202 American Anthropologist [68, 19661

REFERENCES CITED
FREED,STANLEY
1963 An objective method for determining the collective caste hierarchy of an Indian
village. American Anthropologist 65: 87+891.
ROMNEY,A. KIMBALL and ROYG . D’ANDRADE
1964 Cognitive aspects of English kin terms. American Anthropologist 66: (special issue
on Transcultural Studies in Cognition) 146-170.
WALLACE,A. F. C.
1961 Culture and Personality. New York, Random House.
WALLACE,A. F. C. and J. ATKINS
1960 The meaning of kinship terms. American Anthropologist 62 :58-79.

FOSTER’S “IMAGE OF LIMITEDGOOD”:AN EXAMPLE OF

ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPLANATION‘
George Foster’s paper in the April issue of this journal (1965:293-315) im-
presses us as raising certain crucial issues regarding the logic of anthropological
explanation. I n our view, Foster involves himself in questionable logical pro-
cedures of a sort that commonly becloud many anthropological attempts a t
scientific explanation.
The crux of Foster’s thesis, as we understand it, is as follows: I n “classical”
peasant communities-which, for the most part, he treats as if they were
“closed systems”-individual behavior is so organized as to maintain the
“steady state” of the community. Characteristic of such societies is a distinc-
tive and shared “cognitive orientation” that provides its members with “basic
premises and sets of assumptions” which, according to Foster, “structure and
guide behavior” (1965 :293). This “cognitive orientation” he represents by a
“model” or “integrating principle” (1965: 294) called “the Image of Limited
Good” by which such societies are said to be “ruled” (1965:306). This “model”
or “integrating principle,” be it noted, is not to be regarded as the cognitive
orientation itself; rather, it is “an inferential construct or analytic abstraction”
which, Foster says, is “derived from observed behavior” (1965: 294).
By the “Image of Limited Good” Foster means (1965:296)
... that broad areas of peasant behavior are patterned in such fashion as to suggest that
peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes-their total environment-as one
in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love,
manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, exist in
lfnite quantity and are always in short supply [emphasis in original], as far as the peasant is con-
cerned. Not only do these and all other “good things” exist in finite and limited quantities,
hut in addition lhere i s no way directly within peasant power to increase the available qitantiliev
[emphasis in original]. It is as if the obvious fact of land shortage in a densely populated area
applied to all other desired things: not enough to go around. “Good,” like land, is seen as
inherent in nature, there to be divided and redivided, if necessary, but not to be augmented.
Foster makes it quite clear in his paper that he views the “Image of
Limited Good” as not merely a literary nicety that serves to summarize and
describe, but as a model which has explanatory and predictive value (1965:
294). Moreover, the cognitive orientation which the model is intended to
represent economically is causally related to behavior. As Foster puts it, “ . . .
 Brief Communications 203
a peasant’s cognitive view provides moral and other precepts that are guides
to-in fact, may be said to produce-behavior ...
” (1965:295).

I n evaluating the logical structure of Foster’s argument, the following con-

siderations seem t o us t o be especially pertinent:
1. To begin with, Foster’s paper raises certain important methodological
and epistemological questions concerning the relationships between ethno-
graphic facts and theory. He says, for example, that his model or integrating
principle is “derived from observed behavior” (1965: 294), and elsewhere he
speaks of “overt behavior” and “the simpler patterns into which this behav-
ior is readily seen to fall , . . ” (p. 295). These rather sketchy remarks, and,
indeed, the general tenor of his paper, strike us as suggesting a Baconian in-
ductionism, i.e., the view that theories and generalizations are somehow syn-
thesized from collections of particular facts. Yet it is difficult to pin Foster
down on this issue inasmuch as he never tells us what he means by “deriving”
his model from “observed behavior.” When he refers to “observed” or “overt
behavior,” he obviously does not mean all behavior. What, then, were the
principles of selection he employed in attending to some behaviors and dis-
criminating against others? Foster does not tell us. He seems to assume that
his readers know what “observed behavior” is and that they are (or should be)
willing to accept his observations as ethnographic facts without any knowledge
of the theory which originally called these facts into being and endowed them
with significance (See Nagel 1959: 71-72; Jarvie 1961).
2. A large portion of Foster’s paper is devoted to offering what he regards
as evidence that conforms to his model. At the same time the model in some
sense is claimed to “explain” the evidence. But the evidence, in fact, largely
consists of rather broad generalizations about the nature of “classical” peas-
ant societies supported by carefully culled illustrations.
Foster maintains that not only do peasants view such measurable tangibles
as land and wealth as limited, but that they also conceive of such human at-
tributes or qualities as love, manliness, honor, friendship, health and sexual
pleasure as being limited, The implication that we draw from Foster’s discus-
sion (at least in the text of his paper) is that this world view is somehow pecu-
liar to peasant society. But we find it difficult to conceive of a society in which
such human qualities or attributes as the aforementioned are viewed as un-
limited and indefinitely expandable. Are there such societies? What would
unlimited quantities of honor, manliness, love, health, etc. mean anyway?
And are we t o believe that peasants seriously entertain the notion that one’s
good health (p. 299) must necessarily be a t the expense of someone else’s poor
health? RIoreover, in a rather curious note to his paper Foster states (1965:
311):
I do not believe the Image of Limited Good is characteristic only of peasant societies.
Quite the contrary, it is found, in one degree or another, in most or all socioeconomic levels in
newly developing countries, and it is, of course, equally characteristic of traditional socialist
doctrine. I am not even sure it is more [emphasisin original]characteristic of peasants than of
other groups. I examine the hypothesis in the context of peasant societies simply because
they are relatively less complex than many other groups, because good data are readily avail-
204 A merican A n1hropologisl [68, 19661
able, and because my arguments can easily be tested in the field by other anthropologists. I
suspect, but will leave the ultimate decision to others, that the Image of Limited Good when
applied to peasant society goes furllrer [emphasis in original] in explaining behavior than when
applied to any other type of society.

