Eurasian Geography and Economics

ISSN: 1538-7216 (Print) 1938-2863 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20

Mapping Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code: an

analysis of Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses,
1997–2014

Thomas Ambrosio & William A. Lange

To cite this article: Thomas Ambrosio & William A. Lange (2014) Mapping Kazakhstan’s
geopolitical code: an analysis of Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, 1997–2014, Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 55:5, 537-559, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2015.1024272

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1024272

Published online: 01 Apr 2015.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 648

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 7 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rege20
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2014
Vol. 55, No. 5, 537–559, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1024272

Mapping Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code: an analysis of Nazarbayev’s

presidential addresses, 1997–2014
Thomas Ambrosioa* and William A. Langeb
a
Criminal Justice and Political Science, North Dakota State University, NDSU Dept 2315, Fargo,
ND 58108-6050, USA; bNorth Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, USA
(Received 10 October 2014; accepted 24 February 2015)

Kazakhstan sits at the crossroads of Eurasia. Its foreign policy is heavily defined by
geopolitics – the intersection of geography and international politics. However, there
have been few studies that have systematically analyzed the rhetoric used to define
its geopolitical condition. Building upon prior works on United States and
Russian presidential addresses, this article examines 18 presidential addresses by
Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in an effort to identify the assump-
tions and content of his “geopolitical code.” In particular, it focuses on four issues:
the degree of emphasis Nazarbayev has placed on specific countries and regions,
Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation and position, the multi-vector foreign policy and
Kazakhstan’s role in the international system, and the need for Kazakhstan to be
integrated into the global economy.
Keywords: Kazakhstan; geopolitics; rhetoric; foreign policy; multi-vector foreign
policy; Central Asia

Kazakhstan sits at the crossroads of Eurasia. Upon independence in December 1991, the
country had to establish its foreign policy and national security concepts virtually from
scratch. Under the leadership of its sole ruler, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the
Kazakh Government sought to outline its views on the state’s position in the regional
and wider international system. Two centrally defining features of these concepts have
been Kazakhstan’s geographic condition as a landlocked state with a long border adja-
cent to two regional powers and the convergence of Russian, Chinese, and American
interests in Central Asia. Geopolitics – the intersection of geography and international
politics – is critical to understanding Kazakhstan’s foreign policies and, in some cases,
its domestic politics. This is especially true since Nazarbayev repeatedly references
geography in his speeches and has stressed the centrality of geography in influencing
his foreign policy thinking.
Most studies of Kazakhstan’s geopolitics fall into one of three categories: looking at
the country as part of Central Asia or neighboring regions (Idan and Shaffer 2011;
Cooley 2012); focusing on a particular issue and its impact on Kazakh foreign or
domestic policies (İpek 2007; Kandiyoti 2008); or emphasizing the geopolitical interests
or perspectives of external powers in Kazakhstan or Central Asia (Nikolaev 2011;
Zabortseva 2014). Many of these studies have provided revealing insights into Kazakh
policies, but they have failed to systematically analyze the speeches and writings of key

*Corresponding author. Email: thomas.ambrosio@ndsu.edu

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

538 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

foreign policy actors, outside of selecting specific quotes to reinforce the point of their
study. Although there are exceptions (Kassenova 2005; Koch 2013a, 2013b), what is
generally lacking are studies that conduct systemic data analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign
policy concepts and geopolitical perspectives from a rhetorical standpoint.
Why is this problematic? The first sentence of this article begins with the ‘crossroads’
cliché, but it is also a geopolitical reality: Kazakhstan’s size, its geographic position, its
economic potential, and its relationships with the great powers mean that Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy has implications not only for fourth largest country in Asia, but also for the
interests of these powers and the region as a whole. It is therefore essential that we better
understand the assumptions upon which its foreign policy rests. In particular, there is a
need to outline Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code. A “geopolitical code” is “an organized set
of political-geographical assumptions that underlie foreign policy-making” which includes
“a definition of a state’s interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a
planned response to such threats, and a justification of that response” (Huliaras and
Tsardanidis 2006, 465–466). By studying this geopolitical code, one can better reveal the
context within which foreign policy creators feel they are acting, how they view their
country’s current conditions and circumstances, and how they pursue opportunities and
respond to threats. While this can be done in a variety of ways, including those cited
above, the benefit of systematic data analysis is that it does not begin with an argument
and seek to justify it, but rather allows the data itself to drive the conclusions. While this
may at times appear more descriptive than analytical, it has the advantage of avoiding the
danger of selection bias by cherry-picking certain speeches or statements. Moreover,
systematic data analysis can better track consistencies and changes in geopolitical thinking
because, in many cases, it utilizes a consistent set of statements or other rhetorical
products/artifacts over time. Additionally, it recognizes the leading role that speech acts
play in defining the contours of geopolitical thinking. As such, these speech acts serve as
examples of “practical geopolitics,” which examine the creators of foreign policy articu-
late and codify a geopolitical culture through the production of geopolitical narratives
(O’Loughlin, Ó Tauthail, and Kolossov 2005). Finally, this approach should be of interest
to a wider audience than just those who study Kazakhstan because its focus on practical
geopolitics and its methodology are applicable across a wide variety of cases.
This article therefore seeks to fill this scholarly gap by examining 18 of
Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses in order to develop a rhetorical map of his geopo-
litical code. (See Appendix 1 for date and title of speeches.) It asks the following
questions: What are the assumptions that constitute the basis of the geopolitical code of
Kazakhstan’s leader?, Has this changed significantly over time?, How does this affect
Kazakhstan’s relationships with its immediate geographic neighbors and those farther
afield?, and, How does this influence Kazakhstan’s self-conception or self-image in the
international system? As shown below, Nazarbayev has repeatedly and consistently
presented Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation as inherently positive and non-threatening
– this is particularly true in terms of its relationship with the region’s dominant actor,
Russia. Moreover, he has advanced the dual strategies of a multi-vector foreign policy
and global economic integration to enhance and guarantee Kazakhstan’s independence,
as well as its long-term development. Central to this is the value placed on Kazakhstan
playing the roles of conciliator and bridge between different civilizations and conflicting
geopolitical interests. However, as presented in the conclusion, the assumptions upon
which Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code rest are potentially precarious.
This article builds upon similar research conducted on American (O’Loughlin and
Grant 1990; Flint et al. 2009) and Russian (Ambrosio and Vandrovec 2013) presidential
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 539

addresses with the aim of exploring the ways in which geopolitical concepts have been
defined and prioritized through these speeches. Focusing on Nazarbayev’s speeches, as
opposed to the opinions of citizens, the media, or popular culture, is appropriate for two
reasons. First, presidential addresses provide a powerful opportunity for a leader to
define and outline their geopolitical understandings and vision, speaking to both domes-
tic and international audiences in a formal manner. They also are reflective of current
thinking and shape the parameters of future discussions. While at times, they can feel
like banal political exercises, their relevance as geopolitical acts goes beyond their
annual repetition. The act of speech creation requires the actor to make choices about
“what is included or excluded, how much time to spend on each topic, and how events,
concepts, and goals are represented” (Ambrosio and Vandrovec 2013, 437). Therefore,
careful analysis of these speeches allows for the creation of a rhetorical map that illus-
trates geopolitical assumptions, priorities, and trends. Second, Nazarbayev is the coun-
try’s only ruler and has been at the forefront of an overt effort to delineate Kazakhstan’s
place in the region and world from a broader, geopolitical perspective. As he stated at
the National Press Club in Washington, DC during his first visit to the United States in
May 1992, “Our foreign policy is very much oriented to the geopolitical position of
Kazakhstan” (İpek 2007, 1187). More importantly, Kazakhstan is an authoritarian
country which can be described as “hyper-presidential” – for example, the Kazakh
parliament contains no real-opposition parties and the media is fully dominated by the
Kazakh Government. Although the level of personal and political freedoms is higher
than in, say, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, public debate over foreign policy issues is
quite limited and is largely shaped in accordance with the concepts outlined by the
president (Nourzhanov 2009). Consequently, even if there are differences on foreign
policy issues between the population and the president, it is the latter that is decisive.
While not disparaging alternative sources of data, it is reasonable to begin this analysis
with Nazarbayev himself.
Finally, this article’s focus on presidential addresses is appropriate within the context
of Kazakhstan because Nazarbayev appears to hold these speeches in high regard, present-
ing them as major events in which he outlines extensive and long-term domestic and
foreign policy agendas. In addition, these addresses tout his government’s successes in a
way that reflect positively on the quality of his leadership. The implication being that he is
an agent of positive change and a steady hand at the wheel of state. Therefore, according
to this line of thinking, his continued rule over Kazakhstan, even under non-democratic
conditions, remains necessary for the country to prosper into the future. These speeches,
therefore, play an important role in Nazarbayev’s domestic statecraft as well.
This article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly outlines the methodology
used. The following section provides an overview of Kazakhstan’s geopolitics through
an analysis of the “degree of emphasis” placed on foreign policy, as well as specific
countries, regions, and international institutions (Flint et al. 2009, 611). This establishes
a basic rhetorical map of Nazarbayev’s geopolitical thinking regarding the relative bal-
ance of foreign policy vs. domestic issues and identifies patterns in terms of the scope
and prominence of Kazakhstan’s specific external relations. Following that are three
sections. Each highlights a single issue that features prominently in these speeches:
Kazakhstan’s situation and position within the region and broader international system;
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy and self-ascribed role within the international
system; and, the primacy of economics in Kazakhstan’s development and integration
into the global economic system. Although these issues are placed in separate sections,
there is obviously a great deal of overlap between them, as will be reflected in the
540 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

