Phronesis 62 (2017) 210-225

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Potentiality and Actuality of the Infinite:

A Misunderstood Passage in Aristotle’s Metaphysics
(Θ.6, 1048b14-17)
Hermann Weidemann
Albert-Ketterer-Weg 3, 79856 Hinterzarten, Germany
hermann.weidemann@t-online.de

Abstract

In Metaphysics Θ.6, 1048b14-17, Aristotle treats the problem of what it is for the infi-
nite to exist potentially, i.e. to be potentially actual. According to my interpretation,
Aristotle argues that to exist potentially is for the infinite to have a potentiality which
cannot be actualized in reality but only in thought, because it is a potentiality the pro-
cess of whose actualization cannot be brought to an end.

Keywords

actuality – potentiality – infinity – separation – Aristotle’s Metaphysics

In the sixth chapter of Book Θ of his Metaphysics, in which he shows that there
are different ways in which a potentiality may be related to its correspond-
ing actuality, Aristotle incidentally touches also on the question of how, in
the case of the infinite, potentiality and actuality are related to one another.
Before describing the sort of relation which obtains between them in this case,
he points out that in most other cases their relation is such that whatever holds
of something potentially can sometimes also hold of it actually in the sense
that it can truly be said to hold of it ‘without qualification’ (ἁπλῶς, 1048b12), i.e.
without the qualifying addition ‘potentially’. For instance, ‘is seen’ can be true
of something actually, on the one hand, because that thing is in fact seen, and

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 211

potentially, on the other hand, because that thing is capable of being seen (cf.
1048b13-14). In the case of the infinite, however, potentiality and actuality are
related to one another in a different way, a way that is described by Aristotle in
the following passage (1048b14-17):1

τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἔστιν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ

γνώσει. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ.

In view of the difficulties caused by the Greek, it is not surprising that scholars
differ widely on how to interpret and translate it. My aim in the present article
is to show that in an important respect it has so far been misunderstood and
incorrectly translated.
The passage in question—our Θ.6 passage, as I shall henceforth call it—
confronts the interpreter with a number of questions, among which the fol-
lowing three are the most urgent:

1. What is the complete wording of the phrase abbreviated to ἀλλὰ γνώσει?

Is it (a) ἀλλὰ δυνάμει γνώσει, or (b) ἀλλὰ ὡς γνώσει ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, or
(c) ἀλλὰ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον γνώσει?
2. What is the relation of the three nominalized infinitive constructions,
τὸ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν, τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν and τὸ
χωρίζεσθαι, to the predicate ἀποδίδωσι? Are (a) the first and the third re-
lated to this predicate as objects and the second as subject, (b) the second
and the third as objects and the first as subject, or (c) the first and the
third as subjects and the second as object?2
3. What is the subject-accusative expression that belongs to the infinitive
χωρίζεσθαι?

1  The Greek text has been quoted from Ross 1924, vol. 2 and Jaeger 1957, who in their editions
have corrected, following Christ 1886, the obviously erroneous reading τῷ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι of
the manuscripts, which Bonitz (1848-1849, vol. 1) had adopted, to the reading τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι,
which is indirectly testified by (ps.-)Alexander (in Metaph. 581.11 Hayduck).
2  There are in principle three further possibilities, which are out of the question, however, for
syntactic reasons.

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212 Weidemann

II

As for Question 1, there are two reasons why either answer 1(b) or answer 1(c)
should be preferred to answer 1(a).3 First, there is either a parallelism between
γνώσει and ἐνεργείᾳ, which suggests that γνώσει abbreviates ὡς γνώσει ἐσόμενον
χωριστόν (1(b)),4 or a parallelism between γνώσει and χωριστόν, which suggests
that γνώσει abbreviates ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον γνώσει (1(c)). That is to say that
Aristotle attempts to answer the question of the way in which the infinite
exists potentially either by looking for an answer to the question of the way in
which the infinite ‘is to be’ (i.e. can be expected to be)5 ‘separate’ (χωριστόν),
namely separate from its mere potentiality,6 or by looking for an answer to
the question of the way in which the infinite is to exist ‘actually’ (ἐνεργείᾳ).
In any case, the answer to the question of the way in which the infinite exists
potentially results, in his view, from the answer to the question of the way in
which the potentiality of the infinite to exist can be actualized. I shall argue
that Aristotle’s answer to this question is that this potentiality can be actual-
ized, not in such a way that the infinite actually exists in the extramental real-
ity, but in such a way only that it actually exists in the mind.
What strongly suggests the inadequacy of 1(a) is, secondly, the fact that, if
ἀλλὰ γνώσει were to be understood in the sense of ἀλλὰ δυνάμει γνώσει, then
Aristotle would have regarded the potentiality of the infinite to exist not as
a real potentiality but as a mere conceivability, which, however, he does not

