to fire accident
in the oil tank reservoir zone. By calculating the probability impor-
tance of each cause factor, we determined its quantitative influence
degree on the occurrence of secondary accidents. In addition, we
obtained 44 possible ways leading to secondary accidents and
eight possible approaches to avoid secondary accidents. For cause
factors, we put forward some possible countermeasures against sec-
ondary accidents from the essential safety perspective. The research
results can reveal the basic development and evolution mechanism
of an accident in the emergency process and provide the scientific
basis and guiding significance for oil storage system safety.
Statistical Analysis of Cause Factors in Emergency
Process
According to statistics of 100 (including 62 cases in China, 38
cases abroad) typical fire and explosion accidents in the oil tank
reservoir zone from 1971 to 2016 (Zhang 2013; Wang 2016), about
88% of these accidents caused secondary accidents in the emer-
gency disposal process after the initial accident had occurred, es-
pecially for some major accidents. Moreover, from the perspective
of the origin point (or the involved scope) of secondary accidents,
secondary accidents can be divided into two types. One is that the
origin point of secondary accidents locates in the initial accident

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 Table 2. Statistical table on cause factor, frequency, and the type of obtain the mutual coupling relationships between them. We can
secondary accident see from Table 1 that the existing risk source identification methods
Type have different advantages, disadvantages, and application scopes.
Accident point Around accident
Among them, fault tree analysis method can start from a possible
Cause factors Frequency (numbers) point (numbers) accident to decompose events layer by layer from top to bottom
according to the result–reason analysis thought (Kabir 2017;
Illegal operation 2 2 —
Lavasani et al. 2015). In FTA method, the logical relationships be-
Not handled in time 3 2 1
Misjudgment 2 1 1 tween events can also be clearly expressed step by step by a logical
Tank broken 52 45 7 diagram until the basic events (that is, cause factors) are found, and
Valve broken 10 5 5 the basic event’s combination that may cause secondary accidents
Oil pipelines broken and 4 1 3 can also be obtained through calculating the minimal cut sets (or
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leakage minimal path sets) of the fault tree.