narrative below. The conclusion provides some insights about how this geopolitical code
will likely develop into the future in light of potential complicating factors.

Methodology
The methodology of this article follows closely the structure used in the previous stud-
ies of American and Russian presidential addresses. It examines 18 annual and formal
presidential addresses given in consecutive years from 1997 to 2014.1 This yields a con-
sistent set of speeches over a significant period of time. This is especially important
when examining someone like Nazarbayev, who repeatedly refers to past speeches and
explicitly presents his annual addresses as “status updates” on the goals outlined in
previous addresses. The start date of 1997 was chosen because it was the first year that
these speeches were given in this format. (This is referenced by Nazarbayev in his 2011
speech.) Moreover, the 1997 speech was clearly crafted to be a major, foundational
speech in which Nazarbayev sought to review the progress made in state-building up to
that point, outline the current conditions of the country in terms of both domestic
development and foreign policy, and develop a long-term program in both of these areas
(dubbed “Kazakhstan 2030”). As Nazarbayev stated, the 1997 speech was meant to be a
new starting point after the initial post-independence “abyss of chaos and disorder” and
a move toward a new “stage of stabilization,” during which the state could “afford
facing the future, contemplating [upcoming] development, making elaborate plans.”
Therefore, beginning with the 1997 speech is appropriate.
All presidential addresses were analyzed in both Russian and English language
translations (when available). These speeches were delivered either in Russian (first half
of the speeches) or in both Kazakh and Russian (the latter half of the speeches). All of
the speeches are fully available in Russian on the official website of the President of
Kazakhstan (http://www.akorda.kz/). Some English translations were located on this
website, as well as on other official government websites. Others were unavailable and
therefore had to be translated into English. Nonetheless, all available English transla-
tions were double checked against the Russian versions. This was especially important
in regard to the 2004 speech, which was particularly problematic. There are, of course,
going to be subtle differences in terms of the content and tone of Nazarbayev’s speeches
when he uses Kazakh that will not come across in the Russian or English translations.
However, for the sake of consistency, the Russian speeches (either original or transla-
tion) were used throughout, especially since the Russian language continues to dominate
Nazarbayev’s formal addresses. Moreover, in terms of specific references to countries,
regions, etc. the differences are likely to be negligible.
Each speech was analyzed for international content. This included the following:
direct mention of other countries; references to regions of the world (e.g. Central Asia),
transnational groupings (e.g. “Asian Tigers” or “Islamic world”), or international organi-
zations (e.g. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO); Kazakhstan’s connections with
the international system (e.g. exports and imports, energy transit lines); Kazakhstan’s
self-identified role in the international system; and, comparisons between Kazakhstan and
other countries or regions. In some cases, distinguishing between international and
domestic content was difficult because of the numerous intermestic issues raised by
Nazarbayev. For example, in his coverage of the global economic crises of 1997 and
2008–2009, Nazarbayev discusses ways in which his government is responding. Most of
these were solely domestic in nature, even though the issue obviously straddles the
domestic and international spheres. In these instances, direct references to the global
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 541

economic crises were coded as international content for purposes of the charts in the next
section, whereas domestic responses were not coded as such. However, as will be seen in
the following discussion, the bending of international and domestic issues plays a clear
role in Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code and mental map.
Word counts for “international content” were derived from those sections identified
as such, using whole sentences. An exception was made for an extended sentence sepa-
rated by semicolons. In these cases, only the clauses with international content were
included. In addition, the number of specific references by name to other countries,
world regions, international groups, and international organizations was counted. From
these numbers, proportions of foreign policy to domestic policy were derived, as well as
the data included in this article’s charts. The overall and international content word
counts between Russian and English obviously diverged because of differences between
the two languages. However, in terms of the overall ratios, this divergence was
minimal.
In terms of coding, where there was a clear correlation between a region and an
international organization (e.g. Europe and the European Union), both the region and
the international organization were noted in their respective counts. Although it extends
geographically beyond Europe proper, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) was coded as “Europe,” since it is seen generally, and by Nazarbayev
himself, as representing “European” values. The coding for some regions was more
difficult than countries since, in some cases, Nazarbayev identified a number of subre-
gions, and it was unclear whether they should be coded as part of the larger whole (for
example, Central Europe for Europe) or simply left as separate data points. However,
these only accounted for 9 references out of 326 total regional references, and they were
therefore kept separate. Similarly, regions defined by specific geographic features (Black
Sea or Caspian Sea regions) were likewise left separate. A trickier problem emerged in
regard to general designations such as “the East” and “the West,” which Nazarbayev
used when referring to Asia and Europe, respectively. Nonetheless, the context of these
references was clear from the speeches, and they were therefore folded into the regional
counts. Lastly, within Nazarbayev’s speeches, Central Asia is represented as a distinct
region from “Asia” – even though, geographically, Central Asia is obviously part of
Asia. Moreover, South Asia is not specifically mentioned in these speeches, with
Nazarbayev seemingly preferring to reference these countries directly by name. Thus,
when coding Nazarbayev’s speeches, and in the discussion in this article, “Asia” refers
specifically to the countries of East and Southeast Asia.

Overview of Nazarbayev’s rhetorical map

A basic outline of Nazarbayev’s rhetorical map can be discerned through both quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses of his presidential addresses. This section provides the
quantitative analysis, and the following three sections examine these documents from a
qualitative perspective.
The first concern found in prior analyses of presidential address and geopolitics
involves the “degree of emphasis” placed on foreign policy and other international
issues. This provides a baseline which contrasts these issues to domestic policy matters.
(See Figure 1).
As in American and Russian presidential addresses, there is a lack of consistency
with Nazarbayev’s speeches, ranging from a low of 6.4 percent international content to
a high of 32.6 percent.2 The average for his speeches was 18.5 percent, a number less
542 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

Figure 1. Percentage of international content.

than that found in American state-of-the-nation addresses during the Cold War, but com-
parable to US addresses afterward and to Russian addresses during 2001–2011. This is
somewhat surprising, given that Kazakhstan is in the process of state-building and
domestic economic development and would therefore be thought to be inward-looking.
Moreover, in contrast to the United States and Russia, Kazakhstan’s lack of great power
ambitions should limit its foreign policy concerns. However, this is not the case. As
seen below, Nazarbayev has made regional issues, connections to Europe, Asia, and (to
a lesser extent) the Islamic world, and integration into the global economy priorities of
Kazakh statecraft.
Nazarbayev’s rhetorical map is also represented by the geographic scope of these
speeches, in terms of which certain countries and regions are mentioned more than
others. Those with a larger number, particularly if sustained over time, are reasonably
seen to be at the forefront of his geopolitical thinking, whereas those less mentioned or
absent are reflective of their lesser prominence. In these 18 speeches, 45 separate coun-
tries are referenced.3 However, there is a stark, uneven distribution in this number. For
example, while certain countries are referenced many times, 9 countries are referenced
only twice, whereas 20 are referenced only once. Figure 2 shows the overall number of
references in these speeches for the top 10 countries.
Russia and China are tied with 49 references each. Combined, they represent 42 per-
cent of all country references. This indicates their clear dominance in Nazarbayev’s
rhetorical map. However, it is interesting that these two countries are mentioned the

Figure 2. Highest 10 country references.