3  Answer 1(a) is endorsed by Bonitz 1890, 185 = 1994, 240; Ross 1924, ii. 250, 252; Hope 1952, 189;
Apostle 1966, 152; Hintikka 1973, 131-3; the Londinenses (Burnyeat et al. 1984, 127); Reale 1993,
ii. 411; Hübner 2000, 270, 274, 275 n. 20; Tricot 2000, 501; and Makin 2006, 7, 141. For answer
1(b), see Rolfes 1904, 23, 162 n. 16 = 1928, 231, 374-5 n. 17; Tredennick 1933, 447; Bassenge 1960,
212 = 1990, 222; Hussey 1983, 87; Ross 1984, 1655; Furth 1985, 68; Szlezák 2003, 158; and Beere
2009, 209-10 n. 71. Answer 1(c) seems to originate, if not in every detail, at least in outline,
with Wieland (1970, 298), who has been followed by Wolf (1979, 412 n. 22). Independently of
Wieland Burnyeat too (2008, 227-8), who has suggested emending γνώσει to γενέσει, seems
to endorse this answer. His proposal to alter the received text, which has been accepted by
Makin, will be discussed in Section V below.
4  Beere, who points out this parallelism (‘The datives are in parallel with one another’: 2009,
210 n. 71), describes what, according to answer 1(b), Aristotle wants to say as follows: ‘hav-
ing said that the infinite is in capacity not inasmuch as it is going to be separate in energeia
(ἐνεργείᾳ), he allows that the infinite is in capacity inasmuch as it is going to be separate in
thought (γνώσει)’ (his emphases).
5  For this rendering of the future tense of the participle ἐσόμενον cf. Kühner and Gerth 1898-
1904, ii.1, 173, 175-6; ii.2, 90-2.
6  For the view that ‘separate’ here means ‘separate from its mere potentiality’ see the final
paragraph of the present section of this article.

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 213

appear to have done. As the second sentence of our Θ.6 passage shows, the
kind of infinite he speaks about in this passage, that which is infinite ‘with
respect to division’ (κατὰ διαίρεσιν, Phys. 3.4, 204a7; cf. 3.6, 206a15-16), exists
potentially in that the division with respect to which it is infinite can be
repeated ad infinitum. The infinity of the set of stretches, e.g., into which a
given line can be divided by first bisecting it, then bisecting its two halves,
then bisecting the four halves of its two halves, and so on, is a potential infin-
ity in that each bisection can be followed by a further one. That this infinite
divisibility of a line is in Aristotle’s opinion not a real potentiality but a mere
conceivability we have no grounds to suppose; that lines are infinitely divisible
is for him, as it seems, in the nature of things.
The fact that the verb ὑπολείπειν (‘to fail’, ‘to give out’), which occurs in our
Θ.6 passage, is used in a similar passage of the Physics in combination with the
expression ἐν τῇ νοήσει (‘in thought’) is by no means a proof to the contrary.
For in this passage, which runs: ‘because they do not give out in thought (ἐν τῇ
νοήσει μὴ ὑπολείπειν), number and mathematical magnitudes and what is out-
side the heavens all are thought to be infinite’ (Phys. 3.4, 203b23-5),7 Aristotle
advances an argument for the real existence of the infinite, against which he
subsequently raises the objection that one must not blindly trust in thought,
rashly inferring from the possibility of thinking of a spatial magnitude as in-
finitely large that it is infinitely large in reality (cf. Phys. 3.8, 208a14-19).8 It is
not, then, the potentiality of the infinite to exist but its real existence that he
is concerned with here. More precisely, his point is that certain things which
are taken to be infinite because their infinity can be thought of are not in fact
infinite. That the infinity of what in his opinion is rightly taken to be infinite,
as for example the infinity of the sequence of positive integers or the infinity of
the set of stretches into which a line can be divided by repeated bisection, is for
him the infinity of something whose potentiality is a mere conceivability can-
not, therefore, be inferred from the Physics passage quoted. What this passage
suggests is rather the contrary, namely, that the potentiality of the genuine in-
finite is for him a real potentiality. For if the existence of the merely putative
infinite is no less conceivable than that of the genuine infinite, and if the latter
can no more exist in reality than the former, Aristotle would not be able to
distinguish the latter from the former if he held that its potentiality to exist
were no less a mere conceivability than that of the former. If both the genuine
infinite and the putative one are such that their potentiality can be actualized
only in thought, what makes them different from one another can only be the

