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The Relationship between Project Governance and Project Success

Article  in  International Journal of Project Management · March 2016

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2016.01.008

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International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613 – 626
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

The relationship between project governance and

project success☆
Robert Joslin a,1 , Ralf Müller b,2
a
Skema Business School, Lille campus, Avenue Willy Brandt, 59777 Lille, France
b
BI Norwegian Business School, Nydalsveien 37, 0484 Oslo, Norway
Received 5 November 2014; received in revised form 30 December 2015; accepted 15 January 2016
Available online xxxx

Abstract

This study looks at the relationship between project governance and project success from an agency theory and stewardship theory perspective.
For that project governance was operationalized respectively as a) the extent of shareholder versus stakeholder orientation and b) the extent of
behavior versus outcome control, both exercised by the parent organization over its project. A cross-sectional, worldwide online survey yielded
254 usable responses. Factor and regression analyses indicate that project success correlates with increasing stakeholder orientation of the parent
organization, while the types of control mechanisms do not correlate with project success. Results support the importance of stewardship
approaches in the context of successful projects.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Project governance; Project success; Agency theory; Stewardship theory

1. Introduction exponentially in popularity since 2005 (Biesenthal and Wilden,

Forty years of research have brought up a variety of new
success factors (i.e. those elements that, when applied during a
project's life cycle, increase the project's chances to be successful)
and extended the number of success criteria (i.e. those measures
applied at the end of the project to judge on the project's success).
Project success is hereby seen as the achievement of a particular
combination of objective and subjective measures, manifested in
the success criteria and measured at the end of a project (Müller
and Judgev, 2012). But success rates still do not meet expectations
(Judgev and Müller, 2005; Lehtonen and Martinsuo, 2006).
Because of that, researchers have started to widen the scope
of possible success factors and focus more on the structural
characteristics of the project context and its impact on success.
One of these factors is project governance, which has grown
☆ Note: Live in Switzerland hence the Swiss phone numbers.
E-mail addresses: robert.p.joslin@gmail.com (R. Joslin),
pmconcepts.ab@gmail.com (R. Müller).
1
Tel.: +33 44 720 1630 (direct), + 33 79 244 8383 (Mobile).
2
Tel.: +47 46 410 613.
2014). This stream of literature identifies the structural character-
istics needed for successful project execution (Müller and
Lecoeuvre, 2014). Project governance is “the use of systems,
structures of authority, and processes to allocate resources and
coordinate or control activity in a project” (Pinto, 2014), it
coexists within the corporate governance framework with the
objective to support projects in achieving their organizational
objectives (Müller, 2009). The majority of published research
on project governance is conceptual, supplemented by some
qualitative studies and very little quantitative evidence on the
relationship between project governance and project success.
Among the few quantitative studies are Wang and Chen's (2006)
assessment of governance impact on success in ERP projects, and
Müller and Martinsuo's (2015) investigation of the role of project
governance in the relationship between relational norms between
project buyers and suppliers and their joint project's success.
However, both studies showed an important role of governance,
but were confined to the IT industry. This is in contrast to general
management studies, where the link between corporate gover-
nance, management performance, and shareholder value is well
researched (Amzaleg et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999; Lazonick and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2016.01.008
0263-7863/00 © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
614 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626
O'Sullivan, 2000; Maher and Andersson, 2000). As project
governance is aligned with corporate governance and good
corporate governance is associated with management perfor-
mance, a link between project governance and project success
may be assumed. This will be addressed in the present paper.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship
between project governance and project success. The aim is to
understand which forms of project governance relate with project
success. To achieve this, the following research question is posed:
What is the relationship between project governance and
project success?
To answer this question, we first empirically test the
correlation between project governance and project success.
After that we discuss some of the underlying assumptions, which,
when met, may provide indicators for a limited causality. The
unit of analysis is the relationship between project governance
and project success. The study uses the governance paradigms
framework from Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014), which identifies
two governance dimensions: a) a continuum of the extent of
shareholder versus stakeholder orientation (following Clarke,
2004), and b) a continuum on the level of behavior versus
outcome control (following Ouchi, 1980), as exercised by the
project's parent organization. This allows for the contrasting
views of agency and stewardship theory. Agency theory is hereby
seen as a proxy in explaining behavior in more shareholder-
oriented governance structures, where contracts and process
control structures are used to manage the self-serving behavior of
managers for the maximization of shareholder wealth (Berle and
Means, 1968; Friedman, 1962). Contrarily, stewardship theory is
taken as a lens explaining behavior in more stakeholder-oriented
governance structures, where trust and controlling by outcomes/
results serve as a mechanism to govern towards the achievement
of organizational goals by balancing the requirements of a diverse
set of stakeholders (Davis et al., 1997c; Müller, 2011).
The study is relevant for practitioners developing success
related governance structures by pointing out the success
related governance approaches, and for academics in developing
contingency theories of project performance and results.
The next section reviews literature on governance, project
success, and agency and stewardship theories from which the
hypotheses are derived, followed by the research methodology,
results and discussion sections. The paper finishes with the
study's conclusions and its implications.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Governance as a success factor on projects
Building on the early success factor models by Pinto, Slevin