Flange broken 3 — 3 Therefore, in this paper, we use the FTA method to establish the
Oil leakage and spillage 42 7 35 fault tree of secondary accidents. Where, the secondary accident in
Reburning or reblasting 20 15 5
the emergency process of fire accident in an oil tank reservoir zone
of high temperature oil
Blast wave and radiant 46 — 46
is taken as the research subject and cause factors listed in Table 1 as
heat the basic events. In this fault tree, the secondary accident (T) is
Floating plate damage 9 7 2 taken as the top event and classified into two types according to
Power-supply system 6 1 5 its origin point (or the involved scope). One type is the secondary
and water system broken accident around the initial accident point (M1), and the other is the
Not setting firefighting 5 2 3 secondary accident in the initial accident point (M2). The secon-
facility dary accident around the initial accident point is caused due to re-
Firefighting facility 23 10 13
burning or reblasting of high temperature oil, or oil leakage and
failure
Fire water system failure 6 2 4
spillage, with the small fire separation (X3) between tanks and
Unreasonable setting of 2 1 1 other buildings, pipe networks, and arteries. Where, reburning or
fire dike reblasting of high temperature oil (X1) and oil leakage and spillage
Drain valve failure 2 — 2 (X2) are classified as oil hazards (M3). For the secondary accident
Weather factor 12 12 — in the initial accident point, on the one hand it is caused by fire
Small fire separation 1 — 1 upgrading in the initial accident point, and on the other hand it
is caused because of the apparatus failure (such as firefighting ap-
paratus, tanks, valves) and human factors (like not handled in time,
illegal operation). In which, fire upgrading (M4) is caused by
point, such as potential combustion upgrading, oil hazards, and so
environmental factors surrounding the combustion point (M6)
on. The other is that the origin point of secondary accidents locates
[including strong blast wave and radiant heat (X5) and weather fac-
around the initial accident point, that is, energy’s outward spread
tor (X6)] and a misjudge of the combustion situation (X4). The
from the initial accident point will lead to the damage of the sur-
apparatus failure and human factors are defined as control factors
rounding substances or combustion upgrading. Table 2 shows
cause factors, frequency, and numbers of a secondary accident’s (M5), which include firefighting apparatus factors (M8) and inher-
type based on 100 statistical accident cases. ent equipment and human factors (M7). The failures of firefighting
In Table 2, the individual cause factor, or their combination, will apparatus mainly include not setting firefighting facility (X15),
cause secondary accidents. To determine the influence degree of firefighting facility failure (X16), fire water system failure (X17),
each cause factor on secondary accidents, obtain the possible ways drain valve failure (X18), and unreasonable setting of fire dike
to prevent secondary accidents and give the essential safety mea- (X19). The inherent equipment and human factors can be divided
sures in advance, we first have to find out the possible cause factors. into human factors (M9) and the inherent equipment factors (M10),
The cause factors in Table 2 are the main influencing factors in the where human factors include not handled in time (X7) and illegal
emergency response to a fire accident in an oil tank reservoir area operation (X8), and the inherent equipment factors include tank
through the statistical analysis of actual accident cases. On the basis broken (X9), valve broken (X10), flange broken (X11), oil pipe-
of these factors, we can carry on further study, including establish- lines broken and leakage (X12), floating plate broken (X13),
ing the connection between secondary accidents and these cause and power-supply system and water system broken (X14). Based
factors by using the effective risk source identification method, de- on the above analysis, we decompose events layer by layer from
termining the mutual coupling relationship between cause factors, top to bottom according to the causes of secondary accidents
calculating the quantitative influence degree of each cause factor on and establish the fault tree of secondary accidents in the emergency
secondary accidents, and putting forward some advance active pre- process for oil tank reservoir zone. The basic events and the estab-
vention measures. Therefore, this part is the basis of the following lished fault tree are shown respectively in Table 3 and Fig. 1.
research in the paper.
Analysis of Minimal Cut Set and Path Set
Fault Tree Analysis of Secondary Accident in
Emergency Process Minimal Cut Set Analysis
The minimal cut set is a collection of the basic events and also in-
dicates the possible ways that cause the occurrence of the top event.
Fault Tree Establishment According to the fault tree in Fig. 1, we use the Boolean algebra
The effective way of avoiding and preventing secondary accidents method to calculate its minimal cut sets. The structural algebra (T)
is to find out the potential risk sources as much as possible and of the fault tree shown in Fig. 1 is as follows:

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 Table 3. Basic events of the fault tree of secondary accidents
Code Basic events
T Secondary accident
M1 Secondary accident around the initial accident point
M2 Secondary accident in the initial accident point
M3 Oil hazards
M4 Fire upgrading
M5 Control factors
M6 Environmental factors
M7 Inherent equipment and human factors
M8 Firefighting apparatus factors
M9 Human factors
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M10 Inherent equipment factors

X1 Reburning or reblasting of high temperature oil
X2 Oil leakage and spillage
X3 Small fire separation
X4 Misjudgment
X5 Blast wave and radiant heat
X6 Weather factor
X7 Not handled in time Fig. 2. Successful tree of secondary accidents.
X8 Illegal operation
X9 Tank broken
X10 Valve broken
X11 Flange broken fX1;X3g;fX10; X15g;fX10;X16g;fX10; X17g; fX10;X18g;
X12 Oil pipelines broken and leakage
X13 Floating plate broken fX10;X19g;fX11;X15g; fX11;X16g;fX11;X17g;fX11; X18g;
X14 Power-supply system and water system broken fX11;X19g;fX12; X15g; fX12;X16g;fX12;X17g;fX12; X18g;
X15 Not setting firefighting facility
X16 Firefighting facility failure fX12; X19g;fX13; X15g; fX13; X16g;fX13;X17g;fX13; X18g;
X17 Fire water system failure
X18 Drain valve failure
fX13;X19g;fX14;X15g; fX14; X16g;fX14;X17g;fX14; X18g;
X19 Unreasonable setting of fire dike fX14;X19g;fX2;X3g;fX4;X5g;fX4;X6g;fX7;X15g;
fX7; X16g; fX7;X17g;fX7;X18g;fX7; X19g;fX8; X15g;
fX8;X16g; fX8;X17g;fX8;X18g;fX8; X19g;fX9;X15g;
fX9;X16g; fX9;X17g; fX9;X18g;fX9; X19g