7  Hussey’s translation (1983, 8; my emphasis).

8  For the last-mentioned passage see Wieland 1970, 304-5; Hintikka 1973, 128-9.

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214 Weidemann

fact that the potentiality of the genuine infinite is a real potentiality, whereas
the potentiality of the putative infinite is a mere conceivability.9
As for the remaining two answers to Question 1: according to each of them,
Aristotle will turn out to be making essentially the same assertion. What ac-
cording to 1(b) is expressed by ἐνεργείᾳ, namely the reality as opposed to the
mere conceivability of the actual existence of the infinite, is expressed accord-
ing to 1(c) by χωριστόν as the separateness of the infinite from other things
independently of which it exists; and what according to 1(c) is expressed by
ἐνεργείᾳ, namely the actuality of what the infinite is potentially, is expressed
according to 1(b) by χωριστόν as the separateness of the infinite from its mere
potentiality. What tips the scales in favour of 1(b) is the fact that ἐνεργείᾳ is
more obviously in parallel with γνώσει than χωριστόν is. In comparison with
1(b), which imposes itself upon an unprejudiced reader as the intuitively right
answer to Question 1, 1(c) seems rather far-fetched and artificial. Answer 1(b),
then, allows for a more natural reading of the text than 1(c) and should there-
fore be preferred.10
As regards the word χωριστός (‘separate’, ‘separable’),11 it has quite a special
sense in our Θ.6 passage if 1(b) is the correct answer to Question 1. Hussey,
who refers to this passage as bearing witness to the use of χωριστός in the same
sense in which κεχωρισμένος (‘separated’) is used in Phys. 3.5, 204b7-8 (ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδ’ ἀριθμὸς οὕτως ὡς κεχωρισμένος καὶ ἄπειρος), rightly points out that in
the latter passage ‘kechōrismenos . . . cannot mean, as chōristos . . . often does,
anything like “self-subsistent” or “existing independently of ordinary things” . . .
The sense required is, rather, “existing as the number of an actually realized

9  Since, in Aristotle’s view, ‘the universe is necessarily finite in size’ (Hussey 1983, p. xxiii),
his criterion for distinguishing between the real potentiality of the genuine infinite and
the mere conceivability of the putative one seems to be this: the potentiality of some-
thing to be infinite is not a mere conceivability, but a real potentiality if and only if its
potential infinity is compatible with the finiteness of the universe. While the infinity of
the set of continuous bisections by which a line can be divided, or the infinity of the se-
quence of numbers by which these bisections can be counted, is compatible with it, the
infinity of the extension of a spatial magnitude is not (cf. Phys. 3.7, 207b1-21).
10  That nothing more, but also nothing less, can be said in favour of 1(b) is due to the fact
that our Θ.6 passage is formulated in a way that does not allow an interpretation to be
proven correct, but only to be shown more plausible than rival ones.
11  What the separateness or the separability expressed by this word exactly consists in is a
matter of dispute, on which see Hübner 2000. According to Morrison, ‘the probability is
very strong that Aristotle, or his circle, coined the word’ (1985, 92).

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 215

totality” and hence “separated out” from a mere potentiality’.12 That, in our
Θ.6 passage, the word χωριστός is used in this sense was already recognized
by Rolfes, whose translation of the first sentence of this passage runs: ‘das
Unendliche aber ist nicht so der Möglichkeit nach, als ob es einmal aktuell von
der Potenz getrennt werden könnte, sondern nur für die Erkenntnis ist es von
ihr getrennt.’13

III

If we use the letters Υ, Δ and Χ as short-hand labels for the three nominalized
infinitive constructions τὸ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν, τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην
τὴν ἐνέργειαν and τὸ χωρίζεσθαι, we can illustrate the three possible answers to
Question 2 as follows:

2(a) 2(b) 2(c)

Ƴ ∆ Ƴ
∆ Ƴ ∆
X X X

Answer 2(c) is the mirror image of answer 2(a), which it inverts by exchanging
the roles played by Υ, Δ and Χ in relation to the predicate ἀποδίδωσι. Whereas
according to 2(a) Δ is the subject of ἀποδίδωσι while Υ and Χ are objects of it,
according to 2(c) Δ is an object of ἀποδίδωσι while Υ and Χ are its subjects. As
for answer 2(b), it is intermediary between 2(a) and 2(c) in that it makes, on
the one hand, Υ and Δ play the same roles as 2(c) while, on the other hand, Χ
play the same role as 2(a).
Answer 2(b) appears to be the most popular answer to Question 2. Ross, who
expressly argues that 2(b) should be preferred to 2(a), points out that already
(ps.-)Alexander understood the text in the sense of 2(b) (cf. in Metaph. 580.33-
581.11 Hayduck).14 Nobody besides Hintikka and, following him, Wolf appears