and Prescott (Pinto and Prescott, 1988; Pinto and Slevin, 1988),
which covered organizational effectiveness and technical validity,
the development of success factors diversified significantly over
the years. Researchers soon realized that success factors without
structure, grouping, and context would result in increased project
risks; therefore, success factor frameworks were introduced such
as those fostering multi-dimensionality and idiosyncrasy of factors
(Baccarini, 1999; Shenhar et al., 2001). Further research showed
the importance of soft factors such as teamwork (Hoegl and
Gemünden, 2001) or leadership styles of project managers (Turner
and Müller, 2005) and the shared leadership by the team (Cox
et al., 2003) (see Judgev and Müller (2005) a for complete
review). Serra & Kunc (Serra and Kunc, 2014) showed the link
between strategy planning and execution using benefits realization
management (BRM) as a success factor. The importance of
project governance as a success factor in large scale investment
projects was empirically assessed in two qualitative case studies in
South Africa. Using Delphi and nominal group techniques the
researchers found strong agreement among the interviewees that
the application of governance principles affects project success
(Bekker and Steyn, 2008). A recent quantitative study on the
impact of project management methodologies on project success
in different project governance contexts used the analysis
framework from Sharma et al. (1981). Results indicated that
governance has neither a pure moderating nor a mediating role in
the methodology – success relationship, thus it indicates that
governance is an antecedent variable. This is in line with
conceptual studies, which perceive governance to span the entire
life-cycle of temporary organizations, such as projects. Especially
the organization's shareholder or stakeholder orientation, as well
as the organizational control structures can be assumed to exist
before individual projects are launched in these organizations.
Hence, Stinchcombe's (1965) theory may apply, which suggests
that “the founding characteristics imprinted at the birth of an
organization influence its subsequent behavior” (Van de Ven,
2007). Therefore we assume “temporal precedence of the cause
[project governance] occurring before the effect [project success,
measured at the end of the project]” (Van de Ven, 2007),
contingent on the criteria that governance structures are setup by
organizations independent of their project types, thus governance
structures are not chosen depending on the project at hand, If this
is the case, the empirical test fulfills the first of three criteria for
causality, as proposed by the 19th century philosopher John Stuart
Mills and more recently by Van de Ven (2007). The other two
criteria (covariation or correlation, and absence of spurious
factors) are addressed in the analysis section of this paper. A
discussion about a possible causal relationship between project
governance and project success follows in the conclusion section.
2.2. Project success
Historically the understanding of project success criteria has
evolved from the simplistic triple constraint concept, known as the
iron triangle to something that encompasses many additional
success criteria such as quality, stakeholder satisfaction, and
knowledge management. (Atkinson, 1999; Judgev and Müller,
2005; Müller and Judgev, 2012; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). In terms
of measuring success, a variety of models for measuring project
success were developed, such as the popular ones are by Pinto and
Prescott (1988); Shenhar et al. (2002); Hoegl and Gemünden
(2001), or Turner and Müller (2006), which are all designed with
different underlying assumptions.
An amalgamation of these models was done by Khan et al.
(2013), who analyzed the literature on success criteria of the
past 40 years. Their model for measuring success was selected
 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626
for this study as it is based on most recent literature, which is a
superset of the success criteria from the leading researchers on
project success. Their model offers a balance between hard and
soft factors and measures 25 success criteria variables organized
in the five dimensions. The model contains the three criteria,
which are typically termed the iron triangle (dimension 1 below),
plus four additional project success criteria dimensions:
1. Project efficiency,
2. Organizational benefits,
3. Project impact,
4. Stakeholder satisfaction, and
5. Future potential.
Appendix 1 contains the list of success criteria variables
(questions).
In this paper, project success is assessed for its correlation with
project governance and then discussed as a possible dependent
variable in a causal relationship.
2.3. Project governance
According to Klakegg et al. (2009), it is important that
governance covers all levels of the organization, starting with
corporate governance flowing from the board level to the
management level responsible for execution, and down to the
project level of governance. The definition of corporate
governance from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) is:
“Involving a set of relationships between a company's
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders
[...] and should provide proper incentives for the board and
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective
monitoring OECD (2004)”.
Project-related governance is based on and aligned with
corporate governance; but focuses on the governance of individual
projects. The Project Management Institute (PMI®) defines
project governance as “an oversight function that is aligned with
the organization's governance model and that encompasses the
project lifecycle [and provides] a consistent method of controlling
the project and ensuring its success by defining and documenting
and communicating reliable, repeatable project practices” (PMI,
2013b). Whereas, project governance looks at the governance of
individual projects, the governance of projects looks at a group of
projects, such as a program or portfolio of projects and therefore
has a broader perspective (Müller et al., 2014).
Before going into more detail on project governance, it is
important to understand the history and application of manage-
ment theories in the corporate governance world, because many
of them apply to and are used in project governance.
Before the 1980's corporate governance was largely in the
realm of lawyers until economists became interested in how
organizations make decisions (Gilson, 1996). Gilson went on to
615
say the economists perceived a connection between organiza-
tional governance and organizational performance. From this
point, researchers started to apply management theories to help
understand the factors that influence corporate governance and
organizational performance (Maher and Andersson, 2000). The
most popular theories applied to corporate governance include
agency theory, stewardship theory, transaction cost economics,
stakeholder theory, shareholder theory and resource dependency
theory (Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012). One of the motivations for using
