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AestheticsinArtHistory Libre PDF
AestheticsinArtHistory Libre PDF
This was published in one of James Elkins’ edited books (included in ‘The Art
Seminar’ series, I think.) It sets out in a highly schematic form, the approach I take
in all my monographs on the visual arts.
Aesthetics in Art History (and Vice Versa).
Paul Crowther
The Kantian and Hegelian traditions – in their different ways each saw
historical factors as partially constitutive of artistic meaning; whilst the great tradition
of German art history from Riegl to the early Panofsky fully understood that art
historical change centred on issues of aesthetic transformation. The reciprocal
dependence of art historical and aesthetic significance was here acknowledged by
both schools, even if not fully understood.
The importance of this insight has long been forgotten. In fact, recent
developments in art history and aesthetics actively suppress it. In this little discussion
I shall consider some of its ramifications mainly in relation to the limitations of
contemporary art history.
A first problem arises from an influential consumerist mindset whose
major manifestation is a (putatively) ‘antifoundational’ cultural relativism. This
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derives, in large part, from an unquestioning acceptance of the selfcontradictory
discourses of Foucault, Derrida, and the like 1. Such relativism has distorted both art
practice and the interpretative discourses consequent upon such practice. More
specifically it has reversed the order of dependence between these so that art practice
is now understood primarily as a vehicle for the reflection of modes of reception and
theory rather than as a mode of making.
This reversal is also consolidated by the contentious supposition that
Duchamp’s readymades centre on the creation of something artistically different,
rather than something different from art. A supposition of this kind is tacitly racist to
the profoundest degree (as well as being conceptually flawed) 2. The reason why is
that whilst, for many thousands of years (and across many cultural boundaries), art
as – at best a marginal western artcritical strategy – it is seen as the paradigmatic
artcreation activity in relation to which all else should be understood. The primacy
of making is dismissed with a condescending sneer, or worse. Art per se is taken to
amount to little more than ideas, theories, and their contexts of occurrence.
The dominant contextualist modes of recent art history 3, in particular have
internalized this view with dogmatic insistency. They reduce artistic meaning to
and other contextual elements which enable these. Apart from the occasional
discussion of technique and artists’ materials, such approaches are overwhelmingly
consumer and context orientated.
3
It might be thought that the frequent contextualist use of such terms as artistic
‘production’ is ‘consumption’ and that this pairing is itself a deployment of western
consumerist patterns of instrumental reason.
In fact, matters get worse. For in contextualist terms ‘production’ is understood as
rather than understood as a unifying activity which directs those practices. The
upshot is that what is distinctive to the making and meaning of visual images per se
is either repressed or distorted. It is recreated as the academic consumer’s
disembodied fantasy image of what making is supposed to involve.
This consumerist distortion has also carried over into the understanding of art
history as a discipline itself. Over the past twenty years or so the key German tradition
referred to earlier on has been looked at again, and many of its key works have
their analysis has been on how they enable us to understand the way in which art
history has been ‘constructed’ as an area of ‘discourse’. The active core of this
tradition – its conception of art as a formative aesthetic activity, is understood not in
terms of its continuing relevance for the art object but rather as an idea in the
development of art history itself.
What I am describing then is, literally, a conceptual western degradation of the
intimate link between artmaking and its objects. There is also a smug consumerist
definitions of art which gives succor to this. It holds that the concept of ‘art’ has
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simply changed. It has become an ‘open’ concept which must be redefined so as to
accommodate a vast range of practices based on material not made by the artist. But
against this, whilst such a change may be true de facto, its validity de juris is an
4, and if a sustained alternative to this occidental smugness is available, it must be
grasped with alacrity.
Fortunately, there is such an alternative 5. A useful starting point for
understanding it consists in what might be called the intrinsic significance of the
image. The ubiquity of the image and decorative forms across vastly different times
and places suggests that they have some compelling aesthetic power. Only on this
assumption can we explain the extraordinary range of magical and communicative
functions which different cultures invest in them.
Contextualist art history might attempt to dismiss this significance as follows.
‘Art’ is a privileged form of representation which reflects and consolidates the
interests of white male middleclass Eurocentric patriarchy. Its informative and
dominant and controlling power group. Art’s privileged status is due to its provision
of luxury commodities which can set their consumers apart from others in terms of
social kudos.
Again, however, we must ask what it is about the visual image which supports
these and other functions, and, especially, what it is about art which enables it to
of such kudos? If the kudos is based on aesthetic pleasure being regarded as superior,
what is it about such pleasure which allows it to be so regarded?