It can be seen that this fault tree has many minimal cut sets,
and it shows that there are a number of risk factors that can cause
the top event. Each minimal cut set can be a means of leading to
secondary accidents. Of course, in the actual accident, it is usually
the simultaneous occurrence or interaction of these minimal cut
sets.

Minimal Path Set Analysis

Fig. 1. Fault tree of secondary accidents.
T ¼ M1 þ M2 ¼ X3 • M3 þ M4 þ M5 ¼ X3 • ðX1 þ X2Þ
þ X4 • ðX5 þ X6Þ þ M7 • M8 ¼ X3 • ðX1 þ X2Þ
þ X4 • ðX5 þ X6Þ þ ðM9 þ M10Þ • ðX15 þ X16 þ X17
þ X18 þ X19Þ ¼ X3 • ðX1 þ X2Þ þ X4 • ðX5 þ X6Þ
þ ðX7 þ X8 þ X9 þ X10 þ X11 þ X12 þ X13
þ X14Þ • ðX15 þ X16 þ X17 þ X18 þ X19
Then, we get 44 minimal cut sets by calculating T,
respectively
The minimal path set of fault tree is a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for avoiding the occurrence of the top event. There are some
common methods to calculate the minimal path set, such as dual
tree method, Boolean algebra method, and determinant method.
In this paper, we use the dual tree method to solve the minimal path
sets. First, the dual tree (usually called a successful tree) is drawn
according to Fig. 1 and shown in Fig. 2. And then, the minimal cut
sets of Fig. 2 (that is, the minimal path sets of Fig. 1) are calculated.
The structural algebra (T 0 ) of the successful tree shown in Fig. 2
is as follows:
T 0 ¼ M1 0 • M2 0 ¼ ðX3 0 þ M3 0 Þ • ðM4 0 • M5 0 Þ
¼ ðX3 0 þ X1 0 • X2 0 Þ • ðX4 0 þ M6 0 Þ • ðM7 0 þ M8 0 Þ
¼ ðX1 0 • X2 0 þ X3 0 Þ • ðX4 0 þ X5 0 • X6 0 Þ
• ðM9 0 M10 0 þ X15 0 • X16 0 • X17 0 • X18 0 • X19 0 Þ
¼ ðX1 0 • X2 0 þ X3 0 Þ • ðX4 0 þ X5 0 • X6 0 Þ
• ðX7 0 • X8 0 • X9 0 • X10 0 • X11 0 • X12 0 • X13 0 • X14 0
þ X15 0 • X16 0 • X17 0 • X18 0 • X19 0

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 Then we calculate T 0 and get its eight minimal path sets, Table 5. Probability importance of basic events
respectively Basic events Probability importance