12  Hussey 1983, 79. Hussey’s view has convincingly been defended by Hübner (cf. 2000,
273-5).
13  Rolfes 1904, 23 = 1928, 231.
14  Cf. Ross 1924, ii. 252-3.

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216 Weidemann

to have voted in favour of 2(a),15 while only Rolfes, the Londinenses (Burnyeat
et al.), Makin and Beere appear to understand the text in the sense of 2(c).16
In order to answer Question 2 correctly, we must pay attention, on the one
hand, to the fact that it is the task of the second sentence of our Θ.6 passage to
explain why the infinite exists potentially in the way described by the first sen-
tence and, on the other hand, to the fact that the predicate ἀποδίδωσι indicates
that the things signified by Υ, Δ and Χ in a certain way are and in a certain way
are not related to one another by definition. In view of this consideration, 2(c)
undoubtedly deserves to be regarded as the right answer to Question 2. For, in
order to explain what it is destined to explain, the second sentence of the pas-
sage does not need to inform us either of what is such that the state of affairs
signified by Δ ‘renders’ it, in the sense that it defines it or gives an account of
it,17 and what is not; or of what is such that the state of affairs signified by Υ
‘renders’ it in this sense and what is not. The sentence in question must rather
inform us of what is such that the state of affairs signified by Δ is in this sense
‘rendered’ by it and what is not. That is to say that neither Υ nor Χ is related to
ἀποδίδωσι (‘renders’) as object: Χ as well as Υ are related to it as subjects.18 It is
what Υ signifies, not what Χ signifies, that defines or gives an account of what
is signified by Δ. In other words: the second sentence of our Θ.6 passage does
not need to inform us either of what is such that τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν
ἐνέργειαν gives an account of it and what is not, or of what is such that τὸ μὴ
ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν does so and what is not. The sentence in question must
rather inform us of what is such that an account of τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν
ἐνέργειαν is given by it and what is not.

15  Cf. Hintikka 1973, 132, 133-4; Wolf 1979, 71, 72, 413 n. 23. Lear, who, following Ross, interprets
the text in the sense of 2(b), rightly rejects Hintikka’s interpretation (cf. 1979/1980, 192-3;
see also Hübner 2000, 274).
16  Cf. Rolfes 1904, 23 = 1928, 231; Burnyeat et al. 1984, 128; Makin 2006, 7; Beere 2009, 209. None
of the three possible answers to Question 2 is matched by the rather strange manner in
which Apostle translates the second sentence of our Θ.6 passage: ‘For, to a never-ending
process of division we attribute an actuality which exists potentially, but not a separate
existence to the infinite’ (1966, 152; Apostle’s emphasis). Apostle seems to suppose that in
this sentence τὸ ἄπειρον is to be added in thought as a second object parallel to Υ.
17  For this meaning of the Greek verb cf. LSJ s.v. ἀποδίδωμι, I.11.
18  ‘In 15-17 τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ is to be taken as a second subject, parallel to τὸ μὴ ὑπολείπειν
τὴν διαίρεσιν’ (Burnyeat et al. 1984, 128; the Londinenses’ emphasis). The οὔ, which the
Londinenses should have dropped, is not a constituent part of this second subject, how-
ever, but belongs to the predicate ἀποδίδωσι. Hübner’s criticism of the suggested construc-
tion (cf. 2000, 274 n. 18) rests on a misunderstanding of what this predicate means.

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 217

It is important to be aware of what exactly is meant here by giving an ac-

count of τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν (i.e. of the state of affairs signified
by Δ). Translated literally, Δ means ‘this actuality’, i.e. the actuality which is
at stake here,19 namely the actuality of the infinite, ‘existing potentially’. An
admissible paraphrase of this translation which more clearly expresses Δ’s
meaning is: ‘the infinite being potentially actual.’ But the account given of
the state of affairs signified by Δ is not, as the wording of Δ might suggest, an
account of the potentiality of the infinite’s actual existence. It is rather an
account of the actual existence which the infinite has potentially. What the
state of affairs signified by Υ gives an account of is, strictly speaking, not the
εἶναι δυνάμει of the infinite but the εἶναι which belongs to the infinite δυνάμει.