 Eurasian Geography and Economics 543

same number of times, despite the importance that he repeatedly attaches to

Kazakhstan’s special relationship with the Russian Federation. Even so, the relative
balance in these speeches given to Kazakhstan’s bordering great powers indicates that
the Kazakhstan–China relationship is particularly significant to Nazarbayev.
As seen below, Nazarbayev has advanced a foreign policy concept which seeks to
balance Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia, China, the West (in particular, the United
States), and the Islamic world – this is called the multi-vector foreign policy concept.
Nonetheless, in terms of references, the United States comes in a distant third, with
approximately half the number of mentions as Russia and China. While Afghanistan is
number four, it is an outlier for two reasons: seven of these mentions occur in a single
speech (2000), and Afghanistan is only mentioned in four other speeches, a single time
each. Although Afghanistan was very much on the mind of Nazarbayev in 2000 (at the
height of the Taliban’s power), this attention has not been sustained over time.
Singapore, South Korea, and Malaysia also appear prominently in these speeches as
countries Kazakhstan could emulate for their rapid economic development and stable
political systems. (This is explored in the section on economics, below). Moreover,
Belarus is mentioned seven times as part of the larger integration processes in the for-
mer Soviet Union. Finally, the references to Great Britain and India are less focused
than in the cases of many of the previous countries, and there is little discernable pattern
over these speeches.
When compared to specific countries, new patterns emerge from these speeches in
regard to regions. Figure 3 shows the top eight regional references, which, together,
represent 84 percent of the total.
Although Europe and the West appear far more than any other specific region, and
Central Asia is tied with Asia and the East, this is misleading. First, over half of these
references are associated with the European Union, the OSCE, and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. A similar amplification occurs for Asia in regard
to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)
and the Asian Development Bank, which represent some 20 percent of references to
Asia. Thus, if these international organizations are removed, Europe and Asia would
have only 32 and 40 references, respectively. The Islamic world total is likewise
reduced by six to reflect references to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
the Islamic Development Bank. (Figure 4 excludes all international organizations that
were originally counted toward regions.)

Figure 3. Highest eight regional references (international organizations included).

544 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

Figure 4. Highest eight regional references (international organizations excluded).

If we compare these new numbers for Europe and Asia to Central Asia, the
dominance of Kazakhstan’s immediate neighborhood in Nazarbayev’s rhetoric map
becomes clearer. Even if references to the Central Asian Union and Central Asian
Economic Community are excluded, Central Asia still has 50 references. If we combine
this with Eurasia, the former Soviet Union, and the Caspian Sea region, Nazarbayev’s
primary concern about Kazakhstan’s immediate neighborhood is even more evident.4 In
total, the former Soviet region includes over 37 percent of total references to regions.
In addition to the raw numbers, which represent a baseline degree of emphasis, there
are three additional implications from the data on regional references that should be
highlighted. First, Europe and Asia remain very important in these speeches. This
should not be discounted, since it represents the fact that Nazarbayev’s world view is
not insular, but rather outward looking, particularly in terms of trading opportunities,
development examples, and economic standards. Second, there is a clear contrast
between these regions and the final part of the multi-vector foreign policy: the southern
vector toward the Islamic world and the Middle East. This region lags considerably
behind with a total only of 21 references to the region (27, if Islamic organizations are
included).5 A lack of economic interactions, combined with the sense that Nazarbayev
seemingly does not see these countries as examples to emulate either economically or
politically, means that this vector remains a more distant concern. Lastly, with the
exception of Russia and Belarus, other countries in the former Soviet Union are men-
tioned only a total of 14 times (6 percent of total country references).6 There appears to
be a disconnect in these speeches between concerns about Kazakhstan’s proximate
region in general terms, on the one hand, and many of the specific countries that consti-
tute it, on the other. Further investigation is needed to determine if this is actually
reflective of the relative importance of Kazakhstan’s bilateral relationships with the other
countries of Central Asia, as opposed to its multilateral relations with these same coun-
tries through such international institutions as the SCO and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization.
Nazarbayev’s references to international organizations fit a similar pattern seen in
regard to regions, with a primary focus on those closer to home (see Figures 5 and 6).7
Of the 181 total references to international organizations, a full third are within the
former Soviet Union; such as a number of economic integration institutions (e.g. the
Eurasian Economic Community and the Customs Union), the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, the SCO, the proposed Central Asian Union, and the Eurasian Develop-
ment Bank. Europe constitutes 27 percent of regional references, though over half of
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 545

Figure 5. Highest eight international organization references.

Figure 6. References to international organizations by region.

these are references to the OSCE. (The OSCE featured prominently because Kazakhstan
became the chair of the organization in 2010, which was touted as an item of prestige
for the country and for Nazarbayev himself.) The European Union also figures promi-
nently in Nazarbayev’s references to Europe, though primarily in terms of international
trade, standards, and economic conditions within the common economic space.
Although references to Asian institutions come in a distant third (8 percent of regional
references), Nazarbayev consistently highlights his country’s role in the CICA, which,
as seen below, fits directly into his notion of Kazakhstan as a bridge builder and
conciliator. Nazarbayev makes only five references to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, consistent with the pattern seen above in which the fourth vector toward
the Islamic world is less weighty than that directed toward the former Soviet Union,
Europe, and Asia. Finally, references to non-region-specific international organizations
are primarily economic based, with the World Trade Organization being the third most
mentioned institution.
The foregoing discussion of the number of references to countries, regions, and
international organizations found in Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses is indicative of
his basic rhetorical map. The following three sections extend this analysis further by
examining the central geopolitical themes in these addresses from a qualitative perspec-
tive. Each reinforces the notion that Kazakhstan’s future lies not in isolation, but rather
in connections with the international community. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan’s immediate
546 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

region, and the great power actors within it, figures prominently in his geopolitical
code.

Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation and position

When Kazakhstan emerged as an independent country in December 1991, its leaders
were forced to advance foreign policy and strategic concepts to manage the regional
and international conditions within which the new state would be forced to operate. The
way in which Nazarbayev framed these conditions set the contours for Kazakh foreign
policy going forward.
Nazarbayev’s 1997 address was clearly meant as a major speech that aimed to
describe the historical factors affecting Kazakhstan and the present conditions of the
country, as well as to set a course for the future. In it, he emphasizes that Kazakhstan
had moved beyond the initial post-independence shocks and was now in a situation in
which it could analyze “both external and internal factors of [Kazakhstan’s] develop-
ment … on the basis of [Kazakhstan’s] history and unique circumstances.” The most
important of these was the “geographical, geopolitical, and economic position of the
country … on the very crossroads in the Eurasian region.” The concept of Kazakhstan
as a Eurasian crossroads is well established in Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses and
has become a cornerstone of his overall nation-building project (Cummings 2003;
Mostafa 2013). According to Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s geographic situation is a major
advantage that presents the country with the freedom from being restricted to one
direction or another in its path of development. Instead, it can take the best from all
directions. He argues that beliefs about Kazakhstan being tied to European or Asian
civilizations, Russia collectivism, or a neo-Turkic, Islamic model are “right and wrong
at the same time” (1997). They are right in that Kazakhstan has been shaped by all of
them. However, these beliefs are also wrong because Kazakhstan is a unique “Eurasian
country” which possesses “its own specific history and specific culture.” As he
explained, “[t]hat’s why our model would bear likeness to neither model. It [will]
imbibe the achievements of various civilizations” (1997). In this way, it is consistent
with some of the Eurasianist discourses that emerged from Russia, which sees that
country as having a distinct civilizational identity (Morozova 2009). Moreover, as a
Eurasian crossroads, Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned to integrate into the important
international markets of Asia, Europe, and South Asia. This provides Kazakhstan with
access to over two billion potential consumers of Kazakh goods (1997). Furthermore,
the country can serve as a crucial transportation and communications hub between Asia
and Europe (2006). Thus, Kazakhstan’s geographical situation is not represented as a
source of hazard or concern, but rather as something positive.
A state’s geopolitical code is often predicated upon perceptions of the sources of
threat, particularly from other states or blocs. One could easily imagine Kazakhstan’s
geographic situation being framed in a manner that places it in a security vacuum, bor-
dered by two, larger regional powers (Russia and China), one of which (Russia) has
potential historical and ethnic claims to its territory. Historically, geography has not been
kind to other “crossroads,” such as Poland, the Balkans, and the Levant. Furthermore,
American interests in Central Asia could be regarded as returning the region to a new
“great game” of conflict and great power interference. This negative perspective was in
fact a rather popular heuristic device, primarily amongst outside observers, during the
mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, and is even so amongst some today (Hickey 1999; Cooley
2012). However, little of this is reflected in Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses. In fact,
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 547

it is the very absence of state-level threats that form a notable, core component of
Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code. His 1997 statement to this effect is telling:

We understand only too well that all possible potential troubles threatening national security
of Kazakhstan at present and in the nearest future do not imply and will never imply a
direct military invasion or a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. It is perfectly clear
that neither Russia, nor China, nor the West, nor any Moslem country has any impelling
motive to attack us. And this relatively predictable state of calm and stability must be made
use of to effectively strengthen economic potential of Kazakhstan which would serve the
basis for our building a reliable system of national security.

This sentiment was reiterated in 1998: “We have created a buffer of peace on all of our
borders, a safety belt of friendly frontiers. No nation on earth – not one! – is our
enemy.”
In no presidential address is any state portrayed as a direct threat to Kazakhstan.
The closest one comes is in the 2000 address in which Nazarbayev singles out the situa-
tion in Afghanistan as being a serious regional problem. But even here, the threat is not
to Kazakhstan directly, but a general threat to the region. Whenever threats are men-
tioned, the consistent theme is that they only come from non-state forces such as reli-
gious extremism, national and ethnic conflict, political chaos in other countries
(including resulting refugee flows), narcotrafficking, terrorism, and external economic
crises (see Table 1).8
These threats are portrayed seriously, but are seen as potential problems that can be
managed through the proactive policies adopted by the government. The absence of
state-level threats serves as a foundation for Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy.
Not identifying any country or bloc as a threat allows Kazakhstan maximum flexibility
to work with all countries, something seen as highly valued by Nazarbayev.

Table 1. References to threats by year.

National and Political chaos External
Religious ethnic in other economic
extremism conflict countries Narcotrafficking Terrorism crises
1997 X X X
1998 X X
1999 X X X X
2000 X X X X X X
2001 X X X X
2002
2003
2004 X X X
2005 X X X X
2006 X X X
2007 X X X
2008 X X X
2009 X
2010 X
2011
2012a X
2012b X X X X X
2014
548 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

However, there is a key limitation to this flexibility. Although Nazarbayev remarks

that “[the] ethnic composition our country is too motley, our interests are too important,
and the prospects too bright for us to afford dependence on the relations with some cer-
tain country or reliance thereon” (1997), it is clear that the very ethnic composition of
the country requires a qualitatively different relationship with the Russian Federation
than with other countries. At the time of independence, Kazakhstan was split roughly
evenly between ethnic Kazakhs and Russians, though differing birthrates and Russian
out-migration reduced the number of ethnic Russians in the country to a smaller, but
still substantial, minority. Moreover, the ethnic Russians predominantly live within the
northern part of the country, creating the potential for Russian irredentism along what is
the world’s longest, continuous border. Thus, Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia have
the most significant impact on the country’s geopolitical position. Nevertheless, despite
the very real potential for tensions, Kazakhstan–Russia relations are consistently
portrayed by Nazarbayev as being very close, as the following quotes indicate:

We will develop and strengthen trust and equal relations with our closest and historically
friendly neighbor, Russia. (1997)

Russia is now not just the one of the neighboring nations. We ought to understand and
admit the simple fact that our partnership with Russia will be one of the prepositions of our
national security in the twenty-first century. (1999)

Russia is a very important country for Kazakhstan. We are in the same geopolitical condi-
tions and we are facing common problems. We share similar views on many processes in
the world, which need to be realized. The high level of economic integration and trust that
we have achieved should be continued. (2004)

The Kazakhstan-Russia relationship is on a high level of confidence and strategic partner-

ship. The Russian dimension is the most important priority in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.
(2006)

This close relationship with Russia is maintained not just on a bilateral basis or through
multilateral institutions to which they both belong, but also through ensuring inter-
communal peace within Kazakhstan. “Peace maintained with neighbors represents an
issue of paramount importance, but it would not be settled if the country is torn apart
by internal discord” (1997). The dangers of inter-communal tensions are a persistent
theme in Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, and he talks repeatedly about how the
Russian language and citizens of all ethnicities are to be respected and how Kazakh
nationalism and language policies are not a threat to the Russians. This tension has
resulted in a nationalizing program which has been both inconsistent and halting (Spehr
and Kassenova 2012; Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan 2013). In short, the large number of
Russians in the country categorically requires Kazakhstan to have a positive relationship
with Russia, which is in part dependent upon ensuring that Russian speakers do not feel
threatened by Kazakh nation-building. If this self-reinforcing dynamic was to falter, this
would in turn threaten Kazakhstan’s security, development, and territorial integrity.
Thus, Kazakhstan’s geopolitical position affects its domestic policies, just as its
domestic policies affect its geopolitical position.
Kazakhstan’s overall geopolitical situation is portrayed in Nazarbayev’s presidential
addresses as being positive. Geographic location, the absence of state-level threats, and
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 549

a good relationship with Russia are the foundations of Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code.
As seen in the following two sections, these conditions are reflected in and reinforced
by Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy and its active pursuit of international economic
integration.

Multi-vector foreign policy and Kazakhstan’s international “role”

At the core of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical strategy is the “multi-vector” foreign policy con-
cept. Within the former Soviet Union, the notion of a multi-vector foreign policy (or
“balanced” foreign policy in the Azerbaijani context, or the foreign policy “complemen-
tarism” of Armenia) has been used as a rhetorical device to claim that a particular coun-
try is pursuing “strategic independence while retaining the benefits of alignment with
larger powers” (Minasyan 2012; Strakes 2013, 46). While not explicitly defined by
Nazarbayev in his presidential addresses, it is referred to in some form in nearly all of
these speeches, and it has been pervasive in his foreign policy rhetoric since the earliest
months of independence (Hanks 2009, 257). Yermukhamet Yertisbayev, an advisor to
Nazarbayev, stated that the adoption of this strategy was less of a choice than a reflection
of the “geographical position of the young independent state” and the “appearance of a
new geopolitical reality in the world politics” (Zabortseva 2014, 320). For Kazakhstan, it
manifests as a pragmatic, non-confrontational foreign policy which aims to balance posi-
tive relations with the major powers (Russia, China, the United States), as well as to
ensure an active policy in the regions surrounding Kazakhstan (Eurasia, Europe, Asia,
and the Islamic world). However, as this section demonstrates, the full extent to which
this foreign policy is truly multi-vectored is limited by Kazakhstan’s geographical reali-
ties: its immediate neighborhood is obviously more consequential than those farther
afield, which means that true multi-vectorness is restricted by the precedence that
relations with Russia and China take over relations with the United States and Europe.
In Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, the multi-vector foreign policy concept is
usually depicted in terms of relations with a number of countries, beginning with those
in close proximity and moving outward. First and foremost, there are repeated refer-
ences to the need to maintain friendly relations with Kazakhstan’s great power neigh-
bors, Russia and China. This is portrayed as being the highest priority for Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy since the country’s “independence and territorial integrity” is dependent
upon it (1997). This is understandable since these countries have a disproportionate
impact on Kazakhstan’s security. However, the way that these relationships are depicted
is different.
Given the importance of Russia in Kazakh geopolitical thinking, the realities of the
power imbalance between the two countries and their historical ties, as well as the eth-
nic dimension covered in the previous section, it is telling that Russia is almost always
listed first, followed by China. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s evolving relationship with
Russia is based upon a continuous process of integration through various economic and
security institutions, such as the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. These are presented as having economic or security bene-
fits, as well as solidifying the partnership between these two countries. In terms of eco-
nomics, this should not be surprising given that the Soviet Union’s command economy
had an integrated supply chain which needed to be restored following its collapse –
thus, (re-)integration with Russia is seen as a top priority. Similarly, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union left many of the former republics with comparable security challenges
which, it is believed, can best be managed through a multilateral approach. Given
550 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