If it is the case that the Image of Limited Good may not be more char-
acteristic of peasants than of other groups, then how can it go further in ex-
plaining behavior in peasant society than when applied to other types of
society? But perhaps what Foster is suggesting is that the Image of Limited
Good is the model with the greatest explanatory power for peasant societies
whereas in more “complex” societies-and Foster does not define “complex”-
other equally important models may have to be invoked.
3. Foster (1965: 293) introduces his paper with a statement by Hallowell
concerning “ethno-metaphysics.” Then, in the body of his paper, Foster states
that peasants “see their universe as one in which the good things in life are
.
in limited and unexpandable quantities , , ” (p. 301). The implication is
that this is part of the peasants’ world view and that insofar as their metaphys-
ics is concerned, scarcity is a sort of ontological attribute of the universe. But
does a notion of “limited good” necessarily constitute a metaphysical per-
spective? Or may it be the case that peasants view their access to wealth and
land as limited vis d vis other groups without conceiving of wealth and land
as being limited in some metaphysical sense? Foster fails to recognize the
logical independence of these two possibilities-or at least nowhere in his
paper can we find this distinction clearly spelled out.
4. Foster (1965:294) makes the claim that he sees the “nature of the
cognitive orientation. ..
as something ‘psychologically real’.’’ At the same
time he tells us that (1965: 297) “At no point has an informant even remotely
suggested that this is his vision of his universe.” Now, it is not our purpose
here to involve ourselves in a discussion of “psychological reality” or “cog-
nitive saliency.” Suffice it to note that there is disagreement among those
employing methods such as componential analysis as to the possibilities of
going from “structural reality” to “psychological reality” (see, for example,
Wallace and Atkins 1960; Burling 1964; Romney and D’Andrade 1964). Fur-
thermore, Wallace (1961) has formally demonstrated that individuals with
different cognitive maps can support successful social interactions provided
that their maps sum to “equivalence structures.” I n light of these considera-
tions, and in view of Foster’s methodology, we consider his claim to be getting
a t the “psychologically real,” and, indeed, the “cognitively shared,” to bc
optimistic.
5. Foster sets out to explain peasant behavior as he conceives of zt. He at-
tempts to explain that behavior by inferring a cognitive orientation. He then
goes even one step further. From this cognitive orientation Foster creates an
integrating principle or analytic construct-his model-on a higher level of
abstraction, This model, he claims, explains both the salient features of the
cognitive orientation and the behavior of peasants.
 Brief Communications 205
If Foster’s explanation were to be adjudged satisfactory, it would have to
have testable consequences independent of the data which invoked it (see
Popper 1957:2+25). But Foster only offers us the kind of data that were
utilized in formulating his explanation, and which in fact the explanation was
designed to explain. Moreover, Foster is vague about the boundaries of the
behaviors t o which his model can be applied. That is, what and how much is
the model supposed to explain? Because of this formal failing, it is difficult to
know what kind oi empirical evidence would be required to refute and in-
validate his model as an explanatory device-and thus testing it becomes
problematical.
Foster (1963: 297) does assert that the model emplojred in his explanation,
when “fed back” to behavior in Tzintzuntzan, “proved remarkably produc-
tive in revealing hitherto unsuspected structural regularities linking econon~ic
behavior with social relations, friendship, love and jealousy patterns, health
beliefs, concepts of honor and masculinity, egoisnto manifestations-even folk-
lore.” I n our judgment, however, these structural regularities are not explained
by the Image of Limited Good. Rather, the model itself strikes us as being
only a compressed rephrasing of the cognitive orientation inferred from be-
havioral data. Thus the Image of Limited Good is essentially a tautology and
contributes only to the ad hoc character of Foster’s explanation.
6. Finally, in the concluding pages of his paper, Foster makes a number
of statements which strike us as puzzling in that they appear to diminish and
compromise the position he takes in the paper up to that point. For example,
in speaking of McClelland’s “need for Achievement” ( 1 2 Achievement) he
writes (1965 :309-3 10) :
If the arguments advanced in this paper are sound, it is clear that n Achievement is rare
in peasant societies, not because of psychological factors, but because display of n Achieve-
ment is met by sanctions that a traditional villager does not wish to incur. .. . The brakes
on change are less psychological than social.