IV

There are also three possible answers to Question 3; but, curiously enough,
only two of them seem to have been given to it so far, namely that the ex-
pression which functions as the subject-accusative of the infinitive χωρίζεσθαι
is τὸ ἄπειρον, and that this expression is ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν.20 Both answers
are unsatisfactory for the following reason: If Question 1 has to be answered
by 1(b), which has turned out most probably to be the correct answer to this
question, then the first sentence of our Θ.6 passage makes a qualified state-
ment with respect to the separation of the infinite from its mere potentiality,
namely the statement that the infinite can be separated from this potentiality
in knowledge but not in reality. It would contravene this qualified statement if,
in the second sentence of the passage, the unqualified statement were made
that it is not the separation of the infinite, or for that matter the separation of
its actuality, from its mere potentiality that accounts for the actual existence
which it has potentially. Neither τὸ ἄπειρον, then, nor ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν is

19  For this quasi-adverbial use of the demonstrative pronoun cf. LSJ s.v. οὗτος, C.I.5.
20  The view that τὸ ἄπειρον is the subject-accusative of the infinitive χωρίζεσθαι, which was
already taken by (ps.‑)Alexander (in Metaph. 581.11 Hayduck), is taken by Ross 1924, ii. 252,
253; Hope 1952, 189; Bassenge 1960, 212 = 1990, 221; Hintikka 1973, 132; Wolf 1979, 71; Lear
1979/1980, 193; Furth 1985, 68; Szlezák 2003, 158; and Makin 2006, 7. The view that it is
ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν is taken by Rolfes 1904, 23 = 1928, 231; Tredennick 1933, 447; Seel 1982,
293; Ross 1984, 1655-6; Reale 1993, ii. 411; Hübner 2000, 270, 274; Tricot 2000, 501; and Beere
2009, 209. Bonitz, who sticks to the dative τῷ χωρίζεσθαι of the manuscripts, takes this
dative to be a counterpart of the dative δυνάμει (cf. 1848-1849, ii. 395); he therefore trans-
lates: ‘dass diese Wirklichkeit nur dem Vermögen nach, aber nicht in selbständiger
Abtrennung besteht’ (1890, 185 = 1994, 241).

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218 Weidemann

likely to play the part of the subject-accusative which belongs to the infinitive
χωρίζεσθαι.
The expression which remains to be considered and yet appears to have
been disregarded by previous interpreters and translators, τὴν διαίρεσιν, turns
out to be the most promising candidate. As far as the syntactic structure of the
text is concerned, the fact that the infinitive constructions Υ and Χ, both being
subjects of the predicate ἀποδίδωσι, are in parallel with one another strongly
suggests that the same expression which, regarding the infinitive ὑπολείπειν,
functions as subject-accusative also has this function with respect to the infini-
tive χωρίζεσθαι. As for the meaning of the text: to say that the process of divi-
sion is separated makes good sense. For since it is its ‘not failing [to continue]’
(μὴ ὑπολείπειν) with which its ‘being separated’ (χωρίζεσθαι) is contrasted, to
be separated, obviously, is for it to be separated from continuing, i.e. to be ab-
solved from taking on further states of its development because it has reached
the final state by which it is completed. Whereas the process of dividing a line
five times, say, fails to continue and, thus, is separated from continuing in the
sense of having been completed after the fifth cut, the process of infinitely
dividing a line never fails to continue and, thus, is never separated from con-
tinuing in this sense.21
The use of the verb χωρίζεσθαι to express the separation of the process of
division from continuing, i.e. the completion of this process, matches perfectly
the use of the verbal adjective χωριστός to express the separateness of the in-
finite from its mere potentiality, i.e. the actuality of the infinite. For the infi-
nite would be separate from its mere potentiality in the sense of being actual
exactly when the process of division has been separated from continuing in
the sense of having been completed. Since, as a matter of fact, this process can
never be completed, the infinite can, in reality at least, never be actual.
If, as there is every reason to believe, this is what Aristotle wants to say in our
Θ.6 passage, the separation of a process from continuing is, according to him,
not the actualization of a potentiality distinct from that which is actualized
when the process in question is still going on, but the end and completion of
the successive actualization of this very potentiality. Our Θ.6 passage, in other
words, implies the view that the process by which a certain object changes

21  As for the parallelism between ὑπολείπειν and χωρίζεσθαι in the second sentence of our
Θ.6 passage, there is a similar parallelism between ἀπολείπεσθαι and χωριστὸν εἶναι in the
fourth book of the Physics, where Aristotle makes the requirement, regarding what he
calls ‘the primary place’, ‘that it should be left behind by each object [when the object
moves] and be separable [from it]’ (ἀπολείπεσθαι ἑκάστου καὶ χωριστὸν εἶναι, Phys. 4.4,
211a2-3, tr. Hussey 1983, 26).