Russia’s relative level of power and its critical interests in the region, a formal,
institutional relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan in the area of security is seen
as necessary to provide for Kazakhstan’s defense.
Economic and security integration is absent from Nazarbayev’s depiction of relations
with China. Rather, trading opportunities with China’s huge market and bilateral and
multilateral cooperation (the latter, through the SCO) are highlighted. Moreover,
Russia’s de facto assertion of a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, and
China’s willingness to recognize Russia’s “privileged” role in Central Asia, means that
any talk of Kazakh–Chinese security integration would likely precipitate a sharp
response from Russia (Cooley 2012, 166). This is something that both Kazakhstan and
China wish to avoid. Although Russia and China figure prominently in Nazarbayev’s
multi-vector foreign policy, true multi-vectorism is limited by Kazakhstan’s perceived
need to maintain a far closer and qualitatively different relationship with Russia.
Similarly, considerations of how Russia would react to a closer Kazakhstan–China
relationship further restrict the Kazakhstan–China relationship to certain issue areas and
preclude others. Thus, while the importance of Russia in Kazakhstan’s geopolitical
circumstance is not the same as the “pro-Russian univectoral policy” exhibited by, for
example, Belarus (Minasyan 2012, 268), it does mean that Kazakhstan’s strategic
independence is more aspirational than practical.
After Russia and China, Kazakhstan’s relations with the other Central Asian coun-
tries take precedence in Nazarbayev’s addresses. He describes these countries in very
warm terms, calling them “brothers brought up by a single mother” (1997) who “share
economic interest, cultural heritage, language, religion, and environmental challenges,
and face common external threats” (2005). He bemoans the Tsarist and Stalinist policies
which divided them into competing ethnic groups and calls upon them to strive toward
greater unity. Nazarbayev repeatedly9 calls for the greater integration of the Central
Asian countries, going so far as to advance the idea of a Central Asian Union, based on
the model of the European Union. In addition to promoting the economic and cultural
connections between these countries, this integration is seen as helping to secure peace-
ful relations in the region, which Nazarbayev also highlights as a cornerstone of his for-
eign policy and “an indispensable prerequisite for successful development” (1997).
Central Asian integration would do this in two ways. First, it would move toward
resolving problems between the Central Asian countries and “stabilize the region”
(2012b). Second, it would provide the Central Asian countries with more weight region-
ally. This in turn renders them better able to preserve their independence in the face of
potential “superpower rivalry for economic dominance in our region”; otherwise, they
will be forced to “wait patiently for the emergence of the next imperial master” of the
region (2005).
Outside of this immediate neighborhood is another set of interests: promoting posi-
tive relations with the United States, Europe, Asia, and the Islamic world. Obviously,
those countries in closest proximity (Russia, China, the other Central Asian states) will
have the greatest impact on Kazakhstan’s security and economic development. This is
reflected in the 2007 address, in which positive relations with these states are described
as “priorities,” in contrast to the need for developing a “strategic partnership” with the
US and “multilateral cooperation” with the EU – the implication being that these other
relationships are of a lesser priority. Similar language is used in 2002, 2008, and 2012b,
though this order of precedence between these groupings of countries is found in nearly
all of the speeches.
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 551

Nonetheless, the world outside of Kazakhstan’s close, geographic proximity serves

several purposes in terms of the country’s geopolitical goals. It is in Kazakhstan’s interests
to ensure that it remains important for other global actors. Positive relations with these
countries will ensure that they, in turn, have an interest in maintaining Kazakhstan’s
independence (1997).10 They serve as a hedge against Russian and Chinese power in the
region and against their potential influence over Kazakhstan. Given the global power of
the United States, Kazakhstan’s relationship with the US is particularly important in this
regard. Although Nazarbayev’s references to the United States are not made explicitly in
this fashion, in some speeches (particularly 2004 and 2006) there is an implied equiva-
lency between all three great powers. However, this must be done in such a way as not to
provoke a negative response by its great power neighbors.
A central danger for Kazakhstan, as identified in these speeches, is that Central Asia
will one day become an arena for great power conflict which will “involve the country
in an unpredictable vortex of various regional conflicts of military, political, economic,
and confessional nature” (1997). Such an outcome is more likely to occur if countries
adopt a “bloc” or “alliance” mentality, something which Nazarbayev deems as “unac-
ceptable” for Kazakhstan (1997). Kazakhstan’s membership in the Collective Security
Trade Organization (CSTO) appears to violate this prohibition, but Nazarbayev strongly
asserts that the country has a “purely practical interest in the treaty” and that it will not
act to “satisfy somebody’s geopolitical ambitions” (2000). The implication is that the
CSTO is a pragmatic, non-ideological means to enhance Kazakhstan’s security and that
Kazakhstan will not serve as part of a pro-Russian, anti-NATO alliance.
In short, the exercise of Kazakh sovereignty is dependent upon maintaining flexibil-
ity in its foreign and security policies through these wider relationships. This in turn
helps to preserve the country’s multi-vector foreign policy. But it all must be conducted
without causing a negative reaction vis-à-vis Russia.
Because regional peace is seen as so important to Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and
economic development, Nazarbayev identifies two central roles for his country. First,
Kazakhstan must act as a “responsible member of the international community” (2006).
Nazarbayev repeatedly points to his country’s decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons
(2002, 2005) and to actively promote nuclear non-proliferation and global reductions in
nuclear stockpiles (2011, 2012a, 2013) as evidence of this. Second, and related to this,
is that Kazakhstan must take upon itself the responsibility of promoting “geopolitical
stability and regional security” (2006). (Similar language is used in 2007.) To this end,
Kazakhstan should facilitate peaceful relations between the different sets of interests
which intersect within Central Asia: Russia, Asia, Europe, and the Islamic world.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy also aims to promote the “regulation of strategic dialog
between all existing systems of collective security” (2010) and to serve as a “bridge for
dialog and interaction between East and West” (2012b). According to Nazarbayev,
Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned to accomplish this geographically, as well as cultur-
ally. Kazakhstan’s creation of the Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional
Religions, which was hosted in Astana several times, is an example of its role as a
“center of inter-cultural and inter-religious accord” and a facilitator of a “dialog of civi-
lizations” (2007). Preserving and promoting a positive image of Kazakhstan on the
world stage has been an important priority for the regime. This even goes as far as the
Kazakh Government’s response to the film Borat (Schatz 2008).
A final aspect of the multi-vector foreign policy is that these relationships keep
Kazakhstan culturally and politically connected to areas outside of its immediate region.
This is very important for Nazarbayev’s conception of Kazakh national identity as a
552 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

“Eurasian” country. In his view, Eurasianism is not just limited to an identity within
heart of Eurasia itself, but is dependent upon the maintenance of ties to the wider world,
in line with the country’s status as a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the Islamic
world. Thus, Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 was important not only
as a matter of national pride (van Lohuizen 2010), since Kazakhstan was the first former
Soviet country to chair the organization, but also because it solidified the country’s ties
to Europe and provided it with a prominent role in European security issues, as outlined
in-depth in Nazarbayev’s 2010 address. In the following year’s address, Nazarbayev
praises his country’s presidency of the Organization of Islamic Conference as
“strengthen[ing] the Asian vector of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy,” as well as connec-
tions to the Islamic world.11 This “Asian vector” was also served through Kazakhstan’s
active participation in the CICA, originally proposed by Nazarbayev in 1992 and
chaired by Kazakhstan from 2002 to 2010.12 The SCO also serves as a means to
connect Central Asia to China, the rising power in Asia.
Nazarbayev’s multi-vector foreign policy exhibits an awareness of Kazakhstan’s geo-
graphic and geopolitical circumstances, as well as an attempt to both make the most of
its geographic limitations and keep Kazakhstan connected to Europe, Asia, and the
Islamic world. According to this concept, the chief danger for Kazakhstan is that Central
Asia will become a battleground between competing geopolitical actors, dragging the
country into conflicts which it can ill afford or forcing one or other great powers to
actively assert itself and undermine Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Therefore, the multi-vector
foreign policy serves to preserve “a buffer of peace on all of our borders, a safety belt of
friendly frontiers” (1998).