fX3; X4; X15; X16; X17; X18; X19g; fX1; X2; X4; X15; X16; X1 0.004
X2 0.004
X17; X18; X19g; fX3; X5; X6; X15; X16; X17; X18; X19g; X3 0.176
X4 0.232
fX1; X2; X5; X6; X15; X16; X17; X18; X19g; X5 0.008
fX1; X2; X4; X7; X8; X9; X10; X11; X12; X13; X14g; X6 0.008
X7 0.152
fX3; X4; X7; X8; X9; X10; X11; X12; X13; X14g; X8 0.152
X9 0.152
fX3; X5; X6; X7; X8; X9; X10; X11; X12; X13; X14g; X10 0.152
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fX1; X2; X5; X6; X7; X8; X9; X10; X11; X12; X13; X14g X11 0.152
X12 0.152
X13 0.152
The eight minimal path sets show eight kinds of ways to prevent X14 0.152
secondary accidents. That is to say, as long as the basic events in X15 0.356
the minimal path sets do not occur, secondary accidents in the X16 0.356
emergency process can be avoided. X17 0.356
X18 0.356
X19 0.356
Importance Analysis of Basic Events
By establishing a fault tree and calculating its minimal cut sets, we
can obtain all the basic events and possible ways that may cause
Probability importance of the ith basic event (I PðiÞ ) in the fault
secondary accidents, but the influence degree of each basic event
tree can be obtained as follows (Zhao and Zhao 2014):
on secondary accidents is different. To better realize the priority
treatment of proactive prevention and control in advance for those ∂Q
cause factors, it is necessary to make quantitative analysis for a I PðiÞ ¼ ð2Þ
∂qi
fault tree of secondary accidents so as to obtain the importance
of each basic event. The importance can be determined by calcu- where PEi = occurrence probability of the ith minimal cut set; and
lating the structural importance or probability importance of basic qi = occurrence probability of the ith basic event.
events. In this paper, based on the statistical analysis of the actual According to Eqs. (1) and (2) and Table 4, the probability im-
cases, we adopt probability calculation method to calculate prob- portance of each basic event is calculated and listed in Table 5.
ability importance of each basic event. According to the statistical Sorting the calculation results of Table 5, the probability impor-
results in Table 2, the occurrence probability of each basic event is tance of each basic event is ranked as follows:
listed in Table 4.
Combining the fault tree shown in Fig. 1, the probability (Q) of I 15 ¼ I 16 ¼ I 17 ¼ I 18 ¼ I 19 > I 5 ¼ I 6 > I 7 ¼ I 8 ¼ I 9
the top event can be obtained from Eq. (1) ¼ I 10 ¼ I 11 ¼ I 12 ¼ I 13 ¼ I 14 > I 4 > I 3 > I 2 ¼ I 1
Y
44
Q¼1− ð1 − PEi Þ ð1Þ
i¼1 Fault Tree Analysis Conclusion
From the establishment of a fault tree of secondary accidents and
calculations of minimal cut sets, minimal path sets, and probability
importance, we can know that the hazards in the emergency process
Table 4. Probability of basic events
of fire accident for oil-gas storage and transportation can be divided
Basic events Probability into the following aspects:
X1 0.08 1. Firefighting apparatus factors: It can be seen from the above
X2 0.168 ranking result that the probability importance of some basic
X3 0.004 events like not setting firefighting facility, firefighting facility
X4 0.008 failure, fire water system failure, drain valve failure, and unrea-
X5 0.184 sonable setting of fire dike is much greater than that of other
X6 0.048 basic events. These hazards in the emergency process will ser-
X7 0.012 iously affect the firefighting process and cause the further spread
X8 0.008
and expansion of accidents.
X9 0.208
X10 0.04 2. Environmental factors: In the case of fire separation insufficient,
X11 0.012 blast wave and radiant heat caused by the initial accident or
X12 0.016 weather factor (such as the strong wind) can easily cause some
X13 0.036 secondary accidents, such as nearby oil tank fire, firefighting
X14 0.024 equipment breakage, or building damages.
X15 0.02 3. Inherent equipment factors: Once some fixed facilities like tank,
X16 0.092 valve, flange, oil pipeline, floating plate, power-supply system,
X17 0.024 and water system are damaged in the initial accident, they can
X18 0.008 easily cause the leakage and spillage of burning oil and will have
X19 0.008
a great impact on accident upgrade.