general management theories to ground theories in governance of
corporations was to help frame, understand, and address the issues
associated with poor corporate governance (Hirschey et al., 2009).
Since the late 1970's, the issues associated with poor corporate
governance and the impact on shareholder value has been well
researched across the major economies (Basu et al., 2007;
Hirschey et al., 2009). Resolving issues associated with corporate
governance has shown to consistently increase shareholder gains
(Gompers et al., 2003).
Agency theory, which is based on Jensen and Meckling's
(1976) work takes an economic view of the shareholder and
manager relationship in companies by assuming rational and
self-interested actors. Agency theory has been used by researchers
in traditional finance and economics, for example, accounting
(Demski and Feltham, 1978), economics (Spence and Zeckhauser,
1971), and finance (Fama, 1980), then applied to marketing (Basu
et al., 1985), political science (e.g. Mitnick, 1995), organizational
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985), sociology (Kaiser, 2006), corporate
governance (John and Senbet, 1998), and project governance
(Turner and Müller, 2003). It posits that corporate managers
(agents) may use their control over the allocation of corporate
resources opportunistically in order to pursue objectives not in line
with the interests of the shareholders (principals) (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). This is exemplified in the principal – agent
problem which occurs when both principal and agent act in a
self-interested, utility maximizing manner (Mitnick, 1973). Davis
et al. (1997c) relate this behavior to the lower levels of Maslow's
(1970) hierarchy of needs. Principal agent problems arise from
information asymmetry, because one party (e.g. the project
manager as agent) has typically more or better information than
the other (e.g. the project sponsor as principal) (Wiseman et al.,
2012). This results in a moral hazard risk which, unless mitigated,
is likely to increase the agency effect (Poblete and Spulber, 2012).
Popular remedies to the problem include contracts and incentives
that motivate agents to act in accordance with their principals,
controlled through related control structures. Corporate and
project governance, when designed correctly within the context
of the organization, should minimize the risks and issues
associated with agency theory. Agency theory based on Jensen
and Meckling's (1976) view of principle agent models have been
criticized because they neglect to consider that the principle-agent
transitions are socially embedded and therefore impacted by
broader institutional contexts (Davis et al., 1997a; Wiseman et al.,
2012). In this study we use agency theory as a proxy to explain
behavior in the shareholder oriented and behavior controlled
governance structures.
Stewardship theory arose in response to the criticism regarding
the generalizability of agency theory. It takes a psychological
616 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626
perspective towards governance and states that the actors
(managers) are stewards whose motives are aligned with the
higher level objectives of their principles rather than their own,
short term utility maximizing objectives (Donaldson and Davis,
1991). Davis et al. (1997c) relate this behavior to the higher levels
of Maslow's (1970) hierarchy of needs. The steward differs from
the agent in that the steward is trustworthy and will make
decisions in the best interests of the organization, whereas an agent
needs to be incentivized and/or controlled to do this. (Davis et al.,
1997b). Stewardship theory has been criticized, because it views
the organization in a static way and does not account for stewards
resorting back to an agent position when their positions are
threatened (Pastoriza and Ariño, 2008). In the present study we
use stewardship theory as a proxy to explain behavior in the
stakeholder oriented and outcome controlled governance
structures.
Neither agency theory nor stewardship theory is more valid
than the other, as each may be valid for different types of
phenomena (Davis et al., 1997b). This study investigates some
of these phenomena.
Both agency and stewardship theory define the relationship
between actors, thus are task or project level theories. They are
complemented by their organizational counterparts' sharehold-
er and stakeholder theory respectively. These are described
further on this paper.
Transaction cost economics (TCE), is an economic theory
which suggests that organizations achieve the lowest transaction
costs by adapting the governance structures to the nature of the
transaction (Williamson, 1979). Resource dependency theory,
suggests that managers are able to prioritize internal and external
resources needed to achieve the corporate objectives (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). When applied, all of these theories have helped
to improve corporate governance within organizations, under-
pinning ethical values and moral choices (Cameron et al., 2004).
In the realm of projects, two of the three elements that
constitute governance are project governance (governance of
individual projects) and the governance of projects (governance of
a group of projects such as a program or portfolio) (Müller et al.,
2014). Both elements are aligned with the Project Management
Institute (PMI) definitions and governance structures of projects,
programs, and portfolios (PMI, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
The literature on project governance shows the diversity of
governance approaches (Müller et al., 2014), covering topics
such as the optimization of the management of projects (Too and
Weaver, 2014); interrelationship of governance, trust, and ethics
in temporary organizations (Müller et al., 2013); risk, uncertainty,
and governance in megaprojects (Sanderson, 2012); governance
in particular sectors such as information technology (Weill and
Ross, 2004); and the normalization of deviance (Pinto, 2014).
Papers on governance within the realm of projects have utilized to
a large extent the same management theories used in corporate
governance (Biesenthal and Wilden, 2014).
Quantitative studies on project governance and success were
mainly done in the IT industry, where Wang and Chen (2006)
used structural equation modelling to show that an equilibrium
of explicit contracts, implicit contracts, reputation, and trust as
governance mechanisms mediates the relationship between
project hazards and project success. A study by Müller and
Martinsuo (2015) showed the moderating role of project
governance in the relationship between relational norms
between project buyers and suppliers and their joint project's
success. Thus, the number of quantitative studies is limited and
industry specific. The cross sectional study by Joslin and
Müller (2015) mentioned above identified governance as a
quasi-moderator, thus holding an indeterminable role in the
methodology – success relationship. Complementarily, the
qualitative case studies by Bekker and Steyn (2008) indicate an
antecedent relationship between governance and project
success. Taken together, the results show lots of variation in