The need for international economic integration

Another aspect of Nazarbayev’s foreign policy concept is the necessity to integrate
Kazakhstan fully into the international economic system. This is further representative
of Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code in that it identifies a key source of threat for the
country and identifies ways to overcome it. Moreover, its geographic scope is global in
nature but rooted in the specific nature of Kazakhstan’s geographic situation, and reflects
an understanding of global trends and how these are tied to the country’s domestic
conditions. It is also intermingled with the multi-vector foreign policy concept in two
ways: friendly relations with key global actors and regions are essential to achieving this
goal and Kazakhstan can further fulfill its role as, in this case, a physical crossroads
between different countries and regions.
As presented repeatedly in Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, the nature of the
international system is based upon “ever-growing globalization and ever-close interrela-
tionships” between economic actors (1997). Detachment from these trends would be
disastrous for Kazakhstan and the region, as “isolationism equals failure” and these
countries will have “no future” without integration into the global economic system
(1999). The decline of the historic Silk Road made the region a “backwater of progress”
(2005) – a danger that exists today. Because of its geographic location, Kazakhstan is
uniquely positioned to reboot the historic connection between Europe and Asia. This
imagery that is used explicitly in his 1997 and 2005 addresses, and implied throughout
many others. According to Nazarbayev, the country should serve as a trade and transit
conduit between Europe and Asia. References to the need to build or improve trans-
portation networks and energy supply pipelines from or through Kazakhstan are found
in nearly every address. The country’s energy and mineral resources, and the world’s
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 553

need for them, provide the necessary gateway for Kazakhstan to enter these world
markets (2001). Moreover, the opportunities for Kazakh exports are bountiful, given its
central location between huge markets (1997).
Avoiding isolation is not only an end in itself, but it is seen as a prerequisite for
Kazakhstan’s economic development and the improvement of its people’s “well-being”
and “living standards” (2007). The link between integration into the global economic
system and Kazakhstan’s domestic economic conditions is well established in these
speeches. It is often the case that domestic economic issues are addressed in an inter-
mestic manner, as seen most prominently in the 2007 and 2012b addresses in which
Nazarbayev moves seamlessly from the domestic to the international spheres and back
again in long passages on this topic. Oil, natural gas, minerals, and agricultural exports
provide the government with the necessary capital to embark on large-scale activities,
which will in turn provide long-term public goods which cannot or will not be funded
by private domestic actors. The most important of these activities are investments in
infrastructure and projects to make Kazakhstan’s economy more diverse. Kazakhstan
inherited the Soviet Union’s malformed technological base, which placed it in a less
competitive position vis-à-vis other international actors. Thus, integration into the global
economy will provide Kazakhstan with access to technological advances through direct
transfers and joint domestic–foreign enterprises. Finally, as Kazakhstan becomes better
integrated into the global economy and is seen as a responsible and important economic
actor, it will be better able to attract direct foreign investment, providing additional
capital and knowledge. Thus, international recognition of Kazakhstan’s achievements in
reaching certain benchmarks – such as being recognized as a market economy by the
US and EU (2002) and being classified by the World Bank as belonging to the group of
middle-income countries (2005) – are often touted in these addresses.
Nazarbayev’s approach to the global economic system is fundamentally pragmatic,
in that Kazakhstan must deal with the system as it exists: “[t]he global system of the
world economy is a well-developed and well-functioning mechanism working by its
own rules. We should work by these rules too” (2007). Kazakhstan is portrayed as being
in no position to change this system. However, there are no hints that the fundamentals
of this system are unjust or exploitive. Instead, improving Kazakhstan’s ability to adapt
to this system and exploiting opportunities provided by the country’s geography and
resource endowments are emphasized. This is seen most clearly in the 2006 address in
which he discusses this explicitly:

We want to see Kazakhstan as a country developing along the global economic trends, as a
country which is embracing all that is new and progressive, as a country which holds a
small but its own specific niche in the world economy, and as a country which is quickly
adaptable to new economic conditions. We should be ready for fierce competition and use
the advantage of it in our best interests. Kazakhstan can and must actively participate in
multilateral economic projects which promote our integration into the global economy and
are based, among other factors, on our beneficial economic and geographical location and
available resources.

Through flexibility on economic issues and an active government policy, Kazakhstan

can survive and thrive in this highly competitive environment. This is true even in the
face of the economic crises of 2007 and 2008–2009, which Nazarbayev talks about in
detail in these speeches.
For Nazarbayev, the key is to continuously promote Kazakhstan’s integration into
the global economic system. Numerous ways to achieve this goal are outlined in these
554 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

addresses. They include raising Kazakhstan to international standards in a variety of

areas, such as the quality of products and services, the financial sector, regulations,
education, the environment, and health care; ensuring that Kazakhstan is known globally
as a good place to do business; diversifying the Kazakh economy and exports to avoid
falling into the rentier trap, which has hobbled other countries; promoting joint eco-
nomic enterprises between Kazakh and foreign businesses; providing resources for both
the foreign education of Kazakh citizens, who will presumably return with their foreign-
gained knowledge, and the import of foreign specialists to Kazakhstan; embarking on
an ambitious program to ensure that all Kazakh high school and college graduates are
fluent in English, the lingua franca of international business; and, joining the World
Trade Organization, a goal first mentioned in his 2002 address and referenced in nearly
every speech afterward. Although this may appear to be merely a laundry list of pro-
posals, it is reflective of two things. First, it accurately represents a good portion of
Nazarbayev’s addresses – his rhetoric tends to resemble a series of directives to his gov-
ernment. Second, it indicates that Nazarbayev is responding to the geopolitical threat of
potential isolation from different and mutually reinforcing directions. As such, it
constitutes a core component of his geopolitical code.
Nazarbayev’s economic worldview is also driven by his understanding that the
experiences of other countries can be useful for setting Kazakhstan’s economic develop-
ment plan. Although he is quick to say that Kazakhstan will chart its own path based
upon its “history and unique circumstances” (1997), there are repeated references to
what Kazakhstan can learn and indeed should learn from those who came before. There
are certain general concepts that are cited as being guidelines for the evolution of
Kazakhstan’s economy, such as the importance of developing its human resources and a
“smart economy” in order to construct a modern and successful system (2007). More-
over, particular countries are cited in reference to specific aspects of development, such
as the similar need for water conservation between Australia and Kazakhstan (2013).
However, the development paths most frequently cited as the most viable examples for
Kazakhstan to follow are those of the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. These
countries experienced rapid economic growth without, in many cases, the benefit of
much in the way of natural resources. This is something which Kazakhstan can emulate,
with the added advantage of possessing a rich resource base. It is telling that South
Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia are ranked fifth, sixth, and seventh, respectively, in
terms of country references in these addresses. The similarities in governing style
(authoritarian13) and economic structure (technologically modern, market-based systems)
between these states and Kazakhstan likely appeal to Nazarbayev, both as examples to
follow and as a justification for maintaining the domestic status quo of centralized
power. Although economic integration with former Soviet countries and trade with other
regions such as Europe and North America are obviously important, their experiences
are not presented as applicable to Kazakhstan. Instead, from the perspective of eco-
nomic development, there is a clear geographic bias in favor of the East Asian and
Southeast Asian countries.
It is no surprise that economic issues constitute the bulk of Nazarbayev’s presiden-
tial addresses, since Kazakhstan is a developing country making a rapid transition from
a relatively poor, socialist-command economy to a richer, more modern, capitalist sys-
tem. Speaking to these matters is obviously very important in order to let his
constituents know that he shares their concerns and is seeking to improve their
well-being. What is striking, however, is his emphasis on the need to further the
country’s integration into the global economic system. Although there are the threats of
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 555

economic isolation, the problems associated with fitting Kazakhstan into a competitive
economic environment, and the impact of external crises on the country, Nazarbayev is
quick to outline the steps his government is taking to counter these dangers, which are
portrayed as both temporary and manageable.