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 4. Inherent hazardous conditions: Oil leakage and spillage, reburn-
ing, or reblasting will generate a huge blast wave and radiant
heat around the accident point, and these may ignite oil storage
equipment nearby or firefighting facilities.
5. Human factors: Illegal operation, not handled in time, or mis- Fig. 4. Failure model of secondary accident T2 of Dalian accident case.
judging the emergency disposal state are extremely easy factors
that delay the emergency rescue and cause secondary accidents,
such as reburning or reblasting of high temperature oil.
For these problems in the emergency process, we can take the
following active measures in advance to avoid secondary accidents:
1. The surrounding environment of the accident point and fire-
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fighting facility state have a great influence on the emergency

disposal after the initial accident. We should standardize design
for oil tank reservoir structure, fire pool, and fire lane and have
sufficient firefighting power in the emergency process.
2. We should pay great attention to cooling the ignition point and
around the burning oil tank in the emergency disposal process
and accurately estimate fire development tendency to avoid
secondary accidents like oil leakage and spillage, reburning,
or reblasting.
3. We should strictly comply with relevant regulars in the config-
uration and maintenance of the fixed facilities and regularly in-
spect oil tank, valve, oil pipeline, and some affiliated facilities to
ensure their normal operation.
4. We should make clear the relevant safety regulation for the
oil tank reservoir area and strengthen the emergency safety edu-
cation, training, and management for the staff, so as to avoid
missing the best time for firefighting due to illegal operation,
misjudgment, and not handled in time.
Case Study
In this paper, two typical fire and explosion accident cases in oil-
gas storage and transportation are taken as examples, and their
emergency processes are analyzed by using the established fault
tree model so as to find cause factors of secondary accidents
and verify the validity of the FTA method.
Oil Pipeline Explosion Accident in Dalian’s Xingang
Harbor on July 16, 2010
According to accident investigation report, the initial cause of the
July 16 Dalian’s Xingang Harbor oil pipeline explosion accident
was due to the worker’s improper operation that made the desul-
furization oxidant gathered in the oil pipeline burst into flames
(Office of the State Council Security Committee of China 2011).
Risk sources and secondary accidents that occurred after the initial
accident were as follows:
1. Oil leakage (X2) due to explosion formed ground flowing fire
and small fire separation and close distance between oil storage
tanks (X3)→Secondary accident around the initial accident
point (M1)→Secondary accident (T1): Nearby oil storage tank
(No. 103), bump house, and main oil pipelines were ignited.
The failure model of the secondary accident T1 is shown
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Failure model of secondary accident T1 of Dalian accident case.
Fig. 5. Failure model of secondary accident T3 of Dalian accident case.
Fig. 6. Failure model of secondary accident T4 of Dalian accident case.
2. Power-supply system was broken and valve could not be shut
off (X14) and unreasonable setting of fire dike (X19)→Second-
ary accident in the initial accident point (M2)→Secondary ac-
cident (T2): Fire could not be controlled at the beginning and at
least 1,500 t of crude oil was spilled. The failure model of the
secondary accident T2 is shown in Fig. 4.
3. Power-supply system and water system broken (X14) and fail-
ures of some firefighting facilities, such as fixed fire gun and
water spray ring pip (X16)→Secondary accident in the initial
accident point (M2)→Secondary accident (T3): The fire gradu-
ally was upgraded. The failure model of the secondary accident
T3 is shown in Fig. 5.
4. Power-supply system and water system broken (X14) and fire
water system failure (X17)→Secondary accident in the initial
accident point (M2)→Secondary accident (T4): The fire gradu-
ally was upgraded. The failure model of the secondary accident
T4 is shown in Fig. 6.
Based on the above analysis, analysis table of cause factors in
the emergency process can be established and shown in Table 6.
The fault tree of failure events is established by putting these failure
events into Fig. 1 and shown in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7, the shaded rec-
tangle represents failure events.
It can be seen from Fig. 7 that cause factors are X2, X3, X14,
X16, X17, and X19. The minimal cut sets of this fault tree are {X2,
X3}, {X14, X19}, {X14, X16}, and {X14, X17}, which are also
the ways leading to secondary accidents in the emergency process
of the July 16 fire accident in Dalian. For these cause factors, we
can put forward some safety measures in advance as follows:
1. In this accident, the road in the reservoir area is narrow and
the width is only 6 m, which can limit the use of firefighting
vehicles. Therefore, in the design of the oil reservoir area, it is
necessary to ensure fire passage to meet the specification
requirement.
2. The design of tank spacing should comply with specification
requirements, which can avoid having the unburned oil tanks
be affected by the blast wave and radiant heat from the burning
oil tank to further avoid secondary accidents.
3. The overflow pipe should be added to tank accessories, so that
the spilled oil can quickly flow into it to avoid forming a large
area of ground flowing fire.