the role of governance in project success. This knowledge gap
calls for further research.
Few publications have provided some sort of categorization
system for governance and its context, such as the four
governance paradigms described by Müller (2009). This model
builds on two dimensions. The first dimension addresses the
corporate-wide governance orientation by using Clarke's
(2004) continuum from shareholder to stakeholder orientation
of a firm. The second dimension addresses the control behavior
exercised by the parent organization over its project, by using
Ouchi's (1980) and Brown and Eisenhardt's (1997) continuum
from behavior control (i.e. following the process) to outcome
control (i.e. meeting pre-established expectations). The
operationalization of the paradigms was done by Müller and
Lecoeuvre (2014) and allows a quantitative assessment of a
project parent organization's governance position. We choose this
model for the present study because of its applicability to a wide
range of projects, in an attempt to understand organizations'
project governance approaches and the role of the two dimensions
for project success over a wide spectrum of possible project types,
industries and geographies.
Literature on corporate governance and corporate performance
shows a relationship between governance and organizational
success, such that weaker governance mechanisms have greater
agency problems resulting in lower corporate performance
(Hart, 1995; Hirschey et al., 2009; John and Senbet, 1998;
Ozkan, 2007); greater shareholder rights have a positive impact
on corporate performance (Hirschey et al., 2009); and indepen-
dent boards lead to higher corporate performance (Millstein and
MacAvoy, 1998). We transfer this assumption that governance
timely precedes organizational success from the general manage-
ment literature to the realm of projects. This follows the notions of
Biesenthal and Wilden (2014), as well as Turner and Simister
(2000) who see project governance as important in ensuring
successful project delivery, and the particular quantitative
findings by Wang and Chen (2006) for governance of IT projects,
and the broader findings by Joslin and Müller (2015). Hence, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Project governance correlates with project success.
The correlation between corporate governance orientation
(i.e. preference for shareholder or stakeholder oriented
governance) and project success has not been assessed in the
past. A shareholder-orientation of the firm is indicated when an
organization prioritizes the maximization of shareholder wealth
 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626
higher than the requirements of other stakeholders (Clarke,
1998; Davis et al., 1997c). Hence, when organizations take a
more internal view of their raison d'etre (Heblich Hirschey
et al., 2009). Definition of stakeholders vary. In this paper we
adopt Freeman's (1984) view that stakeholders are those
individuals or organizations that might affect the business
objectives and anyone who might be effected by its realization.
A stakeholder oriented organization is characterized by a more
external view of their raison d'etre as an organization (Heblich
Hirschey et al., 2009), which takes into account the various
stakeholder groups and balances their particular requirements
for the accomplishment of organizational objectives (Ansoff,
1965; Clarke, 1998). This is exemplified by the project
management literature which historically emphasized the
importance of stakeholders in and for project success (e.g.
Eskerod and Huemann, 2013 plus many others). Project
managers view stakeholders as the ultimate receivers of project
outcome and rank their satisfaction very high. Research showed
that project managers in North America rank the importance of
stakeholders highest among all success criteria, whereas project
managers in other regions rank its importance consistently
among the top 10 of the success criteria (Müller and Turner,
2007). Thus we hypothesize:
H1.1. Stakeholder oriented governance of projects correlates
positively with project success.
Similarly, the nature of the link between control orientation
(behavior versus outcome) and project success is unclear from
the literature. While the literature on project management
maturity models (e.g. Project Management Institute, OPM3®,
(PMI, 2013c)), and the literature on the governance of large-
scale investment projects e.g. Klakegg et al. (2009), emphasize
the importance of following processes for successful project
implementation, other research shows a more diversified picture,
such as that by Crawford et al. (2008) who showed the need for
situational contingency of structures, or Turner and Müller (2004)
showing that that control through methodology must find the
balance between being too process-focused (i.e. behavior control)
or too laissez-faire, because both lead to project failure. All of these
studies imply a correlation between control structure and success.
Given the general notion of the process orientation of project
Fig. 1. Research model.
617
management and its maturity (PMI, 2013c), and the recent
popularity of process-based approaches to project management,
such as Agile/Scrum (Schwaber, 2004), we hypothesize:
H1.2. Behavior control in project governance correlates positive-
ly with project success.
Fig. 1 shows the related research model with the two
governance dimensions as on the left hand side and project
success on the right.
3. Research methodology
We followed Saunders et al. (2011) process for research
design, which comprises of seven steps: post-positivism was
used as epistemological stance, because it aims for objectivity
as an ideal, but is aware of the subjectivity stemming from the
subjects targeted for data collection. Post-positivism identifies
trends instead of generalizations (Biedenbach and Müller, 2011).
A deductive approach was chosen for a robust design that includes
both existing theory and new empirical evidence. A survey design
was chosen to collect quantitative data in a cross-sectional manner
from a wide variety of individuals, in order to gain the widest
coverage of the resulting theory.
3.1. Questionnaire development
Four sets of questions were included in the questionnaire.
The first set included information about the last project; the
next two sets covered governance paradigms and project
success; and the last set collected the respondents' demographic
information. The questionnaire followed the suggestions of
Cooper and Schindler (2011) to ensure that the scales, criteria,
and wording were consistent and clear. The project governance
questions were taken from Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014). The
governance paradigms were selected as they have been used
successfully in several project governance related studies
before and reflect the organization's governance positioning
with regard to two continuums: (1) shareholder-stakeholder and
(2) behavior–outcome. The project success dimensions were
based on Khan et al. (2013). Its five dimensions (project
efficiency, organizational benefits, project impact, stakeholder
618 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626

