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Imf&wb PDF
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True but justifiably, critics of the World Bank and the IMF are
concerned about the conditionalities-cum-acute stipulations
imposed on borrower countries. The World Bank and the IMF often
attach loan conditionalities based on what is generally termed the
Washington Consensus, focusing on liberalisation-of trade,
investment and the financial sector- deregulation and privatisation
of nationalised industries. Commonly these stipulated
conditionalities are orchestrated without due regard for the
borrower countries’ respective circumstances and therefore the
prescriptive recommendations by the World Bank and IMF
normally fail to resolve the economic problems within the countries.
Whatever the justification for the developing nations’ borrowing 2
loans from the IMF and the World Bank, the truth remains
irrefutable: by agreeing to the terms dictated by these Bretton
Woods institutions, we do agree to compromise our economic
independence focusing on our basic needs that cater our people’s
demands of accommodation and survival. Or in other words, the
IMF-imposed conditionalities largely obscure a state’s authority to
govern its own economy as national economic policies are
predetermined under IMF packages.
And yet conceptually, the understanding of the World Bank and the
IMF of the term ‘development’ – both in doctrine and practice – has
meant a focus on GDP growth, increased trade and greater
consumption. This is reflected in the UN’s adoption of the Human
Development Index as a counter to GDP per capita as a measure of
‘development’. Inequalities among states and within states,
however, have been growing, in many countries, unemployment has
increased, particularly affecting youth, and standards of living have
drastically dropped.
Our policy irony is that despite our wilful denial of not depending
on the IMF support, we are again, and again, and again trapped in
this negative western capitalist trajectory support system. Very
shortly after the historic failure of Bretton Woods System of Fixed
Exchange Rates in August 1971, Pakistan de-linked PKR from GBP
and pegged it de jure with USD at the same parity of PKR
4.7697/USD to keep its fixed exchange rate regime intact, despite
its international demise. In May 1972, parity was devalued to PKR
11.0078, but re-valued again to PKR 9.9078 in February 1973. This
so called parity with USD continued till December 1981. Thereafter,
Pakistan adopted a system of managed floating regime since
January 1982. And consequently, it became impossible for us to
keep flowing the fixed regime. And our readjustment synergy
resulted in causing exchange rate rising so crucially that we have
reached from PKR 9.9078 in December 1981 to PKR 150.09 in May 3
2019.
Our historic misfortune is that in order to get rid of poverty and for
accelerating the economic growth, Pakistan avails funding
opportunity from the world’s largest financial institution IMF
(International Monetary Fund) since decades. However, here a
question arises that whether IMF financial support gives the
positive growth to the economy of Pakistan or it just playing a vital
role in enhancing poverty level instead of prosperity. The purpose
of taking loans from the IMF is that Pakistan’s Government wants
to stabilize its deteriorating economy, exchange rates and balance
of payments. No doubt, IMF helps us in these type of circumstances
and helps us by providing a huge amount of loans. At the very first
sight, it seems a very attractive offer but only for a short-term
perspective. The reality is quite different. When we get a loan from
the IMF, in exchange of that, it imposes so many demands and
conditions on us. This way or that way, we are bound to fulfill the
demands and conditions.
This story of our misfortune is not ended yet. For the 13th time in
three decades, Pakistan formally requested an IMF loan in October
2018, triggering on-going discussions between PM Khan’s
government and the Fund. Pakistan’s economic challenges persist,
as Islamabad battles mammoth twin deficits, deteriorating foreign
currency reserves, low exports, diminishing tax revenues, a weak
currency, onerous external debt payments, and soaring sovereign
debt. Despite interventions to stave off a balance of payments crisis
that would force Pakistan to submit to the Fund – such as currency
devaluations by Pakistan’s Central Bank, a $1 billion loan from
Saudi Arabia, a reported $2 billion pledge from China, and the
issuance by Pakistan of $1 billion worth of bonds to its citizens
living overseas – dialogue between the IMF and Pakistan seems to
have been recently concluded.