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 Table 6. Analysis table of cause factors in emergency process of the July 16 Dalian accident case
Secondary
accident Failure model Cause factors
T1 {X2,X3}→T X2: oil leakage
X3: small fire separation, close distance between oil
storage tanks
T2 {X14,X19}→T X14: power-supply system and water system broken
X19: unreasonable setting of fire dike
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T3 {X14,X16}→T X14: power-supply system and water system broken
X16: failure of firefighting facilities
T4 {X14, X17}→T X14: power-supply system and water system broken
X17: fire water system failure
Fig. 7. Fault tree of failure events for Dalian accident case.
4. In the design of the valve, on one hand increasing the additional
structure of the remote shutoff valve or backup valve can be
considered. On the other hand, the different self-energy-storage
actuators should be set up according to the characteristics of the
tank area to ensure that the valves can be effectively closed dur-
ing the emergency.
August 18 Extraordinarily Big Fire in No. 1 Oil Tank
Reservoir of Qingdao Petroleum
On August 18, 1996, a fire occurred in the No.1 oil tank reservoir of
Qingdao Petroleum because the leaking oil vapor from the oil tank
truck met the external ignition source to explode (Li 1996; Aitmy
Trade Networks 2015). Risk sources and secondary accidents that
occurred after the initial accident were as follows:
1. Oil leakage (X2) due to explosion formed ground flowing fire
and close distance between oil tank trucks (X3)→Secondary ac-
cident around the initial accident point (M1)→Secondary acci-
dent (T1): 19 oil tank trucks exploded one after another and a
large amount of oil was spilled to form a large area of ground
flowing fire. The failure model of the secondary accident T1 is
shown in Fig. 8.
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J. Hazard. Toxic Radioact. Waste, 2018, 22(3): 04018011
Accident description
The initial explosion caused a lot of oil to spill into fire area and
formed a large area of ground flowing fire. With fire aggravating,
nearby oil storage tank (No. 103) was exploded and main oil
pipelines broken due to small fire separation and close distance
between oil storage tanks.
Power-supply system broken caused valve to be unable to shut off.
Unreasonable fire dike design led to fire being unable to
effectively control in the initial stage and at least 1,500-t oil
leakage.
Explosion caused power-supply system and water system to break
and failure of some firefighting facilities (such as fixed fire gun
failure), which resulted in fire upgrading gradually.
Explosion caused power-supply system and water system to break
and fire water system failure (such as water spray ring pipe
broken), which resulted in fire upgrading gradually.
Fig. 8. Failure model of secondary accident T1 of Qingdao accident
case.
Fig. 9. Failure model of secondary accident T2 of Qingdao accident
case.
Fig. 10. Failure model of secondary accident T3 of Qingdao accident
case.
2. Untimely fire foam supplement due to misjudgment (X4) and
high radiant heat caused by ground flowing fire (X5)→Secondary
accident in the initial accident point (M2)→Secondary accident
(T2): The fire was reburned in the entire trench. The failure
model of the secondary accident T2 is shown in Fig. 9.
3. Untimely fire foam supplement due to misjudgment (X4) and
high temperature in combustion area and fast extinguished fire
foam (X6)→Secondary accident in the initial accident point
(M2)→Secondary accident (T3): The fire was reburned in the
entire trench. The failure model of the secondary accident T3 is
shown in Fig. 10.
According to the above analysis, we can establish an analysis
table of cause factors in the emergency process as shown in Table 7.
In addition, we also establish a fault tree of failure events by putting
J. Hazard. Toxic Radioact. Waste
 Table 7. Analysis table of cause factors in emergency process of the August 18 Qingdao accident case
Secondary
accident Failure model Cause factors Accident description
T1 {X2,X3}→T X2: oil leakage After the initial accident, 19 oil tank trucks were exploded one after another
X3: small fire separation, close distance due to the small distance between them, and a large amount of oil leakage
between oil tank trucks formed a large area of ground flowing fire. In the heat of the fire, 200 m oil
pipeline in the trench under the oil tank truck burst into fire.
T2 {X4,X5}→T X4: misjudge Blast wave and radiant heat and untimely fire foam supplement due to
X5: blast wave and radiant heat misjudgment caused the entire trench to reburn.
T3 {X4, X6}→T X4: misjudge High temperature in fire area and untimely fire foam supplement due to
X6: weather factor misjudgment caused the entire trench to reburn.
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secondary accidents in the emergency process and their statis-