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 219

from being in a certain state to being in another does not occur in such a way
that two different potentialities are actualized one after the other (during its
occurrence, the potentiality of the object to be undergoing the change in ques-
tion; and, at the end of its occurrence, the potentiality of the object to have
undergone this change), but in such a way that one and the same potentiality
is step by step being actualized during its occurrence and has completely been
actualized at the end of its occurrence.22 According to this view, the process
by which a line changes from being undivided to being divided five times, e.g.,
does not occur in such a way that, until the fifth cut, the potentiality of the
line to be getting divided five times and, after the fifth cut, its potentiality to
have got divided five times is actualized, but in such a way that the potential-
ity of the line to be divided five times is step-by-step being actualized until the
fifth cut and has completely been actualized after the fifth cut.23 In the case of
an endless process, however, the potentiality of the object concerned is only
step-by-step being actualized, without ever having completely been actualized,
and it is just this Aristotle wants to point out in the second sentence of our Θ.6
passage.
It is difficult to specify just what the potentiality is that is being actualized
in an endless process. As far as the process of infinitely dividing a line is con-
cerned, the answer that the potentiality which is being, but never will have
been, actualized in this process is the potentiality of the line infinitely to be
divided, i.e. its potentiality to be ‘in a state of infinite dividedness’,24 would
surely be wrong, for, according to Aristotle, nothing is such that it has this

22  That this view is implied by our Θ.6 passage is clear from the fact that, if Aristotle had not
held it, there would have been no need for him to grant the infinite, as far as the relation
of its potentiality to its actuality is concerned, the special status that he is granting it in
this passage. For then he could easily have ascribed to it a potentiality which can, like any
other potentiality, be actualized in reality, namely the potentiality to be undergoing an
endless process. The mistaken claim that this is the potentiality which Aristotle ascribes
to the infinite has rightly been criticized by Coope (cf. 2012, 274-5, 278).
23  As Coope has convincingly argued (cf. 2012, 278-80), this view is implied also by Aristotle’s
distinction between a ‘change’ (κίνησις) and an ‘activity’ (ἐνέργεια), the locus classicus of
which is Metaph. Θ.6, 1048b18-35, for which see Burnyeat 2008. Makin, who has exten-
sively discussed this distinction (cf. 2006, 141-150), describes it as a distinction between an
action which is ‘incomplete’ in that it ‘leads to a distinct result, something over and above
the action itself’ and an action which is ‘complete’ in that ‘there is no result distinct from
the action itself’ (2006, 142).
24  Coope 2012, 280.

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220 Weidemann

potentiality.25 Presumably Aristotle would have subscribed to the following

answer, which I should like to propose: the potentiality which is being, but
never will have been, actualized in the process of infinitely dividing a line is
the potentiality of the line to be divided, given a number, be it ever so great, an
even greater number of times.26 To put it more precisely: It is the potentiality
of the line to be divided, given any natural number n, n + 1 times.
The message our Θ.6 passage is intended to convey can thus be stated as
follows. Since the process by which the potentially infinite is becoming actu-
ally infinite is the successive actualization of a potentiality which cannot be
actualized completely, the infinite can never be separate from this potentiality
in such a way that it is separate from it in reality, but in such a way only that it is
separate from it in thought. That is to say that it can never in reality be actually
infinite but only in thought as an object of knowledge.27

In its received textual shape, in which it states that ‘the infinite does not exist
potentially in such a way that it is to be separate [from its mere potentiality]
in reality, but in such a way that it is to be separate [from it] in knowledge’, the
first sentence of our Θ.6 passage is well suited to the second sentence. Just as
in the first sentence ἐνεργείᾳ has a fitting counterpart in γνώσει, in the second
sentence ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν has a fitting counterpart in δυνάμει. The word
ἐνέργεια, which in the second sentence names the actuality as opposed to the
potentiality of the infinite, in the first sentence names the reality as opposed
to the mere conceivability of the actuality of the infinite. As a name for the
actuality of the infinite this word is not available therefore in the first sentence,
for which reason, as it seems, the infinite existing actually is paraphrased in