satisfaction, and future potential), cover short- and long-term Table 1

implications of project success. A five-point Likert scale was Demographics.
used with low values representing low levels of stakeholder Characteristic N % Characteristic N %
orientation, outcome control, and success. A pilot test was done Sector Gender
with ten respondents. Based on the feedback, minor wording Research & development 31 12.2 Male 194 76.4
changes were made for understandability. The pilot answers Engineering/construction 46 18.0 Female 56 22.0
Information technology/ 120 47.1 Other 1 0.4
were not used in the analysis. telecom Total 251 98.8
To avoid influences through common method bias we Media/arts 9 3.5 Missing 3 1.2
followed the recommendations of Podsakoff and Organ (1986), Relief aid 16 6.3
including confirmed anonymity in the introductory text, different Other 29 11.4 Geography - working
layouts and scales, randomizing of questions, as well as the Total 251 98.4 North America 96 37.8
Missing 4 1.6 Europe 61 24.0
conduction of Harman test for the constructs. Australasia 56 22.0
Position held Other 38 15.0
3.2. Data collection CIO 3 1.2 Total 251 98.8
CTO 2 0.8 Missing 3 1.2
A worldwide, cross-sectional questionnaire was used to collect Project portfolio manager 17 6.7
PMO 10 3.9 Project-related experience
quantitative data for generalizable results, using snowball sam-
Program manager 65 25.6 1 to 5 years 36 14.6
pling. Respondents were contacted using email with a link to the Project manager 82 32.3 6 to 10 years 63 25.6
web survey. In addition, the survey details were placed on project Team member 24 9.4 11 to 15 years 53 21.5
management LinkedIn forums. An email with the survey link was Architect/advisor 6 2.4 16 to 20 years 45 18.3
sent to PMI chapters in Switzerland, Germany, central USA and QA/audit function 3 1.2 20 years plus 46 18.7
Technical stakeholder 2 0.8 Total 243 98.8
Pakistan, asking the chapter presidents to distribute the survey link Business stakeholder 4 1.6 Missing 3 1.2
to their members. Data were collected over 2 weeks in April 2014. Other 35 13.8
We obtained 266 responses, of which 254 were usable for analysis. Total 253 99.6 Work experience
Responses came from 41 different countries: 38% from North Missing 1 0.4 1 to 5 years 36 14.6
America 24% from Europe, 22% from Australasia, and 16% 6 to 10 years 60 24.4
11 to 15 years 46 18.7
from other countries. ANOVA analysis showed no difference 16 to 20 years 49 19.9
between early and late respondents. The average respondents' 20 years plus 52 21.1
work experience was 22 years and the average project-related Total 243 98.8
work experience was 15 years. Sample demographics are shown in Missing 3 1.2
Table 1.
An ANOVA test between the demographic regions showed
no statistical differences (p = 0.249).
Project information is shown in Table 2. Approximately 48% of
control) and the dependent construct (project success) (Van
the projects were less than €1 million in cost. 96% of the projects
de Ven and Poole, 2005).
were of either medium or high urgency. 42% were executed in
matrix organizations and 21% in functional organizations.
Hence, in line with existing conventions, we tested a
3.3. Analysis methods theoretically derived causality through correlation tests at the
variable level, following Van de Ven (2007) using a variance
Analysis was carried out following the guidelines from (Hair method approach as outlined by Van de Ven and Poole
et al., 2010). Data were normally distributed (skewness and (2005).
kurtosis between of ± 2), thus eligible for the techniques used.
Eight responses were removed as outliers and because t-tests
showed that the answers from these respondents where 3.4. Validity and reliability
significantly different from the rest of the sample.
Analysis was done in three steps: Content validity was achieved by using literature-based
measurement dimensions, and face validity was tested and
1. Unrotated factor analysis on each of the three constructs ensured during the pilot. Construct validity was ensured through
(governance orientation, governance control, project success) the use of published measurement dimensions (Khan et al., 2013;
as a Harman test for possible common methods bias (Podsakoff Müller and Lecoeuvre, 2014); pilot testing of the questionnaire;
and Organ, 1986). and, quantitatively, through unrotated factor analyses. Convergent
2. Varimax rotated factor analysis (principal component analysis) and discriminant validity were tested and achieved through
with eigenvalue of 1 was used to establish the factors item-to-item and item-to-total correlations above 0.3 and 0.5,
representing each of the three constructs (Field, 2009). respectively. Reliability can be assumed with all constructs
3. Regression analysis to test the correlation between the showing Cronbach alpha values higher than 0.70 (Hair et al.,
independent constructs (governance orientation, governance 2010).
 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626 619

Table 2 data's appropriateness for this analysis (Hair et al., 2010). All
Project information. questionnaire items loaded on their respective factor and were
Characteristic N % of acceptable reliability (Cronbach alpha), see Table 3.
Duration of last project
Under six months 44 17.3 4.1. Project success
6 months to less than 1 year 67 26.4
1 to 2 years 76 29.9
The factor on project success comprises five sub-dimensions
Over 2 years 66 26.0
Total 253 99.6 (project efficiency, organizational benefits, project impact, future
Missing 1 0.4 potential, and stakeholder satisfaction). A second order factor
analysis combined these sub-dimensions into a single factor for
Level of last project complexity
Low 24 9.4
project success (KMO 0.930, p b 0.001) with high reliability
Medium 117 46.1 (Cronbach's alpha 0.923).
High 111 43.7
Total 252 99.2 4.2. Project governance
Missing 2 0.8

Value of last project The questions on governance loaded on the two respective
Under 500,000 (Euro) 85 33.5 sub-dimensions (KMO 0.812, p b 0.001), which explained 53%
500,000 to 999,999 37 14.6 of the variance in GOV orientation (shareholder–stakeholder)
1000,000 to 4,999,999 61 24.0
and GOV control (behavior–outcome). Both were reliable with
5,000,000 to 50,000,000 43 16.9
Over 50,000,000 27 10.6 Cronbach's of 0.743 and 0.802, respectively. GOVorientation
Total 253 99.6 (shareholder–stakeholder) comprised of the upper five questions
Missing 1 0.4 shown in Appendix 2 (i.e. the governance questionnaire). GOV
Urgency of last project
control (behavior–outcome) comprised of lower five questions in
Low 11 4.3 Appendix 2.
Medium 107 42.1
High 135 53.1 4.3. Correlation between project governance on project success
Total 253 99.6
Missing 1 0.4
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the variables.
Last project executed in the following organizational structure Multi-variate regression analysis was done with project success
Projectized organization 81 31.9 as the dependent variable and GOV orientation (shareholder–
Functional organization (Department) 55 21.7
stakeholder) and GOV control (behavior–outcome) as independent
Matrix organization 106 41.7
Other 11 4.3 variables.
Total 253 99.6 Table 5 shows the coefficient table.
Missing 1 0.4 A significant model (p b 0.000) with an R-square of 0.063
and no issue with multicolinearity (VIF b 2) was obtained. The
correlation between GOV orientation (shareholder–stakeholder)
No indication for possible common method bias was found, and project success was positive and significant (p b 0.001,
as a Harman test showed that all questionnaire items loaded on beta = 0.250), supporting H1.1. This constitutes a small, but
their respective factor (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). significant effect size, also known as practical significance
(Cohen, 1988). However GOV control (behavior–outcome) was
4. Data analysis and results not significantly correlated to project success at p = 0.05, which
rejects H1.2.
Varimax rotated factor analysis was used to establish the The hypothesized correlation between project governance
three constructs. Here a KMO of 0.8 (p b 0.001) indicated the and project success (H1.1) is supported through the significant