Now certainly cognitive orientation is a “psychological factor.” Through-

out most of his paper, Foster treates cognitive orientation as an independent,
causal variable, and behavioral and social patterns as dependent variables.
Yet in the conclusion of his paper he appears to treat cognitive orientation as
partially a dependent variable and partially an intervening variable. hlore-
over, this reversal of field terminates in a surprisingly ingenuous statement-
“In other words, change the economic rules of the game and change the cog-
nitive orientation of a peasant society, and a fertile field for the propagation
of n Achievement is created” (p. 310)-which strikes us as somewhat akin to
saying ‘change the world and the world will be changed.’
DAVIDKAPLAN
BENSONSAIXR
Brandeis University,
Waltham, Massachzrselts
206 American Anthropologisl [68, 19661
NOTE
1 We are grateful to George L. Cowgill and Robert A. Manners for commenting critically on
an earlier draft of this communication.

REFERENCES CITED
BURLING,ROBBINS
1964 Cognition and componential analysis: God’s truth or hocus pocus? American An-
thropologist 66: 20-28.
FOSTER, GEORGEM.
1965 Peasant society and the image of limited good. American Anthropologist 67:293-
315.
JARV~E, I. C.
1961 Nadel on the aims and methods of social anthropology. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 12 :1-24.
ERNEST
NAGEL,
1959 The place of science in a liberal education. Daedalus 88:5674.
POPPER,
KARLR.
1957 The aim of science. Ratio 1:24-35.
ROMNEY,A. KIMBALL and ROYGOODWIN D’ANDRADE
1964 Cognitive aspects of English kin terms. Zn Transcultural studies in cognition, A.
Kimball Romney and Roy Goodwin D’Andrade, eds. American Anthropologist 66
(3), Part 2: 146170.
WALLACE,ANTHONY F. C.
1961 Culture and personality. New York, Random House.
WALLACE,ANTHONY F. C. and JOHN ATKINS
1960 The meaning of kinship terms. American Anthropologist 6258-79.

REMARKS
FURTHER ON FOSTER’S OF LIMITED
“IMAGE GOOD”
I wish to discuss certain issues arising out of the article by George Fostel-,
“Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good,” AMERICAN ANTHROPOLO-
GIST 67: 293-315; 1965. Foster’s description of peasant thinking and behavior
is very valuable, and no doubt will become a standard source. However, i t is
my belief that the article is subject to certain interpretations which Foster
probably did not intend. Most important among these is the possible implica-
tion that “limited good” behavior is the major and salient characteristic of
peasantry, and that this form of behavior is to be found only in people deserv-
ing of the “peasant” appellation.’
As I understand it, “limited good” is a version of what sociologists and
interactional theorists call the “zero-sum game”; the human behavior which
proceeds from the assumption that any value is inherently limited in quantity,
and that therefore if any portion of this quantity is used or dissipated, there
is less to go around. The consequent idea of ‘(hanging on to one’s own” can
arise in purely social situations, over criteria of status or worth; over grades
in school; in office jobs or professorships; or it can arise in economic situations
where capital is short in supply. The case examined by Foster concerns the
latter. An actual shortage of capital and credit can lead to cautious, saving
behavior, in which present possessions are accepted as adequate, and the risks
entailed in seeking more are considered too great.