25  This has rightly been pointed out by Coope 2012, 280. Her answer to the question at issue,
according to which the potentiality we are looking for is ‘a potential that has no complete
fulfilment but that is fulfilled as completely as it can be in the process by which the line is
being divided ad infinitum’ (2012, 281; her emphases), is unsatisfactory however.
26  That Aristotle would have endorsed this answer, is suggested by his claim that ‘the infinite
is the opposite of what people say it is: it is not that of which no part is outside, but that
of which some part is always outside’ (Phys. 3.6, 206b33-207a2, tr. Hussey 1983, 15). Cf.
also Phys. 3.7, 207b12-13: ἀεὶ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ λαμβανόμενον παντὸς ὡρισμένου πλήθους (‘what is
taken always exceeds any definite multitude’, tr. Hussey 1983, 17).
27  How, according to Aristotle, the infinite can be an object of knowledge, I shall explain in
the following section of this article.

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 221

this sentence with the help of the word χωριστόν as the infinite being separate,
namely separate from existing merely potentially.
Since the received text of the first sentence makes good sense, there is no
need to emend γνώσει to γενέσει, as Burnyeat has suggested (cf. 2008, 228).
According to Burnyeat this emendation ‘would bring Θ.6 into line with Phys.
3.6, 206a21-5, where the infinite is said to be in actuality in the same way as a
day or a contest, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι. As one hour or one race suc-
ceeds another,’ Burnyeat argues, ‘so a magnitude’s potential for continuous
division is actualized by successive cuts, one after another. The infinite has a
potentiality to be actual not as a separate entity but γενέσει, in a process which
may go on and on without limit.’
In his attempt to base his proposal on the passage from Physics 3.6, Burnyeat
fails to take into account that what Aristotle is concerned with in this passage
is different from what matters for him and what he lays stress upon in our Θ.6
passage. In 206a21-5, which has to be read in connection with the immediately
preceding lines, 18-21,28 Aristotle concerns himself with the fact that, in the
case of the infinite, the way in which its potentiality to exist can be actual-
ized is not the same as, e.g., in the case of a statue, which can actually exist
all-in-all at once, but is the same as, e.g., in the case of a day or a particular set
of Olympic games, which can actually exist only piece-by-piece.29 In our Θ.6
passage, however, it is not this affinity of the infinite with finite things such
as days or sets of games with which Aristotle is concerned, but the important
difference that obtains between the infinite and things of this sort. They essen-
tially differ in that, while the 2020 Olympics, say, can in due course have been
carried out in their entirety, the division-process by which the potentiality of
the infinite to exist is being actualized is an endless process, which can never
be completed.30
If the reading γνώσει of the manuscripts is retained, then explication is
needed for what exactly is meant by Aristotle’s claim that the infinite exists
potentially ‘in such a way that it is to be separate [from its mere potentiality] in

28  See also Phys. 3.6, 206a29-33, 206b13-14.

29  Cf. Coope 2012, 272-3.
30  Coope has rightly emphasized this difference in her critical assessment of the contrasting
views taken by Hintikka on the one hand and Lear on the other (cf. Coope 2012, 274-80).
‘The difference,’ she writes (2012, 282), ‘is that in the case of these potentials (for the day
or the game to occur), there is a corresponding complete fulfilment (the occurrence of
the day or of the game), whereas the potential we ascribe to something when we say it
is infinitely divisible is a potential that has no complete fulfilment.’ She seems to have
overlooked, however, that this difference is the crucial point in our Θ.6 passage, which is
mentioned by her only incidentally (2012, 283 nn. 7 and 11).