Table 3
Scale descriptives.
Measure N Mean Standard Range Original number Scale reliability Skewness Kurtosis
deviation of dimensions (alpha)
Governance
Shareholder–stakeholder 246 2.87 4.05 4.46 2 0.741 0.419 −0.462
Behavior–outcome 246 2.98 4.75 4.51 2 0.802 − 0.203 −0.617
Project success - dimensions (SA01 to SA05) 246 3.81 3.37 4.88 5 0.923 − 0.720 0.552
SA01 Project efficiency 246 3.56 0.78 3.63 1 0.913 − 0.471 −0.061
SA02 Organizational benefits 246 3.82 0.71 3.20 1 0.898 − 0.563 0.062
SA03 Project impact 246 3.95 0.79 3.75 1 0.899 − 0.985 1.192
SA04 Future potential 246 3.71 0.84 3.75 1 0.911 − 0.743 0.372
SA05 Stakeholder satisfaction 246 4.01 0.73 3.50 1 0.906 − 0.774 0.649
620 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626

stakeholder) orientation IV
Goverance (shareholder- N
GOV corp GOV corporate
correlation. Furthermore, tests with the various demographic
variables as control variables indicated no presence of spurious
variables. That fulfills the two other criteria that need to be met
before commencing a discussion on possible causality (Van de
Ven, 2007).
Subsequently an exploratory analysis was done to analyze the

1.000
nature of the relationship between GOV orientation and project
success. The five dimensions of project success (project efficiency,
GOV control goverance

organizational benefits, project impact, future potential, and

‘behavior- N outcome

stakeholder satisfaction) were regressed as dependent variables

against GOV orientation as independent variable. The results
orientation’IV

showed that GOV orientation (shareholder–stakeholder) was

.000 positively and significantly correlated with all five success
1.000

dimensions. The details are shown in Fig. 2.

The success dimension future potential has the strongest
correlation with GOV orientation (adjusted R2 = 0.063; beta
(Dimension 5)
Stakeholder
satisfaction

0.258****), whereas stakeholder satisfaction has the weakest

.162**

correlation of the five dimensions with an adjusted R2 = 0.022;

−.003
1.000
SA05

DV

beta 0.162**.
(Dimension 4)

5. Discussion
SA04 Future

.676****

.258****
potentia

1.000

−.011

The two independent constructs GOV orientation (shareholder–

DV

stakeholder) and GOV control (behavior–outcome) were tested

on their relationship with project success. Only GOV orientation
(Dimension 3
SA03 Project

(shareholder–stakeholder) is significantly correlated to project

.204****
.696****
.755****

success, where 6.3% of the variation in project success can be

impact

1.000

.015

explained by the governance position along the shareholder–

DV

stakeholder continuum. With a beta of 0.25 (p b 0.001) an

Organizational

(Dimension 2)

increase in stakeholder orientation correlates with an increase in

.763****
.778****
.716****

.236****

project success. The results are consistent with the findings of

benefits

Joslin and Müller (2015) who showed that organizations that are
SA02

1.000

.015
DV

more stakeholder-oriented have greater chances of success in

applying the relevant methodology elements or parts in their
(Dimension 1)
SA01 Project

projects. The results also support findings in IT projects, where

.680****
.689****
.717****
.627****

.237****
efficiency

governance takes a mediating role between project hazards and

.006
1.000

success, by directly influencing project success (Wang and Chen,

DV

2006). Finally, the results give quantitative support to the

qualitative study by Bekker and Steyn (2008), whose inter-
Project sucess
(5 combined
dimensions)

viewees predicted such a relationship. Surprisingly, the second

.902****

.250****
.845****

.899****
.861****
.873****

independent construct, GOV control (behavior–outcome) orien-

.007
1.000

tation, does not correlate with project success. In line with

DV

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.005; ****p ≤ 0.001.

the literature cited above, this is indicative of a situational

SA05 Stakeholder satisfaction (Dimension 5) - DV

contingency of control structures in that organizations where

SA02 Organizational benefits (Dimension 2) - DV

governance is more behavior-control oriented do not necessarily

(shareholder- N stakeholder) orientation IV
Project sucess (5 combined dimensions - DV
SA01 Project efficiency (Dimension 1) - DV

SA04 Future potential (Dimension 4) - DV

achieve higher rates of project success than organizations that are

SA03 Project impact (Dimension 3) - DV

outcome-oriented.
GOV corp GOV corporate goverance
GOV control goverance ‘behavior- N

The finding challenges the governance aspects of frame-

works such as the Carnegie Mellon University's Capability
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), or the governance
outcome orientation’ IV

process/outcome orientation behind the Project Management

Institute's Organizational Project Management Maturity Model
Correlation matrix.

(OPM3®) (PMI, 2013c) where the premise is that a stronger

process control leads to better organizational results. Along this
line, Yazici (2009) showed that maturity models have only
Table 4

helped to improve project success on a repeatable basis in

certain organizational cultures. Using the competing values
 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626 621

Table 5
Coefficients table.
Coefficients
Model Unstandardized Standardized t Sig. Correlations Collinearity
coefficients coefficients statistics
B Std. Error beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 5,115E-16 ,062 ,000 1000
GOV control Governance ‘control - N ,007 ,062 ,007 ,111 ,912 ,007 ,007 ,007 1000 1000
behavior’ orientation
GOV corp GOV corporate governance ,250 ,062 ,250 4024 ,000 ,250 ,250 ,250 1000 1000
(share- N stake holder) orientation
a. Dependent variable: Project sucess REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1.