5
The problem is, here, that when all the social functions of art, and standard
questions of iconography and iconology have been mapped out and analysed, the
fundamental question remains unanswered, namely what it about the visual image
which enables it to sustain such breadth of meaning? What is the basis of its formative
power? We are left, in other words, with the problem of the intrinsic significance of
the image.
some Modernist myth of such art’s closeness to the throbbing primal rhythms of the
universe or whatever, but because it more manifestly recognises, and acts upon, a very
straightforward truth. This is the fact that, in the very act of making an image
(irrespective of one’s practical intentions and subsequent uses of the image) one
literally acts upon the world, and in so doing, changes one’s relation to both the
represented object and to oneself, and to existence in more general terms.
a way that changes the existing relation of subject and object of experience at all
If, therefore (as I have done at great length elsewhere)6, we can identify the factors
of what is is distinctive to the making and enjoyment of visual images. We will have a
genuine theory of the image, rather than a mere history of its uses and social meaning.
Contextualist art history might respond to all this by describing such an approach
as ‘ahistorical’. However, this is indicative of a further problem within contextualism
itself. Such art history likes to legitimize itself through a familiar binary opposition
between the ‘historical’ and the ‘ahistorical’. The former involves the understanding
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of events, persons, and activities in their original contexts of enactment, on the basis
of institutional, cultural, social, economic, racial, and gender factors. The ‘ahistorical’
attempts to formulate ‘timeless’ truths based on its object of investigation being
analysed without reference to the litany of factors just noted. It goes without saying,
of course, that ‘ahistorical’ is seen as a methodological flaw to be avoided at all costs.
(The term ‘essentialist’ is a related sneer.)
Now it might be argued that the idea of imagemaking having an intrinsic
significance over and above its historically specific uses, is something ahistorical, and
thence an empty abstraction. However, it must also be noted that the distinction
between the historical and ahistorical per se is itself an even greater abstraction. There
is a missing term involved, namely diachronic art history – understood not in the
derivative sense of patterns of reception, but in the primary one of chronologically
successive transformations of making.
The contextualist approach privileges the synchronic dimension of history as the
authentic mode, and marginalises the primary diachronic aspect. However, no
phenomenon can exist in purely synchronous terms. Its character and significance in
a specific place and time will necessarily be informed by factors (direct or indirect)
which were in place long before and which may survive into the future. Indeed, with
some activities and institutions, the diachronic dimension may be of more importance
than the synchronic.
Art is a case in point, for what establishes itself as canonic does not do so in
arbitrary terms; it offers achievements which exceed the time and place of their
creation. To make sense of this we need, therefore, to acknowledge that the ‘Other’ of
synchronic history is the diachronic, and not the ahistorical. But if this is the case,
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then we need some enduring factor which is the basis of diachronic transmission in
artistic practice.
This, of course, is the role played by the intrinsic significance of imagemaking
(amongst other factors). In mediating between synchronic and diachronic history, it
has a transhistorical rather than ‘ahistorical’ importance. The mistaken accusation of
ahistoricality, in other words, ends up by confirming rather than refuting the idea of
intrinsic significance.
If, therefore, we are to theorise art in adequate terms, it requires a key negotiation
between the making of art, its intrinsic significance, and the way in which this is
instantiated in a diachronic horizon of historical transmission. It is especially possible
to conduct such negotiation on the basis of a redevelopment and substantial extension
of Kant’s aesthetics and, most notably, his theory of fine art and aesthetic ideas 7. In
his theory, originality is, in part, constitutive of artistic meaning. Hence, insofar as
originality is conceptually tied to artistic achievement in the dimension of diachronic
history, this allows the requisite negotiations to be made in some depth. Aesthetics
and art history find, thereby, a zone of authentic interaction.
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Notes and references
1. The conceptual inadequacies of poststructuralism are discussed throughout my
book Philosophy After Postmodernism: Civilized Values and the Scope of Knowledge,
Routledge, London 2003
2. These claims are defended at more in length in a paper entitled ‘Defining Art,
Defending the Canon, Contesting Culture’ in the British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.44,
No.4, 2004, pp 361377.
3. Amongst the key contextualists are Griselda Pollock, T.J. Clark, Norman Bryson,
and Kevin Moxey.
4. These are explored in more detail in the ‘Defining Art..’ paper cited in note 3. .
5. The idea of the image’s intrinsic significance is outlined in Part Three of ‘Cultural
Exclusion, Normativity, and the Definition of Art’ in the Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, vol. 61, No.2, 2003, pp.121131. It is also the major theme of my
recently completed book on Theory of the Image: Aesthetics at the Limits of Art
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History. For a discussion of it in a broader context see my The Transhistorical Image:
Philosophizing Art and Its History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
Chapter 4 is especially relevant.
6. Namely the material cited in note 5.
7. This task has been central to all my work in aesthetics. In addition to the foregoing
references, see for example, Chapter 4 of Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993; and Chapters 4 and 10 of Art and Embodiment: From
Aesthetics to SelfConsciousness, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.