Conclusion
Throughout his presidential addresses, Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code is remarkably
consistent: the absence of state-level threats, an emphasis on pursuing a multi-vector for-
eign policy, and the need to integrate Kazakhstan into the global economic system. The
basic geopolitical assumption that Nazarbayev appears to hold is that Kazakhstan’s
external environment is both non-threatening and ultimately positive. The policies out-
lined in these speeches reflect and are justified by this assumption. This assumption has
seemingly not varied despite changes in the leaderships of other states, such as Russia,
China, and the United States. Within the context of Kazakhstan’s static geographic posi-
tion, the differences between, for example, Yeltsin and Putin, may seem to matter a
great deal for Kazakhstan, given Russia’s size and power, as well as its prominent place
in Kazakh geopolitical thinking. However, this is not reflected in these speeches.
There are potential complicating factors that may upset this assumption in the
future, however. Although Kazakhstan’s good relationship with Russia is highlighted
by Nazarbayev, one cannot but sense that he is intentionally ingratiating himself with
Russia. Given the small size and poor quality of Kazakhstan’s military, its nuclear
disarmament, its long border with Russia, and Russia’s potential ethnic and historical
claims on Kazakhstan’s territory, it is clear that any substantive state-level threat to
the country would most likely come from this direction. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s secu-
rity is first-and-foremost dependent upon a non-aggressive Russia, and it is necessary
above all else that the Kazakhstan–Russian relationship remain positive. This reality
may be why Nazarbayev is so reluctant to identify any country as a potential threat,
even if it means glossing over the truth that the more assertive Russia seen in the
post-Yeltsin period is in fact a real, potential threat to Kazakhstan. Not only would a
reversal of this positive rhetoric likely damage its bilateral relations with Russia, but
it would also create the appearance that Kazakhstan is taking steps to counter this
threat, such as by aligning itself with an opposing bloc. When Georgia and Ukraine
sought to align themselves with the United States and the West, the Kremlin
responded aggressively. The invasion of Georgia of 2008 and the proxy war with
Ukraine six years later is indicative of how Russia deals with perceived threats to its
core interests. Thus, Kazakhstan faces a dilemma: Russia’s assertion of an exclusive
sphere of influence is more-and-more becoming a reality, but to say so will likely
accelerate those trends and threaten Kazakhstan’s security interests.
This leads to the potential that Nazarbayev’s rhetoric in these addresses does not
accurately reflect his thinking about Kazakhstan’s northern neighbor – at least, not at
the present time. Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine has raised
concerns about Russia’s future intentions and has led Nazarbayev to become more
directly assertive of Kazakhstan’s independence and its legitimacy as a nation state
(Holmquist 2015). Although Nazarbayev has not openly identified Russia as a threat, he
may be tempted to take additional steps (even rhetorical ones) to shore-up his country’s
autonomy. This, in turn, could aggravate a Russian leadership, which is currently primed
to see foreign policy threats – thus leading to a negative security spiral.
556 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

One way around this dilemma is through the multi-vector foreign policy.
Kazakhstan’s relationship with China is in line with its economic development, but it
also advances its security interests in that the Kazakhstan–China relationship serves as a
potential hedge against Russian power and influence. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s relation-
ship with the West generally, and the United States in particular, could serve as a hedge
against its immediate neighbors. However, Kazakhstan’s landlocked position and its
physical remoteness from Europe and the United States are reinforced by the logical
emphasis placed on its immediate neighborhood. This means that a true multi-vector
foreign policy remains more of an aspiration than a reality. While it is perfectly sensible
and understandable that Nazarbayev would privilege Russia, China, and Central Asia in
his foreign policy thinking, this means the other vectors are by necessity subordinated
to these relationships. All the while, Kazakhstan continues to draw closer to Russia in
terms of economic and security integration, despite the growing concerns about Russian
foreign policy. This alignment with Russia, accompanied with the growing rift between
Russia and the US/Europe, also means that the degree to which Kazakhstan can even
pursue a multi-vector foreign policy in the future will likely prove to be increasingly
difficult in the long term. While Nazarbayev will undoubtedly continue to proclaim his
country’s commitment to this foreign policy concept, the disparity between the rhetoric
and reality will become more apparent.
Nonetheless, even this primary, northern vector is proving to be a challenge as the
official formation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in January 2015, a project
long promoted by Nazarbayev, has immediately run into trouble. Western economic
sanctions over Russian actions in Ukraine have hurt Russia’s economy and have com-
pounded a looming economic crisis in Russia caused by the recent, significant drop in
oil prices. This has already had ripple effects in Kazakhstan that will likely intensify in
the short term. Trade between Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Belarus and Russia, on
the other, dropped by nearly 20 percent during 2014 (Michel 2015). Russian counter-
sanctions against Western foodstuffs, and Russian accusations of Belarusian repackaging
of Western food imports, has led to trade restrictions against Belarus; these, in turn,
have resulted in restrictions on Belarusian exports to Kazakhstan, which have to cross
Russian territory (Satpaev 2015). More worrying from Kazakhstan’s perspective is the
fact that Russia has proposed a political component for the EEU – something which
Nazarbayev has repeated rejected out of hand as undermining Kazakhstan’s indepen-
dence. If these trends continue, it is possible that the EEU project itself could be in
jeopardy as Kazakhstan prioritizes markets farther afield than its immediate region. This,
in turn, could also increase tensions with Russia, undercutting a core component of
Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code.
Thus, there is even more incentive for Kazakhstan to integrate into the global eco-
nomic system, which has benefited the country significantly since independence. The
country withstood two global economic crises and has still achieved solid GDP growth
since 1992. Moreover, the global need for Kazakhstan’s natural resources will not end
anytime soon, and the country is poised to join the WTO. Nonetheless, there are signs
of danger on the economic front, such as oil prices remaining depressed over the long
term, which will have a negative drag on Kazakhstan’s economy. However, most of
these dangers stem from domestic sources. Although Kazakhstan’s economy continues
to grow, the rate of growth is beginning to level off, despite the post-Great Recession
rebound. Whether the government can continue with the high levels of domestic spend-
ing needed to achieve Nazarbayev’s development goals as well as to maintain the de
facto social contract between the authoritarian regime and the people remains to be
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 557

seen. Moreover, despite the government’s policies aimed at avoiding the rentier trap,
Kazakhstan’s economy continues to depend upon its natural resources. True economic
diversification remains elusive, and Kazakhstan’s global economic integration is largely
limited to its energy sector, which constitutes one-fourth of its economy and 80 percent
of its exports (Solovyov 2014). Finally, Nazarbayev was born in 1940 and a succession
crisis looms over the country (Ambrosio 2015). Historically, authoritarian regimes have
about a 50–50 chance of managing a successful transition and avoiding regime collapse.
Turkmenistan was able to manage such a transition in 2006, but if things go poorly in a
post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan, the country’s economic health and political stability may
be in jeopardy.
The imagery of Kazakhstan as a geopolitical crossroads is well established in
Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses. One could also say that it is at a geopolitical
crossroads, as the geopolitical code advanced by its long-term president may become
destabilized. Nonetheless, this analysis of these speeches indicates that Kazakhstan’s
future will remain tied to both its geographic position and international politics.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by the Upper Midwest Regional Center on Public Policy, North Dakota
State University.