framework (Cameron and Quinn, 2006), Yazici demonstrated that
the clan culture, which represents the importance of stakeholder
participation, cohesion, shared values, and commitment is the
model most linked to project success. This underpins stewardship
theory, which proposes that the behavior of individuals in
organizations is aligned and supportive to the organizational and
collectivistic goals instead of individualistic and self-serving
goals. Project managers (agents) are tasked with complex projects
and need to get things done, therefore flexibility and trust is
required from their principle (Turner and Müller, 2004).
Referring to Fig. 2, the success dimension “future potential”
that relate to enabling, motivating and improving an organization's
capability to undertake future project work, is the dimension
most strongly correlated with the governance orientation. This is
supported by the notion that stakeholder orientation is underpinned
by balancing the requirements of several stakeholder groups
simultaneously, instead of shareholders only (such the share-
holders of a project delivery organization), which is the basis for
long lasting business relationships, as outlined in Donaldson and
Preston's (1995) thesis that “corporations practicing stakeholder
management will, other things being equal, be relatively successful
in conventional performance terms (profitability, stability, growth,
etc.)”. This also applies to the other four success dimensions,
namely organizational benefits, project efficiency, project impact
and stakeholder satisfaction, which are all part of conventional
performance measures at both project and corporate level. In
summary, all five project success dimensions are positively
correlated in varying degrees by a stakeholder orientation in
project governance.
6. Conclusions
This study empirically investigated the relationship of project
governance and project success. A deductive approach tested a
theoretically derived research model. Two theoretical lenses were
used in the study: agency theory and stewardship theory. The data
were collected through a web-based questionnaire with 246
respondents from 11 industries evenly distributed across North
America, Europe, and Australasia. The research question can
now be answered: project governance has a small, but significant
correlation with project success. Hypothesis 1 is partly supported
as one of the two governance dimensions correlates project
success. H1.1 is supported because the stakeholder orientation in
governance correlates positively with project success. Approxi-
mately 6.3% of the variation of project success correlates with the
stakeholder-orientation of the governance structure. The section

Fig. 2. Independent variable (GOV orientation) impact on the five dimensions of project success.
622 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626
on theoretical implications below outlines some of the contin-
gencies under which this correlation might be assumed to become
causal in nature, that is, the underlying assumptions that need to
be met and held constant for assuming that success is to some
extent dependent on project governance. H1.2 is not supported,
as the governance control orientation (behavior–outcome) does
not correlate with project success.
This study's results indicate the importance of understanding
the governance orientation of the organization governing projects
and the potential enabling effect of a stakeholder-orientation in
project governance for project success. Yazici (2009) found that
culture impacts project success; organizations that are more
stakeholder-participative, cohesive, and have shared values and
commitment are most likely to achieve project success.
Stakeholder-oriented organizations that have shared values
suggest stewardship relationships are in place. However, this
can only occur when the necessary situational factors and
structures are present, including individuals with the appropriate
psychological profiles (Toivonen and Toivonen, 2014). When
there is a change of culture in the organization due to external
pressures, for example, a push for short-term benefits, where
management trust turns into excessive control will lead to agency
tendencies (Clases et al., 2003). Determining the appropriate
governance structures should take into consideration the
implications resulting from agency and stewardship perspectives
towards governance and the implications stated below.
6.1. Practical implications
Managers influencing the design of project governance should
be aware of the importance of a stakeholder orientation for
project success. This should be included in training programs for
these managers, at industry as well as academic level. This
includes courses in (project) governance, mid and higher level
management trainings, organizational design courses etc.
Simultaneously managers should be aware that control
structures that foster behavior or outcome control, do not correlate
of impact project success on a global basis, but may do so in the
particular circumstances of their projects.
Recruitment managers should understand the personality
traits of project managers and their governors to ensure that
their personalities are aligned to a stewardship role within the
project governance environment.
Project managers should understand the organization's
governance procedures and work with the authority that defines
project governance procedures to tailor the procedures to the
project environment and/or project type.
6.2. Theoretical implications
In this section we discuss the conditions for assuming a causal
relationship between project governance (as cause, i.e. independent
variable) and project success (as effect, i.e. dependent variable).
Throughout the paper we have listed the most often used
“conditions researcher look for in testing cause and effect
relationships” (Hair et al., 2010), as stated for example Hair et al.
(2010) and supported by Van de Ven and Poole (2005) and John
Stuart Mills:
1. Time sequence – the cause must occur before the effect.
2. Covariance – a change in the hypothesized independent
variable is associated with a change in the dependent variable.
3. Non-spurious associations – the relationship is not due to
other variables that may affect cause and effect.
4. Theoretical support – a logical explanation for the relationship.
The cross sectional design has supported testing conditions 2
and 3. Thus, we have shown that covariance exists (condition
2) in form of a significant correlation between the variables. We
have also tested for non-spurious associations (condition 3) by
controlling several variables in the regressions. However, the
cross-sectional design of the research does not allow to test
whether the cause (the existence of a governance structure)
precedes the effect (project success). To assume causality, the
governance structure must be established before a project is
chosen. This may be the case in organizations that do not adjust
their governance structures to the type and size of projects they
take on. However, in many cases it is likely that governance
structures are chosen based on the project type. The latter is
supported, among others, by transaction costs economics
(Williamson, 1979), which claims that governance structures
are established contingent on the specificity of the transaction's
(i.e. the project's) outcome, its general risk, and its frequency.
This view contrasts with, for example, Bekker and Steyn's (2008)
qualitative (i.e. opinion-based) findings that project governance
impacts project success. To that end we do not find clear evidence
for condition 1.
In terms of testing for condition 4 we have shown in the
literature review section that published research on governance
often assumes and tests for a causal relationship between
governance and organizational success. The importance of
stakeholder management in projects echoes the results that
stakeholder orientation in governance correlates with better
project results. However, in line with the paragraph above, we
cannot rule out alternative explanations. These include the
possibility that projects with higher risk levels are governed more
rigorous than those with lower risk levels, that is, with more
shareholder orientation and from agency theory perspective, in
contrast to less rigorous and stewardship driven governance for
lower risk projects. Support for this is indicated by Klakegg et al.,
(2008) and Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014), who showed that larger
projects, such as public investment projects, are subject to stricter
governance approaches than smaller projects. If lower risk projects
fail less often than higher risk projects, then the correlation
between stakeholder orientation and project success is impacted
by the spurious variable project risk, which was not tested in this
study.
Hence, we cannot claim causality. A limited causality may be
assumed when the following conditions exist: (1) the governance
structure exists before a project is chosen, (2) the governance
structure is independent of the project type, size and risk, and
(3) the governance structure does not change during the course of
the project. This should be tested through future research.
 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626 623