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222 Weidemann

knowledge’. As far as the infinite set of stretches into which a given line can be
divided by repeated bisection is concerned, Aristotle does not mean, of course,
that this set can become actual in knowledge by a mental process of repeat-
edly bisecting the line in question.31 In the third book of the Physics he makes
a statement that sheds some light on the claim at issue, namely the statement
that the infinite ‘is potentially, in the way in which matter is, and not in itself,
as the finite is’ (δυνάμει οὕτως ὡς ἡ ὕλη, καὶ οὐ καθ’ αὑτό, ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον,
Phys. 3.6, 206b14-16, tr. Hussey 1983, 15; cf. 207a21-8). Hussey, who associates
this statement with our Θ.6 passage, explains what it is for the infinite to be-
come actual in knowledge as follows: just as we know the matter of materi-
al substances by detaching it in thought from the different forms which it is
able to receive, we know the infinite set of equal parts into which a spatial
magnitude is divisible by detaching it in thought from the finite sets of equal
parts which in the course of a division-process succeed one another (cf. 1983,
87). The matter of a material substance ‘can be separated in thought’, Hussey
writes; ‘we can think away everything that makes the matter some determinate
substance and what is left by this thought-experiment is the matter itself. Just
so,’ he adds, ‘in thought we can separate an infinite series from its successive
partial realizations.’
As for our Θ.6 passage, Burnyeat has raised a question to which this expla-
nation provides a satisfactory answer. ‘And how to square this text with Phys.
3.6, 207a25-6,’ he asks (2008, 228), ‘where Aristotle claims that the infinite qua
infinite is unknowable?’ In order correctly to understand this claim it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that Aristotle justifies it by pointing out that ‘the [kind of]
matter [which the infinite qua infinite is] has no form’ (εἶδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὕλη,
207a26, my translation). For if it is on account of its formlessness that matter is
unknowable, it is unknowable only as such, but not insofar as it is a component
part of the thing whose matter it is, and just this conclusion Aristotle seems to
draw, when in Metaph. α.2 he declares: ‘But matter also must be apprehended
[as being] in the thing which changes’ (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐν κινουμένῳ νοεῖν
ἀνάγκη, 994b25-6).32 That is to say, we must apprehend matter as the recipient

31  A line, we are told in the second book of the Metaphysics, ‘does not stop being divisible,
but one cannot apprehend it unless one stops dividing’ (κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις μὲν οὐχ ἵσταται,
νοῆσαι δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ στήσαντα: Metaph. α.2, 994b23-4; my translation).
32  My translation. Ross, who suspects the sentence of being corrupt, suggests reading, ‘with
hesitation,’ as he expressly confesses, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὅλην οὐ κινουμένῳ νοεῖν ἀνάγκη (cf. 1924,
i. 219-20). To the received text good sense can be attached, however. If the sentence is in
fact, as Jaeger thinks it could be (cf. 1957, 37 ad loc.), a reader’s note which has intruded
from the margin, it would nevertheless be in accord with Aristotle’s position.

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Potentiality And Actuality Of The Infinite 223

of the contrasting forms which are replaced by one another when the thing
whose matter it is undergoes a change. Just, then, as matter is knowable not as
such but insofar as it can in different ways be shaped into a substance, so the
infinite too is knowable not as such but insofar as it can by degrees partially
be realized.33
Let me summarize. The point of the passage examined in the present ar-
ticle, which has been missed in the translations and interpretations I am
acquainted with, is the way in which Aristotle in its second sentence attempts
to justify what he has asserted in the first. Having asserted in the first sentence
that the infinite does not exist potentially in such a way that it is actually to
exist in reality, but in such a way that it is actually to exist in knowledge, he
points out in the second sentence that this is the case because the process of
the actualization of the infinite’s potentiality to exist is an endless process
which is impossible to complete. By reason of the endlessness of this process
the infinite cannot actually exist in reality, but only in thought as an object of
knowledge. Although its potentiality to exist is a real potentiality, its actual
existence is confined, as it were, to our heads.34
I therefore propose to translate the passage as follows:35

The infinite, however, does not exist potentially in such a way that it is to
be separate [from its mere potentiality] in reality, but in such a way that
it is to be separate [from it] in knowledge. For being potentially actual
means, here, the division’s not failing [to continue], not its being sepa-
rated [from continuing].36

33  For the ‘analogy’ which ‘Aristotle often draws . . . between the infinite and matter’, cf. Lear
1979/1980, 201-2.
34  As existing ‘in the heads’ (‘in den Köpfen’), Ulrich Nortmann, whom I should like to thank
for a helpful exchange of ideas, has characterized the infinity about which mathemati-
cians rack their brains (cf. Nortmann 2015, 323, 327-8).
35  If I were asked to propose a German translation, it would be: ‘Das Unendliche aber
­existiert nicht in der Weise der Möglichkeit nach, dass es in Wirklichkeit [von sei-
nem bloßen Möglichsein] losgelöst sein könnte, sondern in der Weise, dass es in der
Erkenntnis [davon] losgelöst sein kann. Denn der Möglichkeit nach wirklich zu sein heißt
hier ja, dass die Teilung nicht aufhört [weiterzugehen], und nicht etwa, dass sie [vom
Weitergehen] losgelöst würde.’
36  I am grateful to George Boys-Stones (Durham) and John Magee (Toronto), who have
made this article more easily readable by correcting grammatical mistakes and stylistic
inelegancies of earlier versions, for their generous help.

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224 Weidemann

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