Notes
1. There is one exception: 2012–2013. In 2012, Nazarbayev gave two presidential addresses:
27 January and 14 December. The next president speech was given on 18 January 2014.
Thus, no presidential addresses were given in 2013. However, the difference between the 14
December 2012 speech and the normal time of these addresses (the first quarter of the year)
is not significant and for all intents and purposes represents his 2013 speech. Moreover, it
appears that Nazarbayev sought to coordinate the timing of the December 2012 speech with
the anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence (also in December) in order to present a new,
grand political agenda for the country, which he called Kazakhstan-2050. To avoid confu-
sion, this article will refer to 27 January 2012 address as 2012a and the 14 December 2012
address as 2012b. Moreover, the 2007 speech is a bit odd in that it is a two-part address in
which the first was spoken live, whereas the second was given to the members of parliament
as printed statement and published in print and on the president’s website as part of the
2007 address. Since it is clear that this is meant to be one address, but was separated into
two parts for purposes of time, both are included as parts of the 2007 address.
2. Another inconsistency involves the length of these speeches, three of which are rather long
(1997: 18,062 words; 2007: 13,862 words; 2012b: 17,427 words) and programmatic. These
speeches were 2.5 and 3.5 times the average length of the others.
3. Northern Ireland was coded as part of the United Kingdom, and Taiwan was coded as a
separate country.
4. Fourteen out of 27 mentions coded as “Eurasia” also refer to specific international organiza-
tions, such as the Eurasian Economic Community or the Eurasian Development Bank. The
category “Former Soviet Union” also includes a variety of other phrases used by Nazarbayev
to refer to the geographic space of the former Soviet republics, such as the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS). Only twice, out of 27 times, is the CIS referenced in terms of
the organization itself.
558 T. Ambrosio and W.A. Lange

5. Although, geographically, the Subcontinent perhaps should represent the southern vector, this
is not the case either in Nazarbayev’s conception of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy
concept or in his speeches where India and Pakistan appear only rarely (five and one
mentions, respectively, out of 233 country references) and South Asia is not specifically
referenced at all.
6. Kyrgyzstan (4), Turkmenistan (4), Uzbekistan (3), Ukraine (2), Estonia (1).
7. Non-regional references include organizations not tied to a specific region, such as the World
Trade Organization and the United Nations.
8. In terms of national and ethnic conflict, this chart likely undercounts the degree to which this
is seen as a threat, since it only counts explicit references to it as a threat. Instead, the num-
ber of times Nazarbayev mentions the need for inter-ethnic cooperation and peace, as well as
governmental policies proposed or implemented to that effect, reflects that this is in fact seen
as a serious, potential problem for Kazakhstan’s well-being. However, as a threat, this is
mostly addressed implicitly.
9. In the 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007 addresses.
10. Obviously, this is more applicable for the United States, Europe, and Asia than for the
Islamic countries.
11. Nazarbayev’s references to the importance of Kazakhstan’s connections to the Muslim world
also appear prominently in his 2006 and 2012b addresses.
12. This is mentioned by Nazarbayev in eight separate speeches from 2000 to 2012b.
13. South Korea is obviously now democratic, but its rapid economic development after the
Korean War occurred under an authoritarian regime.

References
Ambrosio, Thomas. 2015. “Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Regime Survival
after Nazarbayev and Karimov.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17: 49–67.
Ambrosio, Thomas, and Geoffrey Vandrovec. 2013. “Mapping the Geopolitics of the Russian
Federation: The Federal Assembly Addresses of Putin and Medvedev.” Geopolitics 18: 435–466.
Cooley, Alexander. 2012. Great Games, Local Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cummings, Sally. 2003. “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters between East and West? Ideas,
Identity and Output in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy.” Journal of Communist Studies &
Transition Politics 19: 139–155.
Flint, Colin, Michael Adduci, Michael Chen, and Sang-Hyun Chi. 2009. “Mapping the Dynamism
of the United States’ Geopolitical Code: The Geography of the State of the Union Speeches,
1988–2008.” Geopolitics 14: 604–629.
Hanks, Reuel. 2009. “‘Multi-vector Politics’ and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a Geo-strategic
Player in Central Asia.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11: 257–267.
Hickey, Beth. 1999. “The Return of the Great Game? An Analysis of Russian–American Relations
in Post-Cold War Central Asia.” M.A. thesis, University of Virginia.
Holmquist, Erika. 2015. “Kazakhstan after Crimea: ‘You Cannot Choose Your Neighbours’.”
Swedish Defense Research Agency, RUFS Briefing No. 26. http://www.foi.se/Documents/
RUFS%20Briefing%20No.%2026%20.pdf.
Huliaras, Asteris, and Charalambos Tsardanidis. 2006. “(Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek
Geopolitical Codes of the Post-Communist Era.” Geopolitics 11: 465–483.
Idan, Avinoam, and Brenda Shaffer. 2011. “The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked
States.” Post-Soviet Affairs 27: 241–268.
İpek, Pinar. 2007. “The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Looking East or
West?” Europe-Asia Studies 59: 1179–1199.
Kandiyoti, Rafael. 2008. “What Price Access to the Open Seas? The Geopolitics of Oil and Gas
Transmission from the Trans-Caspian Republics.” Central Asian Survey 27: 75–93.
Kassenova, Nargis. 2005. “Kazakhstan’s National Security: Conceptual and Operational Aspects.”
Central Asian Survey 24: 151–164.
Koch, Natalie. 2013a. “Kazakhstan’s Changing Geopolitics: The Resource Economy and Popular
Attitudes about China’s Growing Regional Influence.” Eurasian Geography & Economics 54:
110–133.
Koch, Natalie. 2013b. “The ‘Heart’ of Eurasia? Kazakhstan’s Centrally Located Capital City.”
Central Asian Survey 32: 134–147.
 Eurasian Geography and Economics 559

van Lohuizen, Matthias. 2010. “Kazakhstan as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office 2010: Success or
Failure for the Organization?” Security & Human Rights 21: 269–278.
Michel, Casey. 2015. “Eurasian Economic Union: Dead on Arrival?” The Diplomat January 5.
Accessed January 28. http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/eurasian-economic-union-dead-on-arrival/
Minasyan, Sergey. 2012. “Multi-vectorism in the Foreign Policy of Post-Soviet Eurasian States.”
Demokratizatsiya 20: 268–273.
Morozova, Natalia. 2009. “Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin.”
Geopolitics 14: 667–686.
Mostafa, Golam. 2013. “The Concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Policy and its Implica-
tions.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4: 160–170.
Nikolaev, Sergei. 2011. “Central Asia in Geopolitics: The American Vector (1991–2008).”
International Affairs 57: 47–63.
Nourzhanov, Kirill. 2009. “Changing Security Threat Perceptions in Central Asia.” Australian
Journal of International Affairs 63: 85–104.
Ó Beacháin, Donnacha, and Rob Kevlihan. 2013. “Threading a Needle: Kazakhstan between Civic
and Ethno-nationalist State-building.” Nations & Nationalism 19: 337–356.
O’Loughlin, John, and Richard Grant. 1990. “The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches,
1946–87.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80: 504–530.
O’Loughlin, John, Gearóid Ó Tuathail Gerard Toal, and Vladimir Kolossov. 2005. “Russian
Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: The Masks of Proteus Revisited.” Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers 30: 322–335.
Satpaev, Dosym. 2015. “Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic Union: The View from Astana.”
European Council on Foreign Relations. January 12. Accessed September 28. http://www.ecfr.
eu/article/commentary_kazakhstan_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_view_from_astana395
Schatz, Edward. 2008. “Transnational Image Making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan.” Slavic
Review 67: 50–62.
Solovyov, Dmitry. 2014. “Kazakhstan Seeks Economic Diversification, Fast Growth in ADB
Deal.” Reuters, May 4. Accessed September 29. http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
USL6N0NQ08220140504
Spehr, Scott, and Nargis Kassenova. 2012. “Kazakhstan: Constructing Identity in a Post-Soviet
Society.” Asian Ethnicity 13: 135–151.
Strakes, Jason. 2013. “Situating the ‘Balanced Foreign Policy’: The Role of System Structure in
Azerbaijan’s Multi-vector Diplomacy.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 15: 37–67.
Zabortseva, Yelena. 2014. “Rethinking the Economic Relationship between Kazakhstan and
Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 66: 311–327.

Appendix 1. Dates of Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Presidential Addresses

1997 – 16 November 1997
1998 – 30 September 1998
1999 – 15 December 1999
2000 – 24 November 2000
2001 – 16 September 2001
2002 – 29 April 2002
2003 – 4 April 2003
2004 – 19 March 2004
2005 – 18 February 2005
2006 – 1 March 2006
2007 – 28 February 2007
2008 – 6 February 2008
2009 – 6 March 2009
2010 – 29 January 2010
2011 – 28 January 2011
2012a – 27 January 2012
2012b – 14 December 2012
2014 – 18 January 2014