Stewardship theory, which is operationalized in this study as
the combination of stakeholder oriented governance and outcome-
oriented control in project governance, was shown to be an
appropriate lens for assessing project governance. The findings
provide evidence for a generalization to a theory (in the sense of
Yin, 2009) in respect of stewardship theory's applicability for
project settings, and a generalization to the wider population of
projects and their governance. Stewardship theory and stakeholder
theory are recommended as theoretical lenses for the development
and implementation of project governance structures.
Simultaneously, the study shows some of the limitations of
existing agency theory approaches, especially shareholder theory
driven approaches to governance. Agency theory was operation-
alized in this study as the combination of shareholder orientation
and behavior control, which relies merely on unilateral return on
investment thinking and control as governance principle. The
study's results show that these approaches are limited in their
likelihood to predict project results.
The implications for developing a broader theory of project
governance is that a shareholder or stakeholder orientation in
project governance is required to be implemented in a way that
allows it to flourish within a corporate governance structure which
may or may not be supportive of it, without creating conflicts or
friction points. To do that, further research is required to identify
the interfaces between project and corporate governance, which
can then be used to adapt the two levels of governance to each
other.
6.3. Strengths and limitations
The strength of the study include the use of tested and
validated measurement constructs. Another strength lies in the
well balanced sample covering the three main regions of the world,
and respondents who are professionals engaged in professional
organizations, which led to better responses, because these
individuals are interested in their profession over and above their
employer demands.
The use of professional associations such as IPMA and PMI for
distribution of the questionnaire limited the pool of respondents to
only their members. A further limitation of the study was the use
of one particular governance model. Other governance models
should be used for similar analyses to get a more holistic picture of
the relationship between governance and success.
6.4. Further research
In addition to the suggestions above, we suggest that future
research should address the nature of the link between project
success dimensions and project governance, and possible
moderator or mediator effects that influence this relationship.
Further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to
investigate whether project governance orientation structures
optimized for project success can exist and thrive throughout an
organization and under what conditions, even though the main
organization's governance orientation may be different.
Process studies such as those suggested by Langley et al.
(2013) are recommended in order to understand the temporal
nature of the elements of project governance, their relation-
ships, and the variations across project life-cycle stages.
Moreover future research should investigate the impact of
the governance paradigms on the governance of projects at the
program and project portfolio level, and if different, provide
insights as to which paradigm(s) are the most correlated to
program and project portfolio success?
The study's contribution to knowledge lies in its clarification
of a correlation between different project governance approaches
and project success. To that end we have provided the ground for
further studies on causality and its direction in order to investigate
the role of governance as a success factor in projects.

Appendix 1. Project success questions

The following success-related questions were asked regarding the last project:

Project success achieved

My last project was successful in terms of
Not successful Slightly successful Moderately successful Highly successful Very highly successful
Completed according to the specification ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Supplier satisfied ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Enabling of other project work in future ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Project achieved a high national profile ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Yielded business and other benefits ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Met client's requirement ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Minimum disruption to organization ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Cost effectiveness of work ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Met planned quality standard ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Adhered to defined procedures ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Learned from project ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Smooth handover of project outputs ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Resources mobilized and used as planned ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Improvement in organizational capability ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
624 R. Joslin, R. Müller / International Journal of Project Management 34 (2016) 613–626

Appendix 1 (continued)
Project success achieved
My last project was successful in terms of
Not successful Slightly successful Moderately successful Highly successful Very highly successful
Met safety standards ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Minimum number of agreed scope changes ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Motivated for future projects ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Project's impacts on beneficiaries are visible ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Project achieved its purpose ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Project has good reputation ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Finished on time ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
New understanding/knowledge gained ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Steering group satisfaction ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Complied with environmental regulations ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
End-user satisfaction ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Project team satisfaction ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Activities carried out as scheduled ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Finished within budget ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Sponsor satisfaction ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
End product used as planned ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Personal financial rewards ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Met organizational objectives ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
The project satisfies the needs of users ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯
Personal nonfinancial rewards ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯ ◯

Appendix 2. Project success questions

Questionnaire for assessing corporate govern ace orientation and organizational control orientation (Müller and Lecoeuvre, 2014).

In my organization
…decisions are made in the best interest of the shareholders and
owners of the organization and their return on investment (RoI)
…the remuneration system includes stock-options for employees
and similar incentives that foster shareholder RoI thinking
…prevails an image that profitability determines the legitimacy
of actions (including projects)
…I am sometimes asked to sacrifice stakeholder satisfaction
for the achievement of financial objectives
…the long term objective is to maximize value for the owners
of the organization
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …decisions are made in the best interest of the wider stakeholder community
(including shareholder, employees, local communities etc.)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …the remuneration system provides incentives for community, environmental,
humanitarian or other non-profit activities outside and/or inside the organization
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …prevails an image that wider social and ethical interests determine the
legitimacy of actions (including projects)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …I am sometimes asked to sacrifice the achievement of financial objectives for
improvement of stakeholder satisfaction
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …the long term objective is to maximize value for society

The management philosophy in my organization favors…

…a strong emphasis on always getting personnel to follow the
formally laid down procedures
…tight formal control of most operations by means of
sophisticated control and information systems
…a strong emphasis on getting personnel to adhere closely to
formal job descriptions
…support institutions (like a PMO) should ensure compliance
with the organization's project management methodology
…prioritization of methodology compliance over people's
own experiences in doing their work
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …a strong emphasis on getting things done even if it means disregarding formal
procedures
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …loose, informal control; heavy dependence on informal relationships and the
norm of cooperation for getting things done
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …a strong emphasis to let the requirements of the situation and the individual's
personality define proper on-job behavior
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …support institutions (like a PMO) should collect performance data in order to
identify skills and knowledge gaps
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …prioritization of people's own experiences in doing their work over methodology
compliance

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