Fig. 11. Fault tree of failure events for Qingdao accident case.
these failure events into Fig. 1. It is shown in Fig. 11, where failure
events are represented with a shaded rectangle.
As shown in Fig. 11, cause factors are X2, X3, X4, X5, and X6.
The minimal cut sets of this fault tree are {X2, X3}, {X4, X5}, and
{X4, X6}, which are also the approaches leading to secondary ac-
cidents in the emergency process of the August 18 fire accident in
Qingdao. According to these cause factors, we can give some safety
measures in advance as follows:
1. The design of the tank area should meet specification require-
ments, which can avoid the unburned oil tanks being affected
by the blast wave and radiant heat from the burning oil tank to
further cause secondary accidents.
2. The tank truck spacing should meet the requirements to prevent
fire spreading and development because of the small spacing.
3. On-site fire commander must predict the most unfavorable si-
tuation of the fire and fully estimate needed human and material
resources for firefighting to ensure the effective and centralized
usage of firefighting resources.
Conclusion
This research focuses on emergency safety to analyze cause factors
in the emergency process for fire accident for an oil-gas storage and
transportation system by using the FTA method. Consequently, the
research highlights the following points:
1. According to public reports, 100 typical fire and explosion
accidents happened in an oil tank reservoir zone for about past
40 years at home and abroad. We analyzed causes that led to
tical features. Based on it, we summarize 19 cause factors in the
emergency process.
2. We established the fault tree model of secondary accidents in the
emergency process for the oil tank reservoir zone, and calcu-
lated its 44 minimal cut sets so as to learn the possible causes
of secondary accidents. In addition, eight minimal path sets of
this fault tree were also obtained, and we found possible ways to
avoid secondary accidents. We also calculated the probability
importance of each basic event so that their influencing degrees
on secondary accidents were determined.
3. Based on fault tree analysis, from the perspective of cause
factors, in this paper we conclude the possible hazards in the
emergency process of fire accident for oil-gas storage and trans-
portation and put forward some active prevention and control
measures in advance. The research results lay a solid foundation
to reveal a developing mechanism of secondary accidents and
realize proactive prevention and control of risk sources in the
emergency process.
For further research, we intend to integrate FTA with Bayesian
network (BN) to analyze cause factors in the emergency process.
The fault tree model will be transformed into a BN model, and we
will utilize polymorphism of the BN to calculate the more accurate
probability distribution of cause factors and study sensitivity and
influence analysis for them. In this way, we can grasp the influenc-
ing degree of every cause factor on secondary accidents more
reasonably and accurately. In addition, we will connect FTA with
system engineering theory [for example, interpretative structural
modeling (ISM)] and construct an ISM model and analyze the
relationship between cause factors to identify the direct causes,
indirect causes, and root causes resulting in secondary accidents.
Acknowledgments
This work was financially supported by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 51404052,
71571025, and 